Conflicts or Cleavage?
Contesting Globalization in Western Europe and Beyond

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Abstract
Recent literature argues that a cleavage on globalization is forming in Western Europe with the issues of migration and European integration as core bones of contention. This paper investigates the extent to which we can find support for the theses that 1) we are facing a cleavage rather than a set of different conflicts; and 2) this cleavage is brought about by globalization. To do this, we analyze issue-linkage among political actors as evident in claims made in public debates on the issue areas of climate change, human rights, migration, regional integration and trade. We content analyze newspaper in Germany, the Poland, Turkey, the USA and Mexico between 2007 and 2011, using the quantitative content analysis of representative claims-analysis. Based on this analysis, we refine the globalization cleavage hypothesis. Globalization leads to a cleavage even beyond Western Europe and on issues beyond regional integration and migration. Furthermore, globalized communication in the sense of domestic reporting in the news of claims by foreign and international players exacerbates and accelerates the process of cleavage formation. Cleavage formation on globalization, however, should be understood as the communitarian break-away from the cosmopolitan consensus rather than the generation of both camps from previous ambivalence, ignorance or indifference. This break-away is hindered when domestic human rights violations are a major salient issue and when domestic costs of globalization remain limited.

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Introduction

West European countries have become increasingly open to cross-border interaction. This can be seen in terms of economic dependency on trade as a percentage of GDP, in the amount of immigrants in relation to the total population and in the willingness to share sovereignty within the most encompassing regime of supranational governance the world has ever seen: the European Union. Furthermore, no other group of states have subscribed so strongly to global regulatory regimes. The Kyoto Protocol on climate change is a good example of this, binding all West European countries to strong reduction targets in greenhouse gas emissions. Interactions among West European countries of cultural, economic, social and political character are numerous and substantial (Dreher et al. 2008). One might thus say, that increasing extensity, intensity and velocity of transnational interconnectedness has impacted Western Europe more than any other region. In other words, Western Europe is more globalized or denationalized (Beisheim et al. 1999; Held et al. 1999: 15) than any other region in the world.

In the wake of this denationalization, a growing body of literature reports societal conflicts about the benefits and costs associated with globalization, in both objective (primarily economic) and subjective (primarily identity-based) terms. Denationalization in general has opened up new opportunities for conflict that has become manifest in all types of parties (Zürn 1998: Ch. 9 & 10). More specifically, Fligstein (2008) reports with respect to Europe about the emergence of a ‘Euro-clash’ between opponents and proponents of the integration project. Far right populist-right or ‘TAN parties’ (Traditionalist, Authoritarian, Nationalist) (Hooghe et al. 2004) have emerged in several West European countries – like Front National in France, FPÖ/BZÖ in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium and PVV in The Netherlands. In other countries, like Switzerland and Germany, older conservative parties have moved towards occupying the same electoral niche. Capitalizing on wide-spread feelings of unease about the ‘unbundling’ (Ruggie 1993) of territoriality and sovereignty, these parties tend to combine

In two major contributions, Hanspeter Kriesi, Edgar Grande and colleagues (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008) have mapped this rising political conflict in Western Europe. As multiple political issues – economic liberalization, immigration and European integration – increasingly converge into a single dimension of conflict on both the supply side of political parties and the demand side of voters, the notion of an emerging cleavage gains leverage. To speak of a cleavage rather than merely a divide or a conflict, we need a coalescence of structural division, organizational division and ideational division. Only if all three characteristics are present, can we speak of a cleavage (Deegan-Krause 2013; Mair 2005).

Firstly, a structural division would be present if citizens on each side of a cleavage share some structural features like economic profession, ethnicity, education or collective identity that binds the group and separates them from the other side of the cleavage. Secondly, an organizational division is present if each side of the population in the structural divide has their own institutions or organizations that mobilize their constituency and participate in the process of making collectively-binding decisions. Thirdly, an ideational division is present if each side is bound together internally and separated from the other side by a set of policy preferences and subjective identity, like class consciousness served to solidify the class cleavage. Following the work of Stein Rokkan who argued societal revolutions are at the basis of cleavages (Flora et al. 1999), Kriesi et al. (2012; 2008) identify globalization as the major societal revolution that has brought this transformation of the West European political spectrum about. That is, they argue that denationalization creates new opportunities and threats. As these opportunities and threats are unequally distributed among citizens, new divisions of winners and losers – both objectively or subjectively (Teney et al. 2013) – are generated in its wake. These new or transformed social groups, in turn, provide possibilities for political parties to campaign. Populist-right parties in particular have
capitalized on this new potential and have forced other political parties to respond. Hence, the new cleavage is born.

To further test the dual hypotheses of Kriesi et al that we are witnessing the emergence of a cleavage and that globalization is the driving force of it, we subject it to two critical tests: 1) can we speak of a ‘cleavage’, rather than conflicts?; and 2) is it really globalization that is behind the generation of this alleged cleavage? We conduct these tests by expanding both the number of political issues under investigation and the number of countries in a most different systems comparative research design.

First, we test the globalization cleavage thesis by including more issues that are clearly related to globalization. Besides migration and European integration, which have been the main focus of empirical studies on globalization cleavage so far, we include the issues of climate change, human rights and trade. Most scholars highlight the multidimensionality of globalization and argue that it reaches far beyond the economics of trade, to include a general ‘shrinking of time and space’ through intense human interaction across borders, which brings about environmental degradation, the proliferation of norms and culture, cross-border communication via the internet and the rising threat of global pandemics and international terrorism, to name but a few disparate consequences (Beisheim et al. 1999; Dreher et al. 2008; Held et al. 1999; Norris and Inglehart 2009; Steger 2009; Turner and Khondker 2010; Zürn 2002). On each of these issues, a process in which nation-state boundaries become more permeable creates anxieties and inequalities and thus raises questions concerning the political desirability thereof. Hence, the logic of having preferences of ‘demarcation’ or ‘integration’ can be applied to human rights issues and climate change as well, for example. Relevant societal questions generating such conflict are then: should we apply global norms of human rights in our society and uphold them in others too, even if it means giving up on our cultural traditions and risking our soldiers' lives in humanitarian interventions? Do we have a responsibility to protect the global environment, even if that means sacrificing some of our wealth and jobs in heavy industry?
If globalization is behind the generation of this cleavage, we should find the conflict patterns documented on migration and European integration to also play out on other globalization issues.

Second, if it truly is globalization that functions as the catalyst of this cleavage, we would expect to find evidence of its existence beyond Western Europe as well. The extent, intensity and velocity of international interaction may be particularly pronounced in Western Europe, but denationalization certainly is not geographically restricted to this area. In other words, if the globalization cleavage thesis holds, we should find evidence of a coherent bundling of positions on a variety of issues including, but extending beyond, migration and regional integration and trade and we would expect evidence of it beyond Western Europe as well. It goes beyond the present paper to investigate all dimensions of a ‘cleavage’, as this would require the coherent analysis of the supply by organized representatives, the demand by citizens and the extent to which both sides of the conflict are underpinned by a more or less coherent set of norms and values in the form of two distinct political ideologies. Instead, we restrict ourselves to a focus on the organizational and ideational components asking whether representatives in the public sphere – partisan or otherwise – articulate coherent positions on various globalization issues.

We find that globalization leads to a cleavage even beyond Western Europe and on issues beyond regional integration and migration. Furthermore, globalized communication in the sense of domestic reporting in the news of claims by foreign and international players exacerbates and accelerates the process of cleavage formation. The globalization cleavage thesis thus largely survives our tough test. Cleavage formation on globalization, however, should be understood as the communitarian break-away from the cosmopolitan consensus rather than the generation of both camps from previous ambivalence, ignorance or indifference. This break-away is hindered when domestic human rights violations are a major salient issue and when domestic costs of globalization remain limited. Hence, we find very limited evidence of a cleavage outside of rich and stable democracies. We therefore
conclude by refining the globalization cleavage thesis through the articulation of scope conditions and mechanisms that affect its development.

**Cleavage Theory and Hypotheses**

From the seminal works of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967b) onwards, literature on cleavages has focused primarily on Western Europe (Bartolini 2000; Flora et al. 1999; Lipset and Rokkan 1967b; Mair 2005). Arguably, the old democracies of Western Europe have provided an ideal setting for studying the co-occurrence of historical revolutions like the Reformation and industrialization and their impact on societies in conjunction with democratic innovations like the expansion of voting rights toward universal suffrage and the generation and transformation of party systems. Yet, the four old cleavages – center/periphery, class, urban/rural and Church/state – have become less important in determining West European politics. According to this ‘dealignment thesis’ (Enyedi 2008), the structural divisions underlying these four cleavages have eroded as social and political mobility have increased in postindustrial societies. We find evidence of this thesis in declining party membership, increasing electoral volatility and a transformation of mainstream political parties from mass-parties to catch all parties (Enyedi 2008). In a way, the social and political ‘closure’ of society into separated and stable groups has eroded to the point of a more open, volatile and flexible market place of political demand and supply. This is evidenced by the quick rise and fall of a variety of issues capitalized by single-issue parties. Such might be called the ‘thawing’ of the previously ‘frozen’ West European party system (Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 1987). It should be noted though, that although there is evidence of dealignment in Western Europe, politics in many other areas of the world remain much less shaped by cleavages. Cleavages were never as pronounced in Latin America or the Middle East as in Western Europe (Deegan-Krause 2007), and they are only in a process of creation in Eastern Europe (Marks et al. 2006; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009).
Even though the extent of dealignment is disputed (e.g. Manza et al. 1995; Stoll 2010), there are some claiming that the new openness in the political market as a result of dealignment has provided opportunities for ’realignment’ around new or transformed cleavages. For example, there is evidence of a post material ’new politics’ cleavage primarily politicized by green parties (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990). On the other hand, populist parties on the far right have politicized a GAL-TAN cleavage (Hooghe et al. 2004). Increasing evidence is mounting supporting the existence of a globalization cleavage, pitting those in favor of integration in the wider international community, embracing cross-border interdependence and establishing a regional or global set of institutions and policy regimes against those favoring demarcation to maintain national sovereignty, cultural distinctiveness and economic self-sufficiency (Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008).

The evidence gathered by Kriesi et al (2012; 2008) on the generation of a globalization cleavage in Western Europe is impressive, detailed, extensive and methodologically very sophisticated. They provide a wealth of data on several West European countries including convincing quantitative content analysis of newspaper debates, identifying the positions of political parties on European integration, immigration and economic liberalization to demonstrate dimensionality in conflict between them. Yet it is also wanting in three important ways. First, if globalization is identified as the catalyst or revolution that fuels the generation of this cleavage, then we should see it outside of Western Europe as well. According to the most authoritative international measurement of the degree to which countries have become ’globalized’- the KOF index – West European countries may rank among the most globalized countries in the world, but they are in no way unique (Dreher et al. 2008). Hence, countries outside Western Europe may not show the new cleavage as clearly as West European countries do, but they should show some signs of its presence. Second, globalization is a multi-faceted process that impacts previously more or less independent nation states in a variety of economic, social, cultural, environmental and other ways (Beisheim et al. 1999; Dreher et al. 2008; Held et al. 1999; Steger 2009). If globalization is at the root of a new cleavage, other related issues should feature similar patterns of conflict.
Third, the denationalization of issues brings with it a (possible) wider range of transnational, international and foreign organizations who claim to represent different sides in the demarcation-integration conflict (Saward 2006). While earlier cleavages became institutionalized in the political system of territorially bounded nation-states, the borders and the relative importance of the nation-state are now the bone of contention. By including the potential contribution made by transnational, international and foreign actors to the formation of a cleavage, we go beyond the existing studies focusing on domestic political parties only (e.g. Kriesi et al. 2012; Kriesi et al. 2008).

Although the definition of what a cleavage is was notably vague in Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) who pioneered its study, the academic literature has since converged around an understanding of three necessary and collectively sufficient conditions of a cleavage (Bartolini 2000; Deegan-Krause 2007; 2013; Mair 2005). To speak of a cleavage rather than merely a divide or a conflict, we need a coalescence of structural division, organizational division and ideational division. First, citizens on each side of a cleavage need to share structurally grounded interests that determine their positions and beliefs across a set of different issues. Second, a full cleavage requires organizations that mobilize each side of the divide toward the process of making collectively-binding decisions. Traditionally, this function is performed by political parties. However, in modern ‘real-existing democracies’ (Schmitter 2009) that feature a plethora of institutions involved in the making of collectively-binding decisions – from civil society organizations, to international institutions, to expert bodies like central banks – this function is increasingly performed by non-partisan organizations (Hendriks 2009). Kriesi et al (2012) note for example that while the demarcationist side of the globalization cleavage is primarily mobilized and organized by far-right populist parties, the integrationist side depends more on social movements.

In the modern age where societies face a plurality of complicated challenges and opportunities for public goods and bads, different political issues constantly compete for attention in the political agenda. Cleavages have traditionally functioned to organize bias
into the political system, institutionalizing conflict on some issues while at the same time crowding out other issues from the political agenda (Schattschneider 1960). In a political landscape in which cleavages do not play a predominant role, different political issues are likely to enter and leave the political agenda depending on short term political campaigning following triggering events that momentarily raise their salience (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Green-Pedersen 2007). Single-issue challenger parties might rise, but may also disappear again quickly when the issue becomes less salient. These quick changes in the political agenda and in the party system are exacerbated by the increasing dominance of mass media in shaping democratic politics as the main vehicle of political communication between represented and representatives (Bennett and Entman 2001). Therefore, it is unlikely that a single issue can constitute the substance of a cleavage in the long term. An indication that this holds is provided by the fact that successful single-issue challenger parties, those that survive more than two or three elections, tend to broaden their political program beyond the single issue of their original foundation (Mudde 1999). Moreover, if the normative component of a cleavage in the sense of a political ideology is present, it in all likelihood provides the members of a cleavage coalition – both represented and representatives – with the normative and cognitive tools to interpret a wide range of issues that somehow resonate with the abstract values it contains.

In relation to the literature on cleavages, we thus accept the commonly used definition of a (full) cleavage as having three necessary components: a structural component, an organizational component and a normative component (Deegan-Krause 2013; Mair 2005). An immediate implication of this conceptualization is the importance of issue-linkage as an observable indicator. Under issue-linkage, we understand actors taking up similar positions on different issues so that multiple issues form a single dimension of political contestation. In other words, a cleavage must contain similar conflict lines across multiple issues.

1 Note that this is different from the usage of the term in negotiation theory.
One empirical step to be taken in investigating whether there is a new globalization cleavage and whether it exists beyond Western Europe is thus to establish the degree of issue-linkage on globalization related topics. To do this, we ask whether political actors expressing integrationist or demarcationist preferences regarding one issue related to globalization express similarly integrationist or demarcationist preferences regarding other globalization issues. We therefore put to the test three hypotheses that should hold true before we can speak of a globalization cleavage. First, the cleavage should structure all the issue-areas strongly affected by globalization. Second, we should see this in organizational terms – partisan or otherwise – with different organizations representing different positions on this dimension. Third, the cleavage should play out similarly in different parts of the world, to the extent that the countries involved are exposed to globalization in similar ways.

**Case Selection**

To capture the wide variety of manifestations of denationalization, we select five different political issues that each involve the border-crossing of different commodities. *International trade* has long stood at the forefront of globalization studies (e.g. Margalit 2012). We understand it here to reflect the border crossing of goods and services. Political actors take up a variety of positions regarding free trade, ranging from advocating free trade for the economic benefit of all, to the targeted subsidizing of specific export industries or the creation of tariffs or other barriers to trade to protect domestic industry. *Migration* is a second major issue area dominantly understood to be a feature of globalization (e.g. Kymlicka 2010). We understand it here as the border crossing of people, whether for temporary or permanent resettlement. This issue area includes questions such as rights to employment and residence permits, roads to citizenship and asylum policy, but also brain drain and the societal integration of immigrants and diaspora. Thirdly, we include the issue area of *human rights*. We understand that here as the border crossing of norms and values.
The buildup of a global human rights regime under the auspices of the United Nations is probably the most pronounced and far reaching institutionalized form of globalization, as well as one of the corner stones of arguments in favor of a shared global responsibility among humanity (e.g. Pogge 2002). This issue area includes the defense of physical integrity of human beings against violence, non-discrimination, freedoms of association, religion etc. and due process, including such rights as a fair trial. In political practice, we find arguments in favor and against international intervention as well as debates on conflictual human rights, such as conflicts between the non-discrimination of women and religious freedom to wear head scarves and conflicts between a woman’s right to choose and an unborn child’s right to live in abortion. The fourth issue included here is regional integration of which European integration institutionalized in the European Union is the most prominent and well-known manifestation. We understand this to be the border crossing of political authority and sovereignty. This issue area includes questions such as whether countries should be a member of a regional organization, how much power regional institutions should have over the member states, on which policy issues these institutions should be allowed to create collectively binding decisions and how regional decision-making processes should be organized – including such questions as voting weights and unanimity vs majority voting (Börzel 2005; Lindberg and Scheingold 1971). Finally, the fifth issue area we include is climate change. We understand this to concern the border crossing of environmental pollutants and their remedies. Political questions included in this issue are whether a country should subscribe to obligations as currently laid down in the Kyoto Protocol to limit its emissions of greenhouse gasses, how voluntary combating global climate change should be and who should pay for mitigating the effects of climate change. Needless to say, there are many more issues that manifest and contribute to denationalization. Our selection here is merely an attempt to capture a broad variety of different issues – representing the border crossing of commodities as varied as people, goods, norms, authority and pollutants – so as to present a least likely case for issue linkage. That is, if we find that political actors take up
coherent positions on these five very different issues, we can state more confidently that globalization really is the driving societal revolution behind an emerging cleavage.

Following Przeworski and Teune (1970), we employ a most different systems design of country cases. Cleavages, at least in the way we study them here, similar to the approach of Kriesi et al, do not play out universally. Without minimal levels of democracy – including most notably: freedom of the press and multi-party systems – there will be no sensible, accessible public debates about globalization issues with competing organizations representing different sides of a structural social divide in the national news. Democracy is thus a scope condition, delimiting the population of countries in which we can study globalization cleavage. Our five cases – Germany, Poland, Turkey, the USA and Mexico – are all large, advanced industrialized democracies subject to the forces of globalization, but they differ strongly in their cultural and political heritage that might affect the way cleavages form. Geographically, we expand the focus on Western European countries to include another Western country (the USA), a Central and East European Country (Poland), a country from the Middle East (Turkey) and one from Latin America (Mexico). They contain predominantly Protestant, Catholic and Islamic societies. Some have a long history of stable democracy, political parties and cleavages, while others are more recently democratized, plagued by coups and do not have fully crystalized cleavages. Our countries differ in from parliamentary to presidential democracies, contain various forms of proportional and majoritarian electoral rules and have two or multiple party systems. Thus, to the extent that different cultures, political history and party political system affect the way a globalization cleavage manifests itself, our research design maximally allows difference to occur while controlling for the fact that all countries are subject to globalization and filter societal conflict through democratic processes, including at least a partially free press and competitive party systems. Given maximized difference, any common findings in terms of patterns of conflict across issues and countries would strongly support the thesis that a cleavage is in the making and that globalization is driving it.
Data: Claim-Making in Public Spheres

Although cleavages may be generated by societal revolutions, there is nothing ‘natural’ about them. Revolutions like the reformation, industrialization and globalization create the potential for a cleavage, but will only become manifest when political entrepreneurs – within democracies notably political parties – start to campaign and capitalize on this potential. Sartori even goes as far as to claim that parties (in the class cleavage) do not flow out of an objective class, but that the party creates the class consciousness in a subjective way (Sartori cited in Mair 2005: 372). To establish a cleavage, therefore, the issues on which represented and representatives connect need to be ‘politicized’. Through a process of raising the visibility, polarization and public resonance of an issue in the public sphere (De Wilde 2011b) the structural, organizational and normative components of a cleavage can be made to coalesce.

In the modern world of a complicated plurality of multi-level issues, this is even more the case. With the multiplication of political issues, competition between parties is often no longer “those supporting a policy against those opposing it”, but rather “those talking about an issue against those ignoring it”. Yet, while political parties may act as agents in setting the agenda, they are also constrained by it. Once other parties successfully manage to put an issue on the agenda, others will have to follow in debating it (Green-Pedersen 2007: 609-610). Political actors thus shape the political agenda in terms of which issues are considered salient and are constrained by it at the same time.

In light of this, our attention in studying the formation of a globalization cleavage is directed to the activities of various political entrepreneurs in trying to set the political agenda where they champion some issues while ignoring or downplaying others, all limited by the existing agenda set by others. Here, we focus on the public sphere as the central arena where political actors engage in agenda-setting, based on the assumption that successful political agenda-setting includes convincing both other representatives as well as the represented of
the importance of a particular issue, thus requiring political communication to reach both elites and citizens. It is in the public sphere that establishing the salience of issues and the viability and desirability of alternative policy options unfolds through communicative interaction, most inclusive of both elites and citizens (Habermas 1991). In today’s mediatized democracies, the main place for such political communication are mass media (Bennett and Entman 2001). Sticking to the economic metaphors that dominate the cleavage literature: if political parties provide the ‘supply’ of political programs and citizens the ‘demand’, then the public sphere – primarily constituted by mass media – is the ‘market place’ in which supply and demand meet.

In the age of internet, news reporting is instantaneous. Events may rapidly alter the political climate, providing opportunities for political entrepreneurs to politicize some issues and depoliticize others (Berkhout and Van der Brug 2013; De Wilde and Zürn 2012; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). What is more, such event-driven issues rapidly travel from the arena of mass media to the parliamentary political arena and back (De Wilde 2011a; Walgrave et al. 2008). Mass media increasingly recognize the far-reaching consequences for their domestic audiences of decisions and events unfolding outside of the nation-state. While still aiming to cater to the interests of a domestic, national audience, globalization and regional integration therefore lead mass media to increase their coverage of global and regional news, including the foreign political actors that make it (Koopmans and Statham 2010; Wessler et al. 2008).

Hence, globalization does not just provide new political issues of possible contention, it also provides new players beyond national political parties for issue and position competition. These include foreign political actors and international organizations, for example. The public debates involved feature a variety of actors trying to raise the salience of different issues or campaigning for specific issue positions while at the same time trying to present themselves as the best or most legitimate representatives of the issue and/or position in question. A process of issue politicization can thus be understood as ‘competitive
representative claims-making’ (De Wilde 2011b) where domestic and ‘non-national’ political actors compete simultaneously over policy options and over legitimacy, understood here as being widely accepted representatives. In addition to the internationalization of formal – elected or appointed – political representatives, globalization brings in a range in informal political representatives, like civil society organizations, religious actors, public intellectuals and celebrities. Saward therefore speaks of political representation as a dynamic act of claims-making, rather than the static result of elections or appointment (Saward 2009). The political spectrum of entrepreneurs thus becomes diversified in the wake of globalization, just like the spectrum of (potentially) salient issues. Consequently, it has become less obvious which institutions constitute the organizational component of a cleavage. Each of the above mentioned institutions have a primary interest in establishing themselves as legitimate political representatives of the wider public to ensure their own institutional survival. Democratic political conflict in the age of globalization is therefore about: 1) which issues should we care about?, 2) what policies should we conduct in relation to those salient issues and 3) which organizations deserve the mandate to enact that policy?

To analyze the possible formation of a globalization cleavage, we therefore proceed to study claims in the public sphere constituted by mass media and the extent to which linkages between different globalization-related issues are established therein. Such linkages could come to the fore through both position competition and issue competition and they could be driven by a range of possible political entrepreneurs, from political parties to international institutions to civil society organizations.

To measure issue linkage in the public sphere, we use the method of representative claims analysis (De Wilde 2013; Koopmans and Statham 1999) as a specific form of quantitative content analysis. Claims analysis is very suitable for measuring issue linkage through politicization in different contexts as it takes a very small unit – a ‘claim’ – as unit of analysis and measures relevant variables at that level. This allows for both aggregation towards the level of individual political actors as well as the comparative cases of different
issues and countries. Aside from the uses for various forms of aggregation, taking claims as a unit of measurement comes with the major advantage of maximizing ‘construct equivalence’ (Hantrais 1999: 104; Wirth and Kolb 2004) since political claims are basic building blocks of political debates, recognisable across time, space and forum. A claim is defined as a unit of strategic or communicative action in the public sphere: "[...] which articulate[s] political demands, decisions, implementations, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors in a policy field" (Statham 2005: 12). The archetypical claim would be a verbal speech act concerning some political issue that could be loosely translated as: “I (do not) want ...”. However, the definition above is far more inclusive, encompassing claims such as meetings of the G8, protests by farmers, resolutions tabled by parliamentarians and critical op-ed pieces by journalists. In textual terms, a claim can be as short as a few words, or as elaborate as several paragraphs, as long as it is made by the same claimant(s), conducting a single action in which a single position regarding integration or demarcation on a single globalization-related issue is articulated. An alteration in any of these four core characteristics separates one claim from the next.


Formal intercoder reliability ranged from .65 to 1.00 (agreement correlation coefficients). Variables with a basic percentage agreement lower than .70 were subsequently discarded or regrouped so that only variables with an agreement correlation of .84 or higher are used in the analysis (for full details, see De Wilde et al. 2014). Real intercoder reliability is presumably even higher through close cooperation among coders in praxis.
we measure WHERE, WHEN, WHO, HOW, directed at WHOM, claims WHAT, for/against WHOSE interests and WHY.

We draw on digital newspaper archives to conduct a stratified sampling using key word searches. In the period of 2007-2011 for which digital archives on a range of newspapers from all countries was available, we sampled using the following key word strings, with minor grammatical adaptations if the specific language required so (Table 1). Only articles with at least two of the key words present in the search string were selected for coding. A preliminary pilot sampling of key words established whether individual words were disproportionally used in either left-wing or right-wing newspapers. To avoid political bias in the sampling, only words that were either neutral (no disproportional usage in specific newspapers) or combinations of both leftist and rightist words were used in the subsequent sampling.

Table 1: Issues and key word search

| Migration       | • Immigration          |
|                | • Emigration           |
|                | • Citizenship          |
| Regional integration | • Regional integration |
|                | • European integration OR EU membership OR European Union |
|                | • NAFTA OR ASEAN OR Organization of American States OR OAS |
|                | • Sovereignty          |
|                | • Membership           |
| International trade | • Import               |
|                | • Export               |
To establish issue linkage, we sampled a fixed number of articles from multiple years and multiple newspapers per issue. The strategy is therefore one of stratified sampling (Krippendorff 2004: 115). The total resulting dataset includes 11810 claims. Although the sampling was designed to generate an approximately equal number of claims per issue, per country, the actual number of claims coded varies as issue salience varies across countries.

Claims were aggregated based on a combination of the claimant function and whether they were domestic (e.g. of Turkish nationality in the Turkish news), international or foreign. Individual political parties and newspapers (based on their editorials) were further specified beyond the claimant function and nationality. At this level of aggregation, mean positions on each of the five issues were calculated where each claim demanding integration, open borders or international cooperation is coded as +1, each claim demanding or enacting

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3 Sampling targeted 150 articles per issue per country, divided equally over the amount of years and newspapers. The population drawn from includes all articles that have the required keyword combinations, irrespective of type of article or location within the newspaper.
demarcation is coded as −1, and claims drawing attention to the issue without specifying a policy preference coded as 0. We use weighted metric multi-dimensional unfolding (WMMDU) to map issues and claimants in a single two-dimensional space allowing for the visualization of possible cleavage dimensions and bivariate or multivariate dimensions of issue linkage. In the WMMDU analysis, ultimate pro-integrationist and pro-demarcationist issue poles are mapped where claimants’ proximity to these poles is a function of the (inverse) mean position and weighted by the amount of claims that claimant makes on the issue in question. For example, if a claimant makes four integrationist claims (+1), one demarcationist claim (−1) and one neutral claim on climate change, its mean position is 0.5 ((4−1+0)/6). This would be translated to a proximity of 1.5 to the integrationist pole and 0.5 to the demarcationist pole on a scale from 0 to 2. Each proximity would be weighted in the WMMDU by a factor 6: the total number of claims by this actor on climate change. As a result, the proximity of a claimant to a pole informs us about its mean position and the placement of claimants in the policy space in relation to each issue pole is more accurate, the more claims this claimant makes on that issue.

The added value of the WMMDU over bivariate correlations lies not only in the possibility of mapping more than two issues in a two dimensional graph, but also in the possibility of mapping nonlinear patterns of issue linkage (Borg and Groenen 2005). In a number of cases – discussed more extensively below – we find positive issue linkage on the integrationist side but not on the demarcationist side. For example, claimants making integrationist claims on human rights may also make integrationist claims on climate change while those making demarcationist claims on human rights may have various positions on climate change, and vice versa. Such patterns dilute the bivariate correlation, but are captured in the WMMDU graphs where the integrationist coalition forms a coherent cluster close to the five integrationist poles and the demarcationists are spread out in various directions that can best be understood as concentric circles diverging from the integrationist midpoint. We use the PREFSCAL algorithm in SPSS as this allows direct relation of two different objects – claimants and issue poles – while reducing degenerate results (Busing et al. 2005) and at the
same time relaxes the assumption that claimant preferences to various issue policies are necessarily linear (Busing et al. 2010). Given that mean positions are a product of a three-point ordinal variable, rather than an interval variable, this relaxation helps avoid degenerate solutions.

Based on the resulting coordinates in the joint plots of WMMDU analysis, we conducted an inductive two-step cluster analysis\(^4\) to identify the amount of claimant clusters in each plot. This resulted in three clusters in four out of five country cases. The exception is Turkey, where we found two clusters. K-means clustering was subsequently used to identify the exact composition and membership of the clusters. The WMMDU joint plots presented below feature both the 10 issue poles, all the claimants per country, and a visualization of the clusters.

**Analysis and Findings**

Of the five issues we analyze, migration turns out clearly as the most salient issue in the German public debates in the time of study. Graph 1 shows the total number of claims coded per issue in Germany\(^5\). The issue of migration generates considerable partisan competition

\(^4\) Using Akaike’s information criterion with no outliers. As the distances are smooth ordinal ones, rather than linear, we conducted both cluster analysis based on Log-likelihood and on Euclidean distances and accepted the highest number of clusters from either analysis as the right number to proceed with.

\(^5\) Note that the sampling strategy aimed at an equal number of newspaper articles per country per issue. The difference in salience is therefore not the result of there being more articles about migration in the German news, but of a higher density of claims in articles on migration and of claims about migration also featuring in articles that were sampled using the key words strings for
in Germany. Both parties on the left and on the right to some extent acknowledge the right of immigrants – especially Turkish immigrants and their descendents – to live in Germany. Many argue Germany needs immigrants to compensate low birth rates and keep the economy going. But the policy emphasis differs. Leftist parties (SPD, Die Linke and Die Grüne) tend to emphasize that more needs to be done by the government to facilitate the integration into society of immigrants already in Germany. This includes offering roads to citizenship and government facilitation, for example in terms of language courses. Also, they argue in favor of liberal allowance of the residence of political asylum seekers and refugees. The right (CDU/CSU), on the other hand, focuses more on restricting economic immigration – especially lowly educated, non-Western immigrants – and places responsibility for societal integration more on the shoulders of immigrants themselves.

one of the other issues. These numbers are first of all important as a measure of relative salience of the five issues in each of the five national public spheres. Secondly, they affect the subsequent WMMDU analysis, since claimant positions are weighted by their amount of claims per issue. The high relative salience of migration in the German debates means that claimant positions in the WMMDU solution are overall more strongly affected by their positions on migration than by their positions on the other issues.
As shown in the WMMDU solution graph below, the German political space as represented in news features a strong cosmopolitan bias. We find the five integrationist issue poles on the top of the graph and the vast majority of claimants close to one or more of them. In contrast, the five demarcationist poles are more spread out in the lower part of the plot and that part of the political spectrum is sparsely populated with claimants. A powerful cluster of mainstream cosmopolitans centers around the integrationist poles of human rights (HRi) and climate change (CCi) while also close to the integrationist poles of migration (Mi), regional integration (RiI) and trade (Ti). This cluster labeled ‘cosmopolitan mainstream’ includes the majority of domestic claimants, including citizens, experts, bureaucracy representatives, the media in general and taz specifically. It is complemented by some international claimants, including global international organizations, international business and the European Union. To its left, we find the traditional left, including the social democrats (SPD), Die Linke and Die Grüne and the domestic legislative institutions. In comparison to the cosmopolitan mainstream, they are closer to the ultimate pro-integrationist position on migration (Mi) and more ambivalent about regional integration and trade, yet equally far away from all other demarcationist poles. Some foreign and international actors are also located in this cluster,
including the US Democratic Party and citizens. On the bottom and to the right, we find a disperse cluster which we label the communitarian right, including the main conservative political party CDU/CSU and conservative newspapers Die Welt and FAZ. For the rest, it consists of foreign claimants, including religious actors, legislative institutions, business, bureaucracy and governments. Note also the presence of the US Republican Party in this cluster. The main conflict in the German political debate is clearly about the issue of migration, which splits both the domestic left and right and folds also the major US parties in this conflict. However, if we would only focus on domestic political parties as organization component of a cleavage, we would underestimate the power of the cosmopolitan mainstream, which stands out separately from both partisan clusters and outweighs them. This largely non-partisan mainstream folds the other four issues into the political conflict and presents a coherent pro-integrationist argument on all five issues. It lacks, however, a coherent communitarian counterpart taking clear demarcationist positions on more than the issue of migration. The demarcationists remain underrepresented and diffuse.
Graph 1: WMMDU joint plot solution of Germany with K-means generated clusters

Kruskal’s Stress-I: .203, Shepard’s Rough Nondegeneracy Index: .803

*Kruskal’s Stress-I reports a badness-of-fit of the model. Measures below .20 are generally considered acceptable (Borg and Groenen 2005: 47). As our MDU solutions contain more than 10 times as many points as dimensions, we also accept slightly higher values. Only in the case of Poland does Stress-I accede the .20 threshold. Shepard’s rough nondegeneracy index is a goodness of fit measurement and levels around .80 are generally considered acceptable. All of our plots are at or very close to that level. Given high number of points in each solution, low stress, and low degeneracy, we accept all five plots as adequate representations of the multidimensional issue space.*
The issue salience in Poland differs from the German one as the spread of issues is more equally distributed. In other words, none of the five issues in Poland is significantly more salient than the others, in the sense of average number of claims per article or featuring claims in stories that are mainly about a different issue.

In Poland, the analysis again reveals three clusters of claimants with a powerful cosmopolitan mainstream, as visualized in the WMMDU solution graph. All the five integrationist issue poles are located closely together at the upper center of the plot and most claimants – domestic, international and foreign – are located closely to them. Like the German cosmopolitan mainstream, it contains key international actors such as global international organizations and the EU, but also the main non-partisan domestic actors, including the judiciary, business, citizens, government and the liberal newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza. In contrast to the German political space, one of two main political parties also is present in this cluster: the liberal PO party of Donald Tusk. Both its domestic representatives and its Members of the European Parliament contribute to the cosmopolitan mainstream discourse. The second cluster in Poland is the communitarian right. More clearly reflecting
the expectations of Kriesi et al than the German political space, this cluster pulls towards the demarcationist poles of both migration (Md) and regional integration (RId). This group contains the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) of the Kaczynski brothers and the orthodox Catholic newspaper Nasz Dziennik. The cluster is complemented by domestic legislative institutions, religious actors, foreign citizens, foreign judiciary, and international governmental actors. A minor third cluster of communitarian outliers pulls towards the other three demarcationist poles of climate change (CCd), trade (Td) and human rights (HRd). The only domestic member of this cluster are farmers, with the other two being foreign police and the US Republican Party.
Turkey features again a disproportionate salience of one of the five issues, this time human rights. Discussions about democratization in Turkey and alleged corruption of the AKP government were often couched in terms of human rights. Notably, the governments infringements on freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary evoked such criticism. Supporters of the AKP government in turn challenge Kemalist secularism in terms of human rights too. They argue that their rights to freedom of religion are at stake. While demanding various policies, therefore, both sides would speak up vehemently in favor of
upholding or increasing Turkish adherence to human rights. They would just emphasize different human rights, depending on their immediate concerns.

Turkey features even more dominant cosmopolitan discourse than Germany and Poland. The five integrationist issue poles are located very closely together at the upper heart of the plot and almost all claimants are extremely close to them. Some foreign and international actors provide counter arguments and form a second cluster of communitarian outliers, including the EU, foreign governments, media and legislative institutions. Domestically, the newspapers Zaman and Milliyet as well as the CHP party contribute to this second cluster. As can be seen clearly in the plot though, even these are much closer to the five integrationist issue poles than they are to any of the demarcationist poles. With the exception of the German CDU/CSU, this cluster of communitarian outliers could perhaps best be labeled the ‘slightly less cosmopolitan cluster’ instead.
Graph 3: WMMDU joint plot solution of Turkey with K-means clusters

Kruskal’s Stress-1: .149, Shepard’s Rough Nondegeneracy Index: .779

On the other side of the Atlantic, we find the debate in the USA to approximate the German one, in several ways. Firstly, there is a strong cosmopolitan mainstream around the integrationist poles of human rights and climate change mainly, and to a lesser extent related to regional integration and trade. Note, however, that the issue of regional integration generates considerably less contentious claims when no powerful scheme like the European Union is directly at stake. In the US, regional integration is mainly understood as institutionalization of free trade and considered a subordinate issue of the latter.
Like in Germany, it contains most (relatively) nonpartisan domestic actors, including the judiciary, religious actors, civil society as well as international players like international organizations and international civil society. In editorials, the New York Times and the Houston Chronicle contribute to this coalition. Secondly, the partisan conflict evolves mainly around the issue of migration with the Democrats close to the integrationist pole (Mi) and the Republicans close to the demarcationist pole (Md). Thirdly, besides the dimension on migration, we can identify two more dimensions with human rights and climate change forming a single one and regional integration and trade forming the other one. For both of these dimensions, the integrationist poles are closely located together as are the two demarcationist poles. These dimensions, are however, only partially independent, because the integrationist poles are all very close together. Only the demarcationist side is spread out. In contrast to Germany, but similar to Poland, there is no cosmopolitan left cluster in the USA. The Democratic Party, like the Polish PO liberals, are part of the cosmopolitan mainstream. Fourthly, like in Germany, the US communitarian right is formed by the main conservative party, the conservative editorials in newspapers like the Washington Times,
domestic bureaucracy and some foreign actors, like police and the Mexican PAN party. While Germany features a cosmopolitan left that is ambivalent about trade and regional integration, yet strongly integrationist on the other issues, the left in the USA as represented by trade unions is more communitarian. It is moderately demarcationist on trade and regional integration and ambivalent on the other three issues. It includes, besides trade unions, also the main voice of citizens and the domestic legislative institutions. Note that the EU plays a different role in debates in non-member states than in member states. Whereas its representatives belong to the core of the cosmopolitan mainstream in Germany and Poland, their voice in Turkey (on all issues) and in the USA (on trade and regional integration especially) is more demarcationist.
Graph 4: WMMDU joint plot solution of the USA with K-means clusters

Kruskal’s Stress-I: .204, Shepard’s Rough Nondegeneracy Index: .815

Finally, the debate in Mexico features the now familiar powerful cosmopolitan mainstream, with many domestic, international and foreign claimants located very closely to all five integrationist poles. There is, however, a significant domestic other cluster that is skeptical about free trade. It contains farmers, domestic and foreign media, and two of the big Mexican political parties: the PRD and the PRI. Because this cluster is still located in closer proximity to the integrationist poles on the other four issues than to the demarcationist poles, we consider this a cosmopolitan left cluster, rather than a communitarian one. While the
cosmopolitan left in Germany is mainly a pro-migration coalition, the cosmopolitan left in Mexico is anti-trade. With the exception of the conflict on trade, the Mexican political spectrum closely resembles the one in Turkey, featuring an extremely unified and powerful cosmopolitan mainstream and a few foreign voices representing communitarian outliers. To a considerable extent, this is the result of human rights being the most salient issue in Mexico, just like in Turkey, and claimants demanding action against human rights violations, but emphasizing different interpretations of human rights in different contexts. Mexican opposition parties and civil society frequently challenge the behavior of police forces acting in the War on Drugs, against migrants or against indigenous peoples in terms of human rights, while government officials would defend their policies by pointing at the need to combat human rights violations committed by Drug cartels or other limitations on the rights of average Mexican citizens.

Note also that regional integration, like in the USA, generates considerably fewer claims in Mexico than it does in the three country cases that are either full members of the EU or closely associated with it.
Graph 5: WMMDU joint plot solution of Mexico with K-means clusters

Kruskal’s Stress-I: .157, Shepard’s Rough Nondegeneracy Index: .796

Comparison

Recall that our comparative case study has been explicitly designed as a most different systems design to test the thesis that globalization is generating a cleavage. Following this logic, we focus in the comparative analysis on similarities across cases especially. Clearly,
however, there are also major differences. While our design does not allow for the explanation of differences with the same certainty as the explanation of similarities, we will discuss possible explanations for observed differences in more tentative ways.

**Similarities**

On similarities, a clear and striking finding from this study is the presence of a powerful cosmopolitan mainstream cleavage coalition in all five country case studies. This coalition is powerful in the sense that it contains many different claimants, particularly non-partisan institutional domestic claimants like bureaucracy, judiciary, and the government, non-partisan societal domestic actors like mass media in editorials and civil society organizations and international claimants, particularly international organizations and international civil society. In most cases, this coalition is further supported by one of main centrist political parties. This is the case for the PO party in Poland, the AKP in Turkey, the Democratic Party in the US and the PAN in Mexico. Only the German debate sees none of the center parties in this cosmopolitan mainstream coalition, which can partially be explained by the disproportionate salience of migration in Germany, leading parties to form opposing coalitions on this issue somewhat independent of the cosmopolitan mainstream.

While the cosmopolitan mainstream forms a powerful coalition with coherent pro-integrationist positions on all or most of our five issues, communitarian voices remain rare, less outspoken and disorganized. First, the number of claimants part of a communitarian coalition as identified in our cluster analysis is low. There is only a minority of claimants in such clusters. Secondly, those claimants who are communitarian are most of the time not very extreme. In the visual WMMDU solutions, this is shown by their relative distance to the demarcationist issue poles in comparison to the close proximity of the cosmopolitan mainstream to the pro-integrationist poles. In the extreme case of Turkey, most of the members of the communitarian coalition are actually better understood as ‘slightly less
cosmopolitan than the cosmopolitan mainstream’. Thirdly, the communitarian claimants are more disperse that their cosmopolitan counterparts. While the cosmopolitan mainstream forms a coherent coalition in the sense that they are pro-integrationist on all or most issues, communitarians tend to be demarcationist on one or two issues only while remaining silent or pro-integrationist on the other issues. As different (partial) communitarians emphasize demarcationist positions on different issues, this is yet another limitation to the existence of a communitarian cleavage coalition. A fourth restriction to the formation of a communitarian cleavage coalition is that domestic actors are only rarely part of it. Most often, communitarian voices are represented by foreign claimants in the news.

Differences

While these similarities between the five countries described above are striking given the widely different political systems under study, several key differences also need to be discussed. These key differences start with the difference in relative salience of the five issues under study in each of the country cases, which is connected to the cleavage formation. On the one hand, we observe a key difference between the more developed countries – Germany, Poland and the USA – and the developing and democratizing countries – Turkey and Mexico. Of a more minor importance, is the difference in salience of the issue of regional integration on both sides of the Atlantic.

Germany and the USA are rich and stable democracies. Thanks largely to their economic prowess and stable and comparatively safe democracies, they are immigration countries. This immigration has generated a societal conflict in both countries, with each side represented by a mainstream political party or group. The left in Germany and the Democrats in the USA advocate the active integration of migrants into society, through stimulation of language courses, combating discrimination and through formal roads to citizenship. The right embodied by the CDU/CSU and the Republic Party campaign against
immigration, especially of non-Western, lowly educated immigrants, whether they are Turks in Germany or Latin Americans in the USA. Our findings here reflect exactly what the globalization cleavage thesis predicts. It is interesting to note that Poland shows very similar conflicts to both Germany and the USA, despite not nearly having as many immigrants. One possible explanation for this is a Europeanization of globalization conflict lines (Koopmans and Erbe 2004). That is, the politics in Poland may be influenced by the politics of other EU member states as Polish political parties copy successful mobilizing strategies from parties with similar ideological profile in neighboring countries. Another explanation could be the effect of the European Union as strong authority beyond the state that resonates with liberal and conservative predispositions in political parties to align more with issues like migration than when regional integration remains an institutionalized form of free trade only. Given our research design, we are unable to effectively rule out one or the other explanation.

The politics in Turkey and Mexico, differ strongly from the other three cases. Both these countries feature a more cosmopolitan debate than Germany, Poland and the USA as evidenced by the near monopoly of the cosmopolitan mainstream in Turkey and the near absence of communitarian representatives in both. One explanation of this might be that they are not net-immigration countries, and therefore the lack of societal tensions that we see in Germany and the USA. However, both countries actually do feature immigrants from the Middle East and from other Latin American countries respectively. Another explanation could be the salience of domestic human rights violations. Clearly, this issue is of major importance in both countries, even if very different situations and contexts feed the concerns. Both countries feature a government–opposition dynamic in debate about human rights, where both sides accuse the other of either violating human rights or emphasizing the wrong ones. No one argues that human rights are not important, do not apply in their country, or that it is ok to violate them. We theorize that the limited democratization of both countries stands at the origin of this salience. That is, human rights are a salient issue in Turkey and Mexico because the domestic track record is simply not spotless. We do not want to argue that there are no human rights concerns in the other three countries, but they
clearly are not of the same magnitude. We therefore hypothesize that limited democratization increases the salience of human rights concerns and that this inhibits the development of a globalization cleavage by drowning out other issues on which claimants might substantially disagree. A systematic test of this hypothesis is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.

A second major difference is the salience of regional integration in Europe and the Americas. While in Europe, the EU has major impact in many policy areas of its member states (Germany and Poland) and candidate member states (Turkey), NAFTA in the Americas remains nothing more than an institutionalized free trade agreement. The difference is clearly reflected in the salience of this issue in the five countries. Regional integration generates very few claims in both the USA and Mexico. However, interestingly, this does not always have a major impact on the alignment of the issue. In the USA, as one might expect, regional integration is closely aligned with trade and those opposing free trade also oppose regional integration, which they simply see as an institutional extension thereof, and vice versa. In Poland, also as expected, the issue of regional integration is rather aligned with migration, reflecting the more cultural impact European integration has of sovereignty loss colliding with national identity perceptions that globalization cleavage theory predicts. But in Germany, we find that regional integration aligns more with trade as in the US and in Mexico we find it does not align with trade. The Euro crisis may thus have changed the public perception of European integration from a cultural project with identity ramifications back to an economic project with financial ramifications (cf. Statham and Trenz 2013). This interpretation would allow for the difference between Poland and Germany, as only the latter is part of the Eurozone and therefore embroiled in its cumbersome and expensive rescue efforts. This still leaves the surprising finding that Mexican opposition to regional integration, with which the Zapatistas once achieved global acclaim, has completely evaporated. Such findings and interpretations point to the limits of this study, as the findings are clearly shaped by the time frame under study. Even if our sampling has avoided too strong temporal bias by sampling debates in a five year time period, the results would no
doubt have been different if we had studied public debates in the early 1990s or any other time period.

**Discussion**

With an encompassing comparative research design including five countries and five issues, this study elevates the research on the formation of a globalization cleavage from its predominant geographical focus on Western Europe and its substantial focus on the issues of European integration and immigration. We expand the geographical focus to include a Central and Eastern European country (Poland) a Middle Eastern country (Turkey), a North American country (the USA) and a Latin American country (Mexico). We expand the issue focus to generalize from European integration to regional integration and from immigration to migration and include three additional issues: climate change, human rights and trade.

These five countries not only differ in their geographical location. They have widely different cultural and political histories and political systems. And while the five different issues all evolve around the border crossing of commodities an the extent to which this is desirable, these commodities vary from people (migration) to norms (human rights) and from goods (trade), to pollutants (climate change) to political authority (regional integration).

Through this most different research design, we put the thesis that globalization generates a cleavage pitting winners against losers to a tough test. After all, if it truly is globalization that generates a cleavage, one should be able to find evidence of it in countries around the world and in highly varied policy issues, as long as these countries are subject to globalization and the issues have an important border-crossing element. Given this tough test, it is all the more striking that we do indeed find evidence of globalization cleavage formation, albeit only one-sided. It is one-sided in the sense that we document the existence of a strong, dominant cosmopolitan mainstream coalition in all five countries that exists of
similar claimants who voice coherently pro-integrationist claims on all (or most of the) five issues. This cleavage coalition consists primarily of non-partisan institutional and societal claimants, some domestic and some international. Communitarian claimants, in contrast, are sparse, moderate and disperse. In Germany, Poland and the US, there is a communitarian right-wing coalition centered around the main conservative parties CDU/CSU, PiS and the Republican Party and backed by conservative newspapers, like Die Welt, FAZ, Nasz Dziennik and The Washington Times. National legislatures, the police and – sometimes – bureaucracy join this communitarian right coalition as do some foreign claimants. In Turkey and Mexico, only foreign actors represent communitarian voices, notably the CDU/CSU and the Republican Party respectively. Even in the case that there is a significant communitarian coalition, it does not have as varied a membership as the cosmopolitan mainstream, those claimants that do voice a demarcationist position tend to do so more moderately than that their cosmopolitan counterparts voice a pro-integrationist position, and communitarian claimants rarely defend demarcationist positions on all five issues included in our study, whereas the cosmopolitan mainstream tends to be strongly coherent in its pro-integrationist claims on all five issues.

Our study thus shows two major confirmatory, yet qualified, findings for the thesis that globalization generates a cleavage. Firstly, we can find evidence of it beyond Western Europe, but only in rich, advanced and stable democracies. Besides Germany, where substantial research has already documented its existence, we also find supportive evidence of a cleavage in Poland and in the USA, but not in Turkey and Mexico. Secondly, where in Western Europe, far right populist parties have often been identified as the main drivers of a globalization cleavage by campaigning against immigration and against European integration, we document its existence also in countries without electorally successful far-right populist parties, but with mainstream conservative parties that have taken up their electoral niche. The absence of far right populist parties may, however, account for the limited dimensional issue linkage between migration and regional integration that we document.
The inclusion of a multitude of actors in our analysis – whomever makes claims on globalization in the national news of our five countries – reveals several characteristics that remain overlooked in studies that focus on domestic political parties only. First, it reveals the strength of the cosmopolitan mainstream, which often does not include domestic political parties, but does include other domestic and international actors. Second, it reveals higher levels of contentiousness of globalization issues as international claimants are by and large more integrationist than domestic ones while foreign claimants are more demarcationist. Excluding both would therefore lead to an underestimation of globalization cleavage. Thirdly, the inclusion of a multitude of actors demonstrates that cleavage formation – at least on the cosmopolitan side – extends beyond the usual suspect issues of regional integration and migration. Especially on human rights and climate change, non-partisan actors play a key role in the debates and in shaping the cosmopolitan mainstream coalition. Fourthly, we show how foreign political parties – especially the CDU/CSU and the Republican Party – contribute to cleavage formation in other countries than their own. They feature prominently in the Turkish and Mexican news respectively and take up a communitarian position that is not represented by any domestic claimant. The coverage of foreign partisan globalization conflict could function to diffuse cleavages from countries where they are more established to where they are not (yet) pointing to the international interdependence of cleavage formation. Political parties may well decide to copy demarcationist strategies from foreign political parties if they prove to lead to electoral success in similar societies and citizens and other representatives may well become more attuned to the opportunities and threats involved in globalization by being exposed to the arguments voiced by foreigners. At the same time, we need to point out limitations to this mechanism as our findings clearly show that the demarcationist arguments of the CDU/CSU and the Republicans have not been echoed by domestic parties in Turkey or Mexico.

The research design employed here does not allow for an authoritative explanation of observed differences between countries or between issues. We can, however, tentatively draw conclusions in the form of hypotheses that would require more substantial testing in
future. While our positive findings regarding cleavage formation in Germany, Poland and the USA are striking, our negative findings in Turkey and Mexico deserve equal attention. In both Mexico and Turkey, we find an even more dominant cosmopolitan mainstream than in the other three countries and an exceptionally high salience of human rights issues. Furthermore, claims made on human rights are very pro-integrationist, with government and opposition trading blows about who violates human rights more. In other words, we face a valence issue here and a framing contest, rather than a positional conflict (Green-Pedersen 2007; Green 2007). This leads us to suspect that as long as domestic human rights violations are of major societal concern, positional conflict about globalization will be crowded out by the pro-integrationist discourse on human rights. With human rights concerns particularly pressing in developing countries and countries where democracy is not fully consolidated yet, the development of a globalization cleavage may well be restricted to rich developed countries with stable democratic systems. It should further be noted that – with the exception of trade in Mexico – the entire discourse in both countries was highly pro-integrationist, not just the discourse on human rights. We therefore suspect that as long as negative consequences of globalization do not hit home, the development of a globalization cleavage remains limited. It is easy to be in favor of combating climate change, if your own country does not carry any responsibility for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It is easy to argue in favor of humanitarian intervention if you are not expected to deliver the soldiers who have to step into harm’s way. And it is easy to support open borders for migrants if you do not receive a huge inflow and subsequent societal problems of integrating them. To that extent, the discourse of the cosmopolitan mainstream reflects to some extent cheap rhetoric that only becomes more difficult to uphold when direct costs become associated with its implementation. If this is true, the generation of a cleavage on globalization should not be understood as the divergence of opinions towards both pro-integrationist and pro-demarcationist poles from a previous state of collective ambivalence, indifference or ignorance. Instead it resembles the break-up of the cosmopolitan consensus as communitarian dissidents become ever more vocal, numerous and organized.
All this supports the notion that globalization generates a cleavage, albeit with certain caveats, conditions and limitations. Globalization leads to a cleavage even beyond Western Europe and on issues beyond regional integration and migration. Furthermore, globalized communication in the sense of domestic reporting in the news of claims by foreign and international players exacerbates and accelerates the process of cleavage formation. Cleavage formation on globalization, however, should be understood as the communitarian break-away from the cosmopolitan consensus rather than the generation of both camps from previous ambivalence, ignorance or indifference. This break-away is hindered when domestic human rights violations are a major salient issue and when domestic costs of globalization remain limited. This specification of the globalization cleavage thesis invites further research that goes beyond the country cases, issues and time frame analyzed here, that looks at different manifestations than public debates, and that can more authoritatively isolate the scope conditions and causal mechanisms of cleavage formation on globalization.
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