Impact of EU 2020 on Flemish Governance Structures

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Abstract

Europe 2020 is the growth agenda of the EU and is part of the European Semester, a monitoring framework mainly focused on the budgetary policies of its Member States. On the European level, objectives are installed for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Most of these objectives fall within the competences of the Member States. Some of these Member States are highly decentralized and therefore some of the Europe 2020 objectives fall within subnational competences.

This paper presents a research design, which aims at evaluating the impact of Europe 2020 on national and regional governance. The research design will be applied on the governance structures in the policy domains education, poverty and energy for Flanders, Catalonia, Scotland, Denmark and Finland. Data will be analyzed by using a social and political network approach and Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

In this paper I present a strategy to analyze, systematically and in detail, national and subnational governance structures that deal with Europe 2020. Therefore a social network analysis is applied which maps the relations between all actors involved, while a political network analysis envisages insights such as accountability and evaluation mechanisms.

The research design is based on literature on governmental organization and coordination mechanisms in order to map and describe the governance structures (the dependent variable) and on rational and sociological institutionalism drawn from Europeanization literature to explain variation between the governance structures (the independent variables).

Keywords: Europe 2020, governance structures, coordination mechanisms, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Social Network Analysis

Introduction

Regions, EU Member States and the EU itself are all confronted with major social-economic, budgetary and fiscal challenges. The public debt crisis, the euro-zone upheaval and the reform of the national and regional economies dominate the agenda of regional, national and European level officials and politicians. The EU has substantial tools at its disposal to fight the crisis and to guide necessary reforms such as the Europe 2020 strategy.

Europe 2020 is the successor of the Lisbon Strategy and defines key objectives that Member States need to incorporate in their national policies by means of the so-called European Semester. Besides the objectives, the commission called for increasing the ownership Europe 2020 among stakeholders.
on various levels. Hence the Member State level is a crucial player in the formulation and implementation of the EU’s economic policies. However, in federal and highly decentralized Member States which have granted regional entities substantial competencies in economic policies, the response to EU economic policies necessarily also involves the participation of both national and regional authorities. So how do those national and regional authorities deal with the objectives and how do they try to increase ownership among their stakeholders?

This paper fits into a larger project that aims to map the impact of Europe 2020 by analyzing how national and subnational authorities deal with this strategy and by identifying the consequences of the different aspects of the Europe 2020 strategy for the organization of national and subnational policy-making. I hereby focus on two distinct types of organization. The first is the hierarchical model with the primary goal of achieving objectives, while the second, the network model, focuses around a widespread ownership among all relevant stakeholders. Besides the academic relevance of the research, this project is embedded in the Flemish ‘Policy Research Centre - Governmental Organization’, financed by the Flemish government for a time span of 4 years.

In this paper we introduce our research strategy: we will present the case-selection, the conceptualization and operationalization of the independent and dependent variables and some methodological reflections. The paper therefor proceeds as follows: we first contextualize the European context and. Next, we elaborate upon the research questions and selection of the cases. The core of the paper deals with the operationalization of the variables and the research hypotheses. Finally, will we conclude with some methodological issues.

Context

A. The European Semester

The predecessor of the Europe 2020, the Lisbon Strategy, deemed to be unsuccessful very soon in the process. In 2005 the EGMONT think tank already proclaimed that the Lisbon Strategy, which had yet five years to go, was already a failure (Zgajewski, T. and Hajjar, K., 2005). Later in time, also politicians became negative orientated towards the success of the Lisbon Strategy. In 2009 the Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt stated: "Even if progress has been made it must be said that the Lisbon Agenda, with only a year remaining before it is to be evaluated, has been a failure.". Many reasons for the failure of the Lisbon Strategy exist, but one of the most essential in the world of politics was the absence of any binding character. Having drawn lessons from this experience, the EU decided on a more stringent growth agenda. The impact of Europe 2020 on Member States might be more successful because the evaluation of the progress towards the Europe 2020 objectives is carried out in the framework of the European Semester. Hence I outline briefly how this framework functions.

With the European Semester, the Commission is empowered to monitor both the economic situation and the main policies within Member States and the EU as a whole and to take action when things get out of control. Concerning the economic situation, the rules that are agreed upon in the Stability and Growth Pack, complemented by the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack aim at fostering stability and convergence of the Member States’ economic situation. In addition there is also the Euro+ Pact and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. These
two agreements initially were only applicable on the Eurozone Member States, nonetheless some EU Member States did voluntarily join those agreements.

Besides those agreements that focus on macro-economic stability and convergence, the Commission and the Member States also agreed on policy objectives that have to insure a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions and reducing poverty. In the Euro+ Pact, some likewise objectives are agreed upon between the Eurozone Member States, but it is Europe 2020 that includes all Member States.

The stability and convergence agreements are monitored together with the growth pacts by the Commission. This monitoring takes place in the European Semester. In figure 1 I provide an overview of the entanglement of the stability and convergence agreements and the growth pact Europe 2020 in the context of the European Semester.
Figure 1: The entanglement of reform strategies and stability and convergence programs
B. Europe 2020

With the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU strives for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. These three priorities are put forward in order to ensure a high level of employment, productivity and social cohesion in the EU as a whole as well as in the Member States themselves. Each priority is based on several underlying domains as indicated in table 1. The first priority, smart growth, includes a cluster of policies in education, research and development and a digital society. In this cluster the focus lies on knowledge and the transfer of knowledge. The second priority, sustainable growth is based on a cluster that is characterized by two distinct approaches. The first approach entails the development of new ‘green’ technologies and smart electricity grids in support of a low-carbon economy and the preservation of the environment. The second approach departs from a market-oriented sustainability with the purpose to provide networks on the European level that are entitled to assist the consumers as well as the producers in making appropriate choices. Finally, the third priority, inclusive growth, has to ensure a high degree of employment in order to guarantee economic, social and territorial cohesion by investing in work experience and training, modernizing the labor market and the welfare state and by ensuring that the advantages of economic growth reach the farthest corners.

Table 1: the priorities of Europe 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe 2020</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Smart Growth</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainable Growth</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A digital agenda for Europe</td>
<td>- Resource efficient Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- An innovation union</td>
<td>- An industrial policy for the globalization era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Youth on the move</td>
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</table>


At the end of each year, the Commission presents a growth survey. This growth survey focuses on macro-economic evolutions and the progress of the Member States and the EU as a whole in the Europe 2020 strategy. On basis of these evaluations, the Commission takes up priorities for Member States to adjust their policies. Although the Commission drafts those priorities, it is the European Council that adds the finishing touches. In March, the European Council forwards the priorities to the Member States. The latter are supposed to process the priorities in their NRP’s and SCP’s. The Member States present their draft programs to the Commission by the end of April and these programs are assessed by the Commission who then work out the country-specific recommendations. Thereafter the Council of the European Union and especially ECOFIN adjust those recommendations. In June, the country-specific recommendations undergo a final adaption by the European Council. The European Semester halts here and is succeeded by the ‘National Semester” in which national governments presents their budgets and policy agenda to the national parliaments, after which the implementation finally can kick-off.

Although it is expected from the Member States that they adopt the priorities and recommendations in their draft budget and long-term policy plans, they might have reasons to refuse such an adoption. Therefore and in case of non-compliance, the Commission can issue warnings. Albeit these warnings, the Commission can only enforce the adoption of priorities and recommendations in case of excessive macro-economic or budgetary imbalances. Nonetheless, the absence of enforcement
mechanisms doesn’t exclude that member states and regions will act on Europe 2020. Moreover some regions and member states, such as France, repeatedly called for growth enhancing measures in addition to more flexible austerity measure as a tool to tackle the financial and public debt crisis. Finally, in march of 2013, a EU summit took place to discuss growth and jobs. Hence that, despite the failure of the Lisbon strategy, the Europe 2020 strategy enjoys a considerable momentum.

Research Questions

Although the conception and decision-taking of Europe 2020 policies is predominantly in the hands of various European level institutions (Commission, Parliament, Council, European Council), also Member States have a major role to play, both in the acts of policy preparation and policy implementation. This means that in federal and highly decentralized Member States, not only the national but also the regional level will be challenged and affected by these policies. Those regional levels will also be involved in the day-to-day implementation of policy measures and programs initiated at the European level. Hence, it is of major importance that regions invest in various venues, to organize themselves efficiently, and to comply with EU policies.

Academic attention for the impact of European integration upon subnational authorities is more recent and has until now failed to deliver univocal conclusions (Bursens 2012). With respect to subnational policies, the scarce literature suggests that subnational authorities implement EU legislation in diverse ways according to the varying national contexts (Sturm and Dieringer 2005, Borghetto and Franchino 2010). The work on the politics dimension mainly discusses the impact on EU policy coordination mechanisms (Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000, Wessels, Maurer and Mittag, 2003, Zeff and Pirro 2006), domestic horizontal and vertical relations and actors’ preferences and strategies. Empirical research in the latter so far has found limited but differential impact, mediated by domestic institutions (Dyson and Goetz 2003; Bache 2008).

Clearly the problematique of Europe 2020 is an outstanding case of the increasing complexity in terms of layers that confront the national and regional public sector. With Europeanization of politics and policies as starting point, the core objective of the project is (1) to map the impact of Europe 2020 upon the governmental organization and policy content of national and subnational authorities and (2) to account for variation in the adaptation to the European requirements. Hence the descriptive and explanatory research questions are the following: What kind of governance structures do subnational authorities introduce in order to participate in and comply with the Europe 2020 ambitions? And how can we account for the variation in governance structures between various subnational authorities?

Case selection: policy domains and Member States / regions

A. The selection of the policy domains

The idea behind Europe 2020 is based on the three priorities for growth, namely a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. In order to capture the impact of Europe 2020, I will select policy domains that reflect those three priorities. These priorities, however, exist out of flagship initiatives, targets and
benchmarks and integrated guidelines. The relation between (1) the priorities, (2) the flagship initiatives, (3) the targets and benchmarks and (4) the integrated guidelines is described in figure 2.

With respect to the three priorities, I use the integrated guidelines as basis for the selection of the policy domains. I do this firstly because the flagship initiatives are very broad topics and in some cases they lack unambiguous content and secondly because it is not the aim of this research to evaluate the progress on the targets nor do I try to compare regions and member states on their current position vis-à-vis the targets. Hence the level of the integrated guidelines is most appropriate to serve as analytical level on which cases will be selected. In table three I present the policy domains that are related to the three priorities and the integrated guidelines of Europe 2020.

Table 3: case selection of policy domains

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Integrated Guideline</th>
<th>Policy Domain</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Smart growth</td>
<td>Improving the performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing participation in tertiary education</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable growth</td>
<td>Improving resource efficiency and reducing greenhouse gases</td>
<td>Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive growth</td>
<td>Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. The selection of regions and Member States

Since the aim of this research is to map the impact of Europe 2020 on governance structures, I selected regions that have developed a strategy on Europe 2020. This strategy is reflected in official documents such as the NRP’s. Besides comparing regions with one another, it is useful to compare them with some Member States. These comparisons might give some insights of how homogeneity of competences affects governance in a certain policy domain. Furthermore the case selection (especially those of the Member States) is based on the similarity in size in terms of GDP per capita and the population. By doing this, I account for a similar socio-economic status when being confronted with Europe 2020. Regions and Member States that meet these criteria are: Flanders, Scotland, Catalonia, Denmark and Finland.
Figure 2: Europe 2020

EUROPA 2020

SMART

DIGITAL AGENDA FOR EUROPE
INNOVATION UNION
YOUTH ON THE MOVE

INCLUSIVE

AN AGENDA FOR NEW SKILLS AND JOBS
EUROPEAN PLATFORM AGAINST POVERTY

SUSTAINABLE

RESOURCE EFFICIENT EUROPE
AN INDUSTRIAL POLICY FOR THE GLOBALISATION ERA

FLAGSHIPS

THEMES

R&D

EDUCATION & EMPLOYMENT

POVERTY

CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY

EUROPEAN TARGETS

3% of the EU’s GDP to be invested in R&D

at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion

75% of the 20-64 year-olds to be employed

Reducing school drop-out rates below 10%

at least 40% of 30-34 year-olds completing third level education

NATIONAL TARGETS

DEViation FROM THE EUROPEAN TARGETS BECAUSE OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE MEMBER STATES

INTEGRATED GUIDELINES

Optimising support for R&D and innovation, strengthening the knowledge triangle and unleashing the potential of the digital economy

Improving the business and consumer environment and modernising the industrial base

Improving the performance of education and training systems at all levels and increasing participation in tertiary education

Developing a skilled workforce responding to labour market needs, promoting job quality and lifelong learning

Increasing labour market participation and reducing structural unemployment

Promoting social inclusion and combating poverty

Improving resource efficiency and reducing greenhouse gases emissions
Operationalization

In order to map the governance structures, I will use a social network analysis (SNA). The SNA will be combined with a political network analysis to determine the type of coordination mechanism that is applied in the governance structures.

First, governance structures will be grasped in terms of coordination mechanisms. Newman (2001) describes governance as a mechanism for solving common problems on various levels. More specifically, governance structure is about coordination mechanisms that settle decision-making and implementation between actors by allocating tasks and resources among those actors (Carver, 2000; Kooiman, 1993; Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998). The most prominent actors in governance structures are those from the political and administrative sphere and the interest groups. The way those actors interact can be defined in terms of coordination mechanisms.

Three types of coordination mechanisms are frequently discussed in the literature. They are defined as hierarchy, market and network models. For this research, I focus only on the hierarchy and network model. Market will be left out because of a conceptual and a methodological issue. The conceptual issue deals with the dual nature of the Europe 2020 strategy. Is Europe 2020 about reaching the objectives or is it about increasing ownership of Europe 2020 among all relevant stakeholders. The hierarchical and the network model of governance structures can be closely linked with this dual nature as the first is pinpointed to the objectives while the second is strongly related to the idea of a widespread ownership. The second issue is a methodological one. Here I leave market out because of the complexity it would add to the output rendered by the SNA. Using only the hierarchy and the network model, these two diametrically opposing models give the opportunity to point the output of each case on one scale e.g. from ‘very hierarchical’ toward ‘strong network’. Including the market model would create a triangular relationship and thereby creating more fuzziness when envisaging and interpreting the output.

Next, in order to determine whether a governance structures is organized accordingly to a network or a hierarchy, I first need to know who is involved and how the involved actors relate to each other. Social network analysis is a method in itself for capturing the complexity of social relationships by visualizing the set of actors involved and the relations between those actors (Hawea and Ghali, 2008). Furthermore, social network analysis generate interesting insights in the overall functioning of the network. Despite these insights, social network analysis is a broad tool that is applicable to actors in the economic, political and societal field and remains therefore too general.

So, as this research is about governance structures, political insights into the network analysis (PNA) will be used to make the network data relevant for my research questions. Political network analysis counters the disadvantage of the social network analysis of being to general. PNA provides a closer look of actors and their relations by taking into account the power relations role in the governance structure. Furthermore I will account for the control that is exerted, to what extent evaluations and methods of capacity building take place and finally I focus on the accountability in the governance structure.

On the side of the independent variables rational and sociological institutionalism are expected to explain variation in the type of governance structures, defined as coordination mechanisms, between policy domains, and regions and Member States. These independent variables are translated to hypotheses to put the impact of Europe 2020 to the test.
Before discussing the variables and the hypotheses, we need to point out the levels in which policies are developed and implemented. Spanhove and Verhoest (2007) formulated three levels:

- Macro: the level on which the whole administrative system operates controlled by the government and its cabinets
- Meso: the level of a policy sector controlled by the minister of the policy domain
- Micro: the level of a single public or private sector organization.

We will only focus on the macro and meso level. I do so, firstly because these levels are most adequate to approach governance structures as a whole. In addition, the lower the level, the more intervening factors that are present when analyzing governance structures. Therefore the micro level is not the most appropriate level when doing research on the impact of Europe 2020 on the Flemish governance structures.

A. The dependent variable: hierarchy vs network

1) Coordination Mechanisms

Coordination mechanisms provide an ideal framework for the analysis of governance structures as they describe the way in which actors in a governance structure act and deal with each other. In the literature two types of coordination mechanisms are regular mentioned. They are defined as a hierarchy and network type of model. The two types of coordination mechanisms are strictly distinguished in theory. In practice however, governance structures do sometimes entail a mix of coordination mechanisms. In line with Beuselinck, Bouckaert, Meyers, Peters and Verhoest (2005) I picture 4 key characteristics for each coordination mechanism, shown in table 3. So in order to identify the type of coordination mechanisms applied in a governance structure, I need to gather data on those characteristics.

Table 3: Key characteristics of coordination mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Based on authority</td>
<td>Based on collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>Well-considered developed and</td>
<td>Not explicit developed or spontaneous obtained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extent of flexibility</td>
<td>Low flexibility – actors are</td>
<td>High commitment and average flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>steered by clear rules -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>standardized functioning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control and evaluation</td>
<td>Routines, supervision and top-</td>
<td>Consensus, shared norms and values, mutual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>down norms and codes of conduct</td>
<td>trust, joint problem analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

But first, these 4 key characteristics need to be operationalized in order to collect data. To do this, I use a social network analysis so I can visually map the structures that are present and that deal with Europe 2020. In addition I include some political-organizational insights in order to give the structures the governance dimension that they need. Thus the SNA on the one hand is mainly focused on the amount of relations between actors and the position of the actor in the governance
structure due to those relations. The political insights into the network analysis (PNA) on the other is rather about the content of those relations, such as power relations, control, monitoring and accountability. The combination of both approaches allows me to address the basis of interaction, goals, flexibility and planning and evaluation. Now I firstly discuss social and political network analysis, after which I point out the way in which I will transpose the results on those two approaches into the 4 key characteristics.

2) Social network analysis

Actors and their relations

A social network can be defined as: “a specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behavior of the persons involved.” (Mitchell, 1969)

First, actors that operate within the boundaries of my research (the 3 policy domains and the macro and meso level) have to be identified as nodes. Thereby I leave out the micro level and thus the individual level of analysis, as argued before. Actors which are active on the macro and meso level range from ministers and their cabinets, to agencies and stakeholders. Secondly, the interaction between the actors will be captured as ties between the nodes.

After having identified and captured the nodes and their ties by using a survey, I can start with measuring indicators. However, using a social network analysis, one could measure a huge amount of indicators. I have selected only a few indicators that can explain best the coordination mechanisms which are used in governance structures.

I have selected two indicators of which both indicate the type of coordination mechanism applied in the governance structure, while one indicator also gives information on the position of an actor in the governance structure and consequently the potential power of that actor. The first indicator is density. Density is a basic index in SNA and reflects the proportion of ties in respect to the total amount of ties possible. Hierarchy and network types of governance structures differ strongly in their density. While a strict hierarchical structure entails only relations that are necessary to make informed-based decisions and to steer the actors’ functioning, network type of structures do not entail such a necessity-based relational structure. On the contrary, networks are open structures in the sense that it allows actors to share their information and best-practices with anyone that is interested. The second indicator measures the degree of centralization. The extent to which a governance structure is centralized can be determined by several approaches drawn from SNA. I opt for applying the flow betweenness centrality for two reasons. First, this indicator departs from the actor level by stating that an actor has a positional advantage (influence) to the extent that the actor is located on the ties between other pairs of actors. Secondly, the indicator provides an aggregate of all actors’ scores on the flow betweenness centrality. This aggregation allows me to determine the degree of centralization in the governance structure as a whole. The level of centralization is typically high in hierarchies where one or a few actors requires most of the information to make up a decision and to give instructions to other actors of how they should act. In networks the extent of centralization is extremely low since information is available for all actors and problems as well as how they will be approached are collectively defined. Thus, these two indicators, density and flow betweenness centrality, render me some basic insights about the actor constellation in the governance structures and the coordination mechanisms that is used.
**Outcome categories:**
The output on the indicator density is obtained by dividing the number of actual ties in the governance structure by the total number that is possible. If there are N actors present, the total number of ties possible is \( n*(n-1)/2 \). The score on the indicator varies from 0 to 1, and 1 is the most dense a governance structure can be. In addition the intensity of the relations can be considered as well in the calculation of density.

Regarding the flow betweenness centrality, the calculation is more complex. The logic behind this indicator is similar to the betweenness centrality, in which an actor has influence to the extent that the actor is located on the shortest pathway between other pairs of actors. When measuring the flow betweenness centrality, all pathways are included to determine the potential of influence derived from a locational advantage. By including all pathways instead of only the shortest, the indicator has a more realistic approach since longer pathways can be used to circumvent the positional advantage of an actor. The score on the indicator on aggregated level (the centrality of the governance structure) varies is expressed in percent, and 100% refers to a very centralized governance structure.

Before these indicators can be used, I need data on the governance structures. Therefore I will first map the actors that are present in the governance structure, after which data can be collected via questionnaires and surveys. Data will be focused on the type of the relationship between actors and the frequency to which these relations are used. Actors can indicate their relations with other actors and its intensity as being organized on communication, coordination or cooperation. Communication is defined via exchange of messages and information (König, 2003). Coordination on its turn is specified via management of individuals, their activities and resources (Schewe and Thalheim) in the pursuit of common goals or interest. Cooperation is similar to coordination as it is focused on the pursuit of common goals, however, cooperation is more strict since actors act together in a shared space. After having identified the type of relations, the actors will be asked how frequent act in the context of that relation. Frequency varies from daily, weekly, monthly to yearly.

Next I present a political network analysis to discuss more in-depth characteristics of a governance structure. I bring in some key aspect of political network analysis in order to assess the involvement of the actors and their relations. The key aspects that I refer to are: power distribution and relations, legitimacy and policy learning.

### 3) Political insights into the network analysis

#### A) Power relations

One way of understanding the distribution of power in a governance structure is by looking for the power relations. In this paper, I distinguish two types of direction that characterize power relations. The first type is described by Spanhove and Verhoest (2007) and includes three types of relations between the actors: a horizontal relation, e.g. administration vs. administration, a vertical relation, e.g. politics vs. administration in one policy domain, and a diagonal relation, e.g. administration vs. politics in cross-cutting policy domains. The second type deals solely with the top-down and bottom-up interaction with respect to decisions and the flow information. Take note that top-down and bottom-up interaction can only take place in the vertical and diagonal categories. Since those two categories of direction gives some indications on the kind of interaction and the way goals are installed, both will be checked for in case of the exchange of information, advise and decisions.
The link between power relations and the type of governance structure is straightforward. The more horizontal ties in a governance structure, the more that interaction is based on collaboration instead of authority and the more goals arise spontaneous instead of strictly organized. The same is true for bottom-up interaction, while the opposite goes for top-down and vertical relations. Concerning diagonal relations, the link between power relations and the type of governance structure is less clear, since diagonal relations can be understood as a shortcut between first a horizontal relations and afterwards a vertical relation or vice versa.

**Outcome categories:**

The direction of interaction between actors is important for understanding the way goals are agreed on and the type of interaction that is used on the level of the governance structure. Therefore I will consider the flow of information, advices and decisions between actors. In a hierarchy structure most of the relations are vertical and top-down organized, whereas in networks the proportion of horizontal relations prevails. The ties are already identified by the social network analysis. The next step is to characterize these ties as being horizontal, vertical and diagonal forms of interaction. This can be done first via a simple distinction between the government, the administration and interest groups. And secondly via organograms, since the administration is not a unitary actor. Furthermore and with regard to vertical and diagonal interaction, I need to specify the use of bottom-up and top-down interaction. At the end I will consider the proportion of horizontal, vertical and diagonal interaction and the proportion of top-down to bottom-up interaction to determine the way goals are installed and the type of interaction that is used in the context of the coordination mechanisms.

**B) Control**

Control instruments take a central position in analyzing coordination mechanisms. In hierarchies, control instruments are very specific and clearly spelled out, in order to keep actors in line with the policy program. Networks take the opposite position by leaving out strict control instruments, since networks are based on a joint-problem analysis. Because of defining the problem and objectives collectively (and because of trust) one can expect that actors will act accordingly to the problem and objectives.

Control can be understood both as structural or financial control. In case of extensive structural control, an actor is strictly managed from outside the organization in its internal functioning and its interaction with other actors. Complementary to structural control is financial control. Financial control deals with the way that budgets are allocated in a governance structure in order to support the implementation of policies by providing the governance structures with the necessary means.

Central to coordination mechanisms is the type of structural control that is exerted. Beuselinck, Bouckaert, Meyers, Peters and Verhoest (2005) distinguish ex-ante and ex-post control instruments. Ex-ante control instruments are most of the time characterized by one or a few centralized actors that clearly define both the problem and the solution as the way to undertake action on the issue. In this case, detailed action plans are put in place. On the contrary, ex-post control instruments provide the possibility for joint-problem analysis in which all or most of the concerned actors are involved in defining the problem and solution as well as how to change the problematic situation. In this case, imposed actions plans often provide a lot of room for manoeuvre. Nonetheless, action plans may be detailed too, but only as a result of discussions and negotiations between all or at least most of the actors involved.
Similar to structural control, I focus on financial control. Financial control can be understood as control in allocation the budget. When considering hierarchy and networks types of governance structure, I can again distinguish between detailed or strict control instruments on the one hand and loose instruments on the other. As it is the case for detailed action plans, also strict budget allocation is focused on constraining the room for manoeuvre by fixing the budget for actors or by linking the budget to benchmarks. The opposite can take place either as it was the case for the action plans. The way the budget is allocated may be left up to the actors in the governance structures themselves.

Outcome

The variance in action plans starts from very detailed in which most actors are imposed with both specific objectives as how to reach them; rather detailed, in which most actors are imposed with specific objectives, but are free in mapping out how to will deal with them; hardly a plan, in which there are only objectives for the governance structure as a whole along with actor-specific suggestions of how to reach them; and finally there can be no action plan at all, as there are only objectives for the governance structure as a whole.

In addition to the structural control, I focus on financial control in the sense of the allocation of budgets. Conform the use of action plans, depending on the type of coordination mechanism, I account for a strict or loose allocation of the budget. Strict forms of budget allocation on the one hand varies from a yearly government funding in which the budget is yearly taken into consideration, to a contract in which the budget allocation depends on the output. On the other hand, loose budget allocation takes place when projects are the subjects of budget allocation in which a specific set of actors are instructed to cooperate with each other on a project. Besides project funding, a network can be subject of budget allocation to. In this case all, or at least most of the actors have access to the budget.

C) Policy and organizational learning: feedback and capacity building

As we take note of the learning- and adaptation-process at the EU level, an important focus of our research will lay on capacity building. But I first need to define feedback on which capacity building is based.

Feedback results out of monitoring and evaluation. The more frequent and regular that monitoring and evaluations occur, the more up-to-date information on performance (feedback) is provided. Consequently the feedback leads to the possibility of policy and organizational learning by building capacity, i.e. modifying the design and implementation of a policy. This implies “helping to build the capacity of mainstream agencies to adapt and change their purposes, objectives, policies, and ways of working” (Sanderson, 2000). The amount of information that an evaluation offers, depend on the subject of the evaluation. At the end of a policy process, one can evaluate the progress towards the objectives. However, one could also monitor the policy process while it is still ongoing. In this case, not only the progress towards the objectives that is evaluated, but also the activities of the actors of how they cope with those targets. This distinction between an evaluation after or during a policy process, links me back to ex-ante and ex-post control instruments (Beuselinck, Bouckaert, Meyers, Peters and Verhoest, 2005), such as detailed action plans and budget allocation as these control instruments already hint what type of feedback mechanism is used.

Outcome:
In order to operationalize the extent of evaluation, I use the concepts of monitoring and evaluation. Both are distinct, but interrelated actions. The first can be defined as “The routine tracking of the key elements of programme/project performance, usually inputs and outputs, through record-keeping, regular reporting and surveillance systems.” Evaluations on the contrary is “The episodic assessment of the change in targeted results that can be attributed to the programme or project intervention.” (Díaz-Monsalve, 2009). Thus the extent of evaluation is indicated by referring to monitoring vica versa evaluating. Moreover, the use of monitoring and evaluations correlates with the type of control instruments that are used in the governance structures. Hierarchical governance structures are organized based on ex-ante control instruments, like detailed action plans and since these action plans are detailed it allows for monitoring the actors closely. Networks are rather based on joint problem analysis in which detailed action plan are rather absent and consequently only an episodic assessment will take place.

D) Accountability

After monitoring and evaluations, information on the progress of the policy is available. Besides the progress on objectives, this information gives insight in the way actors dealt with a problem, how they used their budget in doing so and how they interacted with each other. Having this information provides the possibility to hold actors accountable for their actions and their (lack of) progress towards the objectives. Fox (2007) talks of accountability in the sense of answerability, in which he distinguishes hard and soft accountability. Whereas soft accountability refers only to the duty to reply, hard accountability goes further by the possibility of imposing sanctions.

Outcome

Accountability measures varies from strong to weak instruments. One of the most stringent forms of accountability is the potential to sanction actors that did not act as instructed or as they failed to reach the objectives. A somewhat less strict way in holding actors accountable is by providing recommendations as a result of audits or inspections in which an organization’s objectives and activities are assessed (The Institute of Internal Auditors). Next, accountability can be focused solely on the objectives while the actor’s activities are kept aside. Finally, as it is the softest form, accountability can be organized following the logic of peer reviews in which actors on the same level swap their best and worst practices without interference of an actor on a higher level.

4) Transposition of SNA and PNA into characteristics of coordination mechanisms

After having outlined the SNA and the dimensions of PNA for governance structures, I will transpose them on the four characteristics of the described coordination mechanisms. In the following I present a first approach to do so. This approach is complex, because there is no clear overlap between one characteristic and one dimension. Each characteristic exists out of one or more dimensions from the political and social network analysis. Thus, the outcomes on the SNA and PNAs dimensions indicate the outcomes on the characteristics, which again indicate whether a governance structure exists out of a network or hierarchy type of coordination mechanism. An overview of this is presented in table 4.

The first characteristic interaction is mainly determined by the concepts of authority and collaboration. These concepts can be found in the SNA and in power relations. The potential for authoritarian interaction and collaboration is reflected by density and the degree of centralization.
The more dense a governance structure is and the lower the level of centralization, the greater the potential for collaboration. Power relations go further in detail by looking to the extent to which interaction occurs along horizontal, vertical and diagonal relations. To end with, the vertical and diagonal relations can be further unfold with the distinction between top-down and bottom-up interaction. Thus, while vertical and top-down relations reflect interaction based on authority, horizontal and bottom-up relations refers to a more collaborative style of interaction.

The second characteristic refers to the way goals are set. Are they installed via an organized structure or are they obtained rather spontaneously? The goals are outlined in action plans which can be very detailed on one hand or non-existent at the other. Detailed action plans make us think of hierarchical governance structures, but this doesn’t have to be the case. Detailed action plans can be constructed in a network too, but only as a result of the joint-problem analysis. Such action plans come into existence as a result of interaction that was mainly horizontal and bottom-up. So I will focus on the proportion of horizontal, vertical and diagonal relations, including top-down to bottom-up interaction in the draft of action plans. Vertical and top-down relations refer to a clearly steered way of setting goals while horizontal relations facilitate the spontaneous way of goal obtainment.

Next, I focus on the extent of flexibility in formulating the way in which an actor functions internally, but also externally, i.e. in respect with other actors. First, the flexibility of an actor in the governance structure is dependent on the action plan. In a strong hierarchical governance structure, goals are imposed via a detailed action plan in which objectives are specified for most of the actors. Besides the objectives, actors can also be instructed of how to reach those objectives, i.e. with whom they have to cooperate with. In case of networks, most of the actors are involved in a joint-problem analysis, in which goals are rather spontaneously generated. Therefore detailed action plans are expected to leave a lot of room for manoeuvre or they can be completely absent. Secondly, the capacity building dimension refers to flexibility in the way that financial control from outside the organization is exerted. The more an organization is financially controlled, the less that the governance structure and actors within enjoy room for manoeuvre. This financial control is expressed in terms of budget allocation. Budget allocation varies from a yearly government funding in which the budget is yearly taken into consideration, to project funding with or without contract to even network funding in which the actors distribute the means among themselves.

To conclude with, the planning, control and evaluation characteristic can be determined twofold. First, I focus on the extent to which goals and the way they are organized are evaluated. When detailed work plans are installed, then most of the time the entire process will be monitored, even when the process is still running. This is in contrast with the evaluation that occurs in networks in case detailed work plans are absent. In a network, goals are evaluated only at the end of a process. Regardless of the differences between evaluation and monitoring, both approaches lean themselves for the identification of problems. The way that is dealt with those problems is the second determinant of the characteristic planning, control and evaluation as it differs between the types of coordination mechanism. In a hierarchy, accountability measures take the form of sanctions or in a tempered hierarchical mode the use of audits and inspections will be commonly used. While in a network not the whole process will be scrutinized, but only the output or in extreme cases peer reviews stand central in defining and addressing operational problems.

In table 4 I have summarized the relations between the dimensions and their operationalization and the type of coordination mechanism. In this table I made clear the effect of a score on a dimension on the characteristics of the coordination mechanisms. The last phase in describing the type of
coordination mechanism that is applied in a governance structure, is to transpose the outcomes on the characteristics to the type of coordination mechanism.

Table 4: Transposing SNA and PNA into coordination mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction</strong></td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>Collaboration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Density</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>rather high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Flow betweenness centrality</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>rather high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proportion of horizontal, vertical and diagonal interaction</td>
<td>mostly vertical</td>
<td>rather vertical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Proportion of top-down or bottom-up interaction</td>
<td>mostly top-down</td>
<td>rather top-down</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Goals                                                                 |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------|---------|
| - Proportion of horizontal, vertical and diagonal interaction (when drafting the action plan) | mostly vertical | rather vertical | mostly horizontal |
| - Proportion of top-down or bottom-up interaction (when drafting the action plan) | mostly top-down | rather top-down | mostly bottom-up |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Flexibility</th>
<th>Low flexibility</th>
<th>Average flexibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Action plan</td>
<td>very detailed</td>
<td>hardly a plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Budget allocation</td>
<td>yearly government funding</td>
<td>contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning control and evaluation</th>
<th>Routines and supervision</th>
<th>Consensus and joint problem analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Monitoring vs evaluations</td>
<td>monitoring</td>
<td>evaluations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Accountability measures</td>
<td>sanctions</td>
<td>Audits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>benchmarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>peer review</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5) Variation on the side of the dependent variable

I expect variation in the type of coordination mechanism applied in governance structures in two ways. Firstly, variation between regions and Member States is plausible since each could react differently on the Europe 2020 strategy. Although Europe 2020 is strengthened as it is situated in the European Semester, this more stringent form of control does not guarantee that the strategy is widely accepted and uniformly implemented. Secondly, variation between policy domains is also possible. Do Member States agree on all objectives stated by Europe 2020 or are some too ambitious or not ambitious at all? Furthermore, federal Member States might share their competences with the subnational government within a policy domain. Hence they have to agree on the instruments and the coordination mechanism to reach the objectives.

In addition to the variation between regions and between policy domains I will account for policy processes since these processes could render some insights. Here I distinguish 2 policy processes of learning and adaptation derived from the context of the European Semester. The first process takes place at the European level. It entails the participation in the OMC and the draft of the NRP which is considered as being the action plan. Here the solution for how to increase performance on the Europe 2020 objectives is decided on from among various alternatives (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; Parsons, 1995). This process is mainly about decision-making because of the drafting and deciding on a policy strategy for Europe 2020. In addition this process is strongly embedded in the European Semester, the monitoring framework that is conducted each year. Therefore the governance structures are organized according to this monitoring cycle. The second process is more about the implementation and the follow-up of the agreed reform program. It takes place at the national level and since it is not directly linked with the European Semester, it rather resembles a linear/continuous policy making.

B. The independent variables and hypotheses

Empirical research about Europeanization often deals with hard law (Bursens and Deforche, 2007 and Graziano, 200...) since it has the advantage for the researcher to be assured to what extent a misfit between the European and the national level is present and thus the pressure on member states to adapt the EU law. Nonetheless as the description of Radaelli (2000; p.4) makes clear, Europeanization is not only about hard law, it is “a process involving, a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public choices.” The Europe 2020 strategy is thus not excluded from a Europeanization process affecting member states and regions. And because Europe 2020 is even more institutionalized on the EU level then the Lisbon Strategy (i.e. the European Semester, figure I), the impact on (sub)nation authorities can be expected to be greater.

The first research question, i.e. what kind of governance structures are set up to comply with Europe 2020, is responded by describing the coordination mechanisms based on the social and political network analysis. The second research question aims at accounting for variation in governance structures between policy domains within or between regions and member states. Here I respond to this second research question by suggesting independent variables that are extracted from rational institutionalism and sociological institutionalism and that fit into the Europeanization theory. But first
I point out how and to what extent the misfit between the EU and the regions and member states can be captured. Misfit can be understood as the disparity between the EU and the (sub)national level on policies, structures or cultures. In case of Europe 2020, the misfit can be grasped by taking the Europe 2020 objectives in account. When a member state is far away from his target, the misfit is greater than that one of a member states which already is in compliance with the objective. Though, the extent of misfit doesn’t involve a similar effect of impact as Ian Bache and Adam Marshall (2004, p.2) stated, “poor fit implies strong adaptational pressure, good fit implies weak pressure; the existence of adaptational pressure, however, does not necessarily lead to domestic change.” Hence, besides determining the level of misfit, I account for domestic factors that may determine the eventual impact. Also, these domestic variables have the potential of explaining the types of governance structures, i.e. network or hierarchy. Domestic variables that might influence the impact and type of coordination mechanisms are the support towards the Integrated Guideline, the emancipatory potential, shared competences, administrative capacity, political culture, issue salience, norm entrepreneurs and compliance with the budgetary deficit. The potential impact of an independent variable on the type of coordination mechanism will be set out, after which hypotheses will be formulated.

**A. The support towards EU 2020**

The extent to which actors are supportive towards the policy strategy, in which the integrated guideline is the subject, can have an effect on the type of coordination mechanism that is used. Actors can support the European 2020 strategy concerning the integrated guideline. Furthermore, they can be supportive towards the (sub)national strategy and the way it deals with the integrated guideline.

Therefore I argue that when actors are highly supportive, then they will be proactive, enhancing cooperation and the exchange of information, thus making control mechanism less necessary. Hence that in the case of high support a network type of coordination mechanism is at its place. So, the first hypothesis is formulated as such:

1) *The more supportive actors are, the more they organize the governance structure according to the network type of coordination.*

**Operationalization**

The extent of support in the overall governance structure will be extracted from the actors via a questionnaire. This questionnaire is focused on the support towards the integrated guideline that is applicable on the actor. Questions will focus on both on the European level as on the (sub)national level. I do this because support can vary according to the level where the strategy is developed. On the one hand actors can be supportive towards the overall Europe 2020 strategy, by which they stress the European context. On the other, actors may support the way the integrated guideline is taken up in the (sub)national strategy. The outcome categories are shown in table 5.
A. Emancipatory potential

Regions have to implement between 70% and 80% of EU legislation, while lacking influence in the decision-making process. This sub-state paradox (Tatham, 2010) is strengthened by the fact that some regions match or even overrule some small Member States in demographic and economic terms. Though we may have seen the rise and fall of the idea of a Europe of the Regions, some regions remain active as they seek a way to express their emancipatory potential.

The presence of a non-state wide party in a regional government will presumably lead to a government striving for more acknowledgement of their contribution to the European project in order to escape from national control mechanisms. Thus regions have an opportunity to make their voices heard at the EU level by implementing successfully Europe 2020. However, there is no such type of coordination mechanism that guarantees that objectives will be reached. Nonetheless the hierarchical type of coordination mechanism does allow the government to strengthen their control capabilities e.g. by installing ex-ante control instruments. Hence a region might use the hierarchic model during the implementation phase in order to assure that the targets are met.

The argumentation departed from the assumption that regions strive for more influence and autonomy, both on the EU as on the national level. In accordance to this argumentation, I will measure the extent to which the need for such an image is present among the political elite. But first I describe the argued relation between the emancipatory potential and the type of coordination mechanism.

2) The greater the emancipatory potential in a region, the more they organize the governance structures according to the hierarchical type of coordination.

Operationalization

The level of emancipatory potential of regions (Studinger, 2012) can be obtained with regard to cultural differences between the region and its nation-state, such as religion and language, and political constellations, e.g. when there is a different government/coalition on the federal level then there is in the regional level. However, these indicators are not useful for Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders since there is hardly be any variation.

Another approach is feasible, e.g. by looking to the extent to which the population in each region favors independency.
**Shared competences**

If competences are shared, than governments will have to make agreements. This triggers governments to control their governance structures and the performances in line with those agreements. Furthermore, once an agreement has been reached, it is hard to renegotiate it, since each government has to consult public and private actors again. Thus in case of shared competences both the decision-making process as the implementation phase requires more control mechanisms and instruments. Therefore governance is likely to be structured in accordance with the hierarchical type of model.

When I would consider a policy domain that is characterized by the division of competences in one Member State, than I expect to find another type of coordination mechanism in a Member State where that policy domain is not subject to the division of competences. In addition, also within one federal state variation between policy domains is likely to occur since competences may be allocated to different levels of authority.

Hypothesis 3 states that:

3) *The more a policy domain is subjected to the division of competences, the more governance structures will be organized according to the hierarchical type of model.*

**Operationalization**

The division of competences is clearly formulated in the constitutions of the Member States. An analysis of the constitutions of the Member States is therefore an suitable approach. Nonetheless one has also to account for financial autonomy, because having a competence doesn’t necessarily mean that the financial resources are available to properly act in that policy field. Data on financial autonomy is provided in the Regional Authority Index (RAI). The outcome categories, which are determined by the division of competences, derived from the constitutions, and weighted by the financial autonomy from the RAI, are presented as table 6 suggests.

**Table 6: Division of competences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>Regional + Federal -</th>
<th>Quasi 50/50</th>
<th>Federal + Regional -</th>
<th>Federal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Catalonia</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flanders</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Administrative capacity**

The capacity of regions and Member States to deal with European policies partly depends on the administrative capacity to negotiate and implement EU policies (Börzel 2002). I approach administrative capacity as “The process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve their development objectives...
over time.” UNDP. Research so far suggests that most instances of non-compliance with international agreements are due to a lack of administrative capacity (Brown Weiss and Jacobson 1998). Hence that administrative capacity needs to be analyzed within the context of political agreements on the Europe 2020 strategy.

In order to process effectively policies concerning Europe 2020, regions and Member States need an adequate administrative capacity. So the more administrative capacity, the more likely that Europe 2020 is successfully implemented and in accordance to the way of operating, i.e. involving stakeholders in the decision-making and implementation of those policies. And since differences in capacity are likely to occur both between as within Member States and regions, I expect differences in the organizational structures. Hence hypothesis 4 reads as follows:

4) **The more administrative capacity in a policy domain, the more a governance structure will be based on the network type of model.**

**Operationalization**

Administrative capacity is composed of structures and human resources. The structural aspect entails legislation, management and cooperation (Galazka, A., 2010). These characteristics however, are part of the dependent variable as the type of coordination mechanism is based on how management and cooperation is expressed in the legislation. Human resources are not described by the concept of coordination mechanism that I apply in this research. Hence I will use human resources as the indicator of administrative capacity. These aspects of human resources in an administration can be deduced from the organizational charts of that organization. I approach human resources in terms of the amount of personnel that directly deals with Europe 2020.

**Political culture**

I assess political culture based on the relations between the government the administration (i.e. the departments and the agencies) and the civil society. I focus on three relations. The first is between the department and its agencies. The second is about the control of the ministers on their administration. Thirdly I look to the extent that the civil society is involved.

Concerning the first two relations, it is all about control. From the administration’s point of view the agentification takes a central position in explaining the relation between the department and the agencies. The more autonomous agencies are with respect to the department, the less hierarchy is present. From the political perspective a similar argument is made. The bigger the ministerial cabinet, i.e. personal advisors that are placed outside of the administrative hierarchy and who assist in the daily functioning of the ministry (Caals, De Swert, Suetens, Walgrave, 2004) the greater the capability of a minister to control and guide the administration. Besides control, also the involvement of the civil society has effect on the political culture. Civil society can be involved in a pluralistic manner or through corporatism. While the first is about competition between stakeholders in order to be involved, the latter aims at involving as many stakeholders as possible.

The political culture can be related to the type of coordination mechanism in the sense that the more the political culture reflects weak control, both in the administration as from the political level on the administration, the more open-minded the political culture is. In addition, the political culture is also determined by the involvement of the civil society. The more institutionalized the involvement of the civil society is, the more that political culture tends to a network type of coordination. Thus, when there is only a small extent of control in and on the administration, while the involvement of the civil
society is strongly institutionalized, then I argue again that the political culture is open-minded. Therefore hypothesis 5 states:

1) *The more open-minded a policy domain, the more that governance structures will be based on the network type of model.*

**Operationalization**

For the political perspective, data on this variable is to be found in the number of the ministerial cabinets in terms of personal advisors and assistants. Regarding the agentification more nuance is in place since different types of agencies exist. I sum up the three main categories: first there is the public internal agency, secondly there is the public external agency and thirdly there is the private external agency. The ratio of these three categories determines the extent of agentification; the more independent that agencies are (from internal agencies to private external agencies), the greater the agentification. Finally, the involvement of the civil society is based on the strength of the corporatist model. This can be non-existent, weak or strong. When pluralism is applicable to a region or Member State, then the outcome on corporatism will be non-existent. Weak and strong corporatism differs in the extent that the involvement of civil society is institutionalized on socio-economic and cultural grounds and extended by informal consultations and negotiations (Katzenstein).

**Outcome categories:**

The scores of the three indicators are

- The size of ministerial cabinets: LOW (big), MEDIUM (average); or HIGH (small)
- The extent of agentification: LOW (dependent), MEDIUM (average); or HIGH (independent)
- The level of corporatism: LOW (non-existent), MEDIUM (weak); or HIGH (strong)

The outcome categories of political culture are: open-minded; medium; and closed-minded and are obtained by the following combinations of the scores on the indicators:

- Open-minded: 3x high – 2x high and 1x medium – 1x high and 2 x medium
- Medium: 3x medium – 1x medium, 1x high and 1x low
- Closed-minded: 3x low – 2x low and 1x medium and 1x low and 2x medium

**Issue salience**

Issue salience refers to the visibility of and the importance attached to an issue (Versluis, 2004). Although Europe 2020 is extensively promoted by the European Commission, public and private actors can accept the strategy in a wide variety of manners. They could adopt the strategy or they could just ignore it. This of course has an impact on the way that a Member State or region deals with the strategy.

Hence, when Europe 2020 receives a lot of attention, then the pressure raises for including public and private actors in both the decision-making process and implementation phase in line with the way of operating that is expressed in the Europe 2020 strategy. Furthermore, public and private actors will be involved in order to maintain or increase governmental legitimacy by widening societal support. In hypothesis 6 I argue that differences in salience between policy domains will have an impact on the type of governance structure:
2) The more salient Europe 2020 in a policy domain, the more a governance structure will be based on the network type of model.

**Operationalization**

I will measure the salience of Europe 2020 by the use of a questionnaire. The aim of this questionnaire is to identify who mentions Europe 2020 and how often they deal with it. Thus, a first step in measuring the salience of Europe 2020 is by determining the proportion of organizations that mention Europe 2020. Secondly, I turn to the extent to which those actors that deal with Europe 2020 mention it. I will do this by asking questions such as: How important is the EU benchmark/integrated guideline for your organization? How often does your organization refer (explicitly as well as implicitly) to the EU benchmark/integrated guideline when communication with other actors? The answers on both questions fluctuate between low, medium or high. At the end, the combination of both steps, i.e. the proportion of actors that mention Europe 2020 and the extent to which they refer to Europe 2020, gives a score on issue salience that varies from not salient, average saliency to highly salient as indicated in table 7.

**Table 7: issue salience**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low reference</th>
<th>Medium reference</th>
<th>High reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Few actors</td>
<td>Low salience</td>
<td>Low salience</td>
<td>Medium salience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some actor</td>
<td>Low salience</td>
<td>Medium salience</td>
<td>High salience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many actors</td>
<td>Medium salience</td>
<td>High salience</td>
<td>High salience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Norm entrepreneurs**

According to Börzel and Risse, norm entrepreneurs convince others actors in the governance structure to redefine their interests and identities. The persuasion can be based on knowledge and expertise or on shared beliefs and values. The first is often referred to by the term epistemic communities, while the latter is referred to as advocacy networks. Furthermore norm entrepreneurs can be appointed by the government to promote Europe 2020 or stakeholders might be challenged to take that task upon them.

The number and the expertise of norm entrepreneurs can differ between policy domains both within as between Member States and regions. Hence differences in organizational structures may occur. This reasoning is embodied in hypothesis 7:

3) The more the number and skills of norm entrepreneur in one policy domain, the more the governance structure will to be organized according to the network type of model.

**Operationalization:**

Regarding the issue salience, I measure the extent to which Europe 2020 is dealt with by the actors. In addition to the salience of Europe 2020, the questionnaire will allow me to reveal the identity of norm entrepreneurs and their skills in spreading the ideas and practices of Europe 2020. However, if issue salience is low, then I assume that the skills or the number of norm entrepreneurs or both are that low, that I define the outcome of the independent variable ‘norm entrepreneur’ as low.
Table 8: norm entrepreneurs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low skilled</th>
<th>Medium skilled</th>
<th>High skilled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Few norm entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Low number and skills</td>
<td>Low number and skills</td>
<td>Medium number and skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some norm entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Low number and skills</td>
<td>Medium number and skills</td>
<td>High number and skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many norm entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Medium number and skills</td>
<td>High number and skills</td>
<td>High number and skills</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Compliance budgetary deficit**

A final hypothesis builds further upon the adaptional pressure in case of non-compliance. The European Semester doesn’t provide a framework merely for Europe 2020, but it entails the evaluation of the economic and budgetary outlook of member states as well. In case of non-compliance with the budgetary deficit norm of 3%, the member state can be fined and therefore adaptational pressure rises. Furthermore, national authorities have only a small period of time to develop and implement policy measures in order to get back in line with the European prescription. In addition the European level is far more involved in the follow-up of these policies. So national authorities can not simply take their time and hand the problem over to the stakeholders and the civil society, as only the national authority will be held to account. Hence I expect that member states that do not comply with the more likely to organize their governance structures accordingly to the hierarchy model.

4) Regions or member states that don’t met the budgetary deficit norm will be more inclined to make use of hierarchical governance structures.

**Methodology and data collection strategy**

The data collection will consist of a series of interviews and document analyses in the five selected regions and Member States with actors involved in the policies. These come from several levels (regional, national, European) and from both public as private actors (politicians, officials from administrations and agencies, advisory bodies and interest groups). Interviews will take place using an actor list and a questionnaire. The actor list will provide the data in order to draw a detailed picture of the governance structures (the dependent variable), whereas the questionnaire is meant to identify the factors that can account for the variation (the independent variables).

In terms of design, I envisage a multiple case study, comparing (sub)national authorities. Since I focus on three issues in five regions and countries, a total of 15 case-studies (5 regions * 3 policies) is envisaged. These 15 cases combined with a series of independent variables drawn from rational and sociological institutionalism will possibly also allow for formalized qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as illustrated in table 9. In the QCA model, the hypotheses will be tested by linking the conditions to the outcomes. This will be done for the two outcome categories that refer to the policy processes, and which may inhibit different types of coordination mechanism. Thus, I will verify whether or not institutional differences between policy domains and regions and Member States do have an impact on the governance structures concerning the decision-making process and the implementation of Europe 2020.
### Table 9: QCA model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors’ preference</th>
<th>Conditions – Rational and sociological institutionalism</th>
<th>Outcome – Type of coordination mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attitude towards EU</td>
<td>Perception by others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Flanders – Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Flanders – Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3 Flanders – Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Catalonia – Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Catalonia – Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Catalonia – Poverty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Scotland – Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Scotland – Energy</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Scotland – Poverty</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Denmark – Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Denmark – Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Denmark – Poverty</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Finland – Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Finland – Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Finland – Poverty</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSION

Although Europe 2020 is part of the European Semester, the success of Europe 2020 still depends on the way that Member States and the regions deal with this strategy. The governance structures on the (sub)national level are therefore crucial for understanding how organizations such as agencies and stakeholders deal with each other when acting on the Europe 2020 strategy. This is what I address in the first research question, i.e. what kind of governance structures do subnational authorities introduce in order to participate in and comply with the Europe 2020 ambitions?

To be able to respond to this question, I presented a strategy that is focused on coordination mechanism. Derived from the literature, I envisage two opposing models of coordination mechanisms: the hierarchy and the network type of model. In order to identify what type of coordination mechanism is used in a governance structure, I apply a social network analysis (actor constellation) combined with political insights. This allows me to map the actor constellation, complemented by insights on structural and financial control mechanisms and the type of evaluation methods.

Since I will identify the coordination mechanisms in the policy domains of education, energy and poverty for Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, Denmark and Finland, I may expect variation. Hence my second research question: How can we account for the variation in governance structures between various (sub)national authorities? In order to explain some of the variation, I made a list of independent variables drawn from rational and sociological institutionalism and related to the Europeanization theories.

By doing interviews and analyzing documents I will be able to identify the coordination mechanisms and the outcomes of the independent variables. After which both the dependent as the independent variables will be brought together in the QCA-model and first results will appear.

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