Normative Engagement Across Difference: A Pragmatic Social-Practice Based Perspective

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Introduction: Normative Difference in Methodological and Democratic Engagement

Some problems arise in a literature only to fall out of focus, whether solved or forgotten. Some problems dominate discussions, preoccupying every approach and tradition as unavoidable. And some problems linger in the background of every analysis, never fully addressed and generally avoided. While often the subject of perfunctory recognition or “accounting for”, their fundamental consequences mean that they are only engaged insofar as is required by academic form, before moving on to the tractable subject of the analysis. Methodological issues have often received such treatment in political theory. While this is increasingly not the case, this dynamic persists in one particular issue. This is the meta-problem, across many spheres of the discipline, of inter-normative engagement; how we engage in substantive political theorizing on many shared problems between frameworks which do not share critical and normative criteria. I call this the problem of non-foundational normativity.

While a general problem in political theory, in Critical Social Theory (CST) this is an overt and contentious issue. Much of the tradition has confronted it, and its internal divisions are often linked to different approaches to this problem. Further, it is not solely methodological. Its political cognate is the problem of democratic engagement across similar normative differences found in varying cultural, ideological, and religious frameworks. The latter political division, while not mapping perfectly onto the former, similarly divide theories of pluralistic democracy within CST. While the methodological and democratic problems of inter-normative engagement are not reducible to each other, they are linked by the common attempt to frame (primarily) linguistic interaction in the absence of shared critical and normative criteria in a manner that does not presume or favour the criteria of one vocabulary or group. They thus seek methods for non-authoritarian, horizontal modes of normative interaction both amongst varying methodological clusters in political theory and diverse clusters of democratic agents. It is thus no surprise that literatures focused on the most overt manifestations of the problem of inter-normative engagement (e.g. multiculturalism, post-colonialism, feminism) have also been those characterized by methodological experimentation around difference.

Pragmatism is a minority voice within CST and political theory in general. However, this article argues it offers unique resources to address this obdurate situation. Drawing on Richard Rorty’s last set of essays and recent re-readings from within pragmatism, it argues he makes a valuable contribution to the methods debate around normativity, especially around the possibility of a social-practice based or situated perspective. He does this by avoiding the usual pitfalls of confronting normative pluralism. Unlike many analytical, normative approaches, he does not seek to overcome normative difference by re-grounding our method in a “free-standing”, “ideal” or “constructivist” approach. Nor does he shift neutrality to the
implicit pragmatics of language itself and its shared validity structures as in Critical Theory. Finally, he avoids reifying difference itself into a normative criterion for governing pluralistic contexts, as some ontological trends in contemporary Continental political and democratic theory. Rather, Rorty seeks a practice-based “way of proceeding” within normative difference. This is a meta-theoretical account of inter-normative engagement that allows us to both frame such encounters without raising one set of criteria above others (and is thus anti-foundational) and account for the variety of normative claims already and inevitably around us in a manner that still enables creative normative intervention (anti-sceptical). The value-added is key methodological insights into the opportunities and constraints of contemporary socio-political criticism.

Section one gives some shape to the problem of non-foundational normativity, drawing on a variety of literatures within CST. Framing this as an issue of the practice of justification, it argues that the implicit ideal of these approaches is reflexivity. Section two briefly addresses pragmatism’s possibilities as a framework for political pluralistic thinking, clarifying its social-practice based approach to the project of reflexivity at its core. Section 3 details Rorty’s social approach to normativity, and how this way of understanding normativity suggests an outward ethic of engagement while still providing resources for normative transformation. Section 4 builds on this turning to his later conception of “philosophy as cultural politics”. It argues that this way of framing inter-methodological debate provides both for the aims of horizontal inter-framework engagement and an attention to situated normative resources. Finally, Section 5 clarifies this by engaging Rorty’s approach to normative difference with emergent trends in Agonistic theory.

Political Theory, Normativity and Reflexivity

Critical social theory is ideal to confront this problem of inter-normative engagement. First, it is united around the problematic of the relation between critique and normativity. While a broad tradition, it gains shape by distinguishing it from normative/analytical political theory. The latter separates the critical and the normative and does not concern itself with assessing existing social conditions. Rather, its analyses are “free-standing”, guided only by “analytical rigour”. In contrast, CST ‘regards normative political reflection as being intrinsically connected to a critical social theory’(McNay 2008, 85). As a result, CSTs offer ethically oriented modes of reflection that critically assess existing socio-political arrangements in relation to some normative ideal. The latter at its widest point could be characterized as some explicit or assumed notion of ‘human flourishing’ or idea of ‘the good society’ which represents the normative goal of a context without the socio-political obstacle in question and is key to motivating the practice of criticism (Cooke 2005, 379–380; Cooke 2006, 1–8).

Second, while united around these concerns, CST is deeply divided on the forms of theorizing and normativity that this project requires. Including literatures as diverse as hermeneutics, pragmatism, post-structuralism/post-foundationalism, Marxism, and Frankfurt Critical Theory, it has a long tradition of inter-framework engagement, even if it has not always been amicable. Between less-productive line drawing though, it has engaged in creative cross fertilization in multiple ways.¹

Third, most, if not all, of its iterations have confronted both the methodological and political problems of pluralism in direct ways. This unity is often obscured by the lack of common parlance
regarding the problem of normative difference that would allow a truly non-partisan account. Nonetheless, Rorty’s preferred language of “foundationalism” is a plausible vocabulary. All CST rejects “foundationalism”; that society and politics are somehow grounded by principles that are 1) undeniable and immune to revision (i.e. universal) and 2) exterior to the realms of society and politics (i.e. transcendent). These foundations would assure stability in socio-political structures built on their principles (Marchart 2007, 11; Rajchman 1985, x). Unfortunately, the problem of foundations is both one of the most widely accepted and under-examined aspects of contemporary philosophical and political thought. While articulated within a variety of contexts (within and beyond CST) in different terms it is rarely examined systematically. Few explicit connections have been drawn amongst its various iterations and often there is the problematic assumption that all articulate the same set of issues.

While CST construes foundationalism in different terms (e.g. as metaphysics/grounds/presence), they all tie it to the “linguistic turn”: the idea that all knowledge and validity are linguistically mediated, conditioned by history and the presence of embodied subjects in determinate contexts. This, I argue, entails a common problem of justification in the realm of socio-political criticism. How do we justify the explicit normative claims and implicit normative assumptions that guide socio-political criticism and reconstruction? Further, how do we engage in the practice of justification across diverse normative frameworks (e.g. within the practice of political theorizing and political criticism)? On the one hand, we must recognize the historicity of knowledge and normative claims. On the other, we need political action informed by efficacious political thinking in an increasingly globalized and interwoven world; this requires raising claims to the validity of decisions and the critical-normative frameworks that serve them. In this manner, the problem of justification represents the high theoretical form of the central problem of post-war 20th-century political thought: the problem of political pluralism. Increasingly refined in recent years, this problem questions how to organize democratic engagement across substantive cultural-political differences. Such a project requires a framework that appreciates

... the limits of theory, just because it begins with the need to listen and respond to the plurality of voices we actually confront in a concrete setting, and not transcending them in a projection of its own account of what is right or true. Such a political theory can exhibit the range of disagreement, of contestation in political life, and so keep alive the possibilities that are excluded when we work and think only within a particular framework as, to a large extent, we must (Moon 2004, 25).

These two problems structure all inter-normative engagement and set the terms of political theory today. Importantly, they have also been inadequately examined in their mutual relations. As discussed below, they are fundamentally issues not just of normativity but normative authority, and the methodological and political constraints on authority in pluralistic contexts.

The potential of CST to navigate these issues is that, at least on some interpretations, it is committed to anti-authoritarianism. For Maeve Cooke, the problem of justification raised by the linguistic turn and the notion of the subjectivity and partiality of ethical judgement, require anti-authoritarianism, both epistemic and ethical. We must both reject any implicit or explicit assumptions of a neutral perspective outside history and particularity, and recognize the contestability of the theorist’s perspective. Such anti-authoritarianism within a wide set of theoretical vocabularies is a unique opportunity to reframe the terms within which pluralistic engagement occurs in a variety of academic and non-academic contexts. This opportunity is based on an increasing willingness in this broad nexus of perspectives to highlight
that, epistemically and ethically, rationality is a situated affair. This is not the claim that there is an immanent rationality of unfolding development or forms (i.e. the real is the rational) where CST can identify rational potentials within the process of history. Rather, it is the acknowledgement that the problems of justification and pluralism require a more thorough attention within the practice of political theory to the normative intuitions and ideals of actual social groups (Cooke 2005, 382–3; Cooke 2006, 16–19).

In spite of this shared disposition, there are intense debates about the appropriate response. While there is a broad commitment to anti-authoritarianism across CST, there is deep disagreement about the meta-theoretical shape and method for this anti-authoritarianism. In fact, rather than dividing CST by traditions, e.g. between the Frankfurt school and “Continental theory”, it could be divided along the distinction between context-independent vs context-dependent approaches. This a distinction around the status of our normative intuitions, an important critical object for CST, the norms generated through critical theories, and the role of the ideal of context-transcendence. Is the validity of such intuitions confined to particular socio-political contexts and their systems of justification? Or can certain intuitions appeal to context-transcendent standards and desires common to humanity in a manner which gives them universal validity? Further, does CST have a coherent project if the latter is not the case? While context-independent approaches vary considerably, either from hard claims about the universal validity of certain norms to softer claims about the (solely) universal nature of the goal of context-transcendence itself, they are both found towards the end of the spectrum concerned with overcoming normative difference.

In contrast, context-dependence has the possibility of pushing the situated side of rationality toward a different approach. Rather than fore-fronting the critical role of norms of universality, they reveal the normative value (especially for inter-framework engagement) of an alternative ideal of non-hierarchical situated engagement, linking context-dependent methods. This article understands this as the relational problem of establishing a situated form of reflexivity in relation to norms. This is both situated, in thoroughly framing engagement as a practice between some set of language-speaking groups, and rational, insofar as it still takes the linguistic exchange of reasons as the primary forum for intellectual and democratic engagement. Its question is how to frame such engagement without presupposing a set of norms or end. As discussed below, the turn to reflexivity to address normative difference unites pragmatism with some voices within Anglo-American Continental thought while also illustrating the strengths of the former over the latter to achieve non-authoritarian normativity.

**Pragmatism and Ontological Political Theory: Opportunities and Myopias**

While pragmatism has suffered from a history of internal divisions and external scorn, it has a unique theoretical potential within methodological debates around normativity. Richard Bernstein has argued for the gradual growth and “mainstreaming” of pragmatist ideas throughout the recent “Pragmatic Century” (Bernstein 2006, 3). This is not an argument for direct influence, but a nuanced illustration of pragmatic themes becoming increasingly central within both analytic and continental thinking. For Bernstein, pragmatism’s nonfoundsational conception of human enquiry, focusing on how humans are shaped by and shape normative social practices, has strong resonances in both (Bernstein 2010, ix–x, 17–9). Its key themes (fallibilism, critical communities of enquiry, sensitivity to radical contingency and the
irreducible plurality of perspectives) amount to a shift to human practices as the primary context of thought (Green 2013, 6; Bernstein 2006, 3).

This focus on social practices reveals that the central question of pragmatism is the normative potential of anti-foundationalism. This goes beyond a critical, negative point to ask about positive transformation. Its core component is a critical conception of reflexivity. While the modern project of science (and the values associated with it) is commended as valuable for gaining knowledge within all pragmatist approaches, it is tempered by an attempt to maintain a reflexive critical understanding of its own status (Volbers 2014). As argued here, this double-movement characterizes Rorty’s anti-authoritarianism, which offers a meta-vocabulary of vocabularies, a sociological perspective on language-use, normativity and authority, to maintain this relation.

Despite their internal divisions, pragmatists share this approach: emphasising social-practices to enable reflexive theory. As Bernstein notes, it approaches ideas, theories, and concepts as tools. This is not a representational claim but the notion that this framing highlights their social and practical aspects while offering a reflexive agency in relation to their use (Bernstein 2010, 10). Dewey notes,

> All intelligent thinking means an increment of freedom in action… conceptions, theories, and systems of thought are always open to development through use… They are tools. As in the case of all tools, their value resides not in themselves but in their capacity to work shown in the consequence of their use (Dewey 2008, 163).

This approach to the use of particular linguistic sets of tools (Rorty’s vocabularies) bears out a fundamental point about pragmatism’s response to the problems of justification and pluralism. As Cornel West has insightfully shown, while pragmatism shares Continental thought’s scepticism towards the foundationalist Enlightenment project, it attempts to theorize non-reductive senses of objectivity and human agency rather than either dropping or exponentially-widening these categories (West 1989, 4).

As a result of this response and priorities, pragmatic political thought approaches the practice of political theorizing by rejecting any metaphysical realism about moral and political value. Such a realism can be constituted by any claim to a ‘determinate way the world is’, whether that be a fundamental human nature or the essence of the political, as either the inherently conflictual or cooperative nature of political life, and would extend to any articulation of such a claim (epistemological, ontological, metaphysical, etc.). However, equally, pragmatist political thought rejects scepticism/subjectivism about normativity. These views assume that without a neutral framework for enquiry, conflict about values will necessarily persist and there will be no rational way to resolve disputes; this would mean that no claims about the better or worse nature of values or actions could be substantiated. Pragmatism rejects this for four reasons. First, both belief and doubt require justification. Radical doubt, for the pragmatist, is neither possible nor desirable; we always need a reason to doubt a belief. Second, fallibilism; our knowledge is always open to revision and critical reflexive development. Third, concepts and attitudes are historical and theoretical reflection must be an active agent willing to eliminate and create ideas. Fourth, reasoning is a collective and social activity. It involves dialogical forms of interaction between individuals and groups. The latter are the ultimate source of validity and justification. Finally, all of these claims are framed within a horizontal and reciprocal understanding of the theory-praxis nexus (Festenstein 1997).
It is in this sense that pragmatism firmly falls within context-dependent approaches. The pragmatist political project focuses on, as its primary object of reflection, the values, principles and norms implicit within an existing form of socio-political life as objects for elucidation, critical clarification and melioristic reconstruction. Importantly, and this is contentious with respect to Rorty and is the subject of the critical clarification here, disagreement provides the impetus and fertile soil of such projects. All of this is an important starting point for thinking about both pragmatism’s relation to other traditions, its ultimate theoretical potential and significance for various disciplines (political theory included), and Rorty’s contribution to the question of socio-political criticism within political theory. This latter question, as discussed above, must speak to the problem of inter-normative engagement. Rorty takes on the difficult task of weaving these pragmatist themes and approaches together into a meta-vocabulary for such engagement that provides for both horizontal and reflexive interactions.

The project of balancing an acknowledgement of the problems of justification and pluralism with maintaining positive normative capability is not confined to pragmatism. As a sub-movement of post-foundationalism/post-structuralism that significantly crosses-over with agonistic democracy, ontological political theories are at the centre of contemporary debates in methodology and democracy, a significant voice within Anglo-American Continental variants of CST and have similarly confronted the problem of maintaining normativity in light of context-dependent conditions of enquiry and theorizing. However, while they similarly approach this balancing act through the goal of reflexivity, they differ from pragmatism in where they place it and how they operationalize it. Part of Rorty and pragmatism’s use in this debate, thus, goes beyond the approach it generally feeds into and bolsters (i.e. situated social-practice based theories) into what it can also provide a new critical perspective on (ontological normativity).9

The key difference in ontological political thought is its attempt to use specifically ontological reflection to enable reflexive, non-authoritarian forms of normativity. For its proponents, ontology is both fundamental and contestable, both unavoidable and ungrounded. This paradox necessitates a two-fold approach. Confronting radical contingency and the impossibility of a final ground, political theory must gesture beyond our particular moment to think a necessary impossibility that exceeds particular determinations (i.e. the contingency of all intellectual and normative frameworks). However, it must also realize that this external moment can only occur within a particular historical constellation and must also engage that constellation (Marchart 2007, 31–2). Thus, ontological political theories attempt what William E. Connolly calls a “double-entry orientation” that both engages in the critical task of uncovering covert (and problematic) ontological assumptions within the practices and norms of contemporary liberal democratic life (and their pernicious effects) and reconstructing those norms informed by alternative ontological figurations they argue have some alternative validity (Connolly 2004; Connolly 2008, chap. 3). Thus, unlike Rorty and pragmatism the situated nature of thinking does not necessitate a social-practice based model where current norms, identities and linguistic practices are the primary material of normative interaction and reconstruction. Calling for a deep engagement with contingency, ontological political theories require that we mix assessments of current assumptions with cautious projections of ontologically informed alternative norms. This is not thought to produce norms that are neutral, whether as a common “political” conception or as a reflection of universal structures of validity within language-use, which keeps this a context-dependent approach. Rather, “[t]he fundamental conceptualizations such
an ontology provides can, at most, prefigure practical insight or judgment, in the sense of providing broad cognitive and affective orientation. Practice draws sustenance from an ontology in the sense of both a reflective bearing upon possibilities for action and a mobilizing of motivational force’ (White 2000, 11). While ontological political thought shirks the foundational project of making political forms flow from ontological analyses, it is concerned to make positive political claims, distinguishing it from other areas of postfoundationalism which emphasise the practice of critique over normative reconstruction.10

This emphasis on normative construction links ontological approaches and recent pragmatism. For pragmatism, political enquiry seeks ‘normativity without foundations’; to make political claims without reference to foundations. It must be critical and prescriptive without absolute grounds(Koopman 2011a, 537). This framing illuminates considerable crossover while specific differences remain. Placing ontology to one side momentarily, both reject strong ontologies while retaining affirmation to some ideal. Both understand all claims as contestable without only critiquing foundationalism, but also addressing ‘what must be articulated, cultivated, and affirmed in its wake’(White 2000, 8). Further, contestability, this claim of necessary pluralism, structures both of their articulations of politics, requiring each build reflexively into any positive politics. Contestability must ‘in some sense fold back upon itself, disrupting its own smooth constitution of a unity. In a way, its contestability will thus be enacted rather than just announced’(White 2000, 8). The difference is how they articulate that positive, and enact reflexivity. Ontological political thought resorts to the level of ontological analysis in order to integrate contestability into its presuppositions. Such a level is thought to subsist below conscious dialogue, conditioning our interactions, requiring a specialized form of theoretical access. Pragmatism, in contrast, does not integrate reflexivity at that level nor does it posit such a level. As illustrated in Rorty, it reconstructs understandings of enquiry and political practice by focusing on the commonly-accessible level of linguistic social-practice to explain pluralism and theorize non-hierarchical normative engagement. Ontological political theories, by making norms flow from (often hidden) ontological assumptions, establishes itself in a relation of authority with its interlocutors through a methodological claim of privileged access. It assumes a natural order to reasons with ontology/affect/sensibility/faith at the top and argument/dialogue/reasons at the bottom. As others have observed, when ontology/contingency are necessary, say in the priority of a distinct ontological realm of politics, political theorizing becomes a ‘form of political ontology as prima philosophia’ (Marchart 2007, 166) and the original reflexivity for inter-normative engagement is lost.11

Rorty, Social Practices and Normativity

While ontology is a problematic frame for understanding context-dependent normativity, social-practice both explains normativity’s inevitable presence and indicates possible socio-political approaches for inter-framework engagement. By construing normativity primarily as a social-practice of ascribing authority to a set of criteria or claims, Rorty highlights that competing normative frameworks must always be engaged around the pragmatic purposes they enable and preclude. As discussed below, this redirects enquiry in these contexts not to external criteria of absolute arbitration (e.g. ontological validity), but to reflexive intersubjective engagement. As the next section illustrates this offers new possibilities for inter-normative engagement by both respecting pluralism, enabling non-hierarchical normative interactions, and maintaining reflexive agency in relation to normative transformation.
A concern with methodological diversity, normative transformation and the value of linguistic approaches to social-practices pervade Rorty’s thought. His earliest work was concerned the capacity of the then burgeoning “linguistic turn” of Analytic philosophy in the 1960s to break the train of “presuppositionless one-up-man-ship” that characterized methodological developments within philosophy. These resulted from the central paradox of meta-philosophy: its simultaneous aim for neutrality amongst philosophical systems while each system itself generates meta-philosophical self-confirming criteria that disallow its competitors (Rorty 1961a; Rorty 1961b). For him, the turn itself was not the important issue but its capacity to highlight an alternative to the epistemological quest for certainty which generated this project and resulting paradox (Rorty 1967, 1–3, 39). Specifically, the focus on linguistic practice reveals the contingent nature of both those practices and the “traditional problems of philosophy” our current ways of speaking have engendered, while indicating the potentially liberating effects of a social-practice based perspective. The latter he dramatically inserted into the current debates in the philosophy of mind in a theory he called “eliminative materialism”. This theory argued for the in-principle eliminability of all vocabularies for reporting mental states and the necessity of alternative vocabularies (Hiley 2002, 108–9; Rorty 1965). This revealed for Rorty, a fundamental condition of language-use: the social origin of linguistic norms.

The result is Rorty’s “pragmatism about norms”, the claim that authority is always instituted by linguistic social practices; ways of speaking that give those claims authority. This is ‘the thought that any normative matter of epistemic authority or privilege – even the sort of authority exercised on what we say by what we talk about – is ultimately intelligible only in terms of social practices that involve implicitly recognizing or acknowledging such authority’ (R. B. Brandom, 2000, p. 159). The social practice of treating certain reports as authoritative is the source of their authority, not an ontological or epistemic relation. This has extensive results. ‘Once ontological distinctions have been drawn in normative terms of authority and responsibility, social pragmatism about norms means according a certain substantial categorical privilege to the ontological category of the social’ (Brandom, 2013, p. 26). It is only in the context of a set of social practices and a vocabulary, that something can have authority, carry responsibility, or have any normative significance. The rules and practices for making and contesting various claims reside within the linguistic communities that employ the vocabularies being used and as a result, authority remains, from a metaphilosophical perspective, ultimately social. This is not the idealism12 that the world has no contact with our beliefs. It does causally act on us. However, only concepts justify other concepts and concepts always exist within vocabularies. This means that normative authority is exclusively an intra- rather than inter-vocabulary relation (R. B. Brandom, 2000, pp. 160–1). The justification of a claim within a vocabulary will always depend on how that claim can be related to other claims in the vocabulary and not on the basis of external standards (truth, god, reason, etc.).

This social authority of norms changes the nature of the practice of justification. Principally, causation, as an interaction between objects in the world, is divided from justification, which is a relation between reason-giving language users. The main methodological insight that results is an imperative to theoretical holism. Justification is always a relation among concepts; however, it is never a relation among individual concepts but webs of concepts. Thus, holism represents not just an anti-foundational rejection, but the basis of a socio-pragmatic alternative. While in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty called this
“epistemological behaviourism”, the justificatory model he offers in place of representationist epistemology and ontology, he subsequently cycled through a series of terms for this framework: hermeneutics, pragmatic cultural criticism, literary criticism, and cultural politics. All held that ‘justification is not a matter of a special relation between ideas (or words) and objects, but of conversation, of social practice’ (Rorty 2009, 170). While the names changed, the model remains the same: justification concerns the interaction of a belief with a whole host of other claims. Its primary relation is between assertions rather than between assertions and the world. As discussed in the next section, this enables practices of normative justification even in the absence of shared standards.

The central device of Rorty’s metaphilosophical project is his “vocabulary of vocabularies”. Operationally, this way of speaking of normative diversity, as sets of linguistic practices rather than ontological assumptions, catches all aspects of linguistic practice (e.g. both meaning and belief) and denotes a loose whole over sets of practices that are interrelated. In this, it is a way of designating discursive bodies that does not encourage the “ontological urge” to engage in ontological legitimation. It achieves this by not making any ontologically specific distinction between what we talk about and how we talk about it. This is because vocabularies, as discussed below, have specific purposes and goals insofar as they enable and preclude certain practices and relations. Importantly, such purposes can only be understood from within the vocabulary (Ramberg 2004, 14).

A question of scope naturally follows. Is Rorty invalidating any vocabulary that justifies through external criteria? This is a deep concern for socio-political thought in terms of the nature of moral and political, critical and normative discourses and the claims they make in public, as it would suggest a strong version of relativism. On this reading, Rorty’s account of normative authority entirely undermines any attempt to invest authority in anything external to social consensus. The world is the wrong thing to understand as bearing any kind of authority; this is only something we, as language users, do to each other. This absolutely invalidates standards like objectivity. However, there is a more nuanced reading that argues that investing authority in extra-social entities, such as placing subjective authority in the incorrigible subject or objective authority in the languages of the natural sciences, is not unintelligible, it is only optional and contingent. This allows that such structures of authority may have good reasons behind them and good purposes they fulfil but that we may find better reasons and purposes for advocating a different structure of authority (especially in a different realm of practice). Thus, the socio-pragmatic conception of normative authority ‘does not entail that only the humans who institute those statuses can exhibit or possess them. The notion of responsibility to some non-human authority is not in principle undercut by the Enlightenment pragmatist insight that any such status depends on human attitudes of taking or treating something as authoritative’ (R. B. Brandom, 2013, pp. 28–9). There is an important difference between the things we appeal to in the act of justification and the manner in which justifications are given normative authority. We of course refer to the world in justifying but those justifications only have normative force socially because to justify is to give and ask for reasons. There is no de facto problem with investing normative authority in external sources (e.g. the environment) as long as we understand that it is us who do this, which makes it contingent and optional, and that it is us who must change them when they become problematic. This importantly changes the meta-theoretical status...
(not the substance) of our languages which are not truth-seeking or representation mechanisms, but tools for engaging others.16

To fully understand this point we must return to the metaphilosophical context of Rorty’s work. He followed Wilfid Sellars arguing that ‘philosophy is an attempt to see how "things, in the largest sense of the term, hang together, in the largest sense of the term"’ (Rorty 2009, 114; Sellars 1963, 1). In this sense, his account of normativity and vocabularies is intended as a framework for speaking about the diversity of languages and their relations, one that replaces the dominant representationalism. Its virtue is how it enables this while avoiding the foundationalism of external standards engendered by the quest for certainty and the paradox of meta-philosophy. In this manner, the vocabulary of vocabularies and social model of normativity are key to his approach to the problem of nonfoundational engagement. This is principally because it allows us to do three things without engendering foundational authority: 1) to speak about the diversity of ways of speaking in the world; 2) and to understand the presence of and deploy normative claims from within vocabularies; 3) perhaps most importantly, to change our linguistic practices.

While the former two are clear, how this vocabulary explains and enables normative transformation requires further discussion. Late in his career, Rorty accepted a “friendly amendment” from Robert Brandom which reconstructed his much-maligned public-private divide.17

Every use of a vocabulary, every application of a concept in making a claim, both is answerable to norms implicit in communal practice - its public dimension, apart from which it cannot mean anything (though it can cause something) - and transforms those norms by its novelty - its private dimension, apart from which it does not formulate a belief, plan, or purpose worth expressing (Brandom 2000, 179).

Both these dimensions illuminate important aspects of normative freedom. On the one hand, employing a norm allows one to take-up the possibilities and purposes in a language which would not be otherwise possible; ‘subjecting oneself to constraint by the norms implicit in a vocabulary at the same time confers unparalleled positive freedom - that is, freedom to do things one could not only not do before, but could not even want to do’ (Rorty 2000a, 187–9; Brandom 2000, 178). On the other, to use a vocabulary is to normatively change it. There is a freedom implicit in all language-use, a capacity for transformation afforded linguistic practice itself ‘an absolutely crucial practical capacity that vocabularies give us: the capacity to frame genuinely novel purposes, and so in a real sense to remake ourselves’ (Brandom 2000, 171). This capacity is derived neither from some core feature of human nature nor some transcendental faculty. To use a vocabulary is to change it (this distinguishes them from other tools).18 This means that linguistic norms are both constraining and liberating. They both provide established practices to act within (which is limiting and enabling) and the possibility of transforming those practices (Brandom 2000, 177). Beyond clarifying how language is different from other tools, this weakens the public-private divide to merely a heuristic distinction of emphasis in language. They are no longer distinct vocabularies (with agreement and creativity as their respective aims) but different dimensions of every vocabulary.

This amendment meets the most persistent criticism of Rorty within political theory: that his theory is politically acquiescent.19 This is the claim that it contains insufficient theoretical resources for political criticism, methods to identify practices as harmful and normative resources to transform them. In contrast, Rorty’s vocabulary of vocabularies, his language for inter-vocabulary relations, focuses attention
to how alterations in vocabularies change the purposes of our practices. While such changes are often only understood retrospectively, which Rorty emphasises to ensure his tool-metaphor is not misunderstood as positing mastery over social change (Rorty 1989, 12), this highlights a constitutive space of freedom within language-use, which motivates Rorty’s linguistic turn. Further, it enables a different relation to our vocabularies/norms which is critical, without being foundational, and transformative without being un-reflexive.

This has important consequences on the nature of socio-political theorizing at the meta-level of basic normative difference. Rather than seeking to overcome the aforementioned paradox and disagreement, the imperative is to engage it productively. This is the entire motivation for the focus on practices; ‘the appeal to practice transfers the question of the acceptability of a philosophical program out of metaphilosophy and into the realm of moral choice’ (Rorty 1961b, 111). It demonstrates how any theoretical framework is ultimately dependent on normative authority derived from the social; that is, it is a communal activity involving ethical values about interaction. This frames theoretical controversies in moral-relational terms, suggesting a way to proceed through an appeal to moral virtues of engagement. This is the keystone of Rorty’s work. He derives ethico-political insights only from the social and relational context of human life. He ‘locates philosophy in a space of contingency and choice. By situating epistemological issues in a moral and political context oriented toward our relations to others, Rorty is able to present an alternative picture of the social practice of justification that takes other human beings seriously’ (Voparil 2014, 87).

This clarifies Rorty’s controversial claim that human enquiry should be understood as aimed at solidarity rather than objectivity. This is a meta-theoretical concern with the status of claims. Objectivity posits the fundamental standards of enquiry as external to humans. Solidarity posits them as other humans with whom we exist in social relations (Rorty 1991c, 21–2). Flowing from his arguments about normative authority, Rorty aims enquiry at solidarity, at seeking as much intersubjective agreement as possible, to reflexively subject our claims to as many linguistic challenges as possible. Importantly, when we do this, we will be speaking specific languages of enquiry (with all their relevant criteria). However, none will have meta-theoretical priority. Objectivity may be a way we justify, a reason we give in the game of giving and asking for reasons, but it is not a meta-theoretical standard for that practice as it only gains authority within particular social-linguistic sets of practices. The only common goal of enquiry amongst languages is the meta-theoretical virtue of solidarity as reflexive engagement. Once again Rorty shifts to the language of moral virtue, substituting an socio-ethical foundation of reflective interaction and reciprocal loyalty for an epistemic claim(Rorty 1991c, 33; Rorty 1991b, 45).

This reframes vocabularies and practices in terms of the values and modes of human relation they elicit. The goal here is to switch our

attention from "the demands of the object" to the demands of the purpose which a particular inquiry is supposed to serve. The effect is to modulate philosophical debate from a methodologically-ontological key into an ethico-political key. For now one is debating what purposes are worth bothering to fulfil, which are more worthwhile than others, rather than which purposes the nature of humanity or of reality obliges us to have. (Rorty 1991a, 110).
This ethicization is both the goal and the means. For Rorty, the notion of method is not appropriate to the meta-level of discourse where we encounter linguistic and normative diversity. The social nature of authority precludes the neutrality it posits. Instead, he highlights the role of ethical value, through the concept of *purpose*, something which I have described as relative to vocabulary. This is a tricky concept, with its connotations of instrumentalism or utilitarianism. However, it must be interpreted widely as a social and practice-based view that understands vocabularies as *enabling and disabling* of certain types of practices. It is focused on how linguistic practices affect the way we proceed and live in the world (our “purposes”) and how we can utilize language, a unique practice, to speak (and act) in new ways (i.e. transform). Rorty follows Dewey in arguing that the role of socio-political enquiry, on this meta-level, is not to ground purposes but to frame a disposition that motivates reflective investigation into those purposes, and their fulfilment in practice, and their transformation (Dewey 2008, 182).

Understanding normativity as a social practice of authority rooted within diverse webs of linguistic vocabularies allows us to explain the presence and transformation of normativity. More importantly, it does this while providing a non-hierarchical schema for linguistic diversity that does not immediately assume the criteria of one framework. Interestingly, like many ontological theories, it points to the need for ethos or ethical-based solutions to pluralistic engagement. Its distinctive promise though is a form of interaction which is genuinely non-hierarchical to address the growing realms of pluralistic politics today where we require dialogue without assumed authority. As discussed below, this model can generate genuine normative interaction that results in common projects of normative creation and transformation across equal partners engaging in new common normative frameworks.

**Cultural Politics and Reflexive Engagement**

Cultural politics is Rorty’s positive meta-theoretical (meta-political) vocabulary to enable intercultural critical and normative exchange (i.e. pluralistic socio-political criticism). Assuming the account of normativity above, it offers a framework for egalitarian engagement across linguistic-normative difference. In many ways, as suggested by many recent critics, it is the unfinished climax of his work and this project around normative engagement (Gröschner, Koopman, and Sandbothe 2013; Castro and Ghiraldelli 2011). While schematic at times, it provides the broad outlines of a language for pluralistic democratic engagement designed to open up normative frameworks to horizontal interactions and the possibility of normative creation amongst diverse language-users.

Rorty’s later turn to cultural politics examines the specifically political questions around the issues of authority, normativity, community and identity which pervade his work. It represents the last articulation of his conception of theoretical political practice as a form of socio-political criticism attuned to pluralist engagement. There are two important dimensions. First, continuing the above, it is a politicization and ethicization of our linguistic frameworks that specifically focuses on them as forums for engaging others. Cultural politics sharpens this emphasis by *widening the notion of political* to everything open to socio-political contestation, to include all discourses about ‘humanity’s ongoing conversation about what to do with itself’ (Rorty 2007d, ix). Similar to the broadening out of enquiry to seeking solidarity, cultural politics casts political thought within a wider history of cultural-political conversation. ‘Interventions in cultural politics have sometimes taken the form of proposals for new roles that men and
women might play... Sometimes they have been sketches of an ideal community.... Sometimes they have been suggestions about how to reconcile seemingly incompatible outlooks (Rorty 2007d, ix–x). The category of cultural politics expands the scope of the political to the type of wide linguistic intervention characteristic of theoretical disciplines: new uses of words, new vocabularies enabling new criticisms and normative claims, and suggestions of what words to begin/stop using. Thus, key to this “turn to the political” is a conception of theory as a linguistic practice within a society about what vocabularies, terms, and topics to employ.

Second, this ethicization turns the practice of political thought to the political discourses and vocabularies circling around wider society. ‘The progress of this conversation has engendered new social practices, and changes in the vocabularies deployed in moral and political deliberation. To suggest further novelties is to intervene in cultural politics’ (Rorty 2007d, ix). Cultural politics is the socio-political process of justification where we contest the current context in terms of which languages, categories, and objects to employ. The point of this conception of theoretical contestation in political theorizing is that political exchange cannot, at the meta-level, be understood as rational argument or ontological questioning. Rather, it can only be understood as interpretive intervention into existing socio-political discourses. Such interventions modify our languages and resulting conceptions of who we are, what we are doing and what is important; altering both our purposes and the practices we use to achieve them (Rorty 2007c, ix–x). This means that self-consciously engaging other languages in imaginative redescription is the only way to avoid unproductive impasses between vocabularies. We play off one approach against another, finding particular points of contact and divergence in order to offer new vocabularies that might build on aspects of each.

The intended scope of application of this conception is important. When and where is this understanding operative? Does it govern all political discussions? The answer is clearly no. It is under the problems of justification and pluralism, at the level of inter-vocabulary exchange, that cultural politics is operative. Inter-vocabulary exchange is a context of normative disagreement, where there is an absence of a significantly shared interpretive horizon. This does not entail no overlap, as there must, and usually will be, enough for conversation to take place. However, it does mean that cultural politics is about situations of “abnormal politics”, when established standards are up for grabs.

Rorty highlight this by developing his account of the normative difference of vocabularies through the concept of logical space, clarifying how cultural politics addresses this situation. Every socio-political context contains a plurality of “logical spaces”; some are shared by a variety of perspectives, others overlap to some extent and some find very little resonance with others. All have their sets of criteria, or “canonical designators,” for argument and normativity; they have their own rules for what types of claims can be made and what types of purposes are assumed. At this level, these spaces, even the relatively inclusive language of liberal-democratic politics, are closed off from each other and only have the criteria that resulted from their respective cultural politics, to employ in any engagements. This changes as vocabularies can be shared by groups who may themselves have sub-vocabularies that are not shared or that share other vocabularies with other groups. In fact, this is an increasing dynamic in our interdependent world, though perhaps not at the pace some would claim. In any case, shared discourses,
as logical spaces of cultural politics, open up the possibility of cultural-political relations between groups (Rorty 2007b, 21).

This alters the nature of socio-political change. For Rorty, changing social practices involves the expansion and/or adaption of the logical spaces we inhabit to include or change our relations to others. ‘Debate about the utility of such logical spaces and about the desirability or undesirability of uniting them with, or disjoining them from, one another is the substance of cultural politics’ (Rorty 2007b, 22). Rorty’s above reframing of communities in moral/ethical terms, rather than epistemic or ontological ones, is key to this conception, framing knowledge and political engagement as functions of moral communities of identification. This is why Rorty’s theory is so attuned to the problem of exclusion, to ‘borderline cases’ (Rorty 1998b, 168). The conception of political engagement on cultural-political terms and the language of logical spaces allows for expanding our realms of conversation-partners Rorty argued was key to “taking other human beings seriously”. It achieves this by neither privileging nor rejecting the standards of the speaking community. As situated and finite beings, we initiate such dialogues only from within present networks and identifications. Single, universally authoritative frameworks for commonality become impossible. Rorty’s claim was that this model more effectively engages those with whom we share no normative horizon. He offers it as a meta-vocabulary of inter-vocabulary normative exchange in the absence of agreed-upon criteria and without reference to an external source of authority. By expanding the logical spaces we inhabit to include new groups and languages, Rorty places an important agonistic imperative that reflexively opens up existing standards and consensuses, creating the potential for new forms of normative association and identification in “larger loyalties” (Rorty 2007b, 19–20; Rorty 2007c).

**Agonistic Interaction between Consensus and Conflict**

This raises an important connection and capacity of cultural politics to support a politics of pluralistic agonism. Traditionally, agonists have distanced Rorty and pragmatism based on a perceived commitment to consensual liberal politics that runs counter to emphasising the constitutive nature of conflict for the political. They repeat the charge of acquiescence against Rorty: that his is a politics of the status quo (Mouffe 1996b; Laclau 1996; Connolly 1987, chap. 8). However, by bringing Rorty into conversation with the social-practice based agonism of James Tully, it is clear that the issue is not conflict but its ontologisation. Like Rorty, Tully employs a social account of normative diversity to offer a horizontal and democratic framework for pluralistic interaction that both opens spaces for contestation and provides resources for the possibility of reasonable agreement and common normative creation.

While a full examination of Rorty and Tully is beyond the present study, it is important to emphasise the depth of their connections. For Tully, Rorty is a preeminent 20th c. thinker of the turn to social-practices, the “revolutionary insight” that activity and praxis is prior to theory. As a result, he places Rorty in an instrumental point in his own intellectual history of “public philosophy” (Tully 2008, 17–18,138). Beyond this history, they share a series of methodological claims and account of agonistic democratic engagement in the context of diversity. Regarding the former, their social-practice based approaches raise a key methodological debate: the relation between political theory and other vocabularies within contemporary democratic, political culture. For Rorty, as cultural-politics, political theory is not
hierarchically separate from other political languages or practices, raised above the general level of democratic activity. Similarly, Tully claims that all claims to authority are ‘internally related to and reciprocally shaped by the everyday activities of democratic citizens, not separate from and determinative of their field of freedom’ (Tully 2008, 9). He similarly accounts for political theory under pluralistic conditions as a re-descriptive practice; that ‘seeks to characterise the conditions of possibility of the problematic form of governance in a redescription (often in a new vocabulary) that transforms the self-understanding of those subject to and struggling within it, enabling them to see its contingent conditions and the possibilities of governing themselves differently’ (Tully 2008, 16). This emphasises that it is a mode of interpretive critique. This is not to say that there are no practical differences between the practice of criticism and citizen activity, but that they are reciprocally and horizontally equal. This democratised shift in the status of theory removes barriers between it and everyday political activity.

This strong emphasis on the diversity of normative frameworks and the interpretative nature of inter-normative engagement intuitively flags up the agonistic element. However, both Rorty and Tully not only focus on disagreement, but how it supports democratic and pluralistic reasoning. While not generally observed, there was a gradual shift in Rorty’s work from hostility to a pragmatic reconstruction of rationality as a reflexive relation to inter-normative engagement. This reconstruction flows from his moral ideal of solidarity addressed above; rational justification involves the ethical choice of which terms and vocabularies to employ and who to speak to. In later writings, he similarly turns reason outward, as an intersubjective disposition toward new conversation partners that establishes reflexive equality between them (Rorty 2001; Rorty 2003). This makes rationality about broadening communities of justification;

being rational and acquiring a larger loyalty are two descriptions of the same activity. This is because any unforced agreement between individuals and groups about what to do creates a form of community, and will, with luck, be the initial stage in expanding the circles of those whom each party to the agreement had previously taken to be “people like ourselves” (Rorty 2007c, 53). This is rationality not as authority but a willingness to engage in intersubjective construction, in deeper, reflexive relations with others. Rationality is a ‘continuum of degrees of overlap’ – or reflexive growth (outward from the situated present) (Rorty 2007c, 53). Finally, situated within our moral identities, intercultural engagements, and real linguistic practices, this is an embedded view of rationality as a form of educative and imaginative normative transformation that can lead to new forms of identity.

Similarly, Tully’s horizontal model of thought argues that the value of democratic dialogue, lies not only in the agreements they might produce but the activities themselves. This, as Anthony Laden observes, significantly revises the deliberative end of the dialogical turn by understanding dialogue not ‘as a morally constrained form of bargaining, but as a species of a wider genus of conversational interactions that call for responsiveness’ (Laden 2014, 13). Reasoning is a particular way of interacting with others which builds relations around the values of reciprocity, mutual respect and recognition. Importantly, Laden characterises it as a kind of “inviting” and “responsiveness”, bringing it close to Rorty’s language of inclusion. Tully’s key insight is that reasoning in this manner is not episodic or sporadic, deployed in distinct moments of deliberation. Rather, such dispositions to others are a background to shared life and, thus, constitute a shared space of reasons. As a result, reasoning should be understood
within the broader category of conversation... conversation has no natural termination point or goal, and thus succeeds precisely insofar as it is ongoing. If, then, we can re-orient our conceptual maps so that the activity of reasoning, and in particular the kinds of reasoning together that form the heart of democratic political interaction, can be seen as a specialized form of conversation rather than a joint exercise in decision-making, then we will be in a position to appreciate Tully’s lesson in full (Laden 2014, 15–6).

The ongoing, re-negotiative and agonistic quality of this process means that hard criteria of public reason can’t be imposed. Rather, only ethical criteria of disposition can be offered to guide such interactions. These mandate that reasons are offered with the good faith they can be understood and, more radically, that the space must always be open to reject such reasons. This would allow both agreement and disagreement to result and would mean that the practice of reasoning had been created as a reflexive shared space. For Tully, this is summed up in the norm of audi alteram partem (always listen to the other side). In Rorty, his emergent non-criterial view of rationality generates an ethos of tolerance ‘for a plurality of non-competitive descriptions, descriptions which serve different purposes and which are to be evaluated by reference to their utility in fulfilling these purposes rather than by their “fit” with the objects being described’ (Rorty 2006, 262). The moral and political significance of a fallibilistic disposition is the need to shift the normative source of our socio-political criticism from objectivity to solidarity. To ‘take other human beings seriously’ in democratic inquiry is to situate normative justification in socio-political contexts in a framework that prioritizes our ethical relations to other groups in the game of giving and asking for reasons.

As hinted above, the additional strength of this mutual approach is in how it overcomes one of the most unproductive divides in democratic theory between politics of consensus and conflict. Rorty was often associated with a pedestrian form of consensus-seeking minimalist liberalism. However, for him, ‘it is as pointless to prize diversity as to prize unity’ (Rorty 2000b, 17–8). Neither is appropriate as a meta-standard for socio-political critique or reconstruction under abnormal political conditions. Rorty is as anti-convergence, as against the assumption that some universalism ensures the conjunction of human ethical life, as he is anti-otherness, in the sense of seeing diversity, fracturing, or rupture as a meta-justification of the priority of critique. As a result, the moment to be valued is that of engagement, not agreement (or conflict). Similarly, Bonnie Honig is correct to cast Tully’s model as ‘between the worlds of dissidence and governance’ (Honig 2014, 71). The point is not to predispose interactions to either agreement or conflict but to enable a form of engagement that, with luck and effort, might build new linguistic spaces of shared understanding. It is for this reason that Tully explicitly places reasonable disagreement above consensus as an end (Tully 2005, 254).

Conclusion

The value of Tully’s framing of linguistic engagement and Rorty’s cultural politics is this intellectual democratisation and pluralisation that removes barriers between theoretical frameworks and political vocabularies while enabling a form of engagement which can lead to the creation of new common norms. While this is not appropriate for every theoretical or political context, it is fundamental to a whole host of interactions in our contemporary world characterized by the “abnormal” lack of shared normative criteria. To proceed in these contexts without authoritarianism, in a manner which all participating members can accept and own, requires such horizontal framing. The argument here has been that a pragmatic
vocabulary of the social origin of normative authority provides us with an important frame for such encounters. Thus, like cultural politics, public philosophy offers reflexive authority, by enabling political agency without pre-determining its form through recourse to theories of foundational rationalism or revolutionary uncovering. In this, both are best understood as meta-theories of socio-political discourse, pragmatic “vocabularies of vocabularies”, ways of speaking about and understanding the diversity of linguistic and normative claims without immediately offering criteria for assessment that would trump democratic engagement. They cannot claim neutrality. They are just as contingent, just as much a product of a certain set of factors (a history), as any other. They are simply the best option to satisfy anti-authoritarian norms.

Beyond the points raised here, this reveals an important feature of metatheoretical and meta-political engagement. Non-authoritarian and reflexive engagement must proceed under the imperative to create new and continuing shared spaces of engagement. Understanding interaction only has either conflictual antagonism or consensus seeking agreement procedures blocks the road of interactions by precipitating their outcome before the interaction has taken place. A truly democratic approach, between normative groups, must avoid this if we are to remain invested in the modern democratic project of theorizing common spaces for interaction that can, in some broad sense, govern diversity without hierarchy.

Notes

1 E.g. (Rehg and Bohman 2001; Couzens Hoy and McCarthy 1994; Fairfield 2010; Koopman 2011b)
2 E.g. There is the tendency to conflate it with post-structuralism/post-modernism in general (Marchart 2007; Silverman 1993; Butler 1992).
3 (Berlin 1999)
4 This is not to discount the role of affect and embodiment in these processes but only to say that, contra some voices in the affect and new materialist turns, dialogue necessarily remains primarily a linguistic process.
5 Two difficulties present when examining pragmatism as a tradition. First, internally, it is strongly divided (Bernstein 1995; Rescher 2000; Mounce 1997). This makes identifying its themes difficult, an issue more challenging with Rorty who was rejected by many pragmatists. Second, externally, pragmatism has a) had a contentious history and b) stands at the brink of a unique theoretical potential today. In terms of the former, the dominant narrative has been one of cycles of eclipse and resurgence. However, this has recently been challenged by a group of pragmatists (Ralston 2011; Talisse 2007; Bernstein 2006).
6 In a sense, this is true of contemporary political theory especially, where there have been wide turns to social-practices in recent years (Chin 2016a; Chin 2016b).
7 This importantly distinguishes it from the various voices in the recent realist revival. While both are characterized by critiques of traditional ideal forms of theorizing and attempts to offer more situated forms of political thought, pragmatist rejects realist attempts to reground their method in a conception of “real politics”.
8 Dewey’s use in debates in deliberative democracy are a good example (Honneth and Farrell 1998).
9 There is shockingly little literature examining pragmatism and ontological political thought and their differing solutions to these common problems. See (Koopman, n.d.).
10 A critique commonly made of genealogy for example (Ashenden and Owen 1999).
11 For a fuller version of this argument, see my working paper “What Exactly is Ontology Meant to Do...” available: academia.edu.
12 That being said, it does have extensive results for the categories of the subjective and the objective, which now are not equal with the social in terms of generating authority (Levine 2010).
13 For a comprehensive account of this development, see (Koopman 2013).
14 In political theory, this is the dominant way of reading Rorty.
15 Rorty himself suggested this weaker reading (Rorty 1998a, 44).
Rorty employed this tool-metaphor for vocabularies consistently throughout his career (E.g. Rorty 1989). As discussed above, it is one common to many pragmatists. 

For a comprehensive account of the many criticisms of this elements of Rorty’s thought, see (Curtis 2015, 100–112). Though he did not initially frame it in these terms, Rorty enthusiastically accepts this account (Rorty 2000a).

This charge, originally made against classical pragmatism (Mumford, 1957), was re-deployed against neopragmatism in general and Rorty specifically (MacGilvray 2000; Festenstein 2003; Shapiro 1990). Interestingly, it has both strong currency in liberal, Anglo-American debates and continental ones (Mouffe 1996a). Connolly himself employs an ontological version (Connolly 1987, chap. 8).

Chris Voparil takes this phrasing from Rorty and convincingly argues to represents the central normative base of his work (Voparil 2014).

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22 E.g (Cooke 2006, chap. 2; Kompridis 2000; Koopman 2007).

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