Disrupting the Good Ole Boys’ Club: Leadership Change and Inclusivity in the Brazilian Workers’ Party

Two decades after the implementation of Brazil’s gender quota law, electoral and party politics remain pervasively masculine arenas. Male dominance of local party networks has hindered women’s participation, with Brazil still ranked last among Latin American nations in terms of women’s legislative representation. Those party networks have proven intransigent to external stimuli often cited as inducing party change; a reformed quota law, an electorate increasingly open to women, and examples of successful promotion of women’s participation by a few parties have all failed to incentivize party change among most of Brazil’s party organizations. This paper focuses on two other conditions capable of triggering party change – leadership change and financial incentives. It builds on research highlighting the importance of party leadership for women’s representation and the gendered reality of access to party office to demonstrate why and how leadership change paired with financial incentives can disrupt exclusionary political networks and further inclusion.

The paper applies a feminist institutionalist approach to conduct a case study of leadership inclusivity in the Brazilian Workers’ Party (PT), which implemented a gender parity quota for its internal party office elections in 2013. It uses process tracing and interviews with critical actors to identify the opportunity structures seized and networks mobilized to usher in the parity quota, emphasizing the gendered power relations that constrain strategies to realize inclusion. It then descriptively analyzes 2014 electoral returns to examine the initial consequences of the leadership change for parliamentary representativeness. The paper compares the PT experience to that of other major Brazilian parties, and concludes that the use of quotas for internal party office incentivized by state subsidies constitutes a viable strategy for mitigating gender discrimination within parties and parliament.
Disrupting the Good Ole Boys’ Club: Leadership Change and Inclusivity in the Brazilian Workers’ Party – Kristin N. Wylie, Prepared for ECPG 2017

Two decades after the implementation of Brazil’s gender quota law, electoral and party politics remain pervasively masculine arenas. Male dominance of local party networks has hindered women’s participation, with Brazil still ranked last among Latin American states in terms of women’s legislative representation. Those party networks have proven intransigent to external stimuli often cited as inducing party change; a reformed quota law, an electorate increasingly open to women, and examples of successful promotion of women’s participation by a few parties have all failed to incentivize party change among most of Brazil’s party organizations.

One noteworthy exception is the Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores. PT). The PT implemented a gender parity quota for its internal party offices in 2013, ushering in leadership changes throughout the party ranks. This paper uses process tracing, interviews with critical actors, and descriptive statistics to evaluate that process, working to identify the networks mobilized to win approval for the parity quota, and assess the gendered effects of leadership change on the subsequent congressional elections. I first review the literature on party organizational change, and then apply a feminist institutionalist approach to highlight the gendered power relations that constrain party change. Building on research highlighting the importance of party leadership for women’s representation and the gendered reality of access to party office, the paper concludes that leadership change paired with financial incentives can disrupt exclusionary political networks and further inclusion.

Party Organizational Change

Harmel and Janda’s integrated theory of party change, which they conceptualize as “self-imposed changes in party rules, structures, policies, strategies, or tactics,” articulates the conditions under which party change is likely (1994, 277). While unsatisfactory performance (whether based on votes, executive office, policy, or intraparty democracy) serves as a catalyst for change, the theory underscores the general intransigence of party organizations. In particular, Harmel and Janda (1994) emphasize the role of leadership, with stability in the conformation of the dominant coalition of a party undermining its prospects for change. Subsequent accounts of party organizational change corroborate the salience of party leadership (Harmel et al 1995; Harmel 2002), building on foundational insights about the oligarchic tendencies of party organizations (Michels 1915). Yet neither internal nor external factors appear sufficient to independently trigger change, with general consensus existing on the combined influence of endogenous and exogenous conditions for change (Gauja 2017; Harmel 2002; Hunter 2010).

As articulated by Harmel (2002), analysis of the relative weight of internal and environmental catalysts for party reform is rooted in the “discrete change approach” of the party change literature (Harmel and Janda 1994; Panebianco 1988; Wilson 1994). Studies applying the discrete change approach – which emphasize abrupt rather than inevitable or gradual change (Harmel 2002) – reach mixed findings on the salience of endogenous and exogenous conditions for change. While Harmel and Janda expect that “external shock” would trigger “the most dramatic and broadest changes” (1994, 265), Wilson (1994) and others find that the
Responsiveness of party leadership to such external stimuli is paramount. In the case of party organizational change in the dimension of representation, party leadership seems particularly influential. Irrespective of rank-and-file and societal calls for enhancing representativeness of the party, party elite will likely perceive efforts to introduce new blood in party decision-making circles and/or more equitably distribute party resources as threats to their individual power.

Kittilson’s analysis of women and party change in Europe (2006) offers a compelling model for considering the competing internal and external motivators of party change. She advances an opportunity structure approach to explain how parties’ incorporation of “new contenders” is conditioned by “the set of rules, norms, and political conditions in which the party is embedded” (19). Her approach differentiates between factors exogenous and endogenous to the party, and between political and institutional opportunity structures. The political opportunity structures exogenous and endogenous to the party, respectively, are constituted by: electoral instability, the rise of new issues, and structure of party system competition; and reorganization of power within the party and changing perceptions of party leadership. The institutional opportunity structures exogenous and endogenous to the party, respectively, are constituted by: the electoral system rules; and the internal party structure (Kittilson 2006). Kittilson’s work stands apart from the literature discussed above in its integration of both top-down and bottom-up sources of change (in addition to the exogenous-endogenous distinction). To understand party organizational change and resistance in the Brazilian case, I build on Kittilson’s opportunity structures approach (2006), grounding it in the rich emergent literature on Feminist Institutionalism.

**Gendered Organizational Change**

Feminist Institutionalism (FI) explains how gendered power relations constrain political interactions and processes (Mackay et al. 2010; Mackay and Waylen 2014). Applications of the FI approach have demonstrated the salience of gendered norms and practices for institutional change (Bjarnegård 2013; Franceschet 2010; Kenny 2013; Krook and Mackay 2011; Lovenduski 1998, 2005; Mackay, Kenny, and Chappell 2010; Mackay 2014) and party politics (Childs 2013; Kenny and Verge 2016; Verge and Claveria 2016). It follows that efforts to understand party organizational change would be enriched by insights from FI. As poignantly stated by Joni Lovenduski, “The vast political science of party politics pays little attention to the effects of gender. Yet gender effects are present in both their ideologies and structures. … Thus any study of political parties that fails to take account of gender effects will be inadequate” (2005, 59). Accordingly, this analysis of the PT gender parity rule applies FI to illustrate how gender manifests throughout the process of party organizational change.

The mainstream literature on institutional change (e.g. North 1990) conveys institutional design as a means for retaining or enhancing the privileges of those in power. Often, it entails preserving the status quo while nominally accommodating demands for change. Gender-cognizant accounts of institutional change examine such conservative tendencies through a gendered lens, explaining how gendered norms and practices shape processes of change and resistance. As demonstrated in Wylie and dos Santos (2016), Brazil’s experience with the national gender quota law for legislative candidates exemplifies how primarily male party elites
design and implement institutional reforms so as to preserve the status quo of male dominance. In the case of party organizational change, we would also expect party elites to act to maintain their own power.

When organizational change involves the allocation of party offices, party elites will likely be particularly change-resistant. Party office is, after all, “a crucial political resource for those seeking a political career,” as it affords individuals “privileged access to the patronage parties can distribute” (Verge and Claveria 2016, 1). Yet access to party offices has been limited for women who tend to lack the “male homosocial capital” valued and rewarded in masculine institutions such as parties (Bjarnegärd 2013). As revealed in O’Brien’s analysis, gendered opportunity structures – driven by a party’s political performance – constrain women’s access to and duration in party leadership, with women leaders most likely to emerge in instances of poor party political performance (2015).

The literature discussed above yields the following expectations. First, incentives for party elite to maintain their own power and not disrupt the status quo of male dominance as well as general organizational inertia generate an overarching expectation of resistance to leadership change. Such tendencies will be disrupted in the context of particular opportunity structures that combine facilitating top-down factors with bottom-up mobilization seizing such opportunities. Kittilson’s (2006) approach suggests that parties most responsive to the widespread rhetoric and mobilization on inclusion and representation will be those that are centralized, factionalized, moderately institutionalized, and leftist (especially new left), and confronting electoral instability (in particular, as evidenced by O’Brien (2015), in the situation of poor party performance), with at least a few women leaders to frame the electoral utility of leadership inclusivity.

In what follows, I assess those expectations by chronicling the case of the PT gender parity rule for party leadership, wherein feminist party activists formed a coordinated campaign to disrupt exclusionary political networks. I draw on interviews and documentary research to explain how feminist party activists in the PT – a centralized, factionalized, institutionalized, and new left party – parlayed a climate of electoral instability and societal mobilization into a concrete proposal for leadership inclusivity, presented to a targeted set of party leaders. I then use descriptive statistics from the 2014 legislative elections to evaluate the implications of those leadership changes for women’s descriptive representation.

**Engendering Leadership in the PT**

As compellingly evidenced by Hunter (2010), the PT’s rise to executive power entailed its evolution from a mass party to a catchall, electoral-professional party. Hunter explains that transformation by integrating rational choice institutionalism (RCI) and historical institutionalism (HI), detailing the pivotal role played by party leadership and organization. Two points merit emphasis. First, the combined insights from RCI, HI, and FI offer a more complete account of party change. Parties are constrained by their historical legacies, electoral considerations, and gendered power relations, and accounts of party organizational change that neglect those dimensions are incomplete. Second (and relatedly), throughout its transformation,
the PT retained its internal party structure – centralized, factionalized, and institutionalized (Hunter 2010).

The PT organizational structure is highly centralized as a mass bureaucratic party, with “rules of democratic centralism” governing interaction between national, state, and municipal level directorates and executive committees; although deliberation is “encouraged,” the national party bureaucracy ultimately commands decision making autonomy and can exercise veto power over even ostensibly municipal or state level decisions such as candidate selection and electoral alliance formation (Hunter 2010, 22-23). Party centralization facilitate adaptation by party organizations, allowing reformist-minded leaders to respond strategically to grassroots demands in spite of conservative tendencies by local party elite attempting to preserve their own power (Kitschelt 1994; Kittilson 2006). Similarly, Hinojosa (2012) demonstrates that centralized selectorates can further women’s legislative representation by enabling national party leadership to sidestep local power monopolies and nominate female candidates. From the perspective of those mobilizing for change from below, a centralized party organization also affords a clearer target for their proposal.

In parties such as the PT with a high degree of factionalization, pressure from the grassroots has the potential to induce change. As Kittilson explains, “parties with many disparate factions and interest groups…provide more points of access and norms of inclusion” (2006, 33). Inter-factional competition yields an opportunity for proponents of change to frame their appeal. The PT has since its formation seen internal disputes among its diverse base, forged by an array of leftist groups from organized labor to Christian base communities (Meneguello 1989; Keck 1991; Amaral 2013). The “tendências” or factions of the PT represent (largely) programmatic/ideological differences. The dominant faction is the center-left Articulação,1 associated with former president Lula and notably more reformist and responsive to electoral motivations than other major factions such as the Trotskyist Democracia Socialista (Flores-Macias 2012; Hunter 2010; Secco 2011). With a norm of accommodating various groups and valuing ties with civil society groups, and a history of dealing with internal conflict, the PT offers a relatively favorable climate for proponents of inclusion.

The role of party institutionalization is less clear. We might expect strongly institutionalized parties to be especially resistant to ideological and organizational change (Kittilson 2006; Panebianco 1988). Yet weakly institutionalized parties undermine outsider access by limiting the rule of law, reducing individuals’ opportunities for political capacity-building, and favoring those with “personal political capital” (Guadagnini 1993; Kittilson 2006; Wylie nd). Whether measured at the level of its national or state organizations, the PT is considerably more institutionalized than other major Brazilian parties. Most of its state party organizations marshal sizable human and material resources, have municipal directories or provisional commissions throughout the state, and have regular leadership alternation (Wylie nd). In addition to yielding resources and opportunities for and experience with mobilization conducive to bottom-up campaigns for change, the PT’s institutionalized structure normalized

---

1 *Articulação – Unidade na Luta* joined forces with other factions in 2000 to constitute the *Campo Majoritário*, currently called *Construindo um Novo Brasil*. 
turnover in leadership, rendering party leaders more open to appeals for inclusion, with newer leaders presumably less change resistant than long-time leaders.

Given the general intransigence of party organizations and conservative tendencies of party elite seeking to preserve their own power, as well as the centrality of party leadership in the literature on party change as discussed above, I expect the outcome of new leadership to increase prospects for change. But a party’s process for selecting its leaders could also influence our expectations for change. Studies of women’s representation explain how the composition of and approach taken by the selectorate in recruiting legislative candidates affects women’s prospects for (s)election; selectorates that include more women, are centralized and exclusive, and draw on broader recruitment networks boost female legislative gains (Crowder-Meyer 2013; Hinojosa 2012; Kittilson 2006). Similarly, the approach to leadership selection could affect a party’s propensity for change. The PT’s process for leadership selection is governed in part by the 2001 Processo de Eleições Diretas (PED), by which the party implemented direct membership elections for the National Directorate and party president in 2001 (Hunter 2010; Amaral 2013). The PED reform meant that party leaders would now be elected by the entire membership rather than just by delegates, and thus diluted opposition to the dominant Campo Majoritário factional coalition, consolidating its power and facilitating its adaptation to external pressures (which had been resisted by oppositional factions) (Hunter 2010). While the PT’s more inclusive selectorate for party leadership might actually serve as an obstacle to women’s chances for selection (e.g., Hinojosa 2012), it nevertheless opened party leadership to broader scrutiny from the party membership, making party leaders more susceptible to pressure from mobilization by its ranks.

Finally, a party’s ideological orientation can affect its openness to change. In general, parties are conditioned by their “existing framework of ideas and traditions” (Kitschelt 1994), with a degree of path dependence constraining a party organization’s affinity for any proposed changes. The likelihood of change is positively correlated with the resonance between a party’s history and reform proposals. With regard to the specific proposal of a gender quota for party leadership, a leftist ideology is most favorable given its (at least rhetorical) commitment to equality and equity interventions. In addition to being a leftist party, the PT has a history of supporting quotas. The PT was the first party to institute a formal quota for party leadership in 1991, its largest affiliated union (Unified Workers’ Central – CUT) implemented a quota for its leadership in 1993, and two PT deputies first introduced the national gender quota law in 1995 (Wylie and dos Santos 2016). Those experiences legitimized the use of quotas while also giving women an entrée into leadership and normalizing their place at the decision-making table.

Overall, the PT’s internal party structure contributes to an opportunity structure conducive to party change, conditional upon any proposed reform’s resonance with party ideology and norms. In the case of the gender parity rule, the party’s experience with gender quotas and rhetoric on equality and inclusion proved advantageous for the proposal’s success. The PT’s centralized structure facilitated a targeted strategy for proponents of increased
inclusion, and fewer formal veto points. Moreover, as a factionalized and institutionalized party, proponents of the PT’s gender parity rule enjoyed human (if only limited financial) resources and opportunities for and experience with mobilization inside and outside the party conducive to their campaign.

Yet such structures must be seized by individuals willing to mobilize for and effectuate change. Indeed, the gender parity rule resulted from a coordinated campaign of feminist party activists working through the National Secretary of Women’s office. Thanks to prominent women founders of the PT and the party’s pioneering 1991 quota requiring that 30% of party directorate members be women, women played an active role in party life (Godinho 1998). The 1991 quota was itself a product of feminist party activist mobilization, first proposed at the 2nd National Meeting of PT Women in 1988, resuscitated at the 3rd National Meeting of PT Women in 1991, and introduced with cross-factional support at the PT’s 1st National Congress in 1991, strategically framed by the phrase, “sex inequality does not rhyme with democracy” (dos Santos 2009; PT 2017a). The percent women in the PT’s National Directorate subsequently catapulted from 6.1% in 1990 to 29.8% in 1993 (Godinho 1996).

Women in party leadership were able to use their space at the decision-making table to lobby on behalf of women. As explained by Kittilson (2006), women party leaders can “let the ladder down” to other women, convincing male party leaders of the electoral utility of supporting female candidates and helping to introduced a gendered frame of reference into party decision making. And while women acting on behalf of women is not guaranteed, at a minimum, the inclusion of women in party leadership structures helps them to “stop functioning exclusively as masculine clubs” (Godinho 1996, 155).

According to Tatau Godinho, then Secretary of Organization of the PT’s National Executive Committee, the results of the 1991 quota were profound. The demand for more women in elected office “became more frequent” and gained traction and visibility, persuading both the men in leadership and female political aspirants themselves of the importance and viability of women as political subjects in general and candidates in particular (Godinho 1996, 153; 1998, 29). In the 1994 elections, the proportion of women in the PT’s congressional delegation doubled, up from 8.3% in the 1990 to 16.7 percent (TSE). Again citing Godinho, of all the mechanisms considered for enhancing women’s participation, “none have altered the access and role of women in the party as significantly” as the PT’s quota for leadership positions (1996, 156; 1998, 31). According to Deputy Benedita da Silva, “We, PT women, engaged in this debate about the question of gender in whatever space we were in, whether in the community, church, or samba schools” (PT 2017a). The summary produced of the 3rd National Meeting of PT Women explained, “The organization of women within the party was important for the advance of discussions about gender. … They contributed to allow other women to have contact with feminism. … It was important for the elaboration of public policy related to women. [It

---

2 Nevertheless, as will be discussed further below, informal means of subverting required leadership changes exist. In some instances, the gender parity rule has been met by allocating relatively powerless party offices to women, preserving empowered positions for long-time male party leaders.

3 As will be discussed below, the party’s executive commissions were significantly less inclusive of women.
contributed to the elaboration of electoral platforms for municipal and state governments and for the presidency” (cited in dos Santos 2009, 73).

By 2011, with nearly two decades of a critical mass of women throughout PT party directories (if not executive commissions) under their belt, and the party’s 2010 election of the country’s first female president, female leadership was becoming normalized in the PT. Female petista leaders coordinated with the party’s women’s sectors to pressure party leadership to create and support women-friendly initiatives such as capacity-building workshops and recruit and support viable female candidacies. But barriers remained. Observing the limitations of the party’s 1991 gender quota for leadership and the national candidate quota, party networks of female leaders and women’s sectors mobilized for gender parity in leadership (Interviews with Laisy Morière, May 2015, and Tatau Godinho, August 2014). At the PT’s 4th National Congress in 2011, the party’s pioneering parity statute for all instances of party leadership was approved, to be implemented in the 2013 internal party elections (Agência Patrícia Galvão 2011).

The effort to approve the parity quota was the result of a coordinated campaign by female petista leaders and women’s sectors, which strategically targeted individual “puxadores de legenda” (vote champions) for the party in advance of the National Congress and secured their support (Aggege 2011; Interview with Laisy Morière, May 2015). According to the PT’s National Women’s Secretary Laisy Morière, a group of around 50 women petistas physically delivered their parity proposal to key party leaders targeting all major factions and were a force to be reckoned with. She speculated that some of the leaders surely wanted to reject the proposal but “did not have the courage” to speak against their intrepid group (Morière 2017, speaking at the May 2017 Seminar “Women and Participation in Politics: Challenges and Perspectives).

The parity proponents confronted an opportunity structure that was favorable for party change related to gender equality. Brazil had just elected its first female president, Dilma Rousseff, who viewed gender equality as a key component of her mandate (Jalalzai and dos Santos 2016). And when paired with traditional gender norms rooted in marianismo, which expect women to be moral and trustworthy motherly figures, the societal weariness with long-tolerated political corruption offered a context ripe for marketing women’s political involvement. By incorporating women in their leadership, parties could present a novel face representing an alternative to corrupt politics as usual (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Valdini 2013). Opinion polls increasingly demonstrated a public eager for women to play a greater role in politics. A nationally representative survey conducted by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Ibope) in February 2009 found that 94% of respondents would vote for a woman, 83% believed that “women in politics and other spaces can improve politics and these spaces,” 75% agreed that “true democracy exists only with the presence of women in spaces of power,” and 73% concurred that “the Brazilian population wins with the election of a greater number of women” (Ibope 2009).

Legally, a 2009 mini-reform imposed changes to the gender quota law for legislative candidates that required parties to actually comply with the quota, which had been “a law on paper only” since its 1995 approval (Wylie and dos Santos 2016). The mini-reform also required parties to devote 10% of their publicly-provided propaganda time and 5% of their publicly-
provided party funds to promoting women’s representation (Wylie and dos Santos 2016). With those changes to the electoral law alongside increasingly gender egalitarian societal preferences, the writing was on the wall – parties would have to become more women-friendly.

While the PT was not particularly electorally vulnerable at the time, as a centralized, factionalized, and institutionalized leftist party, with a history favorable to gender quotas, it did offer an internal party structure and ideology conducive to the change proposed by the gender parity rule. The 1991 quota, notwithstanding its limitations, put a critical mass of women in a position to pressure for changes. Female petista leaders were able to leverage that party context and general evolving societal and legal scenario described above to convince the party leadership to support the parity proposal. The PT’s 4th National Congress also saw the approval of quotas for age and race (Abreu 2011). The statute changes promised a major shakeup in the PT’s leadership composition, yielding expectations of further change.

Effects of Leadership Change

The proponents of the parity provision had hopes that the introduction of new blood throughout PT leadership would be a catalyst for transformational change. Morière anticipated a “radical transformation” as a result of the parity measure, facilitating “a new party vision” in which “parity is possible and is something that we can attain” (PT 2012b). Deputy and former Minister of Human Rights Maria do Rosário was similarly enthusiastic, saying “parity in the PT will have a great influence in the parliament” (PT 2011). Reflecting upon the parity principle, former Deputy and Minister of Women’s Affairs Iriny Lopes stated “in our comprehension, parity is an instrument to transform the Workers’ Party into a feminist party” (Lopes, May 2017 Seminar).

The PT’s 2013 internal elections saw nine women elected with a specific office to the National Executive Commission (NEC) – 39.1% of 23 members with an office, more than twice the national average across all parties with congressional presence (17.1%). It was a significant boost from 2010, when just two of the PT’s 13 NEC titled (with a specific office) members were women (15.4%). The failure to meet the 50% target is reflective of the implementation of the PT’s internal quota, which came to be considered satisfied with posts that do not actually have a specific office on the executive commission (in the role of “vogal”). Even some women with titled posts would find their secretariat woefully under-resourced in comparison to the offices held by their male colleagues (PT Secretaria de Formação – Minas Gerais, May 2017 Seminar). Such subversion of the parity provision represents “informal and masculinist party practices” that illustrate the “‘stickiness’ of informal institutions, drawing attention to how ‘old’ ways of doing things have been reinvented and redeployed” (Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016, 17-18).

The numeric results of the parity clause nonetheless represent a significant advance; at the time of the 2010 elections, just over half of the PT state executive commissions had a critical

---

4 At least 20% of party leaders should be less than 30, and at least 20% should be “in compliance with ethno-racial criteria to be defined by the National Directorate,” based proportionally on the ethno-racial demographics of its membership (www.pt.org.br/estrutura-partidaria/).

5 The 84-member National Directorate, which is elected by the full membership, and elects the National Executive Commission, does have 39 women (46.4%). When I refer to “leaders,” I mean members of the executive commissions with a specific office.
mass of women leaders (at least 25%), ranging from 0 to 53.8 percent, with an average of 24.0 percent. In 2014, the average percent of titled women on state level executive commissions was 40.0 percent, ranging from 20.0 to 63.6 percent. Perhaps more importantly, by 2014, 19/27 PT state party organizations were led by a female secretary general, president, or vice president.

Four years later, petista feminists credit the parity rule with changing the political culture of the party (PT 2017b, 2017c). “Now, we women have a greater protagonism, more respect, we are more heard, we have a more equal relationship” (Maristella Matos, PT’s Secretaria Nacional de Mobilização, quoted in PT 2017b). “Although it is not in the statute of the PT, today most panels are comprised with parity. There was a change in the greetings,” in the narrative of the party. Women empowered themselves and succeeded in politically capturing parity for a change in the political culture and everyday practices of the PT” (Vivian Farias, PT’s Secretaria Nacional de Coordenação Regional, quoted in PT 2017c).

The expectation is that the equal presence of women will facilitate a more equitable distribution of party funds to female candidacies (this has yet to materialize), and will embolden efforts to hold the party accountable to its rhetoric of women’s empowerment. One example of those efforts is the PT’s thorough audit of the legislated 5% of publicly-provided party funds that must be devoted to promoting women’s participation, per the 2009 mini-reform (PT 2012a; Wylie nd). While many parties have neglected that requirement, choosing instead to incur a fine (deduction in publicly-provided party funds in the next allocation), with other parties using the funds for dubious purposes, women PT leaders have demanded accountability in the spending of those funds.

May 31, 2017, the day before the PT’s 6th National Congress was to begin, Moriére held the seminar, “Women and Participation in Politics: Challenges and Perspectives,” with a goal to prepare women delegates to the 6th National Congress and discuss what has worked and not worked with regard to the gender parity rule. The seminar included women representing each of the major factions of the party (PT 2017e). Female petistas discussed the need to stand firm collectively to protect the parity rule, and push for its application to actual offices (rather than the disempowered vogal role). A central objective of the meeting was to discuss how to pressure the party to reconceptualize parity as a concept, rather than a number. Moriére lamented, “parity cannot be just a number” (Moriére, May 2017 Seminar); “the number is not sufficient to give women the decision-making power and protagonism that they should have” (Moriére, quoted in Mazotte 2016). Moriére implored women petistas to “fight every hour, every moment for parity to stop being a number and become an everyday form or manner of militancy in the PT” (Moriére, May 2017 Seminar). Just days later, the PT elected its first woman national president, Senator and former Chief of Staff for President Rousseff, Gleisi Hoffmann (PT 2017f).

While there remains extensive work ahead for the PT to achieve parity in all instances of power in the party and in government, the parity rule has worked to disrupt masculinist party networks. All but one of the PT’s 27 state executive commissions include at least 25% women

---

6 In greetings petistas now tend to explicitly reference men and women, i.e., “companheiros e companheiras,” rather than the conventional use of the male form as universal. An English language parallel is the use of “you guys” to implicitly refer to women as well as men, which is a subtle linguistic form of rendering women invisible.
(up from just 15/27 in 2010). After the 2014 Chamber of Deputies elections, for which most of its party tickets approximated the 30% quota, the PT had the largest share among elected female federal legislators; nine of the 51 women elected deputy were petistas. Nevertheless, only 13.2% of its elected deputies are women. Moreover, an estimated 28.4% of the PT’s female candidates in the 2014 Chamber of Deputies elections were laranjas (sacrificial lambs or phantom candidates) with no party support and no chance of election (Wyylie, Marcelino, and dos Santos 2015). So although the PT has made significant advances in mitigating the structural disparities confronted by women, inequities remain. Moriére points to the persistent weight of traditional gender roles, which result in party politics being a triple shift for women (alongside formal employment and unpaid household labor); when party meetings run late or kids get sick, it is the women who leave the meeting. And when women do actively contribute to meetings, they are sometimes disrespected by male colleagues. This all serves to disincentivize women’s participation in party politics (PT 2017d).

Conclusions

The above narrative of the gender parity provision implemented by the PT for all instances of leadership in 2013 illustrates the importance of both favorable opportunity structures and leaders in ushering in party organizational change. In the case of furthering gender equality, opening party decision-making spaces to feminists (typically but not always women) is critical. Although it remains controversial for the State to regulate the internal organization of parties (Katz 2004; van Biezen and Piccio 2013), Brazil should consider following the PT’s lead and mandating quotas for party’s leadership structures.

But while leadership change is a necessary condition for transformational change within and beyond the PT, it is not sufficient. Organizational inertia and party leaders reluctant to dilute their own influence require additional interventions to lure them into supporting such changes. Moreover, the persistence of masculinist informal norms and practices necessitates that gender equity instruments such as the leadership quota are regularly reformed to navigate conservative tendencies toward subverting real change. Costa Rica serves as a comparison; its 1990 Law for the Promotion of Social Equality and 1996 quota law for party structures have been adjusted and improved over time. By 2009, Costa Rican parties had an average of 41% women on their NEC (ranging from 25-50%) and were allocating between 20-40 percent of their budget to training for women (Roza et al 2011, 22). Although Brazil’s mini-reform requiring that 5% of its party funds be allocated to promoting women is a step in the right direction, its scope and enforcement remain inadequate. When enforced, financial (dis)incentives can serve to compel compliance with gender equity provisions, disrupting exclusionary political networks and furthering inclusion.

---

7 One of those nine women switched parties (to the PCdoB) and two renounced their position to serve in subnational government, one as state Secretary of Education, and another as mayor. Of the 45 women to ever serve in the Senate, 13 were elected (counting two “suplentes” or substitutes) as petistas (28.9%). Not counting Marta Suplicy, who left the PT (for the PMDB) after her election, 3 of the 13 female senators in the 55th Congress are from the PT (23.1%).
Esta é a primeira direção composta com base nas novas regras. Todavia, dirigentes imputam a essas novas regras uma suposta crise da direção.

É necessário que, antes de atribuir responsabilidades, reflitamos se o partido foi capaz de incorporar efetivamente suas próprias decisões e acolher o novo com espírito democrático, ouvindo os novos atores e atrizes e se abrindo para refletir sobre o que eles têm a oferecer.

Aprovamos uma revolução do ponto de vista da nova estrutura, de um novo modelo de fazer política com capacidade de influenciar os demais partidos e a própria legislação brasileira, mas, lamentavelmente estamos optando por repetir os velhos padrões da política. A sociedade brasileira, em sua grande maioria, é machista, misógina e conservadora. O partido não é uma ilha. Portanto, cabe a nós discutir, refletir e alterar a cultura interna. A nossa capacidade de ousar é infinita e transformadora. Vamos conversar sobre os desafios dessa nova estrutura do partido, sem apontar o dedo. A responsabilidade é de cada um e cada uma. (Moriére 2015).

a reformed quota law, an electorate increasingly open to women, and examples of successful promotion of women’s participation by a few parties

GENDER

fd

[BOOK BOOK BOOK]

OUTLINE

I. Party change
   a. Lit review (party change, institutional change, FI, party office)
   b. party networks have proven intransigent to external stimuli often cited as inducing party change; a reformed quota law, an electorate increasingly open to women, and examples of successful promotion of women’s participation by a few parties have all failed to incentivize party change among most of Brazil’s party organizations.
   c. This paper focuses on two other conditions capable of triggering party change – leadership change and financial incentives.

II. It uses process tracing and interviews with critical actors to identify the networks mobilized to usher in the parity quota, emphasizing the gendered power relations that constrain strategies to realize inclusion. Demonstrate why and how leadership change paired with financial incentives can disrupt exclusionary political networks and further inclusion.

III. It then descriptively analyzes 2014 electoral returns to examine the initial consequences of the leadership change for parliamentary representativeness. The paper compares the PT experience to that of other major Brazilian parties.
IV. Conclusions
   a. Controversial to regulate internal organization of parties (Katz 2004; van Biezen and Piccio 2013)
what explains the PT’s decision to implement a gender parity rule for party leadership? We would therefore expect parties

situations of organizational with opportunities most likely to be available to women in is afforded by an individual’s “policy expertise, political experience, party officeholding and support networks based on connections to political insiders or ties to social organizations” (Verge)

demonstrating how political processes (re)allocating power and resources are inherently gendered

demonstrate why and how leadership change paired with financial incentives can disrupt exclusionary political networks and further inclusion.

It leverages Kittilson’s (2006) opportunity structure approach to understand the relative successes and limitations of leadership inclusivity efforts within the PT.

Given incentives for party elite to maintain the status quo and general organizational inertia, what explains the PT’s decision to implement a gender parity rule for party leadership? And what were the consequences of that change for women’s electoral performance in the 2014 legislative elections?

The parity rule offers a case of representational party organizational change

Deputy Benedita further explained that the support of men such as Lula was critical in winning approval for the quota among each faction.

The gender parity rule campaign illustrates how coordination between

“grassroots pressure within the party for the inclusion of a group representing this issue (women’s equality) often comes through an existing ancillary organization, which effectively becomes an intraparty interest group” (Kittilson 2006, 33).

1998-2010: average female candidate vote share: 0.86% (average: 0.53%), SR: 16.87% (avg: 7.51%), PII 3.17 (avg: 1.9), cmass: 0.56 (avg: 0.34)


http://www.generonumero.media/as-mulheres-nao-sao-eleitas-porque-nao-sao-financiadas-
afirma-laisy-moriere/

https://www.facebook.com/pt.brasil/videos/vl.199034367251113/1385550121531359/?type=1
References


Keck, Margaret. 1991.


Moriére, Laisy. 2015, 2 October. “O PT, seus 35 Anos e sua Capacidade de Ousar.”


---. 2012b, 8 March. “Secretária Nacional de Mulheres do PT Diz que Partido Vai Passar por Transformação com a Paridade de Gênero nos Cargos de Comando.”
http://www.pt.org.br

---. 2017a, 12 February. “PT Aprovou Cota de Mulheres no 1º Congresso, em 1991.”

---. 2017b, 20 March. “Paridade no PT Ajuda a Empoderar as Mulheres, Afirma Maristella.”

---. 2017c, 27 May. “Paridade Mudou Cultura Política no PT, Afirma Vivian Farias.”

---. 2017d, 29 May. “Congresso do PT Será Momento de Reforçar Paridade, Diz Laisy.”

---. 2017e, 29 May. “Secretaria de Mulheres do PT Promove Seminário em Brasília.”

---. 2017f, 3 June. “Gleisi: Ser presidenta é grande responsabilidade com companheiras.”


