Introduction

This paper examines the historical lessons of leadership killings conducted in World War II. Two case studies from World War II will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of leadership killings; the killing of Reinhard Heydrich in Czechoslovakia and the killing of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto over the island of Buin, Solomon Islands. This study is timely as in more contemporary times we are experiencing some extensive leadership killing operations conducted by the US as part of a global strategy countering Al-Qaeda, widely known now as targeted killings. Targeted killings are also widely practised by Israeli security forces against terrorist groups that are a threat to her. The recent targeted killing of Osama bin Laden by US Navy SEALs is also an example of the relevance of such operations. The lessons of such tactic as an integral part of a military strategy has antecedent examples in World War 2. Academic research specifically on leadership killings and its strategic effectiveness, and strategic history is almost non-existent. This paper takes a historical explanatory approach; it first describes the key definitions and differences of leadership killings, targeted killings and assassination; then explain the strategic theoretical framework; narrates the case studies with analysis; and conclude with the suggestion that the eternal general theory of strategy, influenced by Clausewitz is sufficient to understand the value of leadership killings.
What is Targeted Killing?

Targeted killing as a form of killing off enemies of the state was predominantly an early 21st century terminology construct to define an action against terrorists that avoided the stigma if the term assassination was used. Most contemporary writings on targeted killings tended to focus on the tactical effectiveness, the legal issues, and morality of targeted killings. These studies also dedicatedly looked in the events of the last ten years, in the wake of 9/11 and the US led Global War on Terror.

The usage of the term, targeted killing, had originated from Israel in 2000, when Israel stated its policy to eliminate selected Palestinian militants. The term targeted killing had been further fuelled by the popularity of the media’s usage in reports of Israeli strike operations targeting to kill leaders and senior members of terrorist organizations. Historically, Israeli security forces had used targeted killing against Hamas, Hezbollah, PLO, and other terrorists that had threatened her security since the early days of Israel’s existence; even though Israel finally declared openly that targeted killing was a deliberate policy on 14 February 2001. The most famous usage of targeted killings by Israeli security forces was in the aftermath of the Munich Olympics (1972) massacre of eleven Israeli athletes by Black September members. Israeli intelligence agency (Mossad) and Special Operations units searched for the terrorists and planners in a worldwide hunt, and succeeded in killing thirteen of them. Israelis, in more recent times had resorted to using stand-off weapons to conduct targeted killings, which included precision airstrikes with both laser-guided and satellite-guided bombs, Apache helicopters, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) apart from using individual operatives. As an illustration of the level of commitment in Israel’s security apparatus on targeted killings, it was reported that Israel had conducted at least eighty targeted killing operations since 2001.

In the US, after the devastating 9/11 attacks, US leaders and policy makers were more supportive of assassinations of terrorist operatives. The term assassination, however, is now considered a taboo term with evil connotations and forbidden by EO12333, was replaced by the term ‘targeted killing.’ It is now widely argued that ‘targeted
killing’ of terrorist leaders and supporters is legal under US law and EO 12333. US legal experts had argued that assassination refers to an act of murder intent, where else targeted killing is the legitimate killing for self-defence.

The major argument is that while ‘assassination’ of enemy leaders during war between states is legal, the ‘assassination’ of terrorist leaders and members is more controversial. If the terrorists were given legal combatant status then they would be legitimate for protection under international Laws of Conflict. If they were ‘assassinated’ without combatant status, it would amount to extra-judiciary murder. In order to get around this conundrum, the new term, targeted killing, was conveniently adopted to define chiefly as the killing of designated terrorists. Gary D. Solis provides a useful definition of targeted killing that supports this argument;

Targeted killing is the deliberate, specific targeting and killing, by a government or its agents, of a terrorist or of an "unlawful combatant" (i.e., one taking a direct part in hostilities in the context of an armed conflict) who is not in that government's custody.

In the case of the war on terror, targeted killings of terrorists is considered different from assassinations, as the terrorists are considered combatants in the war on terror, and they can be killed to prevent future terrorist threats of attack. The recent targeted killings of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s no. 2, Atiyah Abdul al-Rahman in Pakistan served as excellent examples of recent US practise of targeted killings. As an interesting note, US utilization of targeted killings in Pakistan increased by four times since President Barack Obama took office - to more than 160 targeted killing operations, and still counting.

On the wider scale, there is a vibrant debate on the effectiveness, morality and legal issues pertaining to targeted killing. The side that supports targeted killing argued that it was effective in killing off middle level terrorist leaders. Targeted killing
operations were perceived to have interrupted the tactical and operational effectiveness of the targeted terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and its affiliated organisations.\textsuperscript{17} Targeted killings were also claimed to have forced the terrorist organisations to take extreme security precautions, and limited their movements and capabilities in organising attacks.\textsuperscript{18} The killing of these leaders also destroyed the experience and skills needed to organise potential attacks, and eroded the morale strength of the terrorists.\textsuperscript{19} It is argued by some terrorism experts that targeted killing is one of the few effective measures in countering terrorism.\textsuperscript{20} In some counter-insurgency campaigns, the killing of the insurgent leader terminally destroyed the insurgency, such as the killing of Che Guevara in 1967, effectively ending the Bolivian insurgency.\textsuperscript{21}

The arguments supporting targeted killings, however, are short sighted at best, as the ‘Global War on Terror’ and the Israeli/Hamas/Hezbollah conflicts are still ongoing, with no end in sight.\textsuperscript{22} With the withdrawal of US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the risk of sectarian violence in Iraq and the re-emergence of Taliban as a major player in Afghanistan, appears to underline the contention that the so-called ‘war on terror’ had not ended but is actually re-swinging upwards in its vicious cycle of violence.\textsuperscript{23} The argument of the tactical and operational effectiveness of targeted killing translated into strategic effectiveness and ultimately political effectiveness are still purely speculative at best.\textsuperscript{24} To paraphrase the title of an excellent article on the global counterinsurgency phenomena by David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, the conviction on targeted killings’ effectiveness focused too much on “Grammar but No Logic.”\textsuperscript{25} These arguments did not utilise an important contextual theoretical foundation that is more important in understanding how killing off enemy leaders would work - strategies of decapitation, which the next section will discuss.

**Targeted Killing and Strategy**

The proposed idea of decapitating the enemy leaders may appear to be a logical solution in modern warfare. Clausewitz’s had inferred his famous trinity of the nature of war as consists of people; government, and army.\textsuperscript{26} If strategic decapitation was to
work against this trinity, the leaders of the people, government, and army will be killed or disabled off, thus achieving a war quickly and efficiently. The question is, does this hypothesis stand?

The spirit of targeted killing and how it links with strategy has also been termed as ‘strategic decapitation,’ being proposed by Alastair Finlan as a third option of choosing between the dual strategies in modern warfare, annihilation or attrition. The targeting and killing of the enemy’s leaders may be an easier or a facilitator to a quicker end in war. Sun Tzu has often been credited with proposing a way of warfare utilising assassination of the enemy leaders. A closer scrutiny of his thirteen chapters in his *Art of War* will reveal no such explicit notion. Sun Tzu, however, did mention that the best way to win a war is to attack the enemy’s strategies. What constituted the enemy’s strategies was not explained further in his text. It can be safely deduced, however, that assassinating enemy leaders was a way of warfare in ancient China. Some later Chinese texts on warfare citing Sun Tzu had revealed a clearer picture. Later research on Chi’ng Dynasty era texts on military methods had exposed some citations and references with Sun Tzu’s *Art of War*. One notable reference was from *Sun Tzu: A Discussion of the Art of Warfare*, which had recorded;

The expert in using the military has three basic strategies that he applies:

The best strategy is to attack the enemy at the level of wisdom and experience…”

Form this passage above it appeared that Sun Tzu had advised the best strategy in war was to attack the enemy’s leaders or military planners. This was especially true in Sun Tzu’s era during the Warring States period, where the Chinese Kings had military advisors giving advice on military affairs to his generals. Killing these military strategists and generals would literally decapitate the enemy’s ‘brains’, and would had facilitated faster and easier victory.
In the 15th century, a Western writer on political philosophy had posited a similar interesting proposition. Thomas More’s idea of warfare in his book *Utopia* first published in 1516. Without encroaching too much on the vast details of Utopia’s social construct debate, Thomas More has suggested an Utopian style of warfare:

When the battle is at its height a group of specially selected young men, who have sworn to stick together, try to knock out the enemy general. They keep hammering away at him by every possible method – frontal attacks, ambushes, long-range archery, hand-to-hand combat. They bear down on him in a long, unbroken wedge-formation, the point of which is constantly renewed as tired men are replaced by fresh ones. As a result the general is nearly always killed or taken prisoner – unless he saves his skin by running away.  

Thomas More’s proposed idea of hunting down the leader of the opposing enemy had uncanny similarity with a strategist that had posited along similar lines four hundred years later. J.F.C. Fuller in designing a strategy to overcome the horrendous human losses in the trenches and killing fields of World War I, and amazed with the new technological wonders of that time, tanks, conceptualised a way to overcome the stalemate of trench warfare with his ‘Plan 1919.’ Fuller’s Plan 1919 posited the usage of mobile tanks to infiltrate behind enemy lines and strike at the enemy’s rear, at the heart of the enemy’s leadership and command centres, to destroy them before frontal attacks began. He envisioned this operation as a way to give a fatal shot at the enemy’s brain, followed by frontal attacks at the enemy’s body. He hypothesised that once the enemy’s brain had been destroyed, the enemy without effective leadership and command, will falter in confusion and will render them more easily to be defeated in the first few hours of the operation.

The main question is does the killing of enemy leaders yield the intended strategic utility? To address this query, two case studies from World War II in the next sections describe and analyse the effects of such operations.
Operation Anthropoid: Killing of Reinhard Heydrich

Reinhard Heydrich was a senior Germany SS member and head of the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA) since 27 September 1939. Heydrich was appointed as the SS Reichprotector of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia exactly two years later on 27 September 1941. In 1938, as a result of the Munich Agreement to appease Hitler, Czechoslovakia’s Sudentenland had been given to Germany. The Germans later invaded and occupied the whole of Czechoslovakia, and carved her into two main areas, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and Slovakia.

Heydrich in his new post was very successful in eliminating most of the Czech resistance movements. In the league of resistance activities in occupied Europe, Czechoslovakia ranked in the bottom position. He also used a ‘stick and carrot’ approach to entice and coerce the Czech population to submit to German occupation, and increase industrial output. Czechoslovakia with its arms manufacturing industry was an important supplier of arms and ammunition for the German military forces.

The Czech exiled President Beneš was also worried that the legitimacy of his government and Czechoslovakia’s future state status will be affected if the war ended soon. He wanted Czechoslovakia’s territories to be recognised as pre-1938 Munich Agreement. In the last quarter of 1941, the British and her allies were in an unstable situation; Western Europe had been occupied by Germany, Rommel was running circles around the British forces in Northern Africa, and the US had not joined the war (not until the Pearl harbour attack on 7 December 1941). President Beneš needed a political publicity coup to push for his Czechoslovakia state agenda which had influenced him to increase the resistance activities in Czechoslovakia and demonstrate to the world the willingness of the Czech people to fight for their freedom. To do that, President Beneš and the exiled Czechoslovakia government, decided to kill Reinhard Heydrich.
President Beneš knew that by killing Heydrich, mass brutal reprisals will be launched against the docile Czech population. President Beneš had stated, “Where national salvation was at stake, ‘even great sacrifices would be worth it’.” These hoped for reprisal was intended to initiate greater hatred against the occupying Germans and kick start more vigorous resistance activities, and to draw worldwide condemnation and sympathy towards the Czechs’ statehood plight.

The operation to kill Heydrich was given the code name Operation Anthropoid. Two Czech SOE members were selected for the mission; they were Josef Gabčík and Jan Kubis. They were dropped into Czechoslovakia on 28 December 1941. The operation to kill Heydrich was conducted almost five months later on 27 May 1942. Heydrich was ambushed by the two Czech SOE operatives, and was seriously wounded by an anti-tank grenade shrapnel. He later died from an infection from his wound on 4 June 1942. As a consequence of Heydrich’s killing, mass brutal reprisals were unleashed upon the Czech people - during the period from 28 May to 1 September 1942, 3,188 Czechs had been arrested with 1,357 of them being executed.

The most famous incident was the destruction of Liddice. All the men between 15 to 84 years of age, a total of 184 men from the village were executed. The women and children (numbering 104) were sent to concentration camps. Only 17 children and 53 women from Lidice survived the horrors of the concentration camps after the war ended. Similarly, on 24 June 1942, the village of Ležáky followed suit. The village was burned to the ground, and its inhabitants either shot or sent to concentration camps.

The SOE operatives who killed Heydrich whom were hiding in Prague’s Orthodox Church was betrayed by a fellow SOE operative, and was attacked by the Germans. After a fierce fire-fight, and running out of ammunition, and to avoid capture, the SOE men decided to take their own lives. All of them killed themselves either with cyanide pills and/ or by shooting themselves.
The Outcome

The mass reprisals and the culmination of the brutal slaughter of Lidice, provided moral fuel, and propaganda triumphs for Czechoslovakia. It symbolised the evil and cruel Nazi regime that was needed to be fought and destroyed. The US Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, had remarked,

“If future generations ask us what we were fighting for in this war we shall tell them the story of Lidice.”

The expected rise in resistance activities, however, failed to kick start. Ironically, this was due to the lesser degree of violence unleashed onto the Czech population that was thought would had been triggered by Heydrich’s killing. Hitler had ordered at the onset 10,000 Czechs to be executed. In all, 1,331 Czechs were killed in Prague alone, and at least 3,000 Czech Jews were killed in the Terezin concentration camp. The total number far less than the original 10,000 Czechs ordered to be killed by Hitler initially. The resistance networks was further weakened by the mass executions of suspected resistance organizers and members, further setting back the already small resistance movements in Czechoslovakia.

The most important outcome, which was also the driving reason for the operation, was a political result. The strategy of killing Heydrich had paid off in the enduring international decisions to alter the fate of the Czech state and nation. The killing highlighted to the world of the Czech resolve to fight for their freedom, and the ensuing mass reprisals in the killing of innocent Czechs had moved the major parties involved in the Munich agreement of 1938, to finally renouncing the agreement. The Munich agreement was finally repudiated in August 1942 by Britain, France, and Russia. President Beneš was proud of the recognition that was given to his rule and the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia sovereign rights. President Beneš had remarked after the Lidice massacre;
The executions...consolidated our state of affairs. This is the great political consequence of these events.\textsuperscript{43}

**Killing of Admiral Yamamoto (Operation Vengeance)**

The Japanese had launched the surprise attack at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. That successful surprise attack was the brainchild of Admiral Yamamoto. The attack on Pearl Harbour was subsequently followed by a string of early war successes until the middle of 1942 when the Japanese had begun to suffer serious setbacks in their war plans. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had lost the Battle of Midway in June 1942 with four of its valuable aircraft carriers sunk by the US Navy. The Japanese forces then settled for a campaign of attrition in the Pacific theater. Admiral Yamamoto was flying in to visit some of his troops stationed at an island near Bougainville in the Solomon Islands to boost their morale on that fateful morning on 18 April 1943.

As his plane approached the island, a flight of 16 American P-38 Lightning fighters appeared from nowhere. The Japanese air fleet was totally surprised. Admiral Yamamoto’s plane was shot down and crashed into the jungle below, killing him.\textsuperscript{44} What appeared as a chance meeting of the two rival forces was in fact a highly coordinated and secretly planned aerial Special Operation. The operation was initiated by US naval intelligence, after having intercepted the Japanese coded message detailing Admiral Yamamoto’s visit itinerary on 13 April 1943, and broke the coded Japanese messages. It was widely believed at that time, killing Admiral Yamamoto would seriously demoralize the Japanese, and who was believed to be the main ‘brain’ of Japanese military strategy in the Pacific war.

The decision to kill was not taken lightly by the Nimitz as he was concerned on Yamamoto’s replacement may be a more effective commander. In deliberating whether to kill Yamamoto or not, Admiral Nimitz had reputedly asked his fleet intelligence officer Captain Edwin T. Layton; “The one thing that concerns me is whether they could find a more effective fleet commander?”\textsuperscript{45} They studied the other Japanese commanders and decided that no one can replace Yamamoto. The selected
Ambush point to kill Admiral Yamamoto was also within the flight distance from Henderson Airfield in Guadalcanal, making it possible to conduct the operation. Nimitz finally decided and replied, “All right, we’ll try it.” It was widely believed at that time, killing Admiral Yamamoto would have seriously demoralised the Japanese. Killing Yamamoto would also blunt the Japanese strategy as he was believed to be the main ‘brain’ of Japanese military strategy in the Pacific war. Admiral Yamamoto’s image and legendary status within the Japanese minds would be an ultimate morale dampener if he was killed. The Americans also hated Admiral Yamamoto for his role in the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was also wrongly quoted that Admiral Yamamoto had said that “the Japanese will dictate terms in Washington.”

The decision to kill Yamamoto was also weighted against the risk of the Japanese finding out that the US forces had broken their codes. It was, however, decided that even if the Japanese found out their codes had been broken, the Japanese would most likely change their codes and the US’s code-breaking unit, Magic, would be able to decipher the new codes in due time. The probable code-breaking effort would also been done unhindered as the US forces had no immediate major operations in the next ten weeks. Admiral Nimitz decided to accept Commander Layton’s suggestion of a cover story that Australian coastwatchers had given the information on Admiral Yamamoto’s flight.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox were widely believed to had personally authorised the operation and instructed Admiral Nimitz to launch the operation. Other studies on this operation, however, argued against this fact, as there was no evidence showing that Roosevelt had ordered the operation. Historians generally agreed that Admiral Nimitz had obtained approval from the Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox even though there is no documentary evidence of these. There was also a suggestion that Nimitz might have made the decision himself. Admiral Yamamoto was a military officer, and Admiral Nimitz has the authorisation to order an operation to kill an enemy military leader.
**The Outcome**

The strategic utility of that operation, however, had given rise to various debates on whether killing Admiral Yamamoto was a strategically concrete decision. Supporters of the operation said that there “was only one Yamamoto.” The argument was that Yamamoto whom was the Japanese naval attaché in Washington, D.C. and educated at Harvard University, understood US’s industrial and manpower might, and may had waged a more successful strategy in the Pacific theater against the US. However, the Japanese military fortunes had certainly turned by the middle of 1943. After the Battle of Midway, the naval and air supremacy of the Japanese forces in the pacific had been seriously impaired. The course of the war could not had been successfully prevented by Yamamoto had he been alive.

The argument that he would had been useful in discussing surrendering terms at the end of the war was also a moot point. A look at how the German Chief of Staff, General Jodl had been treated by General Eisenhower during the surrender of German forces in Berlin will shed light on how Admiral Yamamoto, being a much hated figurehead by the Americans due to the legacy of Pearl Harbour, may well had been snubbed and suffered a similar fate as General Jodl. Yamamoto may also be put on trial for war crimes and executed; as an analogy, his peer, General Yamashita was trialled and executed for war crimes.

The operation also threatened the entire secret code deciphering services of both the US and British for fear of the Japanese found out that the attack was more than a pure coincidence. The risk of the Japanese learning that their codes had been broken, and subsequently warning the Germans, had posed serious threats to the whole Allied code breaking effort. Sir Winston Churchill was so incensed by the carelessness of the Americans in conducting that attack that he had forbidden the sharing of the top secret ULTRA intelligence with the Americans for several months. Luck, however, was on the Americans’ side, as the Japanese did not believe that their codes could had been broken and concluded that it was an accidental encounter.

The operation in killing Yamamoto was a tactical success, contributing one of the many tactical successes that influenced the ultimate US strategic performance in the
final victory in the Pacific theatre. Although the killing did not transform any immediate strategic advantage to the US, the killing of Yamamoto had ensured the Japanese lost a charismatic and legendary military leader that was able to compound the important intangible value of morale.

Conclusion

From what have been discussed, we develop an appreciation of what targeted killing can and cannot achieve, and whether it yields any strategic effect. In the study of Heydrich, he was correctly identified as the epitome of Nazi occupation in Czechoslovakia, and killing him would have dual effects of morale raising, and trigger mass brutal reprisals to influence resistance activities and raise international psychological sympathy on the Czech cause. In Heydrich’s case, his killing had resulted in the intended political outcome for Czechoslovakia.

On the other hand, killing Admiral Yamamoto, a well-respected and famous military commander, only limits the Japanese tactical and operational advantage. The tactical effects, however, still yielded slow returns to the strategic performance. The Special Operation that killed Yamamoto was one of the many actions in the Pacific Theatre that slowly eroded Japanese manpower and material in a campaign of attrition. However, it was a massive morale booster to the Americans fighting in the Pacific and in the US, and a morale dampener for the Japanese.

These varied outcomes demonstrated that targeted killings obtain their strategic value not from a tangible or measurable outcome, but from its intangible value as one of a number of strategic options available to commanders. The outcomes also highlighted the close relationship of leadership killings and the paradox of strategy; the unforeseeable influence of timing, luck and chance come into mind. These unpredictable variables have vast influences on the outcome of a leadership killing operations. There is no foolproof way of determining the expected outcome of targeted killings, due to the eternal character of uncertainty and luck in war. Clausewitz’s dictum reverberates and echoes my earlier caveat on the eternal character of strategy;
No other human activity [war] is so continuously or universally bound up with chance. And through the element of chance, guesswork and luck come to play a great part in war.\textsuperscript{54}

Targeted killing’s outcome ultimately resides in the paradox of strategy; achieving ends with the ways and means; but eternally permeated by the realm of chance and uncertainty.

Notes


\textsuperscript{3} There are studies on the incidents of targeted killing operations such as the operation to kill Field-Marshals Rommel and Admiral Yamamoto, but analysis based on it as a Special Operations and how strategic effective was it in relation to the context of the campaign is non-existent. Most mention on what happened but not how it happened, why and how effective were the Special Operation, and what were the consequences of such operations. See Donald A. Davis: \textit{Lightning Strike: the Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor} (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2005); and Jan Wiener \textit{The Assassination of Heydrich} (New York: Grossman, 1969).


\textsuperscript{5} Kaplan: “Targeted Killings”.


\textsuperscript{7} See Melzer: \textit{Targeted Killing}, p. 29.


\textsuperscript{9} Kaplan: “Targeted Killings”.

\textsuperscript{10} Even before the events of 9/11 shocked the US, assassinations of enemy combatants at war with the US has been defined as legal and is not prohibited under EO 12333. See Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Department of the Army: “Memorandum: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination (DAJA-IA (27-1A))” (Nov 1989), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/echrp/Use%20of%20Force/October%202002/Parks_final.pdf, accessed on 24 February 2011.


\textsuperscript{14} For an excellent discussion see Catherine Lotrionte: “When to Target Leaders”, \textit{The Washington Quarterly}, VOL. 26 No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 73-86.


\textsuperscript{16} See Cronin: \textit{How Terrorism Ends}, pp. 15-34.
Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918

Czech Nationalism, 1918

resistance network in Czechoslovakia, SOKOL, had been decimated. See also Frantisek Moravec:


Mahnken and Joseph A. Maiolo: Strategic Studies: A Reader, p. 322 and p. 326.


Fuller: Memoirs, pp. 323-325.


ibid.

The National Archives (TNA), Kew Gardens: HS 4/39, cover letter on “Operation Anthropoid”.


According to Seton-Watson, total number of people executed in Czechoslovakia was 2,222. See R.W. Seton-Watson: A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948), p. 385. An additional note, the number killed in concentration camps as a consequence of Heydrich’s killing cannot be determined with accuracy. See also Moravec: Master, p. 222.

As a result of the post-Heydrich killing reprisals, more than half of the leadership in one of the largest resistance network in Czechoslovakia, SOKOL, had been decimated. See Mark Dimond: "The SOKOL and Czech Nationalism, 1918-1948", chapter in Mark Cornwall and R.J.W. Evans (eds.): Czechoslovakia in a Nationalist and Fascist Europe, 1918-1948 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 194.


ibid., p. 233.
Admiral Yamamoto actually wrote a letter in a sarcastic tone to a right wing Japanese leader, Ryoichi Sasakawa on 24 January 1941, months before the Pearl Harbor attack, as to whether the Japanese had the capability to win a war against US, and fight all the way to dictate terms in Washington, DC. See Hall (ed): Lightning, pp. 25-26. Admiral Halsey also stated that Yamamoto’s statement was taken at face value at that time. Yamamoto was ranked no. 3 in Halsey’s private list of public enemies; Emperor Hirohito and General Tojo took the top positions in his private list. See William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III: Admiral Halsey’s Story (London: Whittlesey House, 1947), p. 155.

Admiral Halsey also stated that Yamamoto’s statement was taken at face value at that time. Yamamoto was ranked no. 3 in Halsey’s private list of public enemies; Emperor Hirohito and General Tojo took the top positions in his private list. See William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III: Admiral Halsey’s Story (London: Whittlesey House, 1947), p. 155.

David Kahn: The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 598-599. This disproved the argument that there was no adequate cover plan in place at during the planning of the operation. For an example see F.W. Winterbotham: The Ultra Secret (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974), p. 176.

Kahn: The Codebreakers, p. 599. Coastwatchers were members of the Coast Watch Association or also known as Section “C” of the Allied Intelligence Bureau. Coastwatchers consisted mainly of Australian, New Zealanders and Pacific locals. They aided the Allied war effort by gathering and providing intelligence about the Japanese in the Solomon Islands, and later in other Pacific islands. See Walter Lord: Lonely Vigil: Coastwatchers of the Solomons (New York: Viking, 1977).

This was mentioned in Nimitz’s authoritative biography. See Potter: Nimitz, p. 233.


