Title: Arctic Insecurity and Indigenous Peoples: Comparing Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway - DRAFT

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Abstract: While International Relations has increasingly recognized the political salience of Indigenous peoples, the related field of Security Studies has not significantly included Indigenous peoples theoretically or empirically. This paper helps address this gap by comparing two Arctic Indigenous peoples – Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway – as “securitizing actors” within their respective states. It examines how organizations representing Inuit and Sámi, respectively, have articulated the meaning of security in the Arctic region. It finds that Inuit representatives have framed environmental and social challenges as security issues, identifying a conception of Arctic security that emphasizes environmental protection, preservation of cultural identity, and maintenance of Indigenous political autonomy. While sharing certain similarities, Sámi generally do not employ securitizing language to discuss environmental and social issues, rarely characterizing them as existential issues threatening their survival.

Drawing on securitization theory, the article offers a theoretical explanation for why Inuit have sought to securitize serious challenges in their Arctic homeland while Sámi have not. It proposes three factors to explain the difference between attempted Inuit securitization and Sámi non-securitization of Arctic issues: ecological difference between the Canadian and Norwegian Arctic regions, and differing sensitivity to environmental change that results; the relative degree of social inclusion of Inuit and Sámi within their non-Indigenous majority societies; and geography, particularly the proximity of Norway to Russia that results in a more robust national security discourse that restricts space for alternative, non-state security discourses. This paper thus links recent developments in Security Studies and International Relations with key trends in Indigenous politics, environmental change, and geopolitics in the Arctic region.

Keywords: Arctic, Indigenous Peoples, Security, Inuit, Sámi, Canada, Norway, Securitization

Presented at the ECPR General Conference – Montreal, QC, August 27, 2015
Introduction

The circumpolar Arctic is undergoing unprecedented ecological, political, and social transformation, compounding dramatic changes that occurred throughout the 20th century. Among other consequences, the rapid pace of change has caused states and other political actors to re-assess what security means in the Arctic region. Arctic states have released new foreign and security policies outlining conceptions of Arctic security that emphasize sovereign territoriality, militarized defence against conventional and unconventional threats, and expanded natural resource extraction, while other actors articulate alternative conceptions of Arctic security. Indeed, while there are similarities among how security is articulated by circumpolar states, there is wide variation among other actors’ representations of security in, to, and for the region, and the fundamental meaning of in/security in the Arctic remains contested. The Arctic has become a hot topic with high stakes; how the changes occurring there are conceived and managed will have profound implications for states, peoples, and individuals across the region and around the world.

This article examines Arctic security discourse from the perspectives of two Arctic Indigenous peoples: Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway. Focusing on the period between 2001-2011, it compares how Inuit and Sámi political actors have articulated the meaning of in/security within their Arctic homelands, and seeks to explain why Inuit in Canada have attempted to construct pressing environmental and social issues as *security* issues within policy discourse, while Sámi actors have not generally done so. The first section outlines the contemporary context of Indigenous peoples in the Arctic and their relevance to circumpolar politics. It emphasizes that Inuit and Sámi are organized, legitimate, and politically empowered actors with constitutional and legislated standing as self-governing rights-holders within their respective national contexts. The second section compares how Inuit and Sámi leaders and organizations have articulated the meaning of security in the Arctic. Drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary data, it finds representatives of both Indigenous peoples identify similar conceptions of Arctic security that emphasize protection of the natural environment, preservation of cultural identity, and maintenance of Indigenous political autonomy within the context of non-Indigenous settler states. These conceptions are, in essence, human security accounts of what security means in the Arctic.

However, unlike Inuit in Canada, Sámi have not generally sought to securitize their most pressing social and environmental priorities within Norwegian politics. While Sámi actors express concern over various hazards to traditional land use and livelihoods, culture, and
autonomy, such issues are usually not described using securitizing language, and are rarely characterized as existential threats to Sámi survival. Thus, the third section seeks to explain why Inuit have attempted to securitize issues in their Arctic homeland while Sámi have not. It argues three factors explain the difference between attempted Inuit securitization and Sámi non-securitization of Arctic issues: ecological difference between the Canadian and Norwegian Arctic regions, and differing sensitivity to environmental change that results; the degree of social inclusion of Inuit and Sámi within their respective societies; and geography, particularly Norway’s proximity to Russia that results in a more robust national security discourse that restricts space for alternative, non-state security discourses. It thus suggests that how Indigenous peoples have articulated the meaning of in/security in northern Canada and northern Norway reflects their divergent histories and distinct patterns of political and social development, and provides indications of the conditions under which securitization – as the process through which security issues are socially constructed – may succeed.

1. Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic

As the changing Arctic has attracted growing attention from outsiders, the roles and rights of Indigenous peoples have become increasingly important. Indigenous people comprise more than 500,000 of the 4 million residents of the circumpolar region, inhabiting seven of the eight states surrounding the Arctic Ocean. While debates over how indigeneity is defined remain relevant in the circumpolar region,1 Arctic Indigenous peoples are more easily identifiable than elsewhere since, by definition, they inhabit the Arctic regions of the eight circumpolar states. However, the sociological distinctions among Arctic Indigenous peoples deviate from the colonial boundaries that have been imposed upon them; Indigenous peoples serve as a living reminder of earlier patterns of inhabitation around the circumpolar region, and maintain identities that transcend sovereign borders.2 Drawing on the well-established Cobo definition of indigeneity within international law, the Arctic Human Development Report defines Indigenous peoples as:

Those peoples who were marginalized when the modern states were created and identify

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themselves as indigenous peoples. They are associated with specific territories to which they trace their histories. They exhibit one or more of the following characteristics: they speak a language that is different from that of the dominant group(s); they are being discriminated against in the political system; they are being discriminated against within the legal system; their cultures diverge from that of the remaining society; they often diverge from the mainstream society in their resource use by being hunters and gatherers, nomads, pastoralists, or swidden farmers; they consider themselves and are considered by others as different from the rest of the population.3

The political, economic, and social conditions in which they live vary considerably across countries, and Arctic Indigenous peoples exhibit both typical and atypical traits for Indigenous peoples in contemporary global politics. On the one hand, they are colonized populations who, at best, exercise limited authority over their traditional territories. They demonstrate clear continuity with pre-colonial practices and social organization, due in part to relatively recent experiences of colonization, especially in much of Arctic North America. On the other hand, most Arctic states are well-functioning democracies with greater rule of law, economic and social benefits, and recognition of Indigenous rights than most countries with Indigenous minorities. Indeed, Arctic Indigenous peoples enjoy among the highest qualities of life and greatest degrees of political autonomy and social inclusion of any Indigenous peoples in the world.4 With the notable exception of Russia, Arctic Indigenous peoples have organized into political formations able to challenge the preferences of their colonial governments without fear of overt political repression, violence, or retaliation. They thus enjoy relatively high degrees of political freedom, though often continuing to experience relative material privation reflective of their colonized status within settler-dominated political contexts.

Though historically marginalized within regional geopolitics and policymaking within their own states, Arctic Indigenous peoples have emerged as a key set of actors in circumpolar politics. Indeed, the formal political involvement of Indigenous peoples in the circumpolar region is one of the key features of the post-Cold War Arctic order.5 Most are represented by distinct governance structures, and in some cases self-government, within their respective states, and all are represented at the regional level through the six Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council.

In fact, the leading historian of the Arctic Council credits the efforts of Indigenous leaders for its eventual establishment: “Voices that were silenced in the fifties became audible in the sixties, eloquent in the seventies, and powerful and influential later. The colonized now came to the colonial capitals no longer as subjects but as actors shaping their times and the lives of their people.” As the first intergovernmental body to grant them official standing with rights to membership and participation akin to those of Member States, the Arctic Council affords Indigenous peoples a seat at the premier forum for regional cooperation. Many scholars thus argue that it is partly through the efforts of Indigenous peoples that the Arctic has developed into a coherent socio-political region of its own, within which Indigenous peoples enjoy a status close to that of veto-holders. Although they continue to reflect the differences of opportunity afforded by their historical experiences and contemporary circumstances, the emergence of Indigenous voices as a potent political force has substantially affected the shape of the circumpolar region.

However, despite the progress made by settler-colonial states towards recognizing and respecting Indigenous rights and title, the relationships between Indigenous peoples and their governments remain structured by the dominance of settler-colonial values, institutions, and interests. While ratification of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, creation of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and domestic acknowledgement and reparations for colonial wrongs reflect greater political consideration for Indigenous peoples, the terms of their political inclusion remain constrained. Although “the most egregious expressions of colonialism have been discredited … what remained untouched are those ‘colonial agendas’ that have had a controlling (systemic) effect in privileging national (white) interests at the expense of indigenous rights.” One manifestation of this is the limited ability of Indigenous peoples to advance a conception of in/security in their rapidly changing Arctic homeland distinct from those of settler governments. As the next section demonstrates for Inuit in Canada and Sámi in Norway, Indigenous peoples articulate a meaning of security in the Arctic not only different, but contradictory, to that enacted by the states in which they reside. Indeed, despite their standing as legitimate and authoritative political actors, Arctic Indigenous peoples who have attempted to construct urgent social and political issues as security issues have been unsuccessful.

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7 Young 2005; Koivurova and Heinämäki 2006; English 2013.
in having their security claims accepted by the sovereign power. In so far as security threats denote existential challenges to the survival or wellbeing of a specific group of people, the inability to succeed at securitization – the social process through which security threats are constructed within a polity – may have grave implications for the group in question. Though more empowered than ever before, Arctic Indigenous peoples still lack the power to control their own collective futures, at least in so far as that future is said to be threatened by challenges to the Arctic environment, cultural identity, and Indigenous political autonomy.

2. Indigenous Insecurities in the Circumpolar Arctic

2.1 Inuit in Northern Canada

Indigenous peoples are the majority of northern Canada’s population of 110,000, and are central to its social fabric and political institutions. Inuit are the historical inhabitants of much of Canada’s Arctic territory, and with approximately 55,000 persons form the largest Indigenous group in northern Canada and a slight majority of the permanent population north of 60°N. Four recognized Inuit regions – the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (Northwest Territories), Nunavut, Nunavik (northern Quebec), and Nunatsiavut (northern Labrador) – are collectively known as Inuit Nunangat, which forms part of the broader Inuit homeland of Inuit Nunaaqat also comprising territories in Alaska, Greenland, and northeastern Russia. Inuit are one of three constitutionally recognized groups of Aboriginal people in Canada, and have become highly organized through political institutions such as: Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, the national Inuit organization; the Inuit Circumpolar Council, one of the Permanent Participants at the Arctic Council; a range of local and regional organizations and governments; and the Government of Nunavut, where Inuit make up 85% of the territorial population.

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Since the turn of the millennium, leaders and organizations representing Inuit in Canada have articulated a conception of Arctic security that aligns with human, as opposed to national, security discourse. Inuit representatives function as “securitizing actors” by employing the grammar and language of in/security to identify threats to their continued survival as Indigenous people. Based on evidence from a variety of sources, Inuit in Canada primarily understand security to mean: protecting the Arctic environment from degradation and radical climate change; preserving their identities through the maintenance of cultural practices; and maintaining their autonomy as self-determining political actors within the context of the Canadian settler state. These referent objects are not viewed separately, but seen as inter-related and mutually reinforcing, and are consistent with human security broadly understood as “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want.”

For instance, in a previous study I examined the publicly available online documents – including declarations, press releases, speeches, journal articles and other publications – produced between 2001 and 2011 by four organizations representing Arctic Indigenous peoples in Canada, including the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) and Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK). Out of 538 available documents covering all manner of advocacy, awareness-raising, and public relations topics, 25 made “securitizing moves” depicting threats to objects such as: the Arctic environment (19); food security (11), especially the welfare of caribou herds (4); culture, language, or traditional ways of life (9); Indigenous people’s health (5); and Indigenous peoples’ human rights (4). However, the threats to all these objects were linked to human-caused environmental change; none of the documents made a securitizing move without identifying the direct or indirect impacts of climate change as the source of the threat. In effect, these organizations reserved ‘security talk’ for the multiple ways in which climate change is affecting, and will affect, the physical and cultural wellbeing of Indigenous people in the Arctic. This analysis suggests Indigenous peoples in northern Canada have principally operationalized security in terms of the direct and indirect


12 For greater discussion of securitizing actors, see Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998.

13 This analysis synthesizes data from a variety of different sources, including: surveys; textual analysis of public statements and documents; articles and speeches by members of northern Indigenous communities; interviews and correspondence with Inuit leaders; and relevant academic publications. It draws on more detailed discussion of this evidence available in Greaves 2012 and Greaves 2015.


15 Greaves 2012.
effects of human-caused environmental change. As discussed below, Inuit representatives, in particular, underscore human-caused environmental change as the central driver of insecurity in the Arctic region.

Evidence of how Inuit conceive the meaning of security can also be drawn from the first Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey. When unprompted as to the meaning of security, a plurality of 27% of Northerners (including Indigenous and non-Indigenous respondents) indicated the most pressing Arctic security issue to be “protecting Canada’s borders from international threats.” But when the word ‘security’ was omitted, and respondents were asked to list the most pressing Arctic issues, 33% of Northerners listed the environment first, followed by housing and community infrastructure (9%), and the economy, jobs and employment (7%), meaning that by more than 3:1 Northerners consider the environment to be the most important Arctic issue. Moreover, when prompted with various dimensions of security, 91% of Northerners considered environmental security to be important to their definition of Arctic security, with 90% also identifying as important social security including basic health care, education, housing, and community infrastructure. 66% felt cultural and language security was important, but this increased to 74% in Nunavut where Inuit form a large majority. Northerners were also more likely than Southerners (78% to 71%) to agree that “strengthening Canada’s climate change policies is a critical step in ensuring the security of Arctic residents,” and less likely (52% to 60%) to agree that “Canada should strengthen its military presence in the North in order to protect against international threats.” The survey’s authors conclude that Northern respondents “see environmental security and social security as key elements to protecting the Canadian Arctic. National security, while still seen as important, does not seem to be a leading priority.”

These findings appear supported by the second Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey, highlights of which were released in April 2015. In fact, even fewer Northerners identified strengthening Canada’s military presence as an important part of Arctic security in the second survey compared to the first (45% to 52%). Such attitudes appear fairly consistent for Indigenous peoples across the circumpolar region; a recent study found that, “on average three out

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17 EKOS 2011, 14–15.
18 EKOS 2011, 23.
of four [Arctic] indigenous people perceive climate change to be a problem in their communities, and more than 50 per cent mention local contaminated sites, pollution of local lakes and streams and pollution from industrial development as problems in the region.”

In so far as Indigenous peoples in Northern Canada think in terms of security, they appear to prioritize the environmental, social, and cultural challenges affecting their communities and ways of life.

Such quantitative evidence is supported by qualitative analysis of security claims by Inuit leaders and organizations. For instance, Mary Simon, former president of ICC and ITK and a former federal Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs, notes that Inuit “subscribe to the concept that security should be understood in a broad sense. Just as health is more than the absence of disease, so, too, security is more than the absence of military conflict.”

Rosemarie Kuptana, another former president of ITK and a pioneering contributor to the Arctic Council, also views security in human terms: “Security is more than about arms build-up. Security is about ensuring that Inuit are equal members of the human family and have the economic base to ensure a reasonable life-style as defined by contemporary Canada … Security to Inuit was, and is, having food, clothing and shelter.”

Udloriak Hanson, a former official with ITK, asks: “What does security mean to Inuit? Security doesn’t come from the comfort that some find in icebreakers, sonar detectors and Arctic military capabilities. Security from our societal perspective comes from access to the basic essentials of life – food, shelter and water.”

And Nancy Karetak-Liddell, the first federal Member of Parliament for Nunavut, describes security for Inuit as “feeling safe on our lands, in our communities, having the ability to freely move around, the ability to practice our own way.”

While most Inuit leaders acknowledge the validity, even necessity, of military activity as a component of Arctic security, they are unanimous in the view it is insufficient for a complete understanding of what Inuit require to be secure.

Central to Inuit articulations of security are the rapid, unpredictable, and dramatic transformations occurring due to human-caused environmental change. For instance, though

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22 Simon 2011, 891.
Mary Simon identifies issues such as improved education, political engagement, and benefit-sharing from natural resource development as crucial for Inuit’s future, she only invokes securitizing language to emphasize the destabilizing impacts of climate change: “The urgency surrounding mitigating the impact of climate change grows with the almost daily news of unprecedented developments in our Arctic environment … Arctic ice is melting three times faster than models had earlier predicted – and the earlier predictions were alarming. The Arctic is melting, with dramatic consequences for all of us.”26 Terry Audla, current president of ITK, also links “the insecurities that Inuit face as a result of our living, over three or four generations, in what has been a firestorm of cultural change,” with the challenges of economic modernization still underway in the Arctic, noting that “while some insecurities have abated, new ones have arisen and some old ones have taken on new forms.”27 But Audla emphasizes the role of climate change in eroding sustainable conditions of security in the Arctic region, noting that it poses “a formidable threat that confronts all of humanity, but with particularly dire challenges to Inuit,” before specifying the environmental hazards already occurring:

In the Arctic, our physical security has already been challenged by such things as changes to wildlife patterns, unreliable wind and temperature patterns and associated thawing and freezing cycles, rising sea levels, and shifting building foundations due to permafrost variation. Nature is never stable, and life close to nature always brings its own insecurities, as well as benefits. Climate at a rate and of an intensity that appears unprecedented, and well outside Inuit cultural memory, creates insecurities of an entirely new nature, generating concerns about the sustainability of large aspects of our inherited and acquired patterns of life … [sic] our very sense of who and what we are as Inuit.28

Sheila Watt-Cloutier, another former president of ICC, concurs that “human-induced climate change is undermining the ecosystem upon which Inuit depend for their cultural survival … Emission of greenhouse gases from cars and factories threatens our ability far to the North to live as we have always done in harmony with a fragile, vulnerable, and sensitive environment,” and that “the changes to our climate and our environment will bring about the end of the Inuit

26 Mary Simon, “Inuit and the Canadian Arctic: Sovereignty Begins at Home,” *Journal of Canadian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2009), 256.
28 Audla, 8.
In no uncertain terms, she argues: “climate change is threatening the lives, health, culture and livelihoods of the Inuit.”

Environmental change underpins Inuit understandings of security, but is in tension with the priority many regional actors place on extracting Arctic resources, particularly hydrocarbons. While Arctic Indigenous peoples express divided attitudes over extractive activities in their territories, Inuit leaders point to the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Resource Development Principles, which reserves the right of Inuit to benefit from the development of natural resources on their traditional territories while stipulating that “Inuit and others – through their institutions and international instruments – have a shared responsibility to evaluate the risks and benefits of their actions through the prism of global environmental security.” Ambivalence towards natural resource extraction and its contributing relationship to climate change is reflected in several places in the Declaration: “Resource development in Inuit Nunaat must contribute to, and not detract from, global, national and regional efforts to curb greenhouse gas emissions and should always be seen through the reality of climate change … To minimize the risk to global environmental security, the pace of resource development in the Arctic must be carefully considered.” The Declaration further indicates the highest priority for revenues generated by resource development must be “providing security against unplanned or unintended environmental consequences.” It also refers to reducing threats to Arctic wildlife, food security, and maintenance of Inuit culture, all of which are linked to “the scope and depth of climate change and other environmental pressures and challenges facing the Arctic.” Environment security is depicted as the context within which decisions about resource extraction should be made, problematizing forms of economic development that will contribute to global climate change. So, while acknowledging the possible benefits of resource development, Inuit leaders clearly identify the objects of value threatened by extractive activities. As one elder put it: “The circumpolar North is increasingly

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32 ICC 2011, s. 5.2, s. 5.5.
33 ICC 2011, s. 9.5.
34 ICC 2011, preamble.
opening up very quickly now, and coming with that is offshore oil and gas development. To me, the greatest risk to our security is these companies that operate offshore could do major damage to our marine biology.”\(^{35}\) Though some believe development may be inevitable, many Inuit remain concerned over the potential impacts on their land, culture, and subsistence practices.

In addition to outlining a conception of Arctic security emphasizing the environment, identity, and autonomy, many Inuit leaders assert that the Government of Canada’s Arctic policies are detrimental to their interests and contrary to their security. Mary Simon has long held that Canada’s approach to Arctic issues is inconsistent with Inuit values and interests. As early as 1989, she wrote: “Arctic security includes environmental, economic and cultural, as well as defence, aspects,” but has been subordinated to other understandings of Arctic security “justified by the government on the basis of defence and military considerations … [that] too often serve to promote our insecurity.”\(^{36}\) Others also implicate historical and contemporary Canadian policies in the constitution of insecurity for Inuit, often framed in the context of: political domination of Inuit by colonial institutions; Canada’s ongoing failure to sufficiently engage Inuit in decisions that affect their homeland; and the inadequacy of federal climate change policy. Zebedee Nungak describes the “decimation of Inuit security” that resulted from colonization and the imposition of Southern policies on Inuit.\(^{37}\) Rosemarie Kuptana particularly connects the actions of the Canadian state and the insecurities facing Inuit related to food and the cultural dislocation caused by forced permanent settlement:

The settlement of Inuit in hamlets has resulted in many people being unskilled in hunting and the ways of life on the land. This settlement was government policy … [and] resulted in a society which is resettled with some of the amenities of the south but also in a society devoid of the economy which sustained it … The on-going results of this government policy have robbed the Inuit of a viable economy. The government policy of residential schools too worked to this end: it ensured, as best it could, that the traditional ways would not be transferred to a new generation. It can be argued, therefore, that ongoing government policy and actions are working to deprive the Inuit of a basic right to life.\(^{38}\)

Many emphasize that, in various respects, the security of Inuit has been negatively affected by

\(^{37}\) Nungak, 14.
\(^{38}\) Kuptana, 12.
subordination to first colonial, later federal, authorities. Key historical episodes in the relationship between Inuit and the Canadian state indicate a pattern of Indigenous people’s wellbeing undermined by colonial policies. Such episodes include the mass slaughter of Inuit sled dogs by RCMP and provincial police in the 1950s and 1960s,\(^{39}\) and the forced relocation of Inuit families from Nunavik to Ellesmere Island in the 1960s to serve as “human flagpoles” in support of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty claims.\(^{40}\) In these instances, the security of Inuit was directly harmed by actions taken by Canada in the assertion of its own national security interests.

Finally, Inuit leaders identify their political autonomy as a self-determining Indigenous people as vital both to their security and to ensuring the agency necessary to provide for their security. Many thus identify Canada’s incomplete implementation of self-government through federal-Inuit land claim agreements – including the *James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement*, *Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement*, *Labrador Inuit Land Claim Agreement*, and the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA)* – as affecting their rights and security. Rosemarie Kuptana argues that Canada’s “failure to consult Inuit on all matters affecting Inuit, including sovereignty and security,” is illegal under domestic and international law, and claims “Inuit are suffering from a want of dialogue even though this dialogue is constitutionally mandated … This manner of governing is not working for Inuit in Canada, particularly on the issue of arctic [sic] sovereignty and security.”\(^{41}\) James Arreak, CEO of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, the organization mandated to implement the *Nunavut Land Claims Agreement*, also highlights the link between colonialism, the *NLCA*, and Canada’s Arctic sovereignty: “Notwithstanding the colonialism that marred the historic interaction of Inuit and the Canadian state, Inuit are proud Canadians. For years we have been holding up the Canadian flag over disputed waters of the Northwest Passage. Full and fair implementation of the *NLCA* must be part of our continuing to do so.”\(^{42}\) As the principal instrument for realizing Inuit self-determination, land claims are seen as crucial for

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\(^{41}\) Kuptana, 10-11.

\(^{42}\) James Arreak, testimony before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, 41-01-73 (March 26, 2013).
maintaining the political autonomy needed to protect Inuit rights and identity. Participants in the *Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey* also tied security to the capacity to ensure political goals in the future. One explained that “security – in a broad way, [means] we want to protect ourselves and our wishes and our goals for the future,” while another emphasized the importance of self-determination because “security in the Arctic, for me that would be like that my culture is still being alive and being able to stay alive.”

Kirt Ejesiak, a former official with ITK and the Government of Nunavut, also identified the link between autonomy and security by noting that, for Inuit, “the security part comes in when our governments don’t respect our way of life.” Inuit leaders thus view land claim agreements as crucial for defending against Southern pressures for social change, economic modernization, and cultural assimilation.

Based on the preceding section, there is ample evidence to support the argument that for Inuit in northern Canada, security is a holistic concept that links protecting the Arctic environment from degradation and radical climate change; preserving their identity through the maintenance of Indigenous cultural practices; and asserting Inuit autonomy as self-determining political actors within the context of the Canadian settler state. These examples of how Inuit leaders understand security in the Arctic are reinforced by the few academic accounts to explicitly link Inuit, security, and climate change in the Arctic. Inuit security claims invoke existential challenges to core elements of Inuit wellbeing, and even survival. They have been articulated publicly and repeatedly, directly to the Government of Canada, in the media, and to other authoritative actors with the power to take political action. Thus, Inuit leaders and organizations function as securitizing actors employing the grammar and language of in/security in order to construct certain phenomena as security issues within Canadian public and government discourse. Despite the significant progress in establishing institutions for Inuit self-determination, on their own terms it seems that “Inuit have yet to find true security in Canada.”

2.2 Sámi in Northern Norway

Sámi are a transnational people comprising the entire Indigenous populations of Finland, Sweden, and Norway, and a small number in northwestern Russia, and are the only recognized

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43 EKOS 2011, 14.
44 *Nilliajut* 2013.
46 *Nungak*, 15.
Indigenous people in Europe. Of a total Sámi population of approximately 100,000, roughly half live in Norway. Though small in number, since the 1980s Sámi have become highly politicized, seeking state recognition of their collective rights, establishment of distinct representative institutions, and representation within regional and European institutions. Sámi were included in negotiations over the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), one of the key political openings for rapprochement between post-Soviet Russia and the West, and the transnational Saami Council was an original Permanent Participant of the Arctic Council. The establishment of separate Sámi parliaments in Norway, Sweden, and Finland between the late 1980s and mid-1990s served as official recognition of Sámi demands for separate institutions and of the de facto separation of the Sámi people into distinct Fennoscandian constituencies. In Norway specifically, government has recognized the historical rights of Sámi over Sápmi, the traditional Sámi homeland, through its early adoption of the International Labour Organization’s *Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention*, known as ILO Convention 169, and in the government’s 2001 White Paper on Sámi Policy, which acknowledges that “the Kingdom of Norway is based on the territory of two peoples.” Sámi demands for greater autonomy and self-determination have resulted in new institutional arrangements, particularly following the promulgation of the *Finnmark Act* in 2005 that further enshrined Sámi collective land rights and significantly altered the administration of public lands in northern Norway.

This section outlines the meaning of security identified by representatives of Sámi people in Norway, and suggests that security for Sámi can be identified as: maintenance of ecological viability for traditional land-use, preservation and revitalization of Sámi culture and language, and maintenance of Sámi political autonomy as a self-determining Indigenous people within the Norwegian state. In a detailed study of post-Cold War security in the Barents region, Johan Eriksson predicted: “[European] regionalization and transnationalization may lead to a situation where non-state units claim security interests of their own.” Growing awareness of Arctic issues such as environmental change, contamination of the food system, degradation of traditional reindeer herding lands, and threats to Indigenous language and culture informed Eriksson’s view

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49 Broderstad 2011.
that Indigenous peoples, including Sámi, “definitely have their own specific security problems.”\textsuperscript{51} However, while it is possible to identify what security means for Sámi in Norway, Sámi have not generally functioned as securitizing actors employing security language to elevate their political issues within Norwegian domestic politics.

Sámi in northern Norway appear to share similar understandings of what security means to that of Inuit in Canada. To examine how Sámi have articulated Arctic security, I conducted a similar analysis of primary texts to that described above pertaining to Inuit.\textsuperscript{52} I examined 53 documents from a number of sources, including an exhaustive search of relevant online English-language documents available from the Sámi Council, the Sámi Resource Center, and the Galdu Research Center for the Rights of Indigenous People, of which 27 (51\%) contained securitizing moves.\textsuperscript{53} Of these, 44\% dealt with climate change specifically and an additional 30\% with the environment more generally, suggesting the central importance of the environment to Sámi. When directly referencing climate change, referent objects included traditional livelihoods (100\% of cases), Sámi culture (92\%), and autonomy or self-determination (25\%). There was significant overlap between culture and traditional livelihoods as referent objects, which is unsurprising considering the integral link between reindeer herding and Sámi culture, with threats to the former generally considered to endanger the latter. In cases where environmental degradation was specified, referent objects included reindeer herding (63\%), Sámi culture (37\%), autonomy or self-determination (25\%).

These securitizing moves specify various threats as endangering Sámi traditional territories, cultural practices, and subsistence livelihoods. When climate change was specified, threats included: the private sector (67\%), the national government (42\%), assimilation (25\%), and climate change itself (17\%). When the environment more generally was specified, threats included private sector activities (88\%), the host country (25\%), and assimilation (25\%).\textsuperscript{54} Securitizing moves were often very specific, with 63\% of cases indicating the private sector as a threat while citing specific industrial developments and naming relevant corporations. Thus, Sámi organizations explicitly view government’s pro-development policies as partially responsible for private sector encroachment and cultural assimilation threatening to Sámi collective wellbeing,

\textsuperscript{51} Eriksson, 271-272.
\textsuperscript{52} Greaves 2012.
\textsuperscript{53} The small \( n \) is attributable to the smaller number of Sámi documents published in English.
\textsuperscript{54} ‘Host country’ refers here to whichever of the four states in which Sámi reside (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia).
particularly due to mining and other extractive industries. Other securitizing moves publicly invoke the common and existential nature of the threats in question. The director of the International Centre for Reindeer Husbandry describes “climate change as an incredible challenge we all face as a civilization.” 55 Speaking at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Aili Keskitalo, President of the Sámi Parliament of Norway (the Sámediggi), stated: "The degradation of the environment in Inuit and Saami traditional territories caused by e.g. pollution, non-sustainable natural resource extraction and climate change constitute a great threat to their traditional lifestyles and culture." 56 Overall, the pattern is clear: Norwegian Sámi situate the natural environment, and its integral link to the maintenance of traditional Indigenous cultural practices, at the heart of what security means in their Arctic homeland.

This analysis has several methodological limitations. Foremost among these is linguistic; unsurprisingly, Sámi organizations in Norway mostly publish in Norwegian or one of three recognized Sámi languages, complicating the search for securitizing moves. While many notable documents or policy statements are also published in English translations, the total sample of texts and speech acts available in English is much smaller than for the comparable study of Inuit discussed above. Moreover, those that are tend to be directed at international audiences, and thus may differ from speech acts directed by Sámi organizations at the Norwegian government or other regional actors. This also raises the issue of representation, since those organizations that do publish in English tend to be those representing Sámi as a transnational people, rather than solely Sámi within Norway. For instance, the Saami Council publishes most of its documents in English but represents Sámi in all three Fennoscandian states and Russia, while the Sámediggi does not. Thus, the above analysis captures securitizing moves made on behalf of all Sámi, and directed at international audiences such as the Arctic Council and the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, rather than the Norwegian government. Since the choice of which language and discourse to employ is a contextual one, the choices made when communicating Sámi issues internationally may differ from those made for domestic political consumption.

These methodological limitations caution against the finding that Sámi actors in Norway have tried to securitize environmental change and Sámi culture and autonomy, despite occasional


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use of security language. Instead, textual analysis should be complemented by qualitative research into the views of Sámi leaders and political representatives with respect to the meaning of security in the Norwegian High North. Accordingly, I conducted 12 semi-structured interviews with senior individuals representing the Sámediggi, the Sámi Reindeer Herders’ Association of Norway, and the Saami Council. In addition, I undertook participant observation of Sámi politicians, academics, activists, and community members, including reindeer herders, over the course of five months of fieldwork in northern Norway, including visits to five small communities in western Sápmi. These findings provide the first English-language account focused on Sámi understandings of security in the Arctic.

These interviews suggest a high degree of consensus in terms of the political issues considered to be most important by Norwegian Sámi leaders and institutions. Virtually all respondents identified conflicts over land use, particularly the preservation of contiguous grazing areas for reindeer herding, and preservation of Sámi language and culture as the most important issues. Within the category of land use conflicts, three specific issues were frequently mentioned: development of new mines and associated infrastructure, the siting of windmill farms, and a small but growing concern over the possible impacts of oil and gas development. Of these, mining is clearly the gravest concern. Spurred by the rapid growth of mining across the border in Sweden – which has galvanized Sámi and local resistance and drawn comparisons to the seminal Alta dispute in the 1980s – and passage of a new Mineral Act in 2009, Sámi are increasingly concerned about a “mineral extraction wave” occurring in Norway, as well.58 To Sven-Roald Nystø, former president of the Sámediggi: "Minerals, that's a huge issue. The mineral deposits you find in the middle parts of the Sami areas. The reindeer herders already complain that they are losing too much of their grazing land to infrastructure development in our areas."59 Some respondents identified the long-term health and viability of communities as being threatened by mining activities even if they experienced short-term benefits. One representative of the Saami Council sees that resource projects "bring little back to the local community … After the mining has ended, the local communities are left with nothing … The non-renewable resources have been stolen, and the viable natural resources that we had before have been destroyed. And the things

58 Interview with Christina Henriksen, June 20, 2014.
59 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø, May 9, 2014.
that we need to maintain our way of living are gone.”⁶⁰ Another official with the Saami Council concurs, suggesting that mining threatens to undermine the traditional herding basis of Sámi economies. He sees the greatest challenge confronting Sámi to be “by far industrialization of traditional territory. It’s been a while, but the pressure from infrastructure and industry and so on has become so much that reindeer herding cannot sustain much more. We need to be able to stop these kinds of projects. They will soon start to pose a threat to the whole reindeer herding culture and livelihood.”⁶¹ Many respondents noted that while mining has occurred in Sápmi for centuries, and Sámi are not opposed to such projects on principle, they are sceptical of allowing new mines to proceed if they risk compromising the continued viability of the reindeer herding industry.

Concern for grazing areas, rather than objections to mining, per se, is illustrated by the fact that many respondents also noted the negative effects of ‘green’ development projects, particularly related to the construction of windmill farms. Runar Myrnes Balto, political advisor to the President of the Sámediggi, considers renewable wind energy farms to be nearly as problematic as new mine sites: “Big industries [are] coming in and grabbing land, infrastructure coming in. Green energy. Windmills are becoming a big problem for reindeer herders. Green energy in the sense of windmills are taking a lot of land which was traditionally for the reindeer. So that is one of the key threats that we are facing.”⁶² An official with the Saami Council expressed a similar view: “From a reindeer herding perspective, what matters is if it damages or not. It doesn’t matter if it’s green. It’s all about how it impacts on your livelihoods, and the herd is really the only thing that matters when reindeer herders take a stand. The one thing is that a windmill park would be a lesser infringement.”⁶³ Aili Keskitalo has described the growth of windmill farms in Sápmi as a form of “‘green’ colonization, colonization in the name of the climate,” that perpetuates historical patterns of decisions over the High North being made in the south, in the interests of those in the south.⁶⁴ Many Sámi appear equally reluctant to concede traditional grazing areas to renewable energy production as they are to extractive industrial activities.

Finally, several respondents expressed concern over potential future impacts of petroleum development for herding and other traditional uses of land and marine areas. To date, petroleum

⁶¹ Anonymous interview January 22, 2015b.
⁶³ Anonymous interview January 22, 2015b.
development has been a relatively minor issue in the High North due to the industry’s concentration in southern Norway. The fact that drilling is located offshore also means the oil and gas sector has been less susceptible to legal challenges based on Sámi collective rights. A senior advisor to the Sámediggi explained that oil and gas has only recently been addressed by Sámi political institutions:

Partly [why] the Sami Parliament has not been so active when it comes to oil and gas is that it’s offshore and it has not been so far north until recently … It's not in direct conflict with land rights … When it comes to international law, you have more solid situation when it comes to rights of on shore than off shore. So we don't have the tools in the same way, to come to a good negotiated position offshore … The question is, of course, when it comes to environmental questions, if you have a blow out, of course, that's highly problematic, and the climate change.65

His colleague was quick to add, however, that “we know they are searching for new projects, and there may be many politicians who want it to come to shore, to have pipelines and other oil and gas industries on the land. So that's a challenge for the future for us.”66 Sven-Roald Nystø agrees: “Among Sámi in Norway, oil and gas has had minor effects regarding the material basis for Sami industries. It is still a southern industry, but is now moving northward, yes. Those issues are climbing on the Sámi agenda as well.”67 The prospect of expanding petroleum operations in the Barents region and other ecologically sensitive areas has caused some Sámi to worry about the possible repercussions of an oil spill for the coastal fishing sector, upon which many small communities still rely.68 Christina Henriksen, a member of the Sámediggi, insisted that “significant measures to prevent oil spills and disasters at sea” were essential for providing security in the High North.69 As with mining activities, however, their objections are not principled, but framed in terms of mitigating negative impacts for nearby communities and preserving the conditions for continued traditional economic activities.

The other central political issue identified by almost all respondents was the preservation and revitalization of Sámi language, and by extension culture. Until the second half of the 20th

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65 Interview with Torvald Falch June 17, 2014.
66 Interview with Jan-Petter Gintal June 17, 2014
67 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø, May 9, 2014.
69 Interview with Christina Henriksen June 20, 2015.
century, the Norwegian state sought to eliminate Sámi cultural and religious distinctiveness through a policy of “Norwegianization.” Consequently, a major priority of Sámi political institutions has been the revitalization of Sámi languages and the maintenance of Sámi linguistic and cultural communities throughout Norway. Indeed, language has become one of the most important markers of Sámi political success and meaningful self-determination: "We don’t have a country, so language becomes one of the most important things for our culture." Although rights to Sámi language use have been legislated, only a small minority of Sámi remain fluent, making implementation challenging. To Runar Myrnes Balto:

The biggest challenge is concerning language. The statistics are really grim. There are fewer and fewer people, there are fewer students studying Sámi language in school … There are few Sámis, and we live in a number of different places. In a few places, at least where we are in the majority, the language classes are really good. Children get every class in Sámi. But if you look outside those areas … There are so many places where Sámi live and there are only one or two families, and people really struggle … There is a huge gap between the rights that are given through the law and the actual implementation of that in the school system.

Balto links the challenges of limited linguistic use with the maintenance of Sámi identity. Sven-Roald Nystø made a similar observation, noting “it is perhaps an emotional challenge to use a language which we are not supposed to be using. It is a matter of identity. Can we be good Sámi without knowing the language?” Many respondents noted the complicated relationship between Sámi language and cultural identity, and the challenge of promoting language revitalization without making the majority who do not speak it feel excluded from Sámi society.

When directly asked to describe what security means or specify the types of threats Sámi face, respondents clearly identified threats and referent objects related to the maintenance of the natural environment and the practice of subsistence activities, Indigenous culture and identity, and autonomy and self-determination within the Norwegian state. This understanding of security is consistent with the basic elements of human security, since “what can possibly be more important

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73 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø April 6, 2014.
than clean water, fresh air, and clean food?" 74 As a result of industrialization in Sápmi, many respondents identified such necessities as threatened for many Sámi communities. For Runar Myrnes Balto, the “first thing that comes to mind is the livelihood perspective, in the sense of traditional ways of living: reindeer herding, fishing, agriculture, as well, which are traditional Sámi livelihoods, that’s how we’ve had our incomes. Those I would say are under threat. That is the first threat I would identify.” 75 A senior official with the Saami Council responded: “I would say that if you talk security with most Sami, they would talk about environmental risks, and then also personal security … Reindeer herding is the most dangerous occupation … Accidents that have to do with vehicles, 4 wheelers than turn over, go though the ice. Also drowning, people go through the ice. Also fires in these huts.” 76 The same respondent expanded on the relationship between security for Sámi and the pursuit of legal rights and decision-making through Sámi political institutions, particularly with respect to conflicts over land use:

If you are successful with your legal claims, [and] gain control of your lands and resources that way, that gives you security. Security of your possessions, not security against external things, natural catastrophe, and so on. That would allow you to stop mining projects and so on in areas where you don’t find it suitable to pursue mining. Where the damage to traditional livelihoods or environmental risk is too high and so on … Basically, [to] get control of the territories, and over your own society. 77

Parliamentarian Christina Henriksen emphasized that “security also means we should be part of the decision-making, so we don’t just get to clean up the garbage” of other governments’ decisions. 78 One respondent identified the interaction between Sámi’s unique cultural position, their symbolic and economic connection to land, and numerical minority as distinguished Sámi security interests from those of non-Sámi Norwegians:

When we are a smaller population you might experience more security issues. Because you are being a smaller population, you might be ignored. Shortage of culturally-relevant health services. That impacts a Sami more than a Norwegian. Lack of access to culturally-relevant, culturally-appropriate heath care. Same with education. In that sense we might

75 Interview with Runar Myrnes Balto January 23, 2015.
76 Anonymous interview January 22, 2015b.
77 Anonymous interview January 22, 2015b.
78 Interview with Christina Henriksen June 20, 2015.
have more issues that can be addressed as security. We might be more vulnerable in a way. We might be more exposed to insecurity.  

Some also placed the threats facing Sámi, particularly with respect to resource extraction and environmental degradation, within a broader circumpolar and global context. A representative of the Saami Council stated: “[We] have to think about the way we live in the world today … It's the way we're living that is the cause of the problem … If we don't reconsider how we use minerals, resources, if we don't recycle, and cut back, we will put the whole Arctic in danger.” His statement linked demand for Arctic resources with patterns of global consumption that are driving environmental change and manifesting insecurity for communities located near the sites of extraction or vulnerable to climate disruption.

These interviews indicate that, many Sámi hold an understanding of in/security consistent with a broad conception of human security. However, what was also clear is that Sámi leaders and institutions in Norway are not securitizing actors in so far as they do not seek to construct their political priorities as security issues within Norwegian discourse or state policy. Security is not the preferred framework within which Sámi issues are presented or generally discussed, and is a discourse that some respondents view with scepticism. “The term is rarely used,” said one, while another was concerned that if it were employed as a lens for Sámi issues “security might have a negative connotation.” Respondents noted the types of issues commonly related to human security are not typically described using security-centric terminology in either Sámi or Norwegian languages, in contrast with the case of Inuit: “I think that the use of the word ‘security’, and why we don’t use it within the Sami discourse, is because the word has connotations to more ‘hard security’. It’s not relevant to the issues we are so concerned about. So we have other words to describe the feeling that the Inuit may be talking about.” But some respondents were also careful to note the salience of issues underlying human security concerns, particularly with respect to transnational environmental hazards outside of the political control of Sámi or their institutions:

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79 Anonymous interview January 22, 2015a.
81 Anonymous interview January 22, 2015b.
82 Anonymous interview January 22, 2015a.
83 Interview with Runar Myrnes Balto January 23, 2015.
Of course it’s relevant it’s just rarely used in the vocabulary. In the ‘80s, with the Chernobyl breakdown at the power plant, that had enormous impacts on reindeer herding, particularly in Sweden. That made large areas of pastureland unusable. You could use the pasture, but then you could not eat the meat. Of course we are concerned about minimizing environmental security and impacts on environment. It’s just not spoken that much about.”

Others noted the possible downsides of securitization as a strategy for advancing Sámi priorities. Sven-Roald Nystø observed that securitization of the Norway-Russia border during the Cold War had impeded Sámi land rights and resulted in a restrictive discourse in which the state took security and defence decisions without significant consideration of Sámi interests, “so Sámi deliberately avoided the language of security in order to keep open their options or possibilities for resolving their struggle for political good will.” He suggests a similar dynamic has been reproduced by the renewed securitization of the region through the Norwegian government’s High North Initiative, with exclusionary implications for Sámi involvement in state policy:

We are talking on environmental security, society security, energy security, and so on and so on. And that in itself puts much more light on the high political issues in the Arctic and excludes a lot of stakeholders in the discussion on how to put forward civility in the Arctic debate. I think we have taken a couple of steps back in the desecuritization on the Arctic, and where it ends I’m not quite sure, but one of the losers in that process are, of course, Indigenous peoples.

Sámi political actors identify a conception of Arctic in/security that highlights two central issues: land use conflicts affecting contiguous grazing areas for reindeer herding, and the preservation of Sámi language and culture. Notably, climate change is not generally regarded as a security issue, and when it is this is primarily due to its effects on reindeer herding and subsistence food sources such as fish stocks. Overall, Sámi representatives share a similar, though not identical, conception of in/security with Inuit representatives in northern Canada, in as much as threats and referent objects can be categorized in terms of the natural environment, indigenous identity and cultural practices, and political autonomy and self-government. For Sámi, the last of these three is seen as essential for protecting the former two, though Sámi success in establishing

84 Anonymous interview January 22, 2015b.
85 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø May 9, 2014.
87 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø May 9, 2014.
representative institutions for exercising self-determination in northern Norway means that most respondents did not see Sámi political rights as being threatened.

3. Explaining Securitization and Non-Securitization in the Arctic

Given the similarities between Inuit and Sámi as Arctic Indigenous peoples residing within two comparable circumpolar states, the reluctance of Sámi representatives to attempt to securitize their political priorities relative to frequent invocation of in/security by Inuit leaders and organizations is surprising. Based on my research, I suggest three factors influence the non-securitization of Arctic issues by Sámi in the Norwegian High North: ecological difference, and the differing experiences of climate change that result; greater Sámi inclusion within Norwegian society; and the geographic proximity of Norway to Russia, which results in a more robust national security discourse that restricts space for alternative, non-state security discourses.

3.1 Ecological Difference

The Canadian and Norwegian Arctic regions have distinct ecologies and climate conditions, resulting in differing impacts of human-caused environmental change. Recent climate science clearly identifies the milder effects occurring and predicted to occur in northern Europe compared to most of the Canadian Arctic. For instance, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment observes that mean annual temperatures in Scandinavia have risen by about 1 degree Celsius since the 1950s, and average winter temperatures by about 2 degrees. Notably, “surface air temperatures over the Arctic and North Atlantic Oceans have remained very cold in winter, limiting the warming in coastal areas,”88 which is where most settlements in northern Norway are located. By contrast, mean annual temperatures in the central and eastern Canadian Arctic have increased by 1-2 degrees Celsius over the same period, with average winter temperatures increasing by as much as 3-5 degrees.89 This is also reflected in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, which illustrates the trend towards warmer seasonal temperatures in the central and western North American Arctic compared to Fennoscandia.90 In sum, the Canadian North has experienced more than twice the winter warming of the Norwegian High North, with significant

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88 ACIA, 112.
89 ACIA, 113.
effects on seasonal sea ice coverage, flora and fauna, permafrost thawing, and weather unpredictability compared to Scandinavia.

As a result of the less severe ecological changes they have experienced, Sámi leaders and organizations do not typically list climate change among their top political priorities. While Sámi leaders acknowledge climate change in Sápmi adversely affects a range of Sámi interests, the most pressing are the effects on reindeer herding. A senior advisor to the Sámediggi insisted that “[climate change is] very relevant. As [with] other indigenous people, mainly Sámis live in the traditional way, with reindeer herding and fishing, harvesting wild berries, stuff like that. So they can feel the climate change. So I think they are very aware and we see the weather change, so people are talking a lot about that. And especially the latest year we have seen many changes here in the north.” Randi Skum, advisor to the Reindeer Herders Association of Norway and a former member of the Sámediggi, described specific climate challenges for the reindeer industry: “Now the rivers are open very early. Some rivers they don't have ice at all. So its one effect is the traditional way of moving reindeers. Many have to move by cars now. You also see the changing in the type of vegetation and you see the forests actually moving higher and higher up in the mountains. And that also in a way changes the vegetation that the reindeers are dependent on.”

Respondents also mentioned the increased cost of feeding reindeer unable to graze due to changes such as seasonal icing of pastureland, as well as non-reindeer related impacts such as altered fish stocks and decline in other marine animals.

In this respect, many respondents noted that climate change adaptation needs have been mild and manageable. Sven-Roald Nystø observed:

We are not living in the Arctic, we are living in the sub-Arctic. Changes in ice and snow are not as visible as in the High Arctic. You don’t see any erosion here. Climate change is less visible here in terms of physical damage. What we see are changes to some extent. Mackerel are coming further north. Some changes in the distribution of the cod stocks. We can see the tree line is going up. We can see more severe weather, of course, but is that a huge problem? Isn't that a question of clothing, of adaptation?

Representatives of the Sámediggi and Saami Council noted that climate change might actually lead to benefits for reindeer herding, as milder winters and longer growing seasons result in easier

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91 Interview with Jan-Petter Gintal June 17, 2014
92 Interview with Randi Skum June 19, 2014.
93 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø May 9, 2014
access to grazing pasture and less adverse environmental conditions. One respondent observed that unpredictable ice and snow conditions are nothing new for herders: "Most visible for the Sámi is snow and ice conditions for the reindeer herders. That's a bigger issue. But that's so unpredictable, and has always been unpredictable. That's a permanent situation." 94 As a political strategy, therefore, Sámi institutions are reiterating their emphasis on land use and protection of contiguous grazing areas rather than, for example, greenhouse gas mitigation, since bodies like the Sámi-led International Centre for Reindeer Husbandry consider “protection of grazing land will be the most important adaptive strategy for reindeer herders under climate change.” 95 In the hierarchy of Sámi concerns, climate change ranks behind other threats to traditional land use; Runar Balto, for instance, observed that climate change is “just as serious [as mining], but it isn’t [taken as seriously]. Perhaps it should be.” 96

The relative lack of importance afforded to climate change is exacerbated by Sámis’ knowledge of their relatively fortunate position compared to other Arctic Indigenous peoples. Several explicitly contrasted Sámi experiences with those of Inuit, sympathizing with the greater environmental challenges confronting the latter. A Saami Council official sees “the situation is very different even though we share a lot of similarities as Arctic Indigenous peoples, [Inuit] being much more dependent on ice, marine resources than we are. Much more exposed to natural catastrophes than we are. Diseases, so on, that accumulate in fish and marine mammals, that they are exposed to.” 97 Randi Skum sees the Canadian Arctic as a cautionary tale for Sámi, underscoring the view of climate change as more of a future concern: “I think we see what's happening in [the] North of Canada. We have seen on television that the ice is melting, especially affect the indigenous there. I think also here in Norway it will be first the indigenous here that actually will notice this changes mostly.” 98 The perception that climate change is more acute elsewhere, coupled with the relatively modest experiences of environmental change in the High North to date all underline that ecological differences between the Canadian and Norwegian Arctics partly account for the different efforts between Sámi and Inuit to securitize the changing environment. Overall, climate change was viewed as an emerging challenge requiring

94 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø May 9, 2014.
95 Anonymous interview January 20, 2015.
97 Anonymous interview January 22, 2015b.
98 Interview with Randi Skum June 19, 2014.
management and adaptation, not as an urgent priority for Sámi institutions approaching the level of crisis or insecurity.

3.2 Social Inclusion

The second factor that accounts for why Sámi leaders have not sought to securitize their highest priority issues is the high degree of inclusion of Sámi within Norwegian society. In the words of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, “Sámi people in the Nordic countries do not have to deal with many of the socio-economic concerns that commonly face indigenous peoples throughout the world, such as serious health concerns, extreme poverty or hunger.” 99 Norway has ranked first or second on the UN Human Development Index every year since 2001, making it the overall best country in the world in which to live in the 21st century. Sámi in Norway enjoy full benefits of citizenship of one of the world’s most prosperous social democracies: “Most relevant here is the idea of equality which has been a core value in Nordic societies since the 1930s. This has been attributed to the strong position of social democratic parties, but [it] is better to attribute it to the development of a welfare state with a safety net preventing any members of society from falling to destitution and misery.” 100 While the only recognized indigenous people in Europe, Sámi are nonetheless fully incorporated into Norwegian society. More controversially, Sámi in Norway might be described as highly assimilated, since in most cases they are “practically indiscernible from their Norwegian neighbours.” 101 Unlike most Indigenous minorities, Sámi are not segregated from the rest of Norwegian society along geographic, socio-economic, or epidemiological lines.

This was not always the case; Sámi experienced colonization and disempowerment by successive Scandinavian states that viewed them as inferior and incapable, if also somewhat indispensable in the northern border region with Russia and Sweden. 102 Discrimination against Sámi, particularly through government policies of Norwegianization, ultimately fuelled social and


101 Saugestad, 233.

political resistance among Sámi communities and ignited a resurgence of Sámi cultural identity and political institutionalization in the final decades of the 20th century. Following Sámi protests against the construction of a hydroelectric dam at Alta in the early 1980s, Norway undertook significant legislative measures to address Sámi political concerns, protect their human rights, and establish representative institutions. This led to a flurry of activity encompassing passage of a new Sámi Act in 1987, an amendment to the Norwegian Constitution in 1988, ratification of ILO Convention 169 in 1990, and passage of the Finnmark Act in 2005. Cumulatively, this legislation established the Sámi Parliament of Norway, recognized the linguistic and cultural rights of Sámi citizens, affirmed Norway's bi-national ethnic character, committed it to best practices towards Indigenous peoples under international law, and created the first domestic structure approximating a land claim agreement over part of the Sámi homeland of Sápmi. The results are generally regarded as a major political success for Sámi and non-Sámi alike: “In Norway, the national parliament and government over the last thirty years have supported, developed and strengthened Sámi rights on a wide range of issues. The establishment of the Sámi Parliament has given the national authorities a collaborative partner which functions on behalf of the Sámi people and has a legitimacy based on elections.” Several decades of innovative and cooperative policymaking between Sámi and Norwegian political institutions have thus resulted in a situation where Sámi are both incorporated into Norwegian society and represented through distinct indigenous institutions reflecting their specific concerns and interests.

This high degree of social inclusion, and its impacts on the willingness to securitize, was also reflected in the interviews. According to one prominent Sámi academic, whether or not a group sees their concerns as security issues “has to do with experiences of politics, what kind of experiences you have with the political system. We don't need to use the concept [of security]. For good or bad, and mostly here for good, we are integrated into the society. Education, health, infrastructure: we are the same [as other Norwegians].” Multiple interview respondents echoed the view that Sámi have no need to articulate security interests separate from those of other

105 Personal communication with Else Grete Broderstad June 16, 2014.
Norwegians because they are incorporated into Norwegian society. Although Sámi view themselves as distinct, “you have a Sámi public which is also very much connected to the Norwegian public. So it's not a clear division between the Sámi public sphere and the Norwegian public sphere. It has never been actually, in that way.” Sven-Roald Nystø also linked Sámi inclusion directly to attitudes towards climate change, attributing Sámis’ greater willingness and capacity to adapt to the changing environment to the previous adaptations they have undertaken to become part of Norwegian society: "The Sámi societies have changed. They have modernized. They are to a huge extent an integral part of the mainstream economy. All the adaptations to that are very much in place. We have faced the urbanization process for a long time. We have adapted to that as well. The challenges that will follow climate change, they have started on a different basis among the Sámi.”

If efforts to securitize social and cultural issues by minority groups are often premised upon the cleavage that exists between those groups and the dominant society, then the high degree of social and political integration of Sámi in Norway can be expected to decrease the perceived need among Sámi to depict their security as a distinct group as being threatened.

3.3 Geography

The third factor that accounts for why Sámi have not sought to securitize their political priorities is that Norwegian High North security discourse is still structured around security threats emanating from Russia, including in extremis the threat of military conflict. Fear of the Russian threat is an enduring part of Norwegian security discourse, and several recent studies have focused on the role of Russia in Norwegian security policy including the shared border, the Svalbard Archipelago, Norway membership in NATO, Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, and energy extraction in the Barents Sea.

As Leif Jensen writes:

The increasing concern for security, especially after 9/11, at the individual and aggregate level in the West, resonates widely in Norwegian High North discourses. This collective sense of vulnerability has instigated a renaissance for realism and state-centrism. Indeed,

106 Interview with Torvald Falch June 17, 2014.
107 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø, May 9, 2014.
on Norway’s part, there is no more obvious place for prolonging a sense of paranoia and general insecurity than in relation to the High North, where Norway’s national identity as a tiny, vulnerable land and the image of massive Russia (‘the Russian bear’) as ‘the radical other’ are clear and easily resuscitated in the ‘collective Norwegian mind’.109

Fear of Russia, or of being seen to interfere with the state’s ability to effectively defend against Russia, restricts the willingness of Sámi actors to employ security language in making their political claims. This relates to the inclusion of Sámi within Norwegian society, as some interview respondents noted that Sámi in Norway were also protected during the Cold War against the Soviet threat.110

The existence of an enduring national security discourse in Norway limits the conceptual and policy space available to articulate alternative, non-state conceptions of in/security. Security language is widely seen as a privileged discourse within the sole ambit of the central government: “Everything that smacks of ‘security’ acquires a very particular status in Norwegian discourses on the High North. Discourses are wrapped in history, and here in the north, close to Russia, discursive fragments from the Cold War continue to ring like echoes from the past.”111 Sven-Roald Nystø sees opportunities to securitize Sámi issues as limited by proximity to Russia and the high political issues that accompany it: “It's state-centric. When you say the word 'security' then the governments say ‘whoa, hold your horses, this is our business,’ because security in the older days was military security.”112 Given the enduring challenges associated with their Russian neighbour, other types of securitizing moves are able to gain less traction within the public sphere.

This is especially the case because the Norwegian state itself has widened the scope of security threats contained within its official security discourse. The High North has been increasingly securitized since 2005, but the meaning of security has been widened within state policy to accommodate an increasing variety of policy issues. As described by the Minister of Defence: “Current challenges in the North are qualitatively different, but not necessarily less demanding than those facing us during the Cold War. Today’s challenges are related to resource management, unresolved jurisdictional questions and the environment, all of which affect societal security. We cannot, however, disregard situations likely to entail challenges also in respect of

109 Jensen 2012, 94.
110 Interview with Torvald Falch and Jan-Petter Gintal June 17, 2014; interview with Sven-Roald Nystø, May 9, 2014.
111 Jensen 2012, 90.
112 Interview with Sven-Roald Nystø April 16, 2014.
state security.” Rather than attempt to define new issues as related to security, and thus invite the state to take the lead role in their resolution, Sámi actors have employed strategies of politicization and legalization rather than securitization, because “in so far as increasing numbers of questions issues dealing with the High North acquire a security flavour in the expanded sense of the term, the discursive consequences would appear to be the sublimation of other issues.”

Thus, Sámi have generally chosen not to speak security rather than compete with the discursive position of Russia as the preeminent security threat in the High North.

**Conclusion**

In spite of sharing a similar conception with Inuit as to the meaning of security-quahuman security in their respective Arctic homelands, Sámi are not securitizing actors within the context of Norwegian domestic politics. As such they do not seek to have their political priorities elevated to the apex of political priority through the invocation of security language and the construction of existential threats within government policy. Whereas Inuit in Canada commonly articulate their priorities as security issues, Sámi have refrained from framing their issues as security issues precisely to avoid subordinating their priorities to the security concerns of the Norwegian state. I have proposed three factors to explain the decision not to securitize on the part of Norwegian Sámi. First, the relatively modest environmental changes that have occurred in Sápmi reduce the material hazards facing Sámi, decreasing the existential implications of climate change and thus the motivation to securitize. Second, Sámi are full beneficiaries of Norwegian society, enjoying all the benefits of citizenship of the world’s only social democratic petro-state. As such, they do not experience the same poverty, privation, and lower qualities of life vis-à-vis the majority population as most indigenous peoples, further reducing the material basis upon which Sámi could base specific security claims and be motivated to pursue discrete security interests against the Norwegian state. Finally, the continued discursive power of Russia within Norwegian Arctic security policy makes it difficult for other security issues to gain significant traction. Unlike Canada, whose geography is such that there has never been a realistic fear of invasion by the Soviets/Russians, Norwegians have been concerned for centuries over the possibility of aggression from their more powerful neighbour. The continued concern over relations with Russia

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114 Jensen 2012, 95.
contributes to a robust, state-centric national security discourse in Norway that is less susceptible to alternative securitizing moves. Even if they so chose, Sámi might have difficulty making political claims on the discursive terrain of security. Fortunately, given the absence of immediate existential threats to their survival or wellbeing, Sámi have little reason to advance security claims different from those already articulated by the Norwegian state.