CIVIC COMMUNITIES IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

Ethnic networks in Amsterdam

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1. Introduction.

A large part of social life within a community takes place through organizations. People meet in sporting clubs, religious organizations, social-cultural organizations etc. These organizations shape the way in which people live together within the community and, by doing so, partially determine the communities' structure. With regard to the different ethnic groups in The Netherlands, community structure bears significance as to the way in which these ethnic groups relate to Dutch society. For instance, an inward-looking ethnic community will stand at a greater distance from the rest of society than an outward-looking community which, apart from being internally organized, maintains many relations with non-ethnic organizations. In the latter case the ethnic community is well-integrated into (Dutch) society.

Ethnic organizations and the relations between them can be studied from various theoretical perspectives. Here we want to name two, the community power perspective and the civic community perspective. These perspectives may overlap, but emphasize different theoretical concepts. Since the focus of this paper is on Amsterdam, we want to take as an example of the community power approach a study of Jaco Berveling. In 1994, Berveling published a study in which he demonstrated that networks among key actors in the Amsterdam political arena had a self standing impact on the outcomes of decisions that were made by the City Council in the field of urban development and that of minority policy.

Berveling included different sorts of political actors, such as the major and his aldermen, the political parties represented in the City Council, provincial and national planning agencies, business organizations, the municipal Coordination Bureau of Minority Policy, but also ethnic organizations and other community groups. The research design was based on a two-stage model of policy making developed by Stokman and Bos (1992) and inspired by the work of Coleman (1972) and Laumann and Knoke (1986). It is, from a methodological vantage point, an important elaboration of the famous community power study by Dahl and associates Who Governs? (Dahl, 1961). Like Dahl, Berveling took the policy outcomes as dependent variables and the resources of the different actors as independent variables. Yet, contrary to Dahl, Berveling assumed that social networks create a power base of its own which should be taking into account when measuring an actor’s political resources. The network perspective was thus included in Berveling's research design. In his causal model actors' political resources are not restricted to the size of their rank and file, the financial resources they command or the access.
to mass media. Their position in the communication network of the main political actors adds to their political resources and therefore the outcome of community controversies are related to the structure of ties among actors that are interested in the outcomes of collective decision making.

A second theoretical approach to (the networks of) ethnic organizations is the civic community approach, where the emphasize is not on political power but on the working of democracy. Networks of ethnic organizations not only contribute to the political power of the ethnic community, they may also contribute to the civic culture of the community. Alexis de Tocqueville has suggested a connection between civic organization at the local level and the functioning of a democratic system. According to Tocqueville in 1830 the Americans had “carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of common desires” (Tocqueville, quoted in Putnam, 1993:89). The study of Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work*, has demonstrated how important the civic culture is for the working of democracy. In his study of the regional councils in Italy, Putnam has shown that civic culture explains large part of the different performance among the Italian regions. Rather than socio-economic development – as is often assumed - it is the civic culture that seems to be responsible for a high performance of regional democracy in Italy. A balanced mix of vertical and horizontal social relations, according to Putnam, characterizes civic society. The non-civic society lacks the horizontal linkages with the result that the political process depends solely on vertical social relations. In the non-civic society patron-client relations predominate, there is a generalized lack of trust among citizens and performance of regional government is lagging behind. Putnam has measured civic society by the density of the local cultural and recreational associations, by newspaper circulation, by the referendum turnout and by preference voting. These different measurements have a high interrelation and thus form a robust ‘civic community index’: “When two citizens meet on the street in a civic region, both of them are likely to have seen a newspaper at home that day; when two people in a less civic region meet, probably neither of them has. More than half of the citizens in the civic regions have never cast a preference ballot in their lives; more than half of the voters in the less civic regions say they always have. Membership in sports clubs, cultural and recreational groups, community and social action organizations, educational and youth groups, and so on is roughly twice as common in the most civic regions as in the least civic regions.” (Putnam, 1993: 97-98). It is

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1But also, of course, in other countries.
our contention that what is true for a monocultural society, may also be true for a multicultural society. The civic culture of ethnic minorities will most likely contribute to the working of democracy in a multicultural democracy.

In this paper we want to elaborate on the civic community perspective. Our main focus is on ethnic organizations in Amsterdam and the networks between them. Additionally, we will also report data on the turn-out at local elections. We assume that the more interlocks between organizations of a specific ethnic community and the higher their turn-out at municipal elections, the higher the civic culture of that community (see below). However, since our focus, compared to Putnam, shifts from a monocultural society to a multicultural society, an additional concept needs to be introduced into the analysis. This is the concept of integration.

We already mentioned the distinction between an inward-looking ethnic community and an outward-looking community. There may be a densely interlocked network of ethnic organizations, but these organizations may, at the same time, be focused solely on the own ethnic community and in this sense be not integrated in (Dutch) society. It may also be that ethnic communities have few contacts with non-ethnic organizations – and thus are poorly integrated - but have many interlocks amongst themselves. In the latter case, the ethnic groups are not well integrated and yet they are not isolated communities because they interlock with other ethnic communities. In such instances we may speak of a migrant community made up of different ethnic groups. In such instance, the political cleavages that are likely to develop will not be ethnic, but will be racialized (See Cadat and Fennema, 1998). Furthermore, the number of ethnic organizations, their filling (how many people do they represent) and the interlocks between them may contribute to the civic culture of the ethnic community, but this mobilization potential will also depend on the ideological consensus within the ethnic community. In many instances, like in the Turkish or Surinamese community, there seems to be a lack of ideological consensus. Some parts of the Surinamese community are organized along political lines, other cleavages are religious-based, while internal ethnic strife between Hindustan and Creole groups hamper the collaboration within the Surinamese community. Within the Turkish community there is a strong antagonism between the Kurdish organizations and the Turkish nationalist groups, between the revolutionary left and the extreme right. The Ghanese network seems to be fragmented along lines of personal rivalries and denominational sectarianism. These internal cleavages alone make it unrealistic to talk
about ethnic communities in terms of ‘quasi-pillars’ and to assume that any single ethnic organization or even a network of organizations can legitimately represent the ethnic community. There need not to be a linear relation between the number of ethnic organizations, their size and interconnection, and the civic culture of the (ethnic) community. And yet, a densely connected network will, other things being equal, more contribute to the civic culture of that ethnic community than a weakly connected and thin network of organizations\(^2\).

If we, rather empirically, focus on the network perspective we thus can distinguish civic community (in operational terms densely interlocked networks between ethnic organizations) and integration (interlocked networks between ethnic and non-ethnic organizations). This is summarized in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic community (internal network of ethnic organizations)</th>
<th>Integration (external network of ethnic organizations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Densely interlocked</td>
<td>Integrated and civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakly interlocked</td>
<td>Isolated and civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Densely interlocked</td>
<td>Integrated and non-civic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weakly interlocked</td>
<td>Isolated and non-civic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this paper we will not focus on the degree of integration in Dutch society. The emphasis will be on the row of table 1, that is, the degree of civic culture of Amsterdam ethnic communities. Section 2 discusses the networks of ethnic organizations in Amsterdam. We will present data on the number of ethnic organizations and the structure of the network of

\(^2\)Note that in case of the Turkish community in the Netherlands at the national level a network seems to develop in which even the Kurdish and extreme nationalist segments of the community are indirectly linked to each other (refer to Van Heelsum and Tillie, forthcoming).
these organizations. In section 3 we will present additional data on the civic culture of these communities, that is, their turn-out at municipal elections. In section 4 we will develop hypotheses which try to explain the degree of civic culture focusing on the municipal policies towards ethnic organizations in Amsterdam.

2. Civic community: the inter-organizational structure of ethnic communities in Amsterdam.

Ethnic organizations can be studied as such (intra-organizational analysis), but also in connection with each other (inter-organizational analysis). By way of inter-organizational network analysis it is possible to develop an insight into the relations between ethnic organizations. How many and which organizations maintain relations with each other? Which organizations are central in the network of organizations? Is the network as a whole completely connected, or does it fall apart in different components (‘subsets’ of connected networks)? Are many organizations isolated from the network of ethnic organizations?

Connections among organizations can be founded on different types of interaction (sharing the same address, maintaining financial relations, informal contacts, or board-interlocks). Each type of interaction may give rise to a relatively stable structure of organizational linkages. The social significance of these organizational linkages can be interpreted best by combining information from different interaction networks. This is, however, extremely complicated. Even within the same interaction network interlocks between organizations may have very distinct meaning. A joint address may stem from the fact that the two (or more) organizations are intimately related. It may, however, also be the case that the joint address is caused by the municipal policy of granting ethnic organizations a location in the same publicly owned building. In the latter case, the joint address is not at all indicative for a strong tie between organizations even though their joint address will facilitate the communication between them and eventually might even create a common interest. A financial tie may lead to cooperation between the two organizations or to control of one organization by the other. And yet, although the social significance of financial dependence seems rather clear-cut, even the interpretation of financial relations is not always easy. If an organization owes a bank half a million dollar the organization may be in trouble, but if that same organization owes the same bank half a billion dollar then the bank may be in trouble.
Even more difficult to interpret are informal contacts partly because we often do not have systematic knowledge about their content.

In this paper we will not investigate the joint address network, nor the financial network or the network of informal contacts among ethnic organizations. We will only analyze the *interlocking directorates*, that is, the ties between organizations that are formed by a director who has a position in more than one ethnic organization A, B, C, D etc. This means that we will consider persons as links between organizations. These interlocking directors span groups of connected organizations (components) of which the network density can be calculated. In each components we furthermore can calculate the centrality and betweenness of the organizations involved (Wasserman and Faust, 1995). Centrality is defined here as local centrality: the number of adjacent ethnic organizations is seen as a centrality index. Betweenness is defined as the number of time an organization is a node on the shortest path between two other organizations in the component. Thus, we can analyze specific network characteristics of the ethnic communities as well as the structural position of some key organizations within that network. In other words, the network can be analyzed both at the system level and at the actor level.

Interlocking directorates will primarily be interpreted as channels of communication and coordination rather that as channels of domination and control. We assume the ethnic organizations to have very little potential for direct positive or negative sanctions since they do not, as the local authorities do, distribute scarce resources that are unavailable from alternative suppliers. This assumption is based on the fact that most ethnic organizations are not, by themselves, able to mobilize large amounts of financial resources. This may, in some cases, be an unwarranted assumption because some organization may be able to raise substantial amounts of money from their members or clientele. This can be the case with highly ideological organizations. It is often said that the Kurdish PKK is able to raise substantial amounts of money, sometimes even by extortion (‘revolutionary taxes’). Religious organizations are sometimes able to raise substantial sums of money from their congregation. Our assumption about the financial strength of the voluntary organizations may therefore not hold true for some revolutionary and religious organizations in the network, especially if they are internationally organized.

In general, however, we assume that ethnic non-profit organizations do not raise huge amounts of money. We also assume that few financial resources are channeled from outside to the ethnic community organizations. This assumption is also questioned. By, for example,
Braam and Ülger (1997) who suggest that political organizations in Turkey give logistic and ideological support to some Turkish organizations in The Netherlands. Bovenkerk and Yesilgöz (1998) suggest that drugs organizations play a central role in the organization of the Turkish community in the Netherlands. So far, however, little evidence has been produced as to the direct links between Turkish political organizations and the Turkish community in The Netherlands, while the role of organized crime is still unclear. In future we plan to extend our network analysis to this area.

As a first step of our study of the civic culture of ethnic communities in Amsterdam, table 2 reports the number of organizations in relation to the size of the various ethnic communities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Number of persons</th>
<th>Number of voluntary organizations</th>
<th>Number of persons divided by number of organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghanese</td>
<td>7313</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>10619</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>30852</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>49000</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>70093</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chines (including Hong Kong)</td>
<td>4797</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Dutch]</td>
<td>409638</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: The migrants from the Dutch Indies and (later) Indonesia are not selected because they do not fall under the minority policies of the (local) government. The number of organizations have been collected by our IMES research group *Migrant Networks in Amsterdam: Information and Mobilisation* (Tillie and Fennema, 1997; Alink et al. 1998; Berger et al., 1998a, Berger et al. 1998b)

The Ghanese community has the highest number of organizations per person (refer to the last column of table 2, the lower this number the more organizations per person). Per 118 Ghanese inhabitants there is one organization. In the Surinamese community, on the other hand, there is one organization per 770 inhabitants. In how far this difference is explained by the size of
the ethnic community remains to be seen. At first sight, there seems to be an inverse relation between size of the ethnic group and the number of ethnic organizations. This rank-correlation, however, is not perfect. The number of Moroccan and Turkish organizations is higher than the number of Surinamese organizations, whereas the number of Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam is nearly half. As we will see below this organizational strength of the Moroccan and Turkish community becomes even more impressive if we also look at the interlocks between the organizations. Yet this is not the whole story. We do not know whether these organizations have many members or just a few. In other words, the filling of these organizations is an additional measure of civic organization (which, however, will not be studied in this paper).

As already mentioned, not only the number of associations but also the interlocks among these organizations increase the communication (and mobilization potential) of the ethnic communities, thus adding to its civic organization. In the remainder of this paper we will focus on the organization of ethnic associations, thus providing some insight in the structure of civic organization. Again, in the interpretation of our data, we will keep in mind the theoretical framework of Tocqueville and Putnam and assume that the amount of horizontal linkages will contribute most to the civil society of these ethnic communities.

We will first present the main data on organizations and interlocks in table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Total number of organizations</th>
<th>Number of organizations in network analysis (% of total number)</th>
<th>No. of isolated organizations (% of network number)</th>
<th>No. of connected organizations (network number minus isolated number)</th>
<th>No. of components (% of connected organizations)</th>
<th>No. of organizations in largest component</th>
<th>No. Of interlocks in total network (% of network number)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>89 (84%)</td>
<td>41 (46%)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>8 (17%)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>62 (70%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>82 (77%)</td>
<td>32 (39)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11 (22)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45 (55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>70 (77)</td>
<td>50 (71)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7 (35)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12 (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanese</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>52 (84)</td>
<td>38 (73)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5 (36)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35 (81)</td>
<td>28 (80)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 (29)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5 (14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 gives a very rough indication of the structure of community organization. Of the 106 Turkish organizations which we found through various sources, 89 were inscribed in the Chamber of Commerce which enabled us to get information on the board of administration.
(84% of the total number of organizations). The similar number for the other ethnic groups are 77% (Moroccan); 77% (Surinamese); 84% (Ghanese) and 81% (Antillean). This lack of information is of course partly due to inadequacies in our research. Yet it is also an expression of the stability and visibility of the organizations themselves. Thus the percentage of organizations we had to drop because the members of the board of administration could not be found is in itself a indicator of organizational robustness. On this indicator the Turkish community scored best while the Moroccan and Surinamese community scored lowest.

The other indicators of civic culture we use here are (1) the number of isolated organizations relative to the total number of organizations in the network-analysis (the larger the number of isolated organizations, the less civic culture); (2) the number of components relative to the number of connected organizations (the smaller the number of components the more civic culture); (3) the number of organizations in the largest component (the larger this number, the more civic culture) and, finally, (4) the number of interlocks relative to the number of organizations in the network (the larger this number the more civic culture).

With respect to (1) Moroccans score the highest, followed by the Turks. The Antillean community has relatively the largest number of isolated organizations. With respect to (2) the ‘order’ is Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans, Surinamese and Ghanese. With respect to the number of organizations in the largest component (3), Turks show the largest degree of civic culture; Surinamese and Ghanese the lowest. Finally, with respect to the number of interlocks, again the Turks show the largest number, followed by the Moroccan community. The Antillean community shows the smallest number of interlocking directorates.

Following this rather general discussion of civic community in ethnic Amsterdam, we will present a more detailed analysis of the networks in the various ethnic communities.

**Turkish organizations in Amsterdam**

As could be seen in table 2 and 3, Amsterdam numbers about 106 Turkish organizations of which in only 89 cases it was possible to trace the board members (see: Tillie and Fennema, 1997). Of these 89 organizations 41 are not connected with any other Turkish organization through an interlocking directorate. The 48 connected organizations form 8 different components. The largest component, made up of 29 organizations, is displayed in figure 1.
Figure 1-The largest component of Turkish organizations in Amsterdam (29 organizations)

Organizations:
Soyad
F.C. Türkiyem Spor
Yılmaz
Ulu Camii/Grote Moskee
Turkse Raad Nederland
Turkse Humanitaire Hulp Nederland
Turkse Federatie Nederland
Turks Volkshuis Osdorp
Tükmem
TISBO
TINOS
THW
TDM
TDJV
STNO
STISCCAN
SICA
Onderzoekscentrum Iraaks-Turkmeense Cultuur
Nederlands-Turks Academisch Genootschap
HTDB
Hilal
Haci Bayram Osdorp ISN
Fatih moskee ISN
Elif
DIDF/DVA
ATS
Amsterdams Turkse Jongeren Vereniging (ATJV)
Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders
Alternatief
A little over half the nodes in the component (16 organizations marked with a *) consist of religious organizations (a mosque or an organization connected to a mosque). The remaining organizations are five 'general' ones (Turkse Raad Nederland, THW, TDM, HTDB and DIDF/DVA); one sporting club (F.C. Türkiyem Spor); two business organizations (TINOS and STNO); two youth organizations (ATJV, Alternatif) and two academic organizations (Research center Iraqi-Turkmenian Culture, Dutch-Turkish Academic Society). Furthermore, the Amsterdam Centrum Buitenlanders (a heavily subsidized facilitation organization) appears to be integrated into this component as well. We consider this component as Islamic/social-cultural. The component consists of four interconnected cliques. The first clique is grouped around Hilal (religious, extreme nationalist), the second clique around the TDM (the Turkish advisory council, established by the municipality), the third clique around TINOS (goal: the orientation of Turks toward the agricultural sector), the fourth cluster around the Turkse Raad Nederland -the Turkish Council of The Netherlands- (extreme nationalist). Regarding the connectivity of the network, especially the cutpoints are of interest. These are: ATS and Soyad (cutpoints between the Hilal - and the TDM clique); Fitah and STNO (cutpoints

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3If a cutpoint is removed the network falls apart in two or more components or isolated points.
between the TINOS cluster and the TDM cluster) and the Dutch Turkish Academic Society (cutpoint between TDM cluster and the Turkish Council of The Netherlands cluster).

We measure global centrality of the organization by mean distance to all other organizations in the component. In terms of mean distance the TDM (mean distance 2.21), Soyad (2.54), Fatih (2.89) and ATS (2.93) are the most central organizations. For TDM local and global centrality overlap, but for Soyad, Fatih and ATS this is not the case. All three of them are cutpoints in the component.

Moroccan, Surinamese, Antillean and Ghanese organisations

Along similar lines we can analyze the other ethnic communities. In general one can say that the Moroccan community is relatively well organized. Its biggest component is visualized in Figure 2

**Figure 2 - The largest component of Moroccan organizations in Amsterdam (18 organizations)**

*Organizations:*

Stichting Nasser (Nasser)
Sociaal-Kultureel Centrum voor Marokkanen (Sokucen)
Culturele Activiteiten Marokkanen Geuzenveld (CultGeu)
Raad van Moskeeën in Amsterdam en omstreken (RaadMos)
Moskee Sounat (MosSon)
Moskee Nasr (MosNasr)
Hulpverlening aan Moslims in Nederland (HulpMos)
Stedelijke Marokkaanse Raad (SMR)
Stichting De Moskee (Moskee)
Moskee El Hijra (MosHijr)
Al Rissala (Rissala)
Marokkaanse Amicale Amsterdam Oost (Amicalo)
Marokkaanse Adviesraad Voor Onderwijs (MARVO)
Marokkaans Sociaal-Cultureel en Educatief Centrum (Socued)
Moskee Nour (MosNour)
Marokkaanse Buurtraad De Baarsjes (RaadBaa)
Coöperatieve Vereniging Marokkaanse Kunst in Amsterdam UA (Kunst)
Vereniging van Oudere Marokkanen in Nederland (Oudere)
This component consists of two connected clusters. One cluster has the Council of Mosques as its central node, the other is organized around the Moroccan Educational Board (MARVO). The mosque El Hijra is a cutpoint in the component. Without this mosque the two clusters would not have been connected. Nearly all organizations of the component are religious organizations.

A second component of 7 Moroccan organizations is represented in Figure 3.

**Figure 3 - Second Component of Moroccan Organizations**

**Organizations:**

- Rabita Marokkanen in Nederland (Rabita)
- Marokkaans Platform Osdorp (Marplat)
- Kulturele Dialog (Dialoog)
- Amsterdams Centrum Buitenlanders (ACB)
- Komitee Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland (KMAN)
- Marokkaanse Vereniging Fath (Fath)
- Argan

This component contains only left wing and secular organizations and has a particular structure. Apart from the earlier mentioned ACB, (government sponsored facilitating organization and not a Moroccan organization in the strict sense of the word), these
organizations form a string, in which each organization except the ‘end nodes’ of the string, is a cutpoint. Communication in such string networks seems not very efficient.

The *Surinamese* community is very poorly organized, with a biggest component of 4 organizations, two of which have remigration to Surinam in their name label while the other two are Evangelical. Also the total number of organizational interlocks is small (12). This is the more surprising because of the large number of Surinamese in Amsterdam and the relatively long migration history. The *Antillean* community had fared hardly any better when it comes to organizational networks.

The largest component of the *Ghanese* community is represented in figure 4.

**Figure 5 Largest Component of Ghanese organizations**

*Organizations:*

- The Blessed Trinity Parish of the Ghanaian Community in Amsterdam (Trinity)
- Mfanstiman Association (Mfanstiman)
- Amansi Youth Association (Amansi)
- GOWSPACC (Stichting Ghana Organisation for the Welfare of Single Parents and Christian Charity)

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GOWSPACC—— Amansi —— Trinity —— Mfanstiman
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Nearly all Ghanese organizations are evangelical churches. Most of these churches are isolated points, but the *Resurrection Power Evangelistic Ministries, the Christian Action Faith Ministries* and the *Church of Pentacost, Assembly No. 2* are interlocked. The largest Ghanese component is a string.
Summary of the network analysis

Table 4 summarizes our results with respect to the network indicators of civic culture we used in this paper. The number in the cells reflect the rank-order of the various ethnic communities in relation to the specific indicator (that is, ‘1’ = ‘highest civic community’; ‘5’ = ‘lowest civic community’).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Relative number of voluntary organizations</th>
<th>Number of organizations in network analysis</th>
<th>No. of isolated organizations</th>
<th>No. of components</th>
<th>No. of organizations in largest component</th>
<th>No. Of interlocks in total network</th>
<th>‘civic community score’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghanese</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If we weight each network indicator equal (a point which needs more elaboration), summing the rank-orders results in a total ‘civic community score’ for each ethnic group. These scores are summarized in the last column of table 4. From these scores we can conclude that the Turkish community in Amsterdam is the most ‘civic’, followed by the Moroccans and the Ghanese. The Antillean and Surinamese communities show the smallest degree of civic community.

This section concentrated on network indicators of civic community. In section 3 we will discuss one additional indicator: turnout at local (municipal) elections.

3. One additional indicator of civic community: turnout.

Table 5 presents the turnout figures for three ethnic groups in the Amsterdam municipal elections of 1994 and 1998 (the Surinamese and Antilleans were in the referred studies considered as one ethnic group).
Table 5 - Voting turnout at municipal elections in Amsterdam, 1994 and 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Municipal elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese/Antilleans</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal turnout</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Tillie, 1994; Tillie and Van Heelsum, 1999

From table 5 it is clear that voting turnout varies enormously between 1994 and 1998 but also among different groups. Yet the rank order remains the same: Turks vote more often than Moroccans and Moroccans vote more often than Surinamese. In 1994 the Turkish voters even had a higher turnout than average. In 1998 there is a spectacular drop in ethnic turnout, and yet the turnout of the Turkish voters is nearly average (39 as against 46). The result with respect to turnout underline our conclusions in the former section. Turks show the highest degree of ‘civic community’, followed by Moroccans and Surinamese and Antillieans.

Having established the degree of civic community of the various ethnic groups in Amsterdam, the next question is how to explain these degrees of civic community. In the final section we will develop some explaining hypotheses. The focus is on the interaction between (1) municipal policies with respect to the ethnic communities in Amsterdam and (2) the strategies of the organizations themselves.

4. Explaining civic culture: government policy and organization strategies.

Government policy

In Amsterdam, a major part of the policy regarding the multicultural society is being shaped at the level of city districts. Hence we shall elaborate on minority policy of these districts (Wolff and Tillie, 1995). This section is based on interviews with politicians, civil servants, managers of welfare institutions and board members of ethnic organizations.
For quite some time, (local) government policy consisted of subsidizing ethnic organizations with the specific purpose that these organizations would maintain the cultural values of the ethnic community and, at the same time, fulfill some welfare functions. Initially, that is during the sixties and the seventies, this policy was aimed at keeping the ethnic communities intact so as to facilitate the remigration of the 'guest-workers' to their country of origin. When, at the beginning of the eighties, it became clear that remigration was not an option for most of these guest-workers, the policy of subsidizing ethnic organizations was nevertheless continued, but with a somewhat different policy goal. Now ethnic organizations were supposed to be helpful to further integration of migrants into Dutch society. The different 'minority groups' to be supported were explicitly mentioned in the government reports and 'minority policy' focused on ethnic organizations as the main target.

At the end of the eighties, however, category-specific minority policy lost its popularity at the Ministry of Welfare in The Hague, a tendency that was reflected in Amsterdam. Civil servants and politicians were overwhelmingly of the opinion that category-specific minority policy had to be replaced by a general policy for the destitute which focuses on making up for arrears in the field of education and employment. This general policy was aimed at all inhabitants who are in need of welfare and support, not just the migrants. Within all Amsterdam districts, there now is a tendency to question minority policy as a whole. But that does not mean that no policy is being formulated regarding the minorities. For the districts, participation is the central theme in their policy toward minorities. This means that minorities are induced to participate in all sorts of areas in society, both on the individual- and on the group level. Migrant participation is subdivided into two separate policy goals: integration in Amsterdam civil society and making up for arrears.

Integration is being perceived as a process by which people from another culture, often strongly deviating from Dutch culture, can find their way in Dutch society. This doesn't mean they have to give up their own culture, their own norms and values, but that they can find their way out of their own specific position, with their own wishes and needs. Making up for arrears is another policy goal. Here the issue is solving problems that, according to the interviewed, aren't directly related to ethnic origin. As one politician said:

’We want to fight unemployment. But I'm not talking about migrants in the first instance, no, I'm talking about the unemployed. I want to do something about unemployment.’
So the policy is problem-oriented, as opposed to group-oriented. However, at the same time it is recognized that many members of migrant groups belong to the underprivileged:

'Taking care of the migrants is not the policy goal. No, you want to solve a certain problem, a social problem that you come across, and then you notice that certain groups are very often at the receiving end of the stick.'

The means at the disposal of the districts in order to accomplish these policy goals are, on the one hand, consultation and coordination, and on the other hand supplying government grants. The latter is considered an important instrument for the implementation of policies. Implementation of local government policies is often carried out by semi-independent welfare institutions and by the organizations of the migrants themselves. In turn, these organizations and institutions are largely dependent on the money provided by the city district. This financial dependence creates the possibility for the districts to make demands as to the activities of these organizations and institutions. Organizations submit plans of action to the district-council for which they want grants. These grants are mostly for social-cultural activities. Requests to subsidize organizational overhead, such as staff and housing are also submitted. Not all applications however, are granted. Applications can be rejected as a whole, but it also happens that they only partially get rejected. Lump-sum requests for the costs of staff, organization and housing are frequently turned down. Some districts share a negative attitude toward the creation of categorical organizations. A statement made by one of the leading politicians illustrates the point:

'We don't finance the organizations as such, they can't count on lump-sum grants for personnel or that kind of grants. Neither do we reward grants for their own housing. We've got room here and we have existing accommodations. Well, with a little creativity plenty of opportunities can be created.'

In providing grants a number of - shifting - criteria are being applied. First, the allocated grants are more and more *activity-oriented*. It is not the ethnic organization as such that is subsidized, but primarily their social and educational activities. Attention is being paid to whether or not the activities ethnic organizations have planned coincide with the city district's
policy goals. Attempts have been made to abolish integral grants altogether. Two politicians expressed this policy change:

‘We want to finance activities of organizations rather than the organizations themselves’
‘I don't care whether 20 Sri Lankans learn Dutch, or whether 20 other non-Dutch do. What's important to me is that 20 people learn Dutch.’

A second criterion for handing out grants is that the activities should take place where the expertise and the infrastructure are already available. When an organization has neither infrastructure nor any expertise in the field of the planned activities, the chances of receiving money are slim. Welfare budgets are tight, so the money has to be used efficiently. It often happens that several organizations want to organize the same social-cultural or educational activity. One of the politicians commented:

‘... if a Turkish organization wants computer classes, we say: no, go to the Welfare Foundation (Stichting Welzijn), they have classrooms, they have computers. I'm not going to pay twice for everything.’

The districts try to use semi-dependent government institutions for the implementation of their policies. They want to induce immigrants to make use of these general institutions to supply them with welfare services rather than to go to their own ethnic organizations. At the level of organizations they want ethnic organizations to cooperate with general institutions as much as possible, either by organizing activities in localities that are already available through general institutions, or by organizing these activities in collaboration with general institutions. In the words of a civil servant:

‘To say that the district opposes private initiative (by the ethnic organizations MF/JT) is not true, but the district prefers it to be done within the general institutions. This way you'll help them over the threshold.’

According to the districts, ethnic organizations fulfill an important function for their supporters. They can serve as a sort of refuge in which people can catch their breath in a hectic and sometimes rough society. But in general the districts are not willing to subsidize
this function. For example, religious or religion-connected activities, such as Koran lessons, are not subsidized because of the separation between church and state. Although one of the civil servants has a nuanced opinion about that:

'Lessons in Arabic and meetings aren't subsidized, but we try to steer a middle course. The ethnic organizations must remain viable. For us it's a means to implement things we consider important, for instance information about health.'

Ethnic organizations are important to districts, because they can contribute to the implementation of policies. Most city districts do not consider a flourishing ethnic organization as a goal in itself, even though the horizontal linkages among ethnic organizations are stimulated by some city-districts. The districts use ethnic organizations instrumentally to implement their own policy goals. Ethnic organizations have a low threshold for members of ethnic groups, whereas in general institutions this threshold appears to be very high. Ethnic organizations can be used to enhance the ethnic minority groups' accessibility. The low threshold can serve several policy goals. First, ethnic organizations can support emancipation of the ethnic group. They can enforce the position of the members of ethnic minority groups by organizing activities such as job-interview courses, management training, homework classes, etceteras. A second function is strongly related to the first. Ethnic organizations can contribute to social integration. With the help of their organization, individual members can participate better in Amsterdam society. Integration, however, can also take place at a group level. At this level ethnic organizations even play a crucial role. Finally, because of their low threshold, ethnic organizations can have an intermediary function. Alink and Berger (1999) have shown that the district’s policy towards ethnic organizations does influence the degree of openness of these organizations towards governmental institutions. The district can thus use ethnic organizations to transmit information to its members. Ethnic organizations receive money to inform their rank and file about ‘institutional’ aspects of The Netherlands, like, for instance, the educational system, health-care, welfare or the political system. In turn, the rank and file can express wants and demands towards the city-district through the ethnic organization, in which case ethnic organizations can act as agents for collective action. In the latter case the network of ethnic organizations obtains special significance (Granovetter, 1978).
From the above overview we would like to single out two dimensions that, in our opinion, largely determine local governments' strategies with regard to ethnic organizations. One dimension is the local governments' view on the role of ethnic organizations in allocating welfare expenditure; the other dimension is in how far the government wants to provide grants to organizations. In the latter case there are basically two positions: local government either provides or does not provide grants. The first dimension can also be dichotomized: government can either be focused on ethnic organizations or on ethnic activities. In other words: a government can focus on projects (activities) or focus on organizations. If local governments do hand out money to ethnic organizations the latter dimension will be expressed in the choice between, on the one hand, grants for costs of staff or housing and, on the other hand, more project-oriented grants. These two dimensions lead to four possible government strategies regarding ethnic organizations. These strategies are summarized in figure 6.

**Figure 6**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Financial support</th>
<th>Project-oriented</th>
<th>Organization-oriented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Grant/project-oriented</td>
<td>Grants provided for specific projects</td>
<td>Grant/organization-oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No support</td>
<td>No relation between government and ethnic organizations</td>
<td>Alternative facilitating</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first cell in figure 6 consists of a combination of project-orientation and the rewarding of grants to organizations involved in certain projects or certain activities (note that these organizations can also be ethnic organizations). This is presently the dominant policy orientation of the Amsterdam districts. More and more grants are being provided for specific activities, in which case the districts are concerned to have these activities take place within general institutions.

When local governments' policy is organization-oriented and they provide grants this will generally lead to lump sum grants to a number of ethnic organizations. Which ethnic organizations are subsidized and thus will command public resources depends on decisions...
made by civil servants and on local politicians. This means that local authorities determine which organizations are relevant for the ethnic community and which are not.

When government is organization-oriented but doesn't reward grants this will lead to alternative forms of support. This is the case, for instance, when government cooperates with ethnic organizations in order to inform migrants' communities, or when local government invites representative of the ethnic organizations to hammer out or negotiate local policies.

The last strategy is a project-oriented policy of a local government that doesn't provide grants to ethnic organizations. This policy orientation implies the absence of ties between the ethnic organizations and local government. Government does not support the migrants' communities.

Analogous to these four government strategies with regard to ethnic organizations four strategies for the organizations themselves can be described. In section 4 we will elaborate on these organizational strategies.

Organization strategies

Figure 6 showed four government strategies toward ethnic organizations. Similarly, four strategies can be outlined of ethnic organizations toward the (subsidizing) government. The two dimensions determining these four organization strategies are, on the one hand, the orientation toward local government and, on the other hand, the organization's orientation towards project organization. Figure 7 summarizes the four resulting strategies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Government oriented</th>
<th>Project-oriented</th>
<th>Organization-oriented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td><strong>Government/project-oriented</strong></td>
<td>Organization tries to cooperate with local government in task-oriented activities</td>
<td><strong>Government/organization-oriented</strong> Organization aims at 'integral' grants from the government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td><strong>Internal/project-oriented</strong></td>
<td>Organization focuses on task-oriented activities without government support and involvement</td>
<td><strong>Internal/organization oriented</strong> Organization exists apart from government and covers a great number of activities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first strategy consists of a combination of government orientation and a focus on the development of specific, task-oriented activities. Organizing computer courses, setting up language courses etceteras in cooperation with, for instance, general welfare institutions. The second strategy consists of making the organization indispensable for local government. This can be done by assuming a political or symbolic function as was the case with the organizations of political refugees and those of the migrants from former colonies. This combination of government- and organizational orientation results in opting for 'integral' grants for the organization concerned. An organization may consider itself to be a representative of an important part of the migrants' community.

The bottom row of figure 7 concerns organizations that aren't government-oriented. Here the focus is often internal, which means that the organization is focused on the migrants' community itself. Organization that are internal- and project-oriented are, for example, consultants or ethnic business organizations that provide specific services for the migrants' community. In the case of organization-orientation ethnic associations one could think of religious organizations that focus on the migrants' community itself.\(^4\)

On theoretical grounds we expect that there exists a 'dialectical' relation between government policy and strategies of organizations that are government-oriented. If policy becomes more project-oriented and local government provides grants accordingly, then government-oriented organizations will also become project-oriented. The only alternative may be that they become less government oriented.

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*Policy, organization strategies and the network of organizations (civic community)*

The government strategies and ethnic organization strategies described in figure 6 and figure 7 are deduced from a description of the Amsterdam districts' policy. In what way can these diagrams be of use in explaining the structure of the ethnic communities in Amsterdam? We will, as an example, focus here on the largest Turkish component as depicted in figure 1.

\(^4\)Note that with regard to organization strategies a comparison with New Social Movements needs elaboration (see i.a.: Koopmans and Duyvendak, 1991).
Figure 1 is a formal representation of an important part of the Turkish community in Amsterdam. The four most important cliques are grouped around TDM (1); TINOS (2); Hilal (3) and the Turkish Council of The Netherlands (4).

As mentioned earlier in this paper, TDM is a Turkish advisory council established by the municipality of Amsterdam. Several organizations are represented in this council, which can advise the municipality either on request or on its own initiative. In this sense TDM is, by definition, organization oriented (in terms the typology of figure 7 it is government/organization-oriented). The organizations around the TDM can be classified as government/organization-oriented.

The clique around TINOS (Turkish entrepreneurs) is probably best characterized as internal/project oriented. This can be deduced from, among other things, the goals of the organizations within the clique (the orientation of Turks toward the agricultural sector; the support for elderly Muslims by holding information- and discussion meetings; a Turkish soccer club). The organization that forms a cutpoint between the TINOS and the TDM clique, STNO, has an explicit external orientation: it is the Union of Turkish/Dutch Entrepreneurs. In the economic field their is clearly a more open attitude towards Dutch civil society, just as, in the Dutch pillarized society there has generally been more coordination between Christian and secular employers’ associations than there was between other denominational organizations.

The clique around Hilal is eminently internal/organization oriented. This is expressed in Hilal’s formal goals (see Tillie and Fennema, 1997) and in the connection to the TDM-cluster, formed by the cutpoint ATS (Amsterdam Sporting club Türkiyem).

To the clique around the Turkish Council of The Netherlands a substantial interpretation can’t be given due to a lack of sufficient information. What we can say is that the goals of THW (Turkish House Westerpark) are government/organization-oriented: it wants ‘to promote integration, to form a bridge between Turks in the Westerpark and the different institutions inside and outside the district, to improve the position of Turks in the social-cultural field.’

With regard to the interpretation of figure 1 in terms of the different organizational- and government strategies, we can formulate a number of hypotheses about the network structure resulting from specific organizational strategies and local government policies.
1. A government strategy that is based subsidizing projects will lead to a fragmented network. Different organizations will receive separate grants for different activities. The professional ethnic organizations are not solely dependent on grants from the local government and will broaden their orientation and look for other financial sources partly in the market sector. The relations between the ethnic organization will be one of structural equivalence. Competition between ethnic organizations will be expressed in market terms. Informal contacts between local government and ethnic organizations will develop.

2. A government strategy that is based on subsidizing ethnic organizations will lead to a centralized network of government-oriented ethnic organizations. Each ethnic organization will try to secure its financial resources by establishing interlocks with governmental organizations and co-opt politicians and civil servants on their board. If the government tends to sponsor only one ethnic organization in each policy field, ethnic organizations will claim to be ‘representative’ of the ethnic group at that specific policy field. Competition will take a form of ideological rivalry. Interlocking directorates between semi-government institutions and ethnic organizations will develop.

3. Networks of internal/project oriented organizations will be thin: the number of interlocking directorates among these organizations will be relatively small, because there is no need for a high amount of coordination and communication. Also, the ideological profile of project-oriented organizations tends to be low. Finally there is no need to develop intensive contacts with local government institutions. These organizations will tend to become business organizations and thus look for contacts with financial institutions.

4. Networks of internal and organization oriented associations will have a high density, especially if these organizations have an high ideological profile. The organization that have similar ideological orientation will form a cohesive networks (see Knoke, 1990: 11) Resource mobilization in self-standing ethnic organizations requires a substantial amount of control. This control will be partly provided by the ideology of the organizations, partly through a high amount of inter-organizational contacts. This may lead to establishing interlocks with like like-minded organizations in different domains of cultural, political and religious activities.
The above hypotheses can be of help to explain the structure of migrants' communities and thus (part of) the sense of civic community. They may possibly lead to a better understanding of the functioning of the (local) multicultural society.
References.


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