The Case of EU involvement in the Western Balkans: Europeanizing Greek Foreign Policy

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ABSTRACT

The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU has undergone a number of transformations since its conception in 1993. Its evolution is a clear mark that the EU is moving from a pragmatic ad-hocism to a coherent policy paradigm. These changes have had a significant impact on the national foreign policies of its member states. The purpose of this paper is to focus on how the conduct of Greek foreign policy was influenced by the wider transformations of CFSP, and establish a causal multidimensional path between the EU effect and Greek foreign policy. Has the case of EU involvement in the Western Balkans brought about the Europeanization of the foreign policy of a member state? In essence, is “Europeanization” relevant to study changes in national foreign policy? If that case can be argued, then can we attribute change to Europeanization, isolating it from other determining domestic or global factors? The main conclusion is that Greece is in fact a good case of Europeanization of foreign policy, since it shifted from a nationalist or populist-oriented and bilateral foreign policy paradigm to a more Europeanized, pragmatic and multilateral paradigm through the broader CFSP framework.

Introduction

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has undergone a number of transformations since its conception and its inclusion in the Treaty on the European Union. In 1993, CFSP was established by the Treaty (Art. 11 TEU) without having coherent and concrete policy implications for the Member States and for the Union as a unitary actor of foreign policy (Hill, 1994; Peterson & Sjursen, 1998). The initial purpose was to include “all questions related to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy which might lead to a common defence” (Art. 17 TEU). In terms of policy instruments, the CFSP framework included a broad range of tools from diplomatic to economic and trade methods, which were later on enhanced with the addition of the so-called Petersburg tasks and the deployment of a European Rapid Reaction Force as military instruments, following the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice (Duke, 2000). The Treaties transformed its decision-making processes from formal intergovernmentalism, to a system of a *sui generis* informal ‘communitized’ method, albeit quite distinct from the ‘Community’ pillar of the EU. It
still appears quite controversial to assume that the EU is a unitary actor and that its foreign policy approach is distinct. Yet, to claim any permanent policy coherence would be a mistake as the application of CFSP in the recent past has seen both stories of success and failure, and of coordination and complete disarray. Regardless of the fact, the EU emphasizes a holistic approach to security and foreign policy epitomized by conflict prevention and civil-military crisis management, rather than the deployment of traditional military forces (apparent from the adoption of the European Security Strategy in 2003).

The purpose of this paper is to focus on how the conduct of Greek foreign policy was influenced by the wider transformations that the CFSP framework underwent, and establish a causal multidimensional path between the EU effect—as an intervening variable—and the outlook of the Greek foreign policy. For the purposes of this paper, I define foreign and security policy in a broader framework of coordination of economic, political and military tools (Jorgensen, 1997; K. E. Smith, 1999). This paper is part of a broader PhD project that compares the evolution of foreign policy in Germany and Greece vis-à-vis the Eastern Enlargement of the EU. For the purposes of this paper, I focus on Greece as a small member state who traditionally has less weight in the policy-making process and that usually bandwagoned with the common strategies set at the European level. More specifically, the paper illuminates the formulation of Greek foreign policy towards the Western Balkans based on the wider involvement of the EU in the region through the CFSP framework. The central question is therefore, whether the case of EU involvement in the Western Balkans brought about the Europeanization of the foreign policy of a member state. In essence, is “Europeanization” relevant to study changes in national foreign policy? If that case can be argued, then can we attribute change to Europeanization, isolating it from other determining domestic or global factors?

The first section of the paper examines the literature around EU foreign policy and concludes that there has been a general move towards policy coherence albeit not consistent. The second section explains why Europeanization is an appropriate analytical framework for a) discussing European foreign policy, and b) examining changes in national foreign policy, providing its definition and methodological challenges, and highlighting the use of a top-down research design of Europeanization, i.e. the impact of EU-level decisions on domestic politics. The third section defines the variable for analysis and builds the hypotheses of the case study. In this instance, the paper looks at foreign policy as a compound variable amenable to empirical analysis in a finite temporal
horizon (1990 to the present), defined in terms of four contributing variables: actors, instruments, procedures and paradigms. The argument builds hypotheses that changes in foreign policy can be explained by global politics, domestic politics, or through the process of Europeanization. Finally, the last section provides an empirical analysis of the research design, looking at how the EU involvement in the Western Balkans changed Greek foreign policy. Its first part highlights the main EU actions in the region, whereas the second part analyzes the Greek response to them. At the end, the paper provides a summarizing table that shows for each within-case study scenario the magnitude and direction of change. The main conclusion is that Greece is in fact a good case of Europeanization of foreign policy, since it shifted from a nationalist or populist-oriented and bilateral foreign policy paradigm to a more Europeanized, pragmatic and multilateral paradigm through the broader CFSP framework.

**EU foreign policy: towards a coherent policy paradigm?**

In this section, the paper highlights the evolution of the academic literature on European foreign policy, and argues that despite the methodological and theoretical challenges the subject entails, the literature agrees that the EU has made a significant shift towards a coherent policy paradigm, much like in any other EU policy area. The European Union has shown in many policy arenas that despite disagreement on key issues it has the mechanisms and the methods to create the necessary conduits to create an environment of consensus or transform the policy frameworks of its member states in such a manner that policy convergence can be achieved. This has been the case for example of Economic and Monetary Union, or in issues of competition, regional development, or common agricultural policy. Support or implementation of these policies is feasible because they belong to areas where the community method is prescribed by the treaties the member states have signed, and is in fact, legally binding. When it comes to formulating a common foreign policy strategy, or an undertaking a common response to issues of foreign affairs, the EU has shown many signs of resilience. Past studies have argued that indeed the EU is a ‘novel type of international actor’ (K. E. Smith, 2003), even though the member states have tried to retain national sovereignty in foreign policy, and as such the EU has not acted as a unitary actor in world affairs (Hill, 1993). It has been a policy arena that is not directly affected by the common economic and political union context, and therefore relies on the common historically developed and formed values and principles and the historic responsibility of
the member states to the world. It is because of its non-binding nature that—beyond the theoretical aspect—past studies have focused mainly on specific member states (Irondelle, 2003; Miskimmon & Paterson, 2003; Tonra, 2000, 2001; Torreblanca, 2001; Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 2005) or have become an all-inclusive analysis of the totality of cases where the EU was involved.

However, it is quite safe to argue that from the loose EPC framework of the 1970s and the 1980s, the process of formulating a common foreign policy point has become more coherent due to the consolidation of authority at EU level, and the greater degree of national adaptation to the EU modus operandi on foreign policy—or Europeanization. Changes in the CFSP framework itself have altered the hierarchical position of foreign ministries to other ministries involved in the EU decision-making process; have created more open points of access to EU processes; have established clear links between economic and political processes; have intertwined domestic and foreign policy; and have ‘Europeanized’ foreign policy actors (Hill, 1996; Manners & Whitman, 2000; M. E. Smith, 2000, 2004a).

One of the first studies on the newly conceived CFSP framework, which had moved EU foreign policy to a more structured agenda than the EPC, defined European foreign policy as the sum of the actions of the EU and its member states in international relations (Hill, 1993). Hill highlighted a certain capabilities-expectations gap between the rhetoric of the CFSP and the outcomes or the repercussions the Union’s foreign policy activities entailed. This framework of analysis however, was based on the traditional instruments of foreign policy making a direct comparison of the EU with other nation-states of the international system (Peterson & Sjursen, 1998). The traditional approach to foreign policy focuses on the state (and in this case the EU) as a unitary actor. The shortcomings of this approach rest in its disregard towards the importance of norms, deep core values and paradigms. Nevertheless, the expression of norms and ideas about CFSP was a contributing factor towards their institutionalization in the EU foreign policy framework. In fact, this rhetoric frequently became a trap which constrained the actions of those who used it (Schimmelfennig, 2001) and resulted in hastily drawn policies in a number of cases—most evidently in the ‘turbo-charged’ EU involvement in the Kosovo crisis (Friis & Murphy, 2000).

Most scholars agree that the EU has an international presence, in terms of participation in regional and international round-tables and has shown its role as an international actor in some areas but the study of its policy paradigms is difficult since
“the EU is neither a state nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional international organization nor an international regime” (Ginsberg, 1999: 432). In that aspect, EU foreign policy cannot be directly assimilated to the traditional approach to foreign policy. The EU is assumed to be a foreign policy actor with a range of diverse tools at its disposal (Jørgensen, 1997) where foreign policy can be identified as “an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of a state as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives” (Allen, 1998: 43-44). The instruments of foreign policy can range then from trade, cooperation and association agreements, to aid, soft loans, an institutionalized dialogue framework, and even pressure of a pending EU membership (K. E. Smith, 2003: 107). Even so, to what extent does the development of a shared European interest in foreign affairs become an 'objective' of national foreign policy?

More recent scholarship (M. E. Smith, 2004b) presents an approach to CFSP as a model of multi-level governance. Despite the fact that the term has been extensively and successfully used to describe the decision-making process in areas of communitized policies, there are a few points of consideration for its application to foreign policy. M. Smith argues that the EU foreign policy ‘is now a formal EU policy domain with complex linkages, procedural and substantive, to other EU policies’ (2004b: 743). To that extent the Treaty even provides a greater degree of autonomy for the European institutions in specific stages of the foreign policy-making process. On the other hand, national foreign policy actors participate in all stages of the process, and are in fact, the broad agenda-setters at the European Council level (2004b: 744). In this case, M. Smith admits that the characteristics of the condition of domestic politics do have an input in the agenda-setting process (such as government ideology; government unity; and type of state organization), however, the socialization of the national foreign policy elites that takes place at the EU level contributes to the familiarization with each other’s logic, and enhances the belief that the EU can become a credible realm of foreign policy decisions as the socialization literature would prescribe (March & Olsen, 1989; North, 1990). Moreover, socialization at the EU level feeds back into the domestic foreign policy processes altering the actors’ behavior, the deployment of policy instruments and eventually the norms, values and paradigms followed in the conduct of foreign policy.

A good example of that process is the European Security Strategy, adopted by the European Council in December 2003. The ESS emphasized an integrated approach highlighting conflict prevention and civil-military crisis management, than the more traditional projection of military power. In this way, according to Rieker (2006: 510) “the
EU has developed a foreign and security policy discourse (emphasis added) independent of its member states, and that this somewhat comprehensive EU security discourse has influenced the security approaches of some of the Union’s smaller member states.” The argument is that the EU member states have individually developed different levels of importance in terms of security or strategic partnership with certain countries or actors (K. E. Smith, 2003). Therefore, the development of this discourse arena entails an inclination for changing their preference towards positive measures of action such as strengthening economic and political links as prescribed in the EU paradigm. The EU as a whole aims to affect economic and social structures of foreign policy partners through pacific and original means of diplomacy as argued above (Telò, 2001: 264).

Apart from a discourse arena, however, the CFSP has also been considered both a power-based regime and an interest-based regime. In the former case, the most powerful players establish the rules and purpose of the foreign policy framework; therefore, the small member states are left with no choice, where in fact, any decision is based on the lowest common denominator that poses no challenge to national foreign policy interests (Tonra, 2003: 733-734). In the latter case, policy outputs are a product of median-interests bargaining leaving the definition of national interests unaffected (2003:734). A close examination of EU foreign policy actions reveals that its actors do not always recoil to the lowest common denominator position, but strive to a compromising, median position with the desire to reach a decision. The modus operandi of CFSP feeds back into domestic politics and reinforces the institutionalization of the rhetoric of collective EU interests despite the fact central EU leadership is absent. It is this particular way of coordination, internalization of norms, socialization and learning that transforms and advances national foreign policy interests towards a more coherent collective European position, and here is where the concept of Europeanization becomes highly relevant.

**The Europeanization of foreign policy**

The purpose of this section is to examine Europeanization as an appropriate analytic framework for the study of EU foreign policy coherence and its impact on the national foreign policy of its member states. Linking back to the first section, the paper builds upon the more succinct definition of Europeanization by Radaelli (2003: 30) as “processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of norms, beliefs, formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, “ways of doing things”
that are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy processes and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies.” One implication of this definition is a structural one in terms of the coordination process (Tonra, 2003: 740) that is pertinent to the national foreign ministries with adaptations to bureaucratic structures and ‘ways of doing things’ created to explicitly link national foreign policy more effectively into the formal and informal rules, procedures and processes of the collective foreign policy apparatus. In addition, the implications of the internalization of the CFSP norms and paradigms do not necessarily entail adaptation. In this case, the framework that Héritier (2001) developed for Europeanization is quite relevant to measure the magnitude of change and its direction (Radaelli, 2000: annex). The process can result in ‘inertia’ (lack of change); ‘absorption’ (in a sense, adaptation); ‘transformation’ (change in policy paradigms); or even, ‘retrenchment’ (opposition to change). This framework of analysis can provide potential explanations for the successes and failures of EU foreign policy.

However, the concept of Europeanization entails many methodological challenges. One of its earliest definitions builds on the impact of EU membership on domestic politics and policies. Ladrech argues that Europeanization is “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of policies to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making” (1994: 69). This implies that Europeanization builds on European integration theories and leads to the standardization of policy making among the member states. Therefore, due to its development from European integration it is restricted to the member states. The concept of Europeanization is not identical to European integration—it is rather a mechanism concerned with the consequences of the process for the member states (Bulmer & Lequesne, 2002: 16; Irondelle, 2003). At the same wavelength, Europeanization should not be confused with policy convergence or homogenization (Knill, 2001: 41-50; Lequesne, 1998: 126) despite the fact that it signals a certain degree of policy coherence among member states. Finally, there are many cases to be argued for Europeanization not being limited to the EU member states (Fischer, Nicolet, & Sciarini, 2002 on Switzerland; Grabbe, 2001 on enlargement; Levi-Faur, 2004 on a global comparison).

The starting point for the application of Europeanization in foreign policy studies was the comparative study of the foreign policies of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland of Tonra (2000) which brought the analysis of European foreign policy at a
different level. Tonra suggests that in fact, CFSP is a Europeanization mechanism that results in the “transformation in the way in which national foreign policies are constructed, in the way professional roles are defined and pursued and in the consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising from a complex system of collective European policy-making” (Tonra, 2000: 229). Europeanization is implied to be not only a process of adaptation but also one of learning (Risse, Caporaso, & Cowles, 2001). Nevertheless, adaptation requires the adjustment of national instruments and procedures to external pressures usually stemming from the EU level. Yet, learning requires the change in the preferences of the actors and to a greater degree to paradigms, norms and values which, in the case of foreign policy may start from EU-level rhetoric. In fact, this rhetoric does not have to be legally binding to create the necessary conditions for the learning to take place. The example here is the Draft Constitutional Treaty. Article I-3 stated that “the Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its people […] In its relations with the wider world […] it shall contribute to peace, security […] as well as to strict observance and development of international law […] These objectives shall be pursued by appropriate means, depending on the extent to which the relevant competencies are attributed to the Union in the Constitution.” Even though the Treaty’s document was not ratified by all EU member states it does create a common set of paradigms, norms and values, to which the national delegates to the Convention on the Constitutional Treaty subscribed and, in convincing their national constituents, it fed back into the foreign policy-making process. To that extent, national interests “can be seen to have evolved and changed over time as a direct result of their participation in CFSP, with the very formulation of national foreign policies taking place in a new and evolving context” (Tonra, 2003: 749).

Despite the fact that “decision-making inputs are triggered by national and subnational actors and European institutions responding to external and internal stimuli and inspired by indigenous European values and interests and by a politics of scale” (Ginsberg, 1999: 435), there is a sense of top-down Europeanization for small member states which implies a process where the influence occurs fundamentally from the outside (the European level) to the inside (national foreign policy) (Torreblanca, 2001:

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1 (see also Deutsch, 1957; Feldman, 1998; Ginsberg, 1989; Herrberg, 1998; Jorgensen, 1997; Laffan, 1996; Raymond, 1997; Russett, 1993; Waever, 1996; Wendt, 1994). The argument is that national and regional actors influence and are influenced by (a) the European context of and norms rooted in interstate reconciliation, a security community, a democratic (or stable) peace and shared identities linked to the legitimacy and interests of the EU; and (b) the context of rules and norms rooted in international society; and (c) systemic change rooted in international politics.
488), and consequently a harmonization and transformation of a member state to the needs and requirements of EU membership. In terms of national foreign policy, this involves the increasing prominence of the European political agenda; adherence to common objectives; gradual precedence of common policy outputs over national domaines réservés; and internalization of EU membership and its integration process (Wong, 2007: 326). In essence, causation moves from the EU to the domestic level. Nevertheless, the process may not be always successful as EU pressure “mediated by intervening variables, leads to reactions and change at the domestic level, including resistance and inertial responses” (Quaglia & Radaelli, 2007: 926). For this analytical context, Europeanization essentially refers to the process by which CFSP “moved closer to EC norms, policies and habits, without itself becoming supranationalized” (Ginsberg, 1999: 443). The concept of Europeanization is a healthy remedial to the overemphasis on interstate bargaining and opens the door to new, more structured theoretical insights into European foreign policy.

This analysis however, involves a reasonable criticism as there is a risk of “overestimating Europeanization as an ‘all explaining’ factor, forgetting the importance of other endogenous or exogenous influences” (Major, 2005: 183). Thus, the methodological challenge lies in the definition and isolation of the ‘EU effect’ from other domestic or global influences impacting upon national foreign policy. One of the ways proposed to overcome this challenge is to establish a detailed chronological order of events to help establish a causal relationship in the form of process-tracing, but this ‘cannot replace an assessment of whether the EU was a factor of crucial importance’ (Haverland, 2007: 62-67). Tonra (2000) on the other hand, uses a comparative analysis of three small member states over time, allowing for the causal measurement of the impact of Europeanization. More radical studies suggest counterfactual reasoning (Irondelle, 2003) arguing the case of how the foreign and security policies of member states would have developed without the EU or the CFSP framework. No matter the method of analysis for isolating the ‘EU effect’, the process of domestic change is “more voluntary and non-hierarchical” (Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005: 345) than in ‘communitized policy areas, generating through the alteration of beliefs and expectation of actors’ (Knill & Lehmkuhl, 1999: 2). To conclude, it is safe to argue that “Europeanization and CFSP is more a process of socialization than forced adaptation” (Major, 2005: 186).

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2 The definition is translated from the original document in Spanish by author. Torreblanca in the original document defines “top-down” as “un proceso en el que el sentido de la influencia ha discurrido fundamentalmente de afuera (el entorno europeo) hacia dentro (política exterior nacional).”
National foreign policy as a compound variable

Since the focus of the central question of the paper is Europeanization as a determining process in the construct of national foreign policy the previous discussion showed that foreign policy studies utilizing the concept have been quite limited. It is the intention of this paper to employ the existing aforementioned definitions and develop an analytical framework borrowing relevant elements from other studies concerned with the Europeanization of other policy areas. As mentioned before, Europeanization cannot be constrained only as a process of foreign policy convergence: it constitutes a mechanism that may lead to a common position among member states, emanating from the common policies at the EU-level. Put differently, member states adapt to CFSP structures and norms and other common foreign policy strategies. Of course, different country weights in the EU play a different role in the contribution that each member state has in the formulation of these structures and strategies. Nevertheless, once the structures and strategies have been agreed upon, then they create their own Europeanization momentum.

At a first stage, it is necessary to define the dependent variable to be tested, in this case, the change or shift in national foreign policy. Defining foreign policy, I am using the definition by Allen (1998: 43-44) as “an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of the state so as to protect and advance agreed and reconciled objectives.” These activities regard the establishment of economic, political, environmental, social or cultural exchanges. For the examination of the case study however, and due to the length of this paper, I will select the most important ones (admittedly with a slight bias). Although the dependent variable as such, is national foreign policy, it cannot be regarded as a solid variable. Rather, foreign policy (FP) can be expressed as a compound variable of four contributing components:

(a) Actors of foreign policy (A)
(b) Instruments of foreign policy (I)
(c) Decision-making procedures (Pr), and;
(d) Paradigms (Hall, 1993), norms and deep core values.

Put in different connotation: \( \{FP\} = \{A, I, Pr, Pa\} \), and that holds for every case selected. In the effort to measure the change in foreign policy, a finite temporal framework is utilized that measures the continuity or change in these specific components. For each case study then, the change can be measured accordingly over
time as \( \{FP\}_{t=0}^{X} \rightarrow \{FP\}_{t+n}^{X} = \Delta X \), where \( n \) signifies the end of the temporal framework, \( \Delta \) denotes change and \( X \) the case study involved.

From the above definition of the dependent variable it is easy to build four hypotheses for the initial research question of whether we can apply Europeanization to changes in national foreign policy. The hypotheses have as follows:

(i) \( H_0 \) = Inertia; that means that the change \( \Delta X = 0 \). The foreign policy of the country has not changed through the temporal framework of analysis.

(ii) \( H_1 \) = ‘Global geopolitics’ determine most of the variance across time and across countries. This is the political economy argument whereby the global environment becomes conducive to the adoption of new practices.

(iii) \( H_2 \) = ‘Domestic politics’ determine most of the variance across time and across countries. This is the classic intergovernmental argument posed by Moravcsik, that it is the states themselves that inflect change in foreign policy.

(iv) \( H_3 \) = Europeanization as defined by Radaelli (2003: 30) determines most of the variance across time and across countries, by intervening in the processes of foreign policy formulation.

What needs to be determined at the second stage is how each change in the components of the compound dependent variable \( \{FP\} \) reflects the four hypotheses. This can be achieved by identifying the causal mechanisms that influence the scope and orientation of change in the dependent variable components \( \{A, I, Pr, Pa\} \).

The supportive analytic framework by Héritier (2001) discussed above measures the magnitude and direction of change using four outcomes:

(1) inertia (implying lack of change);
(2) absorption (codifying change as adaptation to norms);
(3) transformation (operationalized as paradigmatic change (Hall, 1993)), and;
(4) retrenchment (less Europe than before).

This sort of analytic framework provides the research design with the advantage of being able to categorize certain events and determine the general trend in a specified foreign policy component \( \{A, I, Pr, Pa\} \) as well as trace its process through time, identifying at each stage the seminal intervening variables. The paper utilizes process-tracing and a top-down research design, i.e. what goes on in the EU-level of foreign policy and how the member state foreign policy compound variable responds over time. In the following figure (figure 1) that exhibits a schematic representation of process-tracing, let the four components \( \{A, I, Pr, Pa\} \), randomly placed on the timeline, be denoted with a star in terms of seminal events in foreign policy \( \{FP\} \) for the said case study.
As obvious, different components may change or remain inert for the case study at different times and at a different pace. Therefore, where do the opportunities, pressures, incentives stemming from Europe and identified in the top-down research design, play a causal role in determining the starred variables. To make this model more tangible, let our case study be Greece, a small EU-member state, and let the intervening variables be the CFSP framework, the other common strategies and the EU involvement in the Western Balkans. The timeline for instance, showing the EU actions and the responses of Greek foreign policy would look more or less as follows:

**Figure 2: Example of the model with intervening EU variables in the case of Greece.**

**Greek responses**

- **1991**
  - Greece recognizes Slovenia and Croatia
  - Name dispute with FYROM over name: FM resigns, Socialists back

- **GR sends troops and aid to Bosnia after the Dayton Agreement**

- **1997**
  - Albanian crisis 1997, Greece handles legal order

- **2008**
  - GR not participates in Kosovo campaign, but allows access
  - Greece does not officially recognize Kosovo but does not claim non-recognition

**EU Actions**

- **1991**
  - Recognition by EC of the new former Yugoslav states

- **1992**
  - EU manages Bosnia crisis distantly, allows US intervention

- **1995**
  - Bears peace-building after Dayton

- **2004**
  - Deployment of EU forces post-crisis in Albania

- **2008**
  - Use of NATO arrangements for Kosovo and set-up of Stability Pact

- **2009**
  - EU splits re recognition of Kosovo, no significant common position

Source: author
**EU involvement in the W. Balkans and Greek foreign policy: Europeanization?**

Greece has been a case of a country that has largely been influenced by its participation in the European Union. Most recent studies on Greece have looked at Europeanization as the impact on domestic economic and development policies, in terms of devolution and decentralization of the state, of labor and employment policies and in terms of development of the political parties. There are only a handful of studies on Greek foreign policy as a case of Europeanization and usually on Greek-Turkish relations. In fact, especially in the case of foreign policy, Greece was forced to make adjustments, restructuring its foreign policy, and draw benefits and opportunities far more so than any other member state. All countries are influenced and are subjected to a process of Europeanization, but the case of Greece appears to be quite unique. The reasons are that it contains certain idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis the unstable foreign policy environment and the open issues with its neighboring countries. Through the model analyzed above I expect that looking at the four categories of impact of the process of Europeanization in terms of actors, instruments, decision-making procedures and paradigms, there have certainly been major changes since the accession of Greece into the EU in 1981, and even more rapid developments since 1993, when the Union consolidated a) its Common Foreign and Security Policy and b) its enlargement strategy to include its Eastern European neighbors.

To set up the case study, the paper identifies the start of EU involvement in the Balkans in the early 1990s after the collapse of Yugoslavia and its disintegration into its constituent republics. Due to the recent developments in the region, the timeframe ends with the recent decision of Kosovo to declare its independence on February 17, 2008. Taking the most important events in which the EU was called to take action, the paper explores in parallel the extent of the EU measures and the effect on Greek foreign policy actors, instruments, decision-making procedures and paradigms, tracking the changes in foreign policy. This comparison will allow the isolation of those cases where the EU-effect was the defining variable rather than domestic politics or global developments. By actors, I define the agenda-setters in foreign policy, which, apart from the executives of the government and the foreign ministry as an institution, include also non-governmental actors, such as the general public. In terms of instruments, the paper examines the nature of policies adopted by Greece which includes both economic and political policy development. Regarding the decision-making procedures, the paper identifies the participation of the country in the major and minor European foreign policy schemes.
and strategies. Finally, in terms of paradigms, norms and deep core values, the paper highlights the shift of priorities in the agenda, the transformation of the ‘ways of doing things,’ as well as the socialization and learning processes taking place at the EU level and feeding back to the domestic environment.

Before proceeding however, it is essential to set the geopolitical background to the early 1990s that created the opportunities for Greece to Europeanize its foreign policy. After the demise of Yugoslavia, the successive wars of independence in Southeastern Europe, as well as the resurfacing of nationalist and irredentist sentiments, radically changed the foreign policy agenda. Greece never really had to cope with creating an independent foreign policy, despite the fact that public opinion was against foreign protection, and the political party platforms throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s were calling for foreign policy independence and non-alliance. In addition, although foreign and security matters were ‘directly and insolubly linked to the preservation of national sovereignty and highly symbolically entrusted to the national executive’ (Major, 2005: 183) the 1980s and the 1990s brought the domination in foreign policy of the personalities of the prime ministers, and on occasion, of the foreign ministers—acting as agenda-setters within the agenda-setter. It has been in fact, interestingly argued that for many years prior to 1993, Greece was behaving like a Balkan country within the Union, and not as a European country within the Balkans (Coufoudakis, Psomiades, & Gerolymatos, 1999; Featherstone & Ifantis, 1996; Simitis, 2005; Veremis, 2004) emphasizing the country’s radical transformation of foreign policy since then. Ioakimidis (2000: 365) argues that Greece showed initially a striking inability to grasp the opportunities unleashed in the region but “eventually adjusted its policy to the new conditions, thereby responding to the pressures from the EU.”

**EU actions in the Western Balkans**

The disintegration of former Yugoslavia was followed by short-lived wars with Slovenia and Croatia, and then by the Bosnian war. This fragmentation into its composing entities led to the opening up of the Albanian question in both Albania proper and in the Serbian province of Kosovo and at a later stage in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The Kosovo crises of 1998-1999 and its subsequent bombardment by NATO forces under the auspices of the EU was the starting point for the final demise of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (what remained after the original break-up of the country) which took place in February 2008 with the
self-proclaimed independence of the province and the issues over its recognition. In more recent developments, i.e. since 2000, the EU has replaced NATO forces for peacekeeping and policing and is involved in a number of initiatives and common strategies for the Balkans—despite the complexity of policies and their inefficiencies at times. Although the EU coped fairly well with confronting its Eastern and Central European counterparts and even Russia to a certain extent, it appeared in disarray and quite hesitant in its dealing with the Western Balkans, a region which by one scholar has been described as *terra incognita* (M. Smith, 2000: 812).

The CFSP framework seems to have its stories of success and failure in the Balkans, with European foreign policy as such being quite fragmented. Yet it has enough cases where we can trace its effects on the member states. Again, the EU was more successful in holistic means of conflict management rather than in traditional means of military power projection. In fact, the cases of success have to do with economic reconstruction, humanitarian aid, diplomatic efforts and institutionalized dialogue, and pressures for EU membership.

The first crisis came with the break-up of Yugoslavia, and particularly with the issue of recognition of the newly formed republics of Slovenia and Croatia. The EU appeared unable to cope with the crisis lacking in cohesion, determination, and instruments. Before there was even a common strategy, Germany rushed to recognize the states to be followed by Italy, and then all other member states aligned with the trend. In a sense, the recognition of the two countries was more a response to internal and global pressures to individual member states rather than to a common European perspective. The war in Bosnia (1992-1995) was a test for European foreign policy and its role as a conflict manager. The EU aimed to provide diplomatic pressure and humanitarian relief to stabilize and manage the crisis from a distance. In fact, the United States became more involved in the crisis leading the peace agreements in Dayton. The EU was called to provide the majority of resources in manpower and funds after the war. However, the channeling of military personnel was through a NATO circuit.

Moving on into 1997, the region was in focus once more with the collapse of the Albanian economy which caused a dismay in the local population and a break-down of its legal order. The crisis was managed with EU policing forces coming in post-crisis. Nevertheless, the EU had acted in a coherent manner based on the principles of CFSP. The next major test was the crisis in Kosovo and the eventual bombardment of Serbia in 1999. Although the EU was not a negotiator in the hard security phase (M. Smith, 2000:
817), within a period of four months soon after the first NATO attacks on Serbia, the EU managed to come up with a plan for the day after in Kosovo. The EU, in complete solidarity created the momentum and succeeded in providing a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, to set up a Reconstruction Agency, and to launch the stabilization and association agreements specifically for this region. According to Friis and Murphy (2000: 767), the innovative aspect of this strategy was that it evolved around a new inclusive approach perceiving the countries of the Western Balkans as potential EU members. Although the initial split for the undertaking of military measures against Serbia was quite deep among member states, the characterization of the crisis itself as a triple one for the EU (as humanitarian first; second, as indicative of a future role for Germany as a military force in Europe; and third, as undermining the credibility of the EU as an actor in foreign policy) created an EU-widespread consensus that common action was necessary.

In more recent developments, the EU successfully managed the ethnic conflict in FYROM in 2003 with the conclusion of the Ohrid Agreement and the military operation Concordia. It was also successful in managing the constitutional dispute in Serbia and Montenegro. In fact, the EU had a major role in the velvet secession of Montenegro from the union with Serbia overseeing the referendum process and any negotiations. In the CFSP framework, the Balkans proved to be a good training ground for the development of a civilian and military operational capacity that for the first instance was deployed in the region. In spring 2003, the EU took over the policing of Bosnia from the UN through the EUPM. In the summer, the EU undertook the command from NATO in FYROM, to be followed by the deployment of EU police forces later in December. Finally, in December 2004, the UN-led SFOR mission in Bosnia was replaced by 7,000 troops under the EU administrative umbrella (Cameron, 2007: 129) codenamed EUFOR Althea. While this paper was still being composed, the EU has faced a split in the issue of the recognition of an independent Kosovo, where, in terms of actions, limited itself to the issuing of a common position, without specifying EU-wide recognition.

Nevertheless, the EU has adopted a whole new approach since the beginning of the decade by using apart from traditional means of foreign policy, the more contemporary idea of stabilization through a promise of association or even integration within the European structures. The most prominent manifestation of that was during the Thessaloniki 2003 summit, under the auspices of the Greek Presidency. The declaration to the Balkans was including several enlargement instruments to enhance the Stabilization and Association Agreements and the pre-accession strategies. Moreover,
through the Stability Pact, the EU is now promoting a free-trade area in the Western
Balkans to encourage additional foreign investment and trade relations with the EU
member states.

**Greek foreign policy responses to the EU actions**

In the first case of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, Greece, following the
global pressures and trends of action from other countries and the UN, had to
bandwagon and proceed with their recognition as well. The situation raised concerns in
Greece, and the main objective of its foreign policy was the preservation of the status
quo of the Yugoslav entity in any format. Nevertheless, under the weight of global
pressures Greece was forced to even recognize FYROM with this provisional name,
which did cause a change of government in 1993 and allowed local politicians to exploit
the situation for their own benefit. The subsequent war in Bosnia, which cost Greece a
lot in financial and commercial terms, created a domestic momentum for the
continuation of a rational and low-key policy emphasizing the concerns for security in
the EU context. Therefore, the undertaking by the EU of the majority of the costs and
manpower to maintain stability and provide peace-keeping missions in Bosnia was
welcome in Greece, which participated actively both in the reconstruction and
humanitarian aid schemes, and in the provision of troops for the peace-keeping and
policing missions. In the case of Albania in 1997, Greece was praised for its ability to
handle successfully the break-down of the legal order and reflected a Europeanized way
of doing things by keeping “equidistant (vis-à-vis parties in dispute) and multilateral
policies in the Balkans” (Couloumbis, 2000: 382) as was prescribed by the EU-level.

Essentially the turning point in Greek foreign policy has been identified in the
literature as 1996 with the assumption of the Prime Minister’s office by Kostas Simitis,
who proclaimed himself a modernizer and a Europeanist. Simitis set his foreign policy
style to a more pragmatic, problem solving and issue-oriented one (Ioakimidis, 2000:
365) bringing it to a more technocratic context. Greece removed the bilateral level of
foreign affairs and allowed for the absorption of multilateral policies stemming from the
CFSP and enlargement frameworks. Nevertheless, the Kosovo crisis brought Greek
foreign policy to a serious test resulting from the demand for cooperation with NATO
forces. The Greek media intensified the public opinion reactions by projecting the air
strikes ‘as an act of aggression not only against Serbia, but also against the geopolitical
order in the Balkans’ (Huliaras & Tsardanidis, 2006: 478). In fact, during the Kosovo
military campaign, national opinion polls revealed a staggering 95% of the Greek public in opposition of the intervention (Friis & Murphy, 2000: 769; Tsardanidis & Stavridis, 2005: 218). Despite the public outcry, Simitis steered the crisis managing a stratagem where the Greek position would be in accordance with European demands, and bear the least domestic political costs. He placed at the heart of the Greek diplomatic efforts a political solution and declined the participation of Greek military forces. He did not oppose on the other hand, the operation and granting right of passage to the allied forces and maintenance of logistics routes through Greek territory (Economides, 2005: 485-486). But this was clearly a retrenchment from the European common position.

At the end of the crisis, Greece revealed a strong Europeanized foreign policy by admitting refugees from Kosovo, and dispatching large quantities of humanitarian aid. Greece adopted the integrated regional framework for reforms and transformed its foreign policy instruments and paradigms to adopt the proposed Stability Pact. Greece even decided to finance the appointment of its diplomat, P. Roumeliotis, who was the EU coordinator of the Royaumont process for Kosovo, as the coordinator of the Stability Pact and agreed in locating the European Agency for Reconstruction headquarters in Pristina (Friis & Murphy, 2000: 776). Due to the overlapping of competencies, Greece traded the appointment instead, for the location of the headquarters in Thessaloniki, making it a hub for the dissemination of the EU policies towards the Western Balkans. The aftermath of the Kosovo conflict resulted in the transformation of Greek foreign policy actors, instruments, procedures and paradigms. Partisan and personal disputes were set aside; actions were based upon a realistic assessment of the extent of the Greek influence and power; and Greece managed to be perceived by the European Union as contributing towards the solution of the crisis by advocating and assisting in the implementation of international aid programs for the entire region (Tziampiris, 2003: 148).

In terms of the stability agreements for the region, Greece has favored their respect and complete application of the Dayton Agreement, the Ohrid Agreement and the regional strategies for Kosovo. The Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003, organized by the Greek presidency of the EU, produced declarations adopted at the EU level for the European orientation and integration of the Balkans, which remain in the core of the EU foreign policy objectives for the region. The bundle of measures that began to be implemented in the subsequent Italian presidency encourages the EU and Greek commitment. The Greek presidency organized and facilitated the installation of the
EUPM force and the commencement of the Althea military operation in Bosnia. At the same time, Greece strongly participated in cost and troops in the Concordia operation in FYROM (Bakoyannis, 2006; Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). Lately however, the inability of the EU to provide a common strategy towards the recognition or not of the independence of Kosovo has proven to be a detrimental case for the Europeanization of national foreign policy. The EU appears quite split with Germany, Italy, France and the UK being fervent supporters and first to recognize it. On the other hand, Spain, Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania have declared non-recognition. Where does Greece stand on this? It has not officially recognized the state, but has maintained a balancing position by not recognizing either. In this sense, Greece is showing inertia from the policy it followed of maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, now that the region has managed to maintain stability for long period of time, and most of its countries are on a good track for European integration. However, its position remains to be seen.

The Europeanization literature has argued that there are two direct effects of national participation in EU foreign policy: first of all, elite socialization and second, change in national foreign policy bureaucracies (M. E. Smith, 2004b: 746). It can be argued in both cases that member states try to fill in the treaty gaps in institutional terms, which causes deep changes in their own foreign policy paradigms. The CFSP required the establishment of new national officials to serve it. Moreover, it led to a clear reorientation and reorganization of national foreign ministries towards “Europe” in order to improve their handling of European affairs (Manners & Whitman, 2000). In a way, there was an internalization of CFSP norms and paradigms with transformations of national bureaucratic structures and working methods “made explicitly to link national foreign policy more effectively into the processes and procedures of the collective foreign policy machinery” (Tonra, 2003: 740). This transformation also reflected the way in which national foreign policies are constructed and in the way professional role are defined and pursued due to the complex system of collective European policy-making.

Political cooperation priorities became national prerogatives and EU member states were expected to sustain a level of commitment to the joint strategies and policies. One aspect of this commitment is the expression of the common positions and acting on behalf of the EU (M. E. Smith, 2000: 619; Torreblanca, 2001: 484\(^3\)). This was particularly visible when Greece held the EU presidency in 2003. Finally, the foreign ministries have

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\(^3\) As translated by author from original text: “convertirse ella misma en intérprete y portavoz de los intereses de la UE en estas regiones.”
acquired a new place in the domestic political hierarchy and an enhanced role in the decision-making procedures. The construction of a European foreign policy has, in the words of Laffan (1996: 297), “blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs and has meant that the department of foreign affairs is more intensely involved in domestic issues than at any stage in the department’s history.”

In the case of Greece, due to the widening of the foreign policy paradigms, it was necessary to radically adjust the structures of the Ministry by law in 1998. The 3rd Directorate General is now in full charge of EU and EU-enlargement issues, and is currently divided in four sub-directorates. One additional position was created, that of the Political Director, who is in charge of coordinating negotiations on common communiqués with the Union. Nevertheless, there was a wide restructuring of the way things were run within the strategic planning of foreign policy that would not be bound to the choices of the incumbent Minister but rather they would be the product of a set of institutional procedures. For a prolonged time, foreign policy was by and large the byproduct of personal choices—that entailed a certain electoral or political purpose. With the shift in the internal structures of the Ministry, due to Europeanization, began a process of gradual institutionalization of strategic planning and exercise of foreign policy. The diminishing of the distinction between issues of internal affairs and foreign affairs can mainly be attributed to Europeanization. When it comes to foreign affairs now, other actors beyond the respective ministry are heavily involved, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Environmental and Urban Planning, other governmental institutions, the civil society, various think tanks—all belonging to what is referred to as second track diplomacy (Ioakimidis, 2007). The Europeanization of the Ministry resulted in the development of many directorates on various issues like foreign aid, and of course, in a gradual institutionalization of political actors. Thus, without diminishing the role of political actors, the role of institutional actors has emerged.
**Appraisal of results: a strong case for Europeanization**

The following table summarizes the evolution of EU actions in the Western Balkans and the response of Greece to them, adding the major cause for change or no change going back to the original hypotheses, the expected outcome in terms of the direction and magnitude of change, and the variable component mostly affected. The table shows that in most cases, Europeanization (as defined earlier by Radaelli), rather than global pressures or domestic politics, determines the formulation of foreign policy. In fact, in most of the cases the change was towards absorption (i.e. adaptation) of EU norms and strategies and towards transformation (i.e. paradigmatic change) in the form of adopting multilateral paradigms rather than bilateral and institutionalizing the adaptation to EU paradigms, norms and deep core values.

<p>| Table 1: Summarizing EU actions, Greek responses and impacts in the case of EU involvement in the Western Balkans (1991-2008). |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Year             | EU Action         | Greek response   | Major Cause      | Expected Outcome                      | Affected FP Component (A, I, Pr, Pa) |
| 1991-1992        | Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia | Aligned with international pressures, even recognized FYROM | International Politics | Absorption of international strategies | A: Change of government |
| 1992-1995        | Distant in Bosnia as a negotiator in Dayton, but bore costs and manpower | Aligned with EU and supported with troops, aid and reconstruction funds | EU | Absorption of EU strategy | A: Europeanist Prime Minister \ I: structured foreign aid \ Pr: support through EU initiatives rather than bilateral |
| 1997             | Post-crisis support for Albanian scandal | Provided policing forces and helped maintain legal order | EU | Transformation of paradigms | I: police forces for first time \ Pr: part of the EU initiatives \ Pa: institutionalization of EU norms and paradigms |
| 1999             | EU participates with forces in the NATO campaign in Kosovo | Greece does not participate, due to public outcry, but allows right of passage and use of facilities | Domestic Politics | Retrenchment from the EU strategy | A: constructive ambivalence by Prime Minister \ I: classic diplomatic means \ Pr: bilateral relations \ Pa: against EU |
| 1999             | EU sets up regional approach and Stability Pact | Adopts Stability Pact and leads the regional efforts for reconstruction | EU | Transformation of actors, instruments and paradigms | A: act and speak on behalf of EU \ I: new agencies, formal aid \ Pa: trade-offs through EU means, active contributor to EU shaping of policy |</p>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>EU Action</th>
<th>Greek response</th>
<th>Major Cause</th>
<th>Expected Outcome</th>
<th>Affected FP Component (A, I, Pr, Pa)</th>
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| 2003 | Thessaloniki      | Greek EU presidency, fervent supporter for European orientation of Balkans | EU                                              | Transformation of actors, procedures and paradigms | A: Greek actors are transformed into EU actors  
Pr: highly Europeanized through high-level summits  
Pa: transformed to become part of the EU ones due to presidency, but change is maintained |
|      | Declaration       |                                     |                                                 |                                                        |                                                                                                  |
| 2003 | Establishment of  | Contributes troops and funds         | EU                                              | Absorption of EU strategy                             | I: peace-keeping mission  
Pr: establishment through EU presidency  
Pa: from UN to EU-led                                                                 |
|      | Concordia operation |                                     |                                                 |                                                        |                                                                                                  |
| 2003 | EUPM operation    | Contributes police forces            | EU                                              | Absorption of EU strategy                             | A: involvement of police  
I: integrated policing  
Pa: from UN to EU-led                                                                 |
| 2004 | EUFOR Althea      | Maintains existing force and contributes more troops | EU                                              | Absorption of EU strategy                             | A: involvement of Ministry of Defense  
I: integrated military support  
Pa: from UN/NATO to EU-led                                                                 |
|      | operation         |                                     |                                                 |                                                        |                                                                                                  |
| 2008 | Kosovo common     | Maintains status quo, leans towards non-recognition | Domestic Politics and International Politics    | Inertia                                                | A: no formal response  
I: no recognition  
Pr: bilateral  
Pa: balancing act                                                                 |
|      | position          |                                     |                                                 |                                                        |                                                                                                  |

**Concluding Remarks**

The purpose of this paper was to focus on how the conduct of Greek foreign policy was influenced by the wider transformations that the CFSP framework underwent and establish a causal multidimensional path between the EU effect as an intervening variable and the response of the Greek foreign policy. The analysis concludes that Greece as a small member state usually adapts its policy to the EU-level strategies and positions, but there have been significant cases where there has been a deep transformation of the foreign policy components through the paradigmatic changes, the institutionalization of norms and ‘ways of doing things,’ and an incorporation of the EU policy processes in the logic of domestic discourse, political structures and public policies—essentially resulting in the Europeanization of Greek foreign policy. Due to the low institutionalization of CFSP, the analysis has shown that as the EU moves towards a more coherent foreign policy paradigm, the EU effect on domestic foreign policies increases and the transformative power is enhanced through higher institutionalization. Going back to the central question, the answer is positive: we can indeed talk about the Europeanization of the foreign policy of a member state and apply the concept to
measure the magnitude and orientation of change. In fact, in most of the within-case studies that the paper examined, the EU-effect can be clearly isolated from the impact of other external or internal factors. As this paper is part of a broader PhD project, future empirical research will have to include the comparison with Germany and in other instances such as on EU enlargement, to create a comprehensive study that is both diachronic and synchronic.

**Note:** This paper is still part of work in progress. Please do not cite without permission from the author. Comments and feedback as well as stark criticism are very welcome.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


