CITIZENSHIP, WELFARE AND SOCIAL COHESION. Is there a civic turn in Norwegian public policy towards immigrants?

Grete Brochmann,
Institute for Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo

Concern over the development of parallel societies in the wake of increased immigration and insufficient integration has induced public concern over what has been labelled social cohesion – the societal “glue” – usually defined as various versions of generalized trust: the preconditions liberal democratic welfare states rest upon in order to ensure the continued welfare for all its members in a context increasingly featured by people’s diverse loyalties and lifestyle preferences. Although being a more general concern in today’s Europe, the issue has crystalized through multicultural immigration. More than four decades after the introduction of various versions of integration policies towards immigrants in Europe, several states have embarked on a critical scrutiny followed by reform processes to adjust practices of the past. Multicultural policies, underlining the rights of immigrants and ethnic minorities to preserve their cultural inheritance, are many places critically revised. Integration problems are in focus and the public has largely turned more critical towards immigration. Revisions throughout the receiving states of Europe have taken different routes, yet a common denominator has been a more selective access control. Apart from the EU internal mobility regime, liberalization of access policy towards high skilled labour from 3rd countries have been introduced, in tandem with steadily more restrictions on immigrant categories justified on humanitarian grounds. Intentionally reinforced access control has been combined with retrenchments and adjustments of various kinds as to the welfare policies relevant for the immigrant population.

In this larger context of retrenchments, revisions and a new interest in sufficient and/or necessary basic values for a liberal democratic state to reproduce itself, the term “civic integration” or “civic turn” (Mouritsen 2008, 2009) has been used to coin a generic aim of civilizing or disciplining newcomers into virtuous and productive citizens of liberal democratic states. A number of new policy claims in the realm of “citizenship-making” (language requirements, knowledge about receiving society –citizenship tests -, ceremonies, virtue of participation etc.) are used as examples of how European democracies today exhibit varieties of conditioned liberality within which culturalized pressures to become specific
kinds of modern liberal citizens implicitly limit the same liberality. Within this “civic integration” discourse, two opposing positions have materialized; one arguing for a tendency of convergence of policies in Europe, rendering the traditional national models obsolete (Joppke 2007), and the other arguing for resilience of national approaches (Jacobs and Rea 2007).

This paper addresses the civic turn hypothesis, using Norway as a case. I will go through and discuss adjustments and reforms in the area of citizenship-making in a broad sense the last 15 years, using public documents and law revisions as empirical data, and I will argue that both diffusion and national resilience can be substantiated. I also argue more substantially that the civic turn discourse needs to link up more systematically with the equality/labour inclusion dimension, when assessing the alleged turn normatively.

“Pluralistic state interventionism”¹

The conceptual dichotomy redistribution and recognition, as discussed by the American social philosopher Nancy Fraser (1997) is frequently used to pin down a central area of tension as concerns immigration and the welfare state. According to Fraser, justice has both a redistribution and recognition dimension. The former involves attacking socio-economic injustice, exploitation and poverty. The recognition dimension, on the other hand, has to do with eradicating cultural and symbolic injustice through measures which grant recognition and respect to invisible or discredited practices, groups and identities. In Norwegian policies towards immigrants with legal residence, the “integration” philosophy has involved both dimensions since the formative years of the 1970s. Equal treatment in terms of access to social rights should be combined with cultural recognition in the sense that newcomers should have the possibility to retain their cultural luggage and identity from the country of origin. As for the other Scandinavian advanced welfare state, a combination of “interests, ideas and institutions” (Boswell 2007) serves to explain the Norwegian political configuration of the redistribution/recognition dichotomy in practice. From the outset, “redistribution” in terms of equal treatment, as concerns both salary level and access to welfare entitlements, was seen as a systemic necessity in order to avoid a segmented labour market, with a potential of undermining hard-won labour standards. Hence the equal treatment policy reflected institutional exigencies and thus political interests of central actors within the polity. The

¹Term used by Francis Sejersted on the Scandinavian take on ‘multiculturalism’( 2005:425).
recognition dimension was from the outset more of an ideological feature – a reflection of the zeitgeist of the radical early 1970s, including incorporation of external human rights conventions. Tolerance of cultural diversity in Norway, i.e. support to the preservation of the original culture of immigrant minorities, was from the beginning by and large expressed in terms of individual rights, not group rights – individual freedom of religion, individual right to mother tongue instruction as well as Norwegian language training, individual freedom of expression etc. There were however, also elements of policy approaches directed at group level, like organizational support to religious associations, exceptions from laws affecting cultural/religious traditions as well as occasional support to minority representation in certain contexts. And it is possible to claim that the recognition dimension understood as the facilitation of cultural preservation in itself indirectly denotes some sort of group membership for newcomers.

It can be argued (Brochmann and Hagelund 2012) that the Norwegian version of the integration ideology represented an anomaly or a breach with the overarching social democratic approach to general socialization of the population that had taken place after the 2nd world war, in which the welfare state played a central role in nation-building. By means of social rights, all inhabitants were to be incorporated into society and become part of the modern nation-state that was to be strengthened by combating social inequality based on class affiliation, region and, gradually, also gender. The production of a national ideology linked to the welfare state became both means and end: National solidarity was a prerequisite for the development of the welfare-state project, but it was also viewed as a consequence, an ongoing spin-off from the development of welfare for the citizens.

The Labour Party (the ruling party or ‘state-bearing party’ as it came to be called) was not only aiming to unify all of Norwegian society but also to ensure the inner cohesion of the national culture. Cultural life was to be formed to benefit the people; the goal of politics was to create a more secure and thus richer life for everybody. Security was also linked to freedom: The social democrats believed that security and trust were preconditions for equal opportunity, thus also for freedom. Popular education (Folkeoppdragelse) became a catchword in this variant of social engineering, in which ‘the will to modernise, centralise and rationalise’ was the baseline for policy-making - and state control. Social-scientific, especially socio-economic, research came to play an important role for decision-makers during this period. Roger

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2 ‘Ideological’ here defined as ‘ideas with symbolic power’ – inspired by Pierre Bourdieu.
Brubaker’s distinction between ‘politics of interest’ and ‘politics of identity’ (Brubaker 1992) in nation-building was not particularly distinct in the early post-war period in Norway. Identity and interests formed a synthesis in the name of building a society and the welfare state. A general homogenization (assimilation) took place that is often seen as a precondition for the development of the specific Nordic brand of a welfare state system (Loefgren 1999).

The integration ideology of the 1970s, through which immigrants could at least theoretically, choose to retain their culture and their private sphere undisturbed, thus represents an interesting turning point in the post war history. Leaving out new members of the Norwegian society from the general streamlined popular education was seen as the right and necessary approach in order to accommodate modern thinking on human rights and cultural pluralism. The integration ideology became a compromise between equality and diversity, between solidarity and freedom. Curiously, the otherwise quite paternalistically intervening welfare state, took on a kind of cultural liberalism as a central ideological premise in relation to immigrants in this early phase.

How deeply founded this Norwegian integration version of multicultural policies actually was has nevertheless been a recurring issue in public debate ever since the 1970s. Ideologically, integration was for long negatively defined – it was the negation of assimilation. Assimilation was associated with everything wrong from the earlier, largely oppressive approach towards the national minorities, primarily the Sami population. Looking back now, more than four decades after the initiation of the integration approach, there has been a gradual change of tide in the public understanding of the processes to which the concepts refer, and more important, there has also been a change in substantial policy approach to the whole redistribution/recognition complex.

From warning of assimilation to necessary cultural adaptation

During- roughly speaking- the first 15 years of new diversity-Norway (till the end of the 1980s), fear of offending newcomers prevailed. The authorities were apparently preoccupied

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3 The Norwegian approach to ethnic diversity in this initial period largely represented ideology import from the more experienced immigration country Sweden
4 Mats Wickström (2013) interestingly points to the fact as concerns Sweden in this respect, that the early “social engineer”, Gunnar Myrdal, considered assimilation as inherently anti-racist and progressive.
5 The term “multicultural” never got status as an –ism in Norway. It has meant ethnically plural in a descriptive sense, and the policy-related term has been “integration” in most contexts.
with the free choice line in relation to the inclusion of newcomers, i.e. immigrants were to be shielded against the assimilatory forces of the majority society, and parents were even cautioned about the ‘danger of hidden assimilation pressure’ that could be part of Norwegian kindergardens. This concern gradually dwindled, and by the end of the 1980s the tenor of the public documents had changed, a tendency which was accentuated during the 1990s and the 2000s. This new communication started with a White paper to the Parliament in 1987, in which reciprocity and the duty to participate was emphasized. This actually changed message, which was again imported from Sweden, mildly modified the earlier free choice line. No one should be allowed to withdraw from society, from learning the Norwegian language or achieve knowledge about the majority society. Three unconditional principles of the Norwegian polity were introduced; democracy, gender equality and children’s rights. No deviance from these benchmarks for the tolerance of difference would be accepted, it was asserted, although assimilation was still presented as a malign term. After this noteworthy white paper of 1987, during the 1990s and the 2000s targeting the individual gained further importance at the expense of groups, although the welfare apparatus still registered and directed measures towards individuals as group members for some purposes. And, besides, particularly since the turn of the century, protection of individuals from group pressures of various kinds became pronounced, gender issues ranking high in this respect. The immigrants themselves have revealed a mixed attitude towards the group/individual nexus: The urge to be seen as an individual is obviously there, but at the same time, claims are made to be protected as members of groups (such as religious and linguistic minorities) to be given ‘quotas’ in political representation or special arrangements in labour life.

These are the broad strokes of the development since the 1970: On the ground, there seems to have been a shift in emphasis from a relatively soft and passive rights-based multicultural policy to a more actively interfering and duty-based methodology, thus prompting public accusations of a retreat to hard-core assimilation strategies.

Reflections on nationhood

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6 White Paper to Parliament no. 39 (1973-74)
8 White Paper to Parliament no.39 (1987-88)
Let’s now take a closer look on the policy changes from the 1980s onwards, the way they are reflected in central public documents. I will concentrate on the ideological level – the ideas on which the overarching approach is based, in order to see how a possible “civic turn” materialize in the texts.

It is interesting to note how seamlessly the post-war ideology of the unity of the nation in the name of welfare integration changed into a new conception of diversity and integration through tolerance of otherness, with respect to national identity and cultural anchorage. In practically all the public documents on immigration and integration from the 1970s to the turn of the century, there is an absence of reflections on the nation in terms of national identity of the majority and cohesion-making. The authorities had either skilfully avoided or unconsciously omitted discussing these issues in all the parliamentary white papers on immigration and integration, until 2004, when the so-called Diversity White Paper was published. The earlier white papers confined themselves to stating that ‘cultural diversity is enriching and an asset for a sense of community’.

An alternative source for analysing understandings of culture and nation is to be found in the government white papers on cultural policy. Here, an interesting conceptual shift took place through time. Until the 1990s, growing cultural diversity was also here viewed positively - as an unambiguous enrichment of Norwegian society. This was repeated routinely during the 1970s and 1980s. The state’s task was seen as a facilitator in order to provide equal opportunities in the realm of culture.

The Willoch right-wing government’s White Paper no. 27 (1983–84) was the first to mention any unrest at all concerning ‘pluralisation’ in a general sense: ‘...indicates that these phenomena can also lead to insecurity, rootlessness and an uncertainty of values for the individual’. Instead, ‘a conscious cultural policy that gives people real access to a meaningful life [will] prevent and counter the dissolution of norms and values in society’.

When the Brundtland Social Democratic Government actually approached challenges facing the national (majority) culture in the early 1990s, it forestalled the later cohesion-discourse: Culture had now acquired the meaning ‘totalising cohesive force’; cultural inheritance was at stake; and the Government was back in linking national culture and the welfare state:

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Political ideologies have been weakened. The values on which the modern welfare society is based are just as vital for the further development of society. Therefore, the government wishes to underline the importance of preserving and making visible the democratic inheritance that has humanism, social solidarity and equality as bearing elements. The most important defence of democracy will be to maintain common responsibility as a key social ethic. [...]. The government will therefore seek to strengthen culture as a societally creative and stabilising force. In the opinion of the government, our age needs enhanced measures that bind people more closely together in a common cultural community based on common insight, values, references and symbols as important preconditions for a functioning democracy.  

Further:

Concentrating on national culture must also entail great respect for the cultures of other countries. Strengthening Norwegian culture does not imply that it is better than everybody else’s, but that it is important as it is ours. Because it embodies precisely our history, our traditions, our way of life, the form and expression that previous generations have given their thoughts and dreams. There is not necessarily any conflict between the need to preserve one’s own culture and the wish to be open to the cultural expression of other countries.

These rather clear cut messages did not, however, lead to any noticeable discussion in the public, as was actually the case with most White Papers on culture.

Public messages – popular attitudes

Practical integration work gradually became more experienced and comprehensive during the 1980s and 1990s, and the obligation to participate in society was gradually strengthened in the integration policy documents. Whereas the 1987 white paper clarified the boundaries for freedom of choice, a new white paper in 1997 (Concerning Immigration and Multicultural Norway) emphasised even more strongly active participation as an ideal:

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A diversity of culture and belief, of knowledge and skills makes us better equipped to meet new challenges, nationally and internationally. Immigration gives us access to a considerably more varied basis of experience and knowledge than [that] which exists in a more closed, uniform society. For us to be able to make full use of this basis, all inhabitants, no matter [what] their background, must have the opportunity of taking an active part in the life of society, and there must be contact and interaction between different groups in the population.\textsuperscript{17}

The emphasis on work, education, social services, housing and health was the same as in the late 1980s. But while the ministry in the 1987 white paper meticulously went through immigrants’ rights sector by sector, the 1997 white paper dealt with work and education as \textit{arenas for participation} where immigrants could become part of the community. The state continued to be responsible for organising things so that everyone would have equal opportunities to participate (by creating meeting places, work and a perception of Norway as a multicultural society, for example) yet it was underscored more strongly that each individual has an \textit{obligation} to participate.\textsuperscript{18}

During the 1990s public discourse on immigration and integration changed in Norway, and the tenor turned more mixed. The social scientist Ottar Brox wrote a book in 1991 called ”I am not a racist, but...” (Brox 1991 authors translation), which played an important role in public and academic discussions. Brox actually placed ”political correctness” as a theme on the agenda by inventing a new concept; ”The moral-championship” (\textit{moralmesterskapet}). One of his major points was that researchers in the field of migration strived to appear as morally good as possible more than approaching the field analytically. – Research became a presentation of self in the public and in the peer group of academics. Researchers figured prominently among what he called the”moral elite”. One of Brox’ theses was that substantial self-censorship was prevalent among researchers (and politicians) in fear of being called ”racist”, with the result that debates were choked or never raised. Even substantial facts generated through research were held back as they could ”function racist” in the public, according to Brox. Furthermore Brox analyzed how the ‘moral left’ and the increasingly forceful ‘populist right’ reinforced each other’s positions. The book was naturally very controversial among his colleagues at the time.
In the political sphere the same year another intervention played into this schism: A leading labour politician, Rune Gerhardsen,\(^{19}\) accused Norwegian establishment, absolutely including his own party, of being kind to a fault, or mistakenly nice to weak groups – immigrants in particular. Gerhardsen (1991) called this phenomenon *Snillisme* (literally *kind-ism*) – making an -ism out of being excessively understanding and accommodating (Hagelund 2003). The *snillisme*-concept was originally coined by the leader of the populist rightist party (FrP), which made the intervention even more dubious within the political left.. The message of Gerhardsen was that the Norwegian welfare state had to shape up its policies towards weak groups through making demands on the individuals instead of patronizing them and clientelizing them through generous public benefits. Anthropologist Unni Wikan followed suit with her book *Mot en ny norsk underklasse* (Towards a new Norwegian underclass)(1995).

Both were highly critical of the way the welfare state had handled immigration: The insistence on social and cultural rights had been allowed to overshadow the obligations regarding participation and adaptation that the authors argued had to apply also to newcomers. These significant interventions – basically coming from the political left - represented a change of tide, and definitely also legitimized a more critical scrutinization of integration policies as well as public discourse on issues related to immigration. After the early 1990s, and even more so after the turn of the century, public discourse on immigration has become polarized, yet at the same time including more voices – from both minority and majority population. A report from the Institute for Social Research in Oslo in 2014 (Enjolras et al 2014) on freedom of expression in the Norwegian public, revealed a mixed picture: Protection of minorities against racism, harassment and pestering had a high standing in the population when balanced against freedom of expression.\(^{20}\) It also revealed that almost all minority representatives being interviewed had had negative experiences related to their ethnic or religious background when participating in the public debate. The investigation underlined the change that had nevertheless taken place since the 1990s in the sense that a “plural set of voices have emerged and that more possibilities for minorities to take on different ideological positions exist today” (2014:3). As to general attitudes towards immigration and integration in the Norwegian population, a slight positive tendency is possible to detect in 2014, as compared to 2005: Norwegians are now slightly more positive to 1) the contribution of immigrants in the labour market (69%- 77%); 2) that more refugees should been given

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\(^{20}\) Three out of four stated that hate speech against immigrants were not acceptable anywhere.
residency (9%-18% - approximately half of the population thinks the existing level is ok). 3) Fewer persons think immigrants generally is a source of insecurity in society (40%-28%), 4) yet slightly fewer believes that “immigrants generally speaking is an enrichment to cultural life in Norway” (71%-69%).\(^{21}\) At the same time more than 40% of the population wants more restricted access to the country.

By the mid-1990s, the authorities noted that the proportion of immigrants receiving social benefits was three times as high as for the rest of the population.\(^{22}\) Surveys had been produced that documented weak ties to the labour market among many minority groups as well as considerable differences in living conditions between minorities and the majority.

**Perceived crisis in integration policy**

For large parts of the 1980s and 1990s, integration policy was overshadowed by control policy and the asylum debate. But in the new century, the debate has been most vexed concerning integration policy, frequently labelled a ‘crisis’. About the turn of the century, politicians from the entire political spectrum expressed the view that integration policy had failed and that new measures were called for. Two sources of concern were particularly prevalent: employment and gender, which have been coupled together in an understanding that cultural- and religious-based patriarchal family patterns weaken the participation of minority women in the labour market and civil society. As a result, their ability to support children in their education and social life was also seen as weakened. Translated into policies and concrete measures, this analysis implied emphasizing integration and participation as an obligation, a requirement to be made of immigrants that the authorities were also prepared to enforce.

The employment concern did not actually apply only to immigrants. The welfare state faces a formidable task in sustaining employment rates and maintaining a necessary balance between the proportion of the economically active and those on social security. At the same time as the immigrants’ weak link to the labour market was giving rise to increasing worry in the 1990s, the so-called workline was launched as a major objective in general welfare policy. In Norway, a high level of employment has been a goal for general welfare policy since the end of the

\(^{21}\) [http://www.ssb.no/befolkning/statistikker/innvhold/aar](http://www.ssb.no/befolkning/statistikker/innvhold/aar)

1950s, which has been reflected in family policy, taxation policy and pension schemes.\textsuperscript{23} There has also been a high level of legitimacy regarding state interventions into order to ensure such objectives (ibid.). Despite the generality of the work-line emphasis, the public and the authorities became more strongly focused on the immigrant population, as the employment rate in some of the minority groups were alarmingly low, as compared to the majority population as well as to other immigrant groups.

The gender concern, on the other hand, specifically related to immigrants and deals explicitly with culture, cultural differences and the question of ‘cultural incompatibility’. Through the mass media, arranged marriages, sexual mutilation and suppression of women in immigrant environments were placed on the public and political agenda around the turn of the century. ‘Women with an immigrant background’ became a category linked to special integration challenges, and ‘family immigration’ turned into an issue in the public.

After the turn of the century, the perception of crisis and the need to develop new ways of thinking materialized in two important law amendments and two white papers: the Introductory Act, the Citizen Act, the Diversity White Paper and the Holistic integration White Paper.

\textit{The Diversity White Paper}

The Diversity White Paper - presented by the Bondevik Centre-Conservative government in 2004 - described far more clearly than earlier white papers, a tension between individuals’ freedom to choose cultural affiliation and society’s demands for adaptation. Its creed is that policy must promote the individual’s opportunity to make independent choices. It is ‘the single individual in focus’: Yes to diversity, yes to individual freedom, but at the same time, individualism must not be allowed to weaken the ‘rules of the game’ that everyone in a society must observe. These are defined as laws and regulations as well as ‘something more’. One must ‘ensure a respect of society’s basic values’; ‘certain principles are unchallengeable’; ‘something must be shared by all’, and so on: It is The Good State speaking. Tolerance, participation, inclusion, anti-discrimination, dialogue and diversity are constantly recurring concepts. The government stuck its neck out by calling for an acceptance of basic social values (the ‘glue’ in society) without doing much to define them. It clearly states that under

\textsuperscript{23} Halvorsen & Jensen 2004.
certain circumstances, the state has the right to intervene in the private sphere, even though the conduct in question is, strictly speaking, not in conflict with the law. It was not made clear however, just how the authorities envisaged carrying this out in practice, or where various boundaries actually go.

The overall message of the Diversity White Paper was that ethnic minorities are offered rights and cultural tolerance in exchange for accepting the basic principles of Norway’s laws and values. Demands are made in exchange for redefining the basis of the community from a national monoculture to a multiculture within the framework of a transformed nation-state. Minorities are understood as ‘culture-bearing’ groups that need to be integrated via work, education and a public sphere that offers participation and that is to transform them from immigrants into Norwegian citizens. They are to be fitted into a nation-state that has to be recreated to cope with cultural diversity; the state needs to transform and the old narratives are to be given new content. Alongside all the fine phrases about diversity, tolerance and dialogue, this white paper reflects a more self-assured majority.

The political debate on the Diversity white paper did not throw up any real resistance to, or closer definition of, the boundaries for tolerance outlined by the centre-right government, yet it triggered quite some public discussion.

*Revitalization of citizenship*

Academic literature distinguishes between *citizens* and *denizens*, the latter designating a person who has social and civil rights on a par with citizens, but who lacks formally recognised citizenship. In Norway, all immigrants can achieve partial citizenship or denizenship when they have a permanent residence permit. Partial citizenship is important when considering the way welfare states have managed recent immigration, because it means that granting social rights takes place independently of citizenship. This is important for the formulation of both control and integration policy; but it also provides a basis for asking whether citizenship has been emptied of its content when such far-reaching rights can be attained independently of it. Regarding social rights, there are obviously grounds for such a point of view. At the same time, citizenship has retained its meaning when it comes to full political rights: the indisputable right to be a political participant in the nation-state. Besides, only citizenship can give absolute protection against deportation. Seen from a majority
perspective, additionally, concerns about ‘social cohesion’ and the preservation of the desired polity could raise some more fundamental questions as to the types of political community which comes out of different approaches to citizenship. Thus in Norway the citizenship institute gained new relevance in the balance between rights and obligations – the question as to which forces that were believed to promote integration.

In 1999, a law committee was appointed to draw up a new citizenship bill that was finally approved in June 2005. The decade around the turn of the century had brought citizenship legislation to the fore in many European countries. Several aspects of this legislation had become politicised, and what for a long time had seemed to be an unambiguous move towards more liberal legislation had been challenged. In some countries, it was specifically advocated that citizenship should be upgraded as an institution (for example, by extending the residence requirement and making stricter knowledge demands [as in Denmark, Austria and the Netherlands]), while other states made legislation less strict (for example, by allowing dual citizenship [as in Sweden, Finland and Iceland]).

The substantial point of departure for all democratic constitutional states in Europe was precisely that citizenship as an institution had been drained of its content when it came to awarding civil, social and certain political rights, by the establishment of denizenship. At the same time, the question of ‘social cohesion’ had become more prominent on the agenda: Could a revitalised citizenship help strengthen popular dedication and a feeling of community? Social integration was a central theme in both camps, those who had become stricter and those who had become more liberal, although based on different premises.

The conflicting opinions in this process are interesting, because they illustrate a change of view regarding citizenship as a means of further integration. The revaluation that has been tentatively taking place in a number of countries can be seen as a dialectical response to the devaluation process that has been evident since the 1970s and to the efforts towards multicultural policies in many immigration countries, being associated with societal problems in recent years. Paradoxically, the possibility of preserving one’s culture among immigrant groups as a bulwark against dominance by the majority has also opened up a legitimate strengthening of the dominant majority culture: If one defends the right to maintain that

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25 The situation in Europe was as follows in 2004: Dual citizenship is permitted in: Finland, Sweden, Iceland, France, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, UK, Switzerland, Turkey and Hungary. Single citizenship is retained in: Denmark, Spain, Andorra, Belgium, Estonia, Serbia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, The Netherlands, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany and Austria (Proposition to the Odelsting no. 41 (2004–2005)).
minority cultures are something that ought to be preserved, it is difficult to argue against the same applying to the majority culture.

The view of the citizenship law committee, which completed its work in 2000, was characterised by a fundamental difference of opinion on a number of important points. This in many ways reflected the main opposing views in current discussions regarding citizenship, both nationally and internationally. The majority wanted to relax restrictions and allow dual citizenship and they did not want to introduce stricter rules for naturalisation (in the form of language requirements, for example). A minority of one person stressed citizenship as a central part of Norway’s democratic tradition and political community, with important links to its national, cultural landscape. The dissent was a meticulous historical review, emphasizing the welfare stately significance for the building of trust and traditions of equal treatment. He saw the citizenship institute as part of this tradition in polity, and wanted a discussion of the consequences to be drawn in terms of role expectations for citizens (NOU 2000:62). Dual citizenship was not to be accepted, as a reform to this effect would weaken the equality dimension, and infringe the existing Norwegian polity. The minority also argued for both language and knowledge requirements a condition for naturalization.

This discussion of principles by the minority was not commented on by the majority, nor was any attempt made to oppose the arguments. The majority’s proposals were thus relatively weakly justified and were dominated by a clear wish to liberalise on key issues, because it was seen as a natural part of a more internationalised world and because counter-arguments were not felt to be compelling.

Some of the most important perspectives of the Citizenship Act were also announced in the Diversity White Paper. Even though foreign citizens have, since 1983, had the right to vote at local elections after only three years of residence, the government wanted as many as possible to attain full citizenship, so that they could also vote at general elections and ‘influence their everyday lives and that of society around them.’ And it added: ‘in a society where the population has different origins and experiences as well as different religious and cultural affiliations, [the] social contract [implied by citizenship] plays an important role,

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26 NOU 2000:32.
27 Ibid: 127.
29 Ibid.
since citizens to a greater extent will have differing views on value-related issues than in more homogeneous societies'.

In autumn 2004 - four years after the report of the citizens-act committee had been handed in, the Bondevik government presented its bill for a new nationality act, interestingly enough, with the minority's proposals on important issues as its point of departure. The government wanted greater emphasis on society's fundamental values; it rejected dual citizenship and called for language requirements and a citizenship ceremony with an oath of allegiance. Much of the motivation for the government proposals thus adhered to the spirit of the minority view: an upgrading or revitalisation of citizenship as an institution. At the same time, the text of the government proposition reflects an unwillingness to enter into the discussion of the relationship between a governance tradition and national culture, which the committee minority made a central part of its argument.

The closest one gets to such a discussion is in the opening section of the proposition to the Parliament:

> Citizenship can be viewed as a formalisation of the implicit social contract that exists between state and citizen. The ministry is of the opinion that Norwegian citizenship, symbolic or actual, indicates that citizens accept the fundamental values on which the political community is based, such as democracy and common political rules. The ministry therefore wishes persons who have been born here or had a long period of residence in the kingdom, and who fulfil the conditions, to apply for citizenship.

Substantially, the new Nationality Act (as concerns acquisition by application) implied that any person has a right, upon application, to Norwegian citizenship provided the applicant 1) has provided documentary evidence of his or her identity; 2) has reached the age of 12; 3) is and will remain a resident of Norway; 4) has spent a total of seven years in the realm in the last ten years, with residence or work permits of at least one year’s duration; 5) satisfies the requirement regarding Norwegian language training; 6) has not been sentenced to a penalty or special criminal sanction, and 7) satisfies the requirement regarding release from another citizenship. On the other hand, the applicant is not entitled to Norwegian citizenship if this is contrary to the interests of national security or to foreign policy considerations. The

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30 Ibid.
32 This new element clearly represents a liberalization of the regime as compared to the existing Law.
application for citizenship must also be accompanied by a comprehensive certificate of good character issued by the police.

As to the language issue, the requirement is (for applications lodged after 1 September 2008) that applicants between the ages of 18 and 55 must have completed 300 hours of approved Norwegian language training or be able to document that they have adequate knowledge of Norwegian or Sami.

On the symbolic side, a ceremony including an oath was introduced to make a festive mark of the end of the naturalization process for new citizens. In the end, the ceremony turned out to be voluntary. The text of the oath reads as follows: “As a citizen of Norway I promise loyalty to my country Norway and the Norwegian society. I support democracy and the Human Rights and will respect the laws of the country.”

The interconnection between naturalization policy and integration policy was not a theme in Norway until the last revision process of the Nationality Act and the Diversity White Paper at the beginning of the 2000s. The Nationality Act (together with the Diversity White Paper) signals an ambivalence we also find in many other European immigration countries: The aim is to strengthen the interests of the nation-state and the community whilst also supporting the idea of individuals being more important than cultures regarding the rights of newcomers. The Bondevik-government positioned itself in the tension-filled ground between the liberal and the national views, wanting tolerant diversity and national community.

The voluntary nature of the Norwegian citizenship ceremony may be an expression of this ambivalence. The authorities make greater demands, but when it comes down to the crunch, the demands are few and vague. Ultimately, the fundamental commitment – even in the citizenship policies - is a variant of the work-line: ‘It is an overall aim for the authorities that immigrants who are to live in Norway can provide for themselves and actively participate in society.’ In that case, it is not citizenship that is the deciding factor, but the ability of the welfare state to mobilise the labour of the immigrants, both naturalised and foreign citizens.

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33 Hagelund & Reegård 2011.
Active welfare policy\textsuperscript{35}

Since the turn of the century, the most material change to the integration policy itself is the establishment of the Introductory Act, which came into force in 2004, with important additions in 2005. This was actually the first law in the field of integration ever. The Introductory Act requires certain categories of immigrants (Refugees, persons allowed to stay for humanitarian reasons and their family members)\textsuperscript{36} to make active efforts to qualify for participation – in work and in society.

The persons targeted for the program were given the right and the obligation to participate in a full-time qualification program. The program was to be adapted to the individual needs of the refugees, and special consideration was to be taken for participants with health problems. The reform also introduced a new kind of income support: The so-called Introductory Benefit, an economic reward for participating in the program, was somewhat higher than the ordinary social assistance benefit, which used to be the income security for newly arrived refugees. Central to the methodology of the program is that non-legitimized absence is sanctioned with reductions in ‘salary’. The program lasts up to two years, yet participants who manage to find work or start ordinary education during the training period can leave the program. The 2005 additions oblige also two other categories - labour and family immigrants - to take a less comprehensive course of 300 hours in Norwegian and knowledge of society as a precondition for a permanent residence permit and citizenship.\textsuperscript{37} In this way language instruction and knowledge of society have also become connected to control policy.

In other words, the program is characterized by obligatory entry and restricted exit. Through this reform, Norway now offers one of the world’s most financially generous integration regimes for newly arrived refugees and their families,\textsuperscript{38} yet it is a generosity that comes with compulsion. Again, however, the sanctions are meagre. There are no exams (2014) accompanying the obligations, and if participation is disrupted or skirted, the individual will fall back on social assistance benefit instead. The long term sanction in terms of reduced residence security may however be regarded as more serious. It remains to be seen to which degree this will be enforced.

\textsuperscript{35} This section draws on Brochmann and Hagelund 2012 and Brochmann and Djuve 2013.
\textsuperscript{36} …between the ages of 18 and 55 with less than two years of residence.
\textsuperscript{37} In 2011 it was decided to increase this to 600 hours.
\textsuperscript{38} Each participant receives a cash benefit amounting to NOK 175,000 (approximately USD30,000) per year.
The Holistic integration White Paper\textsuperscript{39}.

This White Paper was presented by the Centre–left Stoltenberg Government in 2012, based on the work of three major Governmental expert commissions.\textsuperscript{40} The White Paper sums up the aspirations of the government: The Government wants that immigrants qualify for the Norwegian labour market; that their skills are utilized better; that more females get into work; that their children get solid education. That racism and discrimination is abolished; that children are empowered as independent individuals; that refugees are settled more rapidly; that the citizenship policies ensures the feeling of belonging to Norwegian society; that voluntary sector is inclusive and that the services of the welfare state cater to a diverse population (p:8 authors translation).

Of all aspirations, the three most important elements seem to be: improving the qualifications for immigrants in preparation for work; better utilization of people’s qualification as well as attitudinal work against discrimination. It’s reiterated – everyone in the country has rights and duties: A just society with safety for all presupposes small social differences and gender equality. Trust and equal opportunities as well as work for everybody are keywords; participation and economic self-sufficiency are central goals. As before, it’s underlined that all residents are expected to follow the national laws, yet within those limits, people should feel free to live very different lives, as to e.g. religion, food and clothing. It is underscored that “the Norwegian society consists of everyone who lives in the country” (p 8). Immigrants are resources, diversity is good yet it is unfortunate if people don’t feel included and lack a sense of belonging (p.103). Immigration also implies value conflict, but it doesn’t matter as long as one agrees on the procedures for solving disagreement. Nevertheless, sometimes the majority society has the need to define the limits, as e.g. in questions relating to security, uniformity and neutrality (p 105). The example being used: the wearing of hijab in the police force, which has been prohibited. It is underscored that the aim is still (in principle) citizenship for all long term residents.

This White Paper represents an interesting step backward in relation to the Diversity Paper seen in terms of the linear curve towards more demands on the newcomers. It gives an overall

\textsuperscript{39} St. Meld.nr. 6 (2012-2013) En helhetlig integreringspolitikk. Mangfold og fellesskap. (A coherent integration policy. Diversity and community)

impression of less concretization as to the “limits of tolerance” that was introduced first and foremost by the Bondevik Government in 2003. One is back to the situation where rights are more pronounced than duties, and where the plight of the state to facilitate is a major focus. The long list of good intentions and the texts that follow are interestingly bland on contradictions and dilemmas. By and large the Paper is weak on analysis, which is in itself interesting. Being based on three important, problem oriented public investigations, and after ten more years of increasingly more heated public discussion, it seems remarkably toothless – nearly naïve in style and intention depth.

Yet this White Paper does not roll back on any of the changes done by the previous Centre-Right Government: the important change in terms of connecting integration with access control (The Foreign Law) is reemphasized. Those who want permanent residency/citizenship in Norway are expected to learn Norwegian and attain knowledge about society and polity (p.21). One minor adjustment was made in relation to the naturalization policies: It was made somewhat easier for young persons to be exempted from the requirement as to identity documentation.

From equal rights without intervention to governed inclusion.

Redistribution and recognition - ‘Equal treatment’ and ‘preservation of minority culture’ have followed the field of integration as conflicting imperatives right up till today: the right to be different but also to be treated equally as to social security and wage for labour; special measures to avoid differential treatment; preservation of culture, but not on the basis of stereotypes; and individual rights by virtue of group affiliation, potentially to groups that do not recognise individual rights themselves. The welfare state – handled by varying governments - has groped its way forward using ad hoc solutions in this complex landscape, and has been under constant attack from the Left and, later, also from the Progress Party on the right wing.

Assessing the long lines from before the “new wave of immigrants” started in the 1970s, it seems paradoxical that when assimilation was seen as beneficial – in the sense that everyone would have access to- and should become like Norwegians as soon as possible – the state
used very few measures to assist this process. During the years after the 1970s, we have witnessed a steadily more intervening state, especially as concerns refugees, yet also relating to other third country nationals. Partly this is a reflection of a general expansion in social engineering, with the emphasis on ‘work-line’-policies up front – but it should also be seen as an increased political will to target immigrants specifically, let alone make demands on these groups. In the mid-1990s, the Progress Party was quite alone in advocating compulsory Norwegian teaching, whereas ten years later the whole spectrum of parties supported extensive training as part of a compulsory program. Basically three reasons for the turn can be traced: worries attached to welfare dependence; the inclination to opt out of training; and the insufficient quality of many of the earlier programs. Increasingly available data on marginalization, welfare dependence and ‘cultural incompatibilities’ (like forced marriages, sexual mutilation and religiously legitimized oppression) fuelled the worries.

We have seen how the combined work-line-policy and the ‘making demands on’-policy gradually have materialized in successive public documents since the late 1980s (with a slight modification in tone in the last 2012 White Paper), although with some important exceptions like the introduction of citizenship as a right in 2006; better legal protection against discrimination as well as the introduction of a new pension right for people with few years of residency. Some steps have been taken in order to concretize where the boundaries lay for culturally divergent behaviour, yet in the end they tend to be quite vague, and lacking measures as to implementation. As concerns the ‘social cohesion’-issue, there has not been any targeted policy-making, apart from the (voluntary) ceremonies cum oath of allegiance introduced in the Nationality law. In addition there are some underlying and quite subtle notions in the preparations for the Nationality Law, as well as indirectly some aspects spelled out in the Diversity-Paper as to why a more diverse population requires new ways of thinking in relation to the national community. It seems that the authorities have trusted that ‘cohesion’ would come along as a result of constructive policy making in the more tangible welfare policy making, and through the expectations geared towards all citizens as to their sense of societal commitment. Christian Joppke’s point: “identity cannot be legislated” (Joppke 2008.536), could thus be replicated – neither can cohesion – at least not in a direct sense.

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41 Newly arrived Jewish and Hungarian refugees were given an information brochure and a Linguaphone course in Norwegian upon arrival. See Brochmann and Hagelund 2012 for more details.
42 The first Action Plan against racism and discrimination came in 1992. This focus was reinforced in the White Paper no. 17 (1996-1997).
Seen together the impression to the effect that integration had failed was prevalent, and much of the blame was placed on ideals of preservation of culture as well as the voluntary nature of adaptation. All inhabitants should be given the freedom from oppression and a real and equal possibility of participating. The tenor of the debate had made a turn as to the ‘liberal dilemma’: From conceiving it to be ethnocentrism to intervene in minority norms and conduct, the message from the authorities turned into the opposite: It was now believed to be illegitimate not to intervene, i.e. not providing minorities with the same set of liberties/universal rights as the majority population.

These are the main features of the change. How are we to interpret the changes in light of the civic turn debate?

Discussion

It’s natural to see Norway as part of a much larger international context in these matters. At the European level, a number of countries had introduced different kinds of mandatory integration courses before the Norwegian state, and countries that formerly had an official multicultural policy (like the Netherlands and Sweden) had long since abandoned or strongly toned down ideals linked to the preservation of culture, instead replacing them with endeavours linked to ‘work-line’ policies, emphasis on the individual and (tentatively) compulsory integration. As usual Norway looked to neighbours and others to gain from other states’ experience. In that sense, Norway is subject to “diffusion” – it has followed major trends in other “likeminded” countries.

In evaluating the developments in the national distinctions in Norwegian integration policies, I will take my departure in the criteria used by Dirk Jacobs and Andrea Rea (2007:273-274) in their comparative study on integration courses and citizenship trajectories in nine EU countries:

1) Is there a form of mandatory participation to integration courses for new non-EU migrants?

2) Do the integration courses entail language training, vocational training or orientation and knowledge on history and culture?

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43 Jacobs & Rea (2007)
44 Joppke & Morawska 2002.
3) Is participation to integration courses free (or not very costly)?
4) Is there a fine in case of non-compliance?
5) Is there a cut in social benefits in case of non-compliance?
6) Is entitlement to a residence permit conditional on participation to an integration course?
7) Is there a test at the end of the citizenship trajectory?
8) Is passing a citizenship or integration test a precondition for permanent residence status?
9) Is passing a test a prerequisite for naturalisation?

The answer is ‘yes’ on question 1-6. ‘No’ on 7-9. So, evaluated from this set of criteria, it would be reasonable to place Norway in the ‘civic turn’ grouping, and I would say that there is no doubt that Norway has followed suit in terms of the primary thrust of the new thinking on what it takes to have a diverse welfare society ‘function better’. The ‘function better’ notion always needs follow-up questions like; for whom, and legitimized with reference to which principles? As noted, the Fraser-dichotomy recognition/redistribution suits the Norwegian take on integration policies from the 1970s onwards. One may argue that the welfare state's approach -the redistribution/equal treatment – dimension has been most prevalent all the way, but it’s beyond doubt that the leeway for culturally legitimized deviation from Norwegian central norms and values was larger before the turn of the century than after. At the same time, it would be wrong to claim that the recognition dimension has disappeared from the political sphere. I would argue that the different governments since the year 2000 have followed the same path on the central matters: the work-line approach – securing as much work force participation as possible has been reinforced through a few retrenchments, but basically through more advance social engineering, in which the Introductory program figures most prominently. A whole series of qualification/activation measures have been initiated, and tentatively a more individualized tailored approach has been recommended. The work-line policy is in accordance with the general welfare policy, yet the necessity of targeted advances has been underlined time and again. To the extent that immigrants’ life style is seen as a hindrance to employment, the legitimacy in using pushing mechanisms of various kinds has increased. Real sanctions are few and far between.

The sanction issue actually moderates some of the scores on Jacob and Rea’s criteria: If a participant quits the Introductory program, the sanction is reduced ‘salary’. This means that one falls back on social assistance, which is needs based, thus sometimes come out more or
less the same as the ‘salary’ from the program. There has also been a debate on the use of sanctions against women who insist on wearing ‘dysfunctional clothing’ (usually meaning chador), which hinders them from gaining employment, in the sense that they should lose their welfare benefit. This has not been followed up in practice, basically because it is not legal to deprive any legitimate resident of basic sustenance. This means that the sanction repertoire of a universalistically oriented welfare state is basically limited. Likewise, as the language instruction does not lead to a test, nor does the course on polity and society, the sanctions related to permanent residency/naturalization are in practice non-existent. So, in the Norwegian context, the ‘civic turn’ is basically on the rhetorical and the attitudinal side. Seen from the authorities’ point of view, ideally, ‘functional assimilation’ should take place, in which newcomers undergo civic and linguistic acculturation and a degree of homogenization necessary to be productively included in the labour market. These new messages come out as rather strong expectations in the public, and may consequently contribute to the perceived integration climate among the minorities. The formative grip on life style indirectly implied by the Welfare model, may be conceived as a dwindling of the ‘recognition’-dimension. On the other hand, the stronger imperatives of the work-line since the turn of the century affect groups in the majority as well. And as long as the work-line is bolstered by equal treatment and not least programs to enhance people’s qualifications, one can argue that strengthening the focus on getting new citizens at par with the majority in the labour market is another kind of ‘recognition’.

Anyhow, the explicit aim of the new policies is to achieve better integration based on premises of the Norwegian welfare model written large. We are back to the paternalistically intervening welfare state, with its economic sustainability concerns and the inbuilt need to generate productive tax paying citizens, who contribute to the socialization of new generation through education and the upkeep of liberal democratic values. So, the extensive attention in the media as well as in scholarly and public debates on the tougher approach to immigrants when it comes to the claims- and demands-line is so far disproportionally reflected in institutional changes. The new rhetoric introduced by the Diversity White Paper in 2003, has only to a minor degree been followed up in practical policy, and besides, the tougher tone was partly modified by the red-green government in their 2012 Paper. (The new Conservative government of 2013 has not yet produced any coherent statements in the form of a white paper, but is likely to return to the claims- and demand-track of the former Centre-right government from the 2000s.)
So, where do we thus place Norway in the European “civic turn” scenery, judged from an over-arching perspective? Norway has undoubtedly followed major trends in “public philosophy” lately (Favell 2001) as to the ways in which integration policies are justified. The public rhetoric has made a “duty turn” in line with other immigration states in the EU concerning how to deal with “citizen-making” - how to create the desired civic dispositions in individuals and how to fertilize the best possible route to productive incorporation. And this duty turn relates to both labour market participation and more civic virtues like learning the language and taking part in civil society. In that sense it is possible to say with Yasemin Soysal that Norwegian governments have individualized the responsibility for social cohesion, by increasingly moralizing and incentivizing individual citizens (2012:5).

However, the governments lack the powerful means to transform morale into real life, as there are hardly any penalties. The reason why they have not introduced such penalties, I believe, is twofold: Partly such sanctions would not be favorably received by important parts of the electorate, and probably more important as to the labour market side, they would be in conflict with institutional features of the Norwegian welfare model. Most targeted sanctions would be violating the principle of equal treatment, which is a building block of the universalistic, redistributive welfare state and its important interplay with the operation of the labour market. A differential rights structure potentially disturbs the fine-tuned correspondence between the wage “floor” (in practice minimum wage) in the labour market and the level of welfare compensations. In the longer run this would be a threat to vulnerable groups among the natives as well, who would also be affected by a downward spiral.

Thus, Norway does not fit Soysal’s other claim related to “the civic turn” – “the new social project” of European welfare states - that social cohesion has been decoupled from social justice – that social justice is weakened as a collective good (2012:5). One may argue that the collective good has been weakened generally through the pervasive work-line policies, but at least in Norway, a dual track has (so far) not been pursued.

I therefore contend that the “civic turn” in the Norwegian context is primarily a rhetorical turn – and as such a rather outstretched turn, as well. Incremental change since the late 1980, with acceleration after the turn of the century, would be a more appropriate description. The tabu-term “assimilation” has been left out in the cold, whereas “necessary acculturation”45, is increasingly premising policy-making. What characterizes the public worries 15 years into the

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45 This is my own term, the term used invariably in Norwegain public documents would be «integration».
new century is uncertainty as to which tools which actually works when it comes to productive incorporation of (low skilled) newcomers. Improved social engineering within the bounds of a legitimate human rights /liberal egalitarian regime is what policy-makers are striving for. This is however not new as a general approach, yet the governments now do have some decades of experience as to what does not work particularly well, given the constraints of the welfare model/human rights regime. These constraints will most likely continue to inform policy-makers in the years to come – as long as the Norwegian model upholds it’s popular standing. National ideology or nationhood in Norway is still strongly embedded in social institutions, of which the welfare state figures prominently. Social cohesion is in practice believed to follow from a successful endeavor along these lines, which implies that the welfare state (included labour market governance) is still believed to be the grand nation builder when it comes to the pinch.

By way of conclusion, Norway has been subject to both civic trends through international diffusion, and national path-dependencies at the same time. I would claim that the continuities as to the basic welfare stately approach is stronger than the inclination to enforce civic duties upon the newcomers. I follow Per Mouritsen (2009 and 2013) on the rhetorical side when it comes to “thickened liberalism”, “liberalism as culture” and “egalitarianism” – i.e. the claim that tolerance for (lasting) difference of life style and divergent views on liberal democracy has diminished since the turn of the century. My point is, however, that so far this has basically affected public expectations of how to be a good citizen, it has not significantly affected immigrants’ basic rights in the Norwegian welfare state.

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