The Institutions of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: How Bureaucratic Politics Meets Network Analysis.

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Introduction

Introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) has proven to be quite ineffective. In order to reduce what Christopher Hill has called the “capability-expectations” gap\(^1\), the Amsterdam Treaty introduces several changes into the institutional framework of the CFSP, such as a policy planning and early warning unit, a High Representative for the CFSP, and increased Commission’s visibility. These new steps involve considerable interplay between the European Commission (and more precisely the Commissioners and Directorate-General involved in external relations), the General Affairs Council, and thus the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member-states, the Political Directors, the Coreper, and the Secretary-General of the Council.

The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, I ask the following question: “Why has the CFSP proven so difficulty to implement?”. I posit that the difficult implementation of the EU’s foreign policy is not due to the lack of a common European security interest, but rather to a flawed institutional framework, that has its origins in the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Second, following from the original question, I aim to bring the study of the CFSP to some level of theorization. Compared to the other EC policies, the CFSP has rarely been approached in the light of theories. This paper is an attempt to fill in this theoretical gap by using two frameworks: bureaucratic politics and network analysis. I argue that although bureaucratic politics is necessary to understand the institutional framework of the CFSP it is not sufficient. The sufficient element is to be found in network analysis for four reasons. First, network analysis allows to explain changes and to identify, define, and measure bureaucratic roles over time.

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\(^1\) I would like to thank William N. Dunn, Alberta Sbragia and Mark Wintz for their useful comments. Any remaining errors in the paper are my own.

Second, network analysis allows to capture differentiations of roles and positions within the bureaucratic structures. Third, network analysis allows to take into account the consequences of the different sizes of the member-states of the EU by isolating communication networks. Fourth, network analysis allows to make sense of the interactions within the bureaucratic structure and among the structures and to introduce the conceptual tool of levels of analysis.

My study is for the main part exploratory. To explore the predictions of the proposed framework, further empirical study is needed. However, this does not take away the relevance of the argument, and the necessity of exploratory work for opening social sciences to new perspectives.

The paper is divided in two parts. The first part offers an overview of the institutions of the EU foreign policy as they have unfolded over time: from the EPC until the Amsterdam Treaty. I show that although changes have been brought to the CFSP institutional framework, it mainly remains intergovernmental. The second part of the paper turns to the two theoretical frameworks chosen to explain why the institutions of the CFSP do not work. I first show how the institutional framework is the source of inter- and intra-institutional clashes, using a bureaucratic politics approach issued mainly from the works of Graham Allison, Morton Halperin and Guy Peters. I then turn to network analysis, and show why it is the sufficient complement to bureaucratic politics. Finally, I conclude by analyzing theoretical and policy implications of the framework used, and by pointing to some criticisms that can be addressed to network analysis.
PART ONE –The CFSP Institutional Developments: Changes in Continuity

Preliminary Remarks

This paper deals with the foreign policy institutions\(^2\) of the EU. The military institutions will be left out from the analysis. The reason for this choice is that opening the box of military institutions will lead me too far, and may direct me toward another topic, since I would have to include extraneous organizations, such as NATO and the WEU. The paper focuses on intra-and inter-institutional politics of the EU’s foreign policy.

Second, this paper will not deal with foreign economic policy, which is part of the first pillar of the EU (the European Community). Foreign economic policy is the object of different procedures.

A/ The Beginnings

The institutions of the CFSP have a history that it is important to briefly mention for two reasons.

First, rather than a true policy\(^3\), I see the CFSP more as a process. I prefer the notion of process because it points to the fact that the foreign policy of the EU is an evolving, changing and unfinished design. Looking at the history allows to understand where the results of Amsterdam are coming from and to show how they have unfolded over the 44 years of European integration.

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\(^2\) I think it is important to look at institutions for the following reason: *Institutions matter for the EU in a unique way: the process of European integration is a joint exercise in norm-setting and institution-building. Institutions are supposed to provide for fairness and predictability, and inspire EU countries with a sense of purpose and belonging. Since the 1980s, each new step in European integration, each new common policy, has brought along its own set of institutional requirements [...] Defense will inevitably do the same, all the more so because the EU is currently devoid of any defense culture: only in a specialized institutional setting will such a culture hopefully be imported into it, and solidify.* Andréani, G., “Why Institutions Matter?”, *Survival*, vol. 42, n. 2, Summer 2000, pg. 82

\(^3\) We can define a policy as a strategy set to pursue defined objectives
Second, looking at the history of the EU’s CFSP allows me to show that although changes have marked the institutional framework of the EU’s foreign policy, it essentially remains intergovernmental.

The Rome Treaty did not talk about a foreign/security policy of the then European Economic Community (EEC). International relations were dominated by the Cold War and NATO was the main European defense organization. What is more, the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC)\(^4\) in 1954 left a bitter memory in the mind of the Six. However, the EEC was, since its inception, involved in international economy: it received limited competences to conduct external relations under the common commercial policy.

The development of the EEC and of the world structure would soon show that numerous EC policies had external consequences. It was in the seventies that the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was settled up. As the name suggests, the EPC was not intended to be a policy. It was simply intended to bring some kind of coordination among the foreign policies of the then nine members of the Community. It had no treaty bases and no institutional basis. It was above all declaratory. EPC Foreign Ministers meetings were not called Councils meetings, so as to distinctly mark the difference with the General Affairs Councils\(^5\). The EPC meetings were held at the margins of the General Affairs Councils\(^6\) and were prepared by the Political Committee (grouping the Political Directors of the national Foreign Ministries). First left out, the Commission began in 1981 to be fully associated, since it was allowed to participate to the EPC meetings at all levels. Having first just a small EPC office within its Secretariat-General, the Commission set up after the SEA, a directorate for external affairs.

\(^4\) The EDC was rejected by the French National Assembly on the ground that it was too supranational. The EDC would have created a genuine European Army.

\(^5\) This situation is rather amazing when one knows that the Foreign Affairs Ministers were sitting in both meetings.

\(^6\) Until 1990, when the Irish and Italian Presidencies of that year decided to merge them, the agenda of the EPC meetings and of the General Affairs Councils were kept separate.
The Single European Act (SEA) signed in 1986 brought the EPC within the European treaty, but under a title (Title III) separated from the EEC treaties, and gave it a small secretariat\(^7\) installed in the Council Secretariat, but separate from the Council of Ministers’ Secretariat\(^8\). The staff of the EPC secretariat was mostly dependent on national staff. The SEA also mentioned the possibility for the political and economic aspects of security to be discussed within EPC. The SEA asked the EPC working groups to meet in Brussels and not in the national capital of the country holding the Presidency. The Political Committee could still meet in the capital of the member state holding the Presidency, but EPC matters were also to be discussed during the General Affairs Councils. However, most of the changes made in the SEA regarding foreign policy were a codification of the practices that had developed over the former years of EPC. It must be said that the EPC system, if anything, induced cooperation among the then EC member-states. As Karen Smith underlines, *EPC multiplied the direct contacts between officials at different national levels. By constantly meeting and consulting with each other, officials acquired a [...] coordination reflex. Whenever an international problem arose, officials would consider its “collective dimension” and even adapt their initial position in accordance with those of the other member states*\(^9\).

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\(^7\) The EPC Secretariat was chaired by a senior diplomat appointed for two and a half years. The Secretariat staff consisted of five diplomats, two from the two previous Presidencies, one from the current Presidency and two from the two incoming Presidencies.

\(^8\) However, the EPC Secretariat was separated from the Council Secretariat by doors with special locks on them (see Allen, op. cit., pg. 50)!

B/ Maastricht and Amsterdam

a) The Treaty of Maastricht

The end of the Cold War pushed the then twelve member states to further institutionalize the EPC and think about defense. Indeed the end of the Cold War was leaving the future of NATO uncertain. In addition, Francois Mitterrand was very much on the demand side for a European Foreign Policy, but a “French European Foreign Policy”, that would follow French desiderata.

At the institutional level, a first factor is important to underline: [...] setting things down more explicitly and logically in treaty form is far from ensuring a greater degree of cohesion. [...] one consequence of the disappearance of the old EPC informalities has been to create less mutual trust among decision-makers and to slow down the process of consultation, because officials are drafting CFSP texts with the understanding that legal precedents are being set\textsuperscript{10}. The first priority of the CFSP, as in the EPC before it, usually is to maintain consensus at all costs, as opposed to solving problems\textsuperscript{11}.

The institutional framework of the CFSP established in the Maastricht Treaty is the following:

The Maastricht Treaty institutionalizes the links between the Coreper and the Political Committee, but does not clearly define their role. The Coreper (the Committee of Permanent Representatives\textsuperscript{12}) is in charge of preparing the meetings of the General Affairs Council (bringing together the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the member-states). Under the system of the EPC, it was the Political Committee who was in charge of preparing the EPC meetings of the


\textsuperscript{12} The Permanent Representatives are the “Ambassadors” of the member-states to the EU.
Foreign Ministers. The fact that after Maastricht it is the Coreper who is now in charge represents a positive development towards consistency between first and second pillars of the EU, since the Coreper is better placed to link economic and foreign policies. Geographically, the Coreper is based in Brussels, and has first hand grasp on EC policy development, EC policy-making and EC resources. On the other hand, the Political Directors are located in their national capitals, and are then better informed on national foreign policies. This new situation where the Political Committee does no longer report directly to the Foreign Ministers, but does so through the Coreper, was not well accepted by the Political Directors. A “gentlemen agreement”\textsuperscript{13} was negotiated according to which Coreper would not try to change the Political Committee recommendations when these are directly related to pillar II\textsuperscript{14}. However, foreign policy is increasingly requesting instruments from pillar I. It was decided that when such a mix of instruments was necessary, Coreper would be the only responsible structure. In addition, the Coreper set up a group of advisors – the CFSP Counselors – who is meeting weekly to discuss financial and judicial issues related to CFSP actions, although its agenda gradually expended.

In addition, the CFSP working groups are meeting in Brussels; they are actually merged with the Council working groups on a same geographical area, again to ensure consistency between the economic and political aspects of external relations. These working groups are composed of experts from EU member-states and the Commission. They elaborate policy documents and options to be considered by the Political Committee.

The EPC Secretariat is brought into the Council Secretariat, with the same purpose of increasing the coherence of the EU’s CFSP. A CFSP unit is thus created in the Secretariat, and is part of the External Relations DG. The CFSP Unit resources are increased: its staff becomes

\textsuperscript{13} Gentlemen agreement refers to informal agreements. These agreements are respected through what I would call a “code” of honor.

\textsuperscript{14} The Political Committee’s opinions appear on the Coreper’s agenda.
more permanent and it is given a little budget. However as Roy Ginsberg underlines, the Council Secretariat [...] has been slow to integrate fully the culture of intergovernmental political cooperation with that of the permanent/communitarian staff. The new CFSP Directorate [...] – about fifty professionals, half seconded from the foreign ministries for five-year periods and half permanent – will remain small relative to the professional staff of the Commission’s Directorate-General I and DGIA (sic). Its smallness will constrict its ability to provide meaningful analyses. As I will show in the next section, the treaty of Amsterdam will try to deal with this problematic situation. The tasks of the CFSP unit include: preparing and sending notices of meetings, taking notes and providing a central memory for the CFSP.

The Commission receives a shared right of initiative in CFSP matters (with the Council of the EU); together with the Coreper and the General Affairs Council, it has responsibility for keeping coherence between pillar I and pillar II. The Commission may also, as any member-states, request the Presidency to convene an extraordinary Council meeting.

After the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the Commission was reorganized to adapt its structure to the new CFSP. Under Jacques Delors, DGIA responsible for external political affairs including CFSP was created, and was intended to become the “Foreign Ministry” of the Commission (and in the Commission’s ideal of the EU!). Delors began hiring foreign and defense policy advisors. However, as some scholars have argued, the creation of DGIA seemed to be the anti-thesis of the argument Delors had fought for during the Maastricht negotiations: it was indeed institutionalizing the separation of pillar II from pillar I, since it was DGI that was responsible for external economic relations. In addition, it was very difficult to separate the

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16 At the head of the DGIA was Hans van den Broek, while DGI with Sir Leon Brittan was responsible for external economic affairs.
political from the economic. Also, the 1995 EU enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden made a reorganization of the tasks of the Commissioners inevitable, because more posts of Commissioners were needed. This is why upon his arrival as President of the Commission in January 1995, Jacques Santer changed the structure of the Commission, by adding to the functional division of tasks between DGs dealing with external relations a geographical division. The six Commissioners whose portfolios were related to external relations were meeting regularly under the chairmanship of Santer in order to coordinate external affairs. This sub-structure was called the Relex Group of Commissioners. Their meetings were prepared by the Relex Group of Director Generals. The Relex Group of Planners prepared papers on particular issues. According to Fraser Cameron, on the whole this system has worked well. It may be an exaggeration to talk of a nascent team spirit but the regular meetings of the Relex groups have served a useful coordination function [...]. It has also been useful to hold in-depth discussions of issues of relevance only to those dealing with external affairs such as the external service of the Commission, sanctions policy, geo-political implications of enlargement and the external relations aspects of the IGC.

DGIA was composed of a number of horizontal units: the European Correspondent Planning, Security Issues, Human Rights, Council of Europe, UN, OSCE, geographical desks covering the areas that were under DGIA responsibility. The European Correspondent unit’s role is to coordinate the input to CFSP from DGIA and other DGs, and to prepare the briefing  

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17 The new external relations DGs were: DGI, Sir Leon Brittan, commercial policy, relations with North America, Far East, Australia and New Zealand; DGIA, Hans van den Broek, Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, the CFSP and external missions; DGIB, Manuel Marin, Southern Mediterranean, Middle East, Latin America, Southeast Asia, North-South Cooperation; DGVIII, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, development cooperation with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the Lomé Convention. Emma Bonino was responsible for the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), while Yves Thibault de Silguy was responsible for economic affairs, which of course included international political economy.

files for ministerial and Political Committee meetings. The Director General of DGIA is also Political Director of the Commission.

Romano Prodi changed the Commission external affairs structure again, by creating a DG for external relations encompassing all geographic areas, and dealing precisely with political external relations and not trade.

It is obvious that by creating the pillar structure, the member-states wanted to leave the Commission outside the CFSP. During the negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, Jacques Delors, the then President of the European Commission, strongly opposed the pillar structure\(^{19}\). Indeed if no pillar was created, the CFSP would have been part of the EC and would have followed the decision-making process that applies to Community matters. Delors’ plan for a unified structure was rejected, and the European Union was formed of three pillars, the first one being the EC pillar, while the tow others (CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs) being intergovernmental. As Martin Holland writes, *in general, the provisions agreed to in the Treaty on European Union were characterized by their consistency with, rather than their departure from, EPC procedures. The new nomenclature – Common Foreign and Security Policy – suggested Euro-optimism rather than practical reality. While not insignificant in many respects, the Maastricht reforms continued to rely on intergovernmental solutions and voluntary consensus*\(^{20}\).

\textbf{b) The Treaty of Amsterdam}

The Amsterdam Treaty brought some additional institutional changes regarding the EU foreign policy:

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\(^{19}\) The pillar structure was created based upon the idea of the “Greek temple” of Pierre de Boissieux, the then French Permanent Representative to the EC.

Consistency is stressed, and to that extent, article C of the treaty is amended and calls upon the Council and the Commission to cooperate to ensure consistency.

A High Representative for CFSP is provided for and is the Secretary General of the Council of the EU. Although, the High Representative was created to give the EU more visibility in the international arena, his tasks seem reduced to administrative ones. He will have to assist the Presidency with the execution of the CFSP tasks of representation and implementation. He will also assist the Council in the formulation and preparation of the decisions. At the request of the Presidency he can act on behalf the Council in conducting political dialogue with foreign countries. However, the decision to have one person fills in the role of Secretary General and Mr. CFSP will enhance the role of the Secretariat General in CFSP.

An early warning and planning unit is created within the Council Secretariat. The mandate of the new unit is to monitor, analyze and assess international developments and events, including early warnings and crisis. The unit can also draft, upon the Council’s request or on its own initiative, policy options which may contain recommendations and strategies for presentation to the Council under the responsibility of the Presidency. This can be regarded as an improvement for implementing the CFSP, since it is very difficult to react to international crisis without a common background knowledge or analysis of the situation. The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, is at the head of the unit, which is composed of three staff from the Council Secretariat, one from the Commission, fifteen from the member-states (i.e. one from each member-states) and one from the Western European Union (WEU).

In a “Declaration on the Organization and Functioning of the Commission” attached to the Amsterdam Treaty the desirability of bringing external relations under the responsibility of a Vice-President (of the Commission) is stressed. However, the restructuration of the Commission
launched by Romano Prodi has not gone in that direction. Nevertheless, the Commission has now its seat in the new CFSP “troika”, composed of the Presidency of the Council, the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner in charge of External Relations.

Although the Commission accumulated a relative amount of power in the foreign policy area, the Amsterdam Treaty seems to have set up the institutional balance in favor of the Council of the EU.

I had entitled part one “Changes in Continuity”. This brief overview of the EU’s foreign policy institutions was intended to prove my point. Although institutional developments have occurred over almost fifty years of integration, the CFSP institutional framework remains above all intergovernmental. What we have witnessed until today is the addition of institutional structures that make the process more and more complicate instead of defining it in a clear and workable way. Maybe the biggest developments that occurred regarding the EU’s Foreign Policy are its “legalization” in 1986 in the Single European Act followed by its name’s change in 1991 in the Maastricht Treaty. Besides these two developments, the EU’s foreign policy remains in the hands of the European Council. However, and this gives me the link with the second part of the paper, as Morton Halperin wrote, although the rules give structure to the game, they leave considerable room for maneuver, including maneuver by participants to bypass the rules or change them in their favor21.

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PART TWO: Making Sense of the Difficult Implementation of the CFSP

Preliminary Remark

It is striking that the level of theorization of the CFSP is very low. Few, not to say any study have tried to understand the CFSP in a theoretical perspective. Compared to the level of theorization of EC policies, it is natural to wonder why this is so. A possible reason is that the CFSP, as I mentioned earlier, should not be regarded as a true policy (as its name suggests), but rather as a process. Some could even argue that the CFSP does not exist at all, except on paper, and that what matters, after all, are still the individual foreign policies of the fifteen member-states. It is of course very difficult to theorize something that does not exist. If there is “nihil novi sub sole”, CSFP is not a very attractive case study to test theories…

One of the goals of this paper is to attempt to fill in this theoretical gap by testing two theoretical frameworks: bureaucratic politics and network analysis. If one takes into account the original research question: “Why is the CFSP so difficult to implement?”, it is helpful to try theorizing the answer. What is more, if one agrees with what David Allen calls the “process of Brusselisation” of European foreign policy,22 we are then witnessing the emergence of a true European foreign policy coordination in Brussels (as opposed to the sum of the fifteen member-states’ foreign policies). It makes thus sense to attempt to understand this phenomenon of “Brusselisation” by taking it to a certain level of theorization.

The reason for choosing bureaucratic politics and network analysis as theoretical frameworks again relates to the original question. Since I am looking at the implementation of the CFSP, I argue that it is more useful to use theories of the policy process, looking at how decisions are made, rather than grand-scheme theories, such as theories of international relations.

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What is more, since I have defined the CFSP as an unfinished design, it is more enlightening and challenging to look at how this process unfolds.

**A/ The Argument: “Institutions Matter”, But So Do Other Levels of Analysis**

I posit that the reason why the CFSP has proven so difficult to implement is because its institutional framework is inherently flawed. The institutions do not work and thus are unable to define, prepare, or implement EU policies that the Fifteen agree upon. This institutional structure is full of inconsistencies whose origin is mainly to be found in the contradiction between the European treaties’ texts (calling for an international role for the EU\(^{23}\)) on the one hand and the fact that the member-states do not want to give up the consensual decision-making process of the second pillar on the other hand. *CFSP decision-makers often became preoccupied by seemingly petty disputes surrounding precedent and procedure, as opposed to action*\(^ {24}\).

Some have argued that the lack of CFSP is due to the lack of a common European security interest. Others have argued that the CFSP already exists but is to be found in the first pillar of the EU, in its commercial policy, with the EU remaining essentially a “civilian power”. I refute this argument, stating that the *EU*\(^ {25}\) has no less defined interest in the world than the US for instance (keeping in perspective that the US is an hegemon and that I regard the EU as a regional power). The interests of the EU have to be found in its proper history. The then EEC was created after WWII to establish peace on a European continent destroyed by two world wars. From this particular experience, I see the global interests of the EU as being peace, democracy,

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\(^{23}\) Article B of the Amsterdam Treaty states that one of the EU’s objective is to *assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which may in time lead to a common defense.*


\(^{25}\) I again stress my precise wording: I wrote the *EU* and not the *fifteen member states* (the EU is more than the sum of its fifteen member states).
free trade in the world, and the respect of human rights. My argument is that today such interests are particularly relevant. Indeed, such as the US, the EU is confronting a new world since the end of the Cold War in which the notion of “strategy” is acquiring a different meaning. Strategy is of course still about gaining access to the sea or a big river, controlling critical resources and vital trading roads. But these meanings have become less relevant today because of globalization, because of satellites, because of the new information technology. The notion of strategic interest has acquired a new meaning: today it is more about stability or more precisely about keeping under control the ability of a country or a region to multiply nuisances, such as political chaos, poverty, illegal immigration, drug and arms trafficking and so on. And the EU sees democratization as the best bet to avoid such nuisances. There lies precisely the interest of the EU in foreign affairs.

To support my argument I will use in the first section a bureaucratic politics approach. However, I will show that such an approach, although necessary, is not sufficient to understand the CFSP institutional framework. In the second section, I turn to network analysis, as a (almost) sufficient complement to bureaucratic politics.

26 To that extent, see article J.1 of the Amsterdam Treaty: The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:
- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

27 Of course, realist scholars would disagree with me on that point. They would argue that national interests are still equated with material capabilities. This may be true regarding the fifteen member-states. But when one turns to the EU, I posit that such an argument is less relevant (cfr. Petersberg tasks).
B/ Bureaucratic Politics or the Ongoing Institutional Clashes

a) Bureaucratic Politics is Necessary but…

As Guy Peters has emphasized, it is important to understand *policymaking fragmentation within the Community* (sic) *in order to understand policy outcomes*28. Following from that, the argument I develop under bureaucratic politics is the following: CFSP is difficult to implement because its institutional framework is the source of two types of conflicts:

⇒ an *inter-institutional clash* between the Council of the EU and the Commission;
⇒ an *intra-institutional clash* within the Council of the EU between its sub-structures dealing with CFSP, and within the European Commission between its directorate-general dealing with external affairs.

In the work of Graham Allison29, Morton Halperin30 and Guy Peters31, bureaucratic structures should be seen as having a life of their own; they pursue their own interests, with the purpose of increasing their power within the decision-making process of a given policy. This leads to incessant competition among them for power, prestige and position. These ongoing struggles have consequences for policy outcomes. In addition these struggles lead the members of the bureaucratic structure to acquire a sense of belonging to the particular structure, which in turn influences the perceptions of the individual or to say it simpler, “where you stand depends upon where you sit”. The main characteristics of the policy process in bureaucratic politics are bargaining and compromises.

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31 Peters, G., op. cit.
I/ The Inter-Institutional Clash

The inter-institutional clash refers to what David Allen describes as the emergence of “two” cultures competing for control of the policy-making process, institutionally based in the Council and the Commission. [...] The determination to preserve national foreign policies is ultimately at odds with the ambition to create a European foreign policy. To some extent, I could take the analogy used by Bert Rockman about the US and say that “the EU possesses two foreign ministries within the same government.” Or to put it in other words, we witness what Matthew Holden, Jr. has called “imperialism” in bureaucracy, referring to [...] inter-agency conflict in which two or more agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction, or in which one agency actually seeks to take over another agency as well as the jurisdiction of that agency.

The question of coherence between pillar I and pillar II is a good illustration of the problem, since this problem arises each time the EU wants to use different policy instruments to assert itself in the international arena. Although the Amsterdam Treaty (as the Maastricht Treaty and the SEA had done before) has reaffirmed the need for the Council of the EU and the Commission to ensure coherence when dealing with foreign affairs (the Commissioner for external affairs participate in the General Affairs Councils), it also opens the box for inter-institutional clashes. Indeed, the creation of the EU increases the possibility for the Council of the EU and the Commission to both claim precedence in foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty states that the European Commission should be fully associated with the work of pillars II and

35 The Commission Deputy Secretary is also present in the weekly Coreper meetings.
III. As David Allen underlines, *despite its mantra-like language about “consistency”, the TEU ensured the emergence in Brussels of two rival cultures. Each with their own institutional base and their own rationale for assuming responsibility for identifying and representing the European interest*\(^36\). The Commission is best placed to play a role of coordinator between pillar I and pillar II\(^37\). Instruments used in CFSP are usually part of the first pillar, especially considering the fact that the EU does not yet have a European army. Therefore, it often uses economic sanctions as a way to induce third parties to comply with its will and interests. However, in the years following the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission has been very prudent in exercising the right of initiative that it was granted in the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, on the one hand, the Commission feared that if it got too involved in the CFSP decision-making, its aggressiveness would provoke a contamination of the Community methods of the first pillar by the second intergovernmental pillar. Another explanation lies in the personality of the successor of Jacques Delors as President of the Commission, Jacques Santer who kept a much lower profile than its predecessor.

Nevertheless, the Commission asserted itself by other means. The Commission’s internal administrative changes that I presented earlier were meant to increase its visibility in the international arena, and certainly to gain power vis-à-vis the Council of the EU. Let’s not forget that the Commission has the staff and the expertise at the European level. It is responsible for a network of delegations\(^38\) all over the world.

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\(^{36}\) Allen, D., op. cit, pg. 51

\(^{37}\) Although the SEA keeps the European Community and EPC clearly separated, it makes reference to the need for consistency *(the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to act with consistency and solidarity in order more effectively to protect its common interests).*

\(^{38}\) The origins of these delegations are to be found in the need to establish an EC representation dealing with technical assistance under the Lomé Convention. The first representations were established in Nigeria and Tanzania. The number of delegations increased in the late eighties due to the changing situation in Central and Eastern Europe. The tasks of the European Commission’s delegations are development and technical assistance, trade negotiations, and political reporting (since the Commission involvement in CFSP).
To that extent, I see the French proposal to appoint a “Monsieur PESC” (Mister CFSP) to represent the EU foreign policy in the global arena made during the negotiations revising the Maastricht Treaty, as a counter-reaction to Santer’s decision to set up his “Relex” mini-cabinet (see supra). De Gaulle is still very much alive in French European policy, and the Commission is still regarded as an external supranational body that should be kept in check. Santer strongly opposed the French proposal. A compromise was found during the 1997 Intergovernmental Conference to keep “Mr. CFSP” within the Council Secretariat. This will allow the Council Presidency to still be the external representation of the CFSP, while Mr. CFSP will only be there “to assist” the Presidency.

What is more, although the Council of the EU represents the member-states, it has the potential to become an actor on its own. Scholars of the EU know that the Council of the EU is the intergovernmental institution by excellence created to give a voice to all the member-states. But if we agree with the statement that institutions are more than just the sum of their parts, the Council could indeed acquire an identity on its own.

The relation between the High Representative for CFSP and the Commissioner in charge of external relations could also lead to tensions, especially since this relation has not been legally specified in the treaty. This leads me to yet another problem.

The replacement after the Maastricht Treaty of the EPC secretariat by a CFSP DG within the Council Secretariat might have lead to additional inter-bureaucratic conflicts. The role of the Secretariat General of the Council is to help the Council Presidency. This role could clash with

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39 To that extent, see David Allen, in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds.), pg. 48
40 John Howorth relates the following: At the end of June 2000, the Commissioner in charge of external relations, Chris Patten wrote in the draft of a European Commission’s internal document that he was afraid that the creation of the High Representative for CFSP has complicated the exercise of external policy instead of having simplified it. He regretted the existence of a continuous tension between intergovernmentalism and EC action. This remark created tensions in the relations between Chris Patten and Javier Solana. See Howorth, J., “L’intégration européenne et la défense: l’ultime défi?”, Cahiers de Chaillot, n. 43, Novembre 2000, pg. 34 – Author’s translation.
the role of proposal of the Commission, since both may compete for advisory power within the EU.

Another evolution is worth mentioning. Although the General Affairs Council has a role of overview of all the EU’s policies (the three pillars), this role seems to decline not only because of the CFSP institutional framework set up over the years, but also because of the evolution of international relations. On the one hand, as Peterson and Bomberg write, foreign ministers had to focus more on foreign policy (that is, “non-Community”) decision-making for a variety of reasons: the more formal decision-making rules of the CFSP required more time than informal policy co-ordination, post-Maastricht turf battles gobbled ministerial time and attention, and the EU was simply more active on matters of foreign policy than it was before 1993. The CFSP contributed to a general overcrowding of the General Affairs Council agendas [...]. In part because of the CFSP, foreign ministers found that more and more had to be decided in their name by their deputies. Meanwhile they were less and less able to co-ordinate the work of other Councils in any meaningful way. Today, a lot of matters falling under the heading of “foreign affairs” do not belong to the traditional notion of foreign affairs. Ministers of the Economy or of Finances are gaining power that they take away from the Foreign Affairs Ministers. This is true at the national level and has consequences at the European level. Indeed, at the European level, policies such as economy, trade and development are part of the missions of the Commission. It is clear that the Foreign Ministries, grouped in the General Affairs Councils are determined to fiercely defend the matters that still fall under their competencies. As John Peterson argues, the vast majority of work undertaken during three years of the CFSP’s existence has been done at the Working Group level, and substantial progress has been made in merging pillar I and II.

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Working Groups working on the same topics or regions. The Commission often wields considerable power in these groups, because most national officials based in national capitals tend to know more about their specialized area (i.e. West Africa, landmines or the OSCE) than about EU decision-making, and because the Commission has privileged access to information about Community budgetary resources and instruments\(^{42}\). However, this fusion of the former EPC Working Groups with the EC Working Groups was not without difficulty. It led again to bureaucratic fights about power. As Elfriede Regelsberger underlines, a merger of these two strings raised such sensitive questions as who could or should replace whom, who from different ministries and departments should be in charge of taking the floor in the name of the national delegation, which kind of a division of labor would correspond best to the matter at hand\(^{43}\).

On top of these institutional problems, the CFSP also suffers from a lack of “common” information. Indeed when the Foreign Affairs Ministers meet, they each come with their own information at the table, reflecting the national position of their respective country. It is obvious that the bigger member-states have the most relevant and qualified information. The only shared information is the one that goes through the Coreu telegraphic network\(^{44}\).

To sum up, it is fair to say that the Commission has still not been able to find its place in the decision-making process of the CFSP, even though it has multiplied structures in charge of external relations. On the other hand, the General Affairs Council seems to lose ground, slowly but certainly, multiplying itself in sub-structures. As Bert Rockman rightly points out, the more feeble the gravitational pull of directional authority in government, the more necessary it


\(^{44}\) The information going through Coreu encompasses administrative notices, more substantial information and draft papers on which states are asked to react.
becomes to institutionalize coordinative functions\textsuperscript{45}. This necessity has not been met yet within the EU’s CFSP.

2/ The Intra-Institutional Clash

I posit that the Maastricht Treaty created a situation of latent intra-institutional conflict between the Coreper and the Political Committee. As we saw earlier, although for the first time the Political Committee acquires a legal existence by being codified in the Maastricht Treaty, the reports it prepares must go through the Coreper before reaching the General Affairs Council. Under the EPC, the Political Directors had direct access to the General Affairs Council. Of course, the Political Directors were not willing to give up their powers in favor of the Permanent Representatives, therefore the “gentlemen’s agreement” that I explained earlier. The Political Committee has thus remained a powerful actor in CFSP for three reasons. First, although the reports of the Political Directors go through the Coreper, the Coreper cannot modify them if they deal directly with pillar II. Second, the Coreper is already overwhelmed, since it is in charge of all the EC matters. Third, the Political Directors can appeal directly to their foreign ministers when they are not meeting as part of the General Affairs Council. However, this last reason is also a string against the power of the Political Directors: they are based in their states and are responsive to their administration. Although the Permanent Representatives are also representatives of their state, they are based in Brussels usually for a long time and are more inclined and used to compromises and to the European decision-making process. It is fair to say that while the Coreper has the European sensitiveness and could bring interpillar cohesiveness to the EU, the Political Committee has the expertise on national foreign policies positions. In addition, the Coreper is meeting at least every week, while the Political Committee is meeting twice a month. What is more, the “official” role of the Political Committee is to discuss the

\textsuperscript{45} Rockman, B., op. cit., pg. 177
implementation of CFSP decisions and to contribute to the definition of CFSP policies by advising the General Affairs Council on political issues (art. J.15, Amsterdam Treaty). On the other hand the Coreper prepares the General Affairs Council meetings and decisions. The words speak for themselves.

This opposition between Political Committee and Coreper also reflects an opposition within the different structures of the national foreign affairs ministries, between Political Directors and Permanent Representatives to the EU.

However, the Council is not the only institution whose sub-structures are clashing. The Commission witnessed the same problem, at least until the restructuration decided by Prodi\textsuperscript{46}. Indeed, one could think that the Commission was gaining power after the Maastricht Treaty, since, as I mentioned earlier, the Treaty stressed the importance to fully associate the Commission to CFSP. However, it is striking that the Commission was not acting in a coherent way: the different Commissioners and their respective DGs were continuously fighting over resources and responsibilities. This was true for the functional division chosen by Delors, but also for the geographical division chosen by Santer. There was no integrated approach within the Commission between the economic and the political, nor was there any global approach to the Commission’s attitude towards external affairs. \textit{When presented by its President at the European Council or related forum, the Commission’s position is unambiguous. Within the Commission itself such clarity can be obscured by competition between different Commissioners and their respective DGs for autonomy and exclusivity in certain policy areas}\textsuperscript{47}. One can hope that the new division of labor decided by Romano Prodi will help the intra-relations between the Commission’s DGs.

\textsuperscript{46} It is probably too early to evaluate the consequences of this restructuration.

\textsuperscript{47} Holland, M., \textit{European Union Foreign Policy – From EPC to CFSP Joint Action and South Africa}, New York: St. Martin’ Press, 1995, pg. 84
Regarding the CFSP DG in the Council Secretariat, even though it received a budget independent from the Council Presidency, I argue that the mix of “EU staff” and national staff is one more impediment to the formation of a European foreign policy. Instead of allowing the CFSP unit of the Council Secretariat to be a “more communautarized” body, the member-states wanted to keep an eye on its work and avoid that it became too independent. Therefore the mix of permanent and national staff. As Ben Soetendorp writes, most member-states wanted the CFSP unit in the Council Secretariat to be just an administrative unit that would provide assistance to the Political Committee, composed of the political directors of the national foreign ministries.\(^{48}\)

In addition, as the Amsterdam Treaty states, the Council may, whenever it deems it necessary, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues.\(^{49}\) These “Special Representatives” are in charge of representing the voice of the EU in different regions of the world: Bosnia, the Great Lakes region in Africa, Middle East. The Council is nominating more and more Special Representatives, but do they really achieve coordination and representation? It is difficult for these Representatives to represent the EU, since they do not really have any room of maneuver; they are accountable to the Council of the EU. It is legitimate to wonder if the multiplication of Special Representatives at the end of the 1990’s is not a new administrative structure that confuses rather than helps the coherence of the EU’s CFSP.

In the every-day working of the CFSP, the intra-institutional clashes raise as much problems as the inter-institutional clashes.


\(^{49}\) Article J. 8, Amsterdam Treaty
b) … Not Sufficient.

Although bureaucratic politics has allowed to emphasize the bureaucratic clashes in the name of power, the CFSP institutional framework raises other questions that are left unanswered by bureaucratic politics.

For one thing, the institutions of the CFSP raise the question of consistency over time. Indeed, it is difficult to maintain a sense of continuity between the EU Presidencies, when these change every six months. Each member-state takes over the Presidency with its own agenda, and these agenda greatly differ from one Presidency to the other. Change is a key factor to understand the difficult implementation of the CFSP. To that extent, bureaucratic politics does not offer the tools of explaining and analyzing changes in the institutional structure; it is a very static way to understand organizations.

What is more within the structure or the sub-structure, individuals and networks occupy different role. Some are leaders, others are isolates, and others are bridges. How do we go about identifying such a diversity of roles within the structure? Here again, bureaucratic politics leaves us pretty clueless. Bureaucratic politics talks about the leader role but it does not give us any way to identify it and measure the extent of the leadership. In addition, the leader may also be another figure than the “formal” leader.

An additional factor important to understand the difficult implementation of the CFSP is the size of the country in charge of the EU Presidency. Depending on the size of that country, different resources are going to be used. For instance, smaller countries are more incline to use the European Commission delegations abroad, since they have less diplomatic resources than bigger member-states. What is more, third parties could be reluctant to deal with the EU

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50 These notions will become clearer in the next section. They all have a specific meaning in network analysis.
Presidency when it is held by a small country\textsuperscript{51}. Different countries will use different institutional resources. All this to show that size matters in the EU’s foreign policy, and that bureaucratic politics does not offer any tool to deal with that variable.

Finally, the last question left unanswered by bureaucratic politics is the question of the level of analysis. Bureaucratic politics has been helpful to isolate structures and sub-structures. However, to look beyond the structure, we need other conceptual and methodological tools. Structures and sub-structures are not black boxes. Bureaucratic politics was a reaction against the model of the state as a black box. Bureaucratic politics opened the box and found bureaucracies within the state. What I posit is that bureaucratic politics did not go far enough. It limited itself to what is easily identifiable, i.e. the formal bureaucratic structure. But often there are less visible sources of power than a formal structure. Networks are formed, smaller and bigger, stronger and weaker. Some individuals are more listened to than others. Relationships exit between individuals within the same structure, across the structure, between an individual and a dyad, or among triads, and so on. The decision-making process is less clear-cut and more sophisticated than bureaucratic politics lets us believe. The decision-making process, especially at the EU level, involves different levels of analysis that are less easily identifiable than formal institutions.

\textit{Where you stand depends on where you sit} is a very mechanical approach, leaving the individual quite powerless… \textit{Role, in and of itself, cannot explain the positions adopted by individuals; after all, the very notion of role implies a certain latitude over how to play the role. Further, a role does not involve a single goal and there is therefore significant room for maneuver and judgment in trading off various goals against each other}\textsuperscript{52}. I would add that roles are also

\textsuperscript{51} To that extent, it is striking that that US hesitated in the second semester of 1997 to schedule a routine meeting between the US and the EU, because the Presidency of the EU was held by Luxembourg.

determined by the social interactions among individuals. It is here that network analysis reveals itself very helpful, as I will show in the next section. Bureaucratic structures matter then, but so do other things.

Let's now turn to what network analysis has to bring in the debate.

C/ Network Analysis is the Sufficient Condition

There are two types of network approaches: one more qualitative and the other quantitative. The first one is mainly a conceptual tool used in policy making studies, trying to identify groups of individuals attempting to influence the decision-making process\(^5^3\). These groups can be formed based on common knowledge ("epistemic community"\(^5^4\)), common resources, power, common beliefs (advocacy coalition framework\(^5^5\)). Their appellations widely differ: policy system, policy community, policy domain, policy network, epistemic community, advocacy coalition. Although these denominations all have their proper meanings, they also point all to the same general interpretation of a part of the policy-making process: policy making arrangements characterized by a predominance of informal, decentralized and horizontal relations in the policy process\(^5^6\) and [...] public policies which are not explained by the intentions of one or two central actors, but which are generated within multiple actor-sets in which the individual actors are interrelated in a more or less systematic way\(^5^7\).

\(^{53}\) For the study of the EU decision-making process using the notion of “policy networks”, see among others, Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E., Decision-Making in the European Union, New York: St. Martin’ s Press, 1999
\(^{54}\) See for instance Haas, P. (eds.), Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1997
\(^{57}\) Ibid.
The second network approach, which is the one referred to in this paper, is called network analysis. Issued mainly from the field of sociology, it has developed very complex statistical models in order to identify networks, the roles within these networks and variations among linkages. Its basic premise is that social structures are best characterized by the interactions or absence of interactions among the individuals who constitute them, rather than by the attributes of these individuals. Individuals are part of complex social contexts that it is important to take into account in order to understand social structures and their components. The specific network structure is identified by the configuration of interactions or absence of interactions among the network actors.

The argument I develop under network analysis is that it is the sufficient complement to bureaucratic politics to understand the institutions of the CFSP because:

- it allows to explain changes and to identify, define, and measure bureaucratic roles over time;
- it allows to capture differentiations of roles and positions within the global bureaucratic structure (although bureaucratic politics include in its framework the concept of the leader, it does not give any hints as to how to go about identifying the leader);
- it allows to take into account the consequences of the difference of sizes of the member-states of the EU by isolating communication networks;
- it allows to make sense of the interactions within the bureaucratic structure and among the structures, and to introduce the conceptual tool of levels of analysis.

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58 A note of cautious is necessary here. The framework I am using in this paper is primarily based of Graham Allison’s framework and Graham Allison’s framework is geared towards US foreign policy decision-making, where the leader is obviously there (the President).
a) **Network Analysis and the Measurement of Change**

Borrowing from sociometry, network analysis allows designing a time frequency analysis, so as to identify patterns of interactions over time. The model that I propose is thus dynamic, looking at the process of interactions as it unfolds over time. Changes are an important variable to take into consideration in order to understand the institutional structure of the CFSP, because as I stated at the beginning of the paper, the CFSP is a process that is still evolving, and not a true policy. Networks are certainly created among the more “permanent” institutions and personalities within these institutions playing a role in the CFSP. These networks are created over time, and new ones rise, as the CFSP institutional framework is changed through the intergovernmental conferences that revise the European treaties.

What is more, as I mentioned in the previous section, the Presidency of the EU is changing every six months, and so does one part of the CFSP troika. These changes in the Presidency of the EU are going to produce changes in the way the CFSP is conducted (see infra).

**b) Network Analysis and Differentiation within the Structure**

The second reason for adding network analysis to bureaucratic politics is that bureaucratic politics does not allow for differentiation within the bureaucratic structure. Bureaucratic politics allows analyzing the structure as a totality, but does not look at role differentiations within the structure. It presents the structure as homogeneous. When it speaks about the leader, it assumes the existence of the leader, and does not give any hint as to how to go about identifying it. It is particularly important in foreign policy to be able to isolate the leader or the lack of leader. What is more, if leader there is, his strength, the respect that he inspires, and other leadership characteristics should be identified.
As I have shown in the first part of the paper, the EU’s foreign policy clearly lacks a capacity for leadership. The “leader” role is absent. Of course the CFSP leaves unchanged the prominent role given by the EPC to the European Council in defining and implementing the EU’s foreign policy. But the EU Presidency changes every six months, so instead of a mono-leadership, we are in presence of a multi-leadership. If we add to the six-month EU Presidency the role of the European Commission and, since Amsterdam, the role of the High Representative it is clear that the picture becomes confusing. In addition, depending on which country holds the EU Presidency, the characteristics of the leadership will differ: some countries are exercising a strong leadership role at the EU level, while others, for different reasons, are less apt and/or willing to do so. Because the institutional framework of the CFSP is a very complex one, it is also useful to identify the leadership role within the Commission, and the other institutions involved in the CFSP process.

Besides the role of the leader, network analysis also helps identifying other roles within the structure: these roles can be bridges, liaisons, followers, isolates (actors that are not linked to any others).

On the overall, network analysis offer a powerful framework for describing social differentiation in terms of relational patterns among actors in the system.

c) Network Analysis and Size Differences

Size differences clearly matter in the formation and implementation of a EU’s foreign policy. Small member-states have less diplomatic resources than big member-states and they may not be represented in all the countries. This may bring difficulty in building confidence with third

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59 A bridge is defined by Rogers and Kincaid as an individual who links two or more cliques in a system from his or her position as a member of one of the cliques. (See Rogers and Kincaid, Communication Networks: Towards a New Paradigm for Research, New York: The Free Press, 1981, pg. 83)

60 A liaison is defined by Rogers and Kincaid as an individual who links two or more cliques in a system, but who is not a member of any cliques. (See Rogers and Kincaid, op. cit., pg 83)
parties. In addition, although the Council Secretariat is a sort of memory for the CFSP, the extent to which it is used as such depends on the size of the member-state holding the EU’s Presidency. Small states will be more inclined to use it than bigger state, since the latter have their own national resources in foreign and security policy. As Antonio Missiroli argues, *the element of bureaucratic continuity and political visibility represented by “Mister CFSP” can also create a duality with the EU Presidency and more generally will induce tensions within the new EU troika: the democratic element represented by the rotating presidency can easily be cancelled by the Secretary General/High Representative and the new member of the Commission in charge of external relations, Chris Patten. To that extent, one can expect that the equilibrium of power and of influence will change with the size, the weight and the specific attitude of the country holding the presidency […]* 61.

A way to take into consideration in the analysis the difference of sizes among the member-states and to measure the consequences of the difference of sizes among the member-states of the EU would be to look with who and how frequently the member-states communicate. One could imagine that Luxembourg would communicate less than the big member-states with third parties. An analysis of the communication patterns established by the country holding the EU Presidency can also show what kind of use and the frequency of use of the other institutions involved in CFSP. It is a fair guess that smaller member-states are probably making a more extensive use of the Commission’s resources in external affairs, than bigger member-states.

Another question arises with the new early warning and planning unit: are the member-states ready to share the classified information in their possession with the new unit? Here again it is useful to study the communication networks, and see what kind of patterns are emerging. Are the bigger member-states interacting less with the unit? Is the pattern of relationship between the big

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member-states and the unit one-directional, the unit giving more information that it is receiving from the member-states? Are the small member-states interacting more?

d) Network Analysis, Interactions, and Levels of Analysis

Finally, network analysis points to interactions not only between and within the bureaucratic structures but also, among different levels of analysis. As David Knoke and James Kuklinski write, [...] network analysis incorporates two significant assumptions about social behavior. Its first essential insight is that any actor typically participates in a social system involving many other actors, who are significant reference points in one another's decisions. [...] Its second essential insight lies in the importance of elucidating the various levels of structure in a social system, where structure consists of regularities in the patterns of relations among concrete entities. Indeed, although bureaucratic politics helps conceptualize the inter- and intra-institutional clashes among and within the structures, it did not help identify other levels of analysis: is it always the totality of the structure that clashes? What about the interactions among individuals and the interactions between individuals and the structure? What about the intensity and frequency of these relationships? What about the content of the relationships: there are networks of expertise, networks of resources, networks of power, and network of trust? Network analysis answers such questions. I argue that “Where you stand depends on where you sit”, is to be complement by: “Where you stand depends on where you sit and on how and with whom you interact”. Bureaucratic politics has taught that belonging to a particular bureaucracy influences the individual’s perceptions. Network analysis teaches that the structure of relations among actors and the location of individual actors in the network have

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63 More than probably in the study of the institutions of the CFSP, we will be in the presence of multiplex networks i.e. same network but with different types of relationship. For instance, I could foresee a network of trust between the Commission and a small member-state, but that same network could also be a network of expertise.
important behavioral, perceptual, and attitudinal consequences both for the individual units and for the system as a whole$^{64}$. The lower level is the egocentric network, then the dyad, then we can find triad, cliques (highly cohesive sub-groups of interpersonal relations within the network), and move to much larger networks. Network analysis, because it is based on a very specific unit of analysis, the information-exchange$^{65}$, allows to integrate different levels of analysis: the individual, the sub-structure, and the entire network. A cross-level analysis is thus permitted by network analysis. In addition, in network analysis, the observable actors (i.e. in my case the EU institutions of the CFSP) do not form the social structure of the system, but the pattern of interactions or absence of interactions among the positions of the observable actors form the social structure. Network analysis allows thus to identify informal structures that were left out by bureaucratic politics.

Of course to test network analysis, empirical research needs to be conducted. Useful instruments are survey sociometry, i.e. standardized questions asked to the respondents through a questionnaire. Respondents can also be presented with a roster, i.e. a list of all other members of the system, and be asked if they talk with each other about specific policy issues. But I hope to have convinced the reader of the opportunities offered by network analysis.

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**Conclusions**

This paper tried to answer the following question: “Why has the EU’s CFSP proven so difficult to implement?” It is my belief that this painful implementation is due to the inconsistencies of the CFSP institutional framework. The institutions of the CFSP lead to permanent confrontation rather than unity. Although they has been able to create a network of

$^{64}$ Knoke, D. and Kuklinski, op. cit, pg. 13
$^{65}$ As Rogers and Kincaid note, communication networks consist of interconnected individuals who are linked by patterned flows of information. (Rogers, E. and Kincaid, D., op. cit, 1981, pg. 63).
contacts between Commission’s staff and national staff from the member-states foreign ministries, such a network is not enough to effectively implement a policy. As long as the member-states will not simplify the framework, the EU foreign policy will amount to inter and intra-institutional fights and will remain a reactive policy rather than an active policy. As William Wallace and Anthony Forster argue: Some of the classic characteristics of European integration have, nevertheless, been evident in the field [of CFSP]: the importance of socialization through working together, the proliferation of working groups as a basis for policy-making and policy implementation, the hierarchy of committees through which ministers and prime ministers set general objectives and officials struggle to translate these into detailed policies. Yet the weakness of central institutions, the marginal common budget, the dependence on mutual trust and consensus more than on rules, mark the second pillar out from all other areas of European integration. When policy is carried out through such a complex organizational network, unintended and even disastrous consequences are sometimes unavoidable.

The first part of the paper has shown how these institutions have unfolded over time. Changes have been made, that amount primarily to the addition of new bureaucratic structures, while the process in itself has mainly remained intergovernmental.

In the second part of the paper, I used a bureaucratic politics and a network analysis approaches to understand why the CFSP institutions are not working, since one aim of the paper was to bring theoretical insights in the debate about the CFSP. Although necessary to make sense of the inter- (between the Council of the EU and the European Commission) and intra- (among the sub-structures of the Council of the EU and the DGs of the European Commission)

67 Rourke, F. E. (eds.), op. cit., pg. 406
institutional clashes, I argued that bureaucratic politics leaves unanswered questions. This is why I turned to network analysis as the sufficient theoretical complement to bureaucratic politics for four reasons. First it allows to measure changes within the institutional structures. Second, it allows to differentiate roles within the structures. Third, it allows to take into consideration the difference in size between the member-states of the EU. And fourth, it allows to take into account the different levels of analysis, and the interactions between and among them.

Although this paper was exploratory and field research is now needed to empirically test the framework, I hoped to have convinced the readers of the potential of network analysis. Rather than keeping this approach confined to the field of sociology, political scientists could make an interesting use of it, especially in international relations, to bring insights into the functioning of a complex decision-making process such as the EU, involving different levels of analysis and interactions among those levels. I believe that network analysis is a powerful tool to close the gap between macro- and micro-level explanations and between formal and informal structures within the decision-making process. I also hope to have raised curiosity among the community of scholars because numerous problems remained to be solved. For instance, one of the criticisms that can be addressed to network analysis is its tendency to reduce humane behavior to numerical data, leaving aside the role of beliefs, and ideas, or the role of personality. As Jerel Rosati underlines, [...] to actually determine the nature of the decision-making process, knowledge beyond the decision structure must be considered. The beliefs, personalities, and modes of thinking of the participants will have a direct effect on the decision-making process\textsuperscript{68}.

To conclude and go back to our case-study, I believe, as our theoretical framework has made clear, that what is needed in the EU foreign policy is a strong leadership that can only be

found in the European Commission. The division between pillar I and pillar II is not viable in the post-Cold War world. However, in the long term, to call for a true CFSP is to call for a European “polity”. In the meanwhile, although its plot seems difficult to grasp, the show must go on…

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