

**GENDER, POLITICAL AMBITION, AND MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEMS:
OBSERVATIONS FROM GERMANY AND NEW ZEALAND**

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FIRST DRAFT

“Ambition for office, like other ambitions, develops with a specific situation, that it is a response to the possibilities which lie before a person” (Schlesinger 1966: 8).

Male overrepresentation in politics is a universal phenomenon which political scientists have long sought to explain, pursuing both “demand-side” and “supply-side” explanations (e.g., Norris and Lovenduski 1993). Demand-side factors include both the formal and informal institutions that shape the actions of the “gatekeepers” who select candidates for the ballot. Feminist institutionalists have described these institutions as being highly gendered, often to the advantage of men. Supply-side discussions focus on the availability of men and women qualified and willing to run for office and suggest that women are less politically ambitious than their male peers, due to factors such as a lack of female role models or women’s disproportionate share of household and care work (e.g., Lawless and Fox 2010, 2015; Shames 2017; Preece and Stoddard 2015, Kanthak and Woon 2014; Wohlbrecht and Campbell 2007; Avdeyeva, Vinokurova and Kugaevsky 2017). Yet, as the above-mentioned quote from Joseph Schlesinger, an early student of political ambition, observes, supply and demand side factors are tightly intertwined. The gendered gap in political ambition that many scholars observe may also be a “sour grapes” phenomenon in which women detect gendered deterrents to political careers and decide that such careers are not interesting to pursue. Empirically, however, it is difficult to determine and to distinguish the degree to which women’s and men’s political ambition are determined by exogenous, supply-side factors, such as socialization and household labor, and by gendered demand-side political institutions.

Countries in which mixed electoral systems are employed, however, offer unique opportunities for scholars to disentangle the impact of exogenous, supply-side, factors, such as gender role socialization, and the role played by demand-side institutions, such as candidate nomination procedures, in shaping political ambition. The two tiers of dual electoral systems - single member districts and proportional representation party lists – are gendered in different ways, with the former more masculinized and the latter more feminized. This is especially the case when gender quotas are used for party lists or when parties view the list portion of the ballot as a way to increase the diversity of elected officials. If ambition is indeed, as Schlesinger (1966) hypothesizes, “a response to possibilities” then women should exhibit greater levels of ambition for list positions than single member district candidacies in countries employing dual electoral systems and the reverse may be true of men as well. Drawing on initial

evidence from New Zealand (NZ) and Germany, two countries with a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral systems, this article theorizes why the two tiers of the dual electoral systems are gendered in different ways and why we would expect gendered differences in political ambition across the tiers of a dual electoral system. It also offers initial empirical evidence suggesting this is indeed the case.

We proceed as follows. We first provide a brief description of the two countries' electoral systems. We then discuss why district seats tend to be more masculine and list seats more feminine, and how this may affect men and women's interpretation of the career possibilities present in the two tiers of the electoral system differently. In the following section, we go on to conduct a plausibility probe of our claims of the masculine and feminine character of each type of seat, drawing on qualitative news reports and quantitative analysis of the representation of women and men after the 2017 German and New Zealand national elections. We conclude with a discussion of the importance of our findings for the political ambition of women and men and provide a roadmap for future empirical research.

MIXED MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN GERMANY AND NEW ZEALAND

Countries with MMP systems such as Germany and NZ offer interesting cases in which to explore the impact of ballot structure and electoral rules on men's and women's interest in and likelihood to eventually run for parliament as both the Single Member District (SMD) component (Member of Parliament (MPs) elected in a district) and Proportional Representation (PR) component (MPs elected via a party list) operate in the same cultural, socio-economic and political context.

Germany's mixed electoral system was adopted upon the founding of the Federal Republic after World War II, in part to correct the pure form of proportional representation used during the Weimar Republic, which resulted in parliamentary gridlock and the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor. New Zealand's single member district electoral system was replaced by a mixed electoral system after a referendum held in 1993 and upon the recommendation of a Royal Commission charged with rebuilding citizen confidence in parliament following unpopular neoliberal economic reforms pursued by both the National and Labour parties. Another explicit aim of the introduction of MMP was to diversify the NZ parliament (Barker et al. 2001; Johnson-Myers 2017).

The versions of MMP employed in NZ and Germany bear many similarities as Germany's system was the model recommended by the Royal Commission (Royal Commission on the Electoral System 1986). Each voter casts two votes, one for a party and one for a candidate to represent her district. In both countries, the vast majority of candidates are so-called "dual candidates", standing in both a district and on the party list (Electoral Commission 2012; Manow 2015; Zittel 2017).¹ Parties generally expect district candidates to campaign both to win the district seat and to increase their share of the party vote in the district. If an MP who is candidate both on the list and in a district, wins the district, they enter parliament as district MP and the next candidate on the list bumps up.

The number of parliamentary seats elected via SMD is fixed from election to election: 298 seats in Germany and 71 in NZ.² The winner in the SMD component in each country is determined by plurality; a majority is not required. In both NZ and Germany, a given party's district candidate is nominated by the rank and file membership of their local party organization. While theoretically gender quotas could be employed in the single member district component tier (see Christensen and Bardall 2016) this is not the case in either country studied here.

In contrast to the fixed number of SMD electorates, the precise number of list MPs varies from election to election in both countries to ensure proportionality. The 52nd New Zealand Parliament (2017) has 120 MPs, with 64 general district seats, seven Māori district seats and 49 list seats. Germany's 19th Bundestag elected in 2017 comprises 709 MPs, including 299 district seats and 410 list seats. In Germany's federal system, each party has draws up a list of candidates in each of the sixteen Bundesländer. These lists are compiled by state-level party leaders and approved at meetings attended

¹ After the 2017 NZ election, for example, less than nine percent (9 out of 102) of the elected National and Labour MPs were list MPs who had only campaigned as a list candidate. Of the successful Labour candidates, 78 percent were dual candidates. 87 percent of the successful National candidates were dual candidates. After the 2017 German federal election, only one (an SPD MP) of the 396 elected SPD and CDU/CSU MPs had only campaigned as a list candidate. 98 percent of the elected SPD MPs campaigned both as list and district candidate. 74 percent of the CDU/CSU elected MPs did so.

² Seven of the 71 districts in NZ are dedicated seats for indigenous Māori. These seats were established to give Māori a direct say in parliament and overlay the General electorates. When people enrol as a voter they are asked whether they are of Māori descent and, if so, on which electoral roll (General or Māori) they wish to register. Since 1993, the number of Māori seats has been allowed to vary, depending on how many voters of Māori descent choose to enrol on the Māori roll, rather than the General roll. Based on this provision, the number of Māori seats has grown from five in 1996 to the current seven seats. Such mechanisms to ensure descriptive representation on the basis of ethnic identity are not present in Germany.

by delegates representing the party's rank and file membership. In NZ a single national list is employed. In both countries, the order of names on the party lists is fixed by the parties and voters cannot express preferences for individual candidacies. The position that candidates receive on the list is thus crucial for their likelihood to be successful as list candidate, giving a crucial "gatekeeping role" to the party and nomination process in both NZ and Germany. As will be discussed in more detail below, the party list is compatible with gender quotas or rules requiring certain percentages of men and women among the list candidates.

A consequence of the design of MMP systems is thus that there are two types of MPs: district MPs who are elected directly in a district and therefore rely on support from their district to win an election, and list MPs who win a seat via the party list and therefore rely on receiving a high position on the list to win an election. It is often suggested that the two types of MPs behave differently: those elected via party lists are more likely to be oriented towards their parties than towards constituents, and thus primarily represent their party and interest groups, while those elected directly in a district will primarily focus on their constituents, and represent their district in parliament (e.g. Klingemann and Wessels 2000; Lancaster and Patterson 1990; Lundberg 2006; McLeay and Vowles 2007; Patzelt 1997; Stratmann and Bauer 2002). These suggested differences in the representational focus of district and list MPs has been attributed to the differences in electoral incentives between both types of MP, with district MPs directly dependent on support from their district and list MPs being dependent on their position on a party list compiled at the state or national level.

With regard to the status of MPs, there is no constitutional difference between list and district MPs in either country. Both share the same basic roles and responsibilities in parliament, and are eligible for the same positions, including committee membership and executive positions. Differences, however, exist in the funding of MPs in NZ, with district MPs (whose funding also differs depending on the size of their district) receiving a higher expense allocation than list MPs (Directions of the Speaker of the House of Representatives 2014). This difference does not exist in Germany.

Yet, while there are no constitutional differences between the two types of MPs, differences in prestige have been suggested. District seats are typically also substantially safer than list seats (Manow 2007; see also Matland and Studlar 2004). Moreover, shortly after NZ adopted MMP, Ward (1998) noted that list MPs were considered "second class" MPs by the media (see also Carman and Shephard 2007 for

Scotland), and that some list MPs felt that district MPs saw themselves as “better” than list MPs. This stems from the view that list MPs lack a mandate because they are indirectly elected, in contrast to district MPs who are elected directly by the voters. Moreover, there was the perception among colleagues, the media and the public that – because they were not elected directly – list MPs did not have a legitimate role in terms of electorate work, meaning that their role is unclear. While this view has, perhaps, eased over time, opposition to list MPs has been central to criticism of MMP in NZ since 1993. A number of public submissions to the 2012 MMP review indicated that list MPs are viewed as “unelected”, and are only accountable to the party that had “appointed” them (Electoral Commission 2012; Vowles 2017). The idea also heard in New Zealand is that list MPs are “losers who got in via the back door”, suggesting that list seats would mainly “rescue SMD losers” (Rudd and Taichi 1994: 12). Similarly, and looking at Germany, Patzelt (1997) concludes that district MPs in the Bundestag regard themselves as more successful representatives of voters (see also Carman and Shephard 2007 for Scotland). MPs who enter parliament via the party list after losing the district they previously represented, are often referred to by names such as “zombies” or “back-door MPs” (Shugart and Tan 2016), indicating the negative connotation that (some) list MPs have.

Below, we theorize why the two types of seats in MMP systems are gendered in different ways and why men and women may view their chances of success in each tier of the electoral system differently, with men more likely to anticipate success gaining an SMD seat and women rating their chances of obtaining a list positions more highly – especially when quotas are used or where party lists are viewed as mechanisms for promoting diverse descriptive representation. If this proves empirically correct it would appear that a gender gap in political ambition occurs in mixed electoral systems – with men more likely to aspire to the most powerful and prestigious mandates than women. Women’s greater likelihood of being list MP than district MP would thus place them in a more electorally vulnerable and less prestigious position.

GENDERED COMPONENTS OF MIXED MEMBER PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

While women are underrepresented in most parliaments around the world, there is significant country-level diversity in the representation of women. One explanation that has been given is that women are better represented in countries with PR electoral systems compared with countries with SMD electoral systems (e.g. Castles 1981; Matlan and Studlar 1996; Norris 1985; Paxton et al. 2010; Rule 1981, 1987;

Rule and Zimmerman 1994). This pattern has been observed within countries using MMP systems, where women have been more likely to be elected as list MPs (based on PR systems) than district MPs (based on SMD systems) (Barker and Coffé 2017; Curtin 2014; Davidson-Schmich 2014; Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013; Gallagher 1998; Manow 2015; Vowles et al. 2017). This pattern is likely to shape women's and men's political ambition. Indeed, women's greater likelihood to be list MP may influence women's ambitions and make them more likely to aim at becoming list MP rather than the more prestigious role of district MP. Other (related) characteristics of the district and list seats may also further strengthen the masculine character of district seats and feminine character of list seats.

District Seats as Masculinized

The type of activities required to secure a nomination for district seats are often unattractive to women, and numerous reasons can be suggested why this tier is masculinized.

- Especially in NZ, this tier is the more prestigious and thus also tends to be more masculinized (e.g., Jalalzai 2014).
- This is not the part of the mixed electoral system that is geared toward getting women on the ballot. Also because gender quotas or informal diversity promotion norms are more easily combined with party lists than with SMD (Norris 2006).
- A major hurdle for becoming a district MP are incumbent MPs. Those MP are (to date) mostly men, and it is known that idealized candidates tend to look like the previous candidate, and thus be a male candidate.
- One proposed explanation for the gender difference in representation under MMP is that, when only one candidate can be chosen, as is the case in SMD, party selectorates tend to choose male candidates who are thought to be more likely to win a seat (Davidson-Schmich 2014).
- Nomination is less centralized than for party lists, which tends to hinder women in getting nominated and entering parliament (Gallagher and Marsh 1988).
- Being a district MP is a one and a half person job. You have to go to many functions all over the constituency and be available 24/7 to serve the constituency. This assumes that you have someone backing you up at home and increases the difficulty of finding an acceptable work-life balance (Coffé 2017).
- Women may have a difficult time to convince gatekeepers that they can provide uninterrupted service to the electorate due to caregiving breaks (see Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010)

- This tier is very personalized: It is all about you and gaining the nomination for yourself. Men may feel more comfortable with this personalized approach and the need to “begging” for support among the local party members. Evidence from interviews [ADD INTERVIEW DETAILS] does suggest that women feel like “prostitutes” “streetwalking” to shore up this kind of support.

List Seats as Feminized

Comparative research suggests many reasons why women traditionally fare better in the list PR portion of mixed electoral systems, and various (related) characteristics of this tier suggest why list seats tend to be more feminine compared with district seats.

- Nomination for party lists often entail a relatively centralised nominating procedure, which tends to be an advantage for women as party leadership can intervene to ensure the selection of candidates who might not gain nomination at the district-level (Gallagher and Marsh 1988).
- This tier may offer more nomination opportunities for women given that candidates do not have to wait for a (male) incumbent to retire.
- There is no zero-sum competition with other party members/candidates for only one seat.
- Party lists offer selectors opportunities to engage in ticket-balancing, nominating both male and female candidates, and gender quotas or informal diversity promotion norms are more easily combined with party lists than with SMD (Norris 2006).
- While district MPs are expected to represent their district, list MPs are expected to represent a specific social group or policy (e.g. women, elderly, teachers, etc.). The MP can focus on a specific policy area and get selected as a policy expert on an area they care about. Women may be more interested in such a representational focus than in a geographically defined representational focus.
- Relatedly, women might feel more confident in their qualifications and expertise for such role than for the role as district MP where qualifications and expertise are less clearly specified.
- Being a list MP does not require as much “smoozing” with citizenry and being available 24/7 for individual constituents as being a district MP does. Women may feel more comfortable in such role and it may be more easily combined with family duties.
- In some countries, including Germany (ADD REF) where candidates have to develop a profile at the state level (given each German state has a separate party list), there are more female gatekeepers present at the state or national level than at the local level where party organizations dominated by men.

Based on these different characteristics of list and district seats presented above, we thus suggest that district and list seats have a different gendered nature, with list seats being more feminine and district seats more masculine. This gendered nature of each tier is in its turn anticipated to affect women and men's ambition to become list or district MP. Indeed, defining ambition as a function of opportunity (Schlesinger 1966), women may perceive their chances to become a district MP smaller than to become a list MP and adjust ambitions accordingly by mainly focussing on the possibility of becoming a list MP. Because the odds for women are better in the list tier – in particular within parties with gender quotas for party lists and within parties using the party list to diversify the representation of certain groups (including women) – will aspire more to become list MPs. Because their odds are better for the district tier, men will, in their turn, more often aspire to become district MP.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

[TO EXPAND WITH MORE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DATA]


As is typical of proportional and mixed electoral systems (Duverger 1954; Taagepera 2001) both Germany and NZ have multiparty systems featuring a large center-right and center-left party and several smaller parties. The German Christian Democratic Union /Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and NZ's National Party, to the center-right, and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and NZ Labour Party, to the center-left, are routinely successful in both tiers of the electoral system, winning both SMD and list seats. The smaller parties are generally only successful on the list component of the ballot. In Germany in 2017 the Left Party won five, the Alternative for Germany three, and the Greens only one directly elected seats in contrast to the SPD's 60 and the CDU/CSU's 231. In NZ, all nine NZ First MPs and eight MPs of the Green Party were elected as list MP. The small ACT party only has one MP. He is a district MP. The National Party won 41 district seats in 2017; Labour 29.

Given that only the main parties, Labour and National in NZ and CDU/CSU and SPD in Germany, have a meaningful number of both list and district MPs, our empirical focus here is on these parties. In both countries, the parties of the left send higher percentages of women to the national legislature than do parties of the right: In Germany the SPD's parliamentary delegation contains over twice the percentage of women (42 percent) than the CDU/CSU's mere percent. In NZ, 45.7 percent of the Labour MPs elected in 2017 are female. 30.4 percent of the elected National MPs are women.

In Germany and NZ, party lists have come to be viewed by gatekeepers as instruments to combat male over-representation in parliament and to increase diversity in parliament. With the rise of second wave feminism in Germany, women within the German political parties began to call for the adoption of gender quotas for party lists as a corrective to male overrepresentation in parliament. As a result, today the SPD employs a 50 percent quota for Bundestag lists; once the lead candidate has been chosen, all the odd numbered list places are allotted to candidates of the same sex and all even numbered positions to candidates of the opposite sex. The CDU's "quorum" requires at least one woman among every three list positions; the CSU – present only in the state of Bavaria – does not employ such affirmative action rules in Bundestag elections, although they do for the selection of lower-level inner-party offices. When discussing the introduction of MMP in NZ, the Royal Electoral Commission viewed the list portion of the ballot as a way to improve the gender balance in parliament as well (Barker et al. 2001; Johnson-Myers 2017). Of the NZ parties, only the Green Party requires a gender-blended list, and employs, like the SPD in Germany, a "zipper" quota, alternating male and female candidates (Vowles et al. 2017). Neither the National Party nor the Labour Party have adopted formal gender quotas, but after the introduction of MMP, the Labour Party instituted a so-called 'pause for an equity review' after each bloc of five candidates during the list selection procedure at regional conferences (McLeay 2006). The National Party also applies the principle of balance in its nomination process, but has never applied strict alternation on its lists or introduced quotas.

As mentioned above, women have been more likely to be elected as list MPs (based on PR systems) than district MPs (based on SMD systems) within countries using MMP systems, including NZ and Germany (Barker and Coffé 2017; Curtin 2014; Davidson-Schmich 2014; Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013; Gallagher 1998; Manow 2015; Vowles et al. 2017). While the gender gap has begun to narrow in both Germany and NZ (Curtin 2014; Davidson-Schmich 2014; Fortin-Rittberger and Eder 2013), Figure 1, based on data of the 2017 national elections in NZ and Germany [TO BE ADDED] shows that women continue to be more likely to be elected as list than district MP compared with men.

Figure 1: Percentages of list and district MPs per gender in NZ after the 2017 national elections



[INCLUDE FIGURE FROM GERMANY]


Significant differences in women’s representation and in the way they have been elected, however, exist between political parties. Overall, women are known to be better represented within left-wing parties as a result of these parties’ gender egalitarian ideology (Coffé et al. Forthcoming; Vowles et al. 2017). Compared with right-wing, conservative parties, left-wing parties are more supportive of gender equality and also more likely to introduce gender party quotas (Franceschet et al. 2012; Kittilson 2011; O’Brien 2012; Reynolds 1999). This results in higher numbers of female MPs in left-wing parliamentary party groups.

In the two countries studied in the current paper, this pattern is confirmed after the 2017 elections, with the main parties of the left sending higher percentages of women to the national legislature than do parties of the right. In particular, German SPD’s parliamentary delegation contains over twice the percentage of women (42 percent) than the CDU/CSU’s mere 20 percent. In NZ 45.7 percent of the Labour MPs are women. Within the National Party, 30.4 percent of the MPs are women. The likelihood to get elected was similar for women and men within Labour (58.3 percent for women; 58.1 percent for men), the likelihood to get elected was significantly lower for female National candidates compared with their male counterparts (72.7 percent compared with 87 percent). [ADD THIS INFORMATION FOR GERMANY]

Left-wing parties tend to utilize the list tier of the mixed electoral system to achieve diversity aims, feminizing that pathway to parliament. Such efforts to promote a diversity of descriptive representatives (through the introduction of formal gender quotas or a less formal approach to increase women’s representation) are less common in right-wing parties. As a result, the feminization of the list tier is expected to be less pronounced within right-wing parties compared with left-wing parties. The conservative, right-wing party CDU does, however, employ quotas, making it more like a center-left party than its partner CSU or the National Party in NZ.

Figure 2 shows the relative share of list and district MPs by gender for the two main parties in each country (Labour and National in NZ, and CDU/CSU and SPD in Germany).


Figure 2: Percentages of list and district MPs per gender in Labour, National, SPD, and CDU/CSU after the 2017 national elections (number of MPs in brackets)



As can be seen from Figure 2, the pattern of women being more likely to be list MP than district MP holds for all main parties, except National. Indeed, within National, 25 percent of the female MPs are list MPs compared with 27.5 percent of the male MPs. In comparison, whereas 47.6 percent of the female MPs of NZ's Labour Party are list MP, only 28 percent of the male MPs are list MPs. As suggested above, it looks like Labour takes greater use of the list to bring diversity in gender terms in its parliamentary fraction than National does.

Looking at the parliamentary candidates (rather than elected MPs), the data presented in Figure 3 indicate that, in both main NZ parties, women are more likely to be dual candidates (standing in both a district and on the party list) compared with their male counterparts. Within National, all female candidates were dual candidates. Of the National male candidates, 6.7 percent were district only candidate and 8.9 percent list only candidate. Within Labour, the major gender difference occurs in the likelihood to be district only or dual candidate, with women being more likely to be dual candidate than their male counterparts (83.3 percent of the female candidates are dual candidates compared with 62.8 percent of the male candidates) and less likely to be district only candidate (8.3 percent of the female candidates are district only candidates compared with 25.6 percent of the male candidates).

Figure 3: Percentages of dual, list only and district only candidates per gender in Labour and National during the 2017 national election campaign (number of candidates in brackets)




[ADD THIS INFORMATION FOR GERMANY]

For Labour, an interesting pattern occurs when looking at the candidates and MPs who did not campaign in 2014 or who were not member of the parliament in the 2014 legislation. As can be seen from Figure 4 and Figure 5, among the candidates who did not campaign during the previous election campaign (2014) and among the new MPs, women were significantly more likely to be list only candidate or list MP compared with their male counterparts. Indeed, all except one of the 10 new female Labour MPs entered parliament as list MP. By contrast, only three of the seven new male Labour MPs entered parliament as list MP.³ At least during the 2017 campaign, Labour women were thus more likely to enter parliament for the first time through the list than through a district than their male

³ Following the definitions developed by Zittel and Gschwend (2008) and Hazan and Rahat (2010) who define a safe district as one in which the candidate, or a candidate from the same party, won the district by a margin of at least 10 percent over the second-placed candidate in the previous election, only one of the four male MPs who entered parliament for the first time in 2017 campaigned in a safe district. The one new female district MP also campaigned in a safe district. Of the Labour candidates who did not campaign during the 2014 legislation, one woman (who was a dual candidate) of the 19 new female candidates had a safe list position (a safe list position is calculated by taking the average of the last elected list position off the party list at the previous two elections (Hazan and Rahat, 2010)), and one man (who was also a dual candidate) of the 17 new female candidates campaigned in a safe district. Both of these candidates were elected in 2017.

colleagues. This seems to further confirm the tendency among Labour to use the list to diversify and increase women’s representation. The pattern is different within National. Within National, all female candidates for the 2017 elections who did not campaign in 2014 were dual candidates. Of the National male candidates who did not campaign in 2014, 82.8 percent were dual candidates, while the rest (18.2 percent) were district only candidates. All National MPs who entered parliament for the first time in 2017 were district MPs.⁴


Figure 4: Percentages of dual, list only and district only candidates per gender among the group of new candidates in Labour and National during the 2017 national election campaign (number of candidates in brackets)^a



⁴ All seven male National MPs who were not an incumbent MP were elected in 2017 in a – for National – safe district. Two of the three female MPs who were not incumbent MPs were elected in a safe district in 2017. Of those candidates who did not campaign in 2014, two (out of seven) female candidates campaigned in a safe district while two had a safe list position. Among their male counterparts, one (out of 11) had a safe list position while five campaigned in a safe district. Male candidates who did not campaign in 2014 were thus overall significantly more likely to campaign in a safe district than female candidates.

^a “New” candidates are defined as candidates who did not campaign during the previous national election campaign.

Figure 5: Percentages of list and district MPs per gender among the group of new MPs in Labour and National after the 2017 national elections (number of MPs in brackets)



[ADD THIS INFORMATION FOR GERMANY]

Further evidence [TO BE ADDED] on masculine character of district seats and feminine character of list seats and how that relates to the political ambition of women and men.

- Quotes from interviews [TO BE ADDED]
 - NZ male Labour MP: “Middle-aged white heterosexual men should not be list MPs.”
 - Germany: quotes from women saying they are not interested in direct mandates (or why they view it is tough).
- Case studies of who contests open safe seats [TO BE ADDED].
 - 100% of SPD mandates of this sort were man vs. man in the nominating meeting.

CONCLUSION

[TO BE WRITTEN]

Our data of the 2017 elections in NZ and Germany confirm that women are overall more likely to be elected as list MP than district MPs compared with men. It is of course positive that party lists offer parties the possibility to increase women's representation, and also seemed to be used by parties to increase the diversity of their parliamentary fractions. Yet, it does create an important gender inequality, in particular given that the SMD tier is perceived to be the more important (even if it might not actually be) and prestigious and that – at least in NZ – MPs elected directly are given more resources than list MPs.

Our theory suggests that the gender segregation in the way MPs are elected may have created perverse ambition incentives, with women, especially in left-wing parties and/or those employing quotas, aspiring the list tier more often than the PR tier in mixed electoral systems and men doing the reverse.

Future research should

- Qualitative interviews explicitly asking male and female candidates about their perceptions of the (gendered) nature of list/district seats and their political ambition related to
- Case study participant observation of nominating meetings/ processes in SMDs that become open or when lists are put together
- Delve into intersection with ethnicity: Ethnic minority MPs are also significantly more likely than majority MPs to be elected from a party list - women are better represented among ethnic minority MPs than among MPs from the ethnic majority, but they tend, amongst most ethnic groups, to be more likely than men to be list MPs (Barker and Coffé 2017).

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