“Extremism and democratic coalitions. 
The institutional integration of extreme right parties 
in the regional parliaments of Germany, Austria and France”

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Summary

The study of extreme right parties within the central political field does not really allow to account—or not perfectly—for the modalities of their integration or non-integration. The central point of this paper consists therefore in showing that the institutional integration—defined as the participation at any level in governing alliances—of the extreme right within the national political market is function to its degree of inclusion in the regional parliaments, particularly through more or less transparent coalitional practices. The notion of peripheral coalitional market allows us to emphasise the coherence of the German model of exclusive oligopoly, as well as the Austrian model of maximal institutional inclusion of the extreme right. At last, the French case serves as an experiment field for the analytical scheme built thanks to these two opposite paradigmatic poles.
Outline

Summary.................................................................p.2
Outline..............................................................p.3
Introduction........................................................p. 4

Theory of political coalitional markets..............................................p. 5

The German paradigm of exclusive oligopoly.....................................p.7
The case of the Second Austrian republic: a model of maximal inclusion of an extreme right party.................................................................p. 9

A case study using the German and Austrian paradigmatic poles: the French model of slow, progressively regulated peripheral coalitional markets........................................p. 14

Conclusion.................................................................p. 18
Bibliography..............................................................p. 22
When scholars study the radical right, it seems that, maybe more than for many other objects, the analysis of the “extreme right”1 phenomenon is often correlated with a social demand, especially through a public agenda-setting itself often linked to media campaigns. This partly explains how it was uneasy for university research in that field to avoid normative and performative positions.2 The relaxation of the pressure on the public sphere due to a diminution of the electoral power of many extreme right parties, in France in particular, may offer an opportunity for less passionate analyses. That is anyway our position in this paper,3 which tries to refuse the simple political denunciation of the phenomenon as well as the “epistemocratic” construction4 which aims at producing an idealistic barrier between “democracy” and “extremism.”5 Such an approach is of course directly related to a certain conception of comparative studies6 that envisages to deconstruct in the same fashion the national (esp. French) construction that lies behind many studies of such an object.

We centre our observation on the way different democratic systems and sub-systems reacted and react to the extremist breakthrough without “de-democratising” themselves by two ways that threatened them, i.e. either a total exclusion of systemic margins (extremism) and/or their integration in the regional and national governments.

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6. See, on our conception of that issue, our communication: Laurent Godmer and Laurent Kestel, “ Problèmes épistémologiques : approches de la gestion pratique de l’interdépendance entre empirie et théorie dans le comparatisme institutionnaliste” (Department of Political Science of the Sorbonne University: graduate cycle’s methodology seminar on comparative government, November 28, 2000).
Theory of coalitional political markets

The central point of this paper is our willingness to show that there is a differentiated integration of the extreme right parties within the diverse national political markets (i.e. central markets as well as peripheral ones) and that this methodological bias would allow to better understand the institutionalisation mechanisms of those parties.

First of all, two “substantialistic” biases have to be avoided: on the one side, the vision of the political parties as a compact, unified, homogeneous “whole”, e.g. manipulating the same symbolic goods (under the common sense version of the concept of ideology), with the same practices on the different political markets. On the other side, one should not forget the existence of different political fields, i.e. the national political field and peripheral political fields. If there is undoubtedly a homogenisation of these two categories of markets—e.g. concerning the political programmes7—, it does not mean that one can neglect the differentiated distribution of political practices (such as demonstrations) and political products (programmes, discourse) on these markets. “The political system does not present itself as a compact, homogeneous block […] ruled by a monolithic order, but as a structured and stratified ensemble, formed with heterogeneous elements, sometimes submitted to the central attraction, and sometimes pushed towards the periphery.”8

To analyse the integration attempts of extreme right parties on these different markets, i.e. within the regional and national assemblies and parliaments, obliges to raise the issue of a differentiated cost of entry on these markets. Our common observation was that research in political sociology and political science studies were frequently excessively centred around the central political markets. We aim at showing that the integration of the extreme right—or its exclusion—derives from its more or less objectivated visibility within the peripheral coalitional markets.

Since the extreme right parties are almost never in a position to conquer major power positions, their institutional integration requires a more or less open coalition with other political groups, mostly right-wing conservative ones (even though groups from other political horizons may be involved). Robert Owen Paxton observed that “the extreme right activism, in the twentieth century, never succeeded without the help, or at least the complicity, of the conservative elites.”

The access to the Austrian national government of FPÖ leaders proves it. However, the presence of extreme right parliamentary groups in regional assemblies is a question which is posed to all the actors of a political system, and not only to the concerned “guilty” fringe of conservatives.

That is the reason why we use the notion of coalitional political market, empirically defined as a space of possibilities of a parliamentary institutional structure which can provide either symbolic retributions (such as institutional recognition) or positional ones (i.e. access to diverse degrees of power positions) to a political enterprise which enters an association, more or less formalised, more or less objectivated, with one or several other political enterprises. This coalitional market—mostly regional and national coalitions in our research—is mostly structured around two axes: the maximisation of benefits in terms of access to “power and representation positions” and the “political positions” produced by opinion makers who define and name the entries of radical right deputies on coalitional markets, a “symbolic” aspect at stake that is not really rendered by the coalition-building theorists who emphasise the continuous ideological connections without insisting on the internal border drawn by the opinion makers with political markets.

With the help of this conceptual tool, which is to be more precisely defined thanks to the contact with empirical data, it is possible to study the Austrian case, which is the ideal type of a high level of integration of an extreme right party on open peripheral coalitional markets, and the German case, which on the contrary is the counter-model of the intra-institutional “containment” of major extreme right parties in the post-war period on both levels. These two case studies will allow us to use the two paradigms so as to analyse the French model that we qualify as an “evolving” one, as it is essentially a model of progressive exclusion of the major extreme right parties from the peripheral coalitional markets.

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10. See Pierre Bourdieu, Ce que parler veut dire (Paris: Fayard, 1982), pp. 149-61.
The German paradigm of exclusive oligopoly

Before the Second World War, the regional coaltional market was totally open to extreme right parties. The national-socialist parliamentary group of Bavaria was approached already in 1924 by the local conservative minister-president.11 This very low cost of entry on the regional market favoured the ascension of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) in the different regional parliaments, with a wide range of participation types, from the first simple membership of a regional government in Thuringen, to the status of dominating partner in a coalition in Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Prussia in 1932.12 One may thus raise the question of the importance of that rule of openness and to what extent it took part in its integration of a right-wing and fascist national coalition in 1933.

On the contrary, in the Federal Republic of Germany, there was no possible entry on the coaltional regional market for the successive extreme right parties.13 There is a regulation phenomenon which blocked every attempt for them to take part in any kind of government, even though there was some porosity on certain fringes of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Christian unions (CDU and CSU) in particular, and even if some ex-members of the NSDAP had the opportunity to start a new regional, even national political career. The regulation of the coaltional markets is directly linked to a building of the democratic game based on a severely controlled democratic order. The most famous example of this political-constitutional regulatory basic tendency is the forbidding of the nazi Socialist Empire Party (SRP) in 1952 by the new Federal Constitutional Court, which is very demanding and which led to the destitution of the SRP parliamentary groups in the federal diet and in the Lower-Saxon parliament.14 That conception is also consistent with an important institutional investment at any level in protecting the Basic Law, the political practices and the political parties (e.g. Parteiengesetz in 1967).

12. Ibid., pp. 320-397.
As a result, one can characterise the German coalitional market as an oligopoly and as an exclusive (or close, autarchic) space. The high level of the cost of entry means a broad consensus. This led to the exclusion of all the major extreme right regional parliamentary groups (SRP, National Democratic Party (NPD), Republicans (REP), the German People’s Union (DVU)) from all the regional governments since the war. Even a conservative region like Baden-Württemberg, due to a strong presence of the REP, was automatically “obliged” according to this logic, to set up a grand coalition between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social-democratic Party of Germany (SPD) against the extreme right in the 1990s. That example remains the best illustration of a regulation which does not authorise any “dissidence” and symbolises a high level of nationally-defined discipline.

The democratic parties of the “oligopoly” (CDU, FDP, SPD and the only newcomers (in the 1970s), the Greens) constitute a constitutional archipelago that has therefore developed “counter-strategies”, i.e. a set of refusal practices that implies the existence of extreme right parties as institutionally recognised parliamentary groups since the constitutional interdiction is difficult but does not allow them in any kind of government-type alliances.15 This can be called, after the United States of America’s foreign policy during the cold war, a “containment” policy which is, by the way, very different from a destructive strategy.


15. See, for example, about those counter-strategies within the representative institutions: Mathias Schmidt, Die Parlamentsarbeit rechtsextremer Parteien und möglichen Gegenstrategien. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel der „Deutschen Volksunion“ im Schleswig-Holsteinischen Landtag. (Munster: Agenda, 1997).
The case of the Second Austrian Republic: a model of maximal integration of an extreme right party

The Austrian exception

The Austrian way of dealing with the extreme right parties in regional parliaments can be analysed as the exact opposite of the German one. Indeed the integration of the extreme right major parties—the post-nazi Union of Independents (VdU) and its successor the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)—is total, based on their permanent presence in the national and regional parliaments since 1948.16 The negative reactions of the leaders of most of other European Union (EU) countries are understandable, since the latter (as Germany, France and Belgium) often have national and regional coalitional markets on which the extreme right parties are excluded.

The sanctions implemented by the presidency of the EU announced the 31st January 2000 after the FPÖ-ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) joint declaration,17 though they did not last for a long period (only until the 12th September 2000), had a real symbolic effect and reflected the diverse regulation processes of the political markets according to their treatment of extreme right parties.18 Although the once very sanction-oriented president of the EU went to Vienna on 29th November 2000, different conceptions of the democratic institutional game have been revealed throughout that diplomatic and conceptual conflict.

The rule of Austrian regional coalitional markets

The ubiquitous figure of Jörg Haider, Landeshauptmann (regional governor) of the Carinthian government (1989-91 and 1999-2004) and former federal president of the FPÖ (1986-2000) embodies this fundamental difference with the German system. Indeed, the Austrian political system is the perfect example of a coalitional market which is regionally and nationally unified according to an oligopoly logic that is absolutely inclusive, in the sense that there is no differentiation between extremists and democratic political parties. This absence of exclusion clearly contrasts with the German political practice. Even though it can be linked to a localised “administration”, one observes undoubtedly that the Austrian regional coalition governments for instance defied for six decades the classical laws of coalition building such as the minimum winning coalition and the ideological proximity, contrary to their German neighbours.

The participation in regional governments was relatively masked because of a weak position of the FPÖ for three decades, which did not allow it to have many ministers. Even the national coalition governments SPÖ (Socialist Party of Austria)-FPÖ (chancellors Kreisky and Sinowatz) between 1971 and 1986 (esp. from 1983 to 1986) had a limited impact because there was a huge difference between the majority and minority partners, even if the participation of former SS officers would be nowadays questionable. But the official radicalisation of the FPÖ under the direction of Jörg Haider that led to a SPÖ-ÖVP national coalition (1987-2000) did not question the fundamental rule of the Austrian coalitional markets regarding the extreme right. There was officially at the national level an Ausgrenzung policy, i.e. a “strategy of the incumbent and of the two smaller opposition parties oriented towards the exclusion of Jörg Haider from” the federal government. Nevertheless, even when Jörg Haider himself, for instance, was obliged to resign from his position as


An evolution based on a reversed equalisation of the cost of entry on coalitional markets

Of a great interest is the process of homogenisation that occurred in Austria and Germany. Indeed, the rules governing the regional coalitional markets tended historically to be similar as the ones affecting the national market. The huge difference is that in the FRG and in post-reunification Germany, the homogenisation—completely set up in the 1950s and never questioned—was to exclude definitively the extreme right from coalitions, generating thereby an invisible wall between representation, which is largely accepted for the successive extreme right parties, and government which is strictly reserved for an oligopoly of democratic “anti-extremist” (i.e. refusing any kind of alliance and rapprochement with extreme groups or parties) political parties.

On the contrary, in Austria, one can observe the following rule: the FPÖ, present in almost all the regional governments since the 1970s, has a right to access to a regional coalition in most of the regions, once it reaches a certain threshold of representation in the regional parliament. The result of this particularly open consociational, co-operation-based system is that the FPÖ is present—with one or several ministers—in a majority of the Austrian governments, even sometimes with the SPÖ (for instance in the famous Haider-led Carinthian government) (see Figure 1. below).

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Theory of the Austrian political practice

Consequently it can be argued that the cost of entry for an extreme right party in the Austrian system is extremely low, and not based on “ideological” considerations, since it is widely known that the SPÖ brought the FPÖ to the national coalitional markets in the 1970s and 1980s and negotiated at first point in 2000 with it in order to try to maintain a 30-year dominating presence in the federal government. As a consequence, only counts the local tradition that could be anti-extremist (like in the Vienna region for example) and the ability of the FPÖ to overcome two thresholds: the electoral threshold, easily reached (normally 4 per cent of the regional vote) and an internal threshold that technically justifies the presence in a regional government (i.e. generally only a little more than 10 per cent). Needless to say, such a logic prevails, in an even more organised way (in many regions, it is even compulsory to integrate important parties in the local government), at the local level. In fact, it can be assumed that the “haiderisation” is just the progressive recognition of rooted regional rules based on a pure oligopoly by the centre and, interestingly, the fact that this type of democracy is made internationally visible in its core “values” and rules. In short, Austria is a democracy where there is a structural inclusion of extreme right forces, whereas Germany remained historically in a containment posture.

Henceforth the huge gap and acrimonious reactions among the EU Member States between that newly-arrived country and France, Belgium, and Germany for instance, which have on the contrary organised an institutional resistance (even if it was rather slow in the French case) against their extreme right parliamentary groups. The symbolic and political clash was consequently expectable and logical, even though the EU functioning was not to be endangered by this divergence which reveals different conceptions of democracy.

Fig. 1. An open coalitional market: the institutional participation of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) in the Austrian national and regional governments at the beginning of the twenty-first century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of integration on the coalitional market</th>
<th>Region (Land)</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Ruling coalition</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very high (direction of the government)</td>
<td>Carinthia</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>FPÖ-ÖVP-SPÖ</td>
<td>J. Haider is Landeshauptmann (42% of the votes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria (national)</td>
<td>2000-3</td>
<td>FPÖ-ÖVP</td>
<td>The vice-chancellor 5 ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (at least 2 ministers and/or 1 vice-president)</td>
<td>Higher Austria</td>
<td>1997-2003</td>
<td>ÖVP-SPÖ-FPÖ</td>
<td>2 ministers (one is VP (Landeshauptmannstellvertreter))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vorarlberg</td>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>ÖVP-FPO</td>
<td>1 vice-governor (Landestatthalter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (only one “basic” member of the regional government)</td>
<td>Lower Austria</td>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>ÖVP-SPÖ-FPÖ</td>
<td>1 minister for 9 deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Styria</td>
<td>2000-5</td>
<td>ÖVP-SPÖ-FPÖ</td>
<td>(confirmed in October 2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tyrol</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>ÖVP-SPÖ</td>
<td>No more, contrary to the ÖVP-SPÖ-FPÖ-GAL 1994-9 government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salzburg</td>
<td>1998-2003</td>
<td>ÖVP-SPÖ</td>
<td>12-member group (Klub)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>2001-6</td>
<td>SPÖ-ÖVP</td>
<td>High FPÖ pressure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23. Sources: web sites of the regional governments and/or administrations: Land Burgenland, burgenland.at (2000); Landesregierung Vorarlberg, vrl.gv.at (2000); Land überösterreich, ooe.gv.at (2000); Land Salzburg, land-sbg.gv.at (2000); Land Tirol, tirol.at (2000); Land Steiermark, stmk.gv.at. (2000); Niederösterreichische Landesregierung, noel.gv.at (2000); additional sources: FPÖ-Steiermark, fpoe-stmk.at (2000); Der Standard (Vienna, December 4 and 22, 2000).
A case study using the German and Austrian paradigmatic poles: the French model of slow, progressively regulated peripheral coalitional markets

The electoral rise of the president of the National Front (FN) was not essentially produced by his own ability to become the leader of the extreme right nor by his personal charisma, which is a typical “screen concept.”24 Such a success is also a result of a favourable electoral agenda-setting by the parliamentary right-wing parties and the construction of the phenomenon by the media after the success of the Rally for the Republic (RPR)-FN local alliance in Dreux (Centre region) in 1983.25 The emergence of the FN as a major electoral force has generated numerous debates among the actors of the regional and national political life. Hence a symbolic struggle on how to define the FN. That definition was indeed to impact on the inclusion or the exclusion of that party from coalitions. In that set of fights on symbols agents of the scientific field took an important part.26

Their constative and performative discourses had several consequences in the perception, classification and legitimisation of the FN. In the two main rightist parties, there was a division of labour between, in the RPR for instance, the leaders totally opposed to alliances with the FN (the most famous and constant one being the party’s president Jacques Chirac (1976-94) although he inscribed some aspects of the extreme right programmes in his discourse) and those who use legal internal “excuses” to minimise and “exceptionalise” the agreements like the Dreux RPR-FN contract, such as Charles Pasqua and Jacques Toubon.27 As for the Union for French Democracy (UDF) centrist coalition, the logic was analogous.28 Only the old, small National Centre for independents and Peasants (CNIP) attempted to

27. Le Monde (Paris: November 2, 1983); La Lettre de la nation (June, 29, 1985).
legitimise an alliance with the FN but it did not engender an integration dynamic, except for CNIP leaders who joined the FN and became MPs, particularly in Provence.

In short, it can be said that after the emergence of the FN as a major force in the 1980s, most of the leaders of the central political field attempted progressively, with a relative unequal success in the long run, to exclude the FN elected officials from the peripheral coalitional markets and earlier, and more or less successfully, from the central coalitional market.

The 1986 regional elections: a low cost of entry on the peripheral coalitional markets for the FN

At these first regional direct vote in metropolitan continental France, there did not really exist a willingness to develop a containment policy against the FN in the regional assemblies. Thus the new FN regional parliamentary groups managed to be key actors in the election of the RPR-UDF right-oriented regional presidents in six regions (Higher Normandy, Franche-Comté, Aquitaine, Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrénées). Besides, they obtained one vice-presidency in three regions (Higher Normandy, Picardie, Languedoc-Roussillon) and two—along with an explicit regional government alliance—in Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur (PACA). The process was dual: there was a direct personal positional retribution and also an institutional recognition—i.e. a symbolic acceptance of the integration of the extreme right on the regional political market—due to the participation of the FN in the regional president’s election process.

In other words, the political “tariff” was relatively low for the radical right parliamentary groups, in the sense that their degree of integration, albeit non-comparable with the institutional retribution obtained by the FPÖ, was proportional to their institutional weight: first of all in the assemblies where the number of regional councillors was only one or two (or even none in Limousin), there was obviously absolutely no integration. There was a low degree of integration where the FN regional parliamentarians have a considerable group but could not change the regional majority. At last, it can be said that there was a high degree of integration where they were largely able to do it.

29. Le Quotidien de Paris (June, 29, 1984); Libération, “Le Pen et Médecin se lancent des fleurs” (February, 27, 1984).
The 1992 regional elections: progressive exclusion and differentiated integration

It is only after the March 1992 elections that RPR-UDF leaders tried to totally exclude the FN from the regional coalitional markets. That process was under way at the national level since 1986 and at the peripheral level since 1988 but the conservative landslide and the centralised regulation (facilitated by new possibilities of control from the centre, e.g. thanks to new control rules of political finances) at the beginning of the 1990s may have accelerated it. As a result, there was no explicit right-FN alliance for the elections of the regional presidents.

However, the exclusion from the coalitional markets is not total since in many cases the integration meant the installation of a permanent deliberative commission of which the members are designated by a PR system, thus giving positions to elected leaders of important FN groups. “It becomes possible to soften the alliances, to envisage “good manners exchanges”, to differ certain decisions; and all this all the more easily that the precise definition of the “group” is made by internal rules.” 30 With again the sole exception of Limousin—the only structural “left” region, led by a Socialist Party (PS)-Communist Party (PCF) coalition—which de facto excluded the newly-arrived FN councillors by restricting the number of the commission members, the other regional executives tend on the contrary to conceive the rule in a rather extensive way, allowing a “soft integration” of the FN councillors, characterised by a low visibility. But, if compared with 1986, the degree of the integration is low in all the regions, in PACA in particular.

1998(-9): the regulation of the peripheral coalitional market by the centre

The institutional work of central control by the RPR-UDF leaders was clearly and definitively implemented during the election of the regional presidents in March-April 1998. With 15% of the national votes and 275 councillors, the FN leaders tried to enter the coalitional markets by proposing a six-issue “minimum programme” to the right. There were official and clear interventions of the secretary general and of the president of the RPR, then of the UDF president (himself candidate in PACA against the president of the FN) and the president of the main component of the UDF coalition, with threats of exclusion from the respective parties to avoid regional alliances with the FN. The President of the Republic (RPR) and the Prime minister (PS) made official declarations to oblige the presidents elected thanks to the FN to withdraw. As a consequence, the presidents of Aquitaine, Franche-Comté, Centre, Midi-Pyrénées, and Higher Normandy who were in that situation resigned, refusing a compromise with the FN.

As for the presidents of Picardie, Rhône-Alpes, Languedoc-Roussillon, they refused to apply the national decisions and remained in place. They were excluded from the UDF. In Rhône-Alpes a new election in 1999 allowed the national “centre”, namely the direction of the New-UDF, to organise a better control of its representatives and to take over the regional government by obliging the left (PS-PCF-Radicals-Greens) to enter a temporary alliance. Thereby, it showed the distinction made—by the central organisations—between extremists and “democratic” (or “republican”) forces.

The three remaining right-FN coalition for the 1999-2004 period thus constitute “free zones”, in which there is an autonomy of the regional coalitional market, escaping the regulation from the centre that somehow puts the French democratic game more or less in line with the German paradigm, whereas it was more prone to resemble the Austrian one in the mid-1980s.
Conclusion

An analytical framework
The notion of “peripheral coalitional market” has the comparative advantage of no longer envisaging the political field under a uniquely national angle. It also allows to see how differentiated the political practices of the diverse political entrepreneurs are, despite the very essentialist vision of political parties which prevails.

A permanent “debate” is the place of “ideology” (i.e. of explicit normative criteria—aiming at excluding political parties which refuse the minimal rules of representative democracy—) in the regulation process of those markets. The ideological criterion is in fact limited comparatively to the importance of the position occupied by the entrepreneur in the field.

Concretely the containment logic is based on a distinction between the access to “representation” as systemic inclusion—which is rather accepted and developed for extreme right parties that obtain parliamentary groups—and the access to coalitional markets (i.e. participation in governance processes). This explains to what extent there is a mix of inclusion and exclusion of the extreme parties, a reality which does not imply a “de-democratisation” (or reverse “extremisation”) of the political game.

This analytical scheme was designed in order to understand the different possible systemic responses to the rise of the extreme parties. In addition, it takes into account the post-war institutional evolution of the West European countries that developed a dual political market with regional representative assemblies, following the German example, notably in Spain, Italy, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom.

Application to other countries
The German and Austrian cases represent poles with which one can analyse other states as we did with France. But it is naturally a useful scheme to conduct comparative analyses about the integration of the extreme right: Belgium, for example, seems to follow the German “containment” example by excluding a very important party, namely the Flemish Block (VB) from coalitional government at the national, regional (Flanders) and metropolitan (Antwerp in 2000) levels.

On the contrary, a very interesting case is the “Second” Italian Republic of which the political spectrum presents two major extreme right parties, the North League (LN) and National Alliance (AN). It is interesting to notice that its political markets tend to follow the Austrian
paradigm, in the sense that their participation to regional governments (especially after the 1995 and 2000 elections) is the rule because they are part of the Forza Italia (FI)-led coalition. Besides, that high degree of integration on the regional coalitional markets explains the easy first access in a critical context to the national Berlusconi government in 1994. The limited institutional reaction of 1994 originated in many peculiarities: a state a major crisis in Italy, a less clear position of the centre-right leaders (esp. in France), an objective less “extremist” aspect (as for AN in particular) and of a symbolically less heavy effect. It is be then really useful to compare the reaction of the EU if the “Freedom House coalition” confirms its comeback to national power after the 2001 elections, with the 2000 anti-FPÖ policy, and even more to see the different reactions among the EU countries, since it is obvious that a major founding member state will not be put in a same quarantine as was the Austrian government in 2000.31 It can be argued that the Austrian crisis shows more accurately a dual Europe.

Application to anti-system parties on the left side of the political spectrum
The difference between extreme right and extreme left parties as far as coalitional exclusion is concerned appears fundamental at first sight to the extent that the radical left is normally more or less included in the constitutional order. But the example of the PCF, integrated in a very hard fashion by 1936 (contrary to some fascist parties such as the French People Party (PPF)32), but excluded from 1947 to 1981 and re-included between 1981-4 and 1997-2002 after an objective “self de-extremisation”, that resembles the one of AN. However, it can be observed that the democratic, anti-extremist coalitional control also extend to the left, even though in a less “radical” manner. For example, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) was excluded from all Western regional governments in 1947 and the Karlsruhe Constitutional court dissolved it in 1956. Its “comeback”33 in a democratic regional government in Mecklenburg in 1998 was difficult and faced harsh criticisms from the Christian democratic leaders were maybe more a way of forbidding an integration of what is above all an eastern regionalist interest group to the national government without a long transition and disciplinary

32. Its leader, Jacques Doriot, had launched a “Freedom front” and did not manage to build a process which would have “regularised” his party.
33. As the Democratic Socialism Party (PDS), successor of the SED, itself a merger between the East-KPD and the East-SPD.
period. The ex-DRG (Democratic Republic of Germany) thus can be described as a “free zone”.

Other research tracks

Other “extreme”, anti-system parties (i.e. situated by the doxa and opinion-makers at an extreme side of a political market and being in a position of rupture against the constitutional order or the past construction of democracy) may be analysed with the same scheme. Among many examples, the separatist ETA (Basque Country and Freedom)-linked Euskal Herritarok-Herri Batasuna (EH-HB) (which has a parliamentary group in the Basque parliament) signed a pact at Estrella-Lizarra which functioned from 1998 and 2000 with the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), an agreement reflecting a certain openness of the regional coalitional markets. Albeit exceptional, the election in the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (CAPV) in May 2001 shows a possible convergence between anti-extremist parties following the PP-PSOE anti-terrorist pact.34 A centralised regulation process which is ceteris paribus (i.e. let alone if possible the violence issue) in line with according to the model of the CDU-SPD 1992-1996 anti-REP coalition in Baden-Württemberg, a jurisprudence applied to France in 1998 (Franche-Comté and PACA), and above all in the controversial, famous case of Rhône-Alpes in 1999, or the democratic anti-VB in Antwerp in 2000. This logic is absolutely different from the one which seems to prevail in other countries on the regional markets such as Austria, Italy or the French “free zones” (see figure 2). By going beyond the electoral and ideological issues, this kind of approach widens the scientific perspective about the practical nature of democracy and political representation.

Fig. 2. Systemic models of institutional relation to the extreme right parties on the coalitional markets of the EU countries where extreme right parties have an important representation in regional and/or national parliaments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalitional market</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Germany; France; Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>Austria (1971-86 ; 2000-3); Italy (1994; 2001-6?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral</td>
<td>Inclusive or non-exclusive</td>
<td>Austria ; France (1986-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Progressively exclusive</td>
<td>France (1988-99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>Germany ; France (1999-2004); Belgium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free zones (in 2001)</td>
<td>Languedoc-Roussillon, Picardie, Burgundy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in France (1999-2004)</td>
<td>(integration of the FN in the election of the regional president)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, this model seems therefore to function. However, it is a little less obvious if one focuses on the details of the practices and of the political positioning. One should strangely attenuate the importance of a properly “ideological” cost of entry in the “decision” of excluding the extreme right from the peripheral coalitional markets. A study as refined as possible would undoubtedly emphasise an extremely complex network of interdependence relations between political entrepreneurs, competition and “co-opetition”, differentiated positions, induced by institutional roles that are fulfilled. But this research perspective would necessary lead to a more “monographic” and less comparative research.

35. Such as the one that has been made by Jean-Marie Barbe in his film: Le Juste non (France, 1999) about the 1999 elections of the president of Rhône-Alpes.
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