Introduction

In the academic literature, national sovereignty over security policy, especially in its external dimension, is said to be the fortress that cannot be touched. The gradual dismantling of that fortress, in the context of the EU, appears to violate this rule in the name of security integration. Security integration is a transfer of policy authority from the national to the supranational level. Since security is the ultimate bastion of sovereignty, as long as Europe is still a collection of nation-states, the expectation should be that each will fight to maintain its jurisdiction over security issues and resist security integration. The Lisbon Treaty, and the lead up to it, proves this expectation false. Interviews of leading actors in the security integration process reveal that the traditional security-based concept of sovereignty – which focuses on the ability for the state to exclusively determine how to protect its citizens – is not the main concern. Rather, to the extent that national interests serve as a counterweight to integration, security-related preferences are dictated by the members’ economic interests. State leaders want to protect industries, research, and capabilities within their own country, and fear what would happen if they lose the ability to benefit from the security sector in their economies. But this emphasis on national economic preferences, which serve as obstacles to security integration, are far more visible in the capitals of member-states than in Brussels.

Are EU member-states simply behaving according to their rational self-interest? It is difficult to pin down what such rational self-interest would produce. On the one hand, states

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1 This paper is mainly based on the last two months of research I have conducted in Brussels.
may individually pursue economic gain to increase their overall national wealth. On the other hand, they may instead cede some of their sovereignty over security decision-making and combine resources to ensure maximum security output and efficient protection of European citizens. Choosing national economic gains over security integration means wasteful duplication. With today’s economic crisis, aging populations, and strained government budgets, it arguably does not make rational sense to do anything but integrate. However, this is easier said than done, and resistance from the capitals is as strong as ever. Short-term election cycles, special interests, industrial lobbies, and immovable legal systems make ground-breaking change difficult. More often than not, EU member-states do not do what is in their collective material interest because individuals and groups within states, or even across states, value other factors more.

Why has security integration proceeded despite resistance from the capitals? Which actors are responsible for pushing it forward? Who is operationalizing general political agreement – to the extent it exists – into specific policy action? How are obstacles overcome? I argue in this paper that although security integration is still very much in its nascence, it can largely be explained by a kind of technocratic path-dependent activity carried out by two powerful networks of diplomatic and military-defense experts based in Brussels. But at the same time, technocratic path-dependence is too simplistic of an account. The cohesiveness and persuasiveness of these expert networks play an important role in influencing security policy outcomes. There have been numerous episodes during which these epistemic communities have served as agents driving the process of security integration forward, despite resistance from their capitals. Peter Haas defines epistemic community as “a network of professionals with
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain or issue area.”² To the extent that political will is needed to move integration forward, it is not primarily coming from the member-states, but from the behind-the-scenes work of these two powerful epistemic communities.³

Of course, member-states provide the general context for this to be possible in the first place. They sign treaties putting structures into place, express the desire to tackle security challenges together, and endorse documents like the 2003 European Security Strategy. But there is a difference between talk and action, intentions and follow-through. When the glare of the media lights fade away, the realities of election cycles, domestic public opinion, and strained budgets set in. To understand integration within Europe, it is necessary to look beyond formal processes of decision-making to group dynamics, relationships, professional norms, substantive norms, and worldviews within these epistemic communities. While I examine the diplomatic epistemic community in-depth elsewhere,⁴ the purpose of this paper is to focus on the military-defense epistemic community.

In the first section, I attempt to draw out the ways in which internal and external security overlap, and briefly highlight the extent to which integration has occurred. Second, I review the epistemic community literature and explain why a military-defense epistemic community fits well into this concept. In the third section, I argue that the military-defense epistemic community is a powerful agent behind security integration in the EU. Fourth, I examine the case study of the 2006 “Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs”. I

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³ There are other important epistemic communities that impact security integration, but the military-defense and diplomatic ones are clearly dominant. For example, for an analysis of a technology epistemic community, see Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “An EU Homeland Security? Sovereignty vs. Supranational Order,” European Security, Vol. 16 (1): 79-97, 2007.
conclude with a “prediction” of the future trajectory of internal-external security integration given the importance of epistemic communities.

**The Internal-External Security Nexus**

If the Lisbon Treaty comes into effect it will be the first really significant EU treaty in eighteen years. Besides the more visible aspects of Lisbon – the advent of a permanent president and a post akin to EU foreign minister – arguably its biggest impact on the trajectory of EU integration will be in the area of internal security.\(^5\) Many of the priorities of the 2005-10 Hague Programme, such as counter-terrorism, immigration, cross-border crime, drugs, and illegal trafficking in humans, will no longer require unanimity voting. This would greatly impact the current pillar system which separates EU policy areas according to the type of decision-making that is required, i.e. supranational vs. intergovernmental.\(^6\) Pillar I policies include the single market, environmental law, the Schengen treaty, and competition law, among other things; pillar II policies fall within the domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; and Pillar III contains involve Justice and Home Affairs. In effect, the third pillar will merge into the first if the Lisbon Treaty is implemented, leaving only CFSP in the intergovernmental domain. The EU would become a *single* Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice with nearly all policy areas being decided by qualified majority voting as opposed to unanimity (with the exception of the UK, Denmark, and Ireland which can opt out). The European Court of Justice will be able to enforce all Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policy, and the Commission will be able to initiate legislation in this area.

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\(^6\) Supranational policies are initiated by the Commission, and are subject to the community method of decision-making involving qualified majority voting. Intergovernmental policies are typically determined by the member-states and must achieve unanimous approval.
To be sure, the evolution of JHA from intergovernmentalism to supranationalism has been on the march for some time. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was an important pre-cursor to the Lisbon Treaty in that it transferred immigration, visas, and asylum to the first pillar. At this point, the third pillar was reduced to “Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters”. There was an ongoing process of review since then during which the package of intergovernmental JHA policies was gradually chipped away. The 2005 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe attempted to give the EU a single legal personality, shared competencies in territorial cohesion, and new areas of cooperation for criminal justice proceedings for terrorism and arms, human, and drugs trafficking. Finally, the June 2007 Council meeting demonstrated the unanimous belief among member-states that JHA no longer belonged in the intergovernmentalist framework. Although the fate of the Lisbon Treaty is still not known it is significant in that it would dissolve what remains of the pillar system, and alongside that, what it represents. There is clearly an important process underway that was not wholly anticipated, and that has important implications for what Europe is going to become.

In the past ten years, since the advent of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a sub-category of CFSP, external security policy has been developing in parallel to JHA’s internal security policy. Consequently, the EU is becoming an increasingly visible external security actor with an emerging global identity, and public opinion strongly supports this. While European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is much younger than JHA, its progress over the past few years has been truly remarkable, especially in terms of its civilian operations. Yet, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar is still not exhibiting formal, supranational

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qualities. The second pillar remains firmly intergovernmental. As I will argue in this paper, however, transnational actors in Brussels are starting to give it a supranational flavor.

In addition, since 9/11, it has become increasingly difficult to talk about internal security without also talking about external security, and the fact that the former is increasingly supranational holds implications for the latter. The two are intertwined, as well as mutually constitutive. First, tackling civil unrest, weak governments, and poverty at their source in third countries can prevent future illegal immigration or terrorist activity within the EU’s borders. Second, developing and funding EU projects to put in place security-oriented technologies for internal protection inevitably holds value for external security technologies. Third, identifying best practices in ESDP civilian missions can be valuable for fighting internal crime and vice versa. For example, the police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina fighting organized crime is potentially valuable. Fourth, fighting the external threat of terrorism and organized crime is better accomplished if internal security is not only well-integrated and organized, but also when the EU is able to project this strength beyond its borders. Clearly, the EU’s internal and external security are enmeshed in a variety of ways, and there is some evidence of cross-pillarization.

Epistemic Communities

The epistemic community concept is particularly useful in understanding security integration in the EU. Peter Haas was influential in bringing the idea of epistemic community to the mainstream international relations literature in the 1990s. The definition he puts forth is “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and

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8 The Seventh Research Framework Programme (FP7), 2007-13, with a budget of €1.4 billion “to research, validate, and integrate security-oriented technologies” is a good example of this.

9 Interview with Steffan Ocusto, Swedish Civcom representative, March 26, 2009.
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.”

Epistemic communities are transnational networks of individuals with shared professional expertise. According to Peter Haas, epistemic communities must have an authoritative claim on knowledge in order to impact policy outcomes. This is what differentiates the membership of an epistemic community from others who interact transnationally in international society. Beyond this, they must share norms or beliefs about cause and effect. Therefore, an epistemic community is rarely so broad as to include an entire discipline. It must be narrow enough that all members not only have the expertise necessary to understand the issue at stake, but also interpret the information similarly, and form the same goals about what should be done. Their policy aims have to reflect their expert knowledge – and not some other motivation – otherwise they lose authority with their target audience which is usually elite decision-makers. So they must have a reputation for recognized expertise in their domain. And this usually entails professional training and common validity tests that support their shared causal beliefs.

Several scholars, including Peter Haas, have applied the concept to empirical case studies of environmentalists, economists, and scientists. Amy Verdun argues that knowledge and expertise are critical to understanding the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Her study shows that the Delors Committee, a group of monetary experts, constituted an epistemic community, and its role has been under-recognized in studies explaining the Maastricht Treaty. Her argument rests on the idea that the process of EU integration has been more technocratic and expert-driven than political for the most part. The Delors Report, which launched the EMU, was crafted by central bankers – monetary experts – and the Maastricht Treaty closely paralleled the contents of the report. Both Verdun and Haas argue that uncertainty

is a major pre-condition for epistemic communities to have an impact. Decision-makers and public opinion must be uncertain about the right policy approach to take in the wake of a given problem. Epistemic communities may exist prior to being ‘called’ to action, but their impact is contingent upon this uncertainty.

Claudio Radaelli further supports this approach, adding that epistemic communities are often in competition with other types of actors, all striving to impact policy outcomes. He writes, “it may well be that in a certain policy area there are two competing coalitions and one coalition is assisted by an underlying epistemic community.”12 To determine when epistemic communities will likely have the most influence, Radaelli argues that it is important to find “conditions of radical uncertainty and political visibility”.13 In these scenarios, epistemic communities can both provide and interpret expert-knowledge, triggering a learning-process which enables decision-makers to act.

Thus, according to Haas, Verdun, and Radaelli epistemic communities can exercise agency only when there is a kind of contextual gap – uncertainty – that allows them to do so. Haas argues that the main exception to this is when the available data does not support the epistemic community’s previously held causal beliefs.14 In other words, when the epistemic community no longer seems to hold its monopoly on expertise because the shared knowledge of its members has been proven false, they will not be able to impact policy outcomes. This is quite logical.

The epistemic community literature brings together a remarkable blend of philosophy, sociology, economics, and politics, making it an incredibly fruitful avenue for research.

13 Radaelli, p. 763.
Knowledge is a source of soft power, and soft power influences international relations in profound ways. This is especially true in the European context. But if knowledge is not organized in some way beyond the individual level, and is not shaped into some kind of coherent consensus, it is likely to have a weak impact. Thus, epistemic communities can help us understand when and why knowledge translates into power. A focus on epistemic communities rather than policy outputs alone brings to light larger trends and lends greater visibility of the future.

I would argue, however, that the epistemic community literature is currently quite self-limiting in terms of really being able to make an impact on the way we understand international relations. In particular, the prerequisite of high uncertainty and the overarching emphasis on scientific knowledge are problematic. I seek to add to the concept in the following three ways. First, I argue that an authoritative claim on knowledge need not be confined to scientific knowledge as has been assumed. Diplomats, judges, defense experts, and international lawyers can be experts, without scientific knowledge, and they are not less expert because of the softer nature of their knowledge. Clair Gough and Simon Shackley argue, “scientific knowledge is the ‘glue’ that helps to keep policy actors committed and can be used as a trump card against opponents to the epistemic coalition.” However, even scientific knowledge is often contested, and the line between what is scientific and non-scientific is blurred. Beyond that, there is further disagreement about what policy approach should arise from knowledge. Antoniadès astutely observers that authoritative claims on knowledge are embedded in social contexts as well. It is

not so important whether the knowledge is correct or not. If the social context is agreeable to the
knowledge put forth, it gives the members of the epistemic community power, throwing doubt
onto the primacy of scientific knowledge, as opposed to other types of knowledge, in
determining outcomes.

Second, epistemic communities do not simply exist or not exist. They can actually be
strong or weak and have a varying impact depending on their internal cohesiveness, authoritative
claim on knowledge, and ability to persuade. This will be examined in terms of the military-
defense epistemic community. Third, a triggering event that sparks new uncertainty is not
necessary for epistemic communities to gain attention. Rather, epistemic communities are
always at work because uncertainty is a built-in feature of the international system. This is
especially true in the EU, which by its nature is a work-in-progress with no agreed upon end-
goal.

In order to identify and determine the strength of an epistemic community, I follow a
methodology of historical process-tracing beginning with the creation of the epistemic
community, and including its evolution over time. I argue that ‘membership’ in an epistemic
community entails (1) a process of initial socialization, which can begin very early in one’s
career, followed by (2) continued deliberation and clarification of norms, (3) shaping of values,
and finally (4) development of coherent policy goals. The ‘Value-Shaping’ phase is critical to
the development of coherent policy goals because it allows members to determine the
implications of their knowledge. It is a kind of re-socializing in light of learning, real-world
events, and shifting expectations. Epistemic communities often espouse policy goals after the
first or second stages then re-evaluate these goals after the third. Figure 1 attempts to clarify the
processes that occur within epistemic communities.
Figure 1. From Socialization to Policy Outputs

Initial Socialization within nascent epistemic community → Deliberation & clarification of shared causal norms → Value-Shaping & response to real-world events → Policy Goals

Beyond recognizing who is a member of an epistemic community and the processes they undergo, how can we decipher who is not? Where are the boundaries of an epistemic community? As the above description implies, membership relies heavily on practice. We may be able to identify individuals clearly belonging to an expert group, but if they do not participate in deliberation with others, with the goal of shaping policy, then they are not part of the epistemic community. This is not to say that agency is all that defines membership. Willingness to be involved in policy deliberation is a pre-requisite. Once an epistemic community comes together, it can exercise varying degrees of agency. In short, individuals must objectively possess recognizable expertise in a particular domain – scientific or non-scientific – and practice involvement in politics.

Second, it is important to distinguish between an ordinary bureaucratic committee and an epistemic community. Most committees will have a level of esprit de corps regardless of their place in the hierarchy and level of expertise. Thus, it is easy to find individuals from the same profession with shared norms and common knowledge. However, an epistemic community is more than its formal label. Indeed, epistemic communities may not and often do not exist within structures of government. It is typically easier to identify and study non-governmental epistemic communities, such as environmentalists, doctors, and economists. However, since epistemic communities exist regardless of whether they have a formal place in institutional structures, it’s important to look broadly to find them, to peel back structures to find the real dynamics.

18 Pouliot
Without this careful look at processes of influence and decision-making a big piece of the puzzle could be missing.

There are numerous ways in which it is possible to recognize an epistemic community even if it is embedded in a formal structure. Is a particular committee more than the sum of its parts? Is it producing outcomes that go beyond the expectations of its formal functions? Do the committee’s members bring a high-level of expertise that they possessed before taking up their institutional positions? Did they perhaps even know each other or work with each other in previous settings? Might they, as a collective, wield influence by virtue of their expertise and high status even without the existence of the committee? A look into the emergence and historical development of the expert network is useful in this regard. Do the members of the committee meet often outside of work and informally? Do they share a particular culture and professional norms that are independent of the committee? These factors are helpful in distinguishing not only the difference between a strong or weak epistemic community, but also between a weak epistemic community and an ordinary bureaucratic committee.

An EU Military-Defense Epistemic Community

My research, attempting to elucidate the role of the military-defense epistemic community, is mainly based on interviews of EUMC permanent representatives. These were semi-structured interviews lasting for an average of one hour in February-March 2009. To provide some background, the EUMC is the highest military body in the Council, composed of

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19 I have interviewed four EUMC permanent representatives so far: General Sorin Ioan (Romania), LtGen A.G.D. van Osch (the Netherlands), Major General István Békési (Hungary), and Brigadier General Raimonds Graube (Latvia). I intend to add more interviewees throughout 2009. Research into the internal workings of this epistemic community must rely on interviews as there are no transcripts of informal meetings, and formal summaries of meetings are classified and limited in what they can reveal.

20 Interviewees were not given the questions in advance, but they knew that the purpose of the interview was to test whether they are part of an epistemic community. It was my impression that each interviewee tended to emphasize the limits of his power rather than trying to maximize his self-importance.
Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) of the member-states. They are charged with carrying out the Petersburg Tasks, the European Security Strategy, and EU operations in third countries. By treaty agreement in December 2000, the Chief of the EUMC must be a four-star officer, while the other committee members should hold the rank of a three-star General or Admiral. In May 2005 the EU Military Staff, consisting of over 200 civilian and military personnel was established to assist the EUMC. The focus here, however, is on the EUMC’s under-recognized permanent military representatives in Brussels.

I argue that these permanent military representatives form the core of the military-defense epistemic community, and not the Chiefs of Defense above them who only meet twice per year for one day. Beyond these core players, are the EU Military Staff housed in the Council Secretariat, and the Military Committee Working Group housed in the permanent representations. The dynamic between the Chiefs of Defense and the military representatives is not unlike the dynamic between member-states’ ministers and the Brussels-based Coreper ambassadors on the political-diplomatic side. Critically, as I will return to later, the military representatives are double-hatted. They represent their countries to both the EU and NATO, and are at the highest level permanently in Brussels. For NATO, they are just one step below the North Atlantic Council (NAC). For the EU, which is the main interest of this paper, the military representatives generally handle three types of tasks. First, they play an informative role, discussing views on what is happening on the ground in EU military operations and receiving briefings from operational commanders. Second, they deliberate on issues that need an immediate decision, such as agreeing to install an air traffic management system. They

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21 The Petersburg Tasks, constructed in 1992, are the underlying framework for ESDP. They outline the type and scope of military missions taken by the EU – humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management.

22 The 2003 European Security Strategy outlines the EU’s actions in the fight against terrorism, with the recognition that military action alone will not diffuse the threat.
determine the necessary requirements and contributions from the member-states and try to reach consensus. This decision is then passed up to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) ambassadors. Finally, they have ongoing discussions of informal issues, during which they will check each other’s points of view and figure out what is possible before any formal proposals are put forward.23

EUMC generals are at the core of external security integration. Their counterparts on the internal security side are the ambassadors in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper II). The official hierarchy of the Council somewhat misrepresents the positions of these two committees if the goal is to understand the role of elite expertise and agency in outcomes of internal-external security policy. The right side of the diagram below attempts to express the idea that the Coreper II, PSC, and EUMC are roughly at the same level when it comes to expertise, status, and influence. PSC is technically supposed to submit all of its points of agreement to Coreper II for a formal decision, but in practice it is mainly a matter of a division of labor among issue areas. Coreper II does not really deal with ESDP operations and missions, while the PSC does.

23 Graube Interview.
With this background in mind, I argue that military representatives are doing more than what might be expected of them from their official hierarchy within the Council, and that they are able to do so because they together form an epistemic community, with the resultant agency that such status entails. This argument rests on the re-conceptualization of the epistemic community concept discussed above. I will now elaborate upon the qualities that make this group a relatively strong epistemic community: similar training and career path, high meeting frequency, common professional norms and culture, and shared causal beliefs derived from military expertise.

**Military Training & Expertise.** First, high-ranking military officials are experts and have a specific, authoritative claim on technical knowledge that comes from career experience,

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24 This diagram is still a work-in-progress. The arrows represent the flow of power and who tasks whom. The diagram does not include the role of the Commission which is nonetheless important, nor does it include the EUMS.

25 This is not meant to imply that all military personnel around the world are a part of a cohesive, expert-driven community.
education, and training. All EUMC military representatives have spent extensive time in the armed forces of their respective countries, working their way up through the ranks. They have been commanders and chiefs of staff, attended military academies, and served as faculty at defense colleges. At least eleven of them received advanced mid-career training in the United States, and all but two have received training outside of their own country. At least one has a Ph.D. and two have Master’s degrees. Seven have attended the NATO Defense College in Rome, five went to Washington DC to further their education at the National Defense University, and a handful also attended the US Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Most have been posted to either NATO or the UN earlier in their careers. The remarkable similarities in training and education contribute to a culture of shared values within the broader epistemic community. All together, EUMC military representatives are clearly experts in long-term security and defense strategic planning, and many of them have decades of experience in the defense industry, security policy research, and actual battle planning.

Common Background & Culture. By the time the military representatives arrive in Brussels, they have followed very similar career paths and find they have much in common with each other. Often, they have already met each other at previous postings, but even if their paths have not crossed before, they have certainly served in the same locations at one point or another and are able to immediately connect with one another as a result. As Lt. General Van Osch put it:

The main basis of our esprit de corps is our common background. We are military within a big diplomatic environment. We have the same language, same jargon, same kind of military thinking, and we read each other military philosophers. Many of us knew each other before. At least we have been in the same missions or have common things to talk about.  

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26 http://www.nato.int/cv/milrep/cv-mlrp.htm
Military representations find they develop an instant rapport with each other. They often know what it means to have been on the battlefield as a soldier, to be responsible for soldiers’ lives, and being of a similar age, they have usually spent time on the same operation. Many also have experience working on EU issues, such as providing guidance to the EU Military Staff, which supports the EUMC.\textsuperscript{28}

There is a broad military culture that is common across EU member-states, and exists independent of the unique Brussels environment, which I address below.\textsuperscript{29} The permanent representatives describe several qualities: efficiency, a can-do attitude, and the belief that no decision is a decision in itself.\textsuperscript{30} All three are interrelated. Efficiency is first and foremost a part of European military culture. In many cases, soldiers’ lives are on the line, and no matter what rank a military officer holds, he or she must be able to make decisions quickly. To accomplish this, a can-do attitude is necessary, the idea that there is always a solution, and the main challenge is to identify it quickly. Making no decision at all is a decision in itself because if those at the top are silent, events on the battlefield will still play out. Military officers fundamentally accept that inaction is still a kind of action. Brigadier General Raimonds Graube said:

\begin{quote}
We are the most efficient EU committee, same for NATO because it’s military. It comes from the blood, from military life, from when you were a lieutenant. If you don’t make a decision it’s costly. If you don’t make a decision it’s a decision. As you get more senior, there’s more time for thinking. This is what unites us. Many know each other from previous missions or have been to the same places. What makes us more like a club is that we all have soldiers fighting together everywhere. This is a solid idea bringing us together.\textsuperscript{31}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{28} Interview with General Ioan, Romania. February 23, 2009.
\textsuperscript{29} I focus here on the internal military culture as opposed to the external military culture which is vastly different across member-states. Internal military culture is how militaries operate on a practical level, while external military culture is determined by political leaders and public opinion. For example, with respect to the latter, a country like Germany is anti-militarist in its culture while France is more militarist.
\textsuperscript{30} Interview with General Van Osch, the Netherlands. March 13, 2009.
\textsuperscript{31} Interview with Brigadier General Raimonds Graube, Latvia. March 13, 2009.
These military norms are quite different from political or diplomatic approaches. If a group of diplomats is unable to reach agreement, they can decide that they have pushed the issue far enough and it is time to set it aside. To be sure, a lack of consensus is considered a failed outcome for diplomatic negotiations, but not really a decision in itself. As Graube expressed, however, the idea that a decision must be made as efficiently as possible is implicitly linked to a career in which lives are at risk whenever there is indecision at the top.

Besides this general military culture that the military representatives share in common, there is also a distinctive element brought into the mix when they begin their work in Brussels. After military representatives arrive in Brussels they build upon their immediate rapport to undergo a period of socialization in their new setting in Brussels. This happens at different times for different individuals as turnover is not coordinated across member-states. Some are fairly new to the job, while others have been posted there for three years and are near the end of the typical length of their assignment (although some may stay up to four years). Major General Békési said:

> It’s a tradition somehow inside the organization that if someone steps in he has to follow the rules. In 1998, I attended the Army War College, and had to follow the rules and traditions. It was very different, and I had to figure out how to quickly follow. It was quite different when I first arrived here as well, and my colleagues were very helpful. I quickly learned what should be done.32

Their shared background, language, and experiences certainly help in establishing a common culture that is in some ways unique to the EU-NATO environment. Those within the group are adept at helping new members learn the new aspects of their professional norms.

The process of socialization is important as the multilateral setting, atmosphere at NATO headquarters, and double-hattedness of their posts, all go beyond what they might have experienced in the past. First, in this multilateral setting, politics is a part of the job.

32 Interview with Major General Békési, February 26, 2009.
General Graube said,

At our level, you can’t separate the political and military. You have to know how to understand another country’s other aspects. This is a strategic environment. The operational environment is more about following orders.\(^{33}\)

Van Osch concurs:

Both the military aspects and other aspects are important at our level. We always think of the population. Factors of influence are numerous. There are clearly military, political, and economic arguments.

Thus, while there is a tendency to imagine among the general population that military officers simply follow orders, and this is fundamental to military culture, at the level of the permanent military representatives, the chain of command is not part of the job any longer. As experts, with decades of exposure to different aspects of military-defense strategies, they are now in the driver’s seat and it is a political seat.

Second, the atmosphere at NATO headquarters emphasizes the multilateral, multi-hatted nature of their work. The generals spend all but one day per week time at their NATO offices, although they continue to work equally on EU and NATO issues depending on what is most pressing. General Van Osch said,

We don’t want to fail because we are very visible. We are walking around in uniform in a diplomatic world. The civilian staff is four times bigger than the military staff at NATO.

And their previous postings generally do not prepare them for this distinctive institutional aspect of the environment at NATO. Van Osch added, “Military principles involve one-hatted leadership. All have this principle. This situation is unusual.” This can result in some comedic situations. “Formally, I’m sometimes not allowed to give a document to myself. Eighteen of us are in the same position.”

To add even more complexity to the situation, when the military representatives have their NATO hats on, they actually have more status than when they are wearing their EU hats. General Graube said,

*We play a higher role in NATO. We’re the highest level that reports to the NAC. In the EU, the military committee is one part. The EU also engages in state-building; it can have CIVCOM involved. We are more focused in NATO. In the EU, we are part of a larger picture. Our role is a little lower.*

In effect, the same general owns hats of somewhat unequal status, despite the fact that he is the definition of high-ranking by virtue of being a general. Structurally, the EUMC is placed below the Political and Security Committee (PSC) on a par with the Civilian Committee for Crisis Management (Civcom). The PSC, in turn, should answer to Coreper II (although this often does not happen in practice). This status-differential between the EU and NATO hats is recognized within the Council of the EU. Quentin Weiler, French *chargé de mission* for the PSC said, “EUMC is very high-ranking, but still subordinate to the PSC.”34 By contrast, the diplomats in Civcom are middle-ranking, of lower-status, and far earlier in their careers than the military representatives. Yet, Civcom and the EUMC are of equal rank within the Council. Therefore, not only is the double-hatted nature of the EUMC group at odds with traditional military culture, but the EU’s relatively low placement of the EUMC within the Council hierarchy make the official nature of the committee quite idiosyncratic (see above diagram).

Third, as already mentioned, the EU side of their work in particular takes on a far more encompassing definition of security than one usually finds in a more traditional military culture. For the first time, they are dealing with the internal-external security nexus. Again, this is not unlike Coreper ambassadors who find themselves in negotiations over traditional foreign policy.

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34 Interview with Quentin Weiler, Permanent Representation of France, January 21, 2009.
issues alongside internal governing. The case study of the Long-Term Vision will explore this idea further.

The common background and culture of the military-defense epistemic community is part of what makes the military representatives of the EUMC more than simply a Council committee. There is a natural allegiance that exists before the generals even arrive in Brussels. This paves the way for them to exercise agency beyond their instructions, to add up to more than the sum of their parts, and to go beyond rational bargaining. Once in Brussels, these ties flourish, and there is a sense of camaraderie and willingness to help others that maintains the common culture and adds a new, distinctive layer onto it. The common culture among the military representatives at the same time reflects traditional military norms as well as the realities of an emerging, post-modern era of military expertise, where national borders, interests, and suspicions are no longer as relevant as they were in the past.

**Meetings and Professional Norms.** The amount of time that members of an epistemic community spend together is a critical factor in determining cohesiveness. Quantity of meetings is one simple measure of this, but to dig deeper it is also necessary to consider the quality of the meetings, i.e. if a meeting is too formal or structured for the individuals to speak openly then it is not as productive. There will naturally arise an *esprit de corps* when meetings are frequent, but an epistemic community rests on more than this. Ultimately, professional norms determine the quality of meetings. Meetings must be an opportunity for real deliberation. The strength of common culture and the quality of meetings are mutually constitutive as meetings are the primary forums in which professional norms are expressed and culture is consolidated.

Formal EUMC meetings are on the agenda once per week, and additional meetings are quickly scheduled if there is a crisis. Naturally, it is in the informal meetings, outside of the
walls of NATO, that the military representatives really make decisions. They have frequent working coffees and dinners at each other’s homes on average three or four times per week. It is even quite often that they will get together five times per week. In addition, there is a reception with each presidency, a good opportunity to get to know each other, as well as “away-day” visits to EU military operations, for example in Chad. Twice per year there are more formal non-permanent military committee meetings where the Chiefs of Defense participate at the table.

Military representatives also meet on numerous occasions at conferences, seminars, and think-tanks, when their schedules allow for this. In particular, NATO-ESDP generals and ex-generals can regularly be found attending and participating in Security Defense Agenda seminars.

As mentioned, the EUMC representatives spend most of their time in their NATO offices, whether they are working on NATO or EU issues, but Wednesdays are generally spent at the EU’s council building. As Romanian EUMC representative, General Ioan describes it,

I spend Wednesdays in the EU, and dedicate all day to EU issues and discussing in detail. We also have working lunches and receptions. There is an equal divide of work between NATO and the EU. We are responding to all, but there is overlap of activities. We choose based on which is more important, and our deputies can participate in others.

It is important to note that beyond the overlap evident in NATO and ESDP areas, double-hattedness means that the military representatives are doubling up on both formal and informal meetings, and NATO involves its own set of meetings. Békési said, “NATO has the same type of meetings, but there is much more possibility for special committee meetings, which must be held.”

Since the membership of the two organizations is similar but not the same, meetings must be scheduled generously. It would obviously be unacceptable for the generals, during the

35 Van Osch Interview.
36 Ioan Interview.
37 Ioan Interview.
Wednesday EU meeting, to formally discuss a purely NATO issue without the American representative in the room. More meetings mean more time together, and a tighter cohesiveness in the group.

Beyond the sheer quantity of meetings, it is important to consider what actually happens in these meetings and whether or not real deliberation takes place. First of all, translation is not a part of these meetings, which aids in direct communication. A strong military norm is to speak in English or French, meaning that the generals share language as part of their shared culture.

General Graube explained,

Formally, the military committee is different from other committees. If agricultural ministers get together, they can speak in their own language. This costs a lot of money. The only exception is the military. We can’t speak so many languages. If you are on the battle-field and everyone is speaking seventeen different languages nothing can work. It must be French or English.

In practice, only the French and Belgian generals stick to French while the others use English. In formal meetings, flags are up, and everything is recorded. Their discussion becomes an official paper, and is circulated to those with high enough security clearance. Very few are de-classified for general public consumption.38 “Flags down” is when the generals can discuss frankly with one another whether or not they agree with their instructions. Graube said, “There are sub-dynamics to the process when flags are down. In an informal meeting we are always honest.”

These sub-dynamics include “signaling” in a way that everyone can interpret. For example, if a general begins his statement with “I have instructions to say…” everyone is alerted to the likelihood that he has strict red lines from his capital, and that even though he does not personally agree with them, he may not be able to move from his country’s position. An even more ominous signal is when a general sends his deputy to the meeting instead of going himself.

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38 Van Osch Interview.
Upon the deputy’s arrival, everyone else in the room knows to expect him to read aloud his instructions verbatim. As Van Osch describes it,

You know something is really wrong if Cyprus sends a deputy and he starts with reading instructions. I never have to do it that way, but we all know that if this is happening, maneuvering space is zero. The military representative does it that way so that he never has to see the emotional reaction. He’s protecting himself from the anger of the others because it can be very frustrating.\(^{39}\)

This particular kind of signaling behavior also serves as a protection mechanism. Everyone understands that on any given occasion, anyone of them might find himself in a tough position, with strict instructions that he personally does not support. Yet, they collectively define success as reaching a compromise, and tempers can flair when this success is threatened by one stubborn position. By sending a deputy, a general protects himself from the anger of his peers, and preserves the cohesiveness of the whole. Van Osch said, “We remain friends and proficiently fight at the same time and that’s the best way to get results.”

Another signal that there may be obstacles to compromise is when the quality of the argumentation itself flounders. Van Osch said,

A military representative may use an argument that seems irrelevant, but doesn’t want to say that it is. It starts if someone feels [that the reasoning] is crazy and it happens always. Of course it weakens the argument if you don’t believe in it yourself.

Sometimes a general, obligated to state his case in a certain way, ends up fighting an uphill battle, trying to work with the twin forces of his nation’s hidden agenda and his own lack of support for what he must say working against him. The military representatives know each other well enough to be able to discern if the argument is empty, and this undermines the would-be persuader’s convincingness from the start.

Along with language and signaling, a central aspect of the military representatives’ body of shared professional norms is the distinction between “flags-up” and “flags-down”. When

\(^{39}\) Van Osch Interview.
flags are up, the generals are obligated to serve as mouthpieces for their chiefs of defense (CHODs) at home. Despite this, they are still able to signal certain issues to each other as described above. With flags down, however, discussions take on a tone of expediency. A decision must be made, and it is up to them to find the solution. They are free to express their perspectives as professionals, rather than as transmission belts for state preferences. They can distance themselves from their instructions, and speak honestly about how to reach consensus based on their own expertise. None of these generals have any significant diplomatic experience, yet they find themselves achieving the level of consensus that characterizes ambassadorial negotiations. But there is an important distinction between the two. While their ambassadorial counterparts rely on finely-tuned negotiation skills, the generals rely more on a desire to get things done. After all, no decision is still a decision.

Military culture dictates that a solution is always there, and finding it is what determines success or failure. Van Osch said,

We are not successful if we can’t agree on a topic. And basically it’s almost always the case that if we don’t come to consensus, it’s not because of a military argument. It’s political interest. I can’t think of an example without consensus on military issues. If we don’t find consensus, it’s a political issue.

And although the military representatives deal with political issues too, they are first and foremost military officials charged with designing military solutions. If there is irreconcilable political obstruction, it ultimately boils down to whether the instructions coming from the capitals make it impossible to move forward. Where then is the room for this epistemic community to exercise agency?

*The Nature of Military Agency.* The short answer is that they find military solutions to political problems. In other words, they find compromise solutions despite obstructions. Van Osch said,
The military starts to work around it and there you see a difference… If the decision is there, the military is quick in implementing. We anticipate everything which is necessary. Formally, there’s no consensus, we can’t have coordination between NATO and EU forces in Kosovo, for example. Of course, we are coordinating and the military just makes it happen. They play the game at the political level, and we go forward.

When it is necessary to keep a military operation going because men and women are already on the ground, political obstacles cannot be the answer. Fundamentally, these generals are experts at battle planning, securing threatening situations, and trying to keep soldiers alive. They know how to create strategies based on best-practices and experience, and they reach agreement on this as a matter of course. As the Long-Term Vision case-study will show, the military representatives’ ability to influence real on-the-ground outcomes beyond expectations is also reflected in more conceptual policy areas.

However, the EUMC generals do not simply give up on the main political process. Van Osch said:

Solutions are never found in formal meetings. They’re always found in the evenings….and it’s the whole community. I invite diplomats to come to dinners as well so we can try to understand and influence them. We cannot explain in formal meetings how to get agreement. We are very much influencing the political level.

The three or four informal dinners per week are also an opportunity to socialize with diplomats, in particular the PSC ambassadors.

Unlike in the rest of the Council hierarchy, it is not part of the EUMC’s modus operandi to escalate issues to their CHODs. Formally, the decisions are made by the CHODs, but as a key preparatory body, each military representative is constantly informing his CHOD of what is possible, and how the negotiations are playing out in the EUMC. After all, they know more about the issues at stake because they deal with them on a daily basis. The interaction between EUMC permanent representatives and CHODs runs parallel to the one between ministers and Coreper II. Even if the ministers come to Brussels to deal with a particular issue, they rely
heavily on their permanent representatives to tell them what to do. Sometimes they do not even show up to the meeting. An ambassador described how on occasion a minister would be sent to Brussels to negotiate particularly important components of treaties, but would not show up at the relevant meetings. He said,

I have seen how they have flown in ministers or deputy ministers and they did not show up for meetings because their permanent representative went for them …. They are very intelligent, high-profile, and able men but it is difficult for them to do it if they are not used to negotiating or do not know the treaty. Even those who have chosen others rely on their Personal Representative.\(^{40}\)

Similarly, when the CHODs come to Brussels they rely heavily on their EUMC representative.

Békési said:

Yes, I understand issues better [than the capital]. During preparation, I try to give him [the CHOD] necessary information, but they’re busy all the time so we have to separate what type of information to bring to his attention. It is a short brief.

A personal presence in Brussels is a necessary prerequisite to really understanding ongoing formal and informal deliberations, and to keeping abreast of the intricate policy-making environment.

Another source of permanent representatives’ collective agency is their shared worldviews regarding EU integration. This will be examined more closely in the Long-Term Vision case study as well. Interviews reveal that the military representatives believe in the European project that they are representing. They think security integration is a positive development, and that it is in fact necessary given the current military-defense climate of declining defense spending, ongoing differences in resources, and duplication of security research. For example, General Ioan said:

It’s a necessity to have the same type of capabilities. Capabilities to cover the entire spectrum of military forces, not only mechanized or combat, but also other sorts, intelligence… These forces must be compatible and interoperable. If you’re not

\(^{40}\) Anonymous, personal interview.
interoperable, you at least should be compatible. This involves integration...The EU should have a common security identity.

Considering that these generals spent much of their careers focusing on traditional national interests and developing national hard power (ESDP is only ten years old), it is not a given that they would share pro-security integration norms. It is quite clear in this case that their expertise is primarily what drives them towards these worldviews. An additional, but likely weaker variable, is the fact that they are in Brussels immersed in EU affairs and there may be a draw to “go-native”.  

Overall, the generals are able to collectively influence EU decision-making on operational and conceptual military issues because their expertise provides them with clear-cut solutions to political obstacles, and because they are able to persuade their political masters – the PSC ambassadors and their CHODs. To what extent is the military-defense epistemic community pushing forward internal and external security integration?

**Cooperation vs. Integration.** It is important to come back to the point that security integration is still very much in its nascence. This does however make it a fruitful time to try to shed light on emerging dynamics as a means of potentially understanding future trajectories. To the extent that the military-defense epistemic community is behind security integration, as opposed to just cooperation, it is useful to disaggregate their double-hattedness.

The distinction between their NATO and ESDP functions illustrates well the difference between cooperation and integration. Since it is apparent that the same key actors are in both and that they constitute an epistemic community, the next conclusion might be that NATO is also undergoing a similar process of security integration. This is not the case. NATO is still very

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41 Most generals did not deal with EU issues before, and thus were not selected specifically for their knowledge of EU policy.
42 Only the French and Belgian military representatives are not double-hatted.
much a cooperative enterprise rather than something that is beginning to show supranational elements. Much of the explanation for this is that NATO’s structures simply do not allow room for this. In the case of the EU, the member-states laid some of the groundwork in that (1) integration is a fundamental part of the EU albeit in economic terms, (2) institutions within the EU such as the Commission and ECJ provide a precedence for integration beyond economic policy, and (3) political will for common action, identity, and voice has been expressed throughout the EU’s history.

NATO was certainly never intended to follow a route towards integration, and its history makes this virtually unimaginable. First, NATO missions do not involve a blending of different national troops under one flag, as EU missions do. NATO strategy involves putting “flags to posts”, a process that distributes each country’s troops to a particular location on the map such that there is no overlap.43 Second, NATO has no significant assets. It owns SHAPE and NATO buildings and some AWACS (airplanes), but it does not have a single soldier or own a tank. Its capabilities come from its member-nations. NATO does have a comparative advantage in that over the course of its development it has developed an experienced command and control structure, and fine-tuned common standards. NATO has a lot of experience to back up its reputation. On the other hand, the EU has 30,000 civil servants in Brussels as well as EU buildings. It also has numerous levers of power: diplomatic, military, and political. This is where the EU’s strength lies. The EU also has a good size budget for ESDP: 2.5% of VAT payments in the EU go to ESDP44, the Commission has its own budget for civilian missions, and the ATHENA mechanism allows for some common budgeting for military operations.

43 NATO briefing, March 11, 2009.
44 Presentation by Cdr Keven Blake, Royal Navy, at SHAPE Headquarters, March 10, 2009.
Third, NATO is essentially a one-issue organization – defense – while the EU is necessarily involved in a range of issues. On a daily basis, the EU must ensure the safety of its citizens on a variety of different levels, from food safety to transportation security to traditional military defense. General Sorin Ioan, said:

What differentiates the EU from NATO is that the EU is defending people inside the community, defending them from everything – security of food, energy, homes… concerning an entire variety of social life of each person in the European community. Defense is just one issue on the list of EU pre-occupations. The EU has to take care of every single EU citizen to be sure there won’t be any break in terms of food, certification of food, processing…the entire process. All processes covered by the EU have legislation that is unique and must be obeyed. The difference between the EU and NATO is in EU common legislation for all countries. All sequences of human life and also defense of EU countries and interests.

Security is defined much more broadly in the EU than in NATO, in large part because of the integration that has happened in the economic, social, and political areas.

These three main differences in the EU’s and NATO’s approaches to security emphasize the distinction between NATO – a quintessential cooperative institution – and the EU, a quasi-federalist, ever-integrating structure. Embodied within the double-hatted EUMC permanent representatives is the idea that integration is possible within the EU, and that it is fundamentally different compared to NATO. Moreover, it is militarily desirable.

**A Case Study: Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and Capacity Needs**

This case study sheds light on a specific example of the military representatives’ role in security integration on the more conceptual side. The Long-Term Vision for European Defense Capability and Capacity Needs (LTV) is a conceptual strategy that the military-defense epistemic community played an important role in developing. It is essentially a policy strategy that accounts for demographic, economic, political, and security strategies that Europe will face

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45 Presentation by Cdr Keven Blake, Royal Navy, at SHAPE Headquarters, March 10, 2009.
twenty years from now and prescribes solutions to long-term military capability and capacity needs. Documentation of EUMC negotiation is very limited; indeed most of it is in the form of verbal communication. Because this policy initiative was at least partially debated in an outside forum – the Security Defense Agenda – it is possible to trace some of the development of the LTV and the EUMC’s role in shaping it. It is important to note that the military representatives were not the only ones contributing to the LTV. They worked on a specific part of it, but deliberations included a wider network, or epistemic coalition, defined as a transnational group of individuals with multiple areas of expertise that share the same policy goal.46

An Epistemic Coalition. Although members of the epistemic coalition that created the 2006 LTV came from different professions – research, military, and technology – they had a synergistic kind of expertise. While the military representatives were experts at planning defensive and offensive strategies in the field, the researchers and academics were able to draw important generalizations about these strategies, including big-picture, socio-political implications. The technology experts, meanwhile, had worked closely with the military representatives to develop and provide the weapons and logistical equipment necessary for successful operations. They knew what was possible in terms of future weapons systems, IT, and potential costs. Separately, these professionals might only have been able to tackle their piece of the puzzle, but together they had a powerful knowledge base upon which to put a multi-faceted agenda together.

At the June 2003 European Council in Thessaloniki, the EU member-states approved a mandate to create the European Defense Agency (EDA) with the specific aim to establish a

European Defence Equipment Market.\textsuperscript{47} Less than two years later the EDA became a reality, with Javier Solana (also the High Representative for CFSP) as head of the Agency. In March 2005, the Steering Board, comprised of participating (excluding Denmark) member-states’ defense ministers and Solana, decided to establish by the end of the year “a voluntary intergovernmental approach to opening up defence procurement within Europe.”\textsuperscript{48} The EDA was instrumental in bringing this military-defense epistemic coalition together through its request for research on the Long-Term Vision, and its broader agenda to foster strong, supportive networks.\textsuperscript{49} Seppo Kääriäinen, Finnish Defense Minister at the founding of the EDA said, “We need interoperable and reliable solutions that can support both homeland defence and the requirements of working ESDP cooperation.”\textsuperscript{50} Thus, the EDA created the broad context for such a policy to emerge, and now it was up to the experts to lead it to fruition. In November 2005, the Steering Board conveyed to the Council the urgent need to plan ahead, although discussions had already begun at least since April 2005.\textsuperscript{51} As Javier Solana described it:

> It is vital to have this kind of 20-year perspective, given the lead times typically involved in developing defence capability. Decisions we take, or fail to take, today will affect whether we have the right military capabilities, and the right capacities in Europe’s defence technological and industrial base, in the third decade of this century.\textsuperscript{52}

On October 3, 2006, after 11 months of deliberation within the military-defense epistemic coalition, the Steering Board endorsed the completed LTV document.\textsuperscript{53} The process of how this


\textsuperscript{48} “Report by the Head of the European Defence Agency to the Council,” 17 May 2005, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{49} At the time, the EDA was working quickly to establish an “Extranet” that would serve as a communication and discussion forum, allowing member-states, experts, and EU institutions to readily participate in a more informal manner. “EDA’s relations with key stakeholders,” Annex to Council Document 14421/05.


\textsuperscript{53} It is important to remember that the Steering Board – member-state defense ministers – were political decision-makers – with the status of civilians. The new staff members of the EDA participated as part of the military-defense epistemic community.
occurred is critical to understanding the important role of this epistemic coalition in fostering long-term security norms and launching the first major steps towards long-term security integration.

In the lead up to the creation of the LTV, the epistemic coalition was comprised of (1) members of the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and their permanent representatives, (2) security experts from the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris, and (3) a group of European scientists, technology experts, and academics. While there was some interaction among them, they could be characterized as three distinct groupings, each with their own separate characteristics.

In the months preceding the submission of the LTV to the EDA’s Steering Board, a process of deliberation and clarification of shared causal norms occurred. On June 13, 2006, four months prior to the completion of the LTV document, key members of the epistemic coalition attended an Expert Seminar hosted by the Security and Defence Agenda (SDA), an independent, non-governmental think-tank based in Brussels. In attendance were nine research/security experts, eight high-ranking military officials, seven EDA officials, and four EU officials. SDA’s membership primarily includes EU and military officials, as well as defense, security, and industry experts. One of its new goals, a result of a 2007 study, was to follow the US model of linking government to think-tanks. Thus, it served its purpose as a forum in which the epistemic coalition could meet, deliberate on the future of security policy in Europe, and coalesce around a common goal. A summary of the Expert Seminar’s proceedings, entitled

54 In 2001, the Council created the EUISS as an autonomous think-tank that would research and develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). EUISS researchers refer extensively to academic and scientific work in the larger community, as well as official documentation.
“Europe’s long-term vision of the defence environment in 2025: sharp or fuzzy?” provides a record of the process of deliberation and clarification of shared norms that occurred.\(^{58}\)

According to the summary, at the beginning of the meeting, Nick Witney, Chief Executive of the EDA, summarized some of the initial findings of the military-defense epistemic coalition. He emphasized that in 2025, globalization would continue, but this would happen alongside a declining and aging European population; Europeans would comprise only six percent of the world’s population. In terms of security, this would pose a challenge for maintaining defense budgets,\(^{59}\) and recruitment into the Armed Forces. Witney said that Europe would likely have a lower share of wealth relative to other countries, and would have to devote a greater portion of public budgets towards pensions (the average age of the population would be 45\(^{60}\)). To deal with this European’s would have to anticipate the evolving nature of threats in the information age, and create economies of scale in the military sector.

Subsequently, the key causal norm expressed repeatedly in the course of the meeting was: budgetary pressures necessitate integration of member-state resources to achieve security aims. \textit{For them, the trade-off was clearly between maintaining national sovereignty over security policy and achieving efficiency.} EDA Deputy Chief Executive Hilmar Linnenkamp concluded at the end of their discussions that a good strategy will entail “the blurring of distinctions between intergovernmental and common decision-making processes with respect to a range of issues; for instance, research and technology, industrial matters, crisis management and humanitarian policy [emphasis added]”.\(^{61}\)


\(^{59}\) In 2003, total defense expenditure of the EU-25 was €169 billion or 1.7% of GDP. Ben Hayes, “Arming Big Brother: The EU’s Security Research Program,” \textit{Transnational Briefing Institute Briefing Series}, No. 2006/1, p. 6.


\(^{61}\) “Europe’s long-term vision of the defence environment in 2025: sharp or fuzzy?” p. 11.
A second meeting, described as a Grand Seminar, also took place on June 29, 2006, and this time included representatives of the participating member-states. Although public documentation of this meeting is not available, presumably this venue served as a means for the military-defense epistemic community to persuade member-states of their conclusions. The LTV was emerging as a three strand document, based on the specific groupings within the epistemic coalition. The July 2006 EDA Bulletin summarized:

**Strand 1** discusses developments in the global context such as trends in demography, economy and global governance. The EUISS has supported this exercise by developing an excellent paper, compiling the collective wisdom of “futurologists” from all over. **Strand 2** addresses the future military environment. Here, the EU Military Committee is in the lead. Initial EUMC considerations include a wide spectrum of potential future capability profiles. **Strand 3** evaluates of Science & Technology (S&T) trends both in the light of challenges and of opportunities. The EDA’s R&T director is leading this work. EUISS alone consulted over 650 studies related to the future global context the EU might face in 20 years.

**EUMC and Strand 2.** Since the focus of this paper is the role of the military-defense epistemic community embedded in the larger epistemic coalition, it is useful to highlight some of the views these individuals have with respect to the LTV. Interviews with members of the military-defense epistemic community indeed confirm the norm that emerged, that economic pressures require security integration. General Ioan said,

I can’t see any company from the military-defense industry working alone. You have to start with R & D and you can’t have military research done on its own. You have to put the money together… This is beneficial for each country. They can be sure that delivery will work, and products won’t be stuck in their own market. You start every program from research and research is very costly. It is better to be part of a research program.

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64 Because of turn-over in the EUMC every 3-4 years, not all of the interviewees personally participated in the negotiations, but they nonetheless share the norms of their predecessors. There is continuity, at least in the short term, of the causal beliefs held within epistemic communities. If the nature of the members’ expertise changes then the expectation would be for causal beliefs to also change.
65 Interview, General Sorian Ioan, Romania, February 23, 2009.
Ioan went on to say that the main obstacle to procurement and research integration is EU legislation itself. He argued that the armaments market should have the same principles as the common market, but there is special legislation in place that prevents this.

General Békési also focused on economic rationale, arguing,

The biggest problem for the EU and NATO is the economic crisis, the financial burden for transforming our countries, and not being able to spend as much money as is required…. We need to not duplicate, to be more focused, and to have a common effort to improve – the EDA, Military Committee, and member-states.

Similarly, General Graube said,

Procurement is about market protections. It’s really about the EU vs. the US, like Lockheed Martin. We can’t organize with different weapons. You can’t deliver seven different bullets or shells to the middle of nowhere…. It’s a strange body, Europe. In the US there are two large companies engaged in defense procurement, and there could be 5, 6, 7, 10 in the EU doing the same research because of national interest. Each country believes that if it develops the product it will have economic benefits. It’s a strange situation because all want to be stronger.

What is striking about this finding is that you would not necessarily expect traditional military generals to advocate for military integration. However, in light of the post-modern environment that they inhabit in the EU setting, in which protecting national borders and upholding purely national interests are no longer of chief concern, the outcome makes sense. The particular kind of expertise they share as representatives to the EU shape the policy choices they make.

**Result.** In the end, the epistemic community presented the product of their research and deliberations to the EDA’s Steering Board, where it faced strong intergovernmental scrutiny.

Upon accepting the document, Solana succinctly expressed the key conclusion in a press release:

The best way to prepare for this future is through greater mutual transparency about medium- to long-term defence planning, so we can identify all those areas where the pooling of efforts and resources promises better value for money from tight defence budgets.\(^{66}\)

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In short, efficiency and expediency required security integration. The key words were interoperability, consolidation, and increasing investment.

Not all of the defense ministers agreed to the document word-for-word, but there was general agreement. Even a country like the United Kingdom, which is traditionally opposed to security integration hailed the LTV’s findings:

The UK believes that the Long Term Vision is a valuable piece of work that sets out a coherent view of the challenges we will face and the capabilities we will need. No-one knows whether the vision will turn out to be accurate. But we need a long term aiming point to guide the future development of our defence capabilities. We believe that the Long Term Vision provides a reasonable foundation upon which the EDA’s medium to long term agenda can be based. Furthermore, we strongly support the ongoing work to establish the ESDP Capability Development Plan.

Certainly, within the Council there was immediate support. Five weeks after the public release of the Long-Term Vision, the Council issued its guidelines for the EDA’s work in 2007. Focusing on the medium to long term, the Council instructed the EDA to first start developing a Capability Development Plan that incorporated the LTV’s analysis. This would require member-states to disclose their own national security plans to facilitate cooperation and interoperability. Second, the Council asked the EDA to develop an initial European Defence R&T Strategy with the aim to maximizing efficiency and setting-up collective spending on defense research and technology. Third, the Council charged the EDA with investigating what an “ideal” Defence Technological and Industrial Base would look like for the future, again incorporating the LTV’s findings.

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Conclusion

I have argued elsewhere that overtime transnational networks of diplomats in Europe have exercised varying degrees of agency, finding solutions where none seem to exist, and convincing their political masters of this after they have already reached agreement amongst themselves. While the professional norms, culture, and worldview of the military-defense epistemic community contrasts sharply with those of the epistemic community of diplomats, the demonstrated agency is still evident. The point is not to simply to measure how much they got their way, but actually to discover how much got their way despite contextual, political, and normative obstacles. A small amount of influence in the face of heavy roadblocks means much more than a large amount of influence when the space for maneuver is wide open. In the case of the EU military representatives, the idea of security integration is still very alien in the halls of national governments, EU institutions, and among the general population.

There is a vast literature on security cooperation, but in many ways cooperation is unproblematic for European countries, no matter what the policy area. Recent cases of failed cooperation, such as with the Iraq war, Kosovo’s bid for independence, and the Georgia-Russia crisis, are relatively rare. With each case of failure, there are lessons learned, and a fundamental belief that a single voice is always possible; it’s more a matter of how strong that voice is. Security integration is the real test for how far the idea of an “ever closer Union” might go. And far less has been written about security integration. Such an analysis requires opening up the black box of formal decision-making, and going beyond official documentation to the dynamics that occur behind the scenes in Brussels. I argue that the true movers and shakers are organized into epistemic communities.

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70 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, The European Diplomatic Corps.
What does this mean for the internal-external nexus of security integration? There are both substantive and theoretical implications. Substantively, the Long-Term Vision means that internal and external security integration will likely go hand-in-hand. For the aim of efficiency, interoperability, and economies of scale, integrated research and development will increasingly produce technology and weaponry that can be employed for both defense of the homeland and external missions, and for both both civilian and military uses. Transnational epistemic communities of technology and scientific experts will become more cohesive as they compete for common resources from the EDA and others.\textsuperscript{71} The military-defense epistemic coalition, and especially its core of military representatives, will be important actors to watch in coming years, as they make revision to the Long-Term Vision. Because internal security integration is occurring much more rapidly than its external counter-part, we are likely to observe some spill-over from one to the other in the form of cross-pillarization. As internal security increasingly moves into the community method of decision-making, there will be more and more instances in which hybrid internal-external issues are resolved quickly in the first pillar, making external security de-facto more integrated.

On the more theoretical side, if the military-defense epistemic community is able to increase its influence over the process of integration, there will likely be a mutually constitutive effect. The more influential the epistemic community becomes, the more it gains new kinds of expertise. As argued in this paper, in the context of its NATO-EU multilateral setting, the military-defense epistemic community is taking on a post-modern character. The policy aims when it comes to the EU, are simply unlike traditional, one-hatted military goals. EU citizens must be protected on multiple levels, from food security to environmental security, and they need stronger common borders alongside invisible internal ones. While epistemic communities have

\textsuperscript{71} Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “An EU Homeland Security? Sovereignty vs. Supranational Order.”
the potential to impact the course of security integration, the very process will likely remake
them.

If internal and external security policies do not develop in tandem, external security may
get left behind because the political will from the member-states is not very strong. I would
argue that it will take more than one kind of expertise to move these issues forward, and
diplomatic influence will be critical. The epistemic community of diplomats housed in Coreper
II serves a very important function. Interviews show that even the PSC ambassadors, responsible
for ESDP operations, maintain an almost exclusive focus on external security, with only a
passing recognition of the idea that internal security might be related. It is important to
recognize that by dealing with crises in third countries, providing state-building support, and
training police and judges, ESDP operations are preventing future problems from coming to
Europe’s shores in the form of unmanageable migration flows, terrorist breeding grounds, and
regional instability. The Coreper II ambassadors, however, do discuss the conceptual idea that
internal and external security are closely intertwined. With respect to this, Romanian Antici
diplomat, Alina Padeanu said, “Coreper puts the pieces together.”

Thus, through the combined
work of the military-defense epistemic community of the EUMC and the diplomatic epistemic
community of Coreper II it is possible that internal and external security integration will progress
in a context that may actually becoming increasingly favorable for it.

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72 Interview, Alina Padeanu, Antici, Romania, January 19, 2009.