ESTIMATING PARTY POLICY POSITIONS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ITALIAN POLITICAL DOCUMENTS USING COMPUTERIZED CONTENT ANALYSIS

Daniela Giannetti
Department of Political Science
Trinity College Dublin

Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Meeting

Workshop - Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors
Convenor - Michael Laver

Mannheim, March 1999
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the development of the type of computerized content analysis approach suggested by Laver & Garry (1999) by deriving Italian party policy positions for the 1996 election. In providing some evidence of party policy positions in Italy after 1993, this paper will attempt to start filling a gap in the existing literature. Maps of Italian policy space used in comparative research cover the period until about 1992 and are no longer useful to deal with the major changes that have affected Italian party system during the critical intervening period of transition. Complementing work for other European countries, the application of the computerized content analysis approach to the Italian case aims to refine the procedure, by developing comparisons with independent estimates of party policy positions derived from mass and/or expert survey data.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to apply the ‘computerized content analysis’ (CCA) approach developed by Laver & Garry (1999) to an examination of Italian party documents in order to estimate economic left-right party policy positions. Consequently, this paper has two main aims. Firstly, to extend the development of the computerized content analysis approach to the Italian case, which is a complex multiparty system that has undergone a process of transition since 1993.1 Secondly, to provide some evidence of party policy positions in Italy and by implication indicate some important consequences of this transition phase, thereby filling some gaps within the existing party policy position literature.

Estimates of Italian party policy positions on the left-right dimension reported in Laver & Schofield (1990) end in 1987, while Laver & Hunt’s (1993) comparative analysis of party competition in 24 countries terminates in 1989. More recently, Inglehart & Huber’s (1995) study on change in party positions on the left-right dimension in 42 societies, Knutsen’s (1998) analysis of change in ideological location of political parties in 13 Western European countries and Kim and Fording’s (1998) analysis of party ideology in 15 Western democracies all examine the Italian political system in its pre-transition phase. These research articles may be used to analyze Italian politics before 1993, and are very useful in allowing cross validation of party policy positions, through use of evidence provided by expert surveys and manifesto based scales. These articles results do have practical limitations however, because of the dramatic changes that the Italian party system has experienced since 1991. Old parties have disappeared, some
have changed their name and newcomers have appeared. A new electoral system was approved in 1993 and this is seen by many commentators to have had an important impact on party policy positions and the evolution of new salient policy dimensions. In short, there is now a need to examine more closely how Italian party policy positions have been transformed since 1994 as this transformation has significant implications for understanding of party competition and coalition formation.

The discussion in this paper will be structured as follows. Section 1, contains a brief description of the Italian party system since 1991. Section 2, summarizes the Laver & Garry (1999) approach to computerized content analysis, illustrates how the Italian content analysis dictionary was generated and identifies which documents have been selected for the purpose of this preliminary analysis. In section 3, there will be discussion of this paper’s results along with comparison of independent estimates of Italian party policy positions based on mass survey data. In the concluding section, some suggestions for further research will be given, including comparison between computerized content analysis results and other estimates of party policy positions such as those derived from expert survey data.

ITALIAN POLITICS SINCE 1991

Since 1991, the Italian political system has undergone considerable change at two levels - at the level of ‘party system’ and at the level of ‘political institutions’. Firstly, change at the level of the party system level has resulted in the disappearance of old parties, party splitting and the birth of new parties. Some of the most notable changes are:
Between 1989 and 1991, Italy witnessed the transformation of the former Communist Party PCI into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), and the emergence of the extreme left splinter RC.

During 1994-1995, there was the dismemberment of the former Christian Democrats (DC) which split into three parties: the center left faction PPI, the center right factions CCD and CDU.

Between 1994 and 1996, there was the disappearance of the PSI and other centre parties (PRI, PSDI, PLI). This was significant, as these parties along with the DC had been the basis of the *pentapartito* coalition governments that ruled Italy in the 1980s.

February 1994, saw the entry of Forza Italia (FI) - the party formed by the media magnate Silvio Berlusconi, into Italian national politics, a few months before the 1994 general and European parliament elections.

In January 1995, there was the transformation of the former fascist party MSI, into *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN). This change led to a split in MSI and the birth of an extreme right splinter party, MSFT.

A massive realignment of voters’ choice determined substantial change in the electoral and legislative weight of parties. Table 1 shows the vote shares of the main party lists and their respective number of seats in the Chamber between 1987 and 1996. The elections of April 1992 are commonly regarded as a turning point. The DC fell below the 30% threshold. The PSI dropped from a vote share of 14% in the 1992 election to 2% in the 1994 election. The main beneficiary of the shifting voters’ choice was the Northern League - a federation of regionalist movements that gained 8.7% of the national vote.

The available evidence suggests that party policy positions also changed significantly. Indications of this trend are given by such facts as the former PCI and MSI changing their names, adopting more moderate policy positions and generating splinter parties on their left or right. Perhaps the most notable change that took place during this
period was the reformulation of the issue agenda that defined Italian politics from both elite and mass perspectives.

One of the most important features in this process has been the evolution of the north-south issue (Carmines & Stimson, 1989). More specifically, the Northern League has been able to reverse what had been traditionally called “the Southern issue” (Questione meridionale) into a kind of “Northern issue” under the banner of federalism. In so doing it has been able to define fundamentally the realignment of the Italian political system by introducing what Schofield (1993) implicitly refers to as the “north-south [institutional] dimension” (see, Giannetti, Iacobone & Sened 1999).

Secondly, since 1991, the Italian system has undergone a major revolution at the political institutional level in two major areas. Following a successful mobilisation of support for electoral reform, the Parliament approved a new national electoral law in 1993. After almost fifty years of pure proportional representation, Italy shifted to a mixed system according to which 475 of the seats in the Chamber are allocated by plurality (SMP) while the remaining 155 are allocated by PR. In the Senate, 232 seats are elected by SMP and 83 by PR. The approval of this new electoral system has been regarded as a major turning point in the process of institutional change.

In addition, constitutional reform has also dominated Italian politics. In February 1997, a Bicameral Commission on Constitutional Reform was established and it debated four issues: adoption of a presidential system; structure of the parliament; federal reform and reform of the judiciary. While other issues such as reform of the judiciary have been more salient, the Northern League has continuously advocated the creation of a federal Italian state. Consequently, the Bicameral Commission was unable to complete its task
of drafting a new constitution. Nonetheless, there is the prospect of further change as a referendum to abolish the PR part of the current electoral system is scheduled for April 1999.

Equally important to electoral and political institutional reform processes have been the two parliamentary elections that have been held under the electoral system approved in 1993. In 1994, the chamber and senate elections were contested by three major pre-electoral coalitions. On the right there was an alliance of the Northern League, AN and FI, in the centre there was an alliance of PPI and Patto Segni and on the left an alliance of PDS, RC, the Greens and other minor parties.

The right wing coalition won the election and the new government led by Berlusconi lasted from May to December 1994. Subsequently, a caretaker government was led by Dini and this held office until the general elections of 1996. These elections were contested by two competing coalitions, on the centre right Polo della libertà composed of FI, AN, CCD-CDU and Ulivo on the centre left, composed of the PDS, the Greens, the PPI, the newcomer RI and other minor parties. The Northern League contested the elections on its own. The RC party reached an electoral deal with the Ulivo coalition according to which they avoided contesting the same plurality seats. The Ulivo coalition won the election and the government led by Prodi lasted from May 1996 to October 1998. Prodi’s cabinet was subsequently replaced by a government led by the PDS secretary D'Alema.

The evidence presented here has focused on three key areas of change - electoral law reform, constitutional debate and electoral change in the 1994 and 1996 elections. These changes highlight the fact that the contemporary Italian party system is operating
in a complex and evolving environment. Consequently, any attempt to estimate party policy positions using an economic left-right scale will inevitably encounter some difficulties due to the impact of overlapping domains such as the north-south institutional dimension. In methodological terms, this implies that the estimation of party positions will have to be robust in order to be able to deal with this contextual complexity. This is an issue that will now be addressed in terms of content analysis.

COMPUTERIZED CONTENT ANALYSIS APPROACH AND APPLICATION TO THE ITALIAN CASE

Computerized Content Analysis (CCA)

Various techniques have been used to estimate party policy positions: mass and elite surveys, expert surveys, and content analysis of party manifestos. While each of these methods has particular strengths and weaknesses, the content analysis of party manifestos allows us not only to estimate party positions for specific elections, but also to estimate party positions over time. Content analysis may be performed by hand or computer coding. In contrast to the more “qualitative” hand or expert coding, the computerized content analysis is a quantitative approach that allocates text units, typically words, to a coding scheme on the basis of a pre-defined dictionary. The procedure consists of the following elements.

♦ Generation of a dictionary of political terms. In order to generate a dictionary, two documents that are considered to be ideologically distinct are necessary. The dictionary is generated by selecting the relevant words that have been used twice as
much in one document as the other and allocating them to a proper category. Initial work in Britain and Ireland has found this procedure to be valid and reliable.

- **Application of the dictionary to the analysis of political texts.** Having constructed the dictionary, the next step is to calculate the frequencies of words in the political texts under examination, which can in this way be coded using the dictionary. Thereafter, a position on the left-right dimension for each party is derived according to the following formula.

\[
\frac{\text{Economic right words} - \text{Economic left words}}{\text{Economic left words} + \text{Economic right words}}
\]

The closer the figure is to +1 the more right wing a party is, the closer the figure is to −1 the more left wing the party is. The same formula can be applied to derive a scale for other relevant dimensions, such as those dealing with institutions, social values and so on (see Laver & Garry 1999, Appendix A).

- **Validation of the procedure through comparison of the results generated by CCA and other independently arrived at estimates.** This involves performing an extensive cross validation of the method by comparing computer-generated scales to hand coding and expert survey based measures of parties’ policy positions.

**Application to the Italian party system 1996**

The focus of the present analysis is on the last Italian elections held in 1996. The 1996 election has been chosen for two reasons. Firstly, there is machine readable data for the 1996 election which facilitates using content analysis, such resources are not at present accessible for earlier elections such as 1994. Secondly, the 1996 election allows
comparison of computer generated scales with currently available independent estimates of party policy positions. It seems appropriate at this stage to illustrate how the dictionary of political terms has been generated and which documents have been selected for analysis.

*Generation of the dictionary:* Two texts have been used to generate a dictionary of political terms in order to analyze Italian party political documents. The first text is the party congressional document of the right wing party AN issued in 1995 and the second is the party congressional motion of the left wing party PDS presented in 1996.\(^2\) Given the uneven length of the two documents, the frequencies of words have been weighted accordingly.

For the purpose of this preliminary analysis the dictionary includes only economic left-right words (see Appendix A). The two documents were judged to be different in terms of policy positions on the economic left-right dimension on the basis of *a priori* knowledge and information about the political system. This research assumption seems to be justified as words such as work (LAVORO), employment (OCCUPAZIONE), unemployment (DISOCCUPAZIONE), equality (EGUAGLIANZA) or welfare were consistently used by the left more than by the right. Alternatively, words typically associated with the right such as tax related words (FISC-, IMPOSTE, TASSAZIONE and so on) were consistently used more by the right. For instance, the word welfare was used about 46 times in the PDS document and never used in the AN document while the word private enterprises (IMPRESE) was used 33 times in the AN document and never used in the PDS text.
Application of the dictionary: The dictionary has been applied to the coding of Italian political texts. Only a few electoral manifestos are available for April 1996 general election. While the PR part of the new electoral system makes it possible for parties to maintain distinct identities, the plurality part has created incentives for the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. Consequently, in 1996 most parties, except the Northern League and RC, for the first time did not issue their own electoral manifesto, but formed pre-electoral coalitions and subscribed to a joint platform. The dictionary was applied first to the available manifestos, treating the two main coalitions as party-like groupings. In short, four electoral manifestos have been coded - Polo, Ulivo, LN, RC.

This research strategy may be justified for two reasons. Firstly, in methodological terms, these particular documents are the only sources that yield information on the research question being examined. Secondly, in theoretical terms, the whole concept of treating pre-electoral coalitions as party-like groupings has stimulated debate among both the political actors themselves and among commentators.

As party-like groupings were used, this initial analysis did not allow estimation of each party’s policy position. Estimation of each party’s policy position is required as it is assumed that parties are still the pre-eminent political actors within Italy. Consequently, a further investigation was undertaken using parliamentary documents. Use of parliamentary documents for establishing party policy positions is not unproblematic. The strategic context of electoral and parliamentary declarations is significantly different. However, for the Italian election of 1996 the only comparable measure of each party’s position is provided by the post-election parliamentary investiture debate on the centre left coalition government.
These declarations refer to the sessions of the parliamentary investiture debate on the Prodi government, which took place in late May 1996. The documents are relatively similar in terms of their purpose, debate on government policy. The documents’ length varies according to the time allocated to each party which is proportional to its electoral strength. For the sake of this analysis the declarations of each party’s spokesmen – including the party leader – were unified into a single document. In other words, parties were treated as unitary actors.

RESULTS OF COMPUTER CONTENT ANALYSIS
The results of coding Italian party documents are shown in Tables 2-5. Tables 2 and 3 report the results obtained from the analysis of electoral manifestos for the 1996 election, showing the frequency of economic left and right words in each manifesto and computer generated positions on the economic left-right dimension, giving raw and standardized scores. The computer generated standardised scale places the RC party solidly on the left (-1.50) and the Northern League on the right (0.57). The Ulivo coalition is consistently placed more on the left (0.44) than the Polo coalition (0.48). The two coalitions are placed relatively close to each other.

This might seem surprising as many commentators would not consider the Ulivo and Polo coalitions as close to each other as these results suggest. However, it may be contended that this finding provides some evidence of a convergence toward the center. From a rational choice perspective, it seems legitimate to argue that parties who join electoral coalitions in order to contest SMP districts are behaving predominantly as office seeking agents or Downsian parties. If one takes the formation of the Ulivo coalition, then
this interpretation seems plausible. It should be remembered that the leftist alliance, which included the extreme leftist RC party, lost the 1994 election. Subsequently the PDS - the main party in the leftist alliance - developed a new strategy of “moving to the centre”. This change in electoral strategy parallels an analogous change in PDS ideology. Many observers would agree that, since 1989, the PDS has been committing itself to a more moderate leftist posture, changing its attitude towards the market and capitalism, a trend that is especially evident in the Second Congress of the party held in 1997.  

Table 4 and 5 present the results derived from the analysis of parliamentary documents. Table 4 shows the frequency of economic left and right wing words in each manifesto and table 5 shows raw and standardised scores of party policy positions on the economic left-right scale generated by these. All parties are located on the appropriate side of the left-right dimension, yielding some confidence in the face validity of the method.

Starting from the extreme right side, the standardised computer generated scale places the NL at 1.30, FI at 1.07 and AN at 0.80. This particular ordering of parties on a strictly economic left-right dimension may be said to have face validity: AN can be seen as a populist rather than a Thatcherite party of the right, while the Northern League is committed to libertarian free-market economic policies.

RI, the party list formed just before the election by the former Prime Minister Dini that joined the left wing coalition, is placed more to the right (0.20) than CCD-CDU, the two splinters of the former DC that joined the right wing coalition (0.16). This finding makes sense, if it is considered that the RI leader was formerly Treasury Minister in the Berlusconi right wing government, where he committed himself to a radical reform of the pension system.
Taking the left wing parties, RC has been placed consistently on the extreme left of the scale (-1.88). In this case the counter intuitive result is the placement of the PPI (-0.67) to the left of the PDS (-0.43). It might be argued that the PPI and the PDS have roughly similar policy positions on the strictly economic left-right dimension as they share a conception of solidaristic welfare. In addition, the PDS score could be considered to be “deflated” because of its current participation in government for the first time in more than forty years. This finding, however, raises an important issue, that is the extent to which the content analysis method is dependent upon making assumptions about the credibility of political actors declarations.

In tables 6 and 7, the computerized coding results are compared with independent estimates of party policy positions derived from mass survey data. This is not to deny that mass survey data relate primarily to voters perceptions, unlike those derived from content analysis of party manifestos, but it does provide a completely independent estimate of party policy positions, based on data quite unrelated to content analysis. Two national surveys have been used and were undertaken in April and June 1996 respectively. The ISPO cross-sectional survey is based on a sample of 3237 respondents while the ABACUS panel survey is based on a sample of 3926 cases. Both include a number of questions about political issues and a question relating to vote choice. For the purpose of this analysis, the questions relating to economic left-right issues in each survey were selected and combined in one compound variable. A difference of means test was then undertaken between the standardised compound variable and the vote choice variable in order to derive a factor score for voters on the economic left-right scale. These estimates show some notable discrepancies. As regards the PPI, the computer based standardised score seems to be more
left wing than one would expect. For the PDS, the computer content analysis estimate of position is more centrist than the survey measures. As regards the right wing parties, the content analysis yields less right wing scores for AN and FI than those derived from survey data, while for the Northern League the converse is true.

Summarizing these findings, the various estimates of party positions were correlated against each other - see table 7. There was considerable overall agreement between these different estimates, as can be seen by correlations of 0.88 and 0.92 respectively with the survey generated estimates. This is a correlation of the same order of magnitude as that between the two survey generated estimates (of 0.90). These findings cross-validate the computer codings against a quite independent data source, giving confidence in the overall validity of the content analysis procedure used in this paper.

CONCLUSIONS AND PLANS FOR FUTURE WORK

The research undertaken in this paper is preliminary in that it has had to deal with a number of difficult methodological, empirical and interpretative issues. Party policy positions based on a strictly economic left-right dimension have been derived for the Italian election of 1996. The results obtained are encouraging because they are quite similar to those that one would have expected a priori and they agree with other independent measures of party policy positions derived from mass survey data. Until now there has been no measure of party policy positions in Italy for the 1996 elections.

These research results point to a number of avenues for future work. Firstly, a refinement of the content analysis dictionary used in this paper is required. In addition, an extended version of the dictionary should be able to capture party positions on other
relevant dimensions, such as the dimension dealing with institutional radicalism. Secondly, an analysis of a greater range of documents could provide empirical knowledge of party positions in earlier elections and thereby facilitate better understanding of the dynamics of party competition and coalition formation. Documents relating to the policies of actors within parties would provide estimates that could be used to explore the processes of intra-party politics.

One important way of developing this research agenda is to compare content analysis results with estimates of party policy positions based on expert surveys. Expert survey based measures are unique in providing independent estimates of party positions from individuals who are well informed, unlike many mass survey respondents. This is especially important if the task is to estimate party policy position on different dimensions. Some preliminary work for this future research has already been undertaken.
REFERENCES


Figure 1, Main changes in party system since 1991

**Parties in the 1980’s**

- PCI
- DC
- PSI
- PRI
- PSDI
- PLI
- MSI
- Radical Party
- Greens
- Regional Leagues

**Parties in the 1990’s**

- PDS (1991)
- RC (1991)
- CU
- PdCI (1998)
- The Network (1991)
- Segni Pact (1993)
- CS (1993)
- PPI (1994)
- CCD (1994)
- CDU (1995)
- UDR (1998)
- RS (1993)
- SI
- Labour
- AD (1994)
- UdC (1993)
- PLD (1993)
- MSI-AN (1994-1995)
- MSFT (1995)
- Greens
- Northern League (1991)
- FI (1994)
- RI (1996)
Table 1. Italian election results: votes and seats in the Chamber of Deputies 1987-1996§

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§ Note, in order to compare electoral results before and after electoral reform in 1993, the results given for 1994 and 1996 refer to PR contests.
TABLE 2, Frequency of economic left and right wing words in election manifests, Italy 1996

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TABLE 3, Computer generated positions on the economic left-right dimension in election manifests, Italy 1996

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TABLE 4, Frequency of economic left and right wing words in parliamentary documents, Italy 1996

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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>118</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD-CDU</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5, Computer generated economic left-right policy positions in parliamentary documents, Italy 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Raw Scores</th>
<th>Standardised Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD-CDU</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern League</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 6, Standardised economic left-right scores for parliamentary documents and standardised scores on comparable mass surveys, Italy 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Computer coding</th>
<th>Ispo survey economic L-R</th>
<th>Abacus survey economic L-R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std score</td>
<td>Std scores</td>
<td>Std scores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
<td>-1.22</td>
<td>-1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>-0.67</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>-1.14</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.83</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD-CDU</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RI</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7, Correlations between computer and survey estimates of economic left-right scale positions, Italy 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Computer Coding</th>
<th>Ispo survey economic L-R</th>
<th>Abacus survey economic L-R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Computer Coding</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ispo survey economic L-R</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abacus survey economic L-R</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX A: ITALIAN CONTENT ANALYSIS DICTIONARY

NB: A code number followed by a hyphen, e.g. 0001-Capitalis, denotes a word root. All words beginning with these letters are coded in this category.

0001 *****ECONOMY/+STATE+ 00003- CONCORRENZ Competition
0001 BORGHEIS Bourgeoisie 0003 CONSUMATORES Consumers
0001- CAPITALIS Capitalism/Capitalist 0003 CONTRIBUTENT Taxpayers
0001 CASA Housing 0003 CORPORATION Business corporation
0001 CLASSE Class 0003 CORPORATIV Rent seeking related
0001 CODECISIONE Co-decision 0003 COSTI Cost
0001- COLLETTIVO Collective 0003 CREDITO Credit
0001 CONCERTAZIONE Co-decision 0003 DENARO Money
0001 CONTRATTAZIONE Collective Bargaining 0003 DEREGULAZIONE Deregulation
0001 CONTRATT Contract 0003 DETASSAZIONE Tax exemption
0001 DEBOLI Disadvantaged 0003 DIRIGISMO State intervention
0001 DIFERENTI Salaried 0003 DISAVANZO Debt
0001 DISAGIO Hardship 0003 DISINCENTIVI Disincentives
0001- DISEGUAGLIANZ Inequalities 0003 DIVIDENDI Dividends
0001- DISOCCHIAP Unemployed 0003 EFFICIENZA Efficiency
0001 EMANCIPAZIONE Emancipation 0003 FINANZ Financing/Financial
0001 GLOBALIZZAZIONE Globalization 0003 ICI Tax related
0001- INJUSTIZIE Injustices 0003 ILOR Tax related
0001- LAVORATORES Workers 0003 IRPEF Tax related
0001 LAVORATRICI Workers 0003 ISOCCHIAP Unemployed
0001 LAVORO Work 0003 LAVORATORI Workers
0001 LOTTE Struggle 0003- MANAGEMENT Managerial
0001 MARGINALITA Marginality 0003 MERCAT Market
0001 MASSE Mass 0003- MILIARDI Billions
0001 MONETARIS Monetarism 0003- IMPOSTA Taxes
0001 MONDIALIZZAZIONE Globalization 0003- IMPRES Business enterprises
0001 OCCUPAZIONE Employment 0003- INCENTIV Incentives
0001- PADRON Owners 0003- INDUSTRIA Industry
0001 PATTO Pact 0003- INFLAZION Inflation
0001 PENSIONATI Retired 0003- INTERESSE Interest
0001 POVERI Poor 0003- INVESTIMENT Investment
0001 POVERTA Poverty 0003- IVA V.A.T. (Value Added Tax)
0001 REGOLAZIONE Regulation 0003- MONTANTO Managerial
0001 REDISTRIBUTION Redistribution 0003- MORGAN Market
0001 RENDITE Rents 0003- MORTGAGE Mortgage
0001- SALARIAT Salaried 0003- NASCENTE Nascent
0001 SOCIAL Social 0003- NATURALIS Naturalism
0001 SOCIALIS Socialism/Socialist 0003- NATURALIS Naturalism
0001 TECNOCRACIA Technocracy 0003- NATURALIS Naturalism
0001 WELFARE Welfare 0003- NATURALIS Naturalism

00003*****ECONOMY/-STATE-
0003- ALIQUOT Tax rate 0003 RISPARMI Savings
0003- ARTIGIAN Artisan 0003 SCAMBI Exchanges
0003- AZIEND Business firms 0003 SCIOPERI Strikes
0003- ASSISTENZIALIS Rent seeking related 0003- SPERPER Waste
0003- AZIEND Business firms 0003- SPESA Spending
0003 AZIONARIATO Stock market investors 0003 TARIFFE Tariffs
0003- BANCA Bank 0003 TASSAZIONE Taxation
0003 BILANCIO Budget 0003 TASSES Taxes
0003 BORSAS Stock market 0003 TRASFERIMENTI Transfers
0003- BORSE Stock market 0003- TRIBUTARY Tax related
0003 CAPITALE Capital 0003- VOLONTARIATO Volunteer
0003- COMPETITIV Competitiveness

Daniela Giannetti, ECPR - Mannheim, 1999
Estimating the Policy Positions of Political Actors

Daniela Giannetti, ECPR - Mannheim, 1999
NOTES

1 See Garry (1999) for the application to the German and the Norwegian case.
2 The PDS party document used here, was originally formulated in 1996 and was discussed later at the Second Party Congress in 1997.
3 The RI party also issued its own electoral platform even though it joined the left wing coalition. The available RI manifesto has not been coded because it is extremely brief.
4 The PDS had 2 hours and 54 minutes; FI - 2 hours and 21 minutes; AN - 2 hours and 1 minute; PPI - 1 hour and 44 minutes; NL - 1 hour and 39 minutes; RC - 1 hour and 23 minutes; CCD-CDU - 1 hour and 21 minutes; RI - 1 hour and 19 minutes; all the other minor parties - 1 hour and 18 minutes.
5 It is worth noting here that these documents might be analyzed disjointly as declarations of individual politicians thereby yielding some insights into the study of intraparty politics.
7 I wish to thank Renato Mannheimer (ISPO) and Paolo Natale (ABACUS) for making the data available.