Migrant girls: conquering the future?

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Introduction

The position of young migrants is a contested matter in the Netherlands. In public debate the conviction is dominant that they form a group which is lagging behind, mostly as a result of their unwillingness to integrate into Dutch society. This unwillingness is ascribed to their ethnic/cultural and religious background, and is supposed to be a sign of a ‘failed integration of migrants’. Especially migrant girls¹ are seen as representing a group in danger: they are considered to be victims of a -conservative- Muslim religion which is oppressing women (mostly visible by wearing a veil), and on top of that of an ethnic culture that is typically not modernised regarding the emancipation of women (Schinkel, 2008, Prins, 2004). But behind this public imagination a much more complex reality is hiding. As the Dutch girls have surpassed their disadvantages in education and labour participation during the last decades, so the migrant girls show a remarkable leap forwards in this respect during the last ten years. They are progressing more than the male migrants in education, in labour participation and in attitudes and behaviour about marriage and division of tasks between sexes. This is not to say that they are yet on equal footing with the Dutch girls. At some points they are more near them, at others they lag behind. Particularly remarkable is the fact that they are doing rather well in education, but do not show a comparable increase in labour participation. In this paper we want to examine how this situation is to explain. We offer several hypotheses, because the available existing data and our own research results are not unequivocal.

We hypothesize that non-western migrant girls are part of a larger emancipatory process. Within one generation chances for schooling and labour market participation changed rapidly for these girls. In education they seem to take their chances, but in employment there are still many obstacles for participation.

¹Migrant girls refer to the four greatest non western groups of migrants: Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Antillian women of the second generation.
We proceed by giving first an overview of the known data about the actual position of migrant girls in education, work and relationships, and the policy context in which they have to be placed. Statistics over years, for the different migrant groups and for different migrant generations are not always available. We aim to give a clear overview over years, for different migrant groups and for first and second generation migrant girls. By doing so, we show the development over years and the intergenerational developments for the different migrant groups in the Netherlands. We also discuss the institutional context of the Dutch school system and labour market and how this context may influence the prospects/experiences of young migrant girls. Last we analyze the policy context, in which emancipation and integration policies are discussed.

Possible obstacles for participation are a low socio economic background and low educational level, lack of support, lack of social networks, discriminatory practices (ethnic and gendered penalties) and traditional gender views concerning marriage and the family. We are especially interested in the role of discrimination and traditional views on gender roles. To examine discriminatory practices and traditional views we will make use of the results from the Dutch studies of two European comparative research projects; TRESEGY 2009 and PROFACITY 2011. The above mentioned obstacles together with a changing public debate in which anti-immigrant (and in particular anti-Islam) attitudes and assimilationist demands are present, make the position of migrant women in Dutch society complicated. We argue that actual prejudices and stereotypes do not benefit Muslim women in their labour market participation and we expect that discrimination of women wearing a headscarf is a realistic obstacle for them to enter the labour market. In our study we show how the emancipation trajectory of migrant women is developing and how migrant women are affected by obstacles and a changing society.

Methods

This study combines different methods of social science research; analysis of existing data and qualitative research methods consisting of interviews and focus groups. Most of the existing data used for this study are from the national statistics office Netherlands Statistics (CBS) and several other national research centres. The goal of the analysis of existing data is to give a description and clear overview of the development of statistics on emancipation of migrant women in the Netherlands. Next to the use of statistical data we analysed policy documents and existing literature in order to make the overview as detailed as possible.
Next to the analysis of existing data we used qualitative data from two comparative European research projects TRESEGY 2009 and PROFACITY 2011 for which we collected quantitative (n=608) and extensive qualitative data among native Dutch and migrant youngsters in secondary vocational education. The present study mostly relies on the qualitative data, but in some cases we will make a reference to the quantitative data as well.

The qualitative data was collected during ethnographic fieldwork (2008-2010). The fieldwork was located at different places; a trainee project for young migrants in Amsterdam and at a secondary vocational school in Utrecht. In total 26 youngsters and 6 teachers were interviewed. Additionally 18 persons (9 migrant girls, 9 teachers) participated in three focus groups organised at the secondary vocational school.

The data was analysed using the MAXQDA 2007 software package. Segments were coded and codes were rearranged to produce a systematic overview of the perspectives of youngsters on education and labour market participation.

The situation in education, work and relationships

Education

Although migrant girls are doing better in school nowadays, they still lag behind their native counterparts. Their disadvantaged position is already visible in the results of the CITO test, which all children take at the end of primary education. The Dutch school system is characterized by an early selection and the CITO test is the first selection moment in the educational career of children in the Netherlands. Most migrant youngsters end up in lower levels of the educational system since they have on average arrears of two years in mathematics and language skills by the time they make the CITO test. A large share of the migrant youngsters enters the VET system (vocational education and training), which exists next to the general secondary education (see model 1). About 55% of all pupils enters the prevocational and senior vocational system after primary education. (CBS, 2009).

Formally it is possible to move from lower levels to higher levels of secondary education, however in reality there is a strong division between the different schools and once you are in the lower track (VET) it is almost impossible to move up. Piling up education and entering higher education is a possibility once you finished the highest level of senior vocational education, and by way of comparison more migrant youngsters take this route. In reality it
requires a lot of efforts and motivation to reach higher levels of education and only the ‘go-getters’ make it this way. Despite the difficulties many migrant youngsters encounter in their school life, their educational level is increasing, and even more for migrant girls. They have made a step forwards in terms of educational success, compared to say a decade ago. It is important to see where they came from: their parents were mostly newcomers and low educated, and especially their mothers in most cases even lacked primary education. During the eighties and nineties it was not uncommon that migrant parents kept their daughters at home and away from further education, and only since then parents saw the meaning of education for girls (Crul & Doomernik, 2003; SCP, 2009). They started in the nineties with arrears compared to the boys in primary education, and have since slightly outperformed them, as shown in results on the CITO test (except the Turkish girls, who in spite of progress remain a bit lagging behind the boys). This pattern of a gradual increase in performance and even passing the migrant boys can not only be seen in primary education but also in almost every aspect of further education: in doing better at secondary vocational education, in more streaming into forms of secondary and higher education, in lower figures of drop out, in higher percentages in passing for exams etc. (SCP, 2009; CBS, 2010a). The Surinamese girls show the greatest progress and are now almost on a par with the Dutch girls. Overall the
educational results of the second generation women are now outperforming these of the first generation. Table 1 gives an indication of these processes by showing the inflow in higher education.

Table 1 inflow in higher education, by sex and ethnic group (x1000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBO</td>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T= Turkish, M= Moroccan, S= Surinamese, A= Antillean, D= Dutch
HBO=higher professional education, WO= university education
Source: CBS Statline

About a third of the youngsters of Turkish and Moroccan decent enter higher secondary education (20 percent direct route, 15 percent long route through ‘piling’ (Crul & Heering, 2008)). However, in the same study Crul and Heering found that only 10 to 14 percent of the Turkish and Moroccan youngsters obtain a diploma at higher education (at least higher professional education).

Work

The steady progress in education is however not translated in terms of labour participation. In general the labour participation of migrant women, especially of Turkish and Moroccan women, is much lower than of Dutch women,. But the lowest participation rates can be ascribed to the first generation women, and the second generation (while partly still following education) show already higher rates, although not as much as the Dutch girls. The only exception form the Surinamese women whose first generation is participating more than the second generation. The lower participation of migrant women in labour can partly be ascribed to their lower educational level. However, studies showed that even when controlled for
educational level, there still is a difference in labour market participation (CBS, 2010a). Table 2 gives the figures for 2010, but it has to be remarked that the last three years show an overall decreasing trend, probably due to the crisis. Especially for the migrants this effect can be shown: there is a decrease of 3-5% in labour participation.

Table 2. Net Labour participation 2010 by sex and ethnic group, in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Non-Western</th>
<th>Turkish</th>
<th>Moroccan</th>
<th>Surinamese</th>
<th>Antillean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>69,4</td>
<td>52,8</td>
<td>52,1</td>
<td>48,4</td>
<td>60,2</td>
<td>57,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td>76,8</td>
<td>60,4</td>
<td>64,4</td>
<td>59,8</td>
<td>62,4</td>
<td>61,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td>61,9</td>
<td>45,3</td>
<td>39,0</td>
<td>36,6</td>
<td>58,3</td>
<td>52,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women age 15-25</td>
<td>38,9</td>
<td>25,4</td>
<td>24,4</td>
<td>24,8</td>
<td>28,8</td>
<td>25,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women age 25-35</td>
<td>85,1</td>
<td>55,4</td>
<td>47,4</td>
<td>49,8</td>
<td>73,3</td>
<td>63,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 1st gen</td>
<td>46,1</td>
<td>38,8</td>
<td>35,6</td>
<td>62,5</td>
<td>51,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women 2nd gen</td>
<td>43,4</td>
<td>39,5</td>
<td>38,6</td>
<td>50,1</td>
<td>55,7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS (EBB, own computation)

The low labour participation of migrant women is not just an effect that is due to the recent economic crisis, because this low participation rate is already long existing. In general the labour participation of migrants is, heavily influenced by the economic tides: they profit when the situation is prosperous but are also more affected by unemployment when the situation is adverse. Particularly young migrants are mostly hit by unemployment, in the age category 15-25 years 24% of the boys and 22% of the girls were unemployed in 2010, compared with their native Dutch counterparts the figures are 9 and 10% respectively. Furthermore the nature of the labour contract has to be taken into account: 45% of the migrants, especially the younger ones, have flexible jobs, twice as much as the native Dutch (CBS, 2008). And flexible jobs, as known, run greater risk on unemployment in harsher economic times.

It is also possible to look at a different way at labour participation: how many women are earning enough to be economic independent (earning at least 70% of the minimum wage (834 euro a month), a Dutch criterion for the emancipation of women).
Table 3. Economic independency, women 15-64 year, in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source, CBS (Income statistics)

From table 3 it is clear that economic independency is slowly growing, for all groups of women, but there is sharp division between the migrant groups: the Turkish and Moroccan women are lagging behind, while the Surinamese and Antillean women are on the same level as the Dutch women. In 2008 45% of the first generation was economical independent, and 35% of the second generation. But this is due to the younger age of the second generation: after correction for age their figure rises with 20% (CBS, 2010a).

*Relations and attitudes about care and work*

One of the reasons for the arrears in labour participation could be the fact that migrant women are, more than the Dutch women, oriented on marriage and care and less on labour and earning a wage. First we present some demographic data, and afterwards we discuss attitudes about work and care.

Table 4 Average number of children and age of firstborn child, 1st and 2nd generation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st generation</th>
<th></th>
<th>2nd generation</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>1,47</td>
<td>29,2</td>
<td>1,78</td>
<td>29,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>2,53</td>
<td>24,3</td>
<td>1,96</td>
<td>26,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>3,37</td>
<td>26,1</td>
<td>3,25</td>
<td>27,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,65</td>
<td>28,5*</td>
<td>1,93</td>
<td>28,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-western</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* year 2001

Source: SCP, Jaarrapport Integratie 2009

From table 4 one can conclude that the average number of children has risen, but mostly because of the Dutch women. The Surinamese and Antillean women have a birth pattern comparable to the Dutch women, while the Moroccan and Turkish women have a decrease in number of children. Especially the second generation shows a birth pattern similar to that of Dutch women, both in numbers of children and age of the firstborn child. Also labour participation after marriage is not decreasing (SCP, 2006) although after the birth of the first and second child most migrant women (except the Surinamese) decide that they leave the labour market more often than the Dutch women. After 2006 more non-western migrant mothers were active at the labour market, and about 30% of the non-participating migrant mothers would like to have a job (CBS, 2010b).

This seems to correspond to a shift in attitudes about care and division of tasks between men and women. Several studies (SCP, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008) show that migrant women are having over time more ‘modern’ views about task division between men and women, and about labour participation, although they do not completely share the views of the Dutch women on these topics. In general the migrant women think less traditional than the migrant men. Especially the second generation has views on the position on women and men that are comparable to the Dutch (SCP, 2004, 2007, 2009). Besides, it is known that attitudes on emancipation change according to the level of education: the higher the level of education, the more emancipated the views. Since the second generation is higher educated than the first generation this contributes to their adherence of the modern opinions on men and women. It is however the more reluctant attitudes of migrant men that make it difficult to realize these views in practice (Pels & de Gruyter, 2006). We will come to discuss this later.
Emancipation Policies in the Netherlands

The Netherlands adapted the first emancipation policies in the 1970s. At first, these policies aimed at labour market integration of women and on improving equality and autonomy. The focus of emancipation policies changed during the 1980’s into a focus on the emancipation of migrant women (Korteweg, 2005). Nowadays emancipation policies still focus on increasing labour market participation of women, with a special focus on labour market participation of migrant women and their safety (SCP/CBS, 2011). During time, emancipation policies became more ethnicized and the focus of these policies shifted from native Dutch women to non-Western migrant women. Most attention is given to Turkish and Moroccan women, since women from the two other main migrant groups in the Netherlands, the Surinamese and Antilleans, show similar participation rates in education and the labour market as Dutch women, and are therefore seen as being emancipated. It is implicitly assumed by policymakers that native Dutch women completed the emancipation trajectory and serve as a reference group for migrant women. In particular Muslim migrant women have according to the policies still a long way to go (Du Bois-Reymond, 2009; Korteweg, 2005). Additionally the most recent emancipation policy document raises the attention to the need to emancipate men (regarding their views and behaviour regarding division of work, care and household tasks). However, so far no specific policies have been adapted aiming to emancipate men.

In the same time the policies on integration and migration changed drastically, as well as the public debate on the integration of migrants. Integration and immigration policies changed from having a multiculturalist to an assimilationist approach in which migrants are demanded to adapt to the Dutch culture. The focus changed from structural integration in the Dutch society (in education and work) to a greater emphasis on culture. In this culturalist perspective the migrant culture is perceived as an obstacle for assimilation and, the Islamic culture in particular, is viewed as being incompatible with the Dutch culture. Together with the shift on culture, the focus also shifted to the position of migrant women. Women are seen as victims of their culture and at the same time as being responsible for their own emancipation (Bevelander & Groeneveld, 2010). This suggests that Dutch policymakers believe cultural norms and values are highly restrictive for migrant women since they are being culturally victimized. The linkage between emancipation and integration policies implies that gender inequality is believed to be part of migrant cultures and perceived as an obstacle for integration in Dutch society.
In short Dutch minority and gender equality policies have undergone two major shifts. Minority and integration policies have become more gendered, where unequal gender relations received more attention. At the same time the emancipation policies became more ‘ethnicized’, with a special and different focus on the emancipation of migrant women (Roggeband & Verloo, 2007). This shift in Dutch emancipation policies is discussed by several scholars, who showed the similar conclusions (Ghorashi, 2010; Prins & Saharso, 2008; Roggeband, 2010).

**Public discourse on migrants**

Next to institutional barriers in the educational system and labour market, the dominant discourse of the Dutch society on the multicultural society and on Muslim women harms or hinders the emancipation of this group. Prins and Saharso (2010) argue that the Netherlands transformed itself from a relatively tolerant country to a nation that called for cultural assimilation, tough measures and neo-patriotism. Several events like 9/11, the terrorist attacks in Madrid and the assassination of a Dutch populist right wing politician Pim Fortuijn and the murder on a Dutch filmmaker who was criticizing Islam, reinforced anti-Muslim feelings in the Netherlands. Like in other western European countries, the public discourse in the Netherlands is being dominated with the association of Muslims with violence and terrorism. About 76% of the population is concerned about Islamic extremism in their country (Pew Research Center, 2005). According to Pew Research Center (2005) the Dutch are the most negative towards Muslims; 51% of the Dutch population has negative feelings towards Muslims. Attitudes towards ethnic groups, integration and immigration are highly influenced by educational level. In general the lower educated share of the population is more negative and the higher educated share of the population more positive (SCP, 2011). In addition, it is debated whether Islamic views and ways of life are compatible with Western lifestyles. For example, more than 75% of all West Europeans believe that Islamic attitudes towards women contradict western values (Van der Noll, 2010). The wearing of the headscarf by Muslim women has become a central issue in the European public debate. Although the wearing of the headscarf by women is in most cases a voluntarily decision, many western people perceive the headscarf as being oppressive for women and as a rejection of gender equality (Van der Noll, 2010). Many European countries developed laws concerning the wearing of headscarves in public places. In France, a ban on the burka (a veil that not only covers the hair, but also the face and eyes of a woman) has just been passed and the first women wearing burka’s have
been arrested. In the Netherlands the court just decided that schools are allowed to forbid wearing headscarves in class when this is opposed to the schools’ (religious) conviction. The public opinion about the headscarf is clear: about half of the Dutch population is in favour of a ban on headscarves in public places. This change in the dominant discourse in the Netherlands may obstruct the participation of Muslim women at the labour market and in society at large.

**How to explain the divergence between education and labour participation?**

In the previous overview we have given the state of affairs about education, labour and (attitudes towards) relations and we have discussed the changing conditions in the public discourse about migrants and their integration. We will now discuss possible explanations for the discrepancy between the relative higher educational performance of migrant girls and their share in work.

First we start with the possible influence of discriminatory practices. In line with the mentioned debate about Muslins and the veil we can find indications of discrimination. It is important to note that official figures about discrimination, based on reported complaints at the Anti Discrimination Offices (SCP, 2007, 2010), represent only the top of the iceberg. About 75% report that they would not report in case of an experience of discrimination: they fear that it would not help (van den Berg & Evers, 2006). Another study by Entzinger and Dourleijn (2008) mentions the possibility that reporting discrimination could make someone a victim, a loser. In this study, based on surveys in 1999 and 2006, Turkish and Moroccan youngsters report less experiences with discrimination in 2006, while they state that as a group (based on ethnic descent and religion) they are more discriminated against, especially on the labour market and in daily life. It is thus difficult to get satisfying data about discrimination, both objectively and subjectively, although it is known to be an existing fact.

With this caveat in mind, the official figures show that women experience less discrimination on the labour market than men: they report less complaints then men (43% against 57%). Also the results of our survey (TRESEGY, 2009) show that in general girls feel less often discriminated against than boys (Turkish youngsters 59 vs. 32%; Moroccan youngsters 71 vs. 45%). Boys also feel slightly more often discriminated against. This may have to do with the greater labour participation of men, but this is speculative. The reasons for discrimination differ. In contrast with Antillean and Surinamese youngsters who feel discriminated against because of their skin color, Turkish and Moroccan youngsters feel most
often discriminated because of their religion and secondly because of their ethnic background. Additionally Turkish and Moroccan girls feel discriminated against because of the way they dress (TRESEGY, 2009). While men complain about discrimination on race, women mostly point at religion as a ground for discrimination. Three quarters of the complaints are about religion, and then especially at the entrance of the labour market (recruitment and selection) where the veil is at stake as a reason for rejection (SCP, 2010). In our study many Muslim respondents claim to be rejected for a job or internship because of wearing a headscarf:

I: Have you experienced discrimination?
R: Of course, who has not? It’s normal nowadays!
I: And on the labour market?
R: Yes, that they reject me because I wear a headscarf, that they won’t hire me because of that. Not that they told me that personally.
I: Will that influence you in the future, when looking for a job?
R: Well, I don’t know, maybe because I wear a headscarf it will affect me more than others, we will see.

R: Last year I applied for a position and I was invited for an interview. I went there and they asked me who are you and when I told my name they said that they had no place for me.
I: And you had the feeling it came from...
R: Well, we didn’t even had the interview, while they invited me.
I: Why do you think they didn’t do that?
R: Like I said, discrimination, maybe because of my headscarf, or...I don’t know.

R: I have experienced that often, because I would like to work in a clothes shop, because many people go there, I just like it a lot, but I can’t work there, because many times they say no.
I: Could you give an example?
R: Yes, recently at an application, they were very enthusiastic on the phone but when I arrived there they were looking at me from top to toe and asked me: so you are (name respondent)? I thought, what’s wrong with that? And then: they don’t want you to work here, because you wear a headscarf. It does something with you, because they don’t look at what you can, but at how you look. I think that is wrong.

If the idea of the top of the iceberg is correct, than this can be an indication of a much larger phenomenon than the official data suggest. There are good grounds to confirm this. In the Trendmeter 2009 (Forum, 2009a) 54% of the employers of companies with 20-500 employees
agrees with the proposition “I rather do not see my personnel wearing a headscarf”. In 2008 and 2007 these percentages were even higher (58% and 56%). Reasons for not hiring a person wearing a headscarf are that employers find the headscarf not representative. According to one of our respondents there are many wrong stereotypes associated with the headscarf:

*R: I think many employers think girls wearing a headscarf are worse employers.
I: Why do you think girls with a headscarf are seen as inferior?
R: What I hear is that the headscarf is associated with being stupid, seen as a sign of suppression, and I have to laugh about this one: a potential terrorist. I think it is ignorance.

In general 25% of the employers are rather reluctant in hiring migrants (Forum, 2009a). Other studies establish the same pattern: discrimination is operative at the entry of the labour market, especially for the lower educated (Klaver et al., 2005). But also higher educated migrants have to deal with this phenomenon, as 29% of the successful migrants indicate that they have had negative experiences with employers (Gravesteijn et al., 2006). In another study 40% of the high educated migrants reported that their color or ethnic descent made it difficult to find a job (Regioplan, 2006).

It is important to analyze how discrimination works. It is not just plain discrimination because of a headscarf or foreign name, but is also based on more subtle ways of selection. In the Discrimination Monitor of 2010 (SCP, 2010) all types of other characteristics seem to play a role, varying from speaking correct Dutch to the so called ‘soft skills’ that point at the general skills like attitude, motivation, communication and contact that are deemed necessary for being a good employee. As a result employers prefer not to take the risk of hiring a migrant, even when (s)he is having the same qualifications as a Dutch employee. The risks are especially seen with Moroccan or Antillean migrants. Besides, the social-normative qualities of migrants, as supposed to be present in the soft skills, are judged as lacking and this contributes according to the authors of the monitor to a further disadvantage (SCP, 2010).

So statistical discrimination based on group stereotypes is occurring, and there are several hypotheses that explain discrimination. According to the meritocracy hypothesis discrimination should decrease over time and the increasing level of education of migrants should be more and more decisive. This hypothesis is to be rejected because chance inequality is not linearly diminishing. The other two hypotheses suppose a relation of discrimination with the economic cycles and a greater social acceptance of discrimination because sanctions
are diminishing. These two hypotheses could not be rejected, and this indicates that both the economic climate and the acceptability of discrimination may play a role in discrimination (SCP, 2010). One study seems to confirm the latter hypothesis: Entzinger and Dourleijn (2008) state that the threshold for experienced discrimination between 1999 and 2006 may have been lowered: what counted as discrimination in 1999 has now become acceptable.

Discrimination is not only a factor at (the entry of) the labour market, but occurs also in internships/work placements. The available data are however less precise than about the labour market. It is even very difficult to find figures about women and men, which makes it hardly possible to be specific about the position of women. According to the National Internship Survey (Landelijke Stage Enquête, 2011), about half of the migrant students report to have experienced discrimination when looking for a job placement. The JOB Monitor reports that migrants have more difficulties to find a placement in BOL (track in which pupils have full time education at school combined with a short internship) or BBL (track in which the pupil is employed as an intern combined with school once a week) than their native counterparts: in 2008 24,3% of the migrants and 16,8% of the Dutch had difficulties in the BOL, and 14,4% of the migrants and 10,4% of the Dutch had problems in the BBL (Forum, 2009b). The Algemene Rekenkamer (2008) found that 27% teachers had experienced discrimination of their pupils in secondary vocational education, but they do not always report this (only one out of three teachers).

Many teachers confirm that indeed it is very difficult for them to mediate between employers and migrant student who are looking for an internship place. Young Islamic girls wearing a headscarf are even more disadvantaged. There are many examples of Muslim girls not being accepted at the work floor because a headscarf is being perceived as being not representative for possible clients or customers. Also teachers in our study confirm this image:

Teacher 1:
Internships are quite difficult, because you don’t want, actually you don’t want to admit that for native Dutch children it takes once or twice to find a place, and for migrant children it takes 6,7,8,9 times to find a place.

Teacher 2:
I: Is there a problem with discrimination when students are looking for a trainee post?
T: Especially the boys, and sometimes also for girls, when they wear a headscarf. Well, there are headscarves and headscarves. You have, how to say, these small bath caps, that’s not so bad. But when you wear a long veil in black or grey, well you look quite impressive. And some trainee places say they find it unsafe for little children, like you saw they are attached with little pins, and that was not what was wanted. And sometimes the girls say; I take of the veil and wear the small cap.

Not finding a place for internship has serious consequences for the youngsters. The internship is a required part of the VET education and when a student does not find an internship place on time this will affect the educational career of the student severely. Next to this, many youngsters in the Netherlands find their first employment through their internship, so not finding an internship also hinders the labour market entrance. The National Internship Survey found indeed that job prospects after an internship are more positive for native Dutch students than for migrant students (65% vs. 56% chances for a job).

Also on this placement market discrimination is not always direct, but takes the more subtle forms described above on the labour market: language and soft skills play a role as negative factors in selection. But also the schools accept sometimes discrimination; if they know that employers are reluctant they do not offer these placements to migrants, or try to seek a placement elsewhere.

Overall we may conclude that discrimination exists, both on the labour market as on the placement market, and that migrant women are affected in two ways. One more explicit way consists of discrimination by external characteristics like headscarf or foreign name or skin color, and one more implicit way by statistical discrimination based on stereotypes of groups that represent a risk or are supposedly lacking soft skills. Discrimination may thus partly explain the lesser labour participation of the second generation girls.

As a second point we will discuss the developments in marriage and attitudes about marriage, task division between men and women and children. We have already mentioned that especially the second generation of migrant women is more emancipated than the first generation, both in fertility rates and in attitudes about task division. We have however to nuance this representation, in order to get more grip on the relation between forming relationships and having children and the labour market. We may start with the wish to have children. Turkish and Moroccan women in the age group 18-27 year find it much more evident then Dutch women to have children: 52% and 41% against only 14% for the Dutch
women. The Turkish and Moroccan men of the same age group find it more evident than the
women: 62% and 60% (Distelbrink and Loozen, 2005). The results of our own qualitative
study show the same image: all migrant girls are convinced about getting married and having
children in the future. The Moroccan girls from the interview below perceives herself as being
more modern than other Moroccan girls; however also for her it is evident that she will marry
and give birth:

R: My future? How I think I will end up? I would like to study, and to become a careers
woman, and yes, getting married, and children. I think I am different than other Moroccan
girls, I am more, I have the tendency, that when I want something I go for it, no matter what.
Whatever happens, I will go on. So for example when I will be married with children, I don’t
think I will stay at home, because I have children. No, I will continue working, I see myself as
a hardworking woman in the future.
I: Do you think that is different from other Moroccan girls?
R: Yes, in my neighbourhood, well most girls think like this: when I am married I am going to
stay at home on the sofa, and my husband will make money, they are very unmotivated. I
think, you should not think like that, you have to make your own money. I prefer to stand on
my own legs, without help from others. I want to be independent, to show; I can do it as well.

Educational levels influence these attitudes: the lower educated find having children more
evident, also among native Dutch girls (Distelbrink and Loozen, 2005). Also on union
formation appear differences: Turkish and Moroccan adolescents prefer more than the Dutch
to marry and not to cohabitate previously. The Turkish girls do have this preference the most:
65%, followed by the Moroccan girls with 52% and they have this wish more than their manly
counterparts. Especially the Moroccan boys (61% ) want to cohabitate before marriage, but
also Turkish and Moroccan girls have a preference for cohabitation before marriage (30% and
41%) (de Valk & Liefboer, 2007). But this preference for cohabitation is hardly in reflected
in practice:

Table 5 Young couples 20-24 year, by sex, ethnicity, cohabitation and children, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd generation Turkish</th>
<th>Cohabitation of whom married</th>
<th>with child(ren)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd generation Moroccan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Dutch**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS

From this table it appears that one third of the young Turkish women are married, and one fifth of the Moroccan women, and are hardly cohabitating, while the Dutch women are hardly married but mostly cohabitating. Also the Moroccan and Turkish women have already more children than the Dutch. A Moroccan girl we interviewed explains the preference for marriage as follows:

*R: Moroccan girls are often Islamic, and from this religion it is not allowed to have boyfriends, or to date. As soon as these girls meet a boy they see as a potential husband, they want to get married. So they get married much younger as native Dutch girls, who often date for 2 or 3 years before they decide to get married. That’s one of the reasons they get married younger. I also notice a stronger wish for having children, that’s also because of our background. Our parents are often married young and got children young. I notice with native Dutch girls the wish to have children appears later, in their thirties, and we talk about it in our twenties.*

Behind the figures an interesting development is hiding. Especially the Turkish and Moroccans marry hardly with a Dutch partner: about 10% does so. For the Surinamese and Antilleans this is different, especially the Antilleans marry much more often (70%) with a Dutch partner. For the Turkish and Moroccans it was for the first generation and for the second generation in 2002 still usual to get a so called migration marriage, but this trend is stopping now, and the second generation mostly marries now a partner living in the Netherlands (Van Huis, 2007). This changing marriage pattern may have consequences for the evolution of practices and attitudes about caring and task division.
The attitudes about the task division between the partners have evolved quite strongly for both the first and second generation. Moroccan and Turkish women subscribe now the opinion that women can work outside the home and earn an own income, and in this latter aspect they even have stronger thoughts than the Dutch women (90% against 75%). But the Turkish and Moroccan men endorse more then the women the conviction that men should be the breadwinner and that women should stop working when having children. Only on one point the Turkish and Moroccan women differ from the Dutch: they feel they are better in caring for children then their partner. So mostly the young migrants have views on the task division that correspond with the Dutch population, and they are more ‘modern’ than their male counterparts. Education influences these opinions, in the sense that lower educated Turkish and Dutch men and women have more traditional views. An exception form the Moroccan women, for whom education does not affect their views: they remain rather modern in their opinions (Distelbrink & Loozen, 2005).

In a qualitative study on young mothers of Moroccan and Turkish descent these data get more relief. The modern views on task division and emancipation in general are embedded in a social context where autonomy is connected to caring and to reckoning with others. This caring identity can combined with the more traditional views of the Turkish and Moroccan men lead to less freedom of manoeuvring when it comes to the concrete practices of dividing the burdens of caring and household tasks (Pels & de Gruijter, 2006). One girl from our study explains this social responsibility as follows:

*R: As a Moroccan-Dutch married women you have your responsibilities, you know, in the Moroccan culture family is very important. So when you marry you have another family you feel responsible for. The Moroccan culture is very collective, and you are expected to care for each other as a family. You visit each other; there is not the distance you see in native Dutch families. You visit them, they rely on your help, and you rely on theirs.*

**Conclusion**

In this paper we analyzed the emancipation process of migrant women in the Netherlands. We aimed to do so by comparing national statistics on education and labour market participation, by analyzing national policy and by using material of our own study to analyze experiences of
discrimination. Our hypothesis was that migrant women in the Netherlands are part of a larger emancipatory process; within one generation their position in schooling and at the labour market changed considerably. Also their views on education, work and relationships modernized during the last decade.

In schooling migrant girls are rapidly catching up, but they lack behind in labour market participation. Migrant girls are hindered in their participation by several factors. First of all, as our analysis showed, by the Dutch school system, that is characterized by early selection. Early selection makes that many migrant youngsters end up in the lower levels of education. ‘Piling up’ education offers them an opportunity to enter higher education in a later stage of their educational career. However, this so called long route is only achievable for a small group. Additionally, ‘piling’ also has some negative connotations (SCP, 2010). Piling up is seen by employers as being indecisive and youngsters who take this route finish their education at a somewhat older age. In this way it looks like students take too long to finish their education. Since migrant girls are in comparison more in favour of getting married early, finishing education at an older might negatively influence their labour market entrance. Secondly, migrants are more prone to the influences of the economic tide and the recent global crisis affected the labour market participation of migrant women negatively. Next to this the contracts of migrant women are often short-term and make their position at the labour market rather weak. Existing studies and results of our own study indicate that migrant women face discrimination in society and at the labour market. However, like we argued before, discrimination is a phenomenon which is difficult to grasp. Although statistics show convincing signs that discrimination exists, it is difficult to show how much discrimination affects the labour market participation of migrant women. We can say at least that discrimination plays a role in the lives of many migrant girls. The headscarf is associated with negative stereotypes, and many girls feel mistreated when they are rejected for a trainee position or job because of their headscarf.

Social policies nowadays focus strongly on the position of migrant women in Dutch society. This focus made, on the one hand, the problems of migrant women more visible. On the other hand, migrant women are victimized in these policies. Furthermore, the disadvantaged position of migrant women is attributed to their cultural and religious background. However, the assumption that culture and religion are barriers to participation is challenged by some scholars and processes of exclusion and othering are perceived to be the actual barriers to participation (Roggeband, 2010). In this way current policies hamper the emancipation of migrant women in the Netherlands.
Lastly, second generation migrant girls have more modern views on relationships and task division than the first generation. However, some traditional norms and values are still present in the young generation. For example it is evident for all migrant girls that they will eventually marry and be a mother. This is much more evident for Turkish and Moroccan girls than for native Dutch girls. It seems that migrant girls are much more manoeuvring between care responsibilities and a working life, in which the wishes of the husband and parents (in law) are also taken into account. Their autonomy is influenced by a social context (the family) and working is only a possibility when in balance with the home situation. This is also the case for native Dutch women, but to a much lesser extend. Marriage and starting a family have priority in the lives of these young women and in this way they might, after graduation, postpone their entrance to the labour market. As a result some of them do not enter the labour market at all, or have lower status jobs. Part time work is preferred by many women in the Netherlands, especially among those who have the care for young children. Entering high status jobs is more difficult when you are only part time available at the labour market.

We can conclude that migrant girls are indeed part of a larger emancipatory process. In schooling, labour market participation and their views on relationships and task divisions, they made considerable steps forward. The fact that within one generation their position changed a lot shows that their emancipation is going much faster than that of native Dutch women. However, migrant girls are not there yet; the economic conjuncture, a harsh tone in Dutch society towards migrants and Islam and a (although nowadays less) traditional situation at home, make the situation of migrant girls complicated. They have to balance between participation at the labour market and confirmation to their norms and values. And once they decide to be active at the labour market, discrimination and negative stereotypes may hinder their participation. Seen the ongoing trends we expect that this process of emancipation of migrant girls will continue and educational outcomes and views on relationships and division of tasks will be similar to native Dutch girls. The situation in the Dutch society, in which negative attitudes towards immigration and integration (of in particular Muslims) are rather constant, is however more difficult to ‘emancipate’.

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