This paper addresses the role that non-institutional actors, namely social movement organisations, can play in the policy process, and very specially in relation to those policies which are usually formulated and decided upon with disregard to people’s hope. The policy studied is nowadays conscription into the armed forces in the Western European countries, a high-profile policy commonly attached to the reason of the state. Though, lacking common people’s patronage, the institutional actor uses different means and measures to achieve the desired consent; actually, conscription will only hold if its alternatives —e.g. conscientious objection— are penalised sufficiently. Social mobilisation can lower the costs of those alternatives and ultimately drive to the abolition of conscription. Different movement actions in this direction are considered: lobbying, referendum, reform mobilisation and conflict mobilisation. Our conclusion is that, when enough political mediations are provided and civil disobedience is efficiently organised, conflict mobilisation is better off than the others are.

Introduction

In spite of the colossal development of the research on social movements in the last ten years, there has been very little factual research on the outcomes, effects, impact, consequences, success, etc., of these non-institutional actors. Methodological problems are at sight: causal relationships are difficult to prove, so it is the differential attribution to the competing actors, input and output measurement is complicated, etc. (Giugni, 1999; Rucht, 1992). Nevertheless, the paradox is obvious: social movements are born to produce social and political change and we do not know if they obtain it or not. Moreover, we like or not, the results or final output is undoubtedly the best criteria against which we can read all that research about the emergence of a social mobilisation, the forged identity, the constraints and potential of the political opportunity structure (POS), the collective action frames, the structure and means of action and so on. As a matter of fact, measuring the outputs should be the first step to any inquire into collective action.
Something similar is happening in the field of the policy sciences. One of the common approaches to determine features of people’s influence into the policy-making is the policy network analysis. Under such label we can find many different definitions of what and who makes a network but, in practice, in most cases the analysis is referred to the institutional actors and the traditional interest groups and citizen or grassroots groups like NGOs, social movement organisations (SMOs) or the like are seldom considered (Dowding, 1995; Jordan y Schubert, 1992; Van Waarden, 1992). And, like it happens with the research on social movements, when they are considered, the analysis worries much more about the quantity and quality of their interactions with the other actors than for the outcomes of the policy process. That is, the evaluation of who was really influential, which, in any case, was their primary reason to be there, is commonly neglected.

The policy of conscription

Ours is a research about the political influence of SMOs, about the results of collective action. For such we have chosen the issue of conscription into the armed forces in Europe. Involving the ongoing reproduction of the state, conscription pertains to the so-called high profile policy domains (Burstein, 1991; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak et al., 1995). These policy domains tend to be withheld from democratic verification (Della Porta y Diani, 1997), and conscription is no exception. It is customarily decided upon the rationale of national interest by a very limited number of actors, essentially the civil and military authorities and the parties that usually hold government office (Pagnucco y Smith, 1993). Accordingly, its implementation follows the top-down style of government and civil society’s option to access the agenda or even expressing its views is seriously narrowed (Della Porta y Diani, 1997); general election would be the moment for it, but, given the closure of the agenda to this issue because of the substantive consensus between the major running parties, conscription steals away from democratic consultation. To put it in simple words, the reason of state prevails over the democratic reason.

In such a setting, conscription’s institutional steadiness for almost a century has relied on coercion: it worked because it was inevitable. As a matter of fact, data at hand confirm a wide social dislike about conscription that contradicts the institutional version of willing consent. First datum is resistance to conscription. It may vary in its manifestations —evasion, desertion, fleeing away to another country, conscientious objection, total objection, etc.—, but resistance is the converse to conscription in every country and period of time; it increases in time of war and self-defence, when conscription is alleged to be most common sense. Secondly, social protests have always accompanied the depart of conscripts to interventions abroad. Examples are the Korean war and the Suez Canal campaign in the case of the United Kingdom (Dietz y Stone, 1975), the Algerian war in the case of France (Martin, 1977), the Korean and Vietnam wars in the case of the United States (Cohen, 1985; Janowitz, 1975), and, more recently, the Gulf war in the case of Spain, Italy or Germany. This also applies to the humanitarian or peace-making military interventions, which were urged by the very same European public opinion. Therefore, the recourse to all-volunteer forces for missions involving foreign intervention is mainly a result of that social pressure. And thirdly, when given the chance, public opinion has undoubtedly favoured the abolition of conscription.
The last statement needs further explanation. It is true that, since they began in the 1970s until very recently, surveys repeatedly showed support for conscription, but it is also true that this support has quickly turned into rejection whenever conscription has been openly argued against. Such abrupt change, which has taken place in Belgium, Netherlands, France or Italy following a governmental announcement in that sense, a statement by a weighty political leader or the news that a neighbouring country was moving towards ending conscription, has to be understood as the emergence of the existent but enclosed dislike of conscription. It did not show for those many years because, as nobody openly defied the general assumption that conscription had to be served, not even the peace movement, any prospect of change was simply unthinkable.\footnote{1}

If Spain was the European exception during the 1980s it was because the Spanish peace movement was the only one in Europe pledging for the end of conscription and promoting a civil disobedience at that respect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rejection of conscription in 1980s</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejection of conscription in 1990s</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1
CHANGE OF PUBLIC OPINION WITH RESPECT TO CONSCRIPTION

The rejection of conscription agrees perfectly with the growing disaffection about military issues in recent decades. Values and priorities have gradually changed since the II World War in the direction of a post-military society. (Shaw, 1991) rightly points out that there has been a sociological shift towards demilitarisation of (a) everyday life and (b) national and international policy. This finds expression in a basic discrepancy between the priorities of the military strategy designed by governments, the central axis of which is national strategic interests, and the priorities of their societies, which centre around human rights or peace. Already in the 1970s, for example, disinterest in military questions, in short the growing distance between the armed forces and society —some authors openly speak of divorce— was great. Two facts will be mentioned in this respect: the position of Defence at the bottom of the scale of social priorities in all European societies (Inglehart, 1977; 49) and the mobilisations against war and the armies in the post-industrial societies.\footnote{2}

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\footnote{1}{France is a good example: opposition to conscription was 41% in 1994 (\textit{Le Figaro}, February 3, 1995) and rose to 72% when a year and a half later Chirac announced his commitment to abolish it (\textit{Le Monde}, February 23, 1996). The evolution in the Low Countries is analysed in Van der Meulen and Manigart (1997: 322); that of Italy in Battistelli (1997); and that of Spain in Ibarra (1992) and Ajangiz (2000).}

\footnote{2}{Basing themselves on an antagonism between warfare and welfare, Harries-Jenkins and Moskos (1984) argued some years ago that the development of the welfare state had favoured a progressive change in the forms of social legitimation of the military institution. That, in the first instance, the traditional, fundamental legitimacy of the armed forces, on the basis of which they were assigned a central role in the building of national identity, began to be replaced by a functional legitimacy in which the armed forces were understood as forming no more than a further part of the state administrative apparatus. The next step, they said, was to be its replacement by a democratic legitimacy, by which the army would be accepted insofar as its existence and the use made of its power were supported by the whole of society.}
The role the mobilisations play is of much interest to our research on democracy from below. They empower society and promote a bottom-up channelling of request, thus counteracting the top-down style of government in military policies. The analysis of contentious politics is, in this respect, a powerful explanatory tool of policy-making. We will see now how it applies to the policy of conscription from the 1970s up to the present.

Peace movement action in the 1970s

The mobilisations in the 1970s meant the end of conscription in the United States and were by far the best occasion to end up with conscription in Europe as well (Van Doorn, 1975; Van Doorn, 1976). Conscientious objection ceased to be an option of minorities —always less than 2% of the call-up— and began to grow significantly, reaching 20% in Denmark, 17% in Germany, 10% in Norway, 8% in Holland and 6% in Belgium (Mellors y McKean, 1982; Moskos y Chambers, 1993). In countries like France, Italy and Spain, this was also when mobilisation began towards the formal recognition of conscientious objection (Albesano, 1993; Ibarra, 1992; Martin, 1993).

Conscientious objection is a good yardstick of the interaction between the institutional actor and the movement actor, or mobilisation factor, in relation to forced recruitment. In the first place, European peace movements have traditionally longed for an increase in conscientious objection: the more conscientious objectors, the less who collaborate with the armed forces and their militarism. Usually, when, as a result of the peace activism, conscientious objection generalises, the movements get frustrated by the poor pacifism of the newcomers. But, in the second place, growing numbers in conscientious objection prove that the divide between personal costs and benefits is better off for this alternative of military service and may mean, on the long term, an insufficient input of conscripts into the armed forces leading to an end of conscription; this is what has happened in Spain and Italy.

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3 The spread of conscientious objection has been described by some authors as the result of the modernisation process undergone by our societies in the last fifty years: with greater welfare there is less affinity for military questions (Moskos y Chambers, 1993). However, there are at least two facts that challenge the theory of cultural change. Firstly, in some countries there are today fewer objectors than thirty years ago. And secondly, there are surprising similarities in the accounts of the processes of recognition of conscientious objection in Norway, which occurred between 1890 and 1922 (Agoy, 1990b), and in Spain, between 1971 and 1996 (Agirre Aranburu, Ajangiz, Ibarra et al., 1998). We find the same civil disobedience, the same ideas of radical anti-militarism, the same forms of nonviolent resistance, the same repressive responses on the part of the authorities, etc.
The mobilisations had tangible consequences in the policy of conscription: a
generalised reduction in the length of military service —in many cases reduced by half,
from twenty-four to twelve months— and the setting up of the trend to increase the
volunteer component in the majority of those armed forces, partly to compensate for the
reduction of forced recruits and partly to prevent future deficits. Nowadays general trend
of bringing conscription to an end must be understood in connection to that social
empowerment. On the one side, the military value of conscription dropped abruptly: the
service time of conscripts became insufficient for technical or in-service duties. On the
other, governments understood that they could not rely on conscription for certain
missions, for example foreign intervention. It is no coincidence that the three countries
that have led the trend of ending conscription in the nineties, Belgium, Netherlands and France, are the very same that seriously studied the possibility of ending conscription after the mobilisations in the 1970s and so started moving towards more professional armies.

Thereafter, even though we could perfectly state that, on the long term, the end of conscription reads after the democratic reason because the alliance between the desire of society to rid itself of conscription and those resistance mobilisations put limits on its strategic usefulness, the fact is that only the government of United States gave in and conscription survived this contentious action in Western Europe.

Two reasons explain why it did not spell the end of conscription. The first is that the governments were painstaking in their application of sufficient holding measures to normalise and integrate that dissidence: obstacles to the recognition of conscientious objection; restrictive laws; systematic rejection of a significant number of requests — Germany in the 1960s, France in the 1970s, Norway from that time until the present; a deterrent length to substitutory service — twice as long as military service in France, a progressive increase in Germany; prison and repression for the few total objectors and, finally, a total closing of the political agenda to the question of compulsory military service.

On the previous account, we can argue that, during all this time, European governments have availed themselves of different mechanisms of social control in order to sustain conscription. Repression of those resisting recruitment or penalisation of conscientious objection with respect to military service have been the common means. These include the discourses legitimising compulsory military service, which, even in the supposition that those who transmitted them held the necessary conviction, have played a basic function of social and political containment with respect to any change that might affect military policy in general. The fact that those who transmitted these discourses were almost always representatives of parties in office lends strength to this assertion.

The second reason is that there was no organised mobilisation that politicised that sum of individual options and expressly posed the suppression of compulsory military service. In the opinion of Shaw (1991: 8), the experience of the European pacifist movements in the early 1980s suggested the existence of a great potential for anti-militarist protest that might have had profound consequences had it been organised against conscription. Instead, the peace movement struggled to improve the profile of conscientious objection and focused on better legislation on conscientious objection.

The results did not come as expected. On the one hand, the locus of the institutional action was not conscientious objection but conscription, and all measures on conscientious objection were thought to assure the commitment to serve in the armed forces. On the other, the strategies adopted by the movement actor did not succeed in

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posing a real threat to that institutional action. Lobbying with progressive political forces like the socialists was the common trend in all countries but, as conscription was to rule, these forces somehow betrayed the movement when in power and conceded very little. Civil disobedience was also practised in France and Italy but was dropped when minor improvements in the legislation were finally passed. The low figures of conscientious objection throughout the years show evidence of the poor outcomes of movement action; the exception of Germany will be reviewed further ahead.

The changes in the 1990s

It has not been until the decade of the 1990s when a certain re-edition of the conflict on conscription has taken place. On the one hand, as if this were a postponed decision, around 1991 many governments once again reduced the length of military service, as a prelude to its definitive abolition in many cases. On the other hand, increases in conscientious objection began to occur in countries that had always had very low figures, for example France or Belgium. But the most notable fact was the extraordinary increase of this option in Germany, Italy and Spain. At present, in these three countries there are more conscientious objectors than conscripts doing military service each year, something that would have been unthinkable at the start of the 1990s. This increase all over Europe coincides with the determination of some governments to drop conscription. Is there a relationship between these two facts?
The prevailing interpretation argues that this move toward all-volunteer armed forces is a sovereign decision of the institutional actor. However, this is not true in all the cases. We have come up with ten variables that enable us to construct a model to explain governmental decisions concerning conscription at the turn of this century. In the adjoining table we can observe those variables. From the point of view of the reason of state, the abolition of conscription would require a prior or contingent verification of a series of conditions: (a) sufficient armament, equipment and military capacity, (b) the availability of rapid action forces, adjusted in number and format to a new strategic context whose absolute priority is military intervention, (c) the existence of a consolidated and sufficient all-volunteer structure, or else to be very close to achieving this, and (d) an appropriate relation to population size and to the power aspirations of the élite, which is usually expressed as "occupying the place that corresponds to us". In this context, having had or having at present (e) a high level of military expenditure is another good indicator of effort in this direction. On the other hand, democratic reason will have made its weight felt if (a) public opinion has expressed itself clearly against conscription, (b) it has opposed the despatch of conscripts on the military interventions that occurred in the 1990s, (c) a deficit of forced recruits is to be noted, (d) there are problems in voluntary recruitment, and (e) there has been a mobilisation of opposition to conscription, or a very important increase in conscientious objection, to the extent of threatening the conscription-based armed forces.
As we can observe, the cases of France, Holland and Belgium —we have introduced the United Kingdom as a control case, since it took its decision in the 1960s— meet all of the conditions of the reason of state and, especially in France, the variables of democratic reason have barely been relevant. No mobilisation has taken place in any of these countries and the number of conscientious objectors has kept fairly low. The determination to place themselves strategically at the centre of co-ordination of the new multinational forces, to a great extent dissolving their own national armed forces within the latter, together with economic restrictions and a general consensus that this "is what had to be done", would adequately explain the decision to abolish conscription in cases such as Belgium and Holland (Dumoulin, 1997; Van der Meulen y Manigart, 1997). And France has abolished conscription in order to guarantee that it has volunteer armed forces of a strength and size slightly superior to the forces of the United Kingdom, the mirror in which it has viewed itself in the last thirty years. The statements of its leaders and its foreign policy movements confirm its determination to become the continental military power par excellence (Duke, 1994).

The options taken by Denmark or Norway demonstrate that implementing of the zero-draft model is not an obligatory question. The consideration that territorial defence continues to be its basic defence priority has led Norway to maintain conscription. Denmark has also preferred to maintain selective recruitment based on conscription— but very close to the all-volunteer force— that it introduced following the threatening growth in conscientious objection that took place in the 1970s. Both these countries characterise by a very stable and contained conscientious objection.

The evolution of conscientious objection in Germany, Spain and Italy and its role in ending conscription needs farther explanation. The behaviour of the majority of conscripts is guided by a rational calculation of costs and benefits, which, in a generalised context of delegitimation of conscription, makes it essential to penalise the possible routes for escaping military service. The exponential growth experienced by these three countries shows evidence that this penalisation is ceasing to exist, and may be the manifestation of a conflict between the institutional actor and the movement actor, or mobilisation factor, in relation to forced recruitment.

Such a conflict grounds differently. In Germany, contrary sentiment and mobilisations against involvement in the military interventions of NATO were allied to the power vacuum concerning questions of conscription that existed in former East Germany between 1989 and 1991. In Italy, the equalisation of the length of substitutory service and military service has made the option of conscientious objection more desirable (Albesano, 1993). And in Spain, the reason has been the failure of the system of substitutory service itself through a lack of social collaboration; the lack of posts in this service in many cases has meant an extreme reduction in the time of obligatory service and on many occasions total exemption (Agirre Aranburu, Ajangiz, Ibarra et al., 1998).

5 This expression can have many readings, but most interesting to us is the acknowledgement that conscription was a too severe burden for the citizens.

6 Nuclear deterrent and foreign projection were, in the words of Jacques Chirac, the keys to that abolition (Le Monde, February 24, 1996).
There is an important peculiarity in the Spanish case, one that differentiates it from the others: substitutory service has never managed to become institutionalised, it has never enjoyed social legitimacy. Unlike the rest of Europe, very few people in Spain defend its educational character or its value as a service to society. The great majority of objectors, their organisations and the bodies that employ them do not share this belief and nobody argues that it is a valid instrument for building a more demilitarised society.

The reason for this lack of legitimacy is that in 1988, before the authorities set up this service, the most emblematic objectors' organisations started a campaign of civil disobedience with the aim of abolishing conscription, possibly a unique experience in Europe but one whose results confirm Shaw's prediction cited above. In this context of mobilisation, the service was understood to be an instrument for legitimising the punishment of the disobedient or total objectors, and, in the final instance, for safeguarding the continuity of conscription.

Differently from Spain and Italy, Germany is holding conscription still. Three basic reasons could be mentioned for it: (1) this is the most economical option and the most appropriate to the effort required for the pact of solidarity with the people of the former GDR; (2) substitutory service has become an essential element for maintaining the services of the welfare state —this is why the German governments have permitted high numbers in conscientious objection (Kuhlmann y Lippert, 1993); and (3) the armed forces recruit 50% of their volunteer personnel from amongst the forced recruits.

Nevertheless, this “defence plus welfare” device will peril is if an increase in conscientious objection takes place. The abolition of conscription is inevitable when the recruiting effort becomes unsustainable. We define recruiting effort as the relation
between the existing young men population and the number of military conscripts plus conscientious objectors. In both Spain and Italy, the institutional actor decided to resign conscription when the recruiting effort hit a 73% in a non-stop rise as result of the combined effect of declining birth rate and sustained growth in conscientious objection; shortage of military conscripts was already visible. In Germany, thanks to a better off birth rate and a quite steady conscientious objection, the recruiting effort is not so intense yet, but could be if conscientious objection evolved as it did in the early nineties.

![Graph](image)

**FIGURE 4**

**PERCENTAGE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECRUITABLE AND RECRUITED POPULATION**

(RECRUITMENT EFFORT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Recruitment effort</th>
<th>Decision to abolish conscription</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>73% in 1995</td>
<td>March 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>73% in 1999</td>
<td>September 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>67% in 1998</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5**

RECRUITMENT EFFORT IN THE 1990S

That is the case of Spain and Italy. There, the increase in conscientious objection has passed the security threshold of conscription. In itself this increase has come about as a result of a conflict that has disabled the mechanisms for penalising conscientious
objection with respect to military service. In Italy, conventional political action —use of
the law courts and lobbying— has resulted in a reduction of substitutory service. In
Spain it has been a full scale mobilisation, with a sufficient level of civil disobedience
—about 20,000 total objectors between 1988 and 1999— which has politicised the
latent demand for the abolition of conscription existing in that country and make the
institutionalisation of substitutory service unrealisable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Polity</th>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Mobilisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consensus</td>
<td>Passive rejection of conscription</td>
<td>Total objection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change of position of peripheral parties and cleavages in majority parties</td>
<td>Active rejection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Growth of conscientious objection</td>
<td>Permanent conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>End of conscription</td>
<td>No recruits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boycott of substitutory service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 5
THE PROCESS OF THE ABOLITION OF CONSCRIPTION IN SPAIN

As we can observe in table 4, it is not the reason of state but democratic reason that
explains the decision to abolish conscription in these two countries. In this respect, Spain is a paradigmatic case: it does not meet any of the conditions of military or strategic order for taking this step, and the variables of democratic reason find their highest expression. Speaking in overall terms, there are two factors that explain the case of Spain: (a) an evident delay in the adaptation of the armed forces to the all-volunteer model —both Spain and Italy began this adaptation in 1987— and, in general, to the parameters that determine the structure of the other European armed forces; and (b) the existence of a substantive mobilisation against conscription that has managed to activate sufficient social response. The social brake on increases in an undersized military expenditure and the poor response of the youth to the all-volunteer proposal are two facts that confirm the existence of a genuine divorce between the armed forces and society, a divorce that is going to seriously condition the military policy of Spain in coming years and the future of the armed forces themselves.
Explaining variables

It is now time to explore these impacts in relation to some variables. The next will be taken into account: (a) the style of contentious politics or interaction between the institutional and the movement actors; (b) the movement’s organisational fashion; (c) the collective action frames; and (d) the political opportunity structure (POS). Four will be the countries reviewed: Germany, France, Spain and Italy. In respect to conscription, while Germany sticks to it, France and Spain decided to get rid of it in 1996, and so did Italy in 1999. And on the side of mobilisation, France is on very low figures and Germany, Spain and Italy enjoy the highest rates of conscientious objection in Europe.

As far as the style of contentious politics is concerned, the following table reflects the relationship between two variables: (a) the reactive or proactive character of the movement goals, and (b) the character of its main action, conflict, disobedience and disruption on the one hand, and lobbying, political mediation and moderation on the other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Moderation</th>
<th>Disruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactive goal</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France (1990s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proactive goal</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>France (1960s) Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOVEMENT GOAL AND MAIN ACTION

In France, the movement actor chose disobedience to claim for recognition of conscientious objection in the 1960s, which the institutional actor resisted for a long time, so finally opted for channelling the demands, growingly reactive, by the political parties. Neither of both actions succeeded in challenging military service. In Germany and Italy, lobbying through the political parties soon became the main action, in the case of Germany to prevent changes to worse and in the case of Italy to obtain reforms in the legislation for conscientious objection. Spain is the only case of proactive demand for abolition of conscription (Finger, 1990; Gleditsch, 1990). Its disruptive action has resulted better off than moderation in the other countries. Being consent the premise of conscription, civil disobedience seems to fit better the goal of its abolition. The different results of civil disobedience in France in the 1960s and Spain in the 1990s explain better after variables like the POS.

The movement’s organisational fashion can be explained after two adjoining variables: (a) decentralisation and web styled organisation rooted in direct democracy vs. centralisation and professionalised institutionalisation, and (b) movement’s strong or weak ability to organise action and convey the demand.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Weak</th>
<th>Strong</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralised</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralised</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ORGANISATIONAL STYLE AND CAPABILITY
The German peace movement seemed powerful and well organised. Yet, as its consummate institutionalisation prevented comprehensive consensus, left very little room for adaptive changes and encouraged splits, tradition and routinisation became the typical output; a good example is its attachment to the substitutary service for conscientious objectors. On the other hand, the Italian, French and Spanish movements, though born very similar —decentralised and prone to civil disobedience and direct democracy—, have evolved differently. The Italian movement pursued formalisation to better suit the lobbying and reform action (Albesano, 1993) and the French movement splintered in many small groups in a poorly knitted web, which commonly prompted in exemplary local action but very scarce, astonishingly bursting but quickly fading away action on a national level.

Conversely, the Spanish movement has found very convenient to organise in a decentralised yet coordinated manner. High conflict action like civil disobedience needs of both powerful small group ties and an efficient national coordination grounded on true consensus (Dwyer, 1983; Gamson, 1991; Hirsch, 1990; Morris, 1981). Forging a strong collective identity is a must when high personal costs are involved and large numbers of free-riders crop up. And a good working national coordination when the contested policy applies all over the country. It was a single SMO that carried out that coordination, but managed to lead the whole mobilisation by networking with the others and embarking in original new disobedience practices. This fact challenges the idea that webbed small groupings can solely deal with expressive goals while instrumental goals can only be purchased through a definite institutionalisation. Instead, impacts seem to depend more on the amount and quality of resources, these understood in an ample way: material means, action skills and experience, high commitment, sound social and political embedding of movement activists, etc.

We have already stated that only in Spain has abolition of conscription become the collective action frame; instead, the other peace movements struggled through the years for some reform in the practice of conscientious objection. Conscription was a historical grievance but it only obtained empirical credibility when the Spanish peace movement called for civil disobedience —“conscription will cease if we all fail to enrol”— and managed to practice it in huge numbers, the insumisos. This is precisely what a collective action frame is about: injustice + agency + identity (Gamson, 1992). Moreover, as it became the master frame (Snow y Benford, 1992) and abolition appeared as the only legitimate solution before the public, every governmental try to pay the crisis off by reforming conscription proved fruitless.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excluding action</th>
<th>Weak state</th>
<th>Intermediate state</th>
<th>Strong state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Germany, Spain</td>
<td>France (formal exclusion, no impacts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(formal inclusion, reactive impacts)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8
STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS FOR MOBILISATION

7 It is also very convenient to tackle clandestine action by government agencies like the CESID, secret information agency in the armed forces (CESID, 1990).
In relation to the POS, we will use the operationalisation proposed by Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak et al. (1995). In it, the four countries fit the category of excluding governmental action, hence favouring reactive impacts at the most. The German, Italian and French cases apply quite well: the movement actor has obtained some reform via lobbying and political mediation. But certainly it does not apply to the Spanish case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSOE (socialist)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Giving in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP (conservative)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Giving in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU (former communist)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIU (Catalonian moderate)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNV (Basque moderate)</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HB (Basque radical left)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
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</tbody>
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TABLE 9
POSITION ON CONSCRIPTION IN GENERAL ELECTIONS

The Spanish POS has always been presented as fairly close, most obviously for claims that pertain to the state government alone, like conscription is. That is the conclusion (Casey, 1998) comes about when he analyses the immigration policy in the 1990s and the one many other authors reached in relation to the peace movement in the 1980s (Alberich, 1993; Alonso, Barceló y Bustamante, 1991; Alonso, 1991; Alvarez Junco, 1994; Barceló, 1991; Garí, 1993; Pastor, 1992; Prevost, 1993; Valencia, 1997). However, it is obvious that the style of contentious politics has an important say at this respect. The previous analyses refer to actions like demonstrations, lobbying and referenda —e.g. the referendum about withdrawing from NATO in 1986—, but never to a civil disobedience as the one implemented against conscription. Hence, we should say that the POS is not conclusive in itself about the kind of impact the movement action may obtain. On the contrary, as Tarrow (1996), Gamson and Meyer (1996), and McAdam (1998) have already stated, it is more appropriate to conceptualise it as something that can be framed after the movement action. In Spain, many political parties changed its position and backed the movement when it openly defied conscription. Farther ahead, our example provides support for the idea of a policy-specific POS: it changed from one peace mobilisation to the other.

Conclusion

To our understanding, any explaining model of the consequences of movement action has to integrate the following four variables: (a) the style of contentious politics or interaction between the institutional and the movement actors, (b) the movement’s organisational fashion, (c) the collective action frames, and (d) the POS. The application of this model to the policy of conscription shows that the European peace movement framed the issue of conscription after the pattern of the antinuclear and euromissile
issues in the 1970s and 1980s: (1) its mobilisation was primarily reactive to a previous institutional action and therefore never pursued the abolition of conscription but some reform on the legislation in conscientious objection; and (2) it used the mobilisation to back up its lobbying efforts, but as the final decision-making commonly kept out of the movement’s reach, the results did not read as expected.

Conversely, the Spanish peace movement has achieved greater outcomes on this issue because: (a) it has clearly framed it as the abolition of conscription, which was the real grievance, though latent and neglected; (b) it has chosen the appropriate action, civil disobedience, before a policy that depended on consent; (c) it has framed the POS to its own profit by helping the confrontation between the smaller peripheral parties and the major parties with state governing responsibilities; it could do so due to its good location in the social and political relevant networks; and (d) it has organised itself in the most convenient way to resist a certain repression with high personal costs.

The Spanish movement actor has attained its goal acting from outside the policy process. Being a central policy for the state until professionalisation of the armed forces is completed, the abolition of conscription was an unreachable goal by any other means; its durability in Europe throughout the 1970s and 1980s in spite of a powerful peace movement certifies it. In the Spanish case, the civil disobedience action has become a factual ongoing veto to the successive solutions the institutional actor has tried in order to keep conscription, and it proves that an authoritarian rule in the policies that build on consent does not always work.

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