Trade Unions’ Strategies and Austerity Politics in Southern Europe: The Role of Labour in Spain, Italy and Portugal vis-à-vis Austerity Measures

by

Angie Gago

(Draft)

Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference 2014, Glasgow
Panel: Anti-Austerity Protest in Southern Europe
Section: Reshaping State and Society in Southern Europe
3-6 September 2014, University of Glasgow

ABSTRACT. This paper attempts to compare trade unions’ strategies in Spain, Italy and Portugal vis-à-vis government’s austerity measures since the beginning of the crisis in 2008. The main aim is to give some insights about the interactions between unions’ strategies (social pacts versus general strikes) and governments’ strategies (concertation versus unilateral decision-making) during the process of political exchange (Pizzorno, 1977). The effects of the opportunity structure (Streeck and Hassel, 2003) on union’s strategies will also be analysed. The main argument is that although Spanish, Italian and Portuguese unions’ strategies are influenced by the government’s strategies, the model of industrial relations of each country and the links with political parties, we can find a co-variation in unions’ strategies due to the different unions’ political identities. Finally, the paper argues that further research on unions’ political identities is needed if we want to explain this variation.

Angie Gago
PhD Candidate in Political Studies
Graduate School in Social and Political Studies
University of Milan
Email: angie.gago@unimi.it
Trade Unions’ Strategies and Austerity Politics in Southern Europe: The Role of Labour in Spain, Italy and Portugal vis-à-vis Austerity Measures

Introduction

Since the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008, the governments of Southern European countries have carried out various reforms that have affected the interests of trade unions’ constituencies and the popular classes. These reforms are based on the austerity paradigm advocated by the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the so-called the Troika. Governments of different political sign, from the centre-right to the centre-left, have approved reforms of the labour market in order to decentralize collective bargaining, increase flexibility and reduce labour costs. They have also decreased public budgets that have led to substantial cutbacks in social expenditure in health or education and they have approved pension’s reforms that have tightened the eligibility criteria and have reduced the purchasing power of future pensioners. Besides, the public administration and the working conditions of public servants have also been targeted.

All these reforms have forced trade unions to react as their members and, more broadly, the sectors of society that they usually represent, have seen how their life and work conditions have worsened. In Southern European countries, trade unions are not only economic actors that regulate collective bargaining issues but they are also political actors. Although those countries lack the institutionalised structures that allow for a stable corporatist system, all of them have developed corporatist decision-making processes in some policy fields such as the labour market and the welfare state. Unions have engaged with governments and employers’ organisations in the administration of social security contributions or in the regulation of the pensions’ system. Observing the relationship between governments and unions during the implementation of austerity politics in Southern Europe is crucial to understand the changes that corporatist processes are experimenting and to comprehend the impact of the austerity politics on trade unions’ behaviour.

This paper attempts to compare trade unions’ strategies in Spain, Italy and Portugal vis-à-vis government’s austerity measures since the beginning of the crisis in 2008. The main aim is to give some insights about the interactions between unions’ strategies (social pacts versus general strikes) and governments’ strategies (concertation versus unilateral decision-making)
during the process of political exchange (Pizzorno, 1977). This paper focuses on the role of trade unions as political actors. In Southern European countries, unions have fomented this role due to their weakness in the private market (Kelly and Hamann, 2004) and the lack of institutionalisation of industrial relations. Southern European unions have traditionally shown low or medium levels of membership, therefore they have been restrained from using membership numbers as a power resource in order to achieve their goals. On the other hand, the industrial relations systems of these countries are characterised by the lack of institutionalisation. The absence of formalised procedures regarding policy-making processes around labour market and social issues have led to development of a model based on the use of political channels to raise the voice of unions. Turning their organisations into political action, unions have traditionally managed to attain political influence.

However, corporatist accounts usually lack of explanations about how interest groups decide their strategies. They focus more on the changes in structures and outcomes giving a minor role to actors. In the same line, the literature on social pacts offers a great knowledge about government’s decision-making processes and the external economic constraints but trade union’s strategies are usually given a secondary role (Hamann, 2012b).

On the contrary, the effects of the opportunity structure (Streeck and Hassel, 2003) on union’s strategies is a very useful framework of analysis when dealing with actor’s behaviour. Trade unions’ political influence have been dependent on the opportunity structure which is defined by two conditions: the links between the unions with the political parties and the institutionalisation of the industrial relations system. The first condition has been particularly important in Spain, Italy and Portugal due to the initial formation of the unions based on fragmentation around political cleavages. Trade unions emerged with clear connections with different political parties and sometimes the parties themselves created the union or controlled their decision structures. Because of their dependence of governments’ strategies, trade unions are interested in maintaining privileged links with political parties that help them in their long-term survival. The alliances with political parties are one of the political influence channels (Streeck and Hassel 2003: 3). Although these links have withered in the last decades the different shapes that these processes have had in each country have determined the emergence of distinct trade unions’ identities.

Regarding with the industrial relations system, Spain, Italy and Portugal also share some characteristics but it is difficult to talk about a Southern European model due to the different dynamics developed in each country. Some of the shared characteristics are the lack of
institutionalisation, the persistent low or medium levels of membership and the existence of different levels of bargaining and work councils. However, while rules on representativeness have been clear in the Spanish case, in Portugal and Italy the lack of clear norms have led to the development of competitive relationships between unions. Whereas in Spain, unity of action has been persistent since the middle of the 1980s, in Portugal and Italy, the relationship between unions are competitive. These different paths regarding partisan legacies and industrial relations dynamics have led to the development of distinct union’s identities, militant or pragmatic. With the exception of Spanish unions that have moved together towards a pragmatic approach, in Portugal and Italy there is a division between unions linked in the past with communist parties that have adopted a more militant approach and unions linked to other parties that have developed a more pragmatic character.

The main argument of the paper is that although Spanish, Italian and Portuguese unions’ strategies are influenced by the government’s strategies, the model of industrial relations of each country and the links with political parties, we can find a co-variation in unions’ strategies due to the different unions’ political identities. It will be argued that the differences in political identities are the consequence of partisan legacies and specific industrial relations dynamics. In Spain, both unions have developed a pragmatic relationship based on unity of action despite of their initial ideological differences. In Portugal and Italy, partisan legacies and the lack of clear representativeness rules have led to a competitive relationship between unions. Although ideological cleavages have blurred, unions have been forced to develop a distinct identity in order to justify the competition and to attract members. This has been translated into a division between militant and pragmatic unions.

This paper is structured as follows. The next section is going to describe the main characteristics of the model of Southern European corporatism. The second section will offer the main explanations about the causal conditions of social pacts and strikes. The third section will introduce the analytical framework of the paper based on the existence of distinct trade unions’ identities as a result of the opportunity structure. The fourth section will offer an empirical account of the political exchange between governments and trade unions during the present economic crisis (2008-2013). Finally, some conclusions will be pointed out.

Southern European corporatism

The term corporatism has been one of the most controversial concepts in the social science literature. Unions lived a great momentum in Europe after the World War II during what is known as the post-war consensus between labour and capital when they participated
in the regulation of economic life (Ebbinghaus 2010: 196). The hegemonic paradigm of the political economy of the golden years of capitalism was based on the relationship between the institutionalization of political conflict with a good economic performance (Hamann: 2012: 3). In some European countries, mostly in the North and Continental Europe, trade unions became part of the decision-making processes and they acquired full democratic rights in exchange for political stability.

It was during these thirty years after the war that Corporatism emerged in most European countries as a “system of interest intermediation” (Schmitter, 1974). Corporatist literature “understood Keynesian post-war welfare states as part of an implicit ‘social pact’ between organized capital and labour” (Ebbinghaus, 2010: 198) and established a causal relationship between the institutionalisation of strong and centralised trade unions and the existence of left-leaning governments with the achievement of economic growth and the reduction of inequality (Hamann 2012: 4; Baccaro 2010a: 2). Besides, the institutionalization of social dialogue is seen as one of the pillar of the Welfare State. However, the post-war consensus started to crumble in the 1970s when the economic recession made politicians and economists question the viability of Welfare politics (Ebbinghaus 2010: 198). The emergence of Neoliberalism such as the political economy capable to solve the crisis led to think that Corporatism was dead. Neoliberalism was based on the liberalization of the economic market, the end of state intervention and the deregulation of labour rights. Therefore, trade unions were seen as obstacles and were targeted as the protagonists of many of the reforms applied by neoliberal governments.

On the other hand, the corporatist model was never consolidated in Southern European countries. After the WWII when corporatism spread in Europe, Portugal and Spain were still dictatorships. Paradoxically, free trade unionism was legalised in both countries in the late 70s with the arrival of democracy and when the oil crisis was already changing the corporatist dynamics in other countries. The fact that corporatist processes emerged in those countries at the same time of the crisis had several consequences for the definition of the Southern European model. Similar structures and processes emerged but in a less institutionalized manner (Molina, 2002: 309). Although in Portugal and Spain the Standing Committee for Social Concertation (CPCS) and the Economic and Social Council of Spain (ESC) were established respectively, tripartite concertation remained voluntary. There was an agreement in calling the decision-making processes of south European or peripheral countries such as “weak corporatism” (Oliet, 2004; Molina, 2005). This type of concertation process was distinguished by the crucial role of the state in shaping the decision making process (Oliet
2004; Molina 2011; Glassner and Keune, 2010; Costa, 2012) and the lack of centralised trade unions (Oliet 2004:15). Besides, concertation in these countries is mostly dependent on ‘contingency’ (Hamann, 2012; Molina, 2011).

On the contrary, during the economic crisis of the 1990s there was a re-emergence of concertation in form of tripartite social pacts that led scholars to think that Corporatism was not dead yet. This led to the development of a new approach about Corporatism related to the processes and not to the system. New Corporatism was seen not a stable structure but as complex process of decision-making between state, employers and trade unions (Baccaro 2010: 2). This statement made even more sense when it was observed that in countries where there were not the necessary structures of corporatism, such as Spain, Italy and Portugal, concertation was being developed. Those countries used social pacts and trilateral agreements to face the requirements to enter in the European market and social pacts served to legitimise the sacrifices demanded by the politics of adjustment to the common currency (Molina and Rhodes, 2002) developing what is being called the model of ‘competitive corporatism (Rhodes, 1997). Moreover, Baccaro argues that New Corporatism includes labour organisations in the decision making process but does not have distributional objectives, on the contrary, is less egalitarian, therefore trade unions participate in concertation to legitimise the process to compensate the lack of egalitarian results (Baccaro 2010a).

The political exchange: social pacts and strikes

The conception of corporatism as a model to achieve consensus was also underlined by Pizzorno. The concept of political exchange was introduced by Pizzorno in 1977 to define the process in which governments negotiate with unions to get their consensus (Pizzorno, 1977). The mechanism of political exchange has become crucial to understand the approval of unions for governmental reform packages to guarantee consensus in exchange of a role in the policy formation or implementation (Regini, 1984). On the other hand, trade unions can use their influence during the political exchange to get concessions from governments and to influence the process of decision making. Labour organisations can have veto power in the political exchange (Ebbinghaus 2010: 199).

More recently, the literature on social pacts provides a great knowledge about the type of strategies and the role of trade unions during the economic crisis. Studying the positioning of labour organisations during other economic crisis can give some insights about their behaviour today, although as Hamman says: “the effects of economic crisis on unions as
industrial relations actors are not entirely predetermined” (2012:3). Observing labour organisations’ strategies in the past also provide us with a greater knowledge about economic crisis functioning as ‘critical junctures’. During the 1970’s recession many studies of the responses of unions in western European countries affirmed that labour organisations acted in line with previous choices (Hamann 2012:17). On the contrary, 1990s economic crisis was accompanied by the emergence of new concertation institutions in many countries. After the economic crisis, the increase of the number of social pacts in many European countries led to the widespread belief that social dialogue was the common response from labour organisations to solve economic shocks (Hyman 2010: 7; Campos Lima and Artiles 2011:388).

But economic pressures and economic shocks do not explain by themselves the emergence of social pacts, it is also important to look at the political context and actors’ strategies (Advagic 2005, 2011). In this sense, Hamann argues that electoral factors and governmental strength are also important (2012: 2-16). In the same line, Oliet explains that, in countries with “weak corporatism”, social pacts are more dependent on economic pressures and the political strategies of political parties (2004: 15). Regarding to the present crisis, whereas Hamann argues that trade unions engage with social pacts with governments to gain political influence (2012:20), Campos Lima and Martin Artiles explains that trade unions have also signed social pacts in Spain and Portugal because of international pressures and the fear of the return of the right to government (2011: 399).

On the other hand, the literature on strikes can also provide us with some knowledge about trade unions’ behaviour in times of crisis. Whereas economic strikes are directed to employers, general strikes are directed to governments. Campos Lima and Artiles argue that trade unions call for general strikes when issues at stake are not regulated by collective bargaining and that other motivation to call a strike for unions is to be excluded from the political policy-making process (2011:389). In the same line, Vandaele argues that the increase of general strikes during the first years of the crisis was closely related with the exclusion of unions by governments and the erosion of neo corporatist structures (2011:34). Although in the past strikes were seen as revitalization strategies by unions, the defensive position of labour after the economic recession in the 1970’s has led to strategies more based on resistance and fear rather than on the improvement of labour conditions (Vandaele 2011:26). In their study on unions’ motivations to call a general strike before or after a social pact, Kelly and Hamann explain that the strikes that precede a social pact show a change in
the balance of power and usually achieve concessions for unions, whereas the strikes called after a social pact are a way of protest after a failed pact (2004:106).

Finally, although the corporatist account and the literature on social pacts offer us various explanations about the interactions between governments and unions, they lack an explanation about the micro-foundations of the decision making processes within trade unions’ organisations (Flanagan, 1999: 1156). The next section is going to offer the analytical framework of the paper with an explanation about how unions have configured their political identities and how this is in relation with their strategies.

Analytical framework: trade unions identities’ as the result of the opportunity structure

Trade unions can exercise political influence through the opportunity structure, therefore their strategies are determined by it. Unions’ behaviour is shaped by two conditions that formed the opportunity structure: the degree and type of institutionalization of unions through the system of industrial relations and their links with political parties. Although the links with political parties have changed along the years and the institutional reforms of the industrial relations systems have modified the reality in which unions operate, trade unions’ strategies are substantially influenced by their past strategies and structures (Hamann, 2012: 17). As Hyman argues “ideologies inherited from the formative period of trade unions have proved persistent, shaping identities which cannot easily be altered…the persistence of political self-definition has a material basis. In part this reflects opportunity structures” (Hyman 2010: 317). In Spain, Italy and Portugal we can observe two main different identities, militant and pragmatic, which are the product of the different partisan legacies and the specific dynamics of industrial relations institutions.

Partisan legacies

Political cleavages were very important in the initial formation of trade unions in Spain, Portugal and Italy. At present the fall of social democratic and communist parties in elections has left unions without their traditional alliances and both, right and left parties, have adopted neoliberal politics and have shown their commitment to reduce the welfare state (Hamann 2012: 4). Despite of the increasing autonomy of unions from their political allies (Beneyto 2008: 71), there has not been a reduction of unions’ political role and unions’ political commitment continues to be seen as a strategic adaptation to their loss of membership
In Spain, partisan legacies have led to the detachment of both unions from ideological differences and the development of the unity of action. The ties between the two main confederations and their historic political allies, the social party (PSOE) for the General Union of Workers (UGT) and the communist party (PC) for the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) have weakened significantly in the last decades. Although in the beginning trade unions maintained a competitive relationship, the distancing between unions and political parties has facilitated a strategy of unity of action that has lasted from the 1990s until now (Richards, 2008:8). The socialist party, PSOE, governed during the 1980s and implemented the politics of adjustment required to enter the European market and the industrial restructuration of public enterprises. This led to the emergence of tensions between the PSOE and the UGT that ended with the breakup of the official link in the middle of the 1980s (Hamann, 2012: 219). The breakup happened in 1985 when the general secretary of the UGT and socialist deputy, Nicolas Redondo voted against the pensions system proposed by the PSOE.

On the other hand, the links between the CCOO and the PC have also been weakened. Above all when the latter shifted towards ‘Eurocommunism’ and this detached the party from its revolutionary goals and led to a process of social democratization of the CCOO which adopted the strategy of social partnership and concertation. There has been a process of autonomy regarding with past political references that has led to the unity of action and the formalization of organization structures (Beneyto, 2008). Both unions have always opted for collaborative relationships with the PSOE, but their pragmatic position has also led them to call for strikes against socialist governments and to sign social pacts with the centre-right party when the latter was in the government. By the end of the 1990s, both trade unions had lost their influence in left parties. One of the consequences of this has been the search of new strategies such as the unity of action. In this sense, trade unions have renounced their past ideological differences in order to raise their voices (Hamann, 2012).

In Italy, partisan legacies have led to competitive relationships between unions. There are three main trade unions: the General Confederation of Italian Workers (Cgil), the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Trade unions (Cisl) and the Union of Italian Workers (Uil). Although the political links with parties have been significantly weakened or disappeared at present, in their origins Italian unions represented different political
orientations. The Cgil has been traditionally linked with the former communist and socialist parties and, from the political changes in the 1990s, has been linked with other leftist parties. Cisl was formally linked with the Christian Democratic Party and also gather sympathizers of other parties of the centre-left. Regarding with Uil, this union has been associated with the reformist and not communist left such as the Republican Party or the Socialist Party. Despite of the blurring of the first political affiliations, cultural references are still important for trade unions (EIRO, 2014). Besides, these origins explain why in Italy unions are divided not by trade or occupation but by ideological cleavages (Regalia 2012:388). As Hyman argues, “the split between socialist, Christian and liberal ideologies might encourage each separate labour movement to highlight its distinctive identity” (Hyman 2001: 21). In Italy, the Cisl reinforced a sectorial organization that define its more economic rather than political orientation and Uil has also been close to an Italian version of business unionism (Hyman, 2001).

Regarding with the relationship between trade unions, this one has had many up and downs. In the late 1960s they adopted a united front strategy but divergences emerged in 1984-1985 and they have been maintained until now with only few exceptions. The longest period of unity of action lasted from the Hot Autumn of 1969 until 1984 during which unions created a Unitary Federation. However, the industrial adjustment of the 1980s flourished the past ideological tensions and after the adopting of a bargaining strategy of restraint, which was symbolized by the "Eur turning-point", unions split again.

In Portugal, partisan legacies have also led to competitive relationships. The particular form of the revolutionary transition from dictatorship to democracy has had enduring effects in the shape of the industrial relations model. The revolutionary process influenced the configuration of trade unionism leading to a strong division between trade unionists about the role that they should have in society (Stoleroff, 1988). Stoleroff argues that the General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers (CGTP), linked with the Communist Party (PC), continued advocating a type of radical and anticapitalist class trade unionism (Stoleroff, 1988:148). On the other hand, the General Union of Workers (UGT) adopted a neocorporatist and reformist strategy. After the entrance of Portugal in the EU and during their 5th Congress, the CGTP recognised the exhaustion of class mobilization as their main strategy (Stoleroff 1988). Although the differences between the confederations diminished after the entrance of the CGTP in the Permanent Council of social concertation in 1986, the divisions between the CGTP and UGT were evident in the 1990s when both confederations showed different positions towards the EU (Costa, 2012). Their initial political cleavages and
their disagreements around political issues have led to the development of competitive relationships between the confederations.

*Trade unions’ identities and their strategies*

The relationship between trade unions’ identities and their strategies is better understood if we observe the evolution of partisan legacies in relation with the choice between concertation and political mobilisation. In his book “Understanding European Trade unionism” (2001), Richard Hyman establishes three main types of trade unions’ identities according to their distribution in the triangulation between market, class and society. The three main identities are: trade unions as labour market actors, as anti-capitalist mobilization actors and as agents of social integration. Depending on their identity, Hyman argues, trade unions have held a specific conception of democracy, have cultivated specific power resources and have pursued different agendas (Hyman, 2001).

The first identity, trade unions as labour market actors, is associated with the model of business unionism of the USA. The main goal of trade unions in this case is to improve working conditions only related to economic issues. The second, anti-capitalist mobilization, is connected with left movements as communism, radical social democracy and syndicalism. The evolution of this identity during the twentieth century has led to the disappearance of the revolutionary goals that were identified with those ideologies in the beginning. First, during the 1914-1918 war, social democratic parties adopted a nationalist position and only a minority defended revolutionary positions. The nationalist position that most of them adopted during the IWW distanced them from communist parties and “consolidated social democrats as defenders of the social order” (Hyman 2001: 42). Second, with the creation of the European Union many communist parties adopted the so-called ‘Euro communism’ that detached them from their revolutionary goals.

This led to the shift of radical social democrat and communist trade unions’ identities from the class vertex towards the society vertex. Unions were not anymore the defenders of a class but the defenders of the whole society. Both, the Italian Cgil and the Spanish CCOO, have experimented similar processes of social democratization (Hyman, 2001.) The Italian communist party made a shift towards a historic compromise with other progressive forces that eroded the self-definition of the Cgil as vehicle of militant class opposition and the Spanish PC moved towards ‘Euro communism’ and the CCOO adopted the social democratic identity. Both, radical social democratic and communist unions, have moved towards the social integration identity that in the beginning was only related to moderate
social democratic and confessional unions. The third identity, social integration, was linked with reformist social-democratic and Christian-democratic unions. Although in the beginning they were rivals, “they came to share significant common ideological attributes: a priority for gradual improvement in social welfare and social cohesion” (Hyman, 2001:4).

If we stop the analysis here we could argue that all trade unions of Spain, Italy and Portugal would have the same identity, social integration, which is related to the use of social partnership and concertation as the main strategy. However, if we observe trade unions’ strategies during the present economic crisis, we can see that in spite of this convergence, they have opted for different strategies. How do we explain the existence of different trade union’s strategies? Next, we are going to explain how the evolution of partisan legacies in conjunction with different industrial relations dynamics lead to distinct unions’ identities.

**Industrial relations systems**

Institutions are one of the sources that unions can use to exercise political influence. They facilitate and constrain the variety of options and also define the way that actors interpret the outcomes of those options (Scharpf 1997: 39). The model of industrial relations of each country shapes the model of unionism according to three factors: the structure of collective negotiations, the legal processes of decision-making and the framework of participation of labour (Heery and Adler 2004: 58). In this sense, the degree of institutionalisation can determine the type of strategic election that trade unions make (Baccaro, Hamann y Turner 2003: 128).

In Spain, clear rules of representativeness in workplace elections and similar membership numbers have facilitated the unity of action and the development of a pragmatic identity. The trade unionism model has been determined by the existence of the workplace elections for work councils. The state has guaranteed the representativeness of trade unions through the existence of workplace elections and the transfer of patrimony and funds. Workplace elections have given unions a higher mobilization capacity than if they had to rely only on their levels of militancy and membership (Richards, 2008:11). Besides, the centralization of the collective bargaining in Spain led to think that it was moving towards a coordinated economy. In fact, much of the efforts of the Spanish unions have been focused on the consolidation of collective bargaining and their main strategy to increase membership has been their participation in work councils’ elections (Baccaro, Hamann and Turner, 2003). In this sense, workplace elections have legitimised unions to negotiate in areas different than the workplace (Hamann, 2012).
In Italy, the lack of clear rules of representativeness and the dual character of the industrial relations system have reinforced the existence of competitive relationships between unions. The industrial relations system has been characterised by two main factors: voluntarism and low institutionalisation. According to Regalia, due to their original divisions along ideological lines and the context of voluntarism and low institutionalisation, trade unions "tend to oscillate between behaving either as organizations or social movements according to convenience and to pressures applied by the rank and file" (Regalia 2012: 386). In spite of low membership and lack of formal recognition Italian unions have been able to influence governments and employers decisions. This paradox that has made difficult the attempts of classifying Italian model of trade unionism that is based on the existence of a persistent tension between the logic of organization and the logic of the movement (Regalia, 2012). In the same line, Hyman argues that the specific characteristics of the industrial relations system and the search for new ways of raising a political voice as a civil society actor have led to Cgil to configure its identity as a social movement and to remain perhaps as the most radical majority union in Western Europe (Hyman, 2001).

The low level of institutionalisation has had some consequences for the definition of trade unions’ identities. The lack of clear representativeness rules led to the emergence of smaller and militant trade unions that challenged larger unions and that made difficult the development of cooperative relationships between them. Besides, the absence of clear procedures established relationships based in power and conflict. The complex structure of collective bargaining that combines national and regional levels with vertical and horizontal levels and the continued revisions of the workplace representation structures have reinforced the existence of “an informal context of ideologically based competitive unionism” allowing the existence of different strategies in the centre and the peripheral levels (Regalia, 2012: 390).

In Portugal, the lack of clear rules of representativeness and the pervasiveness of politics in the labour market have reinforced the existence of competitive relationships between unions. The system of industrial relations has the following characteristics: high role of the justice in the regulation of industrial relations, a competitive relationship between social partners, the influence of political cleavages in collective bargaining negotiations and the central role of the state (Costa, 2012: 10). Portuguese trade unionism has been characterised by a competitive pluralism based on political and ideological lines. This has pervaded the industrial relations structures and norms. The legislation of collective agreements regulated by extension clauses and the predominant role of the state to solve collective bargaining
conflict are the consequence. The pervasion of politics in collective bargaining issues has meant an obstacle to achieve agreements in the labour market (Stoleroff, 2012).

In a similar way than Italian trade unionism, the Portuguese trade unions have not totally lost their character as a movement and their confrontational relationships have been determined by the lack of representativeness rules. The general politicisation of unions and the militant approach of CGTP have led to the lack of implantation of unions in the workplace level (Stoleroff, 2012). On the other hand, the absence of a clear criteria of representativeness with only few requirements that are not enforced and the lack of legal recognition procedures have meant that all unions are considered to have the same rights (Barreto and Naumann, 1998). This has reinforced the competition between CGTP and UGT because the latter has been benefited due to the willingness of employers’ organisations to privileged the UGT and independent unions (Barreto and Naumann, 1998) to the detriment of CGTP.

To sum up, in Spain, the specific dynamics of the industrial relations system with clear rules of representativeness and a relatively high centralization of collective bargaining in combination has facilitated the unity of action of unions. CCOO and UGT have not been forced to define distinct identities and both have developed a pragmatic character that prioritises social partnership and concertation. On the other hand, in countries, like Portugal and Italy, where the specific dynamics of their industrial relations systems have reinforced the existent of competitive relationships between unions they have been force to define distinct identities in order to attract new members and to justify the competition.

**The political exchange during the present economic crisis**

*Spain: unity of action*

The Spanish government faced the first effects of the economic crisis by revitalising the social dialogue agenda. The employers’ organisations and both trade unions, CCOO and UGT, agreed a ‘Declaration of principles for the promotion of the economy, employment, competitiveness and social progress’ on 29 July 2008. In the declaration, both trade unions gave support to the measures announced one month before by the government such as the increase of public credit for companies and a new fund for protected housing construction.

The commitment of CCOO with social dialogue was confirmed in its ninth Confederal Congress on December 2008. Ignacio Fernández Toxo, who was elected as the new general secretary, declared that the demands of the confederation would continue to be expressed
through its participation in social dialogue (EIRO, 2009). However, social dialogue proved to be very difficult due to the worsening of the crisis. Social dialogue between trade unions and the government also broke down after the proposal of the Spanish government to reform the pension system on 29 January 2010. One of the main changes introduced by the reform was the postponement of the retirement age. This proposal aimed to secure the sustainability of the pension system and to reduce 3% the deficit by 2013. The proposal of the government included several measures such as the reform of social security contributions the promotion of private pensions by offering tax incentives or the reform of widow’s pensions. However, the most controversial point was the increase of the retirement age from 65 to 67 years. Trade unions responded to the proposal of the pension reform by calling for industrial action between 22 February and 7 March 2010.

The relationship of the unions with the government continued to be difficult because the latter insisted in austerity policies to face the crisis. The socialist government launched a new plan to cut the public deficit that included measures such as the freezing of the pensions and the reduction of 5% in public sector wages. Trade unions reacted to the plan calling a strike in the public sector on 8 June 2010. But this did not stop the government to launch the austerity package and the labour reform, both were planned to be approved by June 2010. Finally, the new labour reform act was passed unilaterally on 16 June 2010.

The decree approved by the Spanish parliament had four main goals. First, to reduce duality and temporary employment. In order to achieve this the duration of temporary contracts was reduced to 24 months and the compensation for dismissals was increased. On the other hand, to encourage stable employment, the government decided to increase flexibility in the area of dismissals. In this sense, the use of the permanent employment promotion contract, which had a lower redundancy pay in case of dismissal (33 days per year works instead of 45) was widened. Besides, the government had introduced new provisions to justify objective dismissals for economic reasons that also have lower redundancy pay (20 days per year worked). Second, the labour reform reallocated the incentives for firms to hire vulnerable workers. Finally, the government allowed private employment agencies to operate in some sectors with previous limitations. Trade unions condemned specially the cuts in compensation for dismissals and the changes in collective bargaining that allow firms to opt out of sectoral agreements and negotiate separate agreements at company level. CCOO and UGT reacted to the unilateral reform by calling a general strike on 29 September 2010.
After the general strike and the strike in the public sector it seemed that the renewal of social dialogue in Spain was impossible. But, on the contrary, and only four months after the general strike of 2010, the trade unions and the government signed an agreement on pensions, active labour market policies and industrial policies on February 2011. The tripartite agreement called “Social and Economic Agreement for growth, employment and guaranteed pensions” included the following provisions regarding with changes in the pension system. First, the retirement age was raised from 65 to 67 years applied in a progressive way between 2013 and 2027. Only if social security contributions amount to 38 years and six months workers will be able to retire at 65. Second, the number of years of social security contributions increased from 15 to 25 years. Third, the age of early retirement was increased from 61 to 63 years. By signing the agreement the trade unions changed their view about the increase of retirement age which they considered unacceptable after the presentation of the first proposal of the government (EIRO, 2011b).

The expectations for a new road of social dialogue to face the crisis were frustrated after the elections of 20 November 2011. The centre-right party, PP, was elected with absolute majority. Since then, all the austerity politics have been implemented without consultation and agreement with social partners. On 11 February 2012, the PP government approved a unilateral reform of the labour market that aimed to modify collective bargaining regulations. The reform had as the main goal the decentralization of the collective bargaining structure promoting company level agreements. The idea was to introduce internal flexibility and to adapt firms to the new economic situation. Another goal of the reform was to decrease labour costs. In order to achieve that, dismissals costs were reduced in permanent contracts. Both trade unions opposed strongly to the reform and organised demonstrations on 19 February 2012. The trade unions called for a general strike on 29 March 2012 to protest against the labour reform.

The disagreement between unions and the government also continued after the latter approved the budget for 2013 which included major cuts in health and education. Both confederations called for a general strike on 14 November 2012 coinciding with the call for a European general strike. However, confrontation with the unions did not stop the government to pass another unilateral law a few days after. In this case, the government enacted a royal decree to suspend the pension update according to the inflation and established a 1% pension increase for 2013. This was the first step for the planning of another pension reform.
The PP government approved unilaterally the new decree on 16 March 2013 to reform the pensions system. The decree includes new measures that reinforce the ideas introduced by the last pension reform of the centre-left government. These measures aim to tighten the eligibility criteria to get non-contributory unemployment benefits and for people older than 55 to claim a partial pension or early retirement. However, the reform was not completed with this decree and the government appointed a committee of experts to create a new indicator to calculate pensions in order to secure the sustainability of the pension system. Both confederations opposed the reform but they did not mobilise against it.

Both Spanish unions, CCOO and UGT, have confirmed their pragmatic character during the political exchange with governments. The relatively high number of strikes does not show a shift towards a more militant position. First, the strikes have been called only when their constituencies were clearly attacked as in the case of labour market reforms. On the contrary, unions have not mobilised their constituencies against other cuts avoiding an open political confrontation in the national arena. Second, these strikes have had a clear defensive character. Mobilisation by the unions has been moderate, delaying the organisation of the strikes a few months after the enactment of the reforms.

Their pragmatism has also led them to a contradictory position. Trade unions struggled to justify the signing of the social pact to reform the pensions system. They had opposed to the deal of retirement age and they did not get any concessions from the government. Explanations could be found in their support of the socialist party due to the proximity of the elections or due to the international pressure (Hamann 2012, Campos Lima and Martin Artíles, 2011). In any case, unions proved their pragmatism prioritising their participation in social partnerships rather than mobilising. This strategy has continued until now. CCOO and UGT have opted for the adoption of a low political profile against the centre-right government. With the exception of the general strike of 2012 that was more directed towards the politics of the Troika than towards the national government, trade unions have not mobilised against the austerity politics of the PP.

*Italy: militant Cgil versus pragmatic Uil and Cisl*

The centre-right government, led by Silvio Berlusconi, approved the first measures to face the economic crisis on 28 November 2008. The so-called “anti-crisis decree” included 35 articles and an investment of 6.4 billion of euros that had the objective to recover the economy. Some of the measures included the creation of a bonus from 200 to 1000 euros for vulnerable sectors; a new Fund for Employment and Training; the extension of the social
shock absorbers to workers not covered previously by standard schemes and the reduction of taxes for companies. All trade unions agreed that the measures were insufficient to cope with the effects of the downturn. However, their positions were diverse. Whereas Cisl and Uil limited their actions to demand the government to allocate proper funds for the package, Cgil organised a four-hour general strike on December 2008.

The different approaches of the three confederations towards how to deal with the crisis were evident during the negotiations of a reform of the collective bargaining that aimed to revise the agreement of July 1993. The government (acting as a public employer), all employers’ organisations and two trade unions Cisl and Uil signed the 2009 agreement while Cgil opposed the reform arguing that the agreement would diminish real wages and weaken workers’ protection (EIRO, 2009). Three main changes were introduced by the 2009 pact. First, the possibility to use ‘opening clauses’ in decentralised bargaining. Second, the introduction of a new indicator for wage-setting base on the European Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices. And, third, around a dozen of new experimental rules on collective bargaining around issues such as the length of the agreements and the rules on renewal. The refusal of the Cgil of signing the 2009 agreement widened the division between unions. Cgil called a general strike on 4 April 2009 to protest against the collective bargaining reform and also against the first pack of anti-crisis measures that the union considered inadequate.

In the political dimension, elections were held in June 2009 that confirmed the majority consensus of the centre-right coalition. On the other hand, tensions inside Cgil flourished in 2009 about the relationship between all confederations. During the 16th congress of the Cgil two policy documents were presented addressing this and another issues. The first document, presented by the General Secretary, Guglielmo Epifani, advocated for the need of overcoming tensions with the Uil and Cisl and to sign together the renewal of collective bargaining agreements. On the other hand, the second document proposed a more radical and militant line of the union regarding collective bargaining issues. Finally, the first document was approved in the Congress and Epifani was re-elected. Although this served to foment a more pragmatic position in the bilateral relations with other unions, in the national arena tensions between unions remained high.

This was evident when the Cgil called, again alone, for a new general strike on 12 march 2010 to protest against the measures carried out by the government to tackle the effects of the crisis because they consider them insufficient. Cgil argued that further measures were necessary to face the crisis such as the extension of the social shock absorbers to all workers.
affected by the crisis or a tax reform for pensioners and workers. The militant position of Cgil
in the national arena continued after the announcement of the government of a new
financial intervention package. The package included measures to cut in 2.9 billion euros the
public spending and suspended all renewals of collective bargaining agreements from 2010
to 2012. Besides, the salaries of public employees were frozen until 2013, the budgets for
hiring new public employees were decreased and the retirement age was increased.

Cgil opposed strongly these measures and organised a strike on 25 June 2010 and several
days of protests in the sectoral level. On the contrary, Cisl declared that the measures were
necessary and Uil also welcomed the measures except for the cuts for public servants. In this
sense, the Public Administration Worker’s Union affiliated to Uil organised a strike on 9 July
2010. In spite of the confrontation between unions, unity of action remained as the main
objective of Susanna Camusso when she was elected as the new general secretary of the Cgil
on 3 November 2010. She declared that unity with the other two confederations was her
primary objective and that this unity had to begin with the definition of norms regarding
with the representativeness of the confederations (EIRO, 2011a).

In the late August and early September of 2011, the government approved unilaterally
some measures to adjust the public budget that contained some provisions on the possibility
for decentralised bargaining to derogate both collective agreements and legislation. The
decree fostered bargaining decentralization allowing agreements in the company and
territorial levels dealing with issues such as competitiveness, wages and restructuring and
employment reorganisation.

According to the new labour market reform company agreements can include issues such
as employment contracts, job classification, worker tasks and the management of individual
dismissals. Besides, an important change introduced by the Decree is the possibility for
company agreements to derogate industry-wide deals and legislation but within the limits of
Italian Constitution (EIRO, 2013b). Reactions of trade unions were diverse. Whereas Cgil called for a general strike the 6th of September and organised other protests, the other two confederations were neither enthusiastic about the reform but they did not mobilise against it (EIRO, 2013b).

In November 2011 a technocratic government led by Mario Monti launched an austerity
package called ‘Save Italy’. The package had various goals such as ensuring a balanced budget
for 2013 and controlling the national debt and the public spending. ‘Save Italy’ was a broad
package that addressed issues in many fields. First, it included major cuts of public spending
and tax increases. Second, it introduced measures aimed to encourage economic growth such as tax relief for enterprises. Third, it aimed to reform the social security system and to reform the social shock absorbers system and the labour market. In relation with the social security reform, the measures aimed to increase the retirement age and to change the way that pensions were calculated which will depend on the quantity of contributions paid throughout the whole working life rather than on the salaries of the latest years before retirement.

All trade unions opposed the measures and they organised strikes in the public and the private sector on 12 and 19 December 2011. After the strike, conversations between the social partners with the government achieved that the retirement under previous conditions was maintained for 65,000 people. However, 300,000 workers were left without protection.

Two facts led to think that unity of action was possible. First, the fact the all unions called together for the general strike. Second, all social partners signed an agreement on representativeness and the criteria for making company-level bargaining generally binding for all organisations belonging to signatory parties. The Intersectoral Agreement signed on the 21th of September 2011 by Confindustria, Cgil, Cisl and Uil introduces that the representativeness of trade unions has to be assessed according to the number of check-offs for membership certified by INPS, jointly with the votes that unions obtain in the elections of the unitary workplace union structure. Unions have to achieve at least 5% of certified members and votes in order to participate in collective bargaining. This agreement has also been interpreted as a step for the ending of the division of the unions (EIRO, 2013b). As Regalia argues, the unitary Interconfederal agreement on trade-union representativeness and collective bargaining has the potential to end the split between trade unions of 2009 and to establish a reconfiguration of relations among unions with a better balance (Regalia 2012: 403).

On the contrary, these expectations were frustrated when, in the first half of 2012, another labour market reform was approved unilaterally by the Monti government. The labour market reform aimed to abandon the rules settled by the Article 18 of the labour law that makes it difficult to fire workers in larger companies. The key of the disagreement was easing dismissal rules through the reform of this article. Again the reactions of unions were diverse. Cgil showed a strong opposing against this reform whereas other trade unions such as Cisl or Uil showed a more conciliatory approach. Besides, the 21 of November of 2012 the Monti government asked for a new agreement on productivity that it was not signed by
the Cgil making clear that the relationship between the parties continue to be controversial (Regalia 2012: 403).

In Italy, the different trade unions’ identities have flourished during the political exchange with governments since the beginning of the crisis. Cgil have shown a clear militant position opposing to austerity politics and calling for strikes not only when their constituencies were affected. This shows the clear choice of Cgil for political mobilisation rather than for social partnership. On the contrary, Cisl and Uil have consolidated their pragmatic character during the crisis. Their option for concertation was clear when they signed the agreement to reform collective bargaining. Also, they have welcomed some austerity measures and have participated in social dialogue to implement austerity policies. Only in one case the Public Administration Worker’s Union affiliated to Uil organised a strike on 9 July 2010 when their constituency was directly affected by the measure.

Portugal: militant CGTP and the oscillation of the UGT

The world recession had immediate effects in the Portuguese government and the trade unions’ strategies. On one hand, both trade unions demanded a return to Keynesianism, an increase of social benefits and wages, to face the crisis. On the other hand, in 2008, the response of the socialist government under Prime Minister, José Socrates, to the crisis was the adoption of a modernisation programme. This strategy included changes in the labour legislation that found opposition by the CGTP but the government managed to reach an agreement with UGT leading to a moderation of conflict (Naumann and Campos Lima, 2010).

On 25 June 2008, the government and the social partners, except the CGTP, signed a tripartite agreement to regulate social protection, employment policy and industrial relations. After having the consensus of at least one confederation, the Government enacted the Decree No. 255/X on 7 November 2008 which reinforced flexibility of working time and facilitated dismissal procedures. Whereas UGT supported the changes, CGTP opposed it strongly and argued that some of its provisions were anti-constitutional and asked the President of Portugal, Cavaco Silva, to demand an evaluation by the Constitutional Court which decided to reject the decree arguing that it violated the principle of proportionality and the right to secure employment. This led to the reassessment by the Parliament of some provisions. In particular, the article 112 was modified.
In 2010, three austerity packages were approved by the socialist party that was re-elected in September 2009. The first two measures were adopted by the socialist government with the support of Pedro Passos Coelho, the leader of the opposition party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and they were opposed by both trade unions. However, it was the third package (PEC3 Stability and Growth Programme), approved on 29 September 2010 and prepared to be included in the state budget of 2011, which culminated in the organisation of a joint general strike for 24 November 2010. The PEC3 included measures such as the freezing of investment in public sector, the increase in the value-added tax (VAT) from 21 to 23%, the reduction of pensions spending and the reduction of 5% of public sector wages (EIRO, 2010b).

The decision by the UGT to join the call for a strike also stopped the negotiations that the confederation was having with the government in order to sign a new Pact for Employment. According to UGT, the PEC3 emptied the Pact of meaning. On the other hand, CGTP did not join the negotiations since the beginning because they argued that the Pact was incompatible with the application of the second Stability and Growth Pact (PEC2) on May 2010 (EIRO, 2011d).

However, the joint strike of November 2010 did not prevent UGT from continuing social dialogue with the government as the main strategy. In spring of 2011, negotiations between the government and the confederation started again. The government was at the same time negotiating a new pact for employment and competitiveness that introduced the reduction of severance pay in case of dismissals and implementing a new austerity plan (the fourth of 2011) that included cuts in pensions, increase of taxes and cuts in social and welfare programmes. This time the UGT preferred to sign the agreement on 22 March 2011 while the austerity plan was discussed in the parliament. On the other hand, CGTP opposed strongly the austerity plan. On 22 March 2011, a tripartite agreement for competitiveness and employment was signed by the government, the employers’ confederations and the UGT. The idea of the government was to legitimise the plan and to gain consensus in the parliament but the plan was rejected by the parliament and Jose Socrates resigned as a Prime Minister.

On 6 April 2011, the worsening of the public finance situation in Portugal led to the Prime Minister of the socialist government, José Socrates, to ask for foreign help. On 3 May 2011, the Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, based on austerity measures was signed. Negotiations of the conditions of the European Financial
Stability Facility were also maintained between the Troika and social partners, including the CGTP that confirmed its opposition against austerity measures and asked for an extension of the period to reduce the deficit. On the other hand, UGT declared the importance of national unity in the negotiations (EIRO, 2011d). Finally, a three-year 78 billion of euros bailout was approved by the Troika which set the goal of the reduction of the deficit to the 3% in 2013.

The Prime Minister resigned and after the elections on 6 of June of 2011, the new government formed by a liberal-conservative coalition of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the conservative Popular Party (CDS) used the MoU as a framework for further reforms in social and employment policy. Some of the measures imposed by the MoU were cuts in the public sector and the reform of the labour market with the objective of increasing flexibility and reducing labour costs. Two of the immediate consequences of the MoU was the enactment of a law to reduce the severance payments (8 September 2011) and the approval of the budget of 2012 that included cuts in public servants salaries and a 12% average cut in pensions (30 November 2011). The changes in the industrial relations system imposed by the Memorandum meant a shift in power relations because it favoured the position of employers’ organisations (EIRO, 2013c).

Both trade unions, CGTP and UGT, called for a general strike on the 24th of November of 2011 against the labour legislation changes and the 2012 budget. The latter included measures such as cuts in education and health, a rise in VAT, the increase of working hours for employees in the private sector and the suspension of bonus salaries for pensioners and civil servants. The unity of action was influence by the harsh conditions imposed in the budget proposal. Whereas CGTP had already opposed to the memorandum, the UGT had shown a more conciliatory approach. However, the measures of the new budget based on extreme austerity led to the UGT to a reconsideration of its strategy (EIRO, 2011c). Mobilisations continued after the strike in relation with the increase of working time. On 18 January 2012 the CGTP organised a national demonstration and the UGT threatened to stop trilateral negotiations if the bill was approved. The government decided to step back and to start negotiations with the social partners around this and other issues. But, finally, the bill on working time was approved by the government on 16 December 2011 unilaterally.

The unity between UGT and CGTP ended in January 2012 after the signing by the UGT of the social pact “Compromise for Growth, competitiveness, and employment”. This agreement contained policy guidance in relation with labour legislation, active employment
policy and some areas of economic policy. The CGTP called a general strike on 22 March 2012 against the labour market reform. The presentation of the budget for 2013 on 27 November 2012 was also controversial. The budget included new cuts of salaries for public employees and the biggest tax increase of the history of Portugal. The budget met the disagreement of the CGTP and four federations of the UGT that called a general strike on 14 November 2012. The President of Portugal Cavaco Silva asked the Constitutional Court to evaluate if the provisions included in the budget were anti-constitutional. Finally, the Constitutional Court decided on 5 April 2013 that some measures of the budget were unlawful and the government responded to this announcing another austerity package to cut three billions of euros.

To sum up, two social pacts were signed in Portugal at the tripartite Standing Committee of Concertation (CPCS). First, the Tripartite Agreement for Competitiveness and Employment was signed on March 2011. This social pact included measures such as the reduction of severance pay and the decentralization of collective bargaining. Second, the Compromise on growth competitiveness and employment was signed on January 2012. This pact included some measures of the MoU such as the reduction of the unemployment benefits and the severance pay or the easing of the conditions to facilitate dismissals. The different trade union’s identities influenced their strategies. Both pacts were opposed by the militant CGTP, that called a general strike to protest against the social pact of 2012, and signed by the pragmatic UGT.

Moreover, five general strikes took place between 2010 and 2013. On 25 November 2010, CGTP and UGT organised the first general strike against the proposal of the state budget of the socialist government. The rest three general strikes were against the austerity measures of the coalition government PSD and CDS. The second general strike was also organised by both confederations against the state budget 2012. Other two strikes were called only by the CGTP against the revision of the labour code on 22 March 2012 and against the state budget 2013 on 14 November 2012. Unity of action was again possible on 27 June 2013 when both confederation called jointly for a general strike against new austerity proposals that were included in 2013 budget. Cgil proved its militant character by calling all strikes. On the contrary, the behaviour of UGT is contradictory. It has combined a strategy of social partnership and mobilisation. However, whereas mobilisation by Cgil reflected its political and militant position, UGT only used mobilisation when their constituencies were affected reinforcing its pragmatic character.
Conclusions

This paper has attempted to show that Spanish, Portuguese and Italian trade unions have developed different strategies vis-à-vis austerity politics during the present economic crisis due to the existence of distinct unions’ identities. Some unions, such as the Italian Cgil and the Portuguese CGPT, have clearly taken a more militant strategy calling for various strikes and refusing to sign social pacts with governments. On the other hand, other unions such as the Portuguese UGT, the Spanish CCOO and UGT and the Italian Cisl and Uil have developed a very different strategy vis-à-vis austerity politics. They have resorted to both, social pacts and strikes, but in overall their strategy has been more collaborative and they have been willing to sign social pacts due to their pragmatic character.

We can also point out two preliminary conclusions. First, the crisis has not changed trade unions’ identities. Trade unions have reacted to austerity measures using a repertoire based on the combination of partisan legacies and the industrial relations institutions. As Hyman argues, “the ideologically-rooted confrontation of competing models of trade unionism has possessed self-sustaining dynamic. Each model, embodied in substantial organizations with inherited traditions, principles and modes of operation, has acquired over time a considerable institutional inertia” (Hyman 2011: 4). Second, the crisis is placing in a very difficult position to pragmatic trade unions. They have struggled to justify their participation in social partnership giving their consent to measures that go in clear detriment of popular classes such as the pension reform in Spain and the conditions of the MoU in Portugal.

Finally, we can say that this paper has two main weaknesses. First, it relies only on secondary sources to account for trade unions’ identities. In this sense, further research based on interviews will be necessary to have a more detailed explanation about their behaviour. The interviews with trade unionists will proportionate crucial information about the role of leadership and the influence of internal organization dynamics. Second, this paper has not included the European dimension in order to explain trade unions’ identities. But, as Hamann argues, the position of the unions are a product of the political process which is conditioned by the historical legacies, the national institutions and the way that external economic pressures are framed by the actors (Hamann, 2012: 3). Taking into account the European dimension will be fundamental if we want to fully understand why trade unions have chosen to mobilise in some cases and to opt for social dialogue in others. In which way the pressures of the Troika affect their strategies? Which strategies are developing in the
European level? Further research on trade unions’ identities and strategies should address these issues.

Bibliography


EIRO (2009a) “Cgil refuses to sign agreement on collective bargaining reform” Available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2009/02/articles/it0902059i.htm


EIRO (2010a) “CGTP and UGT announce joint strike against austerity measures” Available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/10/articles/pt1010029i.htm


EIRO (2011d) “EC, ECB and IMF meet with social partners before setting bailout conditions” Available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/10/articles/pt1010039i.htm


EIRO (2013b) “Italy. Industrial Relations Profile” Available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/italy.htm

EIRO (2013c) “Portugal. Industrial Relations profile”. Available at http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/country/portugal.htm


Pizzorno, Alessandro (1977) Scambio politico e identità collettiva nel conflitto di classe. Etas Libri, Milano


Regalia, Ida (2012) "Italian trade unions: Still shifting between consolidated organizations and social movements?" Management revue Vol. 23 (4)


Stoleroff, Alan (1988) «Sindicalismo e relações industriais em Portugal», *Sociologia Problemas E Práticas (Lisboa)*, 4, pp. 147-164
