Abstract:

As one of the core concepts of political science, legitimacy has justified sustained attention to both conceptualisation and empirical research in general and particularly in the context of the European integration. This paper is the very first output of a broader research on the meaning and measurement of legitimacy within the European context. It begins with a short review of the ground definitions of the concept before presenting a classical threefold schema of legitimacy which distinguishes between the input legitimacy, the output legitimacy and the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy (or substantial legitimacy). In the second section, this text makes two interrelated claims. First, the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy must be seen more like a constant than a variable. Secondly, when analysing the legitimacy of the European Union, a multi-level analysis which focuses on the interaction between the legitimacy of each of its members’ states and legitimacy of the EU political order and which underlines the importance of the socialisation’s process, is required. Finally, we propose an empirical analysis of the relationship between identification and legitimacy and assume that some identification’s combinations are more legitimating than others. As concluding remarks, we will set out a framework for further analysis.
**Introduction**

As one of the central concepts of political science, legitimacy has justified sustained attention to both conceptualisation and empirical research. But as underlined, by Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, “the concept of legitimacy poses appreciably more problems, essentially because analyses and applications of the concept have not been sufficiently systematic” (Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson, 1998: 6).

This paper is the first output of our thoughts on the meaning and measurement of legitimacy within the European context. Aware of the complexity of this concept, our aim is at answering the question “what does legitimacy mean within the European context?”. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, the text begins with a short review of the classical definitions of legitimacy of a political system generally speaking before moving to a multi-criteria approach of the notion of legitimacy which distinguishes between the input legitimacy, the output legitimacy and the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy (or the substantial legitimacy). The second section addresses the central question of the meaning of legitimacy within the European context defending the necessity of a multi-level approach. Finally, the last part analyses the relationship between identification and legitimacy within the European political system as brought out by Eurobarometers survey data.
1. What does legitimacy of a political system mean?

1.1. The socio-political concept of legitimacy: back to the ground definitions

So the first question that we need to answer to is ‘what does legitimacy of a political system mean?’. Indeed legitimacy of a political system has been defined and interpreted in many different ways by scholars. We seek to focus on the common accepted meaning of the term in order to develop a systematic analysis of the notion in the context of the EU. From the point of view of conceptual (re-)formulation, it seems indicated to turn over to the ground definitions of legitimacy and support as basically developed by Weber and Easton.

First, we should briefly recall what Weber means by the concept of legitimacy. Breaking with the political philosophers who regarded as legitimate a system which had been established in agreement with certain rules (normative theory), Weber conceptualises it as a social fact: legitimacy is the phenomenon that people are willing to accept domination on normative grounds, no matter which specific beliefs this acceptance is based on (traditional, rational-legal or charismatic) (Weber, 1968: pp. 215-216). This conception differs from the normative philosopher’s search for ideal criteria of legitimacy. Power is legitimate where those involved in his political system believe it to be legitimate (Beetham, 1991: 8).

This definition remaining rather broad, a classical but useful starting point in order to systematize our thought is the concept of support such as developed by Easton (Easton, 1965, 1975). It enables us to screen inside of the concept of legitimacy, regarded as a social fact in the sense of Weber, for an empirically application of it. Indeed, legitimacy of a political system stems from support given by individuals belonging to the community in question. In order to survive, any political system needs support. This is particularly true that systems rely on political legitimacy when material and other inducements are insufficient to win the compliance of citizens.

In his analysis of political life, Easton views the political system as the set of all interactions in a given society linked to the authoritative allocation of values in that society. The system receives from his ‘environment’ the inputs of supports and demands; it delivers back to the environment,
as outputs, decisions about demands. It is to say, it transforms demands into decisions. Easton underlines the existence of a feedback effect of these outputs which create new supports and demands. In this brief note on legitimacy, we will be naturally most concerned with support, which refers to “the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his behaviour” (Easton, 1975: 436). Recalling this definition is not only useful for the conceptualisation of support but also because the study of support is too often reduced to the analysis of attitudes through a political system through the gathering of surveys’ data, with few references to actual behaviour such as voting, tax payments or political dissent for example.

As it is known, Easton discriminated between two kinds of support: the specific one and the diffuse one. The concept of diffuse support is described as ‘a reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants’ (Easton, 1965: 273) and refers ‘to evaluations of what an object is or represents – to the general meaning it has for a person – not of what it does’ (Easton, 1975: 444); whereas specific support is related to the satisfactions that members of the system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities (Easton, 1975: 437).

Easton distinguishes between three different objects of support: the political community, the political regime and the political authorities. In Critical Citizens, Norris identifies no less than five different objects or dimensions of support based on Easton’s original model which are described in the figure 1.
If Easton recognizes that, in the long term, diffuse support is not independent of the effects of daily outputs, only diffuse support is taken as stable, whereas specific support varies with perceived benefits or satisfactions. If we understand diffuse support, and from there legitimacy, as a kind of ‘reservoir’, this means that we perceive it as an accumulation’s process. Easton defines legitimacy as the ‘conviction that it is right and proper...to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime. It reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a person] sees these objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right and proper in the political sphere’ (Easton, 1975 : 451). It seems important to underline that diffuse support typically arises from two sources: socialization and direct experience (Easton, 1975 : 446).

### Figure 1: Objects and levels of political support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Characteristics of support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The political community</td>
<td>A basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and a general willingness to co-operate together politically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime principles</td>
<td>Support for (for instance democracy) democracy as a principle or an ideal, i.e. as the most appropriate form of government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime performance</td>
<td>Support for the way the political system functions in practice, i.e. what the system delivers to its citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime institutions</td>
<td>Attitudes toward governments, parliaments, the executive, the legal system and police, the state bureaucracy, political parties and the military. Support for institutions rather than persons. For example, support for the presidency rather than support for the actual person occupying the presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political actors</td>
<td>Specific support for particular political actors or authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of this modest overview of the ground definitions, we want to point out that:

- the legitimacy of a political system has to be understood as a social fact;
- diffuse support, and from there legitimacy, is defined as a “reservoir” of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants;
- only diffuse support to the regime and to the community is stable where specific support varies with perceived benefices and the most fundamental level of diffuse support is represented by the political community;
- finally, this ‘reservoir’ finds its sources in the socialisation process and direct experience of the people who constitute the community.

1.2. A multi-criteria approach

As the differentiation between diffuse and specific supports has shown, support, and from there legitimacy, is a complex and multi-dimensional concept as underlined by Beetham and Lord: “The starting point for any analysis of legitimacy ... has to be the acknowledgement of its complexity” (Beetham and Lord, 1998a: 5).

In order to clearly understand the concept of legitimacy and help to make its complexity intelligible, we use as a starting point the threefold schema of the liberal-democratic legitimacy developed by Beetham and Lord (Beetham and Lord, 1998a, 1998b).

Accordingly, different criteria of legitimacy can be found from the standpoint of comparative political science. Political power is legitimate to the extent that:

- it is acquired and exercised according to established rules (*legality*); and
- the rules are justifiable according to socially accepted beliefs about (1) the rightful source of authority and (2) the proper ends and standards of government (*normative justifiability*); and
positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation on the part of appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities (legitimation) (Beetham and Lord, 1998b: 15).

This distinction is close to the one adopted by the long outline of this workshop, particularly concerning the normative justifiability. Lucarelli distinguishes between three different but interrelated items of legitimacy:

- the input legitimacy – the legal or formal legitimacy enshrined in the Constitution;
- the output legitimacy – the legitimacy arising from the efficiency of common policies and institutions and expressed in formulations such as good governance;
- and the substantial legitimacy – the evolving ability of the EU to justify its existence and to claim allegiance from citizens and member states on the basis of political, social and civic values embodied in its institutions and basic policies (Lucarelli, 2006).

In this paper, we will also be interested in these three concepts. However, we believe that the two first dimensions are not differentiated enough and too normative. We thus propose to exclusively locate the criteria in the field of the beliefs and not restrict to any legal reference. Legitimacy derives from the perceived correspondence of the values of the rulers with the ones of the citizens. So to say, we will consider input legitimacy in the sense given by Parson and Weber. Thus, we propose to define:

- the input legitimacy as the perception by the citizens of the conformity of the rulers values with their own values;
- the output legitimacy as the evaluations of the performance of the rulers (idea which is close to the one of ‘good governance’);
- and the substantial legitimacy which is understood by us as a ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy referring to the conceptualisation of Easton and Blondel.

We understand indeed this last acceptance of the concept as a notion very similar to the Easton’ and Blondel’ notion of ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy. As Cerutti wrote, substantial legitimacy is based on a shared political identity of the European Union and therefore has a lot to do with it (Cerutti,

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1 Whether or not the concept of ‘substantial legitimacy’ has been correctly understood and applied could be discussed, but so far we will use it in the sense of a ‘reservoir’ referring to the conceptualisation of Easton and Blondel.
In the context of the European Union, we will prefer the term of identification\(^2\) to the one of identity. The last content of legitimacy largely overlaps the question of European identification (or identity) which has on its own justified massive attention since the last two decades\(^3\). But we associate to the notion of ‘reservoir’ also the notions of pride and trust because we believe they also refer to some accumulation’s and socialization’s processes. In Weberian terms, identification, pride and trust are social conducts determined by affectual [affektuel] or traditional [traditional] behaviours whereas the input legitimacy may be qualified of value-related conduct [wertrational] and output legitimacy of goal-oriented conduct [zweckrational]\(^4\).

Consciously, this paper restricts itself to the analysis of the links between input legitimacy, output legitimacy and substantial legitimacy\(^5\). We seek to simplify reflections made in the literature with the aim of developing some preliminary hypotheses. The relations between these three subdivisions of legitimacy are illustrated in *figure 2*.

*Figure 2: Relations between input, output and ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input Legitimacy</th>
<th>‘Reservoir’ of Legitimacy or Substantial Legitimacy</th>
<th>Output Legitimacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regarding the relations between these three subdivisions of legitimacy, we can consider on the theoretical level that the reservoir is fulfilled by the positive effects of the input and output legitimacies and emptied when counterbalancing their negative effects. It also appears that when this reservoir falls below a certain level, it raises the question of the stability of the

\(^2\) According to the work of (re-)conceptualisation realized by Sophie Duchesne, we will prefer the concept of ‘identification to Europe’ rather than the commonly used notion of European identity. Duchesne, S. (Forthcoming publication), « Des nations à l’Europe », « l’Europe au-delà des nations » mais aussi « l’Europe contre les nations ». Pour une approche dynamique et complexe de l’identification à l’Europe, paper submitted to *Annales d’Etudes Européennes*, april 2006.


\(^5\) For a external validity of this choice, the reader can refer among others to the following literature : Beetham and Lord (1998a and 1998b), Klingemann, H.-D.(1999), Lucarelli (2006).
political system which can not be anymore satisfied by the level of output legitimacy. We should also recall the interesting thought of Ferrero on the relative independence of the level of legitimacy, corresponding here to the substantial legitimacy, from the concrete performance (Ferrero, 1943). It is the reason why we consider that substantial legitimacy must be seen more like a constant than a variable. In part 2, we will come back on this point.

2. Legitimacy in the European context

2.1. What does legitimacy mean in the European context\(^6\)?

The key questions that we have to address now is whether, how and to what extent these classical conceptualisations of legitimacy are appropriate to the analysis of the legitimacy of the EU seen as a multi-level system. The European context is composed at least from the member states and the European Union qualified as a well structured supra-national political system but still under construction. Both of these political systems seem to be ideally suited for the systems analysis introduced by Easton and subsequently developed by Norris, among others.

First of all, we have to take into account the main specificity of the EU political system which is its multi-level dimension. Whether or not the ground definitions and the multi-criteria approach could be applied to any political system, in the European context, it has to be done at the two (or more)-level: at the members’ states level and at the EU level.

The study of legitimacy within the European context requires indeed a ‘two-level’ analysis which focuses on the interaction between the legitimacy of each of its members’ states and legitimacy of the EU political order. On the one hand, we can assume that the national legitimacy has a strong impact on the beliefs in the legitimacy of the EU. But as we will try to demonstrate in the following paragraphs, this interaction is all but a simple one. On the other hand, the reverse is also true, the legitimacy of the EU should have an impact on the state’s legitimacy. However, as far as the legitimacy is viewed as a social fact which takes its roots in a process of socialization and is defined as a ‘reservoir’ of favourable attitudes, we do make the hypothesis that the

\(^6\) We prefer to use the expression of “Legitimacy in the European context” that “EU legitimacy” because we believe that isolating the question of legitimacy at the European level from the one at the national level constitutes an error as it will be developed follows.
national level is strongly determinant when an analysis of the legitimacy in the European context is desired.

But choosing this bottom-up perspective doesn’t mean that we deny the existence of a reverse effect of the EU legitimacy on the national one. By studying the various feedback processes among and between the different levels of European governance, we seek to get a more complete and exact (but also complicated) picture of the question of legitimacy in the European context. We also assume that the state’s legitimacy can not be studied without referring to the legitimacy of the EU political authority. The impact of European integration and Europeanization on domestic political and social processes in member states can not be ignored and has been largely analysed in the emerging literature.

Convinced by the importance of both socialization’s and accumulation’s processes on legitimacy and considering that the framework of these processes is still the State, we will mainly focus on the bottom-up perspective which better reflects the current reality of the European integration.

Second, as the nature of the EU political system is different of the state one, we could also think that the nature of its legitimacy is different as well. According to the so-called ‘double legitimacy’ thesis (Dehousse, 1995 : 22-26 cited in Beetham and Lord, 1998b: 19), the legitimacy of the EU is at the same time an *indirect* one, derived from the one of its member states and a *direct* one (See figure 3).

*Figure 3: Legitimacy in the European Context*
We should now develop some preliminary hypothesis on how we would expect member states legitimacy to have an impact on the EU political system’s legitimacy and then confront them to empirical data.

We first argue that this impact has different sources depending on the type of legitimacy of the EU that is referred to: indirect or direct legitimacy. In the case of indirect legitimacy, the process that plays the main role is attributed to the accumulation process where state legitimacy is perceived as a kind of ‘reservoir’ for both levels, national and European. In that perspective, the legitimacy of the EU political system is linked to national legitimacy simply because the former is derived from the latter. So to say, in that case, the EU political system relies on the ‘reservoir’ of the member states, which has been constructed through accumulation’s and socialisation processes.

On the other hand, regarding the direct legitimacy, the national level has also an impact but this time through the socialisation process. In order words, ‘citizen preferences are driven by group attachments, by the loyalties, values, and norms that define who a person is’ (Hooghe, L. and Marks, G., 2004: 415). In that case, we expect the relationship between the two levels to be a more complex one that could be approach by figure 4.

*Figure 4 : Possible relationships between State’s Legitimacy and EU direct legitimacy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member States’ Level Legitimacy</th>
<th>EU political system’s Legitimacy</th>
<th>Classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Cumulative Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Reject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2.2. EU political System’s direct Legitimacy

As figure 3 has demonstrated, the question of legitimacy within the European context is a complex one for which analysis exceeds largely the framework of this working paper. However, to carry out a first recognition of the subject, we decide to focus our attention on the direct legitimacy of the EU political system through the analysis of some Eurobarometers indicators. Our task is to test how theoretically positioned dimensions of legitimacy can be identified within the available data.

Concerning the input legitimacy, we do not have a precise indicator perfectly matching with our definition. As a proxy, we choose a rather general item about the image of the European Union (positive/negative) to measure the input legitimacy criteria:

- ‘In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’.

Our choice was lead by the fact that no other item satisfied us plainly as a specific indicator of input legitimacy\(^7\). We do the rather simple assumption that if the rulers govern according to the values of the citizens, the image they give should be positive.

For the output legitimacy, we retain as indicator the standard question about the perceived country's benefits of EU membership:

- ‘Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [our country ] has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union ?’.

Finally, we use three indicators for the measurement of what we've called the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy or substantial legitimacy:

- ‘I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it ? The European Union. Tend to trust, tend not to trust.’
- ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as (a) [nationality] only, (b) [nationality] and European, (c) European and [nationality] or (d) European only?’
- ‘Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be [nationality] ?’ and ‘And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not all proud to be European ?’.

\(^7\) We assume with Linde and Ekman that the survey item ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works’ at both national and European level is not an indicator of support for principles, in our words of input legitimacy, rather it is an indicator of support for the performance of a democratic regime, so to say of output legitimacy (Linde and Ekman, 2003: 391).
As figure 5 shows, all these items are correlated to each other (sign. : .000)\(^8\). The coefficients on the left of the “/” sign give the correlations (r) between the variables\(^9\).

**Figure 5: Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input Legitimacy (Image of Europe)</th>
<th>0.61</th>
<th>Output Legitimacy (Benefice)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reservoir</td>
<td></td>
<td>Substantial Legitimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.50/0.35</td>
<td>0.44/0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantial Legitimacy</td>
<td>0.35/0.22</td>
<td>0.30/0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0.43/0.32</td>
<td>0.34/0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We could think that such a diagram of intercorrelations would mean that all these variables would do nothing but constitute the indicators of only one subjacent variable, the support for example. But we could also apply to these data a more conceptual thought by seeking what is the function of substantial legitimacy, i.e. ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy, compared to the two other forms of legitimacy.

In this respect, our hypothesis is based on the already quoted assumption of G. Ferrero who considers that legitimacy (the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy if we refer to our terms) must be seen more like a constant than a variable, i.e. it operates more or less independently of the concrete performances of the political order. We could also assume that the same kind of relationship exists between the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy and the input legitimacy. To operationalize - partially - this approach, we sought if the relations between the indicators of substantial legitimacy and two other dimensions were independent of the variations of these indicators, by carrying out an analysis of partial correlation of the relations of the input legitimacy and the indicators of

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\(^8\) EB 60.1 2003. UE 15 weighted.

\(^9\) From the methodological point of view, it would have been more indicated to use the rate of Kendall considering the ordinal character of the data, but we employed Bravais Pearson’ coefficient in order to compare the simple correlations and the partial correlations. Besides, the results are very similar between the “t” and the “r”.
substantial legitimacy, while controlling the output legitimacy; and conversely of the relations of the output legitimacy and the same indicators, by controlling this time, the input legitimacy.

The partial coefficients are represented on the figure on the right side of the “/” sign. First of all, we can observe that the effect of the control of input legitimacy item is stronger than the one of the output criteria: the relations decrease by more than an half for trust and even by two thirds for identity and pride. The control of the output item has also reducing effects on the relation between the input and the substantial criteria but this effect is less marked (reduction of a third approximately). The assumption of Ferrero is largely confirmed in the sense that the relation of the performance criteria with what constitutes the ‘essence’ of legitimacy (the substantial legitimacy or the ‘reservoir’ according to our terms) is strongly reduced when we hold constant the other source of power supply of the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy.

It will be noted that the effect of these controls is stronger than the control of the variables of input and output legitimacy for each of the indicators of substantial legitimacy: we go from .61 in binary correlation between the input legitimacy and the output legitimacy, to .50 when controlling trust, .56 for identity and .54 for pride. The relation between input and output legitimacies does not pass by the substantial legitimacy. Two rather specific processes are playing: the first which takes place between the input and the output items and the second between each of these items and the substantial legitimacy. The former could be associated to a value-related conduct or goal-oriented conduct where the second is associated to a affective action, in order to refer to the typology of characteristic forms of social action developed by Weber (Weber, 1968: 55).
3. **Legitimacy and identification: An empirical Framework for Analysis**

As argued above, three interrelated items constitute the so-called nebulous concept of legitimacy: input legitimacy, output legitimacy and substantial legitimacy. The contents of the multi-criteria notion of legitimacy overlap largely the concept of identification which we consider as a part of the substantial legitimacy. We choose here to distinguish between the three dimensions developed above and study more deeply the relationships between the identification, as a part of the substantial legitimacy, and the other two subdivisions of legitimacy, the input and the output.

Our empirical databases are, as in the preceding section, the *Eurobarometers* survey data. Unfortunately, if we want to adopt a multi-level approach, we do not have sufficient data to carry out a robust analysis. However, several indicators exist that deserve attention as a first approximation.

According to the conceptualisation of the supports made by Berglund, Ekman, Vogt and Aarebrot, among others, the identity refers to one specific level of support: the political community, defined as “a basic attachment to the nation beyond the present institutions of government and a general willingness to co-operate together politically” (Berglund, 2006: 61). Regarding the identification’s aspect, three questions are used to measure it (and among them two questions used in the last section):

- ‘People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to (a) your city/town/village, (b) your region, (c) [our country] and (d) Europe. Very attached, fairly attached, not very attached or not at all attached?’

- ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as (a) [nationality] only, (b) [nationality] and European, (c) European and [nationality] or (d) European only?’

- ‘Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not all proud to be [nationality]?’ and ‘And would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not all proud to be European?’

In this modest analysis, we will privilege the former for several reasons. First, it includes four levels of attachment and not only two. Second, the question is formulated in terms of attachment which refers perfectly to the definition of political community adopted above.
The hard core assumption beside this analysis is that the citizens' beliefs in legitimacy are driven by group attachments and by the values which defines who a person is (Hooghe and Marks, 2004). As affective actions in the weberian sense, they result from a socialization process which, we believe, takes place in the framework of the nation-state. That's why we assert that the legitimacy of the European political system can not be thought without linking it to the national legitimacy.

Thus, we have constructed a new identification's scale based on the four items of attachment. We gather the attachment to the town/city and the attachment to the region, dichotomise the response items and from there, construct eight combinations represented in table 1, with their (weighted) frequencies at UE-15 level.

**Table 1 : Attachment to local, national and European levels**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local attachment*</th>
<th>Attachment to the country</th>
<th>Attachment to Europe</th>
<th>Combinations</th>
<th>Frequencies %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Cumulatives</td>
<td>49.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Locals-nationals</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Locals-Europeans</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Exclusive Locals</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Exclusive Nationalists</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Exclusive Europeans</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Nationals-Europeans</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Individualists and others</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Local attachment refers both to the attachment to the town or to the region.
Source: Eurobarometer 60.1 (October-November 2003).

Before analysing this table and in order to test the consistency of this scale with the Moreno one\textsuperscript{10}, we need to have a look on the table 2 which shows their relations. From table 2, we can conclude to the mutual validity of these questions. Indeed, the locals-nationals and exclusive nationalists have the higher percentages of identification with the 'nation only' whereas the exclusive Europeans are the one who describe themselves the most as 'European only'. The

\textsuperscript{10} ‘In the near future, do you see yourself as (a) [nationality] only, (b) [nationality] and European, (c) European and [nationality] or (d) European only?’
higher rates of identification with both the nation and Europe are found in the nationals-Europeans and cumulative categories.

Table 2: Cross tabulation of the new attachment scale and the Moreno question

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTIFICATIONS</th>
<th>(Nationality) only</th>
<th>(Nationality) European and Europeans (Nationality) only</th>
<th>European and Europeans only</th>
<th>DK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cumulatives</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals-nationals</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals-Europeans</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Locals</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Nationalists</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Europeans</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals-Europeans</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualists</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 60.1 (October-November 2003).

Out of table 1, several observations can be drawn. One notes a strong concentration of the results in favour of the cumulative identifications (49.3 %). It is not excluded that a part of these results are due to a problem of fidelity of the measurement (adjacent questions with the same alternatives of answer). However, it will be noticed that 69,2% of ‘cumulatives’ answer the Moreno question by the associations "national and European" and "European and national", which constitutes almost two thirds of coherent answers for these two levels. In the second place, one finds the association of local and national attachments (28.3 %). In order words, it is not unusual for citizens to have multiple identities, conceptualized by Risse as a marble cake in which multiples identities are meshed together. Then, there is a gap to nationals-Europeans (6,5%). Despite small percentages, we believe that these data can nevertheless be subject to analyses considering the big sample size.

What are then the relations of the compound scale with input and output legitimacy’s subdivisions?

To carry out a first recognition of these data, we will scrutinize which are the ‘identification’s combinations’ associated with positive attitudes towards the input and the output legitimacy and
which are those associated to negative evaluations of these two contents of legitimacy. In order to screen the input and output legitimacy items, we will respectively analyse the *Eurobarometer* standard questions about positive/negative image of the European Union\(^{11}\) and about the country’s benefits of EU membership\(^{12}\).

**Table 3: Positive/Negative image of the European Union**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive/Negative Image</th>
<th>Very/Fairly Positive (%)</th>
<th>Neutral (%)</th>
<th>Very/Fairly Negative (%)</th>
<th>DK (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locals-Europeans</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals-Europeans</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulatives</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Europeans</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Nationalists</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Locals</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualists</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals-Nationalists</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Eurobarometer 60.1 (October-November 2003).*

Regarding the input legitimacy’s indicator, associations which follow are relevant:
- the locals-Europeans, the nationals-Europeans, the cumulatives and the exclusive Europeans perceive the more positively the European Union;
- and the exclusive nationalists, the exclusive locals, the individualists and the locals-nationals have a rather negative image of the European Union\(^{13}\).

The table 4 represents the relations between our identification's scale and the perceived benefit of the country’s EU-membership, as a regime performance indicator.

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\(^{11}\) ‘In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’.

\(^{12}\) ‘Taking everything into consideration, would you say that [our country] has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?’.

\(^{13}\) Similar results were found when analyzing the answers to the following question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that [our country’s] membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?’.
Table 4: Evaluation of country’s EU-membership benefit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country’s EU-Membership Benefit</th>
<th>Benefited (%)</th>
<th>Not benefited (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locals-Europeans</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationals-Europeans</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulatives</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Europeans</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individualists</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Locals</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive Nationalists</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locals-Nationals</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer 60.1 (October-November 2003).

Concerning the output legitimacy, rather clear associations can be noted:
- the locals-Europeans, the nationals-Europeans, the cumulatives and the European exclusive have a stronger feeling that their country has benefited of its EU-membership;
- the individualists, the exclusive locals, the exclusive nationalists and the locals-nationals have the reverse feeling.\(^{14}\)

These analyses enable us to modestly draw some preliminary conclusions regarding the relationship between identification and legitimacy in the European context.

First of all, there are some combinations of attachments to the political community which are more legitimating than others. Thus, the cumulative ones, the nationals-Europeans, the exclusive Europeans and the locals-Europeans appear to develop more beliefs in legitimacy both regarding the input legitimacy and the output legitimacy. The beliefs in legitimacy (input and output) increase highly from those who exclusively feel as attached to the national and local levels, on the one hand, and those perceiving themselves as belonging to multiple entities, on the other hand. These analyses corroborate the common assumption made by many scholars that exclusive identification is very powerful at explaining attitudes toward European integration (Marks and Hooghe, 2003; Risse, 2003). We touch here to the basic distinction between exclusive and inclusive identity. However, when regarding the local level, the multiple

\(^{14}\) Similar results were found when analyzing the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item.
attachment to national and local levels dramatically decreases the positive beliefs in both input and output legitimacies of the EU.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that the exclusive attachment to Europe does not involve a remarkably higher percentage of legitimacy’s positive attitudes. An exclusive feeling of belonging to Europe would thus not be the single track to the legitimisation of the European political system. It appears indeed that the cumulative identities (cumulatives, nationals-Europeans and locals-Europeans) are as legitimating as the exclusive attachment to Europe. In other words, it is not true that the more identification is plural, the more it delegitimizes the political system, thus both at the European and national levels. To summarize, legitimacy (diffuse support) requires some identification with Europe, but not one that privileges Europe over the nation state (Risse, 2003: 489).
Concluding remarks

As the first output of a broader research on the meaning and measurement of legitimacy within the European context, this paper aimed at developing and testing some preliminary hypotheses which analysis exceeds largely the framework of this working paper. However, some concluding remarks deserve to be drawn.

First, our presumption that the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy (substantial legitimacy) has to be taken as a constant rather than a variable was corroborated by our study of correlations (section 2.2.). From a theoretical perspective, this outcome oblige us to deeply rethink this aspect of legitimacy and to link it to the socialisation’s process in the light of the Weberian typology of forms of social actions which distinguishes between value-related conduct (input), goal-oriented conduct (output) and affective and/or traditional action (substantial).

Secondly, the classical assumption that identifications constrain preferences on European integration (Carey, 2002; Diez Medrano, 2003; Hooghe and Marks, 2004, 2005) has been confirmed by our modest empirical analysis in the third section. We provide some explanatory evidences that citizens’ beliefs about legitimacy (input legitimacy and output legitimacy) were driven by groups attachments which was perceived as part of the ‘reservoir’ of legitimacy. Indeed, we found that some combinations of identification were more legitimating than others.

Finally, if these results are quite interesting, there are only a static snapshot and further research should investigate the dynamic implications of the subdivisions of legitimacy at the different levels and between these levels. The core analysis is yet far from being achieved and we first need, without any doubt, to deepen our thoughts on the meaning of the concept within a multi-level approach.
References


