Reconciliation as Part of Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Democratization Process: Comparing Post-War Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Post-conflict democratization and reconciliation are two central processes that emerge within the transition process from civil war to sustainable peace. Past examples of transition from war to peace have revealed diverse insights on the role of these two processes on the road to sustainable peace. Based on the cases of postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina, in this study I seek to analyze the question of under what circumstances is postwar democratization likely to lead to reconciliation. In my analysis I take into account the role of external actors, the issue of state legitimacy, and economic factors in the aftermath of conflict.

Introduction

Previous scholarly research on post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building has devoted major attention to reconciliation and democratization as two central processes for the establishment of sustainable peace in societies emerging out of violent conflict (see for example Sarkin, 2008; Baskar, 2009; Bloomfield, 2006; Hippler, 2008; Ottaway, 2003). Both reconciliation and democratization have emerged as key concepts within the complex environment of post-conflict reconstruction which encompasses societal, economic, and political aspects all at once. However, while acknowledged as being central aspects of peace-building, reconciliation and democratization have been studied in relative isolation from each other and studies focusing on the relationship of these two processes have been missing. Furthermore, previous case studies of post-conflict reconstruction have revealed diverse insights in terms of the link between reconciliation and democratization and the views on whether reconciliation is the wider process that encompasses democratization or democratization leads to societal reconciliation and sustainable peace have been diverse.
Based on this observation, in this study I primarily focus on the link between the reconciliation and democratization processes and specifically I seek to answer the question of under what circumstances is democratization likely to lead to postwar reconciliation. I base my analysis on two cases, the case of Greece after the divisive civil war of 1946-1949, and the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the ethno-nationalist civil war of 1992-1995. These two cases have produced diverse insights regarding their post-conflict democratization and reconciliation processes: in Greece reconciliation has only been achieved through the democratization process in late 1970s and early 1980s and more specifically it has emerged as a political tool within the democratization process; in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand despite the tremendous efforts at promoting reconciliation through democratization, democratization has not paved the way towards reconciliation and intergroup divisions in Bosnia today remain deep and unreconciled.

Based on this observation the ensuing parts of this paper are organized as follows: In the first part I introduce the two main concepts of this study- post-conflict democratization and reconciliation- and then I provide the theoretical framework that I use in the ensuing analysis. Within the theoretical framework of this study I investigate the issue of external influence; the issue of internal legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy as explanatory factors on how postwar democratization may lead to reconciliation. In the second part I introduce the cases and I give a brief overview of the civil wars. In the same part I provide an analysis of how postwar democratization and reconciliation proceeded in the two countries. I base my analysis on previous scholarly studies and on primary resources such as reports and newspaper covering. In the last part I investigate three issues- the role of international actors; the issue of state sovereignty; and postwar economic aspects- in the democratization and reconciliation processes in Greece and Bosnia.

Theoretical Framework: Conceptualizing Post-Conflict Democratization and Reconciliation

Reconciliation

Conceptual discussions regarding reconciliation have not established a cross-cutting theory and conceptualization of reconciliation within the post-conflict context. In previous scholarly research, the concept of reconciliation has been presented as encompassing various
aspects of post-conflict peace-building, including psychological aspects, societal/intercommunal aspects, and political aspects and there appears to be a general confusion about its exact definition. The absence of a clear-cut perception of what reconciliation entails in post-conflict contexts and the existence of a general terminological confusion is an introductory argument of previous studies and reports on reconciliation (IDEA, 2003; Bloomfield, 2006; Pankhurst, 1999; Brouneous; 2008; Assefa; 1999). This terminological confusion has been linked to the fact that reconciliation as a concept is perceived both as a goal and a process (IDEA, 2003: 12; Nordquist, 2007) that includes political, social, and legal components once at the same time. Reconciliation is also perceived as an umbrella concept that encompasses various aspects such as justice, truth-seeking, forgiveness, and healing (Bloomfield, 2006; Pankhurst, 1999). Furthermore, reconciliation is perceived as an evolving process rather than a static point (Sarkin, 2008); a proactive and dynamic process that requires the highest degree of mutual participation (Assefa, 1999; Hoogenboom and Vieille, 2008).

Numerous discussions on definitional issues of reconciliation have acknowledged the importance of reconciliation as a relationship-building process (Bloomfield, 2006; Bar-Tal and Bennink, 2004; Chicuecue, 1997; Brouneous, 2008; Lederach, 1997). Studies that conceptualize reconciliation as a relationship-building process underline the importance of reconciliation as a process that requires the restoration of the relationship between former adversaries, which will pave the way for long-term peaceful coexistence. The praxis of reconciliation as a relationship-building process encapsulates concepts such as peace, truth, justice, and mercy, which refers to the act of healing (Lederach, 1997). Additionally, as a relationship-building process reconciliation requires the building of decent relationships, the establishment of restorative justice, the acknowledgement of truth and the emergence of forgiveness (Hoogenboom and Vieille, 2008). According to Hoogenboom and Vieille this is called the “thick perception of reconciliation” as opposed to thin conceptions that refer to aspects such as ending physical violence, democratization, and retributive justice (2008: 6). Seen from this point of view, reconciliation forms a key concept for the move from a history of violence and conflict to a shared future that is characterized by sustainable peace.

In this study I conceptualize reconciliation as a means of conflict prevention and transformation. Building on previous scholarly research, and in line with the study of Brouneous (2008) and the IDEA handbook (2003) I conceptualize reconciliation as the long-term and broad societal and political process that involves the change of destructive attitudes
into constructive relationships towards sustainable peace. In this study I am concerned with the inter-communal level of reconciliation, i.e. with the change in intergroup relationships, as opposed to the individual level which mostly refers to the process of healing and forgiveness. Here I am mainly concerned with political reconciliation, i.e. the move towards political moderation both with the establishment of moderate political forces and the change in the voting pattern towards political parties that foster moderation. I seek to analyze how the process of reconciliation proceeded in Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina within the democratization process of these countries, focusing on how political party competition proceeded in these countries in the postwar period. My expectation is that once democratic processes such as electoral races and political party competition take place, the peaceful contestation of political power will pave the way for political moderation in terms of cross-group voting.

Post-Conflict Democratization

Studies on democratization have focused on the difficulties of transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones in countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and South Korea (Diamond 1992; Geddes 1999; Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996). Within the studies of democratic transitions democratization refers to the processes whereby the rules and processes of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles (e.g. coercive control), or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights (e.g. ethnic minorities), or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation (e.g. state agencies) (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 8).

Since the end of the Cold War democracy has been increasingly perceived as a prerequisite both for political and societal reconstruction after conflict while at the same time the promotion of democratic institutions and the holding of free and fair elections have been accepted as the main engine for sustainable peace (Ottaway 2008). Especially the establishment of peace operations in different parts of the world and the increasing involvement of the international community in peace-building and state-building operations has dramatically increased the attention devoted to the issue of democratization through external actors for the promotion of sustainable peace. At the same time, the wave of

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1 This definition encompasses aspects of both the thin- ending of violence, democratization- and the thick-deeper transformation of inter-communal relationships- conceptions of reconciliation. This definition is also in
externally-led transitions to democracy in the post-1990s period and the active role that the international community assumed especially in the Balkans after the dissolution of Yugoslavia and in more recent examples such as Afghanistan and Iraq has led to a new flow of discussions on the relationship between external democratization and peace. Within this context, issues such as the role of post-conflict elections, the establishment of democratic institutions, constitution-making, and party-building processes have attracted the attention of both the international community and scholarly studies (see for example Hippler, 2008; Diamond, 2006; Manning, 2007; Hoglund et al., 2009; Santiso, 2001; Horowitz, 2008).

In this study I use the term post-conflict democratization as the process through which democratic institutions and processes are established in countries emerging out of civil war. Post-conflict democratization in this study encapsulates both the process of democratization as an internally-driven process, such as the Greek case after the civil war of the 1940s and especially after mid-1970s, and the externally driven process of promoting democratic governance, as in the case of Bosnia after 1995. In Greece the return to democracy begun with the electoral race of 1950, the first organized after the civil war ended in 1949. However, democratization in Greece was interrupted with the coup d’état of 1967 which established a military authoritarian regime that lasted until 1974. With the end of the military regime the democratization process in Greece continued with the return of the multiparty politics (metapolitefsi) after the self-dissolution of the military rule. The post-1974 period was marked by the emergence of two new parties representing the two ends of the political spectrum with a moderate political agenda. In Bosnia, on the other hand, democratization has been an externally driven process where the international community assumed extensive role in the design of the Bosnian state as it was established with the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995. In Bosnia the first post-conflict elections took place in 1996 and were dominated by three ethno-nationalist parties that represented the three ethno-nationalist groups of the country2. These parties have persisted as contenders of political power in Bosnia until today. Despite the establishment of new political parties and the short-term victory of moderate parties, Bosnian politics today are still dominated by ethno-nationalist parties while vote-seeking and voting is based on ethnicity as the main sociopolitical cleavage.

2 These parties are: the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA); the Serb Democratic Party (SDS); and the Croat Democratic Community (HDZ).
Linking Reconciliation to Democracy

While acknowledged in general terms, the relationship between reconciliation and democracy in post-conflict peace-building has been understudied. Reconciliation and democracy form the basis upon which sustainable peace is sought to be built and both democratization and reconciliation are seen as the main engine that will transform past controversies to a peaceful coexistence in the future. However, the connection between the two concepts remains vague and there is a blurred picture of whether democratization requires reconciliation in order to succeed or whether reconciliation is the broader process that both enhances democratization and is the result of it. While the IDEA handbook (2003) underlines the importance of democracy as a prerequisite for post-conflict reconciliation and the restoration of peace, other studies have pointed to the opposite relationship between democracy and reconciliation, declaring the need for reconciliation as a prerequisite for the establishment of democratic governance (Siani-Davies and Katsikas, 2009). Additionally, the view that democracy is linked to reconciliation in terms of its forward-looking dimension urge us to think of a more dynamic interaction between the two concepts (Sarkin and Daly, 2003). Accepting that democracy is part of the forward-looking aspect of reconciliation leaves unanswered the question of whether reconciliation is a prerequisite for democracy or whether it is the broader process that encompasses democracy as part of the reconstruction process.

In this study I seek to analyze how post-conflict democratization may pave the way for reconciliation among previously opposing fractions. Democratic systems of government have a degree of legitimacy, inclusiveness and accountability which are needed for managing conflicting interests peacefully while political participation to democratic governance through non-violent methods paves the way for the establishment of norms that emphasize negotiation and conciliation (Yalcin-Mousseau, 2001). Additionally, by building norms of negotiation, compromise, and co-operation amongst political actors, democracy itself has a pacifying effect on the political relations between different groups (IDEA 1998). The Greek case indicates that the democratization process in the post-1974 period paved the way for reconciliation, a process which did not take place in the first couple of decades after the civil war ended in 1949. While still being at the early stages of post-conflict reconstruction, the Bosnian democratization process, despite the electoral and institutional engineering of the international society towards political moderation and reconciliation, has not led to political reconciliation among the three ethno-nationalist communities. In Bosnia ethno-nationalism persists as the single main societal and political cleavage and political party competition and
vote-seeking is based on ethnic terms. In order to analyze the different patterns that the two countries followed in terms of reconciliation, I base my theoretical framework on three issues that I contend have main explanatory power for this analysis: the issue of external influence; the issue of state legitimacy; and the issue of postwar economy.

External influence may range from external interventionism in internal politics, as was the case with American interventionism to Greece within the Cold War context, to the active role of the international actors in the post-conflict process, as is the case with Bosnia after 1995. Additionally, external interference is relevant for the cases that are examined here in terms of the role of the European Community/European Union in the democratization processes of Greece and Bosnia. One major common aspect of the Greek and the Bosnian case is that the processes of democratization and postwar reconciliation were closely interlinked with the process through which these two countries approached European structures. As was the case with Greece in 1970s and 1980s, Bosnia-Herzegovina today is a country in the process of integration with the EU. Considering that external actors such as the EU have major influential role in the democratization of the countries that seek to become a member, my aim at this point is to analyze how this impacts on the reconciliation process.

The issue of post-conflict legitimacy is a second issue that I use in my analysis. Post-conflict legitimacy can be seen as a campaign to convince the population that the state- as a holder of power and set of institutions- is sufficiently appropriate for the context, hence, meriting freedom from excessive opposition or violent contestation (Lipset, 1963 cited in Barakat et al., 2010). Based on this conceptualization, in this study I use the term state legitimacy as a concept that indicates whether a state is accepted as rightfully holding and exercising political power (Gilley, 2006). In this study my focus is on internal/local/domestic legitimacy, i.e. on state legitimacy as it is perceived by its own citizens rather than external legitimacy, i.e. the recognition of the state by the international community (Roberts, 2008). The concept of internal legitimacy that I adopt encompasses also the legitimacy of the institutions created by the international community in cases where international actors assumed extended role in the post-conflict reconstruction process, as it is the case with Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The issue of state legitimacy is closely linked to the reconciliation and democratization processes after conflict. As the above conceptualization of state legitimacy reveals, the very essence of the perception of legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens has the potential to affect
the peace process as a whole. If a state is not accepted as rightfully holding and exercising political power then the prospects for opposition and subsequent violence rise. Especially in cases where ethnic divisions are deep, power sharing mechanisms should be designed accurately so that any group does not feel marginalized in the political arena and contest the legitimacy of state institutions. In cases where state legitimacy is intertwined with the question of power-sharing and with the issue of the relationship between the state and the groups (whether they are ethnic or non-ethnic/ideological), the reconciliation process runs the risk of getting interrupted. Questioning the state legitimacy will inevitably impede the reconciliation process, as, in cases where the legitimacy is contested, the risk for conflict recurrence will increase.

The third aspect that I use in the analysis is the postwar economy. The improvement of socio-economic conditions in a post-conflict society is accepted as a key step on the road to reconciliation (IDEA 2003, 27) while it is generally acknowledged that economic disparities form a barrier for reconciliation (Sarkin, 2008; Pankhurst, 1999). Economic considerations are the main engine for the willingness of opposing parties or individuals to reconcile with other members of the society. In societies where there is a sense of economic inequality in the aftermath of conflict, it is expected that reconciliation initiatives will be ineffective. This situation is especially important for societies where intergroup divisions are deep. Especially in societies where ethnic divisions coincide with wartime warring lines, the feeling of economic injustice at the expense of a specific group will affect the intergroup relations and the reconciliation process in general. On the other hand, democracy is generally associated with economic well-being while at the same time, it is accepted that in post-conflict transitions successful economic growth raise the chances for democracy (Barnes, 2001). Democratization processes also require the establishment of power-sharing mechanisms which encompass political, social, and economic aspects.

The Cases: Democratization and Reconciliation in Postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina

This study is based on the analysis of postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of how democratization and reconciliation proceeded on the way to the establishment of sustainable peace. Although the two cases present strong differences in terms of the character of the civil war (ethnic versus non-ethnic) and the post-conflict reconstruction process which
in Bosnia was mainly externally-driven, these two cases provide valuable insights for the question of how democratization and reconciliation may root for each other and contribute to peace. In this study I place Greece in the Balkan context as a country which went through the process which is today in place in Bosnia after the divisive civil war of the 1940s. Greece went through a civil conflict which was characterized by severe atrocities and high level of casualties, as was the case in Bosnian internal conflict of 1992-1995. Both the Greek and the Bosnian civil war occurred in the aftermath of wider interstate conflicts: the Greek civil war took place immediately after the end of the Second World War, and the Bosnian civil war occurred as part of the wider Yugoslav Wars that took place among previous Yugoslav republics. The process of democratization in both countries proceeded within the wider process of integration with the European Community/ European Union. Finally, as in Bosnia, reconciliation in Greece took place in the context of integration into wider European structures.

**Greece**

The Greek civil war of the 1940s marked the history of modern Greece as the bitterest civil strife with the highest level of casualties involving Greeks during the 20th century (Close 1995). The civil war in Greece was mainly based on the Right versus Left cleavage but exceeded this cleavage in many aspects. Besides the main division between Left and Right, the conflict was interlinked with the issue of monarchy versus republicanism which itself has been a source of deep divisions in the prewar period of the 1930s. The civil war was also complicated by the fact that it involved a Rightist nationalistic discourse which deepened the divisions between the two fractions. Furthermore, the high levels of foreign engagement firstly by the side of the British and then of the U.S. always in favor of the Greek Right was another source of deep divisions between the two camps (Tsoukalas 1969; Kassimeris 2009). The bitterness of the civil strife had a catalytic impact on how the postwar reconstruction process in Greece proceeded as it was the essence of war-time divisions that shaped the postwar democratization and reconciliation efforts.

The postwar reconstruction process in Greece was marked by the Colonels’ dictatorship that began with the coup d’état of 1967 and persisted until 1974, when it was eventually self-destroyed, paving the way for the democratic consolidation process of the country and opening the horizons for reconciliation between the opposing fractions of the
civil war. The dictatorship period is perceived as a turning point both for Greek democratization and reconciliation processes. In terms of democratization, the pre-dictatorship period in Greece was marked by political party competition that broadly projected the war-time divisions of the previous decade. The immediate post-war years until the disruption of party politics in 1967 has been marked by an unstable party competition that presents both continuity with and departure from the past. This instability can be observed from the frequency of electoral races; nine electoral races took place until the 1967 coup d’état by the Colonels while the number of political parties competing in the electoral races has varied considerably, from 44 parties in the elections of 1950 to three in the elections of 1964. Another important aspect of this period has been the banning of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE- Komounistiko Komma Ellados) from Greek political life. The banning of KKE was a legacy of the civil war years which persisted until the dissolution of the military rule in 1974. The re-legalization of the communist Left was part of the broader process of democratic consolidation which took place in the country in the 1970s and 1980s.

With the self-dissolution of the Colonels’ dictatorship in 1974 Greece entered a period of democratic consolidation. In Greece the level of cohesion among all social and political groups for the establishment of parliamentary democracy appear as an interesting aspect, considering the inherent fragility which marked Greek politics in the pre-Junta period (Clogg 1987, 211). This politico-ideological fragility was a legacy of the civil war divisions and was the most significant characteristic of the pre-dictatorship period in Greece. It is ironic that the Junta, which entered to Greek politics with no resistance from the fragile politikos kosmos of the 1950s and 1960s, became the remedy of this fractionalization and created a coherent anti-Junta stream (Clogg 1987; Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009). During the Colonels’ reign the Greek society coalesced around the common desire for the dissolution of the Junta. It is even more interesting that the common anti-Junta sentiment helped to mitigate the Left versus Right division which stood as a bitter legacy of the civil war period (Clogg 1987, 212). Undoubtedly this mitigation opened the room for the reconciliation process among the Right and Left, a process which did not flourish in the 1950s and 1960s.

According to Diamandouros (1984), national reconciliation was one of the five distinct strategies that Karamanlis adopted in his return to Greece as the manager of the transition to

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3 These parties were the Center Union (Enosis Kentrou), the electoral alliance of National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis) and the Progressive Party (Komma Proodeftikon), and the United Democratic Left (Eniaia Dimokratiki Aristera) (for more information on the electoral races and parties in 1950-1967, see Clogg 1987 p. 17-54).
democracy after the fall of the Junta. The strategies that Karamanlis adopted included (a) national reconciliation and the end of wartime divisions that perpetuated in the postwar exclusivist state; (b) radical redistribution of power among the major political actors that dominated postwar Greek politics; (c) democratization of the Greek Right; (d) creation of the conditions that will allow the Left to participate fully in the political system; (e) the establishment of new institutions that would ensure the inclusiveness of the political system⁴. The national reconciliation strategy of Karamanlis first and foremost required the dismantling of the postwar institutional and legal nexus. In this direction, through legislative acts of his government Karamanlis officially put an end to restrictive legislation originating in the civil war years, restituted the civil liberties to those that had been denied them, and legalized the KKE, integrating the mainstream Left again to the political arena (Diamantouros 1984, 60). These were important steps that jumpstarted the process of reconciliation which it is accepted that was fully achieved in the late 1980s. Greece had to wait for the electoral races of 1981 and 1985 when a radical change took place in Greek party politics with the emergence of PASOK⁵ as a contender of political power, to accept that reconciliation has been fully achieved in Greece in terms of bridging the gap between the Right and the Left.

Reconciliation in 1974 was not primarily about healing the wounds of the conflict but was a specific political project designed to bridge the divides in Greek society so as to forge a national consensus (Siani-Davies and Katsikas 2009, 566). Siani-Davies and Katsikas declare that reconciliation in Greece was closely linked to the need to meet the political exigencies of the time and consolidate democratic norms and practices. This was the result of both the domestic political processes and of the international context. In the domestic arena reconciliation was used as a political tool through which the main contenders of political power sought to gain support. For the sake of gaining broad-based support both ND and PASOK chose moderation in their ideological background and moved to the center. On the other hand, the crisis with Turkey over the issue of Cyprus was an international factor that added to the national reconciliation process. After the humiliating loss in the Cyprus issue, which itself terminated the military dictatorship, Greece had to be united to overcome the crisis. The broad-based anti-Junta stance of the Greek society remained intact for the sake of

⁴ Diamandouros (1984) states that concrete evidence that explains the motivations behind the strategy of Karamanlis is absent. The author provides his own explanation that Karamanlis chose such a strategy because he realized that unless political structures in Greece were radically modernized to become congruent with social and economic changes that had taken place in the preceding thirty years the chances for political stability would be highly diminished.

⁵ Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima is the main social-democratic party in Greece since its foundation in 1974.
national unity on issue of foreign policy. This unity was further enhanced with the prospect for entering the EC in the 1980s.

With the establishment of New Democracy (ND) led by Karamanlis and the establishment of the PASOK led by Papandreou in 1974 Greek politics entered a new era which was of outmost importance for the process of reconciliation. In the immediate post-dictatorship years Right and Left ideologies continued to be relevant in Greek politics. However, this relevance was essentially different from the way the two ideologies dominated the 1950s and 1960s politics. The 1970s saw the modernization of the Greek Right, by abandoning its traditional anti-communism and its past tendency to tolerate military interventionism in Greek politics and the establishment of a new and more moderate profile (Bellou 2003, 160). The Rightist ND of the 1970s, while retaining several old aspects of the Right, adopted a more moderate stance with a new identity which belonged to the center-of-Right spectrum of Greek politics (Diamantouros 1984, 61). Similarly, the establishment of PASOK as a center-of-Left party signaled the inclusion of Left to party politics at a more moderate stance. While the KKE was formally legalized in 1974, the advent of PASOK and its electoral success throughout the 1970s and eventual victory in 1981 indicate the desire of the Left electorate to break away from the extreme Leftist ideology. Throughout the 1980s PASOK has managed to occupy a very broad space in the spectrum of political competition extending from the Left to the center-Right (Pappas 2003, 98).

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Bosnian civil war has its roots in the polarization of ethnic politics beginning with the weakening of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The gradual dissolution of Yugoslavia and the nationalist and separatist tendencies of the former Yugoslav republics such as Serbia and Croatia inflicted intergroup tensions based on ethnicity. The war in Bosnia broke out after a series of conflicts in Croatia and Serbia which brought the issue of sovereignty of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs in the forefront of the political arena. By mid-1992, almost three-quarters of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was claimed either by Serb or by Croat nationalists while mutual suspicions flourished among the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats (Burg and Shoup 1999, 74). In the post-

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6 For an extensive analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia before the explosion of the war in Bosnia, see for example Malcolm (1994) and Burg & Shoup (1999).
Yugoslav context, the conflict in Bosnia evolved into a conflict of antagonistic national identities and an underlying dispute over the legitimate unit of sovereignty (Bose 2002, 249).

The Bosnian democratization process has peculiar characteristics as it is a process which was initiated by international actors within the phase of transition from an ethnic warfare to a multiethnic state and from the socialist rule to democracy (Bojkov 2003, 42). Within this context, democratization in Bosnia has been a process driven by external actors who assumed the task of institutional and electoral engineering in order to foster democratic institutions and secure representative government. However, the effort for democracy promotion has been undermined by the highly undemocratic character of the Office of High Representative (OHR), charged with the civilian implementation of Dayton. The OHR has been criticized for its lack of accountability and representativeness of the Bosnian people, possessing low levels of internal legitimacy (Richmond and Franks 2009; Steward 2006; McCann 2007).

On the other hand, the goal of democratization in Bosnia is not only a goal in itself but it was seen from the very beginning as a tool for the transformation of the political system of the country in general. International actors in Bosnia have designed the new Bosnian state with a consociational structure which secures equal participation of all ethno-nationalist groups in the political arena. In general terms, democratization in Bosnia has meant that international authorities charged with overseeing postwar Bosnia have tried to use the design, monitoring, and revision of successive electoral processes to change the basic shape of interest aggregation (Manning 2005: 47). Besides electoral engineering, democratization in Bosnia has required the establishment of an institutional structure based on strict power-sharing among the three ethno-national groups. Both institutional and electoral engineering in Bosnia have been used for securing the representation of all ethnic groups in the political arena while the establishment of a multi-national Bosnian state has been seen as a key for preserving peace.

Based on these assumptions, electoral and institutional engineering in Bosnia and Herzegovina has focused on introducing and implementing reforms to achieve political reconciliation and moderation. After the 1996 elections\(^7\), which are generally considered as a

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\(^7\) The three ethnic parties that prevailed in the 1996 elections and persisted throughout time, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Bosniac Party for Democratic Action (SDA), were basically formerly fighting groups that were transferred to the political arena. These three parties
failure both in terms of organizational deficits and in terms of their results that led to power-sharing strictly among the previously warring factions, the international community used subsequent elections in order to achieve political change and compliance with the provisions of the Dayton peace agreement (Manning 2004, 69). The Provisional Election Commission of Bosnia initiated a series of reforms, including power-sharing requirements at the level of cantons and municipalities, preferential voting system, the establishment of local constituencies for the Republica Srpska National Assembly, and change in the casting of votes for the Federation’s House of Peoples. In general terms these reforms were in accordance with the aim of diminishing the competitive advantages of wartime parties, focusing on transformations of the electoral and institutional system (Manning 2004, 69).

On the other hand, the electoral system of Bosnia, which was adopted in accordance with the consociational system that was built with Dayton, is accused of increasing the salience of ethnicity in the country, paving the way for electoral competition and voting behavior defined in ethnic terms (Hulsey, 2010). The proportional representation, in conjunction with the general consociational structure that recognizes group rights and supports the differences between the groups rather than eliminating them, has consolidated stable party competition based on ethnicity. The consociational structure that was established in the post-Dayton period served the maintenance of the war-time nationalist parties, who took advantage of this structure and systematically used the electoral processes to pursue their own agendas (Belloni 2004, 335). Political party competition under this structure has taken a stable form, consolidating the existing pattern of competition in ethnic terms. This stability has persisted despite the efforts of the international community to promote political moderation.

Analyzing the Democratization-Reconciliation Processes in the Two Cases

The Role of International Actors

The Greek and the Bosnian postwar processes differ mainly on the level of foreign engagement to these processes. In Greece, the main external actors that impacted on the have their origins at the first elections held in post-communist period in 1992 and actually are the ethnically defined political fractions that initiated the 1992 war.
postwar period are the United States and the European Community/European Union. During the unstable period of 1950-1963 in Greece, the frequent electoral races and the unsuccessful attempts after each electoral race to establish stable governments was closely associated with the United States’ bid to preserve its interests within the Cold War context (Kassimeris 2009, 691). Indeed, US influence on Greek politics was shaped within the framework of the Cold War and was mainly an extension of the containment policy of the US. The Greek Right lacked of a strong ideological basis and its virtual ideology was basically the expression of opposition to the communist ideology. This was in line with the interests of the US and the preservation of this mentality served well the American Cold War foreign policy. The result was that the period 1950-1967 was a rather unsuccessful attempt to promote democratic politics as ideological calculations were beyond the establishment of democratic norms. In terms of reconciliation, the US’ ideological impact on postwar Greek politics further deepened the division between the Greek Right and Left, hindering in this way any prospects for reconciliation (Kassimeris 2009).

This situation of US interference in Greece changed dramatically after the end of the Colonels’ dictatorship in 1974 and the move of Greece towards a new era in both its domestic and foreign policy. The most important aspects of the post-1974 period have been the move from pro-American to anti-American stance and the significant decrease in American interest towards Greece. The importance of this change for this study is that a new international actor, the European Community, proliferated as a main actor affecting the democratization and the subsequent reconciliation process in the country. In terms of democratization, the EC’s conditionality had a catalytic impact on the consolidation of democracy. In terms of reconciliation, the fact that the Greek community coalesced around the desire to become a member of the EC impacted positively on the intergroup relations and paved the way for reconciliation.

Post-conflict Bosnia on the other hand presents a more straightforward picture of external influence in the country. The plethora of actors and the wide range of tasks that they assumed in post-conflict Bosnia indicate that the process of reconstruction was mainly externally driven\(^8\). Additionally, the international dimension of the post-conflict

\(^8\) The international community in Bosnia assumed tasks that covered both the military and the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. A multi-national force led by NATO supervised the compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) supervised the conduct of the elections. Together with the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the UN High Commission for Human Rights took on the task of supervising the implementation of human rights provisions,
reconstruction process in Bosnia was further widened as international bodies such as the OHR widened their mandate throughout the 2000s. The OHR gradually expanded its time-limits: while it was initially established as a provisional body with its mandate ending after the first post-conflict elections in 1996, its mandate was prolonged firstly for two additional years and after 1997 it was extended indefinitely (Chandler 2005, 339). While widening its period of existence, the OHR also widened the areas of its mandate. Throughout the 2000s, the OHR expanded its power, gaining both executive and legislative control over the Bosnian state and assuming the power to dismiss officials in case of non-compliance to Dayton.

The expansion of the powers of the international community entered a new period with the inauguration of EU accession negotiations in early 2000s. From 2000 and onwards Dayton gradually became subordinate to the requirement for EU membership (Chandler 2005, 341). Since 2002, the Directorate for European Integrations, which was established with the aim of preparing a strategy for EU integration for Bosnia has become a key executive body for Bosnia. This has paved the way for more direct EU involvement in the government of Bosnia. Additionally, since 2002 the High Representative in Bosnia jointly holds the position of EU Special Representative (EUSR). The EU has also impacted the reconstruction process through its policy of conditionality and it is accepted that the importance of the EU in terms of the post-conflict democratization process in Bosnia lies in this policy of conditionality (Weller and Wolff 2006, 9). EU’s conditionality policy is successful especially in cases where political elites and the general public are willing to make concessions in order to get EU accession and this was the case for post-conflict Bosnia which is still in a reconstruction process. However, EU integration should become a real option and “the criteria for access should be concrete, credible and achievable if a positive effect of such integration is to become reality” (Fischer 2006, 32).

The main impact of the international community on postwar Bosnian reconciliation process has been through the institutional structure that international actors established for the democratic Bosnian state. The bid of the international actors to preserve diversity within unity an area which needed special sensitivity considering the gross human rights violations that occurred in the country during the civil war. In terms of economic reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) led the reconstruction process. The ICTY was established as the main judicial body charged with the task of fostering transitional justice. Finally, the OHR assumed the civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement.

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9 Bosnia-Herzegovina became potential candidate to the EU following the Thessaloniki European Council of June 2003. Since 2000 Bosnia-Herzegovina has benefited from EU autonomous trade measures.
in Bosnia has led to the establishment of a state where ethnic diversity is strictly preserved and power-sharing mechanisms are based on ethnicity as the divisive factor. By dividing the society institutionally the international actors have established a structure where there is no need for interethnic dialogue at least in the political arena. On the other hand, the extension of the international presence in the country and the extensive powers that international actors such as the EU have assumed especially since the 2000s has inhibited the move to a Bosnian ownership of the postwar reconstruction process in general.

Overall, the impact of external actors on the postwar democratization and reconciliation processes in Greece and Bosnia has been multidimensional and has been dependent on the historical circumstances that each country found itself in its postwar period. In terms of democratization, the common major actor of the two cases, the European Union has influenced the process of transition to democracy. This is the result of the bid of both countries to become a member of a union that is still perceived as a main means for sociopolitical and economic development. One major difference between the Greek and the Bosnian democratization process with relation to the EC/EU is that in Greece the restoration of democracy in the post-1974 period was the result of the internal dynamic of the Greek society. Contrary, in Bosnia the democratization process was from the beginning an externally driven process where the EU assumed major democracy-building and governing tasks. The way democratization proceeded had a major impact on the reconciliation process in the two countries. In the Greek case reconciliation was achieved as a political tool and took place within the political project of Karamanlis to build a united Greek nation in the aftermath of the Colonels Dictatorship. In Bosnia, on the other hand, reconciliation is still not at place despite the electoral and institutional engineering of the international community for the promotion of political moderation and the fostering of inter-ethnic dialogue in the political arena. This is closely related to the fact that there has not been a Bosnian ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process in general.

The Issue of State Legitimacy

During the period of crowned democracy, i.e. until 1967, state legitimacy in Greece was highly contested. This is related to both the unpopularity of the King as part of the state apparatus and the contested legitimacy of the multiparty system which excluded systematically part of the society which was inclined to Leftist ideology. Especially the legal
banning of the KKE inescapably delegitimized any efforts for multiparty politics and
government formation. The main indicator of the legitimacy crisis in this period is the
frequent electoral races as a result of the inability to form stable governments or coalitions.
With the establishment of the Junta the issue of legitimacy gained special significance.
Considering that the Junta was commonly viewed as anachronistic and that a common anti-
Junta stance existed, the Junta was never viewed as legitimately possessing its power. The
weakness of the regime’s initial claim to legitimacy and its inability to institutionalize itself,
the ultimate crisis of failure and the state-led character of the transition (Fishman 1990, 436)
may account for why the transitional caretaker government of Karamanlis in 1974 was
perceived as possessing high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of the Greek society. In direct
contrast with the Colonels reign, the post-1974 phase of democratization led to the
establishment of a republic which possessed high levels of legitimacy.

With the transition to fully functioning liberal democracy and its consolidation in the
1980s, the perception of state legitimacy also changed. The first development changing the
attitudes was the transition from monarchy to republic and the ending of the crowned
democracy regime. The eradication of the royalists as a main source of division after 1974
made the New Greek Republic by far the most legitimate in the history of Greece
(Papadopoulos 1989). On the other hand, after the long-lasting political reign of the Right, the
emergence of the socialist PASOK victorious in the 1981 elections impacted positively on
how the leftist fraction of the Greek society perceived the legitimacy of the political system as
a whole. With the 1981 elections the previously excluded center-Left gained an
unprecedented electoral success which paved the way for a more inclusive political life. This
was intertwined with the legalization of the far Left KKE and its re-entrance to political life
after a long period of banning. In this way we can say that party politics gained a real
multiparty character. At the same time, the bid for becoming a member of the EC and
eventual membership has also impacted positively on the legitimacy of the Greek state. The
adoption of Western liberal democratic values associated with accession strengthened the
legitimacy possessed by the state apparatus.

The issue of legitimacy in Bosnia encompasses both the legitimacy of the Bosnian
state as composed of two distinct entities in the postwar phase and the legitimacy of the
international presence in the country, incorporated mainly in the OHR as the foreign
governing body which assumed the task of the civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace
Accords. It is generally accepted that Dayton established a post-conflict political structure that
failed to generate legitimacy among the Bosnian people (Richmond and Franks 2009; Mc Cann 2007; Bieber 2007; Steward 2006; Hansen 1997). In this study I am mainly concerned with the legitimacy of the international governance in Bosnia as a factor that affects the democratization and reconciliation processes in the country.

The issue of legitimacy of international administrations is closely linked to the issue of accountability of these administrations. The fact that international administrations are not elected by the local community but are established by outside institutions and therefore they have a distinct spatial identity separate from the communities they govern indicates that these administrations lack democratic accountability (Zaum 2006, 469). The OHR in Bosnia is an example of such an international institution that presents accountability deficits. The paradox regarding the international administration in Bosnia is that while it is tasked with the promotion of democratic governance, it lacks accountability, which is the basis of democracy, because of its unchecked executive authority over Bosnia (Mc Cann 2007). The international authority in Bosnia has “the unlimited authority to overrule the democratic institutions of the Bosnian state” (Knaus and Martin 2003, 60)\textsuperscript{10}. The decisions of the OHR are not accountable to independent bodies, the Bosnian public or the Bosnian government (Steward 2006, 758) and while being an institution established with the aim of fostering democracy, the OHR is actually stifling democratization because it is both unrepresentative and unaccountable to the people (Richmond and Franks 2009, 28).

The non-contested legitimacy of the Greek state in the post-1974 period opened the room for the national unity project of Karamanlis and the subsequent reconciliation process. This legitimacy basically echoed the trust and contention with the \textit{metapolitefsi}, i.e. with the fact that democracy was rebuilt in Greece in 1974. On the other hand, the lack of internal legitimacy of the international administration in Bosnia functioned as a barrier in the reconciliation process of the country. The analysis of the two cases indicates that legitimacy prevails as a key issue on the road to reconciliation. However, the fact that post-1974 legitimacy in Greece was achieved as a result of the restoration of democracy as an internal dynamic of the Greek society in this period indicates that the issue of internal legitimacy was closely linked to the issue of external influence.

\textsuperscript{10}The international authority in Bosnia has the power to dismiss elected officials. Knaus and Martin note that the OHR can dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, and mayors without having to submit its decisions for review to any independent body (2003, 61). From this viewpoint the international administration contradicts its own purpose of existence, which is to promote democratic governance.
Postwar Economy

In the immediate postwar years until 1974 the economic performance of Greece was one of the most impressive in postwar Europe (Alogoskoufis 1995, 149). In the 1950s and 1960s Greece became part of the Southern Europe countries that experienced unprecedented levels of economic growth that was mainly externally introduced and heavily dependent on the Western European prosperity (Vergopoulos 1987, 107). The political mobilization of the mid-1960s in Greece which resulted with the alteration of political power by centrist parties was closely related to the developments in the economic sphere. In the 1960s the process of social and political mobilization that took place was motivated by the inequalities that resulted from the Greek model of economic development and the rapid economic changes that accompanied it (Lyritzis 1984, 103). However, the economic growth in Southern Europe from which Greece benefitted was not associated with economic and social practices that permitted the institutionalization of national production means. This paved the way for serious economic drawbacks in the aftermath of the Colonels dictatorship. Especially in late 1970s and in the 1980s when Greece entered a period of sociopolitical change which paralleled its democratization process, the inadequacies of the externally driven economic growth resurfaced.

The Bosnian economic reconstruction process has meant both the transition from the previous socialist structure of Yugoslavia to a market economy and the transition from a war economy to a postwar economy marked by rapid market liberalization and high levels of international assistance. Like the general reconstruction process, the economic reconstruction process in Bosnia has been marked by extensive international assistance. The postwar economy of Bosnia has been analyzed both in terms of the overall economic performance in the aftermath of the civil war (see for example Pugh 2002; Friedman 2004; Bieber 2007) and in terms of the establishment of clandestine economy within the reconstruction process (see

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11 Being part of the European Recovery Program (ERP), postwar Greek economic recovery was first and foremost influenced by the Marshall Plan and the foreign policy of the US towards Greece (Botsiou 2009). Through the recovery program Greece received large amounts of economic aid from the US with the aim of its postwar reconstruction and entrance to the Western Alliance. However, while the basic infrastructure of Greece was largely completed by the end of the Four Year Plan, industrialization, which was not one of the objectives of the American planners, was not achieved (Kofas 1989, 120). Greece remained an exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured goods, thus being heavily dependent to the advanced capitalist countries.
for example Donais 2003; Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006). In this part I am mainly concerned with how the economy of post-war Bosnia affects the reconciliation process in the country.

The fact that the Bosnian war was fought in ethnic lines has impacted on how economic power has been structured in postwar Bosnia. In today’s Bosnia the desire to accumulate power both in political and economic terms is the main factor that unites the country’s nationalist fractions that are represented by the three main nationalist political parties of SDS, SDA and HDZ (Donais 2003, 366). Like the political arena, the economic space has also been dominated by ethnic interests and conflicting views about how the state and the economy should be organized (Tzifakis and Tsardanidis 2006, 72). Additionally, in postwar Bosnia wartime criminal networks have continued their existence due to the weakness and fragmentation of the state institutions (Bieber 2006, 34). Festic and Rausche note that in the post-Dayton institution-building process the international community failed to ban the appointment of wartime political figures to key posts such as banking and customs and gave them the institutional structure needed for the clandestine political economies (2004, 33). Bosnia today maintains the characteristic of a criminal economy and corruption that have their roots in the Yugoslav era. In general terms, the connection between organized crime and corruption and nationalist political forces is the most important obstacle for the development of a market economy and the integration of Bosnia into the EU’s economic space (Donais 2003, 361).

In terms of overall economic performance, postwar Bosnia presents a weak economic performance with high levels of unemployment and low levels of income, and the general performance of the economy is behind its prewar levels (Friedman 2004, 94). Poverty varies regionally and coincides with ethnicity, with poverty being most widespread in Serb-dominated regions and less in Croat dominated regions (Bieber 2007, 51). At the same time, corruption and extensive party control over the economy continue to be two main aspects that have been inherited from the communist era. Dayton established a fragmented economic system where the entities and the cantons set their own budgets and have a degree of autonomy in development policies (Divjak and Pugh 2008, 375). Within these autonomous structures ethnic lines are closely interlinked to economic power while at the same time social clientelism continues to be the main determinant of social provision (Pugh 2002).

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12 For an extended analysis of criminal structures in post-conflict Bosnia see Donais (2003) and Pugh (2002).
This brief analysis indicates that postwar economic considerations have been closely associated with how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in postwar Greece and Bosnia. In Greece the increased levels of economic development of the 1950s and 1960s opened the room for the successful restoration of democracy in the post-dictatorship period. However, the fact that the reconciliation process in Greece took place under circumstances of economic distress in the post-1974 period indicates that the issue of postwar economy falls short of explaining why reconciliation in Greece was achieved as a result of the democratization process. In Bosnia on the other hand, the persistence of war-time economic structures has been a major factor behind the persistence of divisions and the lack of reconciliation in the country.

Conclusions

In this study my aim was to investigate how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the road to the establishment of sustainable peace. These two cases revealed diverse insights regarding their democratization and reconciliation processes: while in Greece reconciliation was achieved as a product of the democratization process of the 1970s and 1980s, in Bosnia-Herzegovina reconciliation is still not at place despite the tremendous efforts to promote inter-ethnic reconciliation through institutional and electoral engineering. In my analysis I focused on postwar democratization as the process through which democratic processes and institutions are established in the aftermath of conflict. As a second concept, in this paper I focused on postwar reconciliation as the process which signifies the move from a divisive past to a shared future. Here I specifically focused on political reconciliation and more specifically on inter-communal reconciliation in terms of political moderation.

The analysis of postwar Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina in terms of the role of international actors, the issue of state legitimacy, and the role of postwar economy indicated that all three aspects had a multidimensional impact on how democratization and reconciliation proceeded in the two countries. These three issues impacted in various ways on the democratization and reconciliation processes in the two countries. The above analysis
revealed that the issue of international engagement/external influence has the major explanatory power on the question of why reconciliation in Greece was achieved as a result of the post-1974 democratization process while in Bosnia this is still not the case. The fact that in Greece the restoration of democracy after the authoritarian rule in the postwar period as a result of the internal dynamic of the Greek society mainly explains why in Greece democracy led to inter-group reconciliation. On the other hand in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the extensive role of the international community and the extension of the powers of international actors such as the EU has prohibited the Bosnian ownership of the postwar democratization process. Overall, this study reached the tentative conclusion that the essence and level of international engagement/external influence has a major impact on explaining the democratization-reconciliation relationship in post-conflict contexts.

REFERENCES


