COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PEACE PROCESSES:
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND SIERRA LEONE

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ABSTRACT

This paper takes a critical look at the third party roles in conflict settlement processes by comparing Togolese mediation in the Lomé Peace Negotiations and Ugandan mediation in the Kampala Peace Dialogue. This study primarily aims to establish secondary party involvement in conflict settlement as a mediator can be one of the reasons why peace processes fail. More specifically, the paper argues that parties who provide financial and military support to insurgency should not serve as a mediator. In the two cases, the paper compares mediator characteristics such as bias, motivation and strategy. The findings indicate that Togolese mediation’s relative success over the Ugandan effort is mainly due to the former party’s sensitivity to answering demands of the conflicting parties, encouraging these parties to make concessions towards a comprehensive peace agreement.
Abbreviations

AFRC: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
CDF: Civil Defense Forces
CNDP: National Congress for the Defence of the People
ECOMAG: The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS: The Economic Community of West African States
FARDC: Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo
FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
M23: March 23 Rebellion Group
RCD: Congolese Rally for Democracy
RUF: Revolutionary United Front
UN: United Nations
1. INTRODUCTION

The main aim of this paper is to analyze the main factors which determine the peace process’s success and failure. To achieve this objective, I compare Togolese mediation in Democratic Republic of Congo and Ugandan mediation in Sierra Leone and highlight the elements which determined the success in Sierra Leone case and failure in DR Congo. In two cases, the goals of the mediators were the same; however, the timing, actors and results were different. By being aware of these factors, through the comparative methodology, my goal is to understand whether there are other factors which influence success and failure of mediation process.

In this particular work, I will focus on Ugandan mediation in the last stage of Congo Conflict (2004-2013) and Togolese mediation in the Sierra Leone Civil War (1998-2002). Both the government of Sierra Leone and DR Congo accepted to negotiate with the rebel group in order to end the conflict and both countries applied for third party mediation. In terms of the conflict type, in both cases, the conflict derived from the combination of interest-based, value-based and need-based issues. However, based on these similarities, it is not accurate to come to the conclusion that both countries has experienced the same challenges and ended up with the successful peace agreements. The main argument of this paper is that the neutrality of the mediator and all relevant parties’ involvement in the peace process makes the conflict resolution process more likely to be achieved.

In order to compare both countries’ peace processes, I will take Jacob Bercovitch’s (1993) mediation analysis as the framework of my study (Figure 1). It should be emphasized that in this paper, Ugandan and Togolese mediators were accepted as a main source of reference since they have been the main actors who carried out the negotiation process. Based on this framework, in the first part, I will examine and compare the nature of the issues and the parties for both countries. In this part, I will try to show whether the conditions are appropriate for the third party’s involvement or not. In the following section, I will analyze the nature of the mediation and make a comparison of Ugandan and Togolese mediation processes. This method will enable me to try to clarify in what ways the Sierra Leone conflict settlement, mediated by Togo, is more successful than are the Togolese mediation process in DR Congo. In the last part of the paper, I provide recommendations about how the DR Congo conflict process could be handled different to increase the chances for the conflict resolution.
2. THE MEDIATION – THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of mediation has been defined in many different ways. In a simple word, mediation is a peaceful intervention which is applied by the consent and will of the disputants. More specifically, mediation can be defined as “the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who has not authoritative decision making power to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of issues in disputes” (Moore 1996, 14). Different from Moore, Bercovitch does not highlight the principle of impartiality and neutrality in the definition of mediation. Bercovitch defines mediation as "a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider to change their perceptions or behavior, and do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law." (1997, p. 130)

Based on the definition of mediation, Bercovitch and Langley (1993) have produced a contingency model of mediation. According to this model, mediation outcome is affected by context and process. While the context analyzes nature of the issues and nature of the disputes, the process includes the nature of the mediator, mediation strategy and behavior. Overall, they have influence on mediation success or failure. Mediation outcome can be either failure or success. For Bercovitch (1997), the failure is evaluated by looking at the change in disputant’s behavior.

However, the issue of success and failure in mediation outcome has always become a contradictory issue. For this reason, scholars use different terminologies to evaluate the success of the mediation. According to Bercovitch, a mediation outcome should be persistent with the goal of the mediation. There would be a number of reasons for the mediation such as ending the cease-fire, changing the perception of the parties, achieving the fair distribution of the resources (Bercovitch 1996). Bercovitch categorizes them as subjective and objective goals.

In order to evaluate both success and failure, Bush and Folger use another approach and analyze whether the mediator is a problem solver or transformative. Problem solving mediators are often highly directive in their attempts to reach this goal they control not only the process, but also the substance of the discussion, focusing on areas of consensus and resolvable issues, while avoiding areas of disagreement where consensus is less likely (Bush and Folger 1994).
Mediation has two significant components which are mediator’s neutrality and impartiality. Neutrality can be analyzed in three ways: impartiality, equidistance and a practice in discourse (Gibson et al 1996). Firstly, neutrality as impartiality suggests that a mediator should be free of bias and should leave behind his or her opinions, beliefs, and agendas. Secondly, neutrality as equidistance concentrates on the point that mediators should try to give equal consideration to each side. Thirdly, neutrality as a practice in discourse focuses on the idea that mediator should give chance to parties to share their positions and concerns, then, reframe these issues in a fair way (Gibson, 1996).

Zerhusen (1993) also emphasizes the importance of impartiality and explore the term. For Zerhusen (1993), a mediator must not show any partiality or bias based on any party’s background, personal characteristics, or performance during the mediation. Each and every aspect of the mediation such as communication, the way questions are asked and positions and interests are reshaped, the use and arrangement of furniture, seating arrangements, and methods to greet the participants as they arrive for the mediation. Impartiality also has been applied to relational issues such as conflict of interest concerns between the mediator and any of the participants (Zerhusen, 1993, p.1169).

Bercovitch suggests that after the nature of the parties and issues are analyzed, in order to achieve successful mediation, there has to be an appropriate mediator with his/her right strategies and nature of the mediation. Therefore, in this section, I will examine the nature of Uganda and Togo mediation and mediators’ strategies in the conflict. In this way, I will find out which one is more successful than another.

3. CONFLICT HISTORIES

3.1. Democratic Republic of Congo

In order to understand the background of the Kivu Conflict, we need to trace back 150 years ago where the Congolese people struggled to gain their independence from the Belgium rule. Upon the declaration of their independence in 1960, the country has almost disintegrated into the regions in which they fight with each other. This crisis continued until 1965. In 1965, Joseph Mobutu seized the power. During his term, a number of rebellions were launched against his regime. He unified the nation and changed the name of the country as Zaire.
The First Congo War started in the wake of Rwandan genocide. During the Rwandan genocide in 1996, thousands of people were killed and the refugees flooded into the Eastern Congo (Eastern Congo Initiative, 2013). After the genocide, Tutsis came to the power and searched for the refugee Hutus in the Eastern Congo. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report, it is estimated that only 7% of these refugees were perpetrators of the genocide. These groups were called as the FDLR—the Federation for the Liberation of Rwanda (Eastern Congo Initiative, 2013).

The Second Congo War occurred because of other parties’ involvement in the Eastern Congo and emergence of political problems. The coalition has established with Uganda and Rwanda to start the proxy war in Eastern Congo and to capture these refugees. Rwandan government formed Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) in order to fight with the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). Laurent Kabila, the opposition leader, contributed to these attempts. In 1998, these forces defeated Mobutu’s rule and Laurent Kabila became president. The role of the Uganda and Rwanda in Eastern Congo have been questioned a number of times due to their interest in capturing natural resources. Kabila took the support of Angola, Chad, Sudan Zimbabwe and other regional countries in order to send Uganda and Rwanda out from the country (Williams, 2013). This fight led to the one of the deadliest wars that we have seen since the Second World War.

In 2001, the President Laurent Kabila was assassinated and his son, Joseph Kabila became president. During his presidency, the Tutsi-led militia group, RCD became a highly active actor in their fighting with FDLR. Their fight ended with the 2003 peace deal. With this agreement, all the armed groups were asked to integrate into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which is the Congolese national army. However, in meantime, General Laurent Nkunda, an RCD military leader, opposed the rules within the Congolese army and launched another rebellion known as National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP). CNDP’s offensive in Bukavu of Kivu region, and their fights against the Kabila’s rule escalated the conflict. In 2009, they signed another agreement known as March 23 Agreement and all armed groups including CNDP, FDLR and other militias are asked to integrate with Congolese army again.

However, the Kivu conflict has passed to the second phase in April 2012. The CNDP members within the Congolese army launched other rebellions and start fighting against the government. They claimed that they were not satisfied with the conditions in the
Congolese army and the government did not keep its promises that it gave with the March 23 Agreement. Since they refer to this agreement, they were called M23 (March 23) militias. In 2012, M23 captured the Goma, the region mostly known with its rich natural resources.

In March 2013, the UN has approved the first offensive brigade in order to combat with the M23 and to stop the violence. M23 members have realized that they cannot continue their fight anymore. Following this, peace talks have re-started in October, 2013 with the support of Uganda as a mediator.

3.2.Sierra Leone

Similar to the Democratic Republic of Congo, the conflict background in Sierra Leone can be found in the independence movement, in the 1960s. Indeed, under the Sir Milton Margai regime, the country’s transition to independence was peaceful (Johansen 2000). However, in the 1970s, with the Steven’s regime, the country turned to the one-party regime and the economic conditions were deteriorated. In meantime, he weakened the democratic structure of the state, limiting and eventually dominating the autonomy of civil society. Moreover, as Abraham states, ‘‘state intervention in elections, both local and national, removed competitiveness and accountability, successfully eliminating opposition parties from functioning and reducing parliament to a rubber-stamp’’ (Abraham 2001, 206).

Then, student demonstrations started in the country against one party system. The fight between the opposition group and the government supporters spread to other places in the country. Their fight in eastern part of the country was also turned out rivalries over control of the cross-border smuggling into Liberia. In 1991, the war began with Revolutionary United Front’s attack from the Liberia into the border districts. The RUF was including the opposition groups, especially young students, who took training in Libya, and material support from Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord (Lord, 2010). Although the Sierra Leone army has tried to respond to the attacks, they did not have enough capacity to do so. The government was deposed by a military coup in 1992 and replaced by the National Provisional Ruling Council. The Kabbah’s new civilian government came together with the local civil defense militias in order to tackle with the RUF and established the military force, Civil Defense Forces (CDF). However, the military coup defeated the CDF, and the Kabbah was driven to exile (Lord 2010, 57). The military coup brought another actor to fight which is the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

The AFCR invited the Revolutionary United Front to join in the power-sharing arrangement. However, with the Nigerian intervention, the AFCR and RUF alliance was
removed from state power. The AFRC and RUF alliance has continued with the military and economic support of external actors who were taking the mineral resources as an exchange. In 1998, the alliance attacked to the capital, Freetown. As a response to this development, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and UN Mission (UNOMSIL) intervened in the region by sending its peacekeeping forces, called ECOWAS. However, fighting continued with the rebel alliance which gained the control over the half of the country. In December 1998, the alliance began an offensive to retake Freetown and in January overran most of the city. All UNOMSIL personnel were evacuated (UN Report, 2005).

Upon this, the ECOMOG retook the city again and removed the insurgency. With the strong support of West African states and the UN, peace dialogues were initiated between Kabbah’s government and RUF. They signed a peace agreement in the Lomé in the 1999.

4. THE NATURE OF THE PARTIES

According to Bercovitch, three steps should have been successfully achieved to experience the effective mediation process (Bercovitch 1996). Firstly, conflict circumstances should be available for third parties involvement in a dispute as the mediator. This necessary conflict circumstances have been already covered in the previous section and as we saw that in both cases, the parties reached to the point of a hurting stalemate. Hurting stalemate is the point that all parties in the conflict understand that continue to conflict will not bring any benefit. Following parts will cover the nature of the issues and the parties relate to the successful mediation.

4.1. Nature of the Parties in Democratic Republic of Congo

The primary parties in Kampala Dialogue were the same with the parties in the Kivu conflict. These are the Congolese official government and the M23 insurgency. The Onion Model can be taken as the basis to explain the positions, needs and interests of the M23 movement. Their position looks as if they demand better payment and working conditions in the Congolese national army. However, when we looked at their interest, it is actually about having control over the Kivu region, especially Goma, in order to access easily the natural resources and trade with other countries. What they actually need is found in the Burton’s human needs theory; food, security, identity and shelter.
Another primary party in the peace process is the Congolese government. Joseph Kabila is the elected president, and the Kivu conflict has actually escalated during his presidency. Although he signed the peace agreement with previous rebel groups, his attempts could not be successful to finish entire conflict. During the peace talks, the main position of the government is to end the cease-fire as soon as possible. Kabila’s interest actually is to keep and enhance his authority in the government. Behind everything, the Kabila and Congolese government needed political, social and economic development.

In the Kivu conflict and peace process, Rwanda and Uganda were accepted as the secondary warring parties. It is highlighted by the UN report that Rwanda and Uganda directly or indirectly support M23 rebels. The UN Group of Experts on DRC verified in their report “the links between M23 and contact in Rwanda and Uganda and documented evidence in numerous atrocities attributed to their leaders according to is that the outcome of the peace talks. The experts also claimed that the Government of Rwanda has provided direct military support to the M23 rebels while the Senior Officials of the Government of Uganda have also supplied troops and weapons” (Duncan 2013, 3).

Due to Uganda’s position as secondary party, deciding on third parties in the peace process is quite ambiguous. Besides being secondary warring party, Uganda was also the mediator in the Kampala peace talks. This is actually what makes this case interesting but at the same time challenging. Uganda’s mediation in this case can be explained by its’ interest of ending the conflict within the Great Lake Region. Apart from Uganda, other third parties are all the countries who involved in the Second Congo War and the African countries who hosted the refugees coming from the DR Congo.

4.2. Nature of the Parties in Sierra Leone

Although many actors were involved in the conflict, the primary parties in the peace process included only the RUF and Sierra Leonean government. Firstly, the RUF consisted of a group of people who were sponsored by the Gaddafi of Libya and Charles Taylor of Liberia. The main aim of the RUF was not clear cut. RUF started its activities with some revolutionary ideologies, but they could not keep a consistent ideology. Later on, the aim became establishing control over the natural resources. RUF leader, Fadoy Sankoh, was under arrest when the peace talks began. For this reason, from the position of RUF, it can be seen that they wanted to release of Sankoh. Indeed, RUF’s interest was to take control of the government and the establishment of a transitional government. On the other hand, the Sierra Leone
government as another primary party aimed to finish the conflict as soon as possible. The government’s interest was also to regain authority and provide security to citizens.

Similar to the DR Congo case, in the Sierra Leone peace process, there were also secondary warring parties who provide constant military and financial support to insurgency, but who were not involved in the peace talks. As mentioned before, RUF was supported by Libya and Liberia. As Lord said, cited by Rashid, Charles Taylor had threatened to “make Sierra Leone taste the bitterness of war” for giving a base to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peace-keeping forces, which he thought were frustrating his ambition of wresting power in Liberia (Lord 2010, 15). According to the U.N report on Sierra Leone civil war, Taylor provided the RUF with training, weapons and related material, logistical support and staging ground for attacks (Global Witness 2012).

In the Sierra Leone peace process, the West African States Monitoring Group played an important role. As a third party, Togo served as a mediator in Lomé Peace Talks. Togolese leader has put many efforts in order to bring parties to the common point and help them in their problem solving. The US and UK has played important role to convince parties to initiate a dialogue. Apart from them, international jewelry companies were at stake because it is claimed that they were actively buying the diamonds from the RUF members.

5. THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES
5.1. Nature of the Issues in Democratic Republic of Congo

It is possible to analyze the main issues into three categories which are interest based, need based and value based issues. The main subjects within this categorization are the ethnic mobilization, political and economic reforms and establishing control over natural resources.

First of all, ethnic diversity itself is not the main issue, but ethnic mobilization and its problems are located at the core of the conflict. M23 movement consists of Tutsis who are about 3 percentage of the overall population in DR Congo. The conflict between Hutus and Tutsis started in the DR Congo following the Rwandan genocide. The ethnic difference, not based on race or biological motives, led to psychological, social and political problems between two groups. The enemy image and stereotyping also contributes to this distinction. As one of the group's commanders said, cited by Blair in the Daily Telegraph in 2008, “we
are fighting every day because we are Hutu and they are Tutsis. We cannot mix, we are always in conflict. We will stay enemies forever” (Blair 2008, 6).

Secondly, ethnic problems were escalated with the government’s inability to provide basic needs to all ethnic groups. This situation can be explained with Gurr’s relative deprivation theory which suggests that unmet expectations of one ethnic group, relatively to others, promote them to search for their own right or share. For example, when the March 23 agreement was signed, Tutsis expected that they will have the same payment conditions with others. However, the government did not keep its promises. Moreover, after the elections in 2006, the President Joseph Kabila was chosen from the South Kivu province of DRC. Following the elections, the Tutsi community in Eastern Congo lost their power in the national government. Therefore, the expectation to access state power could not be achieved and Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda opened rebellion through Congo's Kivu region (Kavanagh, 2009).

Thirdly, similar to the Sierra Leone civil war, the government’s lack of capacity establishes a ground for armed groups to have a control over the natural resources in Congo. Different from the Sierra Leone’s diamonds, the DR Congo’s natural resources are tin, titanium and coltan. These resources are highly attractive for international companies as well as the regional actors. Unlike the diamond, for these resources, certification process is not required. This advantage allows international companies to easily trade with regional actors. Having control over these resources and trade with other countries was highly attractive for M23. According to Kaldor and Luckman, this situation is actually called as a ‘resource curse’ which refers that countries rich in natural resources experience extremes of wealth alongside continuing poverty and immiseration (Kaldor and Luckman 2001, 151).

5.2 Nature of the Issues in Sierra Leone Civil War

It is possible to categorize the main issues in Sierra Leonean Civil War as need based and interest based issues. Therefore, value based issues are the only difference between Sierra Leone and Congo’s conflict issues. Different from the DR Congo conflict, the main issues in Sierra Leone had neither ethnic nor ideological backgrounds. Although the RUF claimed that they had strong ideology, as Enrique has indicated that this ideology actually was with an ambiguous revolutionary ideology with a poorly articulated socialist agenda (Enrique 2006,2).
In the meantime, their ideologies lost its importance since they were more involved in economic matters.

In the Sierra Leone peace process, the first issue was referring to need-based issues. Similar to Congo case, Sierra Leone has also suffered from the bad governance which led to lack of basic needs in the society such as food, health, education and access to justice. They are actually what Burton called as basic human needs. This matter is actually the reason why the rebellions started in Sierra Leone, why they would not be suppressed, and why they were allowed to access natural resources to trade with international companies. According to Lawrence, the bad governance of Sierra Leonean government was based on economic greed, corruption and nepotism destroyed the dignity of the nation, led to poverty, human right abuses (Lawrence 2012). Moreover, all of these problems led to increase violence during the elections, drug violence and; creation of uneducated and unemployed youth (Lawrence 2012).

All of these actually bring us to the second issue which is about the diamonds and war economy. Because there was no government accountability, the elites found a chance to capture minerals. This issue is interest based because there was an incompatibility between the parties in terms of sharing natural resources. Both RUF insurgents and the government have sold diamonds to their contacts in neighbor countries in order to finance their war efforts (Lord 2000). Apart from Sierra Leoneans, Liberian mercenaries and regional peacekeepers also have an interest in the rivalry for political supremacy and control of the diamonds (Lord 2000, 13). Similar to the DR Congo’s natural resources issue, it is possible to explain the Sierra Leonean diamonds as the ‘resource curse’ or ‘blood diamonds’. The only difference is that in this case, the people who struggled to capture them are not ethnically divided.

6. NATURE OF THE MEDIATORS

6.1. Neutrality / Impartiality

In the Sierra Leone case, Lomé, the capital of Togo, was chosen as the right place for conducting negotiations. During that time, Togo was the chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Although ECOWAS sent troops to Sierra Leone to end the conflict second times, Togo has never provided his troops for this intervention. As Hayner stated that Togo was seen as a neutral country, which has never been directly involved in the Sierra Leone conflict, in terms of neither providing troops to ECOMOG, nor supporting the rebels (Hayner 2007, 10). For this reason, Togo was seen as the neutral country. The official mediator was the Togolese president, Gnassingbe Eyadema;
but the mediation committee consisted of other actors as well such as the diplomats from ECOWAS’s other members (Hayner 2007).

In contrast to Togolese mediator in Sierra Leone, Ugandan mediation in DR Congo cannot be accepted as neutral. Uganda, in this dispute, both played the secondary warring party role and third party role. Uganda’s active support to the M23 rebels was highlighted by the United Nation and other tick tack organizations’ reports a number of times. Similar to Togo’s role in Sierra Leone dispute, Uganda was also the chair of the regional organization. In August 2012 in Kampala, as the chair of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region, Uganda was mandated to facilitate dialogue between M23 and Congolese government. Uganda’s impartiality and neutrality was questioned number of times by the scholars and analysts. There are some arguments which suggest that Uganda’s mediation could not be effective for the peaceful solution of the conflict because it is biased.

Philip Apuuli Kasaija, an associate professor of political science at Makerere University, told IRIN that “It’s within the context of ICGLR for Uganda to facilitate the dialogue. But there is confusion. You can’t facilitate talks on the one hand, and on the other you are being accused of arming and supporting rebels ” (IRIN, 2012). Moreover, Nicholas Opiyo, a constitutional and human rights lawyer in Kampala, told IRIN “Uganda still has troops pursuing the Lord’s Resistance Army in DRC. Its credibility and objectivity will always be doubted by the government of DRC and other players” (IRIN, 2012).

7. MOTIVATION OF THE MEDIATORS

It should be emphasized that the Togolese leader had the strong motivation and interest which helped to effective mediation process. Firstly, Togo was interested in this dispute, because as the chair of ECOWAS, they were aware that any problem occurred in the West African countries can affect other countries in that region such as refugee issues and economic recessions. Secondly, during that time, Togo was highly criticized by international community because of human right abuses in the country. Therefore, they hoped to re-establish some of the prestige lost due to the allegations of human right abuses in Togo (Erickson 2013, 160).

In contrast to Togo, Ugandan motivation to mediate conflict in Congo is not clear cut. Indeed, since there were many critiques about the country’s neutrality, Uganda explained that if United Nations detects any problem in their mediation attempts, they will withdraw from the conflict. However, Uganda was still showing the willingness to end the conflict
because the Kivu conflict took place in the border between Congo and Uganda, and in order to keep the security at home, Uganda highly needed to finish the conflict. As Ugandan government said that ‘‘the escalation of the conflict at the porous borders in the west of the country impacts negatively national security, trade, tourism and economic development’’ (Mukasa, 2012).

8. STRATEGIES OF THE MEDIATORS

8.1. Facilitative, Formulative and Manipulative Approach

Apart from the strong motivation and interest of the Togo in this dispute, the ability and the skills of the Togolese leader also helped to achieve successful peace talks. Apart from Togolese mediator keeping equidistance from the parties, during the pre-negotiations, he also gave equal chance to parties to explain their positions. It is possible to say he actually applied for all the mediation strategies which are facilitative, formulative and manipulative.

To illustrate, during pre-negotiations, the Togolese mediator talked with the parties and asked them to prepare the report on which their own stories and demands are written. By doing this, he highlighted both parties’ positions, needs and interests. He also figured out the main issues, for instance, while the RUF wants transitional government and Sankoh’s freedom, the government wants to bring peace to the society in any way. During the negotiations, Joseph Koffigoh led the talks on a day-to-day basis to control timing (Hayner 2007). Moreover, when RUF members applied for different tactics to turn negotiations on their benefit, it led to the deadlock. However, the Togolese mediator realized this and encouraged parties to make further concessions to break the deadlock.

In contrast to the Togolese mediator, Ugandan mediator could not address the demands on both sides in the Kampala talks. For instance, starting from the beginning, the DR Congo government said that at the end of the peace negotiations, they do not want to sign a peace agreement with the M23 rebels, they just demand one sided declaration. Therefore, different from the Lomé peace talks, there is no give and take or bargaining dance in Kampala talks. In the Lome talks, the Sierra Leone government was ready to make concessions as much as they can. However, in the Congo case, for the government, M23 should be the party who gave concessions and accept the government’s demands. During the talks, the Ugandan mediator forced the Congolese representatives to sign an agreement rather than declaration. As Congolese representative said that ‘‘we want to sign a declaration, but the mediator, for a reason we do not understand, wants to impose an accord upon us’’ (Al Jazeera, 2013). Upon
this point, the DR Congo representatives did not attend signing ceremony and left the peace talks.

However, it would be wrong to say that Ugandan mediator was totally distrustful. Actually, similar to the Togolese mediator, the Ugandan mediator also helped parties to highlight the main issues between them and encourage parties to make some concessions. Although the Congolese government left from the negotiation table, highlighting the main issues allowed parties to meet in Kenya and sign the declaration based on such issues; the end of rebellion, amnesty, transitional security arrangements and transformation of M23 as political party.

8.2. Problem Solving or Transformative Approach

In a problem solving approach, the success of the mediator depends on whether she/he achieved the agreement or not. On the other hand, in the transformative approach, the success of the mediator depends on whether he or she could improve the positions of the parties from where they were before hand. Using both approaches can increase the success rate of mediation outcome.

While in DR Congo case, mediators have applied for the problem-solving approach; in the Sierra Leone case, the mediator applied for both problem solving and transformative approaches. The Togolese mediator has put so much effort to highlight main issues and tried to find mutually acceptable solution for them, while the Ugandan mediator had to accept the government’s demands on the issues. At the beginning, the parties see each other as the biggest enemy. For instance, for Sierra Leonean government, they would never share political power with the RUF. And, for the RUF, they would continue their actions if the transition government was not established. However, in the end, both changed their initial positions. In contrast to the Sierra Leone, the Ugandan mediator acted as the problem solver rather than transformative. In the DR Congo case, starting from the beginning, government has strong position on the idea that ‘governments never negotiate with the terrorists’. Therefore, even if they came to the table, they just emphasized the main issues, keep their position strong and never make concessions. Ugandan mediator could not find any solution regarding this point of the conflict.

9. OUTCOMES OF THE MEDIATION EFFORTS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

Under the light of the information explained above, it is not possible to say that one case is more successful than another. Both countries have experienced the deadliest conflicts
since 1990s. And, they are still defined as the poorest countries in the world. Therefore, even if mediation itself can be defined as success, all peace process is hardly defined as successful job. However, one can conclude that Sierra Leone conflict settlement is relatively more successful than the Congolese’s conflict settlement process. There are some issues that can clarify my point of view.

Firstly, because of the accusations on Uganda’s mediation, the Kampala peace talks were canceled by the Congolese government, but, they came together in Kenya in December 12, 2014 and signed the declaration. According to this declaration, the M23 ended their rebellion and will be transformed as the political party. Unfortunately, this declaration’s articles were not so different than the previous agreements made by the CNDP members and RCD, who later on launched M23 insurgency and other armed groups. Congo already experienced this before, and it is certain that this kind of attempts did not bring peace to the country. Therefore, one would be pessimistic about the latest declaration because of its inability to eliminate the risk of establishment of further insurgency.

On the other hand, Lomé peace talks finished in 44 days in July 1999. The Lomé peace talks ended up with the agreement which gives the RUF’s leader Sankoh a vice-president position in the cabinet, RUF’s disarmament and re-generation as the political party. Moreover, the agreement also includes Sierra Leone government’s promises on political, social and economic development. It has been 15 years since the Lomé peace agreement and Sierra Leone already passed to the peace-building process (Figure 4). There are many peace building attempts in the country. For example, the first free elections were held, the country has chosen as World’s top reformers by the World Bank and reconciliation attempts were initiated by the government. However, the DR Congo just finished the de-escalation period and is passing through dispute settlement (Figure 4).

10. RECOMMENDATIONS

There are some suggestions about how the mediation process in Congo could be handled differently. First of all, in my opinion, Uganda should not have been a mediator. Even if Uganda feels totally neutral and impartial, the parties would never see Uganda as neutral and impartial. In some situations, the mediator’s closeness with the parties would be effective in terms of having certain knowledge in the background of the conflict. However, in the Congo case, another neutral country should have mediated the dispute. In my opinion, this
actor would be someone from the United Nations because of the respect of parties to this organization. In that way, there would not be any crisis during the negotiation table and more comprehensive agreement would be signed.

Secondly, I believe that the Kampala peace talks should have been more comprehensive. In other words, all the primary and secondary actors should have been participated in the peace talks. In that talk, Rwanda and Uganda should also be included. Rwandan genocide is the reason why the conflict started in the Eastern Congo. Rwanda actively supports the M23 with the military stuff and money; however, Rwanda took place neither in the talks nor in any agreement. The M23 insurgency was founded based on the March 23 agreement and that agreement was also not including any article regarding the Rwanda’s support of CNDP rebels. In the mean time, the M23 was established and they continue to take support from Rwanda. Apart from the agreement, international organizations, the countries like US and UK and some African countries could put sanctions on Rwanda in order to discourage them and to break the Congolese conflict circle (establishing insurgency-conflict-negotiation-agreement-integration to national army-Rwandan support- establishing insurgency).

Thirdly, apart from the secondary warring parties’ involvement in the peace talks, in order to end all the conflicts in the DR Congo, the peace processes should have included other armed groups. Today, in the DR Congo, M23 is not the only one among armed groups, although it is the biggest and most challenging one. I believe that more comprehensive agreement can discourage other armed groups as well. Apart from this, there should be comprehensive agreement that can also help M23 members to reintegrate into the society. In this respect, I believe that child soldiers and combatants should be specifically addressed by the domestic and international organizations in the peace building process. As Fischer argues that re-integration of combatants and child soldiers can eliminate the risk of establishing other armed groups or terrorist organization in the future (Fischer 2004).

FINDINGS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

This comparative analysis focuses on the Kampala Dialogue and Lomé Peace Talks. In Kampala Dialogue, Ugandan leader was the mediator between Congolese government and M23 rebels. In Lomé Peace Talks, Togolese President was the mediator between RUF and
Sierra Leonean government. In order to compare these peace talks, I used the Bercovitch’s mediation approach. Bercovitch suggests that the nature of the parties, nature of the issues and the nature of the mediator are interconnected and strongly affect the mediation outcome. For this reason, in the first part, I analyzed the nature of the parties and the issues, and figured out that because the hurting stalemate was achieved, it was the right time for the mediation in both countries. Secondly, I analyzed the mediation process between Uganda’s and Togo’s mediations. In order to compare the mediations in detail, I looked at a number of dependent variables. In the end, I figured out that mediation process in Sierra Leone is more likely to have successful outcomes for the peace-building attempts in the society. In addition, I also found out that Uganda’s un-neutral position in the dispute discouraged Congolese government to make concessions and to sign more comprehensive agreement with the M23. In the last section, I made some suggestions for the DR Congo case about how it would be handled differently to increase the chances for conflict resolution. I strongly argue that any future agreement with an insurgency must include Rwanda and Uganda and other armed groups located in DR Congo.
References:


Global Ministries Associate for the Global Advocacy and Education.  


Bercovitch, J. 2007. Mediation Success or Failure, a Search for the Elusive Criteria. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution. 7:2


APPENDIX

Figure 1:

Figure 2: Comparison of the Nature of the Issues and the Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DR Congo</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Years</strong></td>
<td>2004-2013</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>Congolese Government-</td>
<td>Sierra Leonean Government-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Insurgency</strong></td>
<td>CNDDP and M23 Rebellion</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front (RUF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(mainly Tutsi ethnic</td>
<td>(mainly small number of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>group)</td>
<td>intellectuals, sponsored by Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and effected by Gaddafi in Libya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict Type</strong></td>
<td>Interest Based, Value-</td>
<td>Interest Based, Need-Based, Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Based, Need-Based</td>
<td>Based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issues / theories</strong></td>
<td>Relative Deprivation</td>
<td>Human Needs Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Mobilization</td>
<td>Resource Curse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Needs Theory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource Curse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resources</strong></td>
<td>Tin, Tantalum, Diamonds</td>
<td>Diamonds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3: Comparison of the Conflict Settlement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DR Congo</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediator</strong></td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of the Mediator</strong></td>
<td>Not neutral (Secondary warring party)</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategy of the Mediator</strong></td>
<td>Facilitative Approach</td>
<td>Facilitative &amp; Transformative and Problem-solving Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agreement</strong></td>
<td>Joint Declaration - Government demand for accord</td>
<td>Lomé Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation of the Agreement</strong></td>
<td>Unknown Failure</td>
<td>Failure, Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Converted as a political party</strong></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4: Comparison of the conflict dynamics in Sierra Leone and DR Congo

*Intensity levels are not measured, graphs are hypothetical.

Dr Congo

Sierra Leone