Intraparty Factions and Coalition Bargaining in Germany

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Abstract: Most formal theories of coalition formation are based on the assumption of parties as unitary and forward-looking actors who bargain over portfolios and future governmental policies in the government formation process (e.g. Laver/Shepsle 1996, Thies 2001). In this paper we relax the unitary actor assumption and theorize about the conditions under which intraparty factions play a role in coalition bargaining processes. Using a simple model we argue that the outcomes of coalition formation processes (portfolio allocation, governmental policy as stated in the coalition agreement) reflect the policy positions and intraparty strength of party factions rather than the positions of parties as unitary actors. We evaluate the argument in a case study of coalition formation in Germany in 1987/90 and 1998/2002. Party manifestos, platforms of party working groups, and formal coalition agreements are used to derive policy positions of all major parties (as unitary actors), their key factions, and future governmental policies. Using the wordscore technique (Laver/Benoit/Garry 2003), we estimate policy positions with respect to the three most important policy dimensions, the socio-economic, the social, and the foreign affairs dimension. We find support for the argument that the allocation of portfolios to members of party factions is used to enforce coalition contracts when ministerial discretion is high.
Introduction

In most parliamentary democracies, single parties rarely obtain a majority of seats in parliamentary elections so that attaining the control of the executive branch necessitates the, mostly explicit, formation of a coalition of parties possessing a majority of seats in the legislature. The study of the formation and termination of such coalitions is a major field of interest in comparative politics. Almost all of these theories start with the assumption of parties as unitary actors seeking for office or policy gains (Riker 1962; Leiserson 1968; Axelrod 1970; De Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976; Peleg 1981; van Roozendaal 1992; Warwick 1994; Schofield 1995). Yet the conventional focus on the “partisan composition” of coalition governments, whether as the explanandum (formation) or explanans (termination), has somehow marginalized other issues like the questions as to what these collective actors intend to do, what they expect to do, what they actually do, and how these government policies come about (Strom/Müller 1999). More recent studies have begun to study these issues in more detail (Austin-Smith/Banks 1990; Laver/Shepsle 1996; Mitchell 1996; Timmermans 1998; Müller/Strøm 2000a).

A major issue in these studies is the question of stability. In a wide range of settings, majority rule does not produce stable outcomes (Arrow 1964; McKelvey 1986). Likewise, government coalitions are susceptible to re-negotiations, their policy agreements are not self-enforcing per se, and “transferable utility” goods like office spoils provide room for making and breaking governments. Given this, a number of stability-inducing mechanisms have been identified, most notably, ministerial discretion (Austin-Smith/Banks 1990; Laver/Shepsle 1996), last offer authorities (Heller 2001), appointment of junior ministers (Thies 2001), or parliamentary scrutiny (Martin/Vanberg 2004). In this paper we study a different mechanism: the delegation of ministerial authority to members of intraparty factions. More specifically, we relax the unitary actor assumption and theorize about the conditions under which intraparty factions holding different preferences than the coalition core parties or their leaders play a role in coalition bargaining processes.

We develop a simple model to show when and how the outcome of coalition formation processes (portfolio allocation, the governmental policy program as stated in the coalition policy agreement) reflect the policy positions and intraparty strength of party factions rather than the positions of parties as unitary actors. We develop three simple arguments on how intraparty factions can influence or, alternatively, can be used to secure coalition contracts under the condition of ministerial discretion. We first contend that party factions hold
ministries if they make outcomes closer to the Pareto surface possible and parties are interested in efficient outcomes. In a second setting, the (unweighted) bargaining outcome of the governmental parties is assumed to be the negotiated coalition contract so that party factions should hold ministries whenever they produce outcomes closer to the efficient (yet unobserved) bargaining outcome. In a third setting, we test our theoretical considerations by the use of a content analysis of coalition policy documents. We introduce the observed policy program of the coalition and contend that portfolios are allocated to major intraparty groups in such a way that the policy outcome under ministerial discretion is optimal with respect to the coalition policy program.

The argument is evaluated in a case study of coalition formation in Germany in 1987, 1990, 1998, and 2002. We present data on the spatial positions of all political actors as well as the coalition policy program in a three-dimensional policy space. Party manifestos, platforms of party working groups, and formal coalition agreements are used to estimate the policy positions of all major parties (as unitary actors), their key factions, and intended future governmental policies. Using the wordscore technique (Laver/Benoit/Garry 2003), positions are derived with respect to the three most important policy dimensions in Germany, the socio-economic, the social, and the foreign affairs dimension. In what follows we first present our argument on how intraparty politics might help us to explain the allocation of portfolios in coalition governments. The third section introduces our case study of portfolio allocation in Germany in the time period of 1987 to 2002. Section four evaluates the above argument on the impact of intraparty politics on portfolio allocation in the light of these data. In the final section, we draw conclusions from our analysis.

Delegating power to factions: Portfolio allocation with intraparty groups

In this section we develop our argument on how to explain the allocation of portfolios to members of intraparty factions and on how intraparty politics can help to explain the allocation of portfolios in coalition governments more generally. In a nutshell, our argument is that in situations with more than one principal and a divergence of preferences, delegating power to a third party agent with different interests may be Pareto-improving for the principals. This holds beyond the notion that multiparty government creates a principal-agent problem (Strøm/Müller 2001: 9f.).

To begin with, we note that coalition bargaining or government formation proceeds in several steps and involves a number of decisions on the side of the actors involved. One is the
problem of who to ask to join a coalition, or, vice versa, whether or not to join once asked for. A second problem is how the conflict of interest concerning future governmental policies might be resolved within the coalition. Thirdly, a decision has to be taken how to delegate authority for the execution and implementation of the agreed coalition policy program. Obviously, all three questions are interrelated. Laver and Shepsle’s (1990; 1996) model of portfolio allocation is the theoretically most sophisticated example of more recent research that addresses all three questions in one setup.  

They presume that coalition cabinets are usually based on ministerial discretion. Cabinet ministers have "considerable influence" over governmental decision-making in their area of jurisdiction: "health policy is heavily conditioned by the partisan political agenda of the minister of health, defense policy by the political views of the political party of the minister of defense, and so on" (Laver/Shepsle 1998: 34). In short, the party that holds a portfolio sets its policy (Laver/Shepsle 1996: 91). As a result, parties agree over portfolio allocations rather than policies. Coalition programs may exist, but they do not reflect a compromise that is negotiated by all coalition partners and covers all relevant policy areas and portfolios.

Ministerial discretion is apparently a key feature and critical assumption of the model. A number of studies have challenged the assumption on both theoretical and empirical grounds. One argument is that it seems unlikely that coalition partners are willing to accept Pareto-inefficient outcomes, and the existence of formal coalition policy programs suggests that Pareto-improvement is indeed feasible (Martin 2004; Martin/Vanberg 2004: 15f.). A second, related argument refers to the allotment of junior ministerial positions to keep tabs on other parties’ ministers and hereby implement policy packages that are Pareto-superior to those implied in ministerial government (Thies 2001: 581). Thirdly, parties may make use of parliamentary scrutiny of proposals from coalition partners’ ministers at the committee stage which should render the enforcement of coalition policy agreements possible (Martin/Vanberg 2004). Finally, Bräuninger and Hallerberg (2005: 27) argue that countries employ different cabinet decision-making rules, whereby ministerial discretion is one but only one of the three types of rules considered in their analysis. In any case, the key problem is how to put into effect a bargaining outcome when there is no third party equipped to monitor or enforce the agreement.

A further possibility which to our knowledge has not been investigated in detail yet, is the delegation of ministerial policy-making powers to members of party factions having different interests but no bargaining power (see, however, Giannetti/Laver 2005). Suppose

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1 For a similar work, see Austen-Smith and Banks (1990).
that as a result of the initial bargaining process, parties agree on a coalition contract that entails some sort of policy program yet being more or less vague and incomplete. Given such an agreement, candidates for a cabinet post having preferences that come close to the coalition policy agreement, should be acceptable for both coalition partners. This holds irrespective of whether or not the preferences of this individual party member deviate from those of its party leaders. By contrast, in single-party governments, we would not expect to see members of party factions holding cabinet posts. In this paper, we seek to explore this argument.²

We start with three assumptions. First, parties consist of a party core and, possibly, several party factions. Party factions have no bargaining power in the process of coalition formation. Secondly, ministers have full discretion over their portfolio once they are in office. Thirdly, we assume that the bargaining process over the coalition policy program precedes the stage of the division of cabinet posts; at least with respect to Germany, this is consistent with what we know from actual coalition formation processes in the past (Ismayr 2000: 200). What are the implications of these assumptions? We predict that cabinet posts are allocated to members of the party core or party factions in such a way that the policy outcomes these cabinet ministers produce come close to the policy program of the coalition government. We therefore need to know what the coalition contract looks like.

Coalition policy programs are the result of a bargaining, i.e. a collective decision-making process of two or more actors having diverging interests or preferences. In such situations numerous outcomes are in principal feasible and possible. Without further knowledge on the actors’ bargaining power, reversion points or domain constraints, we have to conjecture as to where the intended government policy as fixed in the coalition contract is located. In what follows, we consider three scenarios from which we derive three alternative hypotheses. To be more specific, let \( X \) be a multi-dimensional policy space and assume that exactly one minister is responsible for one policy dimension or jurisdiction. Actors have Euclidean preferences with an ideal point \( x \in X \) denoting the most preferred policy. Ministerial candidates belong to one and only one party faction, or the party core. Party core and factions are unitary actors but may diverge in what their most preferred policy in one or more dimensions is. For a generic party \( A \), let \( A_0 \) denote the party core and \( A_1, A_2, A_3 \) etc. the party factions.

² Note that we do not test the portfolio allocation model. We do not intend to explain the initial formation of coalitions as the choice of a portfolio allocation in the “wineset” of the predecessor government. Instead we take the partisan composition of the government coalition as given. We address the less ambitious question as to who becomes a minister for the portfolios in question given that parties have already agreed on both forming a coalition and a coalition policy plan, and given that they know that ministerial discretion is high afterwards.
In the first scenario we simply assume the coalition contract to be an efficient outcome of the coalition bargaining of the party cores. As a result we expect the contract to be located somewhere on the contract curve (for two parties) or, more general, the convex hull of the ideal points of the coalition party cores. In such a situation and if ministerial discretion is high, the allocation of cabinet posts to members of party factions can help to secure higher benefits for both parties than a division of posts amongst party cores. Comparing portfolio allocation of unitary parties with the one of parties with intraparty factions, we have the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1: The actual non-unitary party cabinet is closer to the Pareto surface of the coalition party cores than the respective unitary party cabinet.

Figure 1 clarifies the hypothesis in a two-dimensional setting with two parties A and B consisting of a party core and two party factions. Factions $A_1$ and $A_2$ of party A have virtually the same position on the foreign affairs dimension as the party core $A_0$ whilst they differ with respect to economic policies. By contrast, the factions of party B prefer different policies than the party core on both dimensions. Suppose that we observe cabinet $o_{\text{non}}$ where an individual from party faction $A_2$ holds the economic ministry and a member of party faction $B_2$ is the minister of foreign affairs. Hypothesis 1 contends that the non-unitary party cabinet $o_{\text{non}}$ is closer to the Pareto surface PS than the unitary party cabinet $o_{\text{uni}}$ that would be in place if ministers did belong to party cores rather than party factions.

*** Figure 1 about here ***

For the second scenario we assume that parties do not only agree on Pareto-efficient policies in the initial bargaining process but on a negotiated coalition contract that is the weighted or unweighted mean position $b_u$ (or $b_w$) of the parties in government (Figure 2). As a result members of party factions should hold ministries whenever they produce outcomes closer to the (efficient) bargaining outcome than the ones the unitary party cabinet would produce.

Hypothesis 2 and 3: If the coalition policy agreement is the unweighted (weighted) mean position $b_u$ ($b_w$) of the coalition parties then the actual non-unitary party cabinet is closer to $b_u$ ($b_w$) than the respective unitary party cabinet.
Finally, for the third setting, we assign even more relevance to the coalition agreement as in our second scenario. Suppose that we can observe the coalition contract (c) as it is often published when the government gets into office. We contend that portfolios are allocated to members of the party core or party factions in such a way that the policy outcome under ministerial discretion is optimal with respect to the coalition policy program (Figure 3). Comparing portfolio allocation of unitary parties with the one of parties with intraparty factions, we have following hypothesis:

_Hypothesis 4:_ If the coalition policy agreement is the observed coalition contract c then the actual non-unitary party cabinet is closer to c than the unitary party cabinet.

**Intraparty groups and portfolio allocation in Germany since 1987**

To test the above hypotheses, we analyze the programmatic positions of all political parties represented in the German Federal Diet (_Bundestag_) and their most important intraparty factions. Furthermore, we consider the coalition agreement between the government coalition parties. The analysis is restricted to two time periods: the legislative periods from January 1987 to December 1990 and from October 1998 to September 2002.

**Time frame of analysis**

What are the reasons for selecting these time frames? First of all, the composition of government is different. In the first period a coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), their Bavarian counterpart Christian Social Union (CSU) and the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) under chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU) was in office, in 1998 a coalition between the Socialdemocratic Party (SPD) and the Green Party (Bündnis90/Grüne; in the following called Greens) under chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) was formed (Saalfeld 2000: 41).

Secondly and sticking to the unitary actor assumption for a moment, the first coalition may be located at a moderate right-wing position on the general left-right ideological dimension. Taking into account at least two of the key conflict dimensions, however, reveals a
huge gap in social policy between the progressive Free Democrats on the one hand and the clearly conservative CDU/CSU on the other (Laver/Hunt 1992: 56). The moderate left-wing so called “red-green” government does not possess such huge ideological differences on the most important policy dimensions, according to recent expert surveys (Laver/Hunt 1992: 56, 197f.; Laver/Benoit 2005). It is therefore of interest whether in the latter case intraparty groups of both coalition partners also have similar positions on key policy dimensions. For the CDU/CSU-FDP cabinet, by contrast, the expectation might be that some intraparty factions exists which try to close the programmatic gap between the coalition party cores. In this case, these factions might help to stabilize a coalition between the Liberals and the Christian Democrats. Such stabilizing intraparty groups, however, do not seem to be necessary in a coalition between the ideological more coherent “red-green” government.

Third, the party constellation changed between the two observed time periods. Between 1987 and 1990, the West-German party system was characterized by two party blocks: SPD and Greens on one side, CDU, CSU and FDP on the other side (Jesse 2001: 73). Only one state-level coalition, the SPD/FDP government in office in Hamburg from 1987 to 1991, was a “mixed” government (Bräuninger/König 1999: 219), i.e. it united parties that belonged to different camps, namely government and opposition, at the federal level (Kropp/Sturm 1998: 118; Jesse 2001: 79). The German unification in 1990 had major implications for each party and the party system as a whole. Eastern Germany developed a fundamentally different party system with three major parties – CDU, SPD and the left-socialist, former communist PDS – and very weak small parties, notably Liberals and Greens (Niedermayer 2001). Therefore – and because of a unique modification of the electoral system for the federal election 1990 – the PDS was present in the Bundestag with a significant share of seats until the elections in 2002. The mere existence of a left-socialist party reduced the chances for attaining a red-green majority at the federal level. As a result, the block-thinking in coalition building vanished. Going back to the state-level, more than five states were governed by mixed governments, mostly coalitions between the two large parties CDU and SPD. Another implication of the demise of communism was the sharply decreasing significance of Neo-Marxist theory inside the SPD and particularly the Greens. The left-fundamentalist wing of the latter party dropped away in 1991 (Poguntke/Schmitt-Beck 1994; Falter/Klein 2003: 62), and the Social Democrats copied the “Third Way” of Tony Blair’s “New Labour Party” for their 1998 electoral campaign (von Alemann 1999: 44; Gallagher/Laver/Mair 2001: 182; Dürr 2002). The question here is whether the party as a whole and intraparty groups of Greens and Social Democrats moved to the center or if there
are intraparty factions, which are still located on the left-wing of the political spectrum and had an impact on portfolio allocation in the first red-green German government 1998. The next section identifies the relevant intraparty factions in both time periods.

_Intraparty Groups of German Parties_

Perhaps the simplest criterion to identify important intraparty factions is their size, e.g. measured as its share of members. Yet, this numerical way can not account for small but influential intraparty groups. Examples for the latter, and also important to our question, are factions consisting of representatives of big and small business. Their share of the population in general and correspondingly their proportion of membership in German catch-all-parties (Kirchheimer 1965) is low according to the social structure in modern Western democracies (Lane/Errson 1999: 19f., 25f.). For this reason we have to use not only quantitative, but also qualitative indicators to identify important factions in German political parties, for example the importance of intraparty groups for collecting contributions and soft money.

Looking at the two major German parties the most important groups according to the membership criterion are the lobbies of employees in CDU/CSU and SPD, respectively. In the case of the Christian Democrats, the “Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft” (CDA; for the CSU: CSA) is the connection between CDU/CSU and labor groups. Ideologically, the CDA draws heavily on the so-called “katholische Soziallehre” (“catholic social-doctrine”; Pappi 1984: 13), and puts emphasis on welfare state issues and traditional values such as the social function of the family. The organized Socialdemocratic counterpart is the “Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Arbeitnehmerfragen” (AfA) which has strong ties to German labor unions. Their policy priority is to expand or at least prevent the retrenchment of the German welfare state. The intraparty opponent of the AfA is the group of Socialdemocratic self-employed (“Arbeitsgemeinschaft Selbstständige in der SPD”, AGS). Since the roots of Socialdemocratic parties are in the organized labor movement, the influence of this group as compared to the impact of the AfA is considered to be low. Laterally reversed to that is the situation in the CDU/CSU. Here the “Mittelstandsvereinigung” (representation of small and middle-sized companies, MIT) is considered to be more influential than the CDA (Poguntke 1994: 200; Ismayr 2000: 108).

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3 We here consider CDU and CSU as one party and hence as one unitary actor at the federal level. Despite the fact that the two are formally independent parties, they form a joint parliamentary group in the Federal Diet since 1949. Furthermore, in the empirical part of this paper we show that they have nearly the same programmatic position in all relevant German policy dimensions.
One specific feature of German politics in the 1970s needs to be mentioned here. At that time, policy-making was characterized by fierce ideological conflicts. Especially the intraparty interest aggregation of the Socialdemocrats was aggravated by the antagonism between more left-wing orientated, mostly younger politicians, for instance today’s Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and moderate, mostly senior Socialdemocrats like the then acting Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The supporters of both camps formed up in more informal circles. These formally non-organized intraparty groups exist until today, and they have a strong influence on the political direction of the party (Ismayr 2000: 110f.). The rightist group is called the “Seeheimer Kreis” (“Seeheim Circle”). The leftist group of the party formed under the name “Frankfurter Kreis” (“Frankfurt Circle”), or “Demokratische Linke 21” (“Democratic Left 21”) since 2000. The more conservative “Seeheimer Kreis” attained key influence during the late 1970s and is now the strongest intraparty supporter of the economic reforms of the red-green government. The “Frankfurter Kreis” was very influential during the long opposition time of the party from 1982 to 1998. We therefore consider these groups as two important intraparty factions of the SPD and include them in our analysis.

Looking at the smaller German parties during in the time period in question, only the PDS has a well-structured party organization with formally existent intraparty groups (Poguntke 2001: 259). Given that the Left-Socialists were not involved in any coalition building process at the national level, we are not going to analyze the programmatic positions of their intraparty factions. More important to our analysis are intraparty factions of Liberals and the Green Party. Both parties have a low and more informal organizational structure. Especially the organization of the FDP looks like one of a “party of notabilities” or an “Elite party” (Poguntke 1994: 201f.; Mair 1997: 97f., 110). German Liberals traditionally are separated into a left-libertarian and a national wing, with the latter focusing more on economic issues (Kirchner/Broughton 1988; Löschke/Walter 1996). The informal conglomereration of the first mentioned group is called the “Freiburg Circle” (FDP-FR). The hardcore economic liberals convene in the working group “Liberal Business Owners” (FDP-MIT). Because of their informal structure, we only could obtain programmatic documents of these groups for the time period from 1998 to 2002. Considering the Green Party, a well structured and detailed party organization comparable to those of other German parties does not exist due to the “grassroots democracy”-approach of the German Greens (Poguntke 2001: 259). However, for the observation period 1998-2002 we use programmatic documents of the Green intraparty “Committee for economic and welfare affairs” (GR-ECO) because senior politicians in this time period belong to the reform-orientated, economically more liberal party...
wing. In the next paragraph, we identify relevant policy dimensions in German party competition and the most salient government offices within the coalition building process.

**Key Policy Dimensions and Government Ministries**

According to seminal cleavage theory (Lipset/Rokkan 1967; see also Lijphart 1999: 79ff.), the German society and party system is structured by two key conflicts. The first and most important one is a result of the industrialization in the late 19th century and is about how much influence the government should have on economic issues. This socio-economic conflict, identified as the key policy dimension in almost all Western Democracies by Anthony Downs (1957) and Kenneth A. Arrow (1964), has established a party conflict in Germany between Social Democrats and Liberals being opposed at the ends of the dimension, and the CDU/CSU as the median player. But how could SPD and FDP build and maintain the long-lasting coalition from 1969 to 1982 given the wide ideological range between both? The simple reason is that on the second key policy dimension reflecting the conflict between progressive and more conservative perspectives about the order of society, Social Democrats and Liberals nearly have the same, progressive position, whereas the more clerical CDU/CSU is at the other end of the dimension (Pappi 1984: 12f.). Following this argument, German parties should try to capture those Government Ministries, where central questions of these conflicts were decided.

Another strategy to identify the most salient policy dimensions is more empirical and relates to the conflict structure in the present. The results of the Laver und Hunt (1992: 105) expert survey on the question which country-specific government portfolios are the most important ones, leads the authors to the conclusion that “if policy is what drives the government formation process, then the salience of key cabinet portfolios will be closely related to the salience of the dimensions over which they have jurisdiction”. Following this argument, the foreign and the economic domain are the two most important policy areas in Germany (Laver/Hunt 1992: 106; Laver/Sheple 1996: 130ff.; Saalfeld 2000: 41ff.; Druckman/Warwick 2005: 39). This, however, partly conflicts with the above findings from the historical-sociological approach.

We therefore take the results of both approaches into account. We consider all three dimensions that structure the German party competition: the economic, the social and the foreign policy dimension. In a second step, we seek to find pairs of dimensions and portfolios, i.e. we search for those portfolios where each conflict dimension is strongest implemented. The identification of the portfolios for the foreign and the social dimension is unproblematic.
We refer to the Foreign Ministry in the first and – once more referring to the Laver und Hunt (1992: 106) expert survey – to the Ministry of the Interior in the latter case. More problematic is the allocation of one portfolio to the socio-economic dimension. The German Cabinet structure allows three possibilities: first, the finance portfolio as used by Laver and Shepsle (1996) for clarification of their model, secondly the economic portfolio, and thirdly the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs. Despite the fact that the Minister of Finance possesses veto power in the budget negotiations (Saalfeld 2000: 66) we refer to the Ministry for Labor and Social Affairs as the key socio-economic portfolio as it is here where the conflict between the different points of view regarding welfare state expansion and market regulation clash. In contrast to this, the economic portfolio lost importance and agenda-setting-power over time (see e.g. the results of a new portfolio ranking conducted by Druckman and Warwick 2005: 39).

We next have a look at the partisan composition of the portfolios under investigation. Considering the research on the “monitoring” function of junior ministers in coalition governments (Thies 2001) we also look at the distribution and intraparty group membership of these so-called “Parlamentarische Staatssekretäre”. The intention for the creation of this positions in 1967 was not only to unburden the respective minister but also to establish a circle of politicians as potential successors for open cabinet posts (Schindler 1999: 1109). Following the monitoring-hypothesis and Thies’ (2001: 592) findings on the importance of intraparty factions during single-party governments in Japan, the same could be the case in Germany. If a ministry is completely controlled by one party and the office-holder is a member of a particular, for example left-wing intraparty group, then some right-wing factions in the same party could try to balance policy in this area by having one of their members nominated as a junior minister. Table 1 shows the distribution of senior and junior ministers in the four key departments for the four government coalitions considered.

***Table 1 about here***

As Table 1 shows, for most departments and governments, senior and junior ministers are from one and only one coalition party. The exceptions are the ministry of justice in the two governments of Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the foreign ministry in the two governments of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. In each of the last mentioned cases, the respective smaller
coalition party holds the position of the senior minister, whilst the junior minister post is assigned to a Social Democrat. Thus, only in two of the cases there is evidence for the “monitoring-hypothesis”. However, keeping in mind the traditional programmatic direction of each coalition party, Thies’ (2001) argument makes some sense. In the 1987 and 1990 cabinet formation, the FDP received the ministry of justice. Because of their more progressive attitudes in social issues, at least one junior minister was a member of the CDU/CSU that had a conservative position on these policy issues. The same pattern becomes apparent in the coalition negotiations between the Social Democrats and the Greens in 1998 and 2002. In the end the Greens received the foreign ministry but – maybe due to their pacifistic and anti-militaristic origins and statements during the 1998 election campaign (Rüdig 2002: 82) – the SPD held one junior minister in each of the two governments (see Saalfeld 2000: 71).

Looking at differences between intraparty factions in the composition in these four ministries and cabinets, there is some evidence for the expectation that intraparty factions of German political parties indeed serve as a corrective, especially in the two cabinets of Chancellor Schröder. The Minister for Labor and Social Affairs in 1998-2002, Walter Riester, was an active member of the AfA faction, which is labor union friendly and welfare state-orientated. By contrast, one of his junior ministers, Gerd Andres, belongs to the economically reform-oriented “Seeheim Circle”. In the Interior and Justice departments, the respective senior minister was not an (active) member of any intraparty faction. However, most of the junior ministers belong to the “Seeheim Circle”. This may hint to the implementation of a more conservative policy in these areas.

In the following section, we apply a new method for estimating (intra)party policy positions (Laver/Benoit/Garry 2003). On this basis, we explore if first the qualitative analysis of programmatic behavior of intraparty factions above matches to what we find in the data. Secondly, we use the same method to analyze the (published) coalition policy agreement and hereby estimate the position of a coalition government. According to Timmermans (1998: 423; see also Müller/Strøm 2000b: 140ff., 147ff.), such contracts between coalition partners do not only have a symbolic and conflict prevention function, their task also is to build a frame of the political agenda for the following years of the election period. Therefore, coalition agreements approximate the intended future policy of the respective government; taking into consideration and balancing the positions of party cores as well as intraparty factions that usually have representatives participating in the coalition negotiations (Timmermans 1998: 419).
This leads us to another point. As Maor (1992; 1995) points out, parties with a decentralized organizational structure are able to handle intraparty conflicts in a better way as strongly centralized parties. The risk of losing members at the ground or the party elite-level is higher for centralized political parties than for parties with a more heterogeneous internal structure (Maor 1995: 66). With respect to our question, Maor’s findings suggest that there exists something like a “strength of weakness” in particular for catch-all-parties enclosing a wide range of social groups. During coalition negotiations, such parties can always remind their potential partner that one or more intraparty groups of them could have problems with the proposed compromise in a specific policy-area. Under certain circumstances, e.g. the potential coalition partner being not in a pivotal position or being highly office-oriented, this yields a strong bargaining potential for the catch-all-party.

Estimating the Policy Positions of German Parties, Intraparty Groups and Coalition Agreements

Though a number of methodologies and studies on concerning the measurement of party positions exist, most of these do not provide information as to what the policy-area specific positions of political parties are. Notably exceptions are recent expert surveys (Laver/Hunt 1992; Laver/Benoit 2005) and the data provided by the “Comparative Manifesto Project” (CMP) that is based on manual content analysis of election manifestos (e.g., Budge et al. 2001). The problem with the first is that expert surveys are usually conducted sporadically; data therefore refer to specific points in time and it is seldom possible to track potential changes in the policy positions of political parties between successive elections. The CMP-data take possible changes in policy priorities of political parties into account. However, being based on salience theory (Robertson 1976; see also Budge 2001: 82) the whole approach has somewhat come under attack (Laver 2001: 70f.).

5 Salience theory is based on the assumption that parties do not formulate positions for or against one issue in their election manifestos. Moreover, it is assumed that first, parties avoid negative formulations, and second, the frequency of mentioning one policy issue tells us something about the position of a party in the respective policy area. However, how often an issue is articulated in a party document reveals something about the importance of the respective policy area, but nothing about the party’s position there. A second problem is how to identify party positions concurrently for different policy areas and separately for each election. The standard Left-Right-dimension included into the dataset, for instance, is based on categories whose assignment as “left” or “right” is questionable. The categories of “Freedom and Human Rights” and “Democracy” are examples in this respect. Furthermore, the structure of the CMP-dataset does not allow for principal component analysis separately for each direction because of the then arising small N, large V-problem (for an alternative methodology based on the transposed data matrix, see Pappi/Shikano 2004).
Even more important, there is, to our knowledge, no dataset that would provide us with information on the positions of both “parties” as unitary actors and their (key) intraparty factions. We therefore use the language blind and non-manual wordscore-method (Laver/Benoit/Garry 2003). The basic idea of the wordscore procedure is to compare the frequency distribution of words in a text, the position of which is known, to the word distribution of a text of the same character whose position is unknown. Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003: 314f.) refer to these two sorts of documents as “reference texts” and “virgin texts”, respectively. In a nutshell, the position of a virgin text changes if the frequency of some “signal” words goes up or down. Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003: 326f.) as well as Gianetti and Laver (2005) use the wordscore technique not only to estimate the position of political parties but also the positions of Irish MPs and cabinet members in Italy. In these studies, “virgin texts” are speeches of the respective politician, while “reference texts” are election manifestos calibrated with expert survey data. In this paper, we use programmatic documents of the respective intraparty groups as virgin texts. The main reason is that the character of both text sorts and hence the set of words used are more similar to each other than the sets of words in election manifestos and speeches of politicians.

Finally, we are also going to estimate the policy-specific position of German coalition agreements with election manifestos as “reference texts”. A regular way to think about the (policy-area specific) “position of a coalition” of actors is to use the arithmetic mean of the position of each participant, sometimes weighted by their share of seats in the parliament (e.g. Cusack 2001). We here refer to the published coalition policy agreement as a more independent source of information. In coalition contracts parties formulate their program for the next years in government considering the actual circumstances in the respective country, whilst parties in order to mobilize their voters have to formulate more radical or opportunistic policy positions in election manifestos. There is another aspect which makes the coalition agreement in Germany useful for this study. In German coalition bargaining processes, the respective parties usually first talk about policies and at last about the allocation of offices to parties and individuals (Ismayr 2000: 200; Saalfeld 2000: 47). Following this, one would expect that cabinet posts – senior and junior ministries – are allocated in a way so that the result of the policy-area specific coalition negotiations is best implemented by the distribution of offices not only to parties but also intraparty groups.
Analysis: Intraparty groups and the coalition policy program

Descriptive Results

Before going on to evaluate the three hypotheses on the allocation of portfolios to intraparty factions, we have a look at the descriptive results. Where are German political parties, their intraparty factions and coalition agreements located on key policy dimensions? Figures 4 and 5 show these positions on the economic, foreign and social dimension during the time periods from 1987 to 1990 and 1998 to 2002 (for the detailed data, see appendix A and B).  

***Figures 4 and 5 about here***

The figures reveal that the programmatic positions of German political parties are – with few exceptions – relatively stable over time. The position of the Greens on economic issues in 2002 clearly has changed from their more left position four years before. In the same time period, the SPD formulated a clearly more progressive position in their 2002 election manifesto than in their 1998 program. It seems that the “New Labour” and “Third Way”-imitation of German Social Democrats in 1998 was more concentrated on social then on economic issues, according to their more left wing position in the latter policy in their election manifesto 1998. All other parties are placed where they should be according to the qualitative literature: the liberal FDP is the economically right-wing party during both time periods, whilst they have a progressive position on social issues. The CDU/CSU, by contrast, formulated a moderate right-wing position in economic issues. In questions on social policy, the CDU/CSU is the right-wing party. In the 1990 election the Bavarian CSU drafted a separate manifesto in addition to a joint one with the CDU. As Figure 4 shows, CSU and CDU/CSU had almost the same programmatic position on any policy dimension. So it indeed makes sense to analyze both parties as an unitary actor. The left-socialistic PDS is the left-wing party on economic and, together with the Greens, on social issues. Furthermore the PDS is the only major outlier on the foreign policy dimension. In 1998 and 2002 the PDS stood against a German participation in European security and peacekeeping missions.

6 We assign expert survey results of 2003 (Laver/Benoit 2005) to the German election manifestos for 2002. In contrast to Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003: 325f.), we use manifestos of the 1987 election as “reference texts”, because the Laver and Hunt expert survey was conducted in the first half of 1989 (1992: 36) and can not account for the circumstances around the German unification process, which had an enormous impact on the 1990 election and hence for the then formulated election manifestos.

7 With the exception of the 1990 election where no reference text and hence no reference score for the party is available.
(Laver/Benoit 2005), whilst in 1990, the former Communists as well as the Greens favored closer relations to the Soviet Union (Laver/Hunt 1992: 197). In the latter mentioned policy area, all other parties are located close to each other. But there are interesting variances in the positioning of the parties, particularly in the last time period observed here. In 2002, the Greens favored a German participation in military peace keeping mission just as the SPD did. In previous time periods when they were in opposition, the pacifistic-orientated Green Party formulated a more ambivalent position on this question in their election manifesto.

Considering the position of intraparty groups, the range the parties cover on each dimension widens: as can be seen from Figures 4 and 5, there is a large differentiation in the economic and social policy area, whilst intraparty groups do not differ that much from the positions of their party cores on foreign policy issues. The reason for this is simply that nearly all intraparty factions are primarily orientated on economic and, partly, on social issues. In the 11th election period from 1987 to 1990, where we could obtain intraparty documents of CDU and SPD only, the “Frankfurt Circle” (FK) receives the most left-wing position on each dimension whereas the position of the AGS, the social democratic self-employed, marks the right wing of the intraparty organizations in the SPD. In contrast to the expectations above, there is no huge difference between the position of the “Seeheim Circle” and the SPD-employee organization “AfA”. In case of CDU/CSU, the position of their employee-organization CDA reaches deeply into areas on the policy dimensions covered by SPD-organizations. In contrast to the Social Democrats, no intraparty group but the party core of the CDU/CSU determines the right border of their intraparty political spectrum. Only in 1987 the small business association MIT, marked the right end on the economic policy dimension. In the other cases, the position of the MIT was nearby the CDU/CSU position, so one could argue, in accordance with descriptive studies (Ismayr 2000: 108), that this group has the most influence in the CDU/CSU as a whole.

The most striking findings become evident when looking at the estimated positions of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in 1987 and 1990. In the economic policy area, despite the right-wing position of both coalition parties, the coalition agreement is located in the center of the dimension. Once the position of intraparty groups are taken into account, the coalition agreement is located inside the range of the programmatic positions of the coalition parties and their factions. The foreign policy dimension shows the same picture. Only in social policy, where the FDP as the smaller coalition partner has a progressive position, the coalition agreement is located near one of the coalition party cores. But once more, the CDA is also the left-wing policy player on this dimension. In sum, when interpreting the programmatic
position of the coalition agreements of 1987 and 1990, it seems that intraparty groups have to be a part of any explanation.

Figure 5 shows positions for 1998 and 2002. Broadly speaking, there are no major changes in the positions of SPD- and CDU/CSU-intraparty factions between the 11th and the 14th election period. In economic policy, the “Democratic Left 21” (DL21), the successor group of the “Frankfurt Circle”, maintains its left-wing position but now alongside with the PDS. Surprisingly, there is no change in the distance between the “Seeheim circle” and the “AfA”. Both social democratic intraparty groups have almost the same programmatic position on all three policy dimensions. There are some changes in the programmatic behavior of intraparty factions of CDU/CSU. Whereas CDA and their Bavarian counterpart CSA slightly drifted to the right in economic questions, the new position of the CDU/CSU business-association is due to the position of the Liberals. On social issues, the ideal point of CDU/CSU is located to the right of all Christian Democratic intraparty groups. Only the position of the CSA comes close to the location of the CDU/CSU-election manifestos in 1998 and 2002. For the latter period, we are also able to estimate the positions of intraparty factions of FDP and Green Party. As Figure 5 shows, the more left-libertarian “Freiburg Circle” (FDP-FR) has almost the same position as the Greens or the left-wing of the Social Democrats in social and foreign policy, whereas the “Freiburg-Circle” has a much more moderate orientation in economic issues. The programmatic position of the liberal self-employed (FDP-MIT) form up the right border in the economic dimension, whereas this faction has a more conservative position in social policy. In questions on foreign affairs, FDP-MIT together with the business-circle in the CDU/CSU is the group that is most favourable about German participation on military peacekeeping missions. The single intraparty faction of the Greens (GR-ECO) indeed holds a more moderate position on all three dimensions than the Green party as a unitary actor.

Hence, the moderate position of the Green party and of most intraparty factions in the SPD should enable the red-green coalition government to formulate reform-orientated, moderate positions in the coalition agreement, especially in economic terms. But taking the policy-area specific position of the coalition contract into account, the economic policy agreement between SPD and Greens is leaning more towards the position of the left than to the more moderate groups. Despite the fact that in 2002, the positions of SPD and Greens moved to the center in economic affairs, the policy agreement almost remained at its 1998 position. In social and foreign policy, however, the coalition position moved in the same direction both coalition parties have moved. There are two possible explanations for this.
First, Social Democrats could fear about losing traditional voters when implementing a radical economic reform concept. Secondly, they try to bring members of those intraparty factions into office, which implement the policy formulated in the coalition agreement. Whilst we are not able to test these competing explanations, we are going to evaluate the latter in the remainder of this paper.

**Evaluation of Hypotheses**

Our main concern in this paper is the role of party factions in the allocation of portfolios. We assume that individual senior politicians belonging to party factions rather than the party core have preferences that deviate from that of the party core. Then, if ministers do have considerable discretion once they are in office – that is to say, they are not only difficult to control by the parliamentary coalition or cabinet members of the coalition partner but also by their own party core – the appointment of party faction members results in (forecasts of) coalition policy outcomes that are different from those the appointment of core party members would produce. Hence the strategic allocation of portfolios to party faction members can secure policy outcomes or even allow for party coalitions that would not have been possible otherwise.

Whilst a test of the second question is beyond the scope of this study, we can address the first one: Is the non-unitary party cabinet (a set of ministers belonging to party factions) closer to the “intended” coalition policy outcome than the unitary party cabinet (the same set of ministers belonging to parties as unitary actors)? This necessitates specifying what the “intended” coalition policy outcome is or was.\(^8\) In the theoretical part of this paper we considered three straightforward options from which we derived three hypotheses. We first assumed that coalition parties prefer outcomes close the Pareto surface to outcomes that are more distant to the Pareto surface. Second, we considered the (weighted) center of the Pareto surface as a likely outcome of the coalition policy bargaining and therefore as the “intended” coalition policy. Thirdly, we use the observed coalition policy program as a proxy for what the coalition intends to do in the succeeding legislative term. The expectation with all three scenarios is that the appointment of party faction members allows to get closer to the intended outcomes.

\(^8\) Note that the “intended” policy outcome in the Laver/Shepsle (1996) model is endogenous: when making governments parties select portfolio allocations or policy outcomes from a finite set a feasible ones (those in the so-called winset of the status quo). In our model, government formation is not to be explained, and in the absence of a status quo policy any given coalition can select any policy as the “intended” coalition policy program. The question then becomes how to make the implementation of (most of) this program possible.
Table 2 shows the results. The columns list Euclidean distances between cabinets and alternative intended policy outcomes in the three-dimensional policy space of economic, social and foreign policy. For senior ministers, the position of the cabinet is straightforward. It is the combined position of the minister of labor on the economic dimension, the positions of the ministers for interior and foreign affairs on the social and the foreign policy dimension, respectively. Accordingly, the positions of the junior ministers are used for the “junior minister cabinet”; if there is more than one junior minister in a department the average of their positions is used. Two things are apparent from the table. First, there is absolutely no evidence for the “Pareto improvement” hypothesis suggesting that either actors have no intention to get closer to the Pareto surface, or party factions do not play a role in the strategic calculations of minister appointments. The same applies to the “unweighted bargaining” scenario. Second, there is considerable evidence for the “weighted bargaining” hypothesis and even more so for the “coalition contract” hypothesis. Under both assumptions, the party faction cabinets are closer to the intended outcome than the unitary actor cabinets. This holds for five, respectively six of the eight senior and junior minister cabinets in the time period under consideration.

Conclusion

The results of the empirical analysis are mixed and somewhat uncomforting. First, looking at parties as unitary actors, the German case study does provide support for the Laver/Shepsle (1996) standard portfolio allocation approach. We find no evidence that junior ministers are placed on the side of senior ministers in order to serve as watchdogs (Thies 2001) who either control the execution of the coalition contract or balance the partisan policy-making of the senior minister. By contrast, most junior ministers are from the same party or even party faction as the senior minister is.

Second, we find that considering intraparty politics in studying portfolio allocation and coalition bargaining is worthwhile. The empirical results suggest that the appointment of individual ministers who belong to party factions is used to secure the enforcement of the coalition contract or, at least, make such an enforcement more likely or make deviations from

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9 Or, the assumption of ministerial discretion is unjustified. This, however, is a last resort objection to our analysis as the model is based on the ministerial discretion assumption.
the contract less severe. This holds for both senior and junior ministers. By contrast, there is no evidence that the allocation of portfolios to members of party factions is used to get outcomes that are simply more efficient from the (unitary) coalition parties’ point of view. The expected outcomes under portfolio allocation with intraparty factions are, as compared to the standard allocation, neither closer to the contract curve of the unitary parties, nor are they closer to a fictitious and efficient bargaining outcome on the contract curve.

These results, however, are unsatisfying and disturbing. With respect to our German case study, we find that intraparty groups of major German parties are largely organized along the socio-economic conflict which is the most important cleavage in the German party system. This is reflected in both the (nominal) labeling and self-reference of those groups, and the ideal positions of these factions in the multi-dimensional policy space. Accordingly, we expect intraparty politics to be most relevant for the appointment of the (junior) Minister of Economy. While this is in line with our expectation and a noteworthy insight in the Germany party system, it is also a misfortune for the empirical analysis as it reduced the number of cases on which we could “test” our hypothesis (which is already low in the case study design we provide).

At the theoretical level, we end with more questions raised than answered. Assuming ministerial discretion we find that intraparty factions might be relevant when it comes to the explanation of portfolio allocations. But in our model, ministers (are supposed to) execute a negotiated coalition contract, while the content or spatial location of that contract is far from being obvious. In many cases it is neither on (or close to) the contract curve of the coalition parties as unitary actors. It is, however, almost always in the (uni-dimensional) range of the positions of governmental actors when we consider both party cores and their factions as key actors in the coalition bargaining process. As we have no theory at hand that could plausibly explain how these contracts come about (and also because of the small number of cases in our approach) in such situations, we had to measure and enter the contract into the analysis as an exogenous variable. This is a misery that calls for further studies into the conditions of coalition bargaining with intraparty factions (see, however, Luebbert 1986; Bäck 2004).

Finally, with respect to the often emerging and – after the last state elections – current discussion about building of a so called “great coalition” between Christian and Social Democrats in Germany, our findings suggest that such a coalition would not be able to implement major reforms in the socioeconomic policy area. Despite the fact that such a coalition would have a broad majority in the lower and the upper chamber and therefore could implement their policy views a lot easier than under the existence of a large opposition party
as a veto player (König 2001, Tsebelis 2002: 145), the ideological positions of intraparty factions in both German catch-all parties would not easily allow for major economic and welfare policy reforms. The reason is that both large parties in Germany have strong economically left-orientated intraparty wings which, as the analysis above suggests, can not be ignored in the formulation of the coalition agreement. This supports the “strength of weakness” conjecture which follows from Maor’s (1995) findings. Finally, one might speculate whether not only the “cooperative federalism” of the German political system but also the programmatic positions and strength of intraparty groups in German catch-all parties is one of the reasons which hinder economic reforms in Germany.

References


Sources

CDU/CSU


SPD


**FDP**


**Greens**


**PDS**


**Coalition Agreements**


Figure 1: Predicted distance of unitary and non-unitary party cabinets to the Pareto surface

Figure 2: Predicted distance of unitary and non-unitary party cabinets to a fictitious bargaining outcome
Figure 3: Predicted distance of unitary and non-unitary party cabinets to an observed coalition contract
Table 1: Senior and Junior Ministers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term/Government</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Junior Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Genscher, FDP</td>
<td>Adam-Schwaetzer, FDP; Schäfer, FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Zimmermann, CSU</td>
<td>Waffenschmidt, CDU; Spranger, CSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994 (CDU/CSU-FDP)</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Blüm, CDU-CDA</td>
<td>Günther, CDU; Seehofer, CSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Genscher, FDP</td>
<td>Adam-Schwaetzer, FDP; Schäfer, FDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Schäuble, CDU</td>
<td>Waffenschmidt, CDU; Lintner, CSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002 (SPD/Greens)</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>Riester, SPD-Afa</td>
<td>Andres, SPD-Seeheim; Mascher, SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>Fischer, Grüne</td>
<td>Verheugen, SPD; Volmer, Grüne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>Schily, SPD</td>
<td>Körper, SPD-Seeheim; Sonntag-Wohlgast, SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002- (SPD/Greens)</td>
<td>Labor/Economy</td>
<td>Clement, SPD</td>
<td>Andres, SPD-Seeheim; Schlauch, Grüne</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Foreign</td>
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<td>Staffelt, SPD-Seeheim</td>
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<td>Interior</td>
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<td>Bury, SPD; Müller, Grüne</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Körper, SPD-Seeheim; Vogt, SPD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Short biographies in the official Bundestag handbook (Kürschners Volkshandbuch 1987, 1991, 1999, 2003); official websites of intraparty groups (http://www.parlamentarische-linke.de/, http://www.seeheimer-kreis.de/organisation/leitungskreis, http://www.kas.de/archiv/acdp/832_webseite.html). A senior or junior minister is coded as a party faction member if he or she explicitly mentions the faction in a short biography or is mentioned as a active member of the respective intraparty group.

Table 2: Distance of unitary and faction party cabinets to coalition policy agreement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unitary</th>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Unitary</th>
<th>Faction</th>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1 (Pareto surface)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>not in favor</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>8.81</td>
<td>not in favor</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>5.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>not in favor</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>(not in favor)</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 (Unweighted bargaining)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>not in favor</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>7.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>not in favor</td>
<td>4.22</td>
<td>6.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td>9.16</td>
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<td>8.13</td>
<td>4.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>(not in favor)</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>2.09</td>
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<tr>
<td>H3 (Weighted bargaining)</td>
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<td>9.60</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>in favor</td>
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<td>7.50</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>9.85</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td>in favor</td>
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<td>7.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>10.63</td>
<td>12.21</td>
<td>not in favor</td>
<td>9.88</td>
<td>8.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>7.05</td>
<td>(not in favor)</td>
<td>7.16</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4 (Coalition contract)</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>6.95</td>
<td>in favor</td>
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<td>6.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>9.74</td>
<td>8.31</td>
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<td>6.43</td>
<td>in favor</td>
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<td>1.90</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>(not in favor)</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4: Position of German Political Parties, Intraparty Factions and Coalition Governments, 1987-1990

Economic Policy

Foreign Policy: Pro friendly relations with USSR vs. anti

Social Policy

1990

1987
Figure 5: Position of German Political Parties, Intraparty Factions and Coalition Governments, 1998-2002

Economic Policy

Foreign Policy: In favour of involvement in European security and peacekeeping missions vs. opposes any involvement

Social Policy
## Appendix A: Positions of German political parties, intraparty factions and coalition agreements, 1987-90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Intraparty fraction/Coalition Agreement</th>
<th>Economic Policy</th>
<th>Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Social Policy</th>
<th>Total scored words</th>
<th>Total words</th>
<th>Share of scored words (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reference or transformed score</td>
<td>95% lower Confidence Interval</td>
<td>95% upper Confidence Interval</td>
<td>Reference or transformed score</td>
<td>95% lower Confidence Interval</td>
<td>95% upper Confidence Interval</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD 1987</td>
<td>6.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP 1987</td>
<td>15.68</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grüne 1987</td>
<td>5.21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU 1990</td>
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<td>16.93</td>
<td>10.84</td>
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<td>SPD 1990</td>
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<td>5.63</td>
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<td>5.87</td>
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<td>FDP 1990</td>
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<td>16.59</td>
<td>17.84</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>7.34</td>
<td>7.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grüne 1990</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
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<td>2.01</td>
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<td>PDS 1990</td>
<td>7.93</td>
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## Appendix B: Positions of German political parties, intraparty factions and coalition agreements, 1998-2002

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