Institutions, Culture or Ethics?
Governance in Europe and East Asia

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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has been reorganizing itself, moving away from the global issues to other forms of international politics such as regionalism. The European Union (EU) is an example of successful regionalism. East Asia, on the other hand, is often cited as a failure for regionalism: the strongest regional organization, ASEAN, is still weak. Yet this argument only makes sense in terms of the the EU’s guiding mode of institutional governance: European integration theory generally discusses the role of institutions in the broadening and deepening of regional structures. To understand regionalism in East Asia, it is necessary to understand the region’s different modes of cultural and ethical governance that look to less formal socio-economic and socio-cultural regional networks. While many stress that informal regionalism in East Asia grows out of the cultural governance of the ethnic ties of Chinese communities in Greater China, this paper will stress the ethical governance of East Asian regionalism. Rather than being regulated by rules (EU), or motivated by exclusionary ethnic ties (Greater China), regionalism in East Asia is best described in terms of the social ethics of people-to-people relations. This essay thus has two theoretical conclusions. Firstly, it shows how East Asian regionalism challenges the European integration’s spreading of institutions from the center – in East Asia regionalism takes shape with norms spreading from the periphery to the center.

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Moreover, the essay’s comparison of institutional, cultural and ethical governance contributes to broader understandings of regionalism and world order.
Institutions, Culture or Ethics?

Governance in Europe and East Asia

Since the end of the Cold War, regional organizations have been active in East Asia, Europe and North America. In 1993, the European Community became further integrated as the European Union (EU), while on the other side of the Atlantic the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was founded. By 1999, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) included all of its former communist enemies, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, as full members. ASEAN also spread to Northeast Asia to include China, Japan and South Korea in the security organization ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, and in a more robust regional organization, ASEAN + 3, in 1997. In December 2005, ASEAN + 3 expanded to include India, Australia and New Zealand for the region’s first East Asian Summit (EAS).

Although there has been a refocus on national security since September 11, 2001, regionalization has continued apace. The Euro was founded as a common currency in 2002, and the EU embraced its former communist enemies in May 2004 to grow to 25 members. ARF and ASEAN + 3 activities also continue to deepen with the EAS, and China, Japan, Korea and ASEAN have been actively negotiating the terms for an East Asian Free Trade Area.

Still, when regional integration in Europe and Asia are compared, it is common for analysts to see Asian regionalization as a failure when measured against the EU’s success. This essay will argue that this conclusion only makes sense in terms of a logic of regionalization that depends on institutional governance. To understand regionalism in East Asia, it is necessary to use a different logic: the network power of cultural and ethical governance. This essay will compare the formal institutions of European regionalism with the informal socio-economic and socio-cultural networks in East Asia. While many stress that informal regionalism in East Asia grows out of the cultural governance of the ethnic ties of Chinese communities in Greater China, this paper will stress the ethical governance of East Asian regionalism. Rather than being regulated by rules (EU), or motivated by exclusionary ethnic ties (Greater China), regionalism in East Asia is best described in terms of the social ethics of people-to-people relations.
There are many similarities in the regional integration of Europe and Asia. Both use territorial, institutional, cultural and ethical arguments to define their community. In the introduction to an influential book, *Network Power*, Peter J. Katzenstein argued that there is a difference in stress in each region, which in turn leads regionalism to take on a more institutional character in Europe, and a more social character in Asia. This difference in style is reflected in content and practice: the EU, which relies on institutions to administer and enforce formal rules and regulations is an example of a ‘hard regionalism’ that is closed and exclusive. Asian regionalism, on the other hand, is an example of ‘soft regionalism’ since it is constituted by a network of informal relationships that are the result of people-to-people encounters in markets and cultural arenas.\(^2\)

This essay will build on Katzenstein’s comparative analysis to argue that the logic of regionalism in Europe and East Asia is more than variations on a theme, where East Asia is on the same road of regional integration – albeit behind Europe. Rather, different regionalisms have emerged from different modes of governance in Europe and East Asia. While Europe takes shape through institutional governance, the essay will show how regionalism in East Asia grows out of cultural governance and ethical governance. Institutional governance refers to the commonsense notion of governance, such as the liberal governance of the WTO, IMF and World Bank. It relies on the abstract definitions of power as a negative force.

With cultural and ethical governance, on the other hand, power is not simply restrictive, but productive. Cultural and ethical governance thus comes not just from the state, but is formed in social relationships more generally. Institutions and the market are still present in cultural and ethical governance, but they work through regimes of power/knowledge that regulate not just the state or individual, but also other spaces as well: kinship networks, the capitalist workplace, the nation-state, and transnational networks.\(^3\) Rather than experiencing regionalism in terms of the inter-

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state activities of international organizations, diasporic and mainland Chinese, for example, are joined in kinship networks where economic and social relationships are ordered according to the governance of cultural norms rather than the rules of instrumental rationality.

Institutional governance and cultural governance thus are not clear examples of Max Weber’s instrumental rationality and substantive rationality, or Michel Foucault’s power and resistance. Both institutions and culture are instrumentally mobilized for corporate calculations. ‘Tradition’ is not dismissed as irrational but is mobilized as a mode of governance: ‘the cash value of Confucian values’. Resistance thus takes on different forms: the shift from institutional governance to cultural governance opens up space for ‘ethical governance’ as a sight of resistance. Here the meaning of ethics shifts from an abstract universal code that is applied to specific cases (i.e. Just War theory), to a Kantian/Levinasian understanding of ethics as an intersubjective relation among people, where self and Other inform each other in a contingent identity politics.

While institutional governance seeks to clarify borders (even as it expands them, as in the EU), ethical governance highlights borders as a contingent space that is crucial to self-definition: identity is constructed not through core values of cultural governance, but at a community’s limits. Inside and outside thus are not essential categories, but involve contingent divisions which are always shifting – not just spatially, but morally. As Gaston Bachelard writes: ‘Outside and inside form a dialectic of division, the obvious geometry of which blinds us as soon as we bring it into play in metaphorical domains. It has the sharpness of the dialectics of yes and no, which decides everything…. Inside and outside are both intimate – they are always

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ready to be reversed, to exchange their hostility.\textsuperscript{7} In this way, inside and outside are not opposites, but each contains an element of the other in a complementary simultaneity, like $\text{yin} / \text{yang}$ in Chinese philosophy. This reconfiguration of political geometry is important since most theories of regional integration and institution-building rely on the guiding image of center and periphery, inside and outside. The essay will conclude by showing how some in Euro-America and Asia are pushing beyond practices of institutional governance and cultural governance that seek to assimilate outsiders in order to image (regional) communities that celebrate the fruitful encounters of self and Other as an ethical relation that respects alterity.

This essay will develop the relation between difference regionalisms and different modes of governance by first outlining the arguments for the EU’s institutional success, before comparing them in more detail with modes of regionalism that look to cultural and ethical governance in East Asia.

I: Institutionalizing Ethics in Europe

Although the European Constitution was rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005, its production can tell us much about the mode of institutional governance that informs regionalism in Europe. Constitutions are important documents because they are the foundation for both structural administration and identity politics.\textsuperscript{8} The US Constitution, for example, not only defines the institutions of governance in a division of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the state. The Preamble, as an example of prose poetry, opens the document with the democratic and ethical invocation of ‘We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union…’.

The European Constitution, which was commissioned in 2001 and signed by European leaders in October 2004, had similar aims. The President of the Convention, former French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, wanted to define Europe’s mission in moral and ethical terms. His preamble to the 2003 Draft Constitution begins with a quote from Thucydides on democracy. The Constitution then invokes ‘Europe’ as ‘a continent that has brought forth civilization.’ Although the civilizational rhetoric was weakened in the 2004 re-write, the Constitution still speaks of ‘the cultural, religious

and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, democracy, equality, freedom and the rule of law.' It stresses that ‘Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilization…’

This Constitution thus defines Europe as a progressive ethical project of civilization. It claims the heritage of the European Enlightenment as the particular historical project of Christian culture, as well as the source of the universal values of science and humanity. The ethics of the European Union are conceptualized and applied in ways familiar to mainstream studies of international ethics: a set of abstract principles that are applied as rules. To become a member of the European Union, for example, a state must pass a set of ethical tests. It must adjust its legal and economic system to meet the structural conditionalities of the European ethical project: liberal market principles, standards of democratic governance, and the rule of law.

Here we move from an ethical notion of Europe to an institutional mode of governance in the EU. In other words, the workings of the EU, for both its members and applicants, demonstrate how ethics are institutionalized. Discussions of identity move from issues of the substantive culture of Christianity, human rights, and democracy to policies of structural adjustment according the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ of markets, democracy and law. This is much like the legal and economic ‘standards of civilization’ that European colonial powers used to regulate the membership of ‘international society’ before World War II. Understood in this way the EU is the logical outcome of centuries of state-building in Europe, which as Max Weber taught us involved rationalizing society. Indeed, Alexander Wendt has recently pushed the teleological logic of state formation beyond nation-states and regions to argue that a world state is ‘inevitable’.

Rather than addressing people-to-people relations, the EU thus largely limits political activity to the nation-state and the regional level of the EU.

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10 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, (Brussels, 16 June 2004).
‘Europeanization’ describes a theoretical approach that emerged in the mid-1990s to explain this state-region dynamic. European integration theory of the 1950s and 1960s was dominated by a neofunctionalist understanding of ‘spillover effects’ where economic integration leads to political integration. Classical neofunctionalism, and then supranational governance and multilevel governance, all focused the research agenda on European institutions and their output in terms of European policies. Neofunctionalism was first challenged by intergovernmentalism’s stress on the domestic sources of European politics, and then by liberal intergovernmentalism’s examination of the institutional adaptation of member states. Thus, although European integration theory addresses issues of Europe as an idea, the dominant analyses of the European Union look to institutional politics rather than identity politics.

As part of this vibrant debate in European integration theory, Europeanization seeks to shift the research focus from the transnationalism of supranational governance back to activities in the nation-state as it adapts European legislation and directives into domestic institutions. Such research on institutional change emphasizes hierarchical relations of power to analyze the EU’s ‘central penetration of national systems of governance’. Indeed the first words of the ‘Introduction’ to The Politics of Europeanization clearly set the parameters of analysis: ‘What does “Europeanization” mean? How does it affect domestic politics and policies?’ Maarten Vink answers this question in the conclusion of his survey of the literature: ‘Europeanization is always (to a certain extent) a process of domestic political change.

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16 See Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe’, *Daedalus* 95 (1966): 862-915.
18 See Moravcsik, 1-17.
caused (somehow) by processes of European integration."^{21} It is a top-down process of not just of civilizing new states, but also rationalizing the institutional civility of existing member states.\^{22}

The changes made to the Preamble of the European Constitution testify to this hierarchical conceptualization of power, on the one hand, and the limitation of politics to institutional relations rather than people-to-people relations, on the other. As mentioned above, democracy was underlined in a quote from Thucydides at the head of the 2003 draft: ‘Our Constitution … is called democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the greatest number.’ The 2004 revision switched from this ethical mode of governance to an institutional one. It is not addressed to ‘We the People’, but to an elite group of Sovereigns: ‘HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF THE BELGIANS, THE PRESIDENT OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF DENMARK’ all the way down to ‘HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND’.\^{23} This dramatic revision of the preamble settled the fears of those who saw the Constitution as an invocation for a populist superstate that by-passed the governing institutions of member states. But it not only preserves the modern nation-state, as Vink and Olsen argue, because it also preserves pre-modern institutions of hierarchical authority. Rather than invoking popular sovereignty, the constitution seeks permission from Sovereigns.

Europeanization does not apply just to member states and applicants. Many see the value of Europeanization going beyond an understanding of European integration as a ‘unique’ experience.\^{24} Europeanization therefore is a concept and methodology that can be applied ‘to other cases of regional integration. In this way we can embrace the theoretical argument that views the EU not as a unique phenomenon…, but as an advanced instance of regional cooperation’.\^{25} While recognizing that ‘Europeanization as Westernization’ was part of imperial conquest and colonial administration in earlier times, Olsen thinks that Europeanization now can be

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22 See Featherstone, 13-14.
23 Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, 2004, all-caps in the original.
24 For a discussion of the generalization of the politics of European integration see Nye, 870 and Moravcsik, 4-5.

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exported as a model to other parts of the world that would accept it as ‘imitation and voluntaristic borrowing from a successful civilization’.

But as many scholars note, the EU’s relations with its periphery are asymmetrical: ‘Often the relationship between the EU and the applicant states can appear akin to that of David and Goliath, albeit with the former having no effective sling in this case.’ Hence there is very little room for negotiation on the part of the extra-European state or region. Europeanization thus is part of New Institutionalism’s interest in the ‘diffusion of global prescriptions; templates and standards of universalistic rationality and validity.’ Like the IMF rescue plans for troubled economies that demand structural adjustment, the EU’s project is to spread institutionally-backed standards of political and economic governance through conditionality. But while the IMF is regularly criticized for its strong-arm tactics that produce a ‘politics of resentment’ in vulnerable countries, the analysts of Europeanization often uncritically celebrate how ‘the center is assimilating the periphery by progressive waves of enlargement’.

The current debate about Turkey and the EU can show the limitations of Europeanization’s logic of power. Turkey has always provoked debate about whether Europe is a territorial, institutional or an ethical community. Geographically, Turkey is only partially in Europe. Rather than a product of Christian civilization, it has a Muslim-majority population. It has serious human rights problems and an uneven history of democracy and the rule of law. The issue arose again in October 2005 when the European Commission started formal accession negotiations with Turkey, and has continued as these talks progress.

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25 Vink, 66.
26 Olsen, 938.
27 Featherstone, 18.
29 Olsen, 938; also see Featherstone, 6.
31 Coppieters, et al., 242.
While the EU should judge Turkey according to the Copenhagen criteria (market economy, democracy, and the rule of law), many in Europe are uneasy at the prospect of a large poor Muslim nation joining their borderless community. In France an opinion poll showed that 75% of the population is against Turkish membership; this is important because Turkish membership will be put to a referendum in France. Although it is presented as a simple inside/outside issue of allowing one state to join the EU, I would argue that the main issue is person-to-person ethnic relations in domestic space: France has the largest Muslim minority on the continent, and Germany has a large population of Turks as ‘guest workers’. This is because Turkey is not simply a neighboring state to the European Union, for it is an important part of the identity politics of Europe: ‘Even though Turkey is a modern secular state, Europe still defines it in terms of Muslim other.’

But rather than addressing these domestic and transnational issues in ethical terms, the EC is using institutional power to rationally manage its borders in a way that depoliticizes the debate. Although it recommended that the EU invite Turkey for accession negotiations in December 2004, this invitation is exclusionary since it defines very high standards of structural adjustment for Turkey to pass. French President Chirac emphasized ‘These negotiations will naturally be long because adapting all of Turkish law to the laws of the European Union will demand a very major effort, particularly on Turkey’s part.’ Institutional governance thus uses the ‘rational’ language of law and diplomacy to hide the politics of EU-Turkey relations. Rather than tracing the progressive inclusion of the periphery, the Turkish example shows how centralized institutions work to exclude the Other – even as they invites it in. In this way, Europeanization is a passive-aggressive practice of institutional governance whose rationalization of conflict risks limiting political debate.

II. Institutional integration from the periphery in Asia

In the following sections, I will compare institutional, cultural and ethical governance in Asia through four examples: 1) ASEAN as a formal regional institution; the informal economic-cultural integration of diasporic Chinese networks in 2) Greater

33 ‘German, French Leaders to meet Turkish PM for talks on EU bid’, Agence France Press (October 13, 2004).
China and 3) Cultural China; and finally 4) the ethical relations between civilization and barbarism on China’s periphery. Rather than progressing from ethics to institutions to see how regionalism is produced as in the EU, the analysis of institutional, cultural and ethical governance in the following sections will proceed in the opposite direction. It will highlight how East Asian regionalism takes shape through a network power that spreads from the periphery toward the center in a way that calls the center/periphery model into question.

ASEAN is the most successful regional organization not just in Asia, but in the developing world. It was founded in 1967 as a way of regularizing the contradictory borders left by decolonization. Like the EU, its membership and its name did not match. Indeed, Western Europe and Eastern Asia have been very successful at ‘monopolizing’ the discourse of identity in their respective regions. For two decades, the Association of Southeast Asian nations only contained half of the countries that cartographers characteristically designate as ‘Southeast Asia’. But with the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, Vietnam was invited into ASEAN in 1995, with the remaining countries joining to complete ‘One Southeast Asia’ by 1999. Thus like the EU welcoming in ten former communist neighbours in 2004, ASEAN is open to embrace its former enemies.

But ASEAN has expanded in quite a different way. Rather than demanding conditions and structural adjustments from new members as in the EU, ASEAN’s regionalism is more open. Its inclusive networks bring in the outsiders, without demanding that they change their domestic structures of governance – indeed, one of the norms of ASEAN is non-interference in domestic politics. Rather than a model where the periphery assimilates to the center’s values (or risks sanctions), ASEAN works more through dialogue than coercion. As a Singaporean foreign minister explained, ‘the ASEAN way stresses informality, organizational minimalism, inclusiveness, intensive consultations leading to consensus and peaceful resolution of disputes.’

Hence while it was integrating the remaining Southeast Asian states in the 1990s, ASEAN also spread beyond its sub-region. The first security organization to include both Southeast and East Asian countries, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), was founded in 1994. This East Asian integration deepened in 1997 with the establishment of a more robust regional organization, ASEAN + 3, which includes China, Japan and South Korea. China also is seeking regional leadership not just by socializing to the ASEAN-way, but also by taking the lead in forming its own regional organizations. In 1993 it held a meeting in Shanghai of five Central Asian states, including Russia, to discuss borders and regional issues. The Shanghai 5 was formalized as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 with the aim of fighting a common foe of Islamic fundamentalism. At the prodding of Malaysia, Japan has also taken a leadership role in the transformation of the open regionalism of APEC into a closed regionalism of the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in 1997. This project resulted in the first East Asia Summit, held in the Malaysian capital in 2005.

Even so, compared with most regional organizations, the powers of ASEAN, SCO, EAEG and EAS are modest. While ASEAN is the strongest organization, it is a decentralized intergovernmental and nongovernmental congress that operates without centralizing powers: it does not have the EU’s powerful Commission or large bureaucracy. Moreover, this regional organization does not include the region’s key countries, China and Japan, except as add-ons in ASEAN + 3. Although regional institutions are developing in East Asia, they are still quite tentative and weak when compared with the EU and NATO.

A Chinese analyst suggests that the PRC should follow the EU example of rising peacefully to global economic and political stature through a process of ‘neither threatening the hegemonic position of the US, nor transforming the international system.’ If Europeanization is to work as a model in East Asia, it would depend upon the formation of a China-Japan axis like the France-Germany axis. Although the Chinese and Japanese economies are increasingly intertwined through trade and

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41 Song Xinning, ‘Zhongguo de jueqi yu Ouzhou de jingyan’ [China’s rise and the European experience], Jiaoxue yu yanjiu No. 4 (April 2004), p. 6.
investment, any Sino-Japanese partnership would have major problems. China’s regular anti-Japanese riots can tell us much about regional politics – the April 2005 disturbances throughout urban China were a reaction to Japan’s campaign to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. When they met at the first East Asia Summit, China’s president snubbed the Japanese prime minister. Indeed, one of the main struggles in East Asia over the past century is whether China or Japan should be the regional hegemon.

To put it another way, both Japan and China are ‘reluctant powers’ that are not willing to take the lead in regional integration (indeed, the main activities of each seem to be forestalling the other from assuming regional leadership). This reluctance stems from a regional environment that is characterized by fears of Japan’s past (militarism), and China’s future (hegemonism). The Japanese empire regionalized East Asia during the first half of the twentieth century, and Chinese and Korean memories of this period still stress the violence of Japanese occupation and colonialism. Because of this suspicion of its intentions Japan repeated failed to shape an East Asian regionalism in the 1960s and 1970s.

China has been unable to take the lead in forming regional institutions because its East Asian neighbours are worried that the PRC would dominate the region. China is seen as a rising power that presents a potential threat to regional order and stability. These fears stem from China’s rapid economic growth and military modernization in the past two decades. Moreover, there are concerns that China’s future leadership will follow the pattern of its imperial past. Some fear that the PRC is modernizing the traditional Sinocentric order where the Middle Kingdom is surrounded by a periphery of tributary states and barbarians as a model for its new hegemonic politics. Indeed, some Western scholars are presenting the traditional Chinese world order as a model for regional order for the twenty-first century.

In the early and mid 1990s, China’s main response to criticism that it was a ‘revisionist power’ with ‘aggressive nationalism’ was to denounce critics as ‘ill-

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intentioned foreigners’ who spread ‘ludicrous fallacies’. Since 1997, China has changed its rhetoric and actions to be more of a status quo power that works in multilateral institutions. This dramatic shift was not just internal, but responded to external factors. Importantly, the external factors were not from the center either internationally or regionally – the United Nations, Japan or the US – but from the periphery of East Asia: ASEAN.

By working through ASEAN’s informal institutional process, China has been socialized into the ASEAN-way of dealing with its neighbors through responsible and cooperative multilateral diplomacy rather than unilateral military actions and ideologically-charged rhetoric. China responded positively to the ARF’s multilateralism, for example, because the organization works according to consensus, and thus would not risk compromising China’s sovereignty. Johnston argues that multilateralism has been internalized by the Chinese diplomats who work in the ARF, who in turn used the experience as ‘a way of educating their own government.’ This socialization process has achieved some concrete results: in 2002 China signed a ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ with ASEAN, whereby all parties pledged to undertake to peacefully resolve the disputes through international law and the Law of the Sea. The ASEAN-way thus is seen as a third way that does not suffer from the ‘pessimism of realism or the “follow-me” hubris of European institutionalization and integration.’

ARF, ASEAN + 3, and EAS are examples of regionalism coming from the periphery and spreading to the center. Other regional organizations, including the

Asia Pacific Economic forum (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the East Asia Economic Group (EAEG), likewise came from initiatives from states on the periphery – such as Singapore, Malaysia and Australia – rather than from the center. Moreover, while regionalism in Europe comes from the large countries, the Franco-German axis, in East Asia it has come from the above-mentioned small and medium powers. The agenda of the East Asia Summit is dominated by ASEAN; indeed, the annual EAS meeting is held in Southeast Asia directly after the ASEAN and ASEAN + 3 meetings.

Hence it is unlikely that ASEAN will transform the EAS into a regional organization like the EU. Actually, ASEAN has limited the growth of regionalism in East Asia because it wants to maintain its relative power: ASEAN formed ARF, ASEAN + 3, and EAS because it was afraid of being marginalized by China and Japan, on the one hand, and the EU and the US, on the other. ASEAN thus does not use a positive notion of power as coercion or integration as in institutional governance. Rather, ASEAN resists such negative power by ‘having the capacity and ability to resist attempts to exert pressure on them to do what they do not want to do.’ This is an unlikely formula for broadening and deepening regional institutions. Indeed, both ASEAN and the SCO were created as regional organizations to stabilize international borders with neighboring countries, and not as transnational organizations to create borderless communities; a key element of the ASEAN-way continues to be non-interference in domestic politics. Moreover, ASEAN’s greater ambitions keep running up against the limit of Sino-Japanese relations.

III. Greater China: from statist political-economy to economic-cultural networks

The second section argued that rather than following a European model of institutional governance spreading from the center to the periphery, in East Asia institutions spread from the periphery to the center. Moreover, ASEAN and its associated organizations all work through very different modes of governance than the EU. Rather than enforcing rules through institutional governance, regional

50 Johnston, 108.
53 Stubbs, 223.
community in East Asia is formed through the cultural and ethical governance of informal consultation and people-to-people relations. Indeed, in trying to understand the role of state and regional institutions in East Asia, Beeson concludes that it is necessary to look beyond the formal logic of institutional governance to ‘the webs of power and interest in which institutions are embedded.’

This section will use the concept of ‘Greater China’ to examine the social and economic activities that produce regionalism in East Asia. Since regionalization in East Asia comes from the ‘private sector with economic forces as its principle drivers,’ this section will shift from the inter-state activities of international organizations like ASEAN + 3 to consider how regionalism is formed through non-state networks that are engaged in economic and cultural governance. In this way, we will move from centralized understanding power that is defined in terms of the institutional governance of states to a decentralized understanding that looks to the cultural governance of family networks.

Analysis of Greater China generally begins by focusing on the increased international economic exchange between the PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong in the 1980s. This was a noteworthy political-economic development because these three Chinese territories had been divided by the ideological barriers of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s, it has been popular to use the phrase ‘Greater China’ to describe this network of economic, cultural and political relations in East Asia, as well as among Chinese diasporic communities around the world.

Though the phrase ‘transnational capital’ usually makes one think of Japanese and Euro-American corporations, in the PRC the main source of capital and expertise comes from the Chinese diaspora, especially ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asia. This decentering of transnational capital was in part the result of the economic fallout from a political event. When the Group of 7 imposed economic sanctions on the PRC after the Tian’anmen massacre in 1989, diasporic Chinese capitalists took this crisis as an opportunity to dominate China’s trade and investment in the 1990s. Rather than simply exploiting the comparative advantages of the Chinese political-economy

(cheap labor and land, weak regulatory regimes), this diasporic Chinese capitalism was self-consciously part of the transformation of the economic-culture of China. As one diasporic Chinese tycoon boasts, ‘We [overseas Chinese] are the dealmakers, the ones that will provide investment and financing advice to a country in the throes of economic transformation.’\textsuperscript{57} Rather than simply being an investment opportunity, diasporic Chinese activities in China became a model of economic-cultural governance.

Since the early 1990s, business intellectuals have been talking about a new Chinese commonwealth that is defined less by state institutions, than by ethnic ties and family clans that join together economic and cultural activity.\textsuperscript{58} Rather than working through state institutions in capital cities, this economic-cultural governance takes place in the diasporic public sphere’s chambers of commerce, fraternal organizations, newspapers, and schools that are located in a network of trading cities.\textsuperscript{59} Rather than meeting at the East Asian Summit, these alternative actors gather at the World Chinese Entrepreneurs conventions held around the Pacific Rim.

This \textit{guanxi} (network of relations) capitalist explanation argues that diasporic Chinese succeed in the PRC because of the comparative advantage of civilization: the language, culture, and habitus shared by the ethnic Chinese both inside and outside of the PRC facilitates economic activity. Diasporic and mainland Chinese thus are joined in kinship networks where economic and social relationships are ordered according to the governmentality of cultural norms rather than the rules of instrumental rationality.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, these diasporic family firms do not work exclusively with other ethnic Chinese firms. Rather, they are an important part of the transnational

\textsuperscript{57} Cited in Joe Studwell, \textit{The China Dream} (New York: Grove Press, 2003), 70.
commodity-driven production networks that manufacture much of the world’s branded consumer goods, in what Seagrave calls ‘the Invisible Empire of the Overseas Chinese’.  

Guanxi capitalism thus is quite different from standard explanations of East Asian economic development that stress the role of the state. The state policy of developmentalism, which relies on close relations between the state and capital, is given credit for achieving rapid equitable economic growth in Japan and the four mini-dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). Diasporic Chinese capitalism, on the other hand, often tries to evade state power. Rather than being part of a state’s industrial policy, much of the diasporic Chinese investment in China has gone against the industrial policy of Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries. Hamilton argues diasporic capitalism changes the whole understanding of political-economic power in East Asia since ‘Chinese capitalism cannot be understood apart from the dynamics of the global economy because… Chinese capitalism is not a domestic capitalism (i.e. the product of indigenous economic growth), but rather is integral to world capitalism itself.’

The notion of Greater China that highlights informal relationships that are produced in kinship networks helps us to shift from institutional governance to cultural governance where power is not simply restrictive, but productive, and comes not just from the state, but is formed in social relationships more generally. Institutions and the market work through regimes of power/knowledge that look to cultural governance in order to regulate not just the state or individual, but also other

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61 See Studwell, 221-25.
65 See Studwell, 72.
spaces as well: kinship networks, the capitalist workplace, the nation-state, and transnational networks.\textsuperscript{67}

Like the ASEAN-way, Greater China’s style of regionalism is radically different from Europeanization. Rather than economic and social power spreading from Beijing to the periphery, economic-cultural power has been produced through the networks of diasporic Chinese investors and managers as they interact with workers and officials in mainland China. These relations are not state-to-state diplomacy or patterns of international trade and investment in a global political-economy. They involve less formal people-to-people relations, flows and disjunctures in a transnational economic-culture.\textsuperscript{68} But in another sense this cultural governance is still limited by ethnicity to relations between mainland and diasporic Chinese.

\textbf{IV. Civilization/barbarism in Cultural China}

The previous section traced the logic of decentralized power in Greater China through the less formal ‘institutions’ of the family and kinship networks that are guided more by cultural norms than by instrumental rationality. This section will show how the interpersonal relations of the family are regulated through the ethical people-to-people relations of civilization – and barbarism. We will examine identity politics in Greater China to see how they shift first from national to transnational identity, and second from geopolitical to cultural identity.

Like in the EU, the discourse of civilization is a key site for identity politics in Greater China. Traditionally, Chinese identity has been formed not by the primordial measures – ethnicity, territory, language – but by the more fluid symbolic border between civilization and barbarism.\textsuperscript{69} This ancient distinction is found in the classical Confucian texts that define Chinese identity, as well as modern textbooks, such as \textit{Civilization and Barbarism}, an ethical handbook to guide young Chinese in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{70} While this ethical textbook makes a stark – and often violent – distinction between civilization and barbarism, it also employs a sophisticated vocabulary of ethical relations to argue that civilization and barbarism are not

\textsuperscript{69} Callahan: 2004, 25-55.
essential categories of radical difference so much as flexible terms that describe different historical periods. Arguing against any ‘golden age’ historical narrative, Zhang tells Chinese readers that although they used to be barbaric, they are getting progressively more civilized:

Once humanity is conscious of itself as ‘human’, it then starts the life-and-death struggle between the wild natures of self and other. … Day after day, year after year, humankind slowly ignites the glorious spark of civilization. … As yesterday they found the way to navigate civilization, today they are lost in a deep and dark sea of barbarism.71

Much like the EU Constitution’s aim ‘to continue along the path of civilization’, the ethical guidebook seeks to keep the civilizing process on track by warning students of barbaric distractions on the narrow road of civilization.

Although there is no formal constitution for Greater China, Harvard philosopher Tu Weiming’s ‘Cultural China: the Periphery as Center’ deserves detailed consideration because it proposes a mode of cultural governance for a transnational community.72 Using a center/periphery logic of power, Tu posits a non-ethnic, non-territorial notion of community that problematizes both narrow nationalism and universal prescriptions for identity: ‘An underlying theme… is the emergence of a cultural space (a symbolic universe) that both encompasses and transcends the ethnic, territorial, linguistic, and religious boundaries that normally define Chineseness.’73 Since Tu works not just as a writer but as a public intellectual,74 this is much more than simply an academic essay. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that it constitutes a ‘manifesto’ that continues to inform Greater China’s new model of cultural governance.

Most considerations of Chineseness are similar to the European identity politics in that they assume that there is a coherent core identity rooted at the center that

71 Zhang, 7.
expands outward to the periphery. The standard Chinese narrative recalls that even when it was conquered by the barbarians, the cultural power of Han China was able to civilize these barbarian hordes into proper Confucian Chinese dynasties. Tu’s essay is interesting because rather than assuming a rooted harmonious core identity, he recalls the disjunctures of the past 150 years that have radically decentered China, displacing the ‘Middle Kingdom’ into the ‘Far East’. The impact of Euro-American and Japanese imperialism certainly fragmented Chinese territory, but Tu stresses how it also fractured Chinese identity. Thus he argues that a crisis of ‘Chineseness’ persists long after the twilight of imperialist aggression because Chinese intellectuals still are engaged in a wholesale criticism of ‘Chinese tradition’.\(^75\)

To address this crisis, Tu’s influential essay makes a series of conceptual reversals. Rather than taking ‘culture’ for granted and celebrating the ever-expanding ‘economic’ ties as does most analysis of the East Asia economic miracle,\(^76\) Tu rehearses Greater China’s economic success as the context for cultural issues. Since the Confucian capitalists on the periphery are successful, they should convert the center back to Confucianism, he tells us. Through this interaction of periphery and center, Tu argues that Confucianism has been able to civilize not only the Chinese capital, but global capitalism itself by combining ‘tradition in modernity’ through guanxi capitalism in Greater China. Whereas traditionally Beijing was the center of political and cultural power – i.e. civilization – now it is the periphery that needs to be civilized.

Tu’s most interesting reversal concerns the locus of Chineseness itself. Instead of rationally measuring membership in Cultural China according to birthplace or bloodline, Tu looks to ethical relations of affiliation. Rather than assuming that people at the center are authentic, and those at the periphery are derivative (as the diaspora is often framed in Chinese discourse), Tu conceptualizes his community in terms of three symbolic universes. The first symbolic universe is based on territories that have an ‘ethnic and cultural’ Chinese majority: the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. The second consists of the Chinese diaspora, particularly in Southeast Asia and including Chinese as far away as New York, Australia and Europe. Most

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\(^75\) Tu 1994b, 5.

\(^76\) See Katzenstein, 1997.
radically, Tu adds a third symbolic universe that ‘consists of individuals, such as scholars, teachers, journalists, industrialists, traders, entrepreneurs, and writers, who try to understand China intellectually and bring their conceptions to their own linguistic communities.’

Thus in the mid-twentieth century while Confucianism was banned in the PRC and stagnated in Taiwan, it was active in New England among ‘Boston Confucians’ – not to mention the thriving Confucian community in South Korea. This third symbolic universe was not peripheral, Tu argues, for it was key to understanding Chineseness not just abroad, but within the first two symbolic universes as well. Indeed, this radical decentering works to exclude populations that one would normally code as Chinese: if Chinese intellectuals in Beijing reject Chinese culture, Tu asks ‘does this mean that they have voluntarily forfeited their right to be included in a definition of Chineseness?’

Much like in guanxi capitalism, Tu’s community is produced in transnational networks of intellectuals in Taiwan, Hong Kong and North America. In this way Tu is involved in a hybrid cultural governance that questions limits to combine the periphery and the center, East and West, tradition and modernity. Even people at the old center in Mainland China, Tu tells us, now think in terms of these cultural categories rather than political-institutional categories. Chinese on the mainland, Taiwan and overseas increasingly call themselves Huaren (cultural Chinese) rather than Zhongguoren (Chinese citizens). Chinese identity thus is not ‘national’ or ‘regional’ according to the governance of geopolitical administrative citizenship, but is a practice of cultural affiliation in a transnational cultural-economy. Drawing on evidence of political activism among diasporic Chinese, Tu concludes that ‘the symbols of Huaren were powerful enough to form a unity in diversity without appealing to an existing geopolitical center.’

Tu’s Cultural China is interesting because it entails more than the alternative political-economy of Greater China; it proposes the alternative modernity of Cultural China. Rather than simply being an thought piece, Tu’s essay on cultural China both promoted and reflected a Chinese cultural renaissance among intellectuals in the PRC.

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77 Tu 1994b, 13-4.
79 Ibid, 6.
80 Ibid, 25.
81 Ibid, 25.
82 Ibid, 26.
and abroad in the 1990s. Moreover, this mode of governance is available not just for an exclusive community of ethnic Chinese, but for all practitioners of Chineseness. Cultural China and Greater China thus signify a move away from institutions to transnational cultural networks that spread from the periphery to the center in ways that undermine the significance of the distinction between center and periphery. As another member of Cultural China declares, with this network power ‘the center is nowhere and the periphery is everywhere.’

V. Barbarian/Civilization encounters at the border
Tu’s Cultural China overcomes the problems of narrow nationalism and geopolitics by pointing to diasporic Chinese as a cosmopolitan community in relation with (barbarians in) Euro-America and Japan. This logic is shared by political-economic and post-structuralist analyses of Greater China. Yet some authors in Tu’s Cultural China project push this periphery/center logic even further by exploring the civilization’s relations with ‘barbarians’ closer at hand: the national minority groups that inhabit China’s geographical and cultural margins. This again shifts the notion of Chineseness from simply Han Chinese to a broader notion of transnational and overlapping identity. By questioning the logic of center/periphery relations, it thus constitutes not simply an openness to Otherness at the margin, but a transformation of civilization/barbarian relations from ‘continual war’ to productive relations based on engagement and exchange.

This shift can be seen in the encounter of barbarian and civilization in Ang Lee’s ‘Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon’ (2000). Before exploring this sub-plot of Lee’s blockbuster film, it is important to note that cinema is a key space not just for nation-building, but also for the construction of transnational communities, especially

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83 Yu Ying-shih in Tu 1994b, 34.
86 Zhang, p. 7.
87 Ang Lee, ‘Wohu zanglong’ [Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon], (Columbia Tristar Home Entertainment, 2000).
88 See Shapiro, pp. 141-72.

The sub-plot of ‘Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon’ that concerns us involves the relationship between Xiaolong (Little Dragon) and Xiaohu (Little Tiger) in Northwest China’s borderlands of Xinjiang. Indeed, this example addresses some of the same concerns as the EU’s engagement with Turkey: both China and Europe are encountering Turkic Islam on their periphery – Xinjiang is also known as East Turkestan. Much as Turkey serves as a foreign other in European identity construction, Xinjiang serves as key element in China’s identity politics as the site of barbarians who reaffirm China’s civilization. This is not just an issue of classical identity politics: the SCO was founded to control the flow of these ‘minority populations’ across national borders in Central Asia.

The encounter between Xiaolong and Xiaohu is instructive because it states the traditional civilization/barbarian relation of struggle, before blurring it through sex, love, and finally mutual-respect. This narrative starts with a journey from the civilized center of Beijing to the wild province of Xinjiang. The trail literally leads the caravan of Chinese officials through a desert, prompting Xiaolong’s mother to ask: ‘Will I ever see a tree again? Why couldn’t your father get an appointment closer to civilization?’ The uncivilized nature of the terrain is confirmed when the caravan is attacked by barbaric bandits, whose leader, Xiaohu, steals Xiaolong’s jade comb (a symbol of civilization). The second meeting, where Xiaolong seeks to recapture her civilized comb, leads to another struggle with Xiaohu – which in time transforms from a violent struggle to an erotic encounter. Indeed, the standard categories of civilization and barbarism are undermined as Xiaohu shows that he is a (civilized)

89 See Sheldon Hsiao-peng Liu, ed. Transnational Chinese Cinema (Honolulu:
gentleman by looking away while Xiaolong bathes; Xiaolong’s bad manners and local clothes show that she is quite barbaric. After wandering around the beautiful desert together, Xiaolong and Xiaohu come to love and respect not just each other, but each others’ way of life. Still, Xiaolong decides to go back to her family and civilization, because neither Xiaolong nor Xiaohu could meaningfully live in the other’s space. Xiaohu later pursues her to the center of civilization in Beijing, but she rejects him. They can only come together again far away from both the civilization center and the barbaric borderlands in the alternative space of a martial arts academy that sits atop an isolated mountain. The ending is ambiguous: it is not clear how and where the lovers can stay together.

This fruitful ambiguity provides an interesting solution to the ethical problem of barbarian/civilization relations, where the aim is not to convert barbarianism to civilization through cultural governance, but to allow space for alterity so as to appreciate difference in ethical governance. Although this narrative has been criticized as reproducing the simplistic notion that all non-Han Chinese are barbarians, the ethics of encounter in a people-to-people relation has overcome the categorical distinction of civilization/barbarism. It allows an opening for each to engage with the Other that questions the limits of (regional) community, and therefore ethically undermines the categories of civilization and barbarian.

This assertion of a definition of civilization that then blurs center/periphery and civilization/barbarian brings us back to the EU’s ‘Turkey problem’ mentioned above. Unlike French popular opinion and Europeanization theory, French philosopher Jacques Derrida is not interested in defining Europe, so much as examining what definitions leave out – the Other. Rather than looking to a cultural core or rejecting the EU, Derrida suggests that European identity has a double injunction to resist both the universal and the particular: neither can it be dispersed into ‘into a myriad of provinces, into a multiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms’, nor should it be monopolized by ‘trans-European cultural mechanisms… be they state-run

University of Hawaii Press, 1997).
91 For a more engaged encounter between civilization and barbarism along the same border, see J.M. Coetzee, *Waiting for the Barbarians*, (London: Vintage, 2000 [1980]).
or not, that would control or standardize.’ In resisting both the institutional governance of the super-state and the cultural governance of the primordial state, Derrida seeks neither to decentralize nor to re-centralize: ‘Responsibility today seems to consist today in renouncing neither of these two contradictory imperatives. One must therefore try to invent new gestures, discourses, politico-institutional practices that inscribe the alliance of these two imperatives, of these two promises or contracts: the capital and the a-capital, the other of the capital’. Similarly resisting the categories of civilization and barbarism, Derrida writes of the possibility and the responsibility of Europe: ‘And what if Europe were this: the opening onto a history for which the changing of the heading, the relation to the other heading or to the other of the heading, is experienced as always possible? An opening and a non-exclusion for which Europe would in some way be responsible?’

Like Tu and Lee, Derrida is not interested in replacing the center with the periphery, so much as being more attentive to the necessary tension between them. Communities are constructed for Derrida through a deconstruction of their limits: the periphery is as important as the center because a community is ‘based on the ethical injunction to continually question the limits of conceptions of community’ where ‘[d]econstruction is not an enclosure in nothingness, but an openness towards the other.’ Being European, Derrida argues, involves a duty of ‘welcoming foreigners in order not only to integrate them but to recognize their alterity.’ Ethics in Europe and East Asian thus is ‘not an experience of value … but a recognition of and vulnerability to alterity … as a difference that cannot be subsumed into the same.’ Hence like Xiaolong and Xiaohu riding together in Xinjiang, Derrida seeks to ‘head off’ the mainstream path not just toward the Other, but toward the Other of the Other,

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93 Derrida, 44.
94 Derrida, 17.
another place that is neither civilized nor barbaric, like Lee’s mountaintop martial arts academy.

**Conclusion**

This essay has taken a critical view of the logic of regionalism by comparing modes of governance in Europe and East Asia. European integration has been a gradual process of institutional expansion from the center to the periphery according to a logic of conditionality. This expansion has not just broadened Europe, but also deepened the EU through a progressive development of regional institutions. According to Europeanization theory, governance in the EU is largely located in interactions between nation-states and EU institutions. Thus both new members and existing members are increasingly regulated by central bodies. The institutional governance of the EU thus is the logical outcome of modernity’s teleological project of state formation.

Rather than using these formal institutional measures to judge East Asian regionalization as a failure, this essay has looked to less formal modes of regionalism that look to cultural and ethical governance. Although there are regional institutions in East Asia – ASEAN, ARF, APEC, SCO, EAEG, EAS – that have become more substantial in the past decade, most of the meaningful regional activity has taken place in people-to-people relations produced in market and cultural networks. Rather than seeing regionalism in terms of the rise of the Chinese state as the new hegemon, it is helpful to think of the region in terms of the transnational social networks of Greater China and Cultural China that employ cultural governance.

This way of explaining regionalism and identity has led some scholars to reverse the center-periphery model used to understand European integration. Rather than regionalism having a center that expands outward from the Northern Capital (i.e. Beijing), economic, social and cultural capital has flowed in the opposite direction in the past two decades. Confucianism, capitalism, and other measures of East Asian identity have been exported into China, as a way of civilizing the former imperial center. To many this is an intra-ethnic relation: diasporic Chinese civilizing their communist compatriots. But it goes beyond the logic of cultural governance based on shared ethnicity. Confucian culture, for example, has been delinked from its Chinese roots to serve as a deterritorialized mode of governance in various sites.\(^98\)

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\(^{98}\) Callahan 2004; Ong 1999.
Regionalism is no longer defined by the geobody of contiguous states, but describes a *modus vivendi* that regulates social life as well as economic production. Instead of institutions exercising the sovereign power of the state, families are producing network power in Cultural China.

This comparison underlines how the location of power (and resistance) is different in Europe and East Asia. As we saw with the EU Constitution, political discussion still is focused on political power defined as the sovereign (state). As Foucault tells us defining ‘the struggle in this limited political space has permitted the state to survive, even as we are questioning it’.99 Certainly East Asian states are still very important, and very powerful; but as the above analysis shows, scholars, artists and activists are looking in different places for the ethical relations of regionalism. Most importantly, the last section showed how some in Euro-America and Asia are pushing beyond a simple reversal of center and periphery to examine the ethical governance of fruitful encounters of civilization and barbarism not with the goal of conversion through conditionalities, but as an ethical relation that respects alterity.

I have used the language of governance to understand the differences and similarities in Europe and East Asia. The mainstream modes of governance are quite different: institutional governance in Europe and cultural governance in East Asia. But they are not mutually exclusive: institutional governance appeals to norms, even though these norms are encoded in laws and rules as the governing norm. Cultural governance, likewise, is structural because its cultural networks depend on the institutions of clans, businesses, and markets – although these are not state institutions. Both rules and culture are used by those in power to regulate not just what people can (and cannot) do, but who they can (and cannot) be. If Turkey cannot change its laws, then it can’t be European according to the EC. If urban Chinese reject Chinese culture, then they forfeit their right to be Chinese according to Tu Weiming. In this way the rationality of law obscures the politics of institutional governance, while the appeal to authentic culture mystifies the politics of transnational networks. Practices of governance in Europe and East Asia thus are not simply determined by cultural codes that are hardwired into these populations; each is flexible, adapting new modes and methods as necessary.

Lastly, the essay has argued that resistance to the power of institutional and cultural governance is similar in Europe and East Asia. In both regions, artists, scholars and activists are looking to the ethical governance of people-to-people relations as a way of resisting the both institutional and cultural power. Thus it is important to understand these different modes of governance to appreciate the problems and possibilities entailed in regional integration and world politics more generally.

the “follow-me” hubris of European institutionalization and integration.’

[more on governance: what is the conclusion?]