Abstract

The Lisbon agenda is the most high-profile initiative of the European Union (EU) for the governance of markets and the knowledge-based society of the last decade. Yet it is also one of the most neglected subjects of EU politics. This may have something to do with the fact that ‘Lisbon’ is only a discursive veneer that does not add much to the individual policy areas that make up the agenda. Or it may be the result of not having identified the right concepts and analytics. One important step in this direction is to understand what is the Lisbon agenda a case of? To do so, we introduce a theoretical framework for the analysis of governance architectures. Thus, after having briefly illustrated the Lisbon agenda, we examine it as a case of governance architecture. This raises a set of research questions about its establishment and evolution over time. We tackle them by presenting a framework that draws on the multiple streams model of the policy process, but specifically points towards four types of governance arenas, depending on the logic of action at work and the saliency of issues. By doing so, we unpack the Lisbon architecture analytically, rather than examining it by looking at individual policies. More importantly perhaps, we pursue a strategy that is not constrained by one specific mode of governance – such as the open method of coordination – but captures the complexity of modes of governance at work. We then relate this framework to the motivations for this workshop, formulate our initial hypotheses, and introduce the different papers to be discussed at the Joint Sessions of Workshops.
1. Introduction

The Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs is perhaps the most high-profile initiative of the European Union (EU) in the first decade of the 2000s (Begg, 2007; Rodrigues, 2003). Launched in March 2000, its original goals covered competitiveness, employment and social cohesion, whereas the goal of becoming ‘world leader in sustainable development’ was added by the Gothenburg summit of June 2001. The catch-all goal, however, is competitiveness, a contested, wide and dynamic notion particularly from the point of view of policy-making (Hay, 2007). In terms of governance, the strategy was set to encompass both policy areas where the institutions of the EU have treaty competence and others where the classic Community method cannot be used or is politically unacceptable. This attempt to make use of novel modes of governance contained a strong element of coordination and policy exchange between member states through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC).

By 2004, it had become clear that the Lisbon Strategy was not achieving its goals. The mid-term review of the Strategy, orchestrated by Wim Kok, found that reports were produced but not used to generate reforms, that it was increasingly difficult to engage governments and domestic institutions on the Lisbon indicators and other reform targets, and that the overall political saliency of the project was declining. In short, the Kok review found that there was a problem of ownership of the Strategy and therefore low commitment (High level group, 2004).

In response to the mid-term review, the Lisbon Strategy was re-launched by the Barroso Commission in 2005 with a new focus on securing ‘more and better jobs’ in Europe: the ‘Growth and Jobs’ agenda. At the same time, though, an increased number of policy fields at EU level were made compliant with this agenda in a complementary Community Lisbon Programme. Policy areas such as regulatory reform and corporate taxation were ‘Lisbonised’, adding to the overall goal of ‘competitiveness’. The roles of the Commission and the governments of the member states were also re-defined by a new attitude to communication and reporting (Borras, 2009). Thus,
the Lisbon Strategy has been re-defined over the years both in terms of content and institutional action, reinforcing its goal-setting and expanding its scope.

Yet, in spite of the current economic situation, the Strategy continues to be the most important initiative on the part of the European Commission and the member states to improve Europe’s economic competitiveness. The credit crunch of 2008 and the resulting economic recession of 2009-2010 do not seem to have changed its top status on the agenda of the EU, although the 2009 EP elections and the prospect of a new Commission have already opened yet another window of opportunity for problem re-definition and a the fine tuning of the modes of governance within the Strategy, particularly referring to the future of this Strategy after the 2010 deadline (Cohen-Tanugi, 2008) (Huang & Soete, 2009).

2. Motivation for this workshop

There are three main reasons for this unchallenged status of the Strategy on the EU agenda in the 2000-2010 period as well as for its future after 2010. The first has to do with the fact that the Lisbon Strategy has broadened significantly the scope of EU public action for economic growth. With its focus on competitiveness, and on the knowledge-based economy, the strategy has expanded the Single Market and has strengthened the economic dimension of the EMU, while going beyond them by emphasizing the importance of framework conditions for growth. In many senses, the Lisbon Strategy has been an extraordinary process of intellectual mobilization across Europe and beyond, traces of which are evident in several land-marking reports such as the Kok report and the Sapir report. Much of this intellectual mobilization has been related to the shaping of the agenda’s contents and conceptual reach, as much as the generation of particular expectations about what is feasible to be delivered. In a sense, the competitiveness focus of the agenda has been conceptualized as the *raison d’être* of the EU.

The second reason why the Lisbon Strategy is so important in the political life of the EU is that this widened scope has been put into action in two complementary venues, namely by stressing the need of induce a series of widespread reforms at all levels of government, including the need to control and reduce red tape and unnecessary regulations; and by addressing in an interconnected way a wider set of areas in the unfolding of the efforts to improve competitiveness (for example life-long learning, innovation and ICT literacy). Last but not least, it has also widened the form of EU public action. The ambitious agenda for economic growth is being achieved by combining the use of conventional EU regulatory and economic instruments, with a series of new
policy instruments of voluntary and network-like nature, stimulating new interactions between public and private actors and in a different understanding and set-up for the interaction between the EU-level and the member state level.

Most of the scholarly work on the Lisbon Strategy, however, is based on either the economic outcome of individual policies (Archibugi & Coco, 2005; Pisani-Ferry & Sapir, 2006; van Pottelsberghe, 2008) or on a specific governance instrument established at the Spring Council of March 2000, that is, the open method of coordination. Other studies have dealt with the Strategy tangentially, moving on from the theoretical premises of the Europeanisation framework or in the context of the analysis of the so-called Lisbonisation of individual policy areas (Radaelli, 2007).

The literature on the open method of coordination is a particularly striking episode in the sociology of knowledge. Although it is clear even to causal observers that the functioning of the Strategy in areas like employment or sustainable development is contingent on the interplay between open coordination and more hierarchical instruments (Armstrong, 2005) (Borrás & Jacobsson, 2004) (Radulova, 2006) (Zeitlin, 2008), there has been a boom of studies looking at the OMC as a self-contained entity, with limited exploration of the inter-connections between OMC and other modes of governance in a single policy area. Recently, this literature has moved to the consideration of more ambitious analytical frameworks related to constitutionalism and governance (Armstrong, 2008; Bulmer & Padgett, 2005; Sabel & Zeitlin, 2008). However, these deliberative and learning approaches have to be tested alongside other explanations, such as realist politics, neo-functionalism, and ideational politics.

Likewise, if we look at studies of Europeanization (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; Lenschow, 2005; Johan P. Olsen, 2002), they tend to be concerned with the potential of EU public policy for domestic change, the different mechanisms at work in complex causal chains, the role of learning in bringing about transformations, and the substantive outcomes. However, they do not tackle the overall analysis of Lisbon. Finally, institutional analysis of EU politics is becoming popular (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000; Marks & Hooghe, 2001), but this is yet another area where we have not seen projects on the complex institutional and multi-level actors constellation at the base of the Lisbon agenda. To sum up, very little work has been done on what we think are the key political questions involved in the Lisbon Strategy, like the role of different institutions in the ‘initial framing’ and then the re-definition of the main aims through time, the interplay between different modes of governance in individual policies and across policies, and the institutional effects brought about by Lisbon novelties. Furthermore, there is a need to
approach these topics from more solidly grounded theoretical considerations, integrating the analysis of the Lisbon Strategy within the theoretically-based studies about the European Union governance at large.

The reasons for this neglect of the Strategy as a unit of analysis are not clear to us. One reason may well be a kind of null hypothesis or conjecture at work, at least implicitly, in the minds of political scientists. This null conjecture, simply stated, is that the whole is nothing more than the sum of its components. It is an important conjecture and should not be under-estimated in our workshop. Indeed, we have heard at many academic conferences the claim that Lisbon is only a discursive veneer on substantive policy domains that have their own history and logic. Even so, one has still to explain the reasons behind the huge amount of discursive, administrative and political coordination attempts that have taken place in Council formations, the Spring Council, the construction of 2008-2011 cycle of integrated guidelines and lower down in the Commission’s preparation of the annual work programme and the preparation of national plans.

These events and activities deserve careful analytical attention. Perhaps the strategy has been yet another form of political hypocrisy in the sense of Brunsson - de-coupling between coordination talk and the reality on the ground (Brunsson, 1989). Even in this scenario, Lisbon has been a useful discursive horse to ride to get more attention for elected politicians in areas like corporate taxation, that have been re-packaged as Lisbon-compliant and inserted into more ambitious goals. And anyhow, one would still want to explain why complex organisations engage in colossal display of political energy, and why they need discursive veneer. Thus, a sort of null hypothesis is needed, but it should be explicitly formulated and tested alongside other hypotheses.

This is where the explanatory job begins. At the outset, we propose a conceptual framework for the study of the Lisbon Strategy. The point of departure has to be a concept with some analytic mileage. Lisbon Strategy is the term coined by policy makers to mobilise their action, set targets, talk to the media, and arrange their policy work over the years. As political scientists, however, we face a research design problem: what is the Lisbon Strategy a case of? We suggest that the Lisbon Strategy is a case of governance architecture.

3. Lisbon as governance architecture
What is a ‘governance architecture’ then? The notion ‘governance architecture’ draws on institutional perspectives in comparative politics (Cerny, 1990) (MacIntyre, 2003) and in international relations (Rittberger, 1993) (Hasenclever, Mayer, & Rittberger, 1997). Examples of
governance architectures in the European Union are the Single Market, and Economic and Monetary Union. Examples of governance architectures in other international context are for example the Millennium Development Goals of the UN, or the Washington and Post-Washington Consensus of the IMF and World Bank. By saying this, we do not pre-assign any internal coherence or efficiency property to governance architectures. Some architectures are more efficient than others, some more coherent than others. The level of endemic tension and the overall coherence of an architecture can be high or low. These are empirical questions. Common for them all, however, is that they are articulated around some key components. In general terms, we understand governance architecture to be a political structure made up of the following ideational and organisational components.

The ideational components comprise:

a) A set of fundamental ideational repertoires, expressed in notions such as ‘governance’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘sustainability’, the ‘knowledge-based society’, and, last but not least, the ‘market’. These notions do not have a clear-cut meaning. They are discursively malleable. To build a strategy around them, political actors have to orchestrate the attribution of meanings and create consensus around meanings. Indeed, the social construction of strategy (around these prismatic repertoires) is the essence of ideational politics in the EU (Jabko, 2006). Ideational repertoires have at least two important features. Firstly, they are ‘grand’ and ‘constitutive’ in the sense that they make a direct appeal to the core raison d’être of the international/supra-national polity in question (in our case, the EU). Secondly, ideational repertoires represent an element of novelty in the political agenda. Novelty does not mean necessarily that they are created from scratch. They often bring about a novel understanding or re-interpretation of existing issues, sometimes with different interpretations associated to different actors, in the context of a new political thrust of international and supra-national politics.

b) A discourse that uses the ideational repertoires in order to discipline, organise and legitimise the hierarchical relationships between the goals of a high-profile initiative and the policy instruments. With this component we go beyond the simple attribution of one meaning or another (or different meanings for different publics). We enter the dimension of defining the semantic territory of concepts, the hierarchical organisation of ideas and norms, and their relation with the policy instruments used by the policy makers. Think of the goal of
competitiveness as master-discourse, or the priority given to the Broad and Economic Policy Guidelines in relation to other instruments (Radaelli, 2003). More pertinently perhaps, discourse is a form of social interaction that contains both causal ideas and norms that have the effect of coordinating and communicating policy choices. The discourse embedded in governance architectures contains ideas about what institutional frameworks enhance competitiveness and what social models are best. They contain as well causal beliefs as how modes of governance work (and how they affect policy outcomes) and notions of ‘good governance’ such as accountability, transparency, participation and so on (V. A. Schmidt, 2002). In consequence, discourse has both a coordinating and a communicative effect.

The organisational components comprise:

c) Formal and informal organisational arrangements through which overall political decisions concerning the architecture are taken. In other words, the explicit politico-organisational machinery where the ideational repertoires and discourses are in fact defined through complex political processes of multi-level nature. In the Lisbon strategy context, this refers to the Spring Council and the other Council formations; to the roles of the Commission, European Parliament and the other EU institutions; to the corresponding political organisation at the national level; and to the politics of horizontal transnational interactions across borders.

d) The selection of policy instruments and their procedural requirements is the fourth and last organizational component. This has to do with the strategic selection of policy instruments among the panoply of possibilities, and with the definition of specific procedural requirements as a consequence of this choice. The ideational repertoire regarding the nature of ‘governance’ and ideal models of ‘good governance’ is articulated organisationally in a set of practical arrangements. The procedural requirements are particularly important because they constrain and enable organizationally the different governmental levels involved in the political and administrative process, which is essentially a multi-level process. In the context of the Lisbon strategy, public action has been based on a specific combination of somewhat decentralized policy instruments (with the OMC at the forefront), three-year medium-term goals and specific assumptions about the public-private interface. In consequence the procedural requirements have re-defined in important ways some administrative modus operandi, at the EU and at the Member State level.
In a single paper, we cannot generalise about the properties of governance architectures in the EU, although we would like to use the workshop to explore comparisons between Lisbon and, say, the Single Market and other architectures. Here, our research questions are contingent on the very special case of Lisbon and have been developed with this case in mind. This is an important limitation of our conceptual framework. Having established our focus and its limitations, the main research questions we would like to suggest to the workshop participants are the following (box 1)

**Box 1- Research Questions**

Q1: How was the Lisbon governance architecture (ideational and organisational components) created? Once created, how was it maintained and adapted over time?

Q2: How has the Lisbon governance architecture shaped and re-shaped power arenas?

Q3: How has this governance architecture affected patterns of public policy?

The first question considers a given governance architecture as dependent variable emerging from rational choices and bargains, learning and reflexive reconsideration of preferences, or path-dependent historical processes – depending on the theoretical framework one selects for the purpose of explanation. The other two questions look at the governance architecture as independent variable, tracing its effects on either power dimensions or the policy-administrative domains.

**4. The emergence and re-definition of Lisbon**

Our first question is about emergence and then evolution over time. As mentioned, there are several possible pathways to an explanation of Lisbon as dependent variable. Our choice here is to take inspiration from institutionalism (historical and discursive) and strategic constructivism, and develop their insights within John Kingdon’s theoretical framework on multiple streams (Kingdon 1994). Historical institutionalism is concerned with temporal causal sequences that can take different forms, such as path dependence or punctuations similar to Kingdon’s policy windows. The emphasis on long causal sequences reminds us that the Lisbon architecture was not created in March 2000 from scratch. Some of its instrumental components pre-date the Lisbon summit. Turning to ideational components, the discursive struggle over the notion of competitiveness has a
long history, rooted in institutional and evolutionary economics as opposed to neo-classical economics. Indeed, one can think of the Single Market and Lisbon as two moments in which the EU tried to define its own distinctive approach to competitiveness without however settling the differences implicit in the persistence of different models of capitalism. Whereas the Single European Market focused on economies of scale and unleashing market forces across national borders, the Lisbon strategy has paid more attention to institutional framework conditions. Besides these general treats, both governance architectures have remained relatively undefined as to the overall models of capitalist organisation. Much of the ideational and organisational dimensions in the re-definition of the Lisbon strategy in 2005 and 2008 have dealt precisely about this.

One insight we take from this reasoning about time is that we do not see the Lisbon summit as a pure bargaining episode in which preferences are aggregated and successful composed. Put differently, we do not interpret the emergence of Lisbon as a rational choice in which institutional solutions (in our case, a governance architecture) were chosen to successfully reduce transaction costs and externalities. In doing so, we deviate from the classic rational choice-style approach to international cooperation and agreements (Keohane, 1984). The reason for that is that, although we acknowledge the presence of purposeful actors with political strategy at work in the process leading to Lisbon and in its re-definition over the years, we also acknowledge:

a) the ambiguity and tensions about policy substance and the role of the market implicit in the Lisbon strategy (Alesina & Perotti, 2004);

b) the presence of persisting and fundamental disagreements about competitiveness, in short, goal complexity that cannot be composed in a single agreement, potentially resulting in some inconsistencies and contradictions (Van Apeldoorn et al. 2008); and

c) the procedural nature of the governance novelties like the OMC, a manifestation of the tendency to defer controversial choices, avoid hard questions of governance, and skirt around a decision about what Jabko calls 'the ultimate direction of change’ (Jabko, 2007: 13).

As mentioned, we are not confined to a perspective uniquely based on bargaining. Neither do we subscribe to the notion that 'ideas matter’ in the sense of deriving choices from a neat, orderly set of ideas. In Lisbon at least, ideas such as ‘governance’, ‘learning’ and ‘coordination’ have the nature of multi-semantic repertoires for action described by strategic constructivism (Jabko, 2006). In line

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1 Typical here is the discussion around impact assessment, as explained by Meuwese and Radaelli (2010, forthcoming).
with the strategic constructivist template, the political actors involved in the emergence of Lisbon (and its re-definition over the years) were more engaged in gambling rather than bargaining.

How do we get these insights to structure empirical analysis? Here, we would like to suggest, we need the multiple streams (MS) model to sort things out. Kingdon’s streams relate to problem recognition, the formation and refining of policy solutions, and how political parties and governments process policy issues and take decisions. MS has been identified with the triad of problems, policy solutions, and politics – the three streams originally identified in US public policy and more recently applied to the analysis of EU public policy (Zahariadis, 2008). When the three streams are coupled – a problem is recognised, a solution is available and the political climate is propitious – a policy window is opened. In the multiple stream theory, time is not a single entity. There are three types of time:

(a) the time of politics, elections, public opinion movements and campaigning on issues, based on the electoral cycle.

(b) the time of policy ideas and solutions that gradually soften up in communities of experts, and are stabilised within coalitions for change or in defence of the status quo; and

(c) the time of policy problems, often characterised by crises and how collective problems are portrayed or identified (e.g. through indicators, new analyses and focusing events). More broadly, this is the territory of the politics of attention (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Rochefort & Cobb, 1994).

Thus, (a) is relatively cyclical and to some extent predictable – in the EU we have EP elections, Council summits, the renewal of the European Commission at regular intervals of time. Instead, (b) is a much slower kind of time, based on different filters (epistemic, but in the EU there is also the classic filter of committee governance) through which policy solutions have to go through. As for (c), this may be more erratic, with long periods of inertia characterised by abrupt change. MS provides theoretical leverage to make sense of these different types of time.

Multiple stream (MS) models – we submit - enable the researcher to perform process-tracing in a three-dimensional space (i.e., politics, solutions, and the politics of problem definition). This makes empirical analysis richer and more precise. It also brings agency into institutional models via the concepts of coupling and policy entrepreneurship. But there are also critiques that have to be acknowledged. Specifically, the garbage-can-model that informs MS has been criticised
by Bendor, Moe and Shotts (2001) for being tautological and empirically indeterminate (Bendor, Moe, & Shotts, 2001). These problems – they argue – are less pronounced in the MS model, which draws on the garbage-can but reduces indeterminacy by entering policy entrepreneurs that couple streams by exploiting windows of opportunities. Yet if entrepreneurs appear as deus ex machina, the predictive-explanatory usages of the model become problematic. Thus, it is easy to conclude that each time that we observe an instance of policy change, this must have occurred as a result of entrepreneurial activity within a policy window. Recent research has indeed tried to make endogenous at least some aspects of policy windows (for example the mechanisms through which they are kept open) and to connect domestic entrepreneurship to the arenas of elections and industrial relations (Natali, 2005).

However, a more incisive approach to MS problems is to enter institutions explicitly. Olsen (2001) in his reply to Bendor, Moe and Shotts observes that the major insight of institutionalism is to explain how the loose garbage-can features of decision-making contexts are stabilised by time and institutional structure (J. P. Olsen, 2001). We go back to the virtuous interplay of MS and institutionalism. Institutional structures make policy formulation less or more open to experts’ advice. They constrain or enable entrepreneurs.

Institutional theorists like Vivien Schmidt add that the process of softening-up solutions (the so-called shortlist of ideas to be considered by policy-makers) is connected to processes of discourse construction – what Vivien Schmidt calls ‘coordinative discourse’ (V. A. Schmidt, 2001). Once agreed upon by elites, ideational changes in public policy have to be communicated to citizens and society in order to gain social legitimacy (Schmidt 2002; Radaelli and Schmidt 2004). In terms of MS models, they have to be coupled to the second set of components of a governance architecture, namely, the organisational components that formalize and embed these ideational changes into specific organisational changes.

Finally, institutional structure tilts the scale, or biases the process of emergence of policy ideas (Immergut, 1998): all policy windows are opportunities for change, but some actors find more windows open, and for a longer period, than others. Institutional analysis alerts us on the role of biases in MS models. Not only do institutions bias, they can also make the three streams less independent one from the others. Mucciaroni among others has noted in the past that institutions couple the streams by creating mechanisms and pathways between them. One can thus talk of institutional coupling – the reference is to the discussion on the independence of streams and the

To sum up then, an institutional approach to Kingdon’s multiple streams takes us in the direction of frameworks like strategic constructivism, Barzelay and Gallego’s processual institutionalism (Barzelay & Gallego, 2006) and discursive institutionalism (V.A. Schmidt, 2006; V. A. Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004). By combining these temporal considerations with Kingdon’s work on policy streams, the approach – we submit – may help our workshop to explore how competitiveness became ‘the’ definition of the problem. Competitiveness became so important than a full strategy was justifiable, and a possible solution like the Lisbon agenda – with a set of fundamental organisational components - was considered acceptable. Papers in this workshop will explore how this problem definition has been re-defined over time; how the policy ‘mix’ has been fine tuned or perhaps incrementally but substantially changed over time; and how these changes in the Lisbon Strategy have been affected by the political stream evident at supranational and member state levels (e.g. changing member state governments, changing Commission term, changing presidencies, European Parliament elections, and the mood of public opinion towards the market, before and after the financial crisis).

5. Lisbon governance arenas
Our second research question is about the Lisbon architecture as independent variable affecting power relations. This question concerns the EU as well as the impact of the Lisbon architecture on power relations at the level of member states. To make our initial exploration more useful and less tentative, in this Section we make some general observations on governance arenas at the EU level. In the following Section, we will concentrate on the impact on public policies in the member states, although in principle both the second and the third research question should be studied at two levels (EU and domestic).

One striking feature of the Lisbon architecture observed in terms of arenas is the usage of different logics of action. Some EU arenas instigated or orchestrated via Lisbon put emphasis on benchmarking, peer review, learning, policy transfer and voluntary engagement of the member states. These arenas have been usefully examined by the recent literature on new modes of governance. Other arenas are more hierarchical, make use of EU legislation, and are based on bargaining rather than arguing and persuasion. Thus, the first dimension is about the
logic of action, with a continuum from the logic of appropriateness to the logic of choice, and hybrids in between the two extremes.

A second element of differentiation is about saliency, i.e., the visibility of the Lisbon policy issues in public opinion and party politics – an element we have already encountered when we mentioned the politics of attention in Kingdon’s multiple streams. We know from previous research (Chiattelli, 2008) that the visibility of Lisbon issues has fluctuated even within single policy areas such as employment. The second dimension, therefore, differentiates between arenas with a public and arenas without a public. This has implications for the number and type of actors involved, and the social construction of the target populations of public policies.

By combining the two dimensions we obtain four different ideal-typical arenas, loosely reminiscent of previous work on policy types by Lowi, Gormley, Wilson and others (Gormley, 1985-6; Kellow, 1988; Lowi, 1972) and the recent literature on new modes of governance. These arenas substantiate and qualify the more abstract insights about policy change provided by the MS model. They expose power and conflict, two variables that are muted in MS theorising. Figure 1 illustrates the arenas.

**Figure 1: Lisbon governance arenas**

Let us examine the four cells of the typology.
H1 – *Package deal politics* is the ideal-typical arena where the logic of action is based on rational choice and bargaining. Issues have visibility in the domestic public opinion. (At least some) national parliaments have organizational devices to monitor the EU arena and increase its saliency in the domestic media – a classic example being the Danish Folketinget. In this arena – we hypothesise – power politics takes the form of package deals with compensation for the losers. When there is a zero-sum game, it is possible to look at higher-level arenas where a larger positive-sum game becomes possible. Conversely, as shown by Radaelli and Kraemer in the case of direct tax policy, it is possible to break down a single large zero-sum game by creating sub-systemic arenas that deal with different actors and different problem definitions (Radaelli & Kraemer, 2008). Within these lower-level arenas the conditions for positive-sum games can be recreated.

A necessary condition for the successful operation of this type of arena is the presence of a legitimising discourse that explains to the public opinion and political parties why the deal was made. Agreement is reached via arena segmentation (or aggregation) and communicative discourse. As we said, taxation is a good example, although in several cases the lack of communicative discourse has led the media to report on the deals as ‘squalid compromise’\(^2\), thus de-legitimising at the domestic level the agreements reached in EU arenas. Thinking in terms of multiple streams, politics, problems and solution may interact perniciously – as in the example of the tax deals denounced the next day as sell-outs of sovereignty. Entrepreneurship – we hypothesise – is about exploiting the rarer moments in which the three streams can be coupled efficiently, with shrewd calculation of the payoffs and the side payments.

The politics stream often adds more and more elements to the package deal. By doing so, it makes the overall package fragile. To carry on with the example of taxation, in 2003 the Italian delegation added to the already difficult (but almost finalised) discussion of the tax treatment of non-residents’ savings the problem of fines to be paid in relation to milk quotas, forcing ECOFIN to ask for a package deal directly at the level of the Spring EU summit.

H2 – This is the arena of *transformative politics*. Entrepreneurship here is not about calculation and ranking preferences. It is mostly about generating the conditions for frame reflection. We conjecture that entrepreneurs – in order to produce change – have to successfully engage with the transformative discourse illustrated by Vivien Schmidt in her book on the political economy of Europe. The presence of high saliency means that policy entrepreneurship has to cover both

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\(^2\) On 16 January 2003, the *Financial Times* referred to the outcome of an ECOFIN meeting as squalid compromise, Leader, “Transparency test: Information exchange on tax matters is worth fighting for”, p.16.
coordinative and communicative discourse, that is, organising technical/political discussions but also offer a justification to public opinion and the media.

Identity politics here is more important than calculation. In fact, inside this type of arena the core mechanism at work is the logic of appropriateness, not the logic of choice. Actors are supposed to engage in learning and experimentalist governance. Yet they operate in the shadow of attentive public opinion, domestic MPs, and national political parties that do not authorise technocratic deliberation in opaque committees of experts (the obvious example is comitology). The preconditions for highly conflictual politics are all here. Yet even under conditions of high visibility preferences can be transformed by the mechanisms of frame reflection, often after conflictual periods of stalemate and ‘dialogue of the deafs’ (Schon & Rein, 1994).

H3 – In technocratic deliberation the main mechanism is socialization. This is the type of arena well-illustrated by the literature on committee governance in the EU (Quaglia, De Francesco, & Radaelli, 2008). Conflict is dealt with successfully if there is a forum where experts are socialised to a notion of European interest that gradually supersedes the national interest (the classic reference for this mechanism pre-dates Lisbon, see the studies by Joerges and Neyer on comitology). In these technocratic arenas, experts become gradually disfranchised from hard bargaining. Paraphrasing the sociology of Alvin Gouldner parochial committee delegates turn into cosmopolitan professionals (Gouldner, 1979). Perhaps they do not shift their loyalty to the EU as neo-functionalism would have predicted – recent studies on socialization and identity in the EU are much more cautious on the relationship between attachment to the EU and attachment to the member states among bureaucratic elites (Radaelli & Banducci, 2008). But they can still find the resources for technocratic deliberation and Pareto-efficiency reasoning when dealing with controversial policy issues. In terms of multiple streams, the prevailing stream is the technical stream in which policy solutions soften up and are explored by experts. The policy entrepreneur will most likely be a technocrat rather than a politician in office or someone very close to politicians.

H4 – Our fourth ideal-typical arena – called efficiency-driven aggregative politics - is characterised by low saliency and the aggregative logic of bargaining and composing different sets of preferences. Conflict is dealt with successfully if there are sufficient economic and political resources to compensate actors and aggregate preferences. If no efficient deal can be made, actors

3 The reference to Gouldner comes from the insights of GianDomenico Majone on copinage technocratique.
prefer to live with the status quo and no agreement is reached. The political sanctions for not improving on the status quo are minimal, since there is no public opinion out there ready to push for a legitimising communicative discourse. Turning to MS, major re-definitions of problems generated by moods in public opinion are relatively scarce or absent in this type of arena. The politics stream churns out opportunities and constraints for bargaining – in relation to changes in parties in offices and consequently changes of policy orientations. The technical policy solution stream is obviously important.

The driving issue in the re-shaping of the arenas at the EU and national level is the extent to which the specific dynamics and contents of the Lisbon strategy has changed previous patterns of power arenas, and perhaps most interestingly, the extent to which Lisbon strategy is more dominated by one or the other ideal types of power arenas. In other words, is the Lisbon strategy as a whole eminently based on transformative politics (as some authors focusing on employment policy or the OMC have argued), or is it more a form of technocratic deliberation? When do forms of efficiency-driven aggregative politics and package deal politics tend to emerge, and why?

6. The policy effects
Following our third research question, it is worth considering the extent to which the Lisbon strategy is likely to have affected the patterns of public policy, particularly at the national level. Here we have to be cautious. In a sense, it is up to the papers to be discussed at the Joint Sessions to shed light on the policy effects. We can only make a few suggestions before we meet at the joint Sessions. With this caveat, it seems useful to consider the ideational and organisation pressures on the domestic systems generated by the Lisbon architecture.

Ideational pressure refers to the difference between policy paradigms contained in the Lisbon agenda and the prevailing domestic policy paradigm, both in terms of ideational repertoires and political discourses. Explicit in the Lisbon strategy is the intention to generate an alignment of national policy objectives with the EU-level overreaching goals. Organisational pressure is about the politico-administrative dimension of this pressure, which in our case refers to the institutional opportunities offered by the specific forms of political organisation and the procedural requirements of policy instruments. We can start from the null hypothesis $H^0$ that there have been no ideational or organisational impacts. This may be the case because (a) the Lisbon architecture has not created
ideational or organisational pressure in spite of its ambitious goals, political configurations and policy instruments, or because (b) the ideational and/or organisational clash between Lisbon and domestic policy is too extreme to accommodate change, hence Lisbon has been ideologically and politico-administratively ‘resisted’ at the level of member states.

The alternative set of hypotheses $H_{1-N}$ state that there has been ideational and organisational pressure and that the particular form and degree of impact at the national level is largely associated to the presence of national-specific institutional variables that define the intermediate level of pressure.\(^4\) Hence, degrees and forms of national impact can be predicted on the basis of these nationally-specific intervening variables. Given non-extreme degrees of Lisbon-generated pressure (of an ideological or organisational nature), we can predict that domestic change depends on the following *intervening variables*:

1) **The degree of discretion in the implementation of Lisbon goals.** This is a crucial intervening factor at the national level. Earlier we have referred to the relative open-ended nature of the Lisbon strategy both in terms of the definition of meta-goals following a set of ideational repertoires (‘competitiveness’) and in terms of the cyclical and changing contents of the Lisbon strategy itself. We can assume that this relatively open-ended nature has in principle allowed to accommodate better these overall goals and principles within different traditional national policy goals according to different interpretations of ideational repertoires. However, across Lisbon policy areas, the stringency and clarity of prescriptions set at the EU level vary, and so do the expected levels of learning ‘from the top’ down to the national and local level. This leads us to the following hypothesis, namely, (H1) the more open the Lisbon strategy goals are, the greater the possibility to accommodate and make compatible the pre-existing national goals with EU-goals, inducing domestic change gradually.

2) **The communication and coordination of the discourse by national policy entrepreneur(s) and reform coalitions** (Schmidt 2002). This refers to who has entry and voice in the Lisbon-related articulation of the national discourse that motivates change, as well as the associated dynamics of communication and coordination. For example, the Lisbon debate on innovation may have suddenly empowered the voice of evolutionary economists, since they seem to have more to say about innovation than traditional economists, a cornerstone of the

\(^4\) This hypothesis draws on the propositions on Europeanisation and domestic change made by Börzel and Risse (2003).
‘competitiveness’ notion. The distinction between coordinative and communicative discourse is useful here, leading our way to the following hypothesis. (H2) For reform coalitions, policy entrepreneurs and politico-administrative organisational leaders pushing for changes to bring policy in line with the Lisbon templates, a thin coordinative discourse facilitates the adoption of new policy ideas or organisational platforms. As explained by Vivien Schmidt, thin coordinative discourse implies thick communicative discourse meaning that a large number of actors are involved in the construction of a discourse that convinces public opinion that the change is legitimate and serves the interests of the country.

3) The national traditions of political and administration organisation. This intermediate variable refers to the overall principles and structures defining the politico-administrative organisation at the national level. The Lisbon strategy political organisation is based on a specific constellation of formal and informal arrangements (Spring Council, Competitiveness Council, etc) likely to influence the political organization at the national level. Likewise, the Lisbon strategy is largely inspired by new public management organizational forms, which contrast with the Napoleonic or Weberian type of political-administration traditions of state-society relations. The politico-administrative organisation at the national level is highly embedded in a specific historical context, and therefore it tends to change gradually and following strong path dependencies. For that reason the hypothesis here is that (H3) the more similar the pre-existing forms of national organisational structures are to the political and administrative organizational structures and principles of the Lisbon strategy, the more likely domestic change will be the product of a synergy between the Lisbon-induced change and the country’s own drive for change. Yet, the absence of this structural similarity would invariably mean a more problematic domestic change because it implies a more radical/disruptive pressure for change, challenging historical path dependencies.

4) The presence-absence of institutional opportunities for coupling and entrepreneurship. Institutions enable or constrain policy entrepreneurs. In consequence, the amount of change depends on the institutional position of the reform coalition or policy entrepreneur (inside or outside the core executive; see Chiattelli 2008), the centralisation of executive authority, the relationship between bureaucrats and Ministers, and the openness to external advisors and

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5 We are grateful to Jakob Edler for this comment.
experts. The fourth and last hypothesis is that (H4) the institutional position of the entrepreneur (individual or reform coalition) determines the amount of change at the domestic level.

7. Summary and outline of the workshop
Arguably, one reason behind the neglect of studies on the Lisbon agenda as a whole is that we have not as yet understood of what Lisbon is a case of. Issues of research design are obviously fundamental in setting the academic trajectory of the field, and our topic is no exception. In this paper we have defined the Lisbon strategy of the EU as a case of governance architecture. We have defined the key ideational and organisational components of governance architectures and introduced a framework for the analysis of different arenas. The four governance arenas draw on previous work on policy types and on the more recent literature on new modes of governance. In introducing the arenas, our aim is to unpack the politics of Lisbon by using analytic tools rather than individual policies (such as the European Employment Strategy, Social Inclusion, and so on). The policy-by-policy orientation of academics who have studied the Lisbon agenda is one of the most frustrating features of the debate. In consequence, we thought it could be useful to pursue a different approach. More importantly, our approach is not constrained by one specific mode of governance – such as the open method of coordination – but captures the complexity of modes of governance at work. Neither is it confined to one specific angle, such as Europeanisation.

In short, we argue that too much work has been done on individual modes of governance and on Europeanisation, and too little on the political logic that animates the different governance arenas at work at Lisbon. Our approach comes with its own limitations of course. It is difficult to use the arenas when we move at the edges, towards the centre of figure 1, where logics are hybridised and saliency is intermediate. It is also challenging to use our framework to say something substantively relevant about individual policy areas. Put differently, we need to go back to the policy areas. On this front we very much hope to find inspiration and empirical findings in the papers delivered to our workshop. We hope that the authors will find our framework useful, and relate some of their thoughts to the proposals we have made in this paper.

We have finally introduced our initial conjectures on the policy effects with four hypotheses plus the null hypothesis – with the caveat that this is the point that needs to be informed by the presentation of the workshop papers and our collective discussion. We have
organised the workshop around panels to maximise the opportunity to draw lessons both from individual papers and the analytic-empirical connections between papers. We will start with a bundle of papers that have more horizontal or historical aims, and as such are not contingent on specific policy areas. The first panel thus includes a paper on the impact of Lisbon on national coordination, a concept-paper on mechanisms of conflict management, and a third paper on the political aspects of priority-construction. The second panel will debate the role of modes of governance and the contested issue of ‘coordination’ within Lisbon. On Thursday, the opening panel will be dedicated to cross-country comparisons, covering Finland, France, Italy, Estonia, and Ireland. We will then move on to a panel on the discourses and instruments of policy coordination, considering sustainable development and childcare policy. Next, we will discuss Europeanisation effects, cohesion policy and the case of the services directive. On Friday we will have two papers on the implementation of institutional innovations, specifically on the Lamfalussy structure and the higher education area.

References


Missing from the list: