Differences in Rhetoric of Male and Female Leaders in the Context of Populist Right Parties

CONFERENCE PAPER
EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON POLITICS AND GENDER
8-10 JUNE 2017
LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND

BY

KATHARINA KNEIP
katharina_kneip@live.de

Zurich, Switzerland, May 29, 2017
Abstract

During the past years, the previously male-dominated arena of populist right parties has been rapidly gaining female participation and popular appeal. Parties such as the Front National have appointed female leaders and simultaneously increased votes. The underlying question asks whether there might be a connection between the emergence of female populist leaders of radical right parties and the growing public appeal of these parties. Many scholars agree that rhetoric plays a significant role in the performance of a populist leader. This paper therefore aims to uncover whether the rhetoric of female populist right party leaders differs along certain lines from their male counterparts. It produces its own theoretical framework built on theories within the fields of Gender Studies and Populist Right Rhetoric. The cases analyzed are: the Front National (FN) in France, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark and Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) in Norway. From a number of party speeches the rhetoric of each a female and male party leader was examined in a qualitative text analysis with the help of a catalogue of sociolinguistic criteria on the one hand and a qualitative content analysis on the other. In a second step, the results within each party were then discussed in a cross-country comparison in order to reveal the general trend for all countries analyzed, showing that the female leaders of the populist right parties analyzed employed less radical antagonist statements than their male counterparts. The findings could suggest that populist right parties may increasingly appoint female leaders in order to gain popular votes. The analysis addresses a gap in current literature, building a gateway for a new research area within Populist Right and Gender Studies.

Key words: Comparative Politics, Extremism, Gender, National Identity, Political Leadership, Populism, Power, Representation

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to thank my initial supervisors Prof. Dr. Daniele Caramani and Dr. Simon Maag for their invaluable support during the first stage of this project in 2015. Secondly, I would like to express my appreciation to PhD Anders Ravik Jupskås and Prof. Cécile Alduy for their insightful tips and their help in accessing the Norwegian and French speeches. Ultimately, I wish to grant my gratitude to Tabea Bilang, David Etienne, Timon Von Mentlen, Joëlle Häubi and Kasper Rosenkvist for their linguistic expertise and their valuable help in dealing with the different languages; as well as Raphael Gurtner, Peter Bernhard, Pia Kneip and Ragnar Wetterblad for their much-appreciated input, comments, criticism and patience.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Previous Research on Gender Differences in Populist Right Parties and Rhetoric</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Gender Differences and Populist Right Rhetoric</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Female and Male Political Rhetoric</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Populist Right Rhetoric</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Research Question and Contribution of the Dissertation</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Theories</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Theories on Male and Female Rhetoric</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Theories on Populist (Right) Discourse</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Research Design and Methods</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Case selection</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Data</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Methods and Operationalization</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Findings</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Findings France</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Findings Norway</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Findings Denmark</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Cross-Country Comparison and Implications</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Reflections on Scientific Value</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Primary Sources</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Secondary Sources</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Appendices</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table of Figures

Graphic 1: Visualization Hypotheses ................................................................. 14
Graph 1: Bar Chart Inclusive Pronouns, Adjectives and Adverbs France Normalized .......................... 23
Graph 2: Bar Chart Code Count Confronting Rhetoric France Normalized ................................. 24
Graph 3: Bar Chart Inclusive Pronouns, Adjectives and Adverbs Norway Normalized .................. 26
Graph 4: Bar Chart Code Count Confronting Rhetoric Norway Normalized .................................. 27
Graph 5: Bar Chart Inclusive Pronouns, Adjectives and Adverbs Denmark Normalized ............... 29
Graph 6: Bar Chart Code Count Confronting Rhetoric Denmark Normalized ............................... 29
Graph 7: Bar Chart Level 3 Confronting Rhetoric France Normalized ......................................... 34
Graph 8: Bar Chart Level 3 Confronting Rhetoric Norway Normalized ....................................... 34
Graph 9: Bar Chart Level 3 Confronting Rhetoric Denmark Normalized ..................................... 35
1 Introduction

During the past years the previously male-dominated arena of populist right parties has been rapidly gaining female participation and popular appeal (Petö 2014: 79). Parties such as the Front National have appointed female leaders and simultaneously increased votes. I thus wondered, whether there might be a connection between the emergence of female populist leaders of radical right parties in Europe and the growing public appeal of these parties. As many scholars agree that rhetoric plays an important role in the performance of a populist leader (Taggart 2000; Mazzoleni et al. 2003; Mudde 2007), I asked myself whether the rhetoric of female populist right leaders differs from the rhetoric of male leaders of populist right parties. Based on theories within the fields of Linguistics and Gender Studies as well as Populist Right Rhetoric this paper constructs its own theoretical framework. Combining these strings of literature, I theorize that Gender differences in populist right rhetoric go along the line of populist in-group and out-group dichotomization and the verbal radicalism of antagonistic statements against such out-groups. Derived from the theory my first hypothesis (H₁) proposes that: Female populist right party leaders utilize in-group references more frequently than the male party leaders whereas the second hypothesis (H₂) suggests that: Female populist leaders use less aggressive or radically formulated antagonistic statements. The cases chosen for the analysis are the populist right parties on national level within Europe that have had female party leaders up to 2015: The Front National (FN⁴) in France with Marine Le Pen, the Dansk Folkeparti (DF) in Denmark with Pia Kjærgaard and Norway’s Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) with Siv Jensen. The rhetoric in two transcribed party speeches of each female leader was compared to her respective predecessor’s or successor’s rhetoric. In-group references were operationalized with the help of a catalogue of sociolinguistic criteria and measured through a Linguistic Text Analysis (LTA) whereas confrontational statements were measured through a directed approach of Qualitative Content Analysis. The analyses were conducted using Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) computer software. The results corroborated H₂ as the female leader’s speeches showed substantially less confronting rhetoric in all cases analyzed whereas they only supported H₁ for one case. The study suggests that gender differences in the discourse of populist right leaders do go along the line of verbal radicalism but not necessarily along the in-group / out-group dichotomization.
2 Previous Research on Gender Differences in Populist Right Parties and Rhetoric

2.1 Gender Differences and Populist Right Rhetoric

Research in this precise area is rather scarce. There is much to be found on populist rhetoric as well as female rhetoric separately (see below) but hardly ever a combination of the two – and if so, it is usually limited to the aspect of anti-Islamic rhetoric and the right wing’s ‘legitimating’ notion of defending women’s rights (cf. Betz and Meret 2009; Fernandez 2009; Mayer et al. 2014). Betz and Meret (2009: 313) discuss how populist right parties “put themselves forward as defenders of fundamental liberal values such as individualism, secularism and gender equality” through framing the question of Islam in terms of identity, culture and values. They take up a frame analysis and develop an analytical framework in order “to put contemporary Islamophobia in Western Europe in a larger historical and transnational context” (Betz and Meret 2009: 313). Fernandez (2009: 269) explores the discourse of gender-based practices such as honor killings, veiling and forced marriages in order to reveal how manifestations of Islamophobia have become neutralized through the association and articulation of patriarchic traditions and gender inequality within Islam. Mayer et al. (2014: 250, 259) conduct a frame analysis of texts published by four right-wing movements and parties in Austria where they focus on the intersections of framing processes in order to untangle the gendering of populist right anti-immigration and anti-Islam discourses as well as the ethnicization of discourses on gender relations. The authors produce a remarkable debate on the (re)framing of gender equality in populist right discourses and point out the inconsistencies that arise in the framing of gender and gender equality “in connection to the shifting use of the essential dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in populist right rhetoric” (Mayer et al. 2014: 250). Their findings show that traditional (family) values, LGBT3 rights and women’s ‘free choice’ “play important roles within right-wing populist (re)framing processes of gender equality” (Mayer et al. 2014: 251) and argue that the repeated re-framing of right-wing populists allows them to address different audiences (‘not- them’), re-constructing the populist ‘we’.

The focus of these analyses however, is on how gender issues are framed and discourse is being handled whilst none of them address the rhetoric of populist leaders of differing gender. Yet,
during the course of writing this dissertation, a book in French was published (Alduy and Wahnich 2015) in which the authors compare Marine Le Pen and Jean-Marie Le Pen’s rhetoric, aiming to show that the new female leader is changing the face of the party through her rhetoric. Alduy and Wahnich’s team transcribed and analyzed a great number of election campaigns and TV debates, radio interviews, speeches as well as various written texts dating from 1987 to 2013. They performed a Qualitative Data Analysis with the help of text analysis software such as Voyant Tools and Hyperbase. Although the scholars stem from the fields of (French) Literature, History and Linguistics, their findings have strong political implications: They state that Marine Le Pen seems to have found a way to de-demonize (“dédiabolisation”) the FN through cloaking radical views in soothing speech: “What is different is the words and phrases she uses to express the same agenda” (Wilcox 2015). My analysis is similar but naturally, I lack the resources and time for analyzing such a vast amount of data – yet, my research covers a greater number of different cases and provides implications that go beyond national borders.

2.2 Female and Male Political Rhetoric

Contrarily, there is a vast discussion on characterizing male and female rhetoric and it is not possible to include in this paper. I will however briefly touch upon an interesting distinction made by several scholars and, whilst referring to the literature listed, proceed with the two authors most relevant for building my theoretical framework and analysis.

Many scholars within Gender Studies agree that biological evolution along with the construction of gender stereotypes and social expectations affect the way in which women and men are perceived in their specific roles and develop distinct communicative styles (Maltz and Borker, 1982; Thelander 1986; Mral 1999; Stephens 2003; Mansfield 2006). One section of scholars has identified male and female rhetorical styles, seeing them as a ‘choice’ or ‘tool’ adopted by men and women as a result of their roles and expectations in society (Mral 1999; Larner 2009). Mral (1999) sees the male as contest and conflict style, and the female as discussion and consensus style arguing that men tend to adopt the male rhetorical style and women the female style due to cultural and social expectations.
Larner (2009) presented the idea that feminine (and masculine) language can be “helpful rhetorical tools for achieving different political speech genres’ purposes and that feminine rhetoric, specifically, should be considered for use in political speech” (Larner 2009: 56). She conducted a content analysis of several winning Presidential Candidates’ speeches: Inaugural Addresses which are supposed to unify the citizenry and “foster speaker-audience collaboration – goals feminine language accomplishes” and Nomination Acceptance Speeches which are meant to “display the speaker as leader, expert, and agent – goals masculine language accomplishes” (Larner 2009: 4, 55). Her hypotheses was largely supported as her findings showed more feminine rhetoric in Inaugural Addresses and more masculine rhetoric in Acceptance Speeches (Larner 2009: 55).

Based upon characterizations of female and male rhetoric widely agreed on by scholars within Gender Studies and Linguistics (Mral 1999; Stephens 2003; Thelander 1986) Åhagen and Nilsson (2013) build a theoretical framework to differentiate female and male rhetoric. The primary aim of their thesis was to find out whether there was a difference between the rhetorical style of women and men in the context of the UN General Assembly. Their secondary aim was to establish whether the gender of culture determined the speaker’s rhetorical style as they compared the rhetoric of Swedish and US representatives in the UN General Assembly (Åhagen and Nilsson 2013: 1). Åhagen and Nilsson’s (2013: 1) findings showed that there is a slight difference in rhetorical style between genders in the first place and culture in the second.

2.3 Populist Right Rhetoric

Many scholars have found that populist right leaders stand out through their communication strategies and often their discourse is analyzed in connection to their media performance (Taggart 2000; Mazzoleni et al. 2003). Due to their populist element, they are often seen as “mediagenic” (Mudde 2007: 253). Research in populist right rhetoric has also greatly focused on antagonistic statements specifically surrounding anti-immigration rhetoric and its concept of national identity (Wodak and Reisigl 1999; Betz 2003; Wodak and Iedema 2004; Wodak and Richardson 2013; Wodak et al. 2013; Kluknavská 2014). In their analyses of the rhetoric of radical right parties in Europe Wodak and Reisigl (1999) and Wodak and Iedema (2004) take up the concept of in-group and out-group differentiation. Wodak and Reisigl’s (1999: 187)
research was inter alia “concerned with the analysis of the relationship between the discursive construction of national same-ness and the discursive construction of difference, which leads to political and social exclusion of specific outgroups”. “In all three studies taken from the Austrian context, racist and anti-Semitic as well as chauvinist utterances occurred simultaneously, especially in everyday conversations” (Wodak and Reisigl 1999: 187). Wodak and Ledema (2004: 157) specifically aimed to show the importance of analyzing populist right rhetoric from a linguistic perspective for the current socio-political developments especially in the European context but also elsewhere. This construction of enemies and allies, the concept of (inclusive) in-group and (exclusive) out-group populist dichotomy has been analyzed by various scholars (Caiani and Parenti 2013; Kluknavská 2014) as an important dimension of populist right rhetoric.

2.4 Research Question and Contribution of the Dissertation

The aspects from above become salient when we consider our research question: Does the rhetoric of female populist right leaders differ from male populist right rhetoric and if so, along what lines do gender differences in populist right rhetoric go? Thus, for my analysis I wish to take up the aspect of (inclusive) in-group / (exclusive) out-group dichotomization as well as radical antagonistic rhetoric as main connecting point between the two strings of literature and basis of my theoretical framework. In this paper, I will work with Åhagen and Nilsson’s (2013: 12) definition of rhetoric “as language used with the purpose of persuasion, the speech of influence”. I define dichotomization as: the division into two parts, classes or groups, and antagonistic statement as: showing dislike or opposition towards an out-group (Merriam-Webster 2017a,b).

My analysis may provide a significant contribution to political science research, addressing the gap in literature between gender analyses of political discourse and populist right rhetoric. It is shown that several populist radical right parties have gained female voters after appointing women party leaders as for example in France: “Marine Le Pen’s greatest success was to overcome her party’s gender gap with female voters. While in 2007 only about one-third of National Front voters were female, by 2012 half of all National Front supporters were women” (Stadelmann 2014: 3). My findings could imply that populist right parties may want to consider appointing female leaders to increase their electoral success. In this paper, I am not
looking at rhetoric styles as strategic tools. Yet, if further studies can confirm that female and male populist right leaders show significant differences in rhetoric there may be potential to consider this as it could have a reasonable effect on the field. Providing further research regarding gender differences in the rhetoric of populist right leaders can then explore the changes resulting from the entry of women into this—up to recently male dominated—political arena. Petö (2014: 79) however reminds that populist right parties “are changing their agenda and appeal to the public. Those who are participating in these parties are not the undereducated anti-establishment losers portrayed by the media in the past, but highly educated professionals who speak foreign languages, know the language of politics and have experience in the political system” (Petö 2014:79). Hence, in taking up a control case¹ I will be able to shed some light on whether female rhetoric may be playing a part in the parties’ appeal or whether there is simply a general trend— if in fact female populist right leaders’ rhetoric in the European context differs.
3 Theories

In order to analyze differences in female and male populist rhetoric I take up the theoretical discussion of female vs. male rhetoric originating from Gender and Discourse Studies, and, combining these strands of literature with theories of right-wing populist rhetoric, I explore and develop a theory highlighting the gender differences of right-wing populist rhetoric.

3.1 Theories on Male and Female Rhetoric

Studies across the fields have discussed the evolutionary process and social pressure impacting the way men and women interact in today’s society and affecting their communication (Baird and Bradley 1979; Mral 1999). Studies have identified women to be nurturing and cooperative and thus, women are more inclined to dialogue and a less attacking rhetoric whereas men prefer monologues and a dominating style of speech (Thelander 1986; Mral 1999; Stephens 2003). Male rhetoric is therefore often adhered to as competitive and aggressive (Maltz and Borker 1982; Mansfield 2006) whilst female discourse is characterized as supportive and inclusive (Maltz and Borker 1982). In line with the general view among these scholars, Åhagen and Nilsson (2013) differentiated male and female political rhetoric along the aspects of inclusion vs confrontation. The male style is characterized by confrontation: a rather excluding and aggressive rhetoric, and the female style is prone to inclusion: as they try to “identify with the audience as ‘the same’” (Åhagen and Nilsson 2013: 14). Their theory is based on the linguistic theories found in the workings of Mral (1999), Thelander (1986) and Tannen (1990). Tannen’s (1990: 26) study on differences in conversation suggests that women consider their relations rather symmetrically by seeing themselves as similar to others as opposed to men who perceive their relations rather hierarchically. The hierarchical character shows in rhetoric through aggressive attacks on opponents and the use of excluding rhetoric and a conflict style of discourse (Mral 2011: 203). Thelander’s (1986: 162) findings show significantly less aggressive and radical rhetoric for women. Åhagen and Nilsson’s (2013) work is of special interest to my research for the thesis generates its own theoretical framework from the works of Linguistics and Gender Studies taking the notion of inclusion vs. confrontation in order to separate feminine from masculine political rhetorical style. Another scholar differentiated feminine and masculine rhetoric along this line: Larner (2009) sees
feminine language as inclusive, cooperative and unifying, and masculine rhetoric as aggressive and competitive (Larner 2009: 4, 7, 13, 25-26). Her work is specifically relevant to my research as she created a catalogue of sociolinguistic criteria that served as model to construct a catalogue for my analysis.

3.2 Theories on Populist (Right) Discourse

One of the most widely accepted and commonly used conceptualizations of populism in comparative studies stems from Cas Mudde. He defines populism as an ideology “that considers society to be ultimately separated in two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté general of the people” (Mudde 2004: 543). Populism has also been defined as a political rhetoric that aims to appeal to “the power of the common people in order to challenge the legitimacy of the current political establishment” (Abts and Rummens 2007, p. 407). Populist rhetoric is thus often characterized by hostility to the established order as well as an identification with the common people, whose language they employ opposing the elitist and complex language of the ruling class (Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000; Canovan 1999).

Right-wing populist rhetoric specifically is characterized as antagonistic and prone to exaggerations or “verbal radicalism” (Betz and Immerfall 1998: 2). Populist right parties aim to defend a certain conception of national identity that they believe is threatened (Betz 2003: 196). This precise strategy is “based on the in-group – out-group differentiation, which is very common when people create their own identities. The populists, building upon such behaviour, divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ [...] in the populist vision the world is separated between the ‘pure people’ and ‘corrupted elites’” (Kluhnanská 2014: 47). Wodak et al. (2013: 16, 28, 29) suggest that populist right discourse is “aggressive, exclusionary rhetoric” creating common enemies through the discursive construction of ‘we’ against ‘them’ (cf. Caiani and Parenti 2013). “Within this strategy, the party, as part of the in-group, constructs an image of itself in opposition” to others, may it be the ‘political elites’, immigrants or the EU, and “it is the enemy [...] who stands in the centre of its discourse” (Kluhnanská 2014: 47). This construction of enemies becomes an important aspect of populist right rhetoric. Consequently,
the ‘us’ – ‘them’ or in-group – out-group aspect in populist right rhetoric is complemented by a further characteristic: the element of radical antagonistic speech.

### 3.3 Theoretical Framework

For my theoretical framework, I take up Åhagen and Nilssons’ (2013) notion of *inclusion and confrontation* and combine it with Wodak et al.’s (2013) and Betz and Immerfall’s (1998) characterization of populist right rhetoric. I imagine the two main features of populist right rhetoric we identified in 3.2 and add the two main tendencies identified within the theories of female and male political rhetoric in 3.1 as a layer on top – as a sort of gender lens to my theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Populist Right Rhetoric</th>
<th>Gender Discourse (Female Rhetoric)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) In-group / out-group dichotomization</td>
<td>a) More inclusive language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Radical antagonistic statements</td>
<td>b) Less aggressive formulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[towards out-groups]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I thus, construct the following theory:

*Gender differences in populist right rhetoric go along the populist in-group and out-group differentiation as well as along the line of verbal radicalism of antagonistic speech. Female populist right leader’s rhetoric is prone to more in-group references because women are said to be more compromising, and, encompasses less radical opposing statements because women are inclined to less confrontational rhetoric* (cf. Maltz and Borker 1982; Thelander 1986; Mral 1999; Stephens 2003; Larner 2009; Åhagen and Nilsson 2013).

When taking up the gender differentiation of previous research as female rhetoric utilizing more inclusive language (adapting and identifying with the audience) and applying it to populist right rhetoric the natural conclusion is that within the populist right context of the construction of in-group and out-group dichotomies, it can be hypothesized that female populist right party leaders utilize in-group proclamations (as identifying and including the audience = inclusive) more frequently than the male party leaders. Based on the theory and my research questions, I develop the following two hypotheses to be tested:
H1: Female populist right party leaders utilize in-group references more frequently than the male party leaders

H2: Female populist right leaders use less aggressive or radically formulated antagonistic statements than the male party leaders

The operationalization will be discussed under 4.3. For the mere purpose of illustration, I have constructed a visualization of both hypotheses (Graphic 1).

Hypothesis 1

FPR: Female Populist Right Rhetoric, MPR: Male Populist Right Rhetoric

Graphic 1: Visualization Hypotheses

A1 = Anti-Elite, A2 = Anti-Europeanization/Globalization, A3 = Anti-Immigration/Anti-Islam
L1 = Level 1: Anti-X but not necessarily aggressive phrasing, L2 = Level 2: Anti-X and harsh or aggressive phrasing, L3 = Level 3: Anti-X and very aggressive or radical phrasing

For hypothesis 1: If we take the Gender Discourse theories from above and apply them to populist right rhetoric, this would lead to the female populist right leader’s rhetoric (FPR) being situated more to the top (larger intensity of in-group references) whilst the intensity of out-group references would stay the same in relation to the male populist right leader’s rhetoric. For hypothesis 2: Female populist right leader’s rhetoric (FPR) is expected to show antagonistic statements of lower levels of radical speech, whereas male populist right rhetoric (MPR) would sit more to the right of the graph for higher levels of radical statements – this is a harsh simplification as there were hundreds of coded statements in my analysis and for every party leader each of the fields combining A1-A3 with L1-L3 is possible, yet the hypothesis suggests that female populist right leaders would render less higher coded segments.
4 Research Design and Methods

4.1 Case selection

Case selection is especially important for the reliability of comparative analyses, which is why I elaborate on this with much attentiveness. I have chosen to analyze the rhetoric of leaders of European populist right parties only on national level for two reasons. Firstly, the political systems vary a great deal in their structure and context: the sub-sections of national parties are organized very differently and show varying degrees of representation. Hence, there are many factors causing variation, which, if not taken into account, may bias the results. Secondly, the number of cases would be too large to analyze for this dissertation and the question of a randomized case selection would arise. Setting the analysis onto national level allows for a straightforward case selection: All national populist right parties in Europe that have had female leaders in recent history\(^7\). This leaves us with the three following parties and six party leaders:

1. Marine Le Pen and Jean-Marie Le Pen, *Front National (FN)*, France
2. Pia Kjærgaard and Kristian Thulesen Dahl, *Dansk Folkeparti (DF)*, Denmark
3. Siv Jensen and Carl I. Hagen, *Fremkrittspartiet (FrP)*, Norway

The classification of the French FN as a populist right party is by far the most unchallenged (Mudde 2007; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011). Betz (2003: 196) even refers to the FN as “Western Europe’s most important and most radical right-wing populist party”. I have specifically chosen to refer to the parties as *populist right parties* and not *populist radical right* or *radical right-wing populist* – as they are often labeled – firstly, due to the negative connotation and secondly, not to imply radical rhetoric per se. However, when referring to other scholars the terms will be used interchangeably.

The Danish DF has often been distinguished as a populist right party (Betz 2003; Mudde 2007) although some scholars question the populist character of DF (cf. Givens 2005). Still, Golder (2003) clearly categorized DF as a populist party, and, when closely looking at the DF and its leader’s rhetoric the populist nature becomes evident. Ivarsflaten (2002) understands the DF as “the dominant populist right party in Denmark” (2002: 13) and confirms its populist character through statements of the party’s leader (Ivarsflaten 2002: 44-45). She also
underlines the populist right aspect of DF in comparison to Pia Kjærsgaard’s previous party _Fremskridtspartiet_ (FrP): “combining exclusionism and anti-politics populism with chauvinist, centre-right, rather than resolutely neo-liberal appeals. Rather than being an awkward member of the European radical right family, the DF in 1998 is a prime example of the winning populist right in Western Europe in the 1990s” (Ivarsflaten 2002: 13). This holds true also for the DF of today as my analysis has further reinforced not only its populist right character through the extensive use of anti-Elite, anti-Europe and anti-immigration rhetoric by both its previous and its current leader but also indicates an even higher usage of these for the current leader (see findings for Denmark under section 5.3).

Whilst many scholars describe FrP as a populist right party (Ivarsflaten 2002; Betz 2003) it is evident that the FrP is the least clearly-defined case (an assumption confirmed also by Jungar and Jupskås 2014). Mudde (2007) classifies the Norwegian FrP as a Neo-Populist party whereas Kitschelt and McGann (1995) define it as a new radical right party and Golder (2003) identifies it as a populist party. Mudde (2007) reasons that FrP lacks a consistently nativist appeal and thus cannot be classified as a populist radical right party. Even though FrP does not see itself as a populist right party – it rejects comparison and collaboration with other such parties (Hagelund 2003: 47) – statements of the party leaders doubtlessly legitimize a characterization of FrP as a populist right party:

_B.1: «We are also a protest movement. Against disempowerment, against unjust taxes, against senseless regulations. We are also a grassroots rebellion against a frivolous asylum policy, and sneak-Islamization and a hopeless criminal policy. And we are also dissidents in a political world where there it seems that we are the only ones who question all the established truths of our society. And we are the real alternative to the old parties that have alternated in governing the country for decades.» - Siv Jensen*, Landsmøtetale 2010_10

These three parties are therefore referred to as _populist right parties_ in this paper. The first two cases are the only right-wing populist parties in Europe with current female leaders on national level and I compared their rhetoric to their respective male predecessors’ rhetoric. The case of the DF served as a control case, where the situation is the opposite: a female leader, Pia Kjærgaard, formed the right-wing populist party and was in 2012 replaced by a male, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, as party leader. Without control case the results of the analysis may not be substantial: if the analysis showed that the current (not only female) party leaders’ rhetoric has a higher frequency of in-group references and less radical antagonistic statements
than their predecessors’ this could also indicate a trend for populist leaders’ rhetoric in general to have become more moderate (and not necessarily a gender-specific difference). In taking up the case of the DF I was able to minimize this bias.

4.2 Data

For each of the six party leaders, I analyzed two transcribed\textsuperscript{11} annual party meeting speeches\textsuperscript{12}. Hence, my data consists of twelve speeches in text form with a length of approximately 4000 to 10’000 words per speech. The main criteria for the type of speech to be analyzed was that the speech must be held by the party leader in their role as leader of the populist right party where he/she advances the ideas of the party – i.e. not at an occasion where the speaker may be acting in one of his/her other positions, as for instance Siv Jensen also is Norway’s Finance Minister. The best way to ensure this was to use speeches from the parties’ annual meetings. Another argument in favor of annual party meeting speeches is that these speeches do not take place as a reaction to a certain event (e.g. Charlie Hebdo), which might render them more radical in varying degrees depending on the nature of the event and thus, less comparable. And lastly, an annual party meeting does not address only one specific topic which could make comparison difficult, rather these speeches are held in front of their old and new members, giving an overview over the achievements of the past year, as well as important issues and the party’s goals for the future. By that, these speeches should contain a good amount of populist rhetoric along the line of in-group and out-group as well as confronting speech in form of anti-Elite attacks for example.

For the case of France’s Front National, I compared the rhetoric in Marine Le Pen's speeches (discours congrès et de UDC du FN) in 2011 and 2012 to Jean-Marie Le Pen’s in 1999 and 2007. For Denmark, I compared the rhetoric in Pia Kjærsgaard's speeches from the annual party meetings (årsmødetale) in 2007 and 2009 to Kristian Thulesen Dahl’s speeches from 2013 and 2014. For Norway’s Fremskrittspartiet, I analyzed the rhetorical differences in Siv Jensen’s speeches from the annual party meeting in 2009 and 2010 with Carl I. Hagen's speeches in 1984 and 1988 (landsmøtetale).
The speeches are all in their respective original languages because it proved impossible to obtain officially to English translated (annual party meeting) speeches as the authorities do not conduct such translations. Analyzing speeches in original language allows to stay very close to the original wording and takes into account language-specific phrasing and terminology that may otherwise get lost through translation. For reasons of accuracy, I enlisted the assistance of several native speakers and language experts. Nevertheless, even in their original languages accessibility to transcribed speeches was limited\textsuperscript{13}. For the case of DF the speeches stem from the party’s official webpage\textsuperscript{14}. For the other parties, official transcripts are not available. In the case of Norway, the speeches were retrieved from the online research database: Virksomme Ord\textsuperscript{15}. The Le Pen’s annual party meeting speeches are not publicly accessible but I was recommended to analyze \textit{les Discours du Congrès du FN} and \textit{des Universités d’Été (UDT) du FN}\textsuperscript{16} instead, which in their content, length and audience are very similar to annual party speeches, and publicly accessible. Accordingly, my main criteria for the choice of the type of speeches are still adhered to. I consequently have chosen one speech from the \textit{Congrès du FN} and one from the \textit{UDT} for each French party leader. Marine Le Pen’s speeches stem from her official website\textsuperscript{17}, whereas Jean-Marie’s speeches were retrieved from the French Legal Information and Administration Department\textsuperscript{18}.

The speeches cover a time frame of 30 years, ranging from 1984 until 2014 in order to allow a maximal time span between the speeches of each party leader and capture the rhetoric in changing circumstances. The speeches were thus chosen to ensure a maximum difference of years per speaker although the scarce accessibility of the data narrowed down the time periods\textsuperscript{19}. Due to the restricted availability, and because of the time-consuming procedure of coding by hand, I decided on a total number of two\textsuperscript{20} speeches per person.

\textbf{4.3 Methods and Operationalization}

A comparative design was employed and the comparison conducted in two stages. As a primary comparison, the rhetoric of the male and female populist right party leaders within each party was compared. Secondly, the results from the primary comparison were confronted with the results of the different cases, i.e. the results of the three parties within their country-specific context were opposed to one another in order to reveal whether there is a general trend for all countries analyzed.
The methods applied are a linguistic text analysis (LTA) (Fairclough 1992; Mehl 2006) and a directed approach to qualitative content analysis (Krippendorff 1980; Mayring 2000; Hsiu-Fang and Shannon 2005). Fairclough (1992: 194) understands text (or textual) analysis as to primarily focus on the form, the “texture”, instead of the content of a text, which prevails in the broader qualitative content analysis. “Two types of textual analysis are distinguished: linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis” (Fairclough 1992: 193). Whereas intertextual analyses show how texts selectively draw upon social circumstances, LTA draw upon linguistic systems (Fairclough 1992: 194)21. Hsiu-Fang and Shannon (2005: 1277) agree that text analysis has a strong focus on the text itself whilst content analysis is used to construe meaning from the content of the data often through certain communication-analysis models. Along this line, Krippendorff (1969: 103) describes "content analysis as the use of a replicable and valid method for making specific inferences from text to other states or properties of its source". Hsiu-Fang and Shannon (2005: 1277) give a useful overview over three distinct approaches within qualitative content analysis: “rather than being a single method, current applications of content analysis show three distinct approaches: conventional, directed, or summative [...] In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived directly from the text data. With a directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant research findings as guidance for initial codes. A summative content analysis involves counting and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying context.”

Based on my theory, gender differences in populist right rhetoric were analyzed around the in-group and out-group aspect and verbal radicalism. To test my first hypothesis (H1), the frequency of in-group references was measured. To test my second hypothesis (H2) the level of radicalism in antagonistic statements was measured. I only measured in-group (and not out-group) references for a number of reasons. In order to facilitate the reading flow and maintain a clear overview over the approach, and because of its relevance mostly for the replication of this study, a discussion of these reasons may be found in Appendix E.

The operationalization is as follows:

a) In-group references: Qualitative Text Analysis → Linguistic approach → Sociolinguistic criteria

b) Radical antagonisms: Qualitative Content Analysis → Directed approach → Codes assigned to text segments in the following categories:
I. Anti-Elite

II. Anti-Europeanization/ Globalization

III. Anti-Immigration/ Anti-Islam

In order to measure a) *in-group references* in the speeches a deductive approach of qualitative text analysis\(^22\) (Fairclough 1992; Mehl 2006) was chosen. The procedure was two-stepped: in a first round a catalogue of sociolinguistic criteria for inclusive rhetoric was formed to measure in-group references, whereas the second round comprised of the determination of frequency (word count) in the Qualitative Data Analysis software: WordStat. The catalogue is based on Larner’s (2009: 58) sociolinguistic criteria model where she measures inclusive and exclusive pronouns. I have complemented the catalogue with a further criterion: inclusive (and exclusive) adjectives and adverbs\(^23\). A scheme of the sociolinguistic criteria for each language may be found in Appendix A. As the lengths of the speeches varied, the word counts per person were divided into the total of words of both speeches per person (relative frequency), and normalized to an average of 10'000 words to permit comparison between the different speakers\(^24\) (cf. Larner 2009: 35).

To measure b) the *intensity of radically formulated antagonistic statements*, I have chosen the directed approach of qualitative content analysis according to Hsiu-Fang and Shannon (2005: 1281-1283). In text analysis, the focus already lies with linguistic and rhetorical aspects but as confrontational speech cannot simply be measured without looking at its actual content and context a directed approach of qualitative content analysis was employed. For the operationalization of confrontational speech, the choice of words becomes salient reflecting the speaker’s rhetoric (Åhagen and Nilsson 2013: 22). The speeches were thus deductively\(^25\) coded by hand measuring the respective party leader’s oppositional stance towards the Elite, Europeanization/globalization and Immigration\(^26\). To measure *antagonistic rhetoric*, statements in the speeches were coded into the categories: Anti-Elite, Anti-Europeanization or Anti-Immigration, and to measure their *intensity of radicalism* subsequently coded with levels ranging from 1-3; 3 being the most radical or aggressive stance. The coding and code analyses were conducted in the software QDAMiner. The codes are intended to capture a certain antagonistic statement and therefore mostly comprised of several consecutive sentences with a fixed maximum of five sentences and the possibility of a code only encompassing part of a sentence. Codes of different categories may overlap or partly overlap
due to their content, not however be coded different levels within the same category, as a segment cannot at the same time be Anti-Immigration Level 2 as well as Level 3. To measure the levels the codes were weighed from 1 to 3 as follows:

Level 1: Anti-X but not necessarily aggressive  
Level 2: Anti-X and harsh or aggressive phrasing  
Level 3: Anti-X and very aggressive or radical phrasing  

The three categories have been chosen according to the theories in populist right rhetoric discussed under section 3, which denominate them as the salient topics. Based upon the characterization of populist rhetoric as centered around hostility towards the ruling Elite (Mudde 2007; Taggart 2000; Abts and Rumens 2007: 407; Canovan 1999), opposition towards the establishment and the political elites as enemies play a central role in the discourse of these parties (Kluknavská 2014: 47). Therefore, the first category is Anti-Elite rhetoric. Bornschier (2008: 1) argues that populist right parties mobilize largely on the cultural dimension of conflict. He states “right-wing populist parties’ discourse now centres on three convictions. They claim, first, that traditional norms based on common understanding stand over abstract universalistic principles, and second, that multicultural society destroys the ‘organically grown’ national community, and thus dilutes those traditional norms. Thirdly, they insist on the primacy of politics, in that majority decisions taken within a political community stand above universalistic normative principles and decisions taken by supranational political authorities such as the European Union” (Bornschier 2008: 2). The underlying notion of these three convictions is the threat to national identity, the traditions, values, language etc. of the national communities. What threatens these are: immigration (“multicultural society”) and Europeanization/globalization (“supra-national authorities” and the EU). Following this, the other two categories are defined as the following: Anti-Immigration27 and Anti-Europeanization/Globalization rhetoric. These three categories have also proven to be the salient issues in an analysis of electoral speeches of Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen (Ballet* 2013: 11):
insisting sometimes on economic issues, sometimes on the security of France, depending on the relevance of these issues in the election campaign.” (Author’s highlighting and comments in brackets)

Ultimately, the choice of categories is supported by my own results. In all speeches, virtually every antagonizing statement concerned one of the three categories\textsuperscript{28}. 

5 Findings

The overall findings partially support our hypotheses. The speeches in all three cases revealed much more radical antagonistic rhetoric for the male leaders, whilst the sociolinguistic criteria showed more in-group references for female leaders in one of the three cases. Female populist right rhetoric in the speeches analyzed has thus proven to be less antagonistic (H₂) but not necessarily more inclusive (H₁) than the rhetoric of their male counterparts.

The results may either be given in effective word or code frequency, or normalized to a number of 10’000 words. Detailed tables with the effective as well as normalized frequencies and additional graphs may be found in the appendices under section 8.

5.1 Findings France

Sociolinguistic Criteria

The text analysis revealed that Marine uses a lot more inclusive pronouns as well as more inclusive adjectives and adverbs in her speeches. Even when we normalize the results, the female leader’s speeches within FN render a much higher frequency of inclusive pronouns and slightly more inclusive adjectives and adverbs (see graph 1). The results of the sociolinguistic criteria in the context of the FN therefore corroborate the first hypothesis (H₁).

Graph 1: Bar Chart Inclusive Pronouns, Adjectives and Adverbs France Normalized
An analysis of the different specific pronouns, adjectives and adverbs that were counted as well as more detailed graphs may be found under Appendix C. A discussion of the implications of the findings follows under section 5.4.

Coding

There is clear evidence that Jean-Marie uses much more aggressive antagonistic rhetoric in the speeches analyzed. Graph 2 shows that Jean-Marie’s speeches contained considerably more Level 2 and 3 coded segments for all three categories.

![Bar Chart](image)

**Graph 2: Bar Chart Code Count Confronting Rhetoric France Normalized**

The frequency for Level 1 coded segments is very similar for both speakers, with Anti-Elite and Anti-Europeanization Level 1 codes occurring slightly more often in Marine’s speeches. As defined under section 4.3, Level 1 denominates anti-X but not necessarily aggressive rhetoric. Thus, the findings concerning radical antagonistic speech for the FN in France support the second hypothesis (H2).

To illustrate this we look at the following segments. The first sentence has been coded Anti-Elite Level 3 as well as Anti-Europeanization Level 3:
Jean-Marie’s statement reveals a very antagonistic and aggressive rhetoric in his critique of the government’s policies through his choice of words: strong negative and antagonistic words as the ones marked bold. When we compare this to the following text segment from Marine’s speech coded Anti-Elite Level 2 and Anti-Immigration Level 2:

E.2: «You, President of the Republic, you put your footsteps in those of your predecessor, continuing mass immigration, incompatible with our national identity!» –Marine Le Pen*, Université d’été 2012

we find that this statement is confrontational as well, yet, the specific wording is not as aggressive as in Jean-Marie’s speech above.

The clearest gender difference in graph 2 occurs within the Anti-Europeanization Level 3 category. Jean-Marie’s speeches yielded more than seven times the number of codes in this category of Marine’s speeches. Examples for Jean-Marie’s strong antagonistic and aggressive anti-Europe rhetoric may be found en masse:

E.3: «We must boldly fight the Europe of Brussels and disengage France, with the growing support of all its victims. Europe is killing France and all historical Nations of its continent. After this path, there is only servitude and war.» –Jean-Marie Le Pen*, Université d’été 1999

E.4: «the New World Order, the programmed destruction of nations, the establishment of a totalitarian democracy, the most hypocritical form of tyrannies.» –Jean-Marie Le Pen*, Université d’été 1999

E.5: «Some try to remove the historic nations of Europe in the crucible of a federal Europe. France has everything to lose on this path, which inevitably leads to the loss of its sovereignty, its independence, its culture and its language, freedoms, security and well-being of its people. There must be a clear break with this policy of death and the necessary cooperation of the peoples of Europe must be organized from the nations.» - Jean-Marie Le Pen*, Université d’été 1999

To sum up, both hypothesis were corroborated in the case of FN in France: the findings concerning in-group references (H1) as well as antagonistic speech (H2).
5.2 Findings Norway

Sociolinguistic Criteria

Even though the results rendered slightly more inclusive terms in Siv’s speeches, when normalized Carl obtained a higher frequency of inclusive pronouns and a minimally higher number of adjectives and adverbs (graph 3). Graphs showing which words from the sociolinguistic catalogue occurred may be found in Appendix C.

![Graph 3: Bar Chart Inclusive Pronouns, Adjectives and Adverbs Norway Normalized](image)

In effect, the results of the sociolinguistic criteria do not support the first hypothesis (H₁) – not primarily because they point in the opposite direction as our hypothesis but because the differences between the genders are insignificant.

Coding

The coding results on the other hand support the hypothesis (H₂). Graph 4 displays that Carl in general uses more antagonistic phrasing in the speeches analyzed. In the categories of Anti-Elite and Anti-Europeanization, Carl shows more radical confronting rhetoric especially in the former category where Level 3 codes even reach a more than 4 times higher frequency than in Siv’s speeches. There are very few codes within the categories of Anti-Europeanization and Anti-Immigration as these topics are not dominant in the Norwegian speeches – this however will be discussed in detail in the cross-country comparison under section 5.4. Even though
Anti-Immigration rhetoric is rare, it is noteworthy that Siv’s speeches have rendered more codes on all three levels of this category. This is an interesting finding, and its implications will be discussed below.

Effectively, since Carl’s speeches rendered more than the double frequency of Anti-Elite-coded segments and a four times higher frequency of Level 3 codes within this category and thus, we can conclude that Siv’s rhetoric at least concerning the prevailing topic in all four speeches is much less confronting and aggressive than Carl’s.

To exemplify, one of the many Level 3-coded Anti-Elite segments from Carl follows:

> E.6: «This ruling class who has stolen from state pensioners, defrauded by the government and disappointed war pensioners. An elite that is growing with ever more top paid politicians in municipalities and counties. Which lets its people burn, but allows itself go unpunished. It is this ruling class that the Progress Party will fight!» – Carl I. Hagen*, Landsmøtetale 1988

In contrast, the following confronting statement from Siv with very similar content was coded Level 2 Anti-Elite:
E.7: «The Progress Party will remove this unreasonable curtailment, this theft, simply because they live together and are married. The Progress Party will increase the minimum pension because we believe it is fair for people to live their old age without having to count every penny as this couple does. And we will preserve the existing pension system, because we believe that they are about to commit another robbery on future retirees.» - Siv Jensen*, Landsmøtetale 2009

These examples demonstrate that the content itself is not sufficient but rather the choice of words and context determine whether one statement can be considered as more radically antagonistic than another. Comparing the two segments we can easily see that Carl utilizes a much greater amount of expressions that have an ironic or sarcastic undertone (implied mock or taunt), or denote an very aggressive or radical stance towards the establishment and its politics.

I have also marked the pronoun we to highlight its use as a sociolinguistic indicator for in-group references. Siv uses we in this segment as pronoun representing the Progress Party, whilst Carl does not use the pronoun but instead the Progress Party in 3rd person singular. However, as the analysis from above has shown even though Siv’s speeches contained an effectively higher count of inclusive pronouns, adjectives and adverbs, the normalized results revealed a higher frequency for Carl.

In summary, the analyzed speeches render results for the sociolinguistic criteria that do not corroborate the first hypothesis (H) for the FrP whereas the coding results support the its hypothesis (H) in the context of the Norwegian FrP.

5.3 Findings Denmark

Socio-Linguistic Criteria

In total words, Pia clearly uses a larger number of inclusive pronouns. Relative to the number of words in her speeches however, she only barely uses more inclusive pronouns than Kristian (graph 5). Similar results were obtained concerning inclusive adjectives and adverbs. Whereas Pia reveals a higher frequency of in-group terms in this category, when normalized the frequency is the same for both party leaders. Hence, the results of the sociolinguistic criteria for DF are not significant and consequently, the differences cannot be sufficiently adhered to the difference in gender. H is thus not corroborated in the Danish case.
Coding

The results of the coding on the other hand are much more apparent. Kristian clearly uses more aggressive wording whilst Pia’s rhetoric is less radically antagonistic. This corroborates our hypothesis ($H_2$).
Graph 6 reveals that Kristian has a much stronger negative stance in all three categories. Level 1 coded segments do not show much variance in their occurrence between the genders: Anti-Elite and Anti-Europeanization Level 1 occur slightly more often in Kristian’s rhetoric whilst one Anti-Immigration Level 1 coded segment more can be found in Pia’s speeches compared to Kristian’s. Quite striking is that the number of Level 2 and 3 codes occur much more often in Kristian’s rhetoric, often three or four times as often. Since according to our definition of the levels, Level 2 denotes an aggressive stance and Level 3 designates very aggressive rhetoric, we can state that Kristian’s rhetoric is a lot more radically antagonistic and confronting than Pia’s is. As an example for Kristian’s very strong antagonistic and aggressive rhetoric, and to show the difference between Level 1, 2 and 3 Anti-Immigration coding we will look at the following segments:

E.8: «Similarly, we shall not endure that there are people in Denmark, who set out for the holy war. Side with the enemy. This is where we have to start. This should actually have happened long ago. [Level 3] We must focus on the core of the problem. And this means, that we ensure that the people who come to Denmark can and will make a positive difference. And this also means, that we ensure that such a number of people can come to Denmark, that it is actually possible to integrate them. [Level 1] It is crucial that we avoid importing the world’s conflicts into the Danish streets. [Level 2] » - Kristian Thulesen Dahl*, Årsmødetale 2014

Between the first four sentences coded Level 3 Anti-Immigration and the Level 1 segments a clear change happens in the speaker’s rhetoric. From making strong accusations with aggressively connoted words such as holy war and enemy, to an entirely different tone: Kristian still makes it clear that immigration is a problem for him but also uses positive and hopeful formulations such as positive difference and possible to integrate. The transition between Level 1 and Level 2 segments then again is less rough as Kristian maintains a reasoning tone avoid, yet including somewhat more radical antagonistic phrases such as importing the world’s conflicts.

Similarly, in the following example the transition between Level 2 and 3 should become clear to the reader:

E:9: «Denmark is in fact, in all likelihood, going to war again. We have agreed to join the coalition against the so-called Islamic State - a terrible, barbaric and literally lethal bunch of terrorists and murderers. Recently we hear from Norway and Australia that there have been plans to murder innocent people in their homes and on the open street. Murdering innocent people in order to spread terror. It is such
The sentence in bold characters is coded Level 2 Anti-Immigration whereas the rest is coded Level 3. To take up a comparison we can look at the following excerpt from one of Pia’s speeches coded Anti-Elite Level 1:

E.10: «Many of the statements that come - especially from the Social Democrats and the parties they can count on for support - but certainly also from the government, do not quite seem as if they come from the heart. And unfortunately, neither from the head. Maybe it is just some spin doctors, who have been at work here??» - Pia Kjærsgaard*, Årsmødetale 2009

Pia’s choice of words makes her critique sound almost friendly. Relative qualifiers such as quite and adverbials that lament rather than reproach such as unfortunately as well as the use of questions instead of exclamations render her rhetoric less aggressive and antagonistic than Kristian’s in the following Anti-Elite Level 3 coded statement:

E.11: «And we are not SF [Socialist People’s Party] - we do not sell our values and the family silver for some ministerial cars!» - Kristian Thulesen Dahl*, Årsmødetale 2013

In this segment we once again see how important not only choice of words and linguistic aspects are but also the significance of the context. If I say to my father: “You are selling our family silver for a car!” this is a powerful accusation but if I take this to the political context and a party leader states this about the current government the implications it provokes for voters may be extensive: “Your government is spending the taxes you pay for their personal luxury”.

To sum up the results in gender differences within the DF, we can conclude that the evidence of the sociolinguistic criteria is not as clear, and we therefore cannot confirm that gender differences along the line of in-group references exist in the context of the Danish Populist Right and our H₁ is not validated. The findings of the code-analysis however, support the its hypothesis (H₂): The female speeches include less radically antagonistic statements within the DF.

5.4 Cross-Country Comparison and Implications

The Sociolinguistic criteria in all countries revealed a great number of inclusive pronouns, and very few adjectives and adverbs. Naturally, pronouns occur very frequently due to
grammatical rules: pronouns are bound to occur in most sentences, since each sentence calls for subject and object and often these are people. The fact that only few adjectives and adverbs of the entire catalogue occurred could be due to the translation of the words in the catalogue – where not all synonyms and variations that exist and were listed are commonly used in spoken language. Also, one could consider extending the catalogue with an inductive approach. The most frequent pronouns, adjectives, and adverbs were mostly the same across the different countries³⁴. This shows a preference for these words but does not necessarily entail that this is a populist right characteristic; rather it may be linguistically explained.

Effectively however, the results of the sociolinguistic criteria imply that gender differences in populist rhetoric likely do not run along the line of in-group references. Åhagen and Nilsson’s (2013: 29) results showed that neither in the context of the UNGA gender differences occurred along this dimension.

The results of the coding revealed many cross-country similarities but also some interesting variations which shall be explained in the following.

In comparison to the other countries, France showed an overall higher frequency of coded segments. Firstly, as both speakers of FN used more antagonistic speech than the other party leaders this could be a language- and culture-specific symptom: French people may in general have a “southern temperament” whilst the four Scandinavian speakers may have a more Nordic and calm way of communication³⁵. Although this may be difficult, it would be interesting to conduct a study taking up theories of specific cultural communication-styles. Secondly, this implies that within the FN and the specific speaker’s rhetoric, these three categories of populist rhetoric are much more salient, which could indicate that the FN indeed is a – if not the – prime example of a populist right party. This is reinforced through the quite unchallenged classification of FN as populist right.

Denmark’s results specifically showed fewer Anti-Europeanization coded segments but more anti-immigration rhetoric than France. An explanation for the higher Anti-Immigration code occurrence could be a bias through the dates of the speeches analyzed: Kristian showed the greatest number of anti-immigration rhetoric and his speeches were the most current ones (2014, 2013) closely followed by Marine’s (2011, 2012). In general, both DF and FN speeches did not date back very long³⁶. Effectively, the rise of the IS³⁷ and cases of Europeans going to Syria, as well as such coming back and their supposed connection to terrorism, are factors that
may have influenced their rhetoric. Fewer anti-Europe codes in the Danish speeches could be explained due to the fact that Denmark does not have the Euro. In the French cases, the Euro was a frequently occurring issue of anti-European critique. A further factor could be that Jean-Marie’s speeches comprised of many anti-globalization statements, not only against the EU but often also against supra national constructs and the USA, as a superpower, controlling the rest of the world. An example is the following:

E.12:«We do not have to participate in any religious or political war against Iran. The unconditional alignment policy on Washington is not in the interests of France, and in addition, seriously jeopardizes world peace, dear comrades, and we must not cease to denounce it.» – Jean-Marie Le Pen*, Congrès du FN 2007

Lastly, the Norwegian speeches showed an impressive amount of anti-Elite rhetoric but compared to the results of the two other countries a distinctively fewer amount of Anti-Europeanization and Anti-Immigration codes. Less anti-Europeanization rhetoric can easily be explained due to Norway not being an EU member and therefore not as prone to restrictions and loss of decision-making power to the EU-apparatus. Less anti-immigration rhetoric could possibly be influenced by FrP not wanting to be connected to the Breivik-Massacre in 2011. Breivik himself claimed to have been active member of the FrP and a function in the party’s youth organization (Langset 2011). This however, does not explain why Siv’s speeches rendered more anti-immigration rhetoric than Carl, whose speeches date back long before the massacre. A more convincing argument however, is the fact that the classification of FrP as populist right party is so highly contested (as argued in the data selection). The FrP’s market-liberal stance was very clear in the speeches of both Siv and Carl, who focusing through large parts of their speeches on economic issues and developments. This is complemented by the fact that FrP is part of the current government and Siv being Norway’s Finance Minister. The FrP’s populist character appears less questionable than its extreme-right position as our analysis has shown such a high frequency of anti-Elite rhetoric. This is also argued by Nome (2013).

In all three cases however, the total number of antagonistic coded statements found in the speeches of the male party leader was nearly exactly three times the total amount of codes in the respective female leader’s speeches. Even more important for the corroborations of the second hypothesis (H2) is the fact, that the Level 2, and especially Level 3 codes in all cases analyzed were a lot higher in the male speeches compared to the female speeches of each
party. Graphs 7-9 show the frequency of Level 3 codes for each country, graphs with Level 2 and 3 codes may be found in Appendix C.

Graph 7: Bar Chart Level 3 Confronting Rhetoric France Normalized

Graph 8: Bar Chart Level 3 Confronting Rhetoric Norway Normalized
5.5 Reflections on Scientific Value

To allow for maximum scientific value and reliability I have carefully adhered to the four principal standards of qualitative research: credibility, dependability, confirmability and transferability (Fathalla 2004: 116-118). Several limitations and potentials of this study however remain to be discussed.

Firstly, transferability is generally difficult within QDA (Fathalla 2004: 117). I have chosen to conduct the main comparison within the same party and national context, and to then compare the results of gender differences between populist right parties of different countries on national levels where the results are better comparable than on sub-national levels. Naturally, one cannot infer from two sole speeches that the rhetoric of a party leader is less confronting in all situations. Research projects of a larger scope in the future may attempt to make inferences through analyzing a more extensive amount of speeches, providing not only a larger quantity of data but also more variety by including different types of speeches as well as other material such as tv and radio interviews. Alduy and Wahnich’s (2015) project is a first step in this direction and their conclusion that Marine Le Pen’s rhetoric is much less
aggressive than her father’s reflect my findings providing evidence which goes far beyond my results. Nonetheless, the cross-country comparison is the most interesting aspect and it would have been desirable to allocate a larger number of country cases. Future research could consider analyzing female populist right leaders’ rhetoric on sub-national party level for instance. Then again, comparison becomes difficult due to the differing structural and contextual aspects of sub-national party-sections. Once more female populist right party leaders emerge, the transferability may be tested. I am however positive that inferences can be made to other national, as well as sub-national populist parties in Europe, although I have doubts about any generalizations that go beyond this continent (mainly due to the political landscape and structures in which European populist right parties are embedded). Whether this holds true, remains to be seen.

Secondly, the limited availability of speeches and restriction on the time frame may have had an effect on the results. Both speeches from Carl I. Hagen for instance stem from the 1980s. It could be that, his rhetoric had changed since then and towards the end of his party leadership in 2006, his rhetoric had drastically become less antagonistic. Similarly, the fact that Marine Le Pen and Kristian Thulesen Dahl have only been in office for a couple of years at the time of writing this dissertation does not enable us to make statements on whether gender differences in populist right rhetoric are changeable over time. Assumptions in this direction are tempting and it would be utterly interesting to conduct an analysis that explores the rigidity of gender differences in populist right rhetoric over time. Yet, such an analysis may have to wait for the female leaders (or in the case of DF the male comparand) to have been in power for a good number of years.

Another potential source for bias is the “observer bias” which is hard to eliminate in Qualitative Data Analysis (Fathalla 2004: 17). It is inevitable to have certain preconceptions, experiences although I have tried to keep these to a minimum by taking the following step. I have undertaken the coding of the speeches “blindly” that is without knowing who the speaker was. Due to the different languages, this was not possible between the countries - yet, this should not have affected my coding as my aim was to reveal gender differences and not differences between the parties. Sometimes the content of the speech gave hints to
whether it was the male or female leader’s speech (for instance a certain date or person) and therefore this bias could not be entirely eliminated.

Lastly, in order to measure antagonistic rhetoric I had originally conducted a co-occurrence analysis of specific terms such as *elite* with antagonistic attributes. The results of this immense analysis however rendered unsatisfactory results: there were zero to two co-occurrences per speech. Most of the actual antagonistic rhetoric was lost due to the deductive linguistic approach and the aim to provide reliability through very close translations. I decided instead, to code the speeches by hand to ensure that such language-specific elements could be captured. By recognizing the limitations of this approach and considering a new approach for the measurement of confronting speech, I admitted to myself this flawed logic and continued with full dedication to rectify this error.

6 Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to discover whether gender differences in populist right rhetoric exist and along which lines they may go. The results of the analysis have shown that such differences do exist. The main contribution of this work is the development of a theory that aims to explain along which lines gender differences in populist right rhetoric run. The hypotheses focused on female populist right party leaders’ rhetoric due to its practical implications, and the findings revealed that female populist right rhetoric indeed is less radically antagonistic in the speeches analyzed but also indicated that gender differences may not run along the line of in-group and out-group populist dichotomization. Further studies could therefore refine and complement this novel theory by exploring other possible aspects and testing its transferability.

The control case of DF, with a male leader and female predecessor, revealed that there may not necessarily be a general trend towards populist right rhetoric becoming less confronting. The findings suggesting that female populist right party leaders employ a less antagonizing and aggressive rhetoric which could be a possible explanation for the growing popular appeal of these parties in Europe, which in turn can serve as subject for further investigations. Petö (2014: 79), who has studied the behavior of female populist leaders in Europe for years, is
confident that these female leaders “are actually changing the face of far-right activism”. Another important implication is that: “Far-right parties have made use of gender politics to bring their narrative on other issues into mainstream conservative discourse” (Petö 2014: 79). Betz and Meret (2009) and Mayer et. al (2014) have shown how these parties have (re-)framed their rhetoric as to defending fundamental liberal values and women’s right to legitimate anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric. The results of my study imply that female leaders use less radical antagonistic rhetoric and could therefore be more successful and credible in this reframing. The findings may therefore also suggest that populist right parties may consider appointing female leaders as a means of increasing their votes. My study can provide a significant contribution to Political Science research, addressing the gap in literature between gendered and populist right discourse. Such research becomes especially relevant because the increasing success of populist right parties seems to alarm a growing number of people: “The emergence of racist feminism advocated by the far right is a serious challenge for progressive politics” (Petö 2014: 79). The possible instrumental use of female leaders in right-wing populism may not only open up a new dimension in Political Science research but also has the potential to change the political landscape. “Stanford scholar Cécile Alduy says Le Pen’s success at the helm of France’s right-wing National Front can be attributed to a combination of sophisticated rebranding and skillfully crafted moderate rhetoric that sells a conservative agenda that borders on extreme” (Wilcox 2015).

Yet, this study only represents a first step in exploring what gender differences in populist right rhetoric exist. The implications of my findings produce numerous interesting questions such as: Do populist right parties appoint female leaders in order to increase their popular appeal? To which extend is the specific rhetoric consciously applied? Are there culture-specific differences in the rhetoric? The attempt to answer such questions shall be a challenge for future research, especially given the every-growing salience of populist right parties.
7 Bibliography

7.1 Primary Sources

[all online sources last accessed: 30.05.2017]


Pia Kjærgaard Årsmødetale 2007: www.danskfolkeparti.dk/pictures_org/PiaKj%C3%A6rgaard2007.doc

Pia Kjærgaard Årsmødetale 2009: www.danskfolkeparti.dk/pictures_org/Pia%20Kj%C3%A6rgaard%20%C3%85rsm%C3%88detale%202009.doc

Kristian Thulesen Dahl Årsmødetale 2013: http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/pictures_org/Kristian_%C3%A5rsm%C3%B8detale_2013.pdf


Siv Jensen Landsmødetale 2010: http://virksommeord.uib.no/taler?id=8561

7.2 Secondary Sources


Endnotes

1 In this paper the party’s names are used in their original language and mostly the abbreviations.

2 Akkerman and Hagelund (2007) conducted a similar study in Norway and the Netherlands.
3 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights.
5 See how under section 4.2 Data.
6 With “populist” the author denotes populist right.
7 The time frame is discussed at the end of this section.
8 Code occurrences are nearly as frequent in the Danish speeches as they are in the French speeches.
9 More examples can be found under section 5.2.
10 A * indicates author of this dissertation’s translation into English. The text in original language may be found in the appendix under the given labeling.
11 Even though with transcripts we cannot take into account the speakers tone and how the different words were verbally emphasized, “the lack of any theoretical groundwork in regards to those factors [...] justifies the transcribed speeches as the source data” (Åhagen and Nilsson 2013: 21).
12 Or similar (see the case of France below)
13 See appendix for further information the availability of the data.
14 http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/ See section 7.1 for the specific sources to each speech.
15 http://virkosmomeord.uib.no/ - an online database of two scholars that have put together a notable amount of transcribed speeches of Norwegian politicians; recommended by Anders Ruvik Jupskås, a Political Science Associate Professor at the University of Oslo and major name within the Network for Nordic Populism.
16 Suggested by Cécile Alduy (co-author of: Alduy and Wahнич 2015) as these are the Party Meetings and the Party Meeting for the young section (FNJ) at their annual “summer university”.
17 http://www.marinelepen.fr/
18 http://www.vie-publique.fr/information/politique-accessibilite.html
19 The potential bias this may raise is discussed in the conclusion.
20 Likewise the discussion of a possible bias may be found in the conclusion.
21 A frame analysis therefore is not applied as the linguistic aspects of speech are central to my analysis (cf. Larner 2009; Åhagen and Nilsson 2013).
22 It can also be argued as what Hsiu-Fang and Shannon (2005: 1283-1285) call the summative approach of qualitative content analysis (QCA). “In a summative approach to qualitative content analysis, data analysis begins with searches for occurrences of the identified words by hand or by computer. Word frequency counts for each identified term are calculated, with source or speaker also identified” (Hsiu-Fang and Shannon: 1285). Yet, the analysis strongly focusses on linguistic aspects, and in order to prevent bias coding was conducted blindly.
23 For a detailed discussion on why the results of out-group terms were excluded see Appendix E
24 As the total number of words analyzed per speaker revolves around this number. The same procedure was followed for the normalization of the results of the QCA.
25 The approach is argued as deductive by Hsiu-Fang and Shannon (2005: 1281) for “the theory or prior research used will guide the discussion of findings” (p. 1283), a claim also supported by (Mayring 2000).
26 A discussion of why these topics where chosen follows shortly.
27 Anti-immigration codes may include anti-Islam rhetoric as many populist right parties in Europe see Islam in their countries as a serious threat to their culture and national identity.
28 In the speeches of the Norwegian politicians, Anti-immigration and Anti-Europeanization rhetoric was very little. This has to do with the fact that the speeches had a very pragmatic stance and much of the content concerned economic factors – this will however be discussed with the contextual factors under section 5.4 in the cross-country comparison).
29 The segments in their original language may be found in Appendix C.
30 Bold characters in these excerpts are made by the author of the dissertation.
31 Bold characters.
32 Italic.
33 Author’s comments in brackets.
34 See Appendix C for a detailed discussion.
35 Åhagen and Nilsson (2013: 6) theorize that there are different rhetorical styles for different cultures; Sweden’s political rhetoric for instance is characterized through its culture of “peacekeeping, consensus seeking and collective concern”.
36 This bias is discussed in the conclusion.
37 Also ISIS denotes the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant wishing to establish an Islamic Caliphate.
38 According to Kluknavská (2014:47) the main element of populist rhetoric.
### 8 Appendices

#### 8.1 Appendix A: Sociolinguistic Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Norwegian</th>
<th>Danish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive Pronouns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Each other, our, ours, ourselves, us, we</td>
<td>l’un l’autre, les uns les autres, notre, nos, nous, nous-mêmes, nôtres, on</td>
<td>hverandre, oss, oss selv, vi, vår, våre</td>
<td>hinanden, os, os selv, vi, vor, vores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive adjectives/adverbs</td>
<td>assimilé, cohésif, cohésive, collectif, collective, collectivement, combiné, combinée, conjoint, conjointe, conjointement, conjugué, ensemble, inclue, inclus incorporé, interracial, intégré, multicultural, multiethnique, multilingue, mutuellement, plurilingue, polyglotte, réciproquement, tolerant, tous, uni, unie, Unifié</td>
<td>all, alle, alt, assimilert, enhetlig, felles, flerkulturel, flerspråklig, forenet, forent, forente, gjensidig, hver som helst, inkludert, innlemmet, integrert, i sin helhet, kollektiv, kollektivt, kombinert, mottagelig, mottakelig, multi-etnisk, multi-lingual, samlet, sammen, sammenhængende, tilpasset, utadvendt, veksel</td>
<td>al, alle, alt, assimileret, flersproget, forenet, forenet, fælles, gensidigt, i fællesskab, indarbejdet, inkluderet, integreret, kollektiv, combineret, ligestillet, multietnisk, multikulturelt, multisproget, samlet, sammen, sammenhængende, tilpasset, udadvendt, åben</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>→ there need to be the stop words: not, never, hardly;</td>
<td></td>
<td>→ stopwords: ikke, aldrig, næppe, ej, dårlig nok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2 Appendix B: Original Language Text Passages

B.1: «Vi er også et grasrotopprør mot en løssluppen asylpolitikk, og snikislamisering og en håpløs kriminalpolitikk. Og vi er også systemkritikere i en politisk verden hvor det bare er vi som synes å stille noen spørsmål ved alle de etablerte sannhetene i vårt samfunn. Og vi er det reelle alternativet til de gamle partiene som har vekslet på å styre landet i årtier.» - Siv Jensen, Landsmøtetale 2010, p. 11.


8.3 Appendix C: Additional Tables and Graphs Sociolinguistic Criteria

8.3.1 France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effective Pronouns</th>
<th>Effective Adjectives</th>
<th>Relative Pronouns</th>
<th>Relative Adjectives</th>
<th>Normalized Pronouns</th>
<th>Normalized Adjectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Effective</td>
<td>Female Effective</td>
<td>Male Relative</td>
<td>Female Relative</td>
<td>Male Normalized</td>
<td>Female Normalized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLUSIVE PRONOUNS</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>0,021928166</td>
<td>0,003478261</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLUSIVE ADJECTIVES</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0,040214477</td>
<td>0,004059747</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Results Coding France Effective Number of Codes, Relative and Normalized Code Count

When we look at the categories in more detail, we see that the by far most frequent inclusive pronoun is nous (Engl. we) occurring almost twice as often in Marine’s speeches (graph 10). The second and third most frequent pronouns are notre (Engl. our) and nos (Engl. our) which occur less often in Jean-Marie’s speeches.
Graph 10: Inclusive Pronouns in Detail Normalized France

Graph 11 reveals that the most commonly occurring inclusive adjective/adverb in the French speeches is *tous* (Engl. *all*) and is not as frequent in Jean-Marie’s speeches as it is in his daughter’s speeches.

Graph 11: Inclusive Adjectives and Adverbs in Detail Normalized France

The second most common term of this category is *ensemble* (Engl. *together*) which also occurs more often in Marine’s speeches. Another frequent inclusive adjective is *collectif/collective*
and its adverb form **collectivem ent** (Engl. *collective/collectively*) with only a minimally higher occurrence in the female speeches.

### 8.3.2 Norway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effective Male</th>
<th>Effective Female</th>
<th>Relative Male</th>
<th>Relative Female</th>
<th>Normalized Male</th>
<th>Normalized Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCLUSIVE_PRONOUNS</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.032011209</td>
<td>0.026211073</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCLUSIVE_ADJECTIVES/ADVERBS</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.006359129</td>
<td>0.005709343</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Words Male**: 9278  
**Total Words Female**: 11560

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Normalized: Number of codes per 10'000 words</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Table 3: Results Coding Norway Effective Number of Codes, Relative and Normalized Code Count

If we look at the actual words that make up these categories, we see that the results for both genders concerning inclusive pronouns (graph 12) as well as adjectives and adverbs (graph 13) look very similar. The most frequent inclusive pronoun is *vi* (Engl. *we*), occurring slightly more often in Siv’s speeches. The second highest occurrence is given with the word *vår* (Engl. *our*) with a minimal higher frequency in Carl’s speeches. The three other pronouns display a similar frequency with a slightly higher occurrence in Carl’s discourse.

![Frequency by Gender](image)

Graph 12: Inclusive Pronouns in Detail Norway Normalized

The by far most frequent inclusive adjective/ adverb in the Norwegian speeches was *all* (Engl. *all*) with a minimal higher occurrence in Siv’s speeches. The second in line was *alt* (Engl. *everything*) with a more than four times higher frequency in Carl’s speeches. Another
frequent word was *sammen¹ (Engl. together), occurring much more often in Siv's speeches.

Graph 13: Inclusive Adjectives and Adverbs in Detail Norway Normalized

8.3.3 Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Relative Male</th>
<th>Relative Female</th>
<th>Normalize Male</th>
<th>Normalize Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCLUSIVE_PRONOUN</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>0,03257500</td>
<td>0,03194599</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0,00099421</td>
<td>0,00104398</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words Male</td>
<td>14368</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Words Female</td>
<td>17099</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Results Coding Denmark Effective Number of Codes, Relative and Normalized Code Count

¹ The * denotes the possibility of a prefix such as til in this case (the meaning of the word stays the same). A * at the end of a word indicates possible suffixes but also enclitic article (as in the Scandinavian languages) or genus adaptations.
When we take a more detailed look at the actual words that occurred we can see in graph 14 that the word *vi* (Engl. *we*) is again by large the most frequent, with a minimally higher occurrence in Pia’s speeches.

Graph 14: Inclusive Pronouns in Detail Denmark Normalized

The second most common inclusive pronoun is *vores* (Engl. *our/ours*) which occurs almost twice as often in Pia’s speeches than in Kristian’s. This is closely followed by *os* (Engl. *us*) with around 25% lower frequency in Kristian’s rhetoric compared to Pia’s.

Graph 15 shows the frequency of the specific inclusive adjectives and adverbs.

Graph 15: Inclusive Adjectives and Adverbs in Detail Denmark Normalized
The most frequent term here is *fælles* (Engl. *together*) with a slightly higher occurrence in Pia’s speeches. The second most frequent inclusive word is samlet (Engl. *collective/-ly*) also with a slighter higher occurrence in the female party leader’s speeches. The rest of the terms occur only once, whilst more of them occur in Kristian’s speeches.

### 8.4 Appendix D: Additional Tables and Graphs Coding

#### 8.4.1 France

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effective Male</th>
<th>Effective Female</th>
<th>Relative Male</th>
<th>Relative Female</th>
<th>Normalized Male</th>
<th>Normalized Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.001663516</td>
<td>0.0000014975</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0.0004385633</td>
<td>0.0022221371</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.003327032</td>
<td>0.000829953</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europeanisation Level 1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.000982987</td>
<td>0.001148985</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europeanisation Level 2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.0027221117</td>
<td>0.001378782</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europeanisation Level 3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.003856333</td>
<td>0.000536193</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.000529301</td>
<td>0.000459594</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.000907372</td>
<td>0.000765999</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.001361059</td>
<td>0.000153198</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total Words Male       | 13225          |                  |               |                |                 |                  |
| Total Words Female     | 13055          |                  |               |                |                 |                  |

*Normalized: Number of codes per 10’000 words*

Table 5: Results Coding France Effective Number of Codes, Relative and Normalized Code Count
Graph 16: Code Count France Not Normalized

Graph 17: Code Count France Levels 2 and 3 Normalized
8.4.2: Norway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Effective Male</th>
<th>Effective Female</th>
<th>Relative Male</th>
<th>Relative Female</th>
<th>Normalized Male</th>
<th>Normalized Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0,002371201</td>
<td>0,001211073</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0,003556801</td>
<td>0,001989619</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0,004850183</td>
<td>0,000865052</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europe-Level 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0,000107782</td>
<td>8,65052E-05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europe-Level 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,000323346</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europe-Level 3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,000215564</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,000431127</td>
<td>0,000346021</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0,000107782</td>
<td>0,000519031</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0,000107782</td>
<td>0,000346021</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Words Male: 9278
Total Words Female: 11560

Normalized: Number of codes per 10'000 words

Table 6: Results Coding Norway Effective Number of Codes, Relative and Normalized

Graph 18: Code Count Norway Not Normalized
8.4.3: Denmark

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Effective Male</th>
<th>Effective Female</th>
<th>Relative Male</th>
<th>Relative Female</th>
<th>Normalized Male</th>
<th>Normalized Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0.001809577</td>
<td>0.001637523</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 2</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.003410356</td>
<td>0.000935727</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Elite-Level 3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.00076559</td>
<td>0.000175449</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europeanisation-Level 1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.000626392</td>
<td>0.000175449</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europeanisation-Level 2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001948775</td>
<td>5.8483E-05</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Europeanisation-Level 3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.000904788</td>
<td>0.000116966</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0.000974388</td>
<td>0.001111176</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.002227171</td>
<td>0.001462074</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Immigration-Level 3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.00160078</td>
<td>0.000526347</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Words Male: 14368
Total Words Female: 17099

Normalized: Number of codes per 10,000 words

Table 7: Results Coding Denmark Effective Number of Codes, Relative and Normalized
Graph 20: Code Count Denmark Not Normalized

Graph 21: Code Count Denmark Levels 2 and 3 Normalized
8.5 Appendix E: Original Language Coded Example Segments

E.1: « Le Front National mène depuis sa fondation, il y a 35 ans, le combat pour la Nation et le Peuple français menacés par la décadence morale et les politiques laxistes et mondialistes. » – Jean-Marie Le Pen, Congrès du FN 2007

E.2: « Vous, président de la République, vous avez mis vos pas dans ceux de votre prédécesseur, poursuivant une immigration de masse, incompatible avec notre identité nationale ! » - Marine Le Pen, Université d’été 2012

E.3: « Il faut combattre hardiment l'Europe de Bruxelles et désengager la France, avec l'appui croissant de toutes ses victimes. L'Europe est en train de tuer la France et toutes les Nations historiques de son continent. Au bout de cette voie, il n'y a que la servitude et la guerre. » – Jean-Marie Le Pen, Université d’été 1999

E.4: « le Nouvel Ordre Mondial, la destruction programmée des nations, l’établissement d’une démocratie totalitaire, forment la plus hypocrite des tyrannies. Celle qui met la violence, y compris la plus extrême, au service des intérêts les plus inhumains sous le couvert des idéaux humanitaires. Droits de l’Homme que de crimes on commet en ton nom! » - Jean-Marie Le Pen, Université d’été 1999

E.5: « Certains s’efforcent de faire disparaître les nations historiques d'Europe dans le creuset d'une Europe fédérale. La France a tout à perdre dans cette voie qui conduit inévitablement à la perte de sa souveraineté, de son indépendance, de sa culture et de sa langue, des libertés, de la sécurité et du bien-être de son peuple. Il faut rompre clairement avec cette politique de mort et dire que la coopération nécessaire des peuples d'Europe doit s'organiser à partir des nations. » – Jean-Marie Le Pen, Université d’été 1999


E.7: «Fremskrittspartiet vil fjerne den urimelige avkorting, dette tjueriet, bare fordi man bor sammen og er gift. Fremskrittspartiet vil øke minstepensjonen fordi vi mener det er anstendig at folk skal kunne leve alderdommen sin uten å måtte snu så til de grader på krona som dette ekteparet gjør. Og vi vil bevare det bestående pensjonssystemet, fordi vi mener at man er i ferd med å begå nok et ran fra fremtidige pensjonister.» - Siv Jensen, Landsmøtetale 2009

E.8: «Tilsvarende skal vi heller ikke finde os i, at der er personer i Danmark, der drager i hellig krig. Står på fjendens side. Her må og skal der sættes ind. Det burde faktisk være sket for længe siden. Vi skal have fokus på problemets kerne. Og her handler det om, at vi skal sikre, at de folk, der kommer til Danmark både kan og vil gøre en positiv forskel. Og det handler også om, at vi sikrer, at der kun kommer et sådant antal til Danmark, så det rent faktisk er
muligt at integrere disse. Det er afgørende for, at vi undgår at importere verdens konflikter til de danske gader.» - Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Årsmødetale 2014


E.11: «Og vi er ikke SF - vi sælger ikke ud af værdierne og arvesølvet til fordel for ministerbiler!» - Kristian Thulesen Dahl, Årsmødetale 2013


8.6 Appendix F: Further Methodological Considerations

There are several reasons why only in-group references were measured. Firstly, I initially also measured exclusiveness but decided to remove the category for the following reasons. Considering that a lot of the exclusive pronouns2 such as me or you do not necessarily have to denote an exclusion of the other but due to grammatical rules need to be employed when the speaker wishes to state something only he himself or only another person has done. For inclusive pronouns such as we or ourselves the speaker has more of a choice as in political speeches the politician has rarely done something (physically) together with large groups of his audience and the usage of inclusive pronouns often occurs with the intention of including certain groups in the audience. Naturally, there are situations where the politician has no choice but to use an inclusive pronoun but these are very rare. Sedcondly, the results of the analysis of exclusive out-group adjectives and adverbs were not meaningful, for out of the entire category only a couple actually occurred in the speeches and usually with a frequency of less than five. The results from the first analysis were the following. Norway: there was only one word from this category that showed up in the speeches, and it only occurred four times in the same speech from Siv (“alene” = Engl. “alone”). France: there were only three words from this category found in the speeches, and there was only one word Marine used more than Jean-Marie: “seul” (Engl. “alone”, which can also denominate “only” as in “yet” and by itself is not exclusive). Denmark: The only word that occurred more than once per person was
“fælles” (Engl. “together”) with a frequency of less than 10 per person. When calculating the percentages relative to the words in the speeches the results clearly did not provide substance for an interpretation.

² Based on Larner’s (2009) categorization.