ENTERING THROUGH THE BACK DOOR: NON-PARTY ACTORS IN INTRA-PARTY (S)ELECTORAL POLITICS

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Interest in the increased involvement of non-party actors is concentrated on inter-party politics, and does not touch the issue of their role in the intra-party realm. Yet, exactly because the intra-party arena is less transparent and unregulated, because most issues and competition within parties are personal rather than ideological, it is a place where non-party actors can have a significant influence which may even be larger than that in the inter-party arena.

This paper presents an analysis of the role of non-party actors in intra-party politics. It identifies the relevant non-party actors in intra-party candidate and leadership selection contests, defines their role and assesses their relative weight vis-à-vis party actors according to different candidate selection methods. The paper is largely based on data gathered in Israel, of both leadership and candidate selection, along with the little available comparative data on this issue from other countries, especially the US, UK and Canada.

The major claim of this paper is that the more inclusive candidate and leadership selection methods are, the higher is both the involvement and the influence of non-party actors. The term inclusiveness refers to the selectorate – the body that selects the candidates that the party presents in the general elections. More inclusive selectorates allow a wider set of actors to take part in candidate selection. The most inclusive selectorates include all voters; a less yet relatively inclusive one would include all party members. A selectorate of one leader, or a few leaders, is considered highly exclusive. Between these two extremes, a moderately exclusive selectorate is one that includes members of party agencies, or delegates selected by party members (Rahat and Hazan 2001).
The tendency of parties to expand their selectorates and widen participation (Bille 2001; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000) has both created and increased the need for candidates to rely on “mediators” who enable them to reach a much larger and highly fluid audience of party members. That is, the internal democratization of parties has increased the candidates’ dependency on non-party actors in the intra-party arena. Moreover, while most democracies regulate the various aspects of inter-party contests, only a minority of democracies regulate intra-party contests. For example, while most democracies regulate inter-party finances, only a minority of democracies regulates the finance of intra-party contests (Hofnung 2005b). This allows non-party actors more freedom to maneuver within parties than between parties.

In this paper, the term non-party actors refers to individuals, groups and organizations that are involved in the internal party contest over leadership or candidacy but are not affiliated to the party as such. That is, non-party actors can be affiliated with several parties, either at the same time or in consecutive elections contests. Examples of these are: campaign professionals who run selection campaigns for candidates in return for payment; the public and private media whose main interest is to look for news in the context of the intra-party struggle for candidacy; interest groups (protective or promotional), that see the internal struggle as an opportunity to promote their interests, or maybe to reward those candidates who served their goals; and individual donors who, like interest groups, may see the internal struggle as an opportunity to promote their interest or assure the return of those candidates who were sympathetic to their interests.
The first section introduces the theoretical and empirical rational for the claim that more inclusive candidate selection methods encourage the involvement and raise the influence of non-party actors. The empirical rationale for this claim is supplied by the very inclusive case of the US primaries. The second section presents evidence from Israel, while the third presents the little evidence available from other democracies. The conclusion is that the involvement of non-party actors in leadership and candidate selection is indeed growing, partly due to the increase in the role of these actors in politics in general and partly as a result of the opportunities supplied by the trend of democratizing candidate selection methods.

**Theoretical and Empirical Rationale**

Why should we expect the democratization of candidate selection methods – i.e., the tendency of parties to expand their selectorates and widen participation – to increase the role and influence of non-party actors? The answer is simple: in order to be selected by a more inclusive selectorate, candidates need to reach a larger and a more fluid audience. The larger and more widespread the selectorate is, the more the candidates have to rely on “mediators” who can help them reach this target audience and spread their message.

**FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**

When a nominating committee – a small group of leaders or their associates – is the exclusive or the dominant selector, candidates will likely have the chance to put their case in front of them personally, or at least through informal intra-party networks. If there will be mediation at all, it will be through formal and informal intra-party actors.
In the case where a moderately inclusive selectorate – a selected party agency, such as a convention or central committee, or the parliamentary party in case of leadership selection – is the exclusive or main selector, the candidate can still create personal, unmediated connections with a significant number of members of the selectorate. Nonetheless, it is likely that some mediation will take place. The (successful) candidates are likely to concentrate their efforts on the more powerful delegates, those who can mobilize the vote of other delegates, and can thus strike deals with other powerful delegates who lead groups within the selected agencies for mutual support for “their” favorite candidates. The candidates are likely to run a moderate campaign in which they will attempt to address the hundreds or even thousands of members of the selectorate either through mail, conferences, phone calls or e-mails. There may be some use of campaign professionals in producing appealing messages. Such a campaign will have its costs, and may oblige the candidate to look for donations. In cases when candidates attempt to address the selectorate indirectly, through the mass media – to demonstrate their public positions and their ability to play the inter-party political game – the role of mediators is likely to increase, which will, in turn, demand the recruitment of more money.

Mediators are likely to play the most important role in the case of the more inclusive selectorates. A candidate may still be able to directly address activists in a party meeting. But, when a candidate’s fate is determined by an amorphous and anonymous crowd of many thousands of largely passive party members, there is no way he or she can reach them and gain their attention – they must use moderators to reach their
selectorate, and their campaign becomes more similar to that of a party in the general elections.

Table 1 summarizes the kinds of non-party actors that are expected to be relevant for candidates who compete for safe seats/positions within their party. It suggests a distinction between the main goals of the different kinds of non-party actors, what they can expect to achieve from participating in intra-party selection, and what can the candidates hope to achieve from them.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Scholars have recognized the relationship between the different candidate selection methods and the role of the media. Sheafer and Tzionit (forthcoming) claim that the candidates’ media skills are becoming more important in cases when the selectorate is more inclusive because “…a single leader who is responsible for nominating the candidates knows each candidate personally… candidates can’t meet personally with all party members who are the selectorate in party primaries.” Semetko (2006:517) claims that the adoption of candidate selection methods in which party members decide the rank of candidates on the party list “…can quickly become externally driven by candidates vying for publicity in the national news media…” Indeed, the mass media, which allows candidates to address wide audiences based on their “newsworthy” activities, rather than their party behavior, is an important mediator in more participatory intra-party politics. The media may play an active role and prefer certain candidates over others, due to their ideological leanings, but it is highly
probable that the central motive will be the basic need of the mass media industry – newsworthiness based on ratings.

It is logical that parallel to the increased role of the mass media, there will be a growing demand and supply of non-party professionals to run personal intra-party candidate campaigns – much like the development in the inter-party arena. These will supply the candidates with crucial information (i.e. polls), strategic advice and various propaganda techniques (also known as “paid media”).

The needs of a campaign targeted at a vast and amorphous audience demands substantial financial resources. Money can buy “paid media” and can be used to hire the professionals who will pave the candidates’ way into the “free media.” Such needs open the way for people and groups to “invest” their money with the expectation for “interest” and policy returns. Breaux and Gierzynski (1991: 430) claim that expenditures might be important in primaries even more than in general elections (in which we already know its importance) because while in general campaigns voters have party labels as a cue to discriminate among candidates, in primaries this cue is absent and money must be invested to inform the selectors so they can distinguish among the candidates.

An important source of support may be found in leaders of interest groups, who can supply candidates not only with the money and the personnel for the campaign but also with the votes of their group members. The relationship between parties and other organizations can be classified according to the level of affiliation of the organization to the party (Poguntke 2006). Our interest here is in non-party actors, so
attention should be limited to those organizations that are loosely affiliated with political parties.

It should be stressed that the absolute size of the selectorate is of great importance, but the difference is also a matter of relative size. For example, several hundreds of party members may select their candidate to parliament in a single member constituency, while thousands of delegates may be gathered nationally to select a party leader or a list of candidates. The larger selectorate of a few thousand is, still relatively more exclusive than the smaller district selectorate of a few hundred. Regardless of the absolute size of the selectorate, the adoption of a more inclusive selectorates has additional important differences: it transforms candidate selection from being a “private” intra-party matter, where leaders and senior apparatchiks make decisions behind closed doors, into being a “public” contest, in which candidates explicitly compete with their counterparts before a wide audience through personal campaigns.

The level of involvement and commitment of the selectorate is also likely to decline as inclusiveness increases. That is, in an exclusive selectorate the candidates need not chase activists or party leaders for their attention because they are deeply involved, whereas in an inclusive selectorate the candidates need to work hard just to be noticed (to win “name recognition”) by a less informed, less committed, unstable and atomistic crowd. In addition, the identity of large parts of an inclusive selectorate is sometimes unknown in advance – registration campaigns conducted on the eve of the selection sometimes double or triple the number of members, and there is no way a candidate can personally meet with them in the little time left before selection takes place (Hazan & Rahat forthcoming). In other words, candidates must “shoot in the
dark” (through paid and unpaid media, with the help of campaign professionals and campaign finance) and make contact with the heads of various interest groups who can supply them with potential voters.

Empirical rationale

Primaries were adopted in the US with the declared goal of undermining the party organizations and empowering the people (Ware 2002). In the long run, they did indeed lead to the undermining of the party organizations (Rae 2006). They did not, however, exactly empower the people, but rather other mediators between the candidates and the people. As Polsby (1983: 147) claims, in his critique of the spreading use of primaries for the selection of the US president, “…the directness of direct democracy in a very large scale society seems to me illusory.” The adoption of primaries thus weakened the parties and strengthened the role of non-party actors in the selection process, particularly the mass media and interest groups, along with the role of campaign professionals and of financial donors. The role of non-party actors in the highly inclusive candidate selection methods used in the US can thus be used to substantiate the expectations that were outlined above.

One should remember that the inclusiveness of candidate selection systems in other democracies is lower, in most cases. The most “extremely” inclusive European cases (apart from several parties in several electoral districts in Iceland) are those in which party primaries were adopted – where only dues-paying members select the candidates. Moreover, in most cases, the party members are not given the exclusive role in selection, since other party agencies are also involved in the process of either screening or vetoing candidates for parliament and for the party leadership. In the US,
on the other hand, only in a minority of the cases do the parties have a say in the selection of candidates – when they are allowed to endorse certain candidates, that is, to express a preference for a certain candidate or candidates (Galderisi and Ezra 2001). In the democracies where inclusiveness of candidate selection has not reached the US level, the main question is about the role of non-party actors – do they have a significant role and how significant is it; whereas in the American case, it has reached the point where scholars have raised the question of whether the party still plays a role in candidate recruitment and selection (Kazee and Thornberry 1990). 

Nevertheless, if we look at the possible selectorates on a continuum that stretches from the most inclusive selectorate (a single leader) to the most inclusive one (all citizens), if we acknowledge that there is a trend of democratization of leadership and of candidate selection methods in many established democracies (Davis 1998; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000; Hazan and Pennings 2001), then the US may signify some possible development for both the present and for the future. Thus, the US experience justifies an expectation for the growth in importance of non-party actors in candidate selection, but not about parties losing control of candidate selection. Similar trends are already evident in other democracies with less inclusive candidate selection methods. For example, Alderman and Carter’s (1995: 452-453) assessment of the British Labour Party posits that, “The 1994 Labour leadership contest assumed many of the appearances of an American Primary.” As for Canada, Davis (1998: 60) claims, “Beyond question, successful candidates in Canada have followed the same

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1 Goodliffe and Magleby (2000: 3) suggest a distinction between the levels of influence of parties in the nominating process that ranges from a formal role (9 states) – of party formal endorsement – to informal endorsement (8 states), and to no active party role (33 states).
organizational and professional management practices that American presidential candidates have found indispensable, if they are to reach the White House.”

As to the non-party character that develops due to the mechanism of primaries, Seligman (1961: 86) presents party primaries in the United States as a competition between “recruitment groups” and claims, “Since recruitment groups have their own goals, there is unequal sharing of the larger party goals. Thus, some groups may stand to gain more by the defeat of some candidates in their own party than by their victories.” Thus, the US experience with the adoption of primaries is a story of the decline of party organization and the rise of non-party actors. It is not the story of the victory of popular participatory democracy. The US case demonstrates that there is an enhanced role for four kinds of non-party actors in a more inclusive candidate selection arena: interest groups, the mass media, campaign professionals and private donors.

First, interest groups play a significant role in primaries, sometimes they are central in influencing the decision of candidates to compete in the primaries (Herrnson 1997), and in places where the party organization is weak candidate selection is sometimes transformed into a competition between interest groups (Epstein 1980). Rae (2006: 201) goes as far as to claim, “By the last quarter of the 20th century, the American parties seemed to have become little more than instruments of candidates or interest groups that captured the party label…”.

Second, the role of the media became central with the growing use of primaries in the process of presidential nomination (Bartles 1988: 24; Davis 1998; Polsby 1983). As
Crittenden (1982: 215) puts it, “Primaries tend to magnify the influence of the media. They offer the elements of news interest: conflict, drama, and suspense.”

Third, as Polsby (1983: 73) puts it, following the adoption of the primaries, “a new group of political decision-makers has gained significant authority. These are the fund-raisers by mail and by rock concert, media buyers, advertising experts, public relations specialists, poll analysts, television spot producers, accountants and lawyers… They work not for the party but directly for candidates.“ Political consultants become central in the primaries campaigns, starting from the very decision to compete (Herrnson 1997). Later on, down the road, as Brox and Shaw (2006: 146) claim, “…. as candidate began to contest primary elections, they developed campaign organizations and expertise independent of the political party. These candidates not only were not beholden to the party when they won the nomination, but also often had personal campaign organizations and did not need help from the party as they turned their attention to the general election contest.”

Finally, significant sums of money are needed in order to establish an effective primary campaign organization. Research demonstrates that money plays a crucial role in US primaries. According to Goodliffe and Magleby (2000: 26) the average amount spent in the 1992-98 house primaries ranged from $39,185 in cases where an unopposed candidate was nominated for candidacy in a district in which the other party held the seat to $517,117 for an incumbent in a competitive primary. Breaux and Gierzynski (1991: 439) find that even in state legislative elections “Campaign expenditures are an important determinant of state legislative primary outcomes.”
Empirical Evidence: The Israeli Case

From 1949, the first elections in Israel, and until the 1970s, Israeli parties largely used selection committees to determine their candidate lists for the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. A small group of party leaders, or their affiliates, designed a list that was later ratified en bloc by the party central committee. In the 1970s and 1980s, most parties in Israel transferred candidate selection to their wider and more representative institutions (typically central committees). The selection of party leaders was formalized at the same period, and also became the task of the same party agencies (Kenig 2006). Since the early 1990s, the two large parties (Likud and Labor) adopted party primaries to select their leaders. Labor, since 1992, also used party primaries for selecting its candidate list, while Likud used primaries to select its candidate list only once, in 1996 (Hazan 1997). Indeed, in line with the expectations that were formulated in the previous section and with the American experience, the adoption of the primaries increased the influence and involvement of the mass media, campaign professionals, large capital holders and interest groups in the candidate selection contests (Rahat and Sher-Hadar 1999a/b).

Mass media and campaign professionals

Regarding the role of the mass media in the 1996 primaries, Rahat and Sher-Hadar (1999b: 161) describe several attempts of candidates to win media exposure in return for their willingness to degrade themselves on television. For example a “gray” minister appeared in a news item that described his attempts to change his image in which he was seen trying different sets of clothes. They also report on the extensive use of media professionals that were supposed to assist candidates in gaining exposure before the hundreds of thousands of party members spread all over the country. A
study of Israeli Knesset members demonstrated that as candidate selection became more inclusive, media skills became more important for the candidates’ success in the intra-party contest (Sheafer and Tzionit forthcoming).

Because of the candidates reliance on the “free media” and the “paid media” to get the needed exposure before the more inclusive selectorates, and since the direct purchase of airtime is not permitted, candidates hired campaign professionals to get themselves invited to appear on radio and television programs (Hofnung 2005a: 72). Rahat and Sher Hadar (1999b: 127-162) report that the adoption of primaries added a new field for the “campaign industry” that until then was mainly occupied with the inter-party contests of the general elections and the municipal elections (in the later case, also the personal race of mayors). These included media consultants that helped candidates gain media exposure and various professionals that dealt with the “paid media”, or campaign propaganda (graphics, copywriters) such as newspaper adds, stylized pamphlets and letters, and internet sites.

Interest groups

In Israel, like in many European countries, there used to be clear affiliations between interest groups and parties. However, also like in Europe, this affiliation has weakened over the years. In Israel it has reached the point when unions, once affiliated with the left-wing socialist parties, became independent actors, trying to use their power to protect their status by influencing the intra-party selection of representatives to the Knesset. Some interest groups have attempted to establish large blocs of selectors within the main parties. Rahat and Sher Hadar (1999b: 166-167) report on mass voting registration campaigns that were conducted by large unions and
cooperatives and that were aimed at either promoting candidates that would protect their interests, or to punish those that challenged them.

Two unions that were, and still are, especially prominent in this respect are the union of the workers of the Israel Electric Corporation (IEC) and the union of the workers of the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI). The IEC union does not have its own representative in the Knesset, but nevertheless it has much influence that helps it to protect its monopoly vis-à-vis pressures for privatization and decentralization of this key industry. In one incident, on the eve of 1996 elections, when the monopoly of the company was at stake, it was clear that the voting behavior of several Members of Knesset was influenced by their fear of the union and its ability to impact on their chances for re-selection (Nissim 1996) – the media reported that these legislators had been “electrocuted”. The IAI, on the other hand, had representative in the Knesset in 1992-96 and again since 1999. The union’s chairman was first selected in 1992 as a district representative in the Labor party, due to the massive registration of thousands of workers and their family members in the party. As a Knesset member, it was clear that he put the interests of the union before his party policies when he voted against the Labor government when his union interest was at stake (Avnon 1996). In 1999, the union once again sent its chairman to the Knesset, this time in the framework of a small party that was built on the basis of the Israeli national federation of Labor. This seemingly “natural” and unionist tendency ended in 2003, when the union chairman joined the right-wing Likud party. In 2002, just after he joined the party, the number of votes he received in the candidate selection process conducted in the central committee placed him 25th on the party list (Likud won 38 seats, and he was elected). In 2006, when the race was even harder, he managed to win the 13th spot. He
apparently succeeded in building a power base within the Likud central committee by “controlling” a bloc of the central committee members -- despite not being a well-known public figure, nor a prominent legislature or a promising future national leader -- due to the organizational capabilities of being the head of a strong union.

A different kind of group that tried to take advantage of the opportunities of intra-party politics was “Jewish Leadership.” This right-wing extremist group explicitly declared its aim to takeover Likud from within, registered thousands of party members, many of whom were not Likud voters. Over time, the group succeeded to build a power base within the party central committee. Until now, its leader has failed to be selected as party chairman. However, in the leadership primary contest in 2002 the “Jewish Leadership” candidate won only 3% of the votes, while in 2005 he won 12%.

In the Israeli case, not only bona fide interest groups took advantage of the new opportunities supplied by the inclusive candidate selection methods. Hofnung reports that some candidates established nonprofit organizations in order to bypass campaign finance rules (Hofnung 1996a; 2005a). Moreover, some local strongman, especially in poor communities, took advantage of the large parties’ registration campaigns and worked as “vote contractors” (Rahat and Sher Hadar 1999ab). As Hofnung (2005a: 72) reports “… internal party primaries gave considerable leverage to vote contractors, people who could deliver the votes of blocs of registered voters to the internal elections.” This means that the registration campaign is the Achilles Heel of a more inclusive candidate selection method.
Individual donors

Hofnung (1996a) points out that at the same time that Israeli political parties are generously financed and are thus not prone to the pressures of private donators, politicians as individuals are dependent on private donations in order to compete in party primaries. He claims that as a result of adopting party primaries, “…the anticipated expenses considered sufficient to present one’s candidacy in a party for the Knesset increased tenfold in a single year” (Hofnung 1996b: 76).

The financing of the primaries campaign was supposed to be regulated according to special legislation (The Party Law of 1993) and additional party rules. But the rules were not kept in many instances and candidates were not punished because the parties, which were suppose to be the regulators, did not have the ability nor the will to punish their prominent figures on the eve of the general elections. There were also loopholes in the legislation that enabled candidates to collect and also spend much more money than the ceiling that the law allowed (Rahat and Sher Hadar1999b: 168-177; Hofnung 1996b).

Thus, the role of money and money donors became central (Hofnung 2005a: 67):

The introduction of primaries into the Israeli political system lengthened electoral campaigns and tremendously increased the costs of presenting candidacy in a major party. With the introduction of party-wide primaries, candidates faced a large electorate… Obviously, candidates cannot compete successfully in such internal party contests without considerable financial means… The move from nominating committees to large electorates has paved the way for the growing influence of money donors in the candidate selection process. Money buys services, expertise, media exposure, and sometimes even votes.
The need for contributions creates dependency, “…Israeli politicians [became] dependent much more than in the past on either personal wealth or ‘investors’ who seek to cash in on their contributions.” (Hofnung 1996a: 145).  

**Empirical Evidence: Additional Cases**

**Mass media and campaign professionals**

In a thorough overview of the study of candidate recruitment in Western Europe, Patzelt (1999) points out the lack of research on the role of the mass media in the selection of candidates. Indeed, there is not much research on this issue, but some general studies of leadership and candidate selection did pay some attention to it. For example, Narud et. al (2002) estimate that the increase in the inclusiveness of candidate selection in Scandinavia would increase the role of the media in linking candidates and voters. Kristjansson (2002) reports that in Iceland, the increased use of open primaries to select party candidates for parliament led to an increase in the role of the mass media because the candidates needed it to reach their selectors.

Accounts of leadership selection in the UK in the 1990s, and at the beginning of the 21st century, claim that the adoption of more inclusive systems made the role of the media more central and required also more finance and more professional support (Alderman and Carter 1993; 1995; 2002; Davis 1998; Quinn 2004). However, UK studies also point out that the growth in the importance of media exposure, the

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2 Hofnung (2005a: 68), however, takes care to point out that the abolition of the primaries in Likud did not necessarily decreased campaign expenses but rather changed their foci. That is, in order to effectively run for candidacy in the Likud central committee, one had to spend much money to keep good relations with the 3000 men and women who made up the selectorate: send “something for their birthdays, attend and bring presents to them and their families in their weddings, Bar-Mitzvaz etc…” However, this kind of expense is clearly not a public one, so we do not know much about it beyond several journalistic investigating reports.
increased use of media professionals and the increase in expenditures occurred also before the reform of the selection methods. For example, an important part of the campaign for the support of the Conservative parliamentary party in 1997 was conducted through the mass media and by addressing grass root members rather than the selectors directly – the MPs (Alderman 1998). It would thus seem reasonable to conclude that the role of the media in intra-party politics increased with the rise in the role of the media in politics as a whole, and that the democratization of selection methods served to accelerate this trend. In other words, if the media was used as an additional tool for influencing MPs (when they were the sole selectors of the party leader), in the case of selection by the party membership at large the media necessarily became the only tool with which a candidate could hope to access all the members.

In the Canadian case – in contrast with the evidence from Scandinavia, Iceland and the UK – we find a rise in the role of the mass media without an increase in the inclusiveness of the selectorate. The Canadian leadership selection method did not change much until the 1990s. Leadership selection in the 1960s-1990s was conducted in special conventions that gathered thousands of delegates that were selected by party members from all over Canada. But there were clearly ongoing trends of increase in the importance of the media, an increase in campaign spending and in the use of campaign professionals (Courtney 1995; Davis 1998). It seems that the role of the media can increase even without a democratization of the selection method, but the latter is expected to exacerbate the former.
Interest groups

The involvement of interest groups in candidate selection looks quite natural because many parties in the democratic world were established by interest groups, or had strong long term affiliations with them. But here we look for their involvement as non-party actors, as groups that, at least potentially, may choose to get involved with more than one party. The only case in which we find reports about this phenomenon is Canada.

O'brien (1993) reports that in 1984 and 1988, single-issue groups (pro-life groups) attempted to use the selection system to place their representatives as candidates in the Liberal Party through mass registration of members in certain constituencies. According to Erickson and Carty (1991), in 8% of the candidate selection meetings in the 1988 elections there was mobilization of members of interest groups, especially of ethnic groups. In response to these attempts (but also with the goal of enhancing women and minority representation, and enabling mediation by the leadership in the case of deep local conflicts), the end of the 1980s saw an increase in the involvement of the national party leadership in candidate selection aimed at preventing a takeover of candidacies by interest groups (Erickson 1997).

In his study of leadership selection, LeDuc (2001: 326) writes:

In seeking to open their internal processes of leadership selection to wider participation by the electorate, political parties… open the door to groups or individuals from outside the party entirely, who may wish to use these institutions as an arena in which to promote a particular issue, candidate or cause… In the Canadian Progressive-Conservative leadership contest of 1998… a candidate with no discernible party credentials entered the contest specifically in order to campaign against the Canada–US Free Trade Agreement.
Canada also witnessed some incidents of “vote contracting” and mobilization of ethnic groups aimed at packing selection meeting of parliamentary candidates and delegates for the leadership selection convention (Courtney 1995: 92; O’Brien 1993).

The case of the UK is of an interest here because the increase in inclusiveness, especially the adoption of the OMOV (One Member One Vote) and the OLOV (One Levypayer One Vote) rules in the Labor leadership selection in 1994, actually decreased the power of the unions in Labor. This does not, however, refute the claim that inclusiveness opens the gate for interest groups influence in intra-party politics, but rather clarifies that interest groups that were intra-party actors may lose power (at least in the short run), while other interest groups might be empowered because they gain an opportunity to influence intra-party power through mass registration of their members.

Individual donors

Hofnung (2005b) points out that not much is known about the funding of candidate selection contests in countries with mixed and proportional electoral systems, and that the funding of these contests is usually (Israel is different in this sense) unregulated. This means that either it is a non-issue or that it might be the secret garden of the influence of private money. In any case, our efforts to find references about the role of money in leadership and candidate selection campaigns bore fruit only in regard to Canada and the UK. This may be a matter of language, but also points out that the issue is at best under-researched if not un-researched.
Stark (1996) compared British leadership selection under different selection methods: the “Magic Circle” method (basically, closed informal selection by a few leaders); by MPs; by an electoral college composed of MPs, unions and party members (with and without partial OMOV rules); and pure OMOV. He finds that while campaigns differ according to the character and strategy of the contesters, the selection systems also have important influence on their duration, on the expenses incurred by both the party and the contesters, and the conspicuousness of the campaign. The more open and inclusive is the system, the longer is the campaign, the more open and public it is, and the more money is spent by contesters. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the amount spent by Tony Blair in his leadership campaign is low in comparison to most candidate races in the US House of Representatives (Alderman and Carter 1995; Goodliffe and Magleby 2000). This means that we are still far away from the American case in terms of the centrality of money in candidate selection contests.

While the selection method has not substantially changed, Canada has witnessed an ongoing trend of increase in spending in leadership selection campaigns (Courtney 1995). If in the 1960s candidates spent a few hundreds of thousands of dollars on their campaigns, the 1980s saw them spending millions (Davis 1998). The increase in spending in the leadership selection campaigns in Canada raised concerns about the impact of big money. Like the parties in Israel, Canadian parties lack the resources and the will to monitor leadership campaign spending (Courtney 1995). After all, to expect a party to expose the wrongdoings of its newly elected leader, or its candidates (many times on the eve of the general elections), is to expect too much.
Conclusion

We believe that the theoretical logic behind the expectation that the role of non-party actors will increase along with the democratization of candidate selection methods is sound. Both the American experience and the Israeli one support this hypothesis, as well as some of the other cross national data (mainly from Canada and the UK).

However, we saw that in the case of leadership selection in Canada and the UK there was an increase in the role of non-party actors even before the adoption of significant changes in the selection system. Moreover, after the cancellation of party primaries in the Israeli Likud and the return of candidate selection to the central committee, the role of non-party actors did not decline. It thus seems that we do not dealing with a simple case of a single cause and effect, nor with a linear relationship. As Bartles (1988: 24) claims, regarding US presidential primaries, it was not just the adoption of primaries that made the mass media central, but rather it “…originated when institutional reform converged with a major social trend…”.

Thus, the role of non-party actors increases over time not only in the inter-party arena but also in the intra-party one – in candidate and leadership selection – due to various general trends such as the change in party organizations and their stand vis-à-vis society and the state. However, the involvement and influence of non-party actors will increase exponentially if the parties also adopt more inclusive selectorates.

While we cannot estimate the exact weight of the influence of changes in candidate selection on non-party actors, it would be a mistake to ignore them. For example, one of the central claims of the cartel party school (Katz and Mair 1995) is that public
financing enabled the party in government to become independent of the party headquarters and of party activists – to detach themselves from society. But aspiring candidates, and especially party leaders, increasingly need money to compete within their parties. This makes them dependent upon those who can supply them with money and/or personal votes. Thus, the opening of candidate selection methods may force candidates to personally “bring society back in”.

It is quite possible that non-party actors still play only a secondary role in candidate selection, because we are only at the beginning of a process. As Ware’s (2002: 242-246) analysis demonstrates, the impact of the adoption of primaries in the US was not immediate. It took decades until real change was felt. Furthermore, we should remember that in most cases we are not dealing with the adoption of the American direct primary methods. Most democracies are still far away from the US model, in which internal elections became similar in many respects to the general elections (Goodliffe and Magleby 2000). Parties are still their own masters in most cases. In the US, parties are heavily regulated while non-party actors are relatively free to have their say in candidate selection, although they are also becoming more and more regulated. One of the interesting questions for future research on parties, due to the growing trend of adopting more inclusive candidate selection methods, is thus: Who should be regulated, the parties or the non-party actors?
TABLE 1: NON-PARTY ACTORS IN INTRA-PARTY (S)ELECTORAL POLITICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The actor</th>
<th>The main goal</th>
<th>Why intra-party selection?</th>
<th>What can they supply?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mass media</td>
<td>News production</td>
<td>Horse race at its best</td>
<td>Spread the word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>Make a living</td>
<td>May lead to winning a contract for the general election campaign</td>
<td>Accessibility to the “free” media; effective campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professionals</td>
<td>Policy/interest promotion/ protection</td>
<td>Spread the investment among several candidates</td>
<td>Votes and money; organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Policy/interest promotion/ protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>donors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


