Latin American Presidentialism: Reducing the perils of presidentialism through presidential interruptions

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Abstract:
Our paper embodies empirical and comparative as well as theoretical elements. The point of departure is the many interrupted presidencies, or premature end of the presidential term, in third wave Latin American presidential regimes, and what consequences these have for Latin American presidentialism. We assert that the interrupted presidencies are changing presidential regimes in the sub-continent. A prematurely interrupted presidency is indeed a sign or a result of a political crisis or conflict. Nevertheless, we claim that these interruptions are not instances/cases of the same type. We distinguish between different subcategories of presidential interruptions. By categorizing 20 empirical cases of interrupted Latin American presidencies into a typology, we discuss the extent to which these interruptions may represent a de facto flexibilisation and/or parliamentarisation of Latin American regimes with regard to the basic defining criteria of presidentialism: the independent survival and origin of the executive and legislative. It has been argued that these two criteria are the source for two major flaws of presidentialism: rigidity (or fixed terms) and dual democratic legitimacy. We argue that the many premature removals of presidents in Latin America are signs of a flexibilisation of rigid presidential structures which weaken the institutional flaws of presidentialism. A majority of the interrupted presidencies bear signs of a flexibilisation of the criterion of independent survival of the executive and legislative in presidential regimes, which affect the problem of fixed terms and rigidity. The increase of interrupted presidencies also leads to a flexibilisation of the criterion of separate origin of the executive and legislative in presidential regimes, which again lessen the problem of dual democratic legitimacy.
I. Introduction

On November 16, 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel, called for an early election because of a political crisis created by an erupting corruption scandal involving his son and the election of a new leader of Likud’s coalition partner, Labour. The new Labour leader, Amir Peretz, unlike his predecessor Shimon Peres, opposed the Labour-Likud government coalition. BBC reported Sharon saying: "As soon as it became clear that the existing political framework was falling apart, I came to the conclusion that the best thing for the country is to hold new elections as soon as possible." This incident highlights one of the main differences between parliamentary and presidential regimes: during this escalating political crisis in Israel, Prime Minister Sharon could call for early elections in order to defuse the crisis.

A presidential regime is defined by its independent origin and survival of the chief executive and the legislature. The fixed electoral terms of the two popularly elected institutions led Linz (1990; 1994) to argue that presidentialism was a rigid regime that often created political conflicts that the regime’s institutions could not handle. Based primarily on Latin American evidence, Linz argued these conflicts and crises would cause the breakdown of democracy.

Since the third wave there have been 20 interrupted presidencies in Latin America and several more failed attempts of presidential interruptions. We understand a presidential interruption as an incident in which the president leaves, or is forced to leave, the presidency before the end of the constitutional term. This paper discusses the political crises and the presidential interruptions in Latin American third wave democracies. We do not seek to explain the occurrence of the political crises ending in presidential interruption, but rather to provide a new interpretation of the interruptions and make descriptive inferences about their consequences for Latin American presidentialism.

We make two main, interrelated arguments:

First, the interrupted presidencies should not be indiscriminately lumped together as on type of cases. Paraphrasing Ragin (2000), we raise the following question: What are the

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1 Quoted from BBC’s webpages on November 17, 2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4444630.stm
2 For good overviews of the institutional literature since Linz, see Munck (2004) and Elgie (2005).
3 We include the 15 cases counted in Valenzuela (2004), add the two cases in Bolivia in 2005 (including Bolivia’s call for early election in December 2005), and the ousting of Gutiérrez in Ecuador in April 2005. We also add as cases the early elections in Peru in 2001 and in Argentina in 2003 even though they are clearly linked to the early resignations of Fujimori in 2000 and De la Rúa in 2001. For failed attempts, see below.
4 The third wave in Latin America started with the democratisation of the Dominican Republic in 1978.
interrupted presidencies really cases of? We argue that there are five prototypical procedures to remove a democratic government and that we find instances of all five types in Latin America during the third wave. The five types are: (1) the military coup or the self coup (undemocratic version); (2) the impeachment (presidential version); (3) the popular recall or the “forced voluntary” presidential resignation (regime independent version); (4) the vote of confidence and no confidence (parliamentary version); and (5) the call for an early election (parliamentary version).

Second, even though Latin American regimes in their constitutions still are pure presidential regimes, we argue that how the many political crises in the region have been handled demonstrates that presidential regimes in Latin America are more flexible than we could expect. The cases of presidential interruptions exhibit a weakening of two of presidentialism’s most serious flaws: (especially) the fixed terms or rigidity, and the dual democratic legitimacy. These flaws are weakened by the many presidential interruptions in Latin America because they first and foremost affect one of the two core definitional criteria of their presidential regimes: the independent survival of the executive and legislative. Furthermore, we find that the interrupted presidencies in some cases also lead to congressional elections of new presidents which in turn affect the other core definitional criterion of presidentialism: the independent origin of the executive and legislative. Hence, we find that what we call a flexibilisation of the independent survival of executives and legislatures entails a flexibilisation of the origin of presidents, in other words how presidents are elected.

Throughout we relate our discussion of interrupted presidencies to Linz (1990; 1994) and Valenzuela’s (1993; 2004) arguments. We believe that this change in the core features of presidentialism has consequences for the lively debate surrounding presidentialism and parliamentarism. Even though there have been many statistical tests of Linz’s argument (with diverging results) (see Cheibub & Limongi, 2002; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000; Stepan & Skach, 1994), the logic of his argument is still persuasive. If our argument is correct, the Latin American experience of presidential interruptions the last 20-25 years undermines Linz’s (1990) perils of presidentialism: Latin American presidentialism is no longer marked by rigidity and dual democratic legitimacy.

This paper continues with a discussion of the survival and origin of governments, and a look at the literature on the recent political crises in Latin America. Then we look at the Latin
America from a constitutional point of view, before we reconfigure the set of interrupted presidencies and analyse them according to the type of interruption. Finally, we discuss possible causes to our findings, the consequences of our findings for Latin American presidentialism and for institutional debate on presidentialism.

II. The survival and origin of governments: procedures of interruptions and elections

We differentiate in this paper between several types of governmental interruptions. In democratic regimes there are prototypically five types of governmental interruptions and four of these are democratic. These are outlined in figure 1.

<figure 1 here>

The figure distinguishes between the democratic and undemocratic type of governmental removals. The undemocratic removal, often a coup, can of course happen in any type of democratic regime. Therefore this form is regime independent. Among the democratic types of governmental removals, we find four different procedures, two of them related to parliamentarism, one related to presidentialism and one regime-independent. In parliamentary regimes a government can be forced to resign through a vote of no-confidence and the government can call for early elections. In Linz’s (1994) view, these are two flexible parliamentary procedures which make parliamentary regimes better at handling crises than (rigid) presidential regimes. In presidential regimes the only procedure to remove the president (or government) in between elections is through the impeachment. A fourth procedure which today is not much used, but has become popular in recent Latin American constitutions, is the popular recall. The recall is in use in several states in USA today and the procedure is also famous because of the latest recall of Governor Davis in California in 2003, which opened for the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger. This procedure is a regime independent tool that relates to the relationship between voter and representative. There are

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5 The figure disregards the most common form of governmental removals, elections. As defined above, here we deal with interruptions that occur in between regularly scheduled elections.

6 Furthermore, a government can make a legislative proposal a matter of confidence and resign if the proposal does not win a majority.

7 This option is also open in parliamentary regimes, but is almost never used since the vote of no-confidence is available. Therefore we argue that as a type of governmental interruption, impeachment is a presidential procedure.

8 The constitutions that open for a popular recall are Colombia 1991, Ecuador 1998 and Venezuela 1999. In Ecuador however, the president cannot be recalled. All recent constitutions.

9 The recall of Governor Davis was the first recall of a governor in California since recall was introduced in 1913, there had however been 7 former recall votes in California before 2003, four of which were successful (see the California Secretary of State’s web pages, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2003_special/contests.pdf).
for example historical instances of recall of parliamentarians in European parliamentary democracies (Christophersen, 1993 [1969]).

And, to a difference from the other democratic procedures of governmental interruptions, the popular recall does not involve congress; it is a procedure linking the “will of the people” directly to the “fate” of the president or government. As figure 1 indicates we expect only to find impeachments in presidential regimes, and of course historically we find cases of undemocratic removals of executives in any type of regimes.

There has been some writing on the presidential crises and interruptions lately, but there has not been much focus on one direct consequence of a presidential interruption, namely that a new chief executive/government must be elected. In a parliamentary regime parliament can elect a new government, or the prime minister could call for early elections. In presidential regimes normally a Vice-President would take over. Presidential succession is rule oriented and rigid, whereas in parliamentary regimes the succession is flexible in the sense that either parliament or the people may make the choice. This key difference affects the options following a governmental interruption.

Rigidity:flexibility

The terms rigidity and flexibility refer to the definitional characteristics of presidentialism (and parliamentarism): the origin and survival of the executive and legislative. Following Linz (1994), we define a rigid presidential regime as a regime in which the executive and legislature are independently elected, the terms are fixed, and the presidential succession, in case of a permanent absence of the chief executive, is rule oriented, i.e. no room for congress or other institutions to select a new president. Flexibility within presidentialism refers to institutions and procedures that relax the independent origin and survival of the executive and legislative, and thus the fixed terms of the two popularly elected institutions. For instance if Congress can vote a president out of office through a regular majority vote, or if congress or the president, can call for early elections, these are procedures not envisioned in presidential regimes that makes the regimes de facto more flexible. Some of these institutions and procedures resemble the flexible institutions within parliamentarism (e.g. vote of no-confidence, the call of early elections), therefore we argue that a flexibilisation of presidential regimes might also entail a de facto parliamentarisation.

One could also argue the vote of no confidence in parliamentary regimes is a special case of popular recall with the parliament representing the people.
How to interpret interruptions of Latin American presidencies?

There are several different understandings of the many interrupted presidencies during the third wave. Two prominent views worth discussing here are the view of Valenzuela (2004) of (still) failed presidencies and Pérez-Liñán’s view of presidential crises, but congressional supremacy (Pérez-Liñán, 2003a, 2003b, 2005).

Valenzuela (2004, pp. 6-14) interprets all the interrupted presidencies in Latin America after the third wave as indications of failed presidencies. Furthermore, Valenzuela argues that these failures constitute confirming evidence of his own (Valenzuela, 1993) and of Linz’s (1990; 1994) thesis. And, in a causal analysis he would regard an interrupted presidency as a functional equivalent of a breakdown of democracy now that the end of the Cold War, a new international “zeitgeist” and a new US policy towards Latin America have blocked the road for military takeovers in the region. Thus a presidential interruption replaces a breakdown as the expected value on the outcome variable. Even though we agree that the interrupted presidencies are associated with high levels of political conflict, very few of these have ended in a regime breakdown. Furthermore, in most of the cases where there has been a breakdown or near breakdown, democracy has eventually prevailed. In our mind Valenzuela confuses regime crises with governmental crises, or regime instability with governmental instability. The reason is that because of presidentialism’s fixed terms and rigidity, and Linz’s dominating view in the field, governmental instability has often not even been envisioned as an option in presidential regimes.11

Pérez-Liñán (2003b; 2005) provides a different view and argue that we should not talk of a presidential regime in crisis, but of a “crisis presidencial”, which he understands as a new analytical category (see Pérez-Liñán, 2003b, p. 150).12 He defines a presidential crisis as a conflict in which the presidency or congress seeks to destitute the other, or one of the two elected powers seeks a military solution to the conflict. Pérez-Liñán differentiates between democratic or undemocratic outcomes of presidential crises and whether the outcome favours

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11 See for instance Tsebelis (1995, p. 321) who argues that the situations which give governmental instability in parliamentary regimes yield regime instability in presidential regimes.

12 We have used the term political crisis which is somewhat more general, but basically refers to the same situations as Pérez-Liñán’s “crisis presidencial”. Both concepts refer more to a government crisis or governmental instability than regime crisis or regime instability.
the president or the congress. On the first dimension, Pérez-Liñán finds that the solutions to presidential crises over time become more and more democratic. On the second dimension he argues that an increasing tendency of presidential interruption rather than dissolutions of congress demonstrate a strengthening of congress vis-à-vis presidents in Latin America (Pérez-Liñán, 2005). In effect, if he is correct (and we support his view) this means that the problem of dual democratic legitimacy in presidential regimes is decreasing due to an increasing congressional supremacy.

Pérez-Liñán differentiates between democratic and undemocratic outcomes of presidential crises, we differentiate further between different forms of democratic outcomes. We argue in this paper that several of the presidential interruptions in Latin America can be understood as functional equivalents of parliamentary forms of governmental interruptions (see figure 1). A functional equivalence exists when different organs or institutions in different countries or regimes carry out the same functions, or when the same or similar institutions perform different functions (Dogan & Pellassy, 2005). The concept of functional equivalence is useful when comparing very diverse countries (Most Different Systems Design), or as we use it to apply concepts of one regime type (e.g. parliamentary) on another regime type (presidentialism). We argue that several of the presidential interruptions in Latin America the last 25 years are the functional equivalents of a vote of no-confidence, early elections and popular recall. The interruptions do not only have the same end result (removal of a government), but the procedures leading to a presidential interruption also resemble these non-presidential procedures of governmental interruptions. Since we now find a whole spectre of democratic presidential interruptions in addition to impeachment, we argue that Latin American presidentialism is becoming more flexible and that formerly rigid presidential institutions are adapting to its surroundings of many political crises (and handling them rather well). Furthermore, to a difference from Valenzuela and Pérez-Liñán, this paper analyses how the political crises and interrupted presidencies affect how presidents are elected in the aftermath of an interrupted presidency.

III. Latin American Presidentialism, from a constitutional viewpoint
As should be clear by now we understand presidentialism as a regime in which the executive and the legislative are independently elected (independent origin) and both institutions have

13 Pérez-Liñán uses the terms institutional and praetorian outcomes, we prefer democratic and undemocratic since several of our democratic outcomes not necessarily have been institutional (or constitutional).
fixed terms (independent survival). According to these two definitional criteria, Latin American regimes are constitutionally (de jure) still pure presidential and therefore rigid regimes. The exceptions are Bolivia where congress elects the president if the popular vote does not give a candidate more than 50% support which makes Bolivia in our terms somewhat more flexible with respect to the origin of the executive, and Haiti which is semi-presidential.

With respect to the survival of presidents there are only a few de jure exceptions to the independent survival rule. In Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador (1979, 1998), and Peru (1979, 1993), Congress can either declare that the president has abandoned his/her post or declare the president physically or mentally unfit to rule. Neither of these countries’ constitutions mentions the required majority to do so, and the only empirical use of this rule is from Ecuador. In Ecuador only an absolute majority (50% + 1 vote) is required. This rule, provided that only an absolute majority is required to dismiss the president, is therefore a weakening of the definitional criterion of separate survival of the executive and legislative, and a functional equivalent of a parliamentary vote of no-confidence. Furthermore, we must add that in Peru (1979 and 1993), Venezuela (1999) and in Uruguay, the president can within very strict rules, dissolve congress. These rules are so strict, that we cannot consider this a weakening of the criterion of separate survival of executive and legislative.

With respect to the origin of a successor in case of an interrupted presidency, there are some substantial differences between the Latin American constitutions. Some countries are rule oriented, which means that the constitution designates whoever is to take over in case of a permanent absence of the president. The line of succession is normally 1) Vice-President; 2) Supreme Court President; 3) Senate (or Congress) President; and 4) Lower Chamber.

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14 This definition follows Shugart & Carey (1992), for a more thorough discussion of definitions of presidentialism, see their chapter 2.
15 Gamarra (1997) calls Bolivia a hybrid presidential regime.
16 Years in the parentheses refer to year of constitutional promulgation. Data from constitutions gathered from the Political Database of the Americas: http://pdba.georgetown.edu/.
17 In fact they were so strict that when Fujimori dissolved congress, he was not able to follow the rules of the constitution. Therefore this case is categorised as an undemocratic self-coup, not a constitutional dissolution of congress. Peru’s president can dissolve congress if congress has voted for no confidence of two governments in one electoral period (in 1979 constitution the requirement was no confidence of three governments), but never in last year of electoral period. In Uruguay the president can dissolve congress if a vote of no confidence is passed with between 50%-2/3 of the votes, if the president then vetoes the no-confidence vote, and a new congressional vote of no confidence cannot muster more than between 50% and 3/5 support, then the president can keep his minister(-s), and call for a new congressional election. In Venezuela (1999) the president can dissolve congress if congress removes the presidentially appointed Vice-President (Vice-Ejecutivo) three times in one electoral period. But congress can never be dissolved during the last 12 months of its constitutional period.
President.\textsuperscript{18} Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela are in this respect the most rigid regimes because the presidential succession is rule oriented in at least three sequences.\textsuperscript{19} Argentina, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panamá, and Paraguay are somewhat more flexible because there is flexibility in electing the second successor of the president.\textsuperscript{20} Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela (first four years of presidential term) are most flexible because there is flexibility in electing a new president if he or she is permanently absent, which means that either congress or the people elect a successor.

\textbf{IV. Operationalising the typology of presidential governmental interruptions}

In figure 1 above, we identified five types of governmental interruptions in democratic regimes. Four of them are democratic procedures, three of which are flexible measures not envisioned in presidential constitutions. Furthermore we identify another flexible institution that affects the independent origin of the executive, one which is a consequence of an interrupted presidency: the congressionally elected president. In order to categorise the interrupted presidencies in Latin America, we need to operationalise our typology.

1) A coup or self-coup is an undemocratic dissolution of the presidency, executive and/or legislature (and/or other democratic institutions) often supported by military force. Furthermore for a coup to be considered successful the new rulers must consolidate their power, only a few hectic days in power during the coup is considered a failed attempt.

2) An impeachment is the legal procedure in which the legislature, in some cases together with the Supreme Court, through a vote that requires a supra-majority can remove the president. It is a legal procedure because the president stands accused for some serious violation of the law. Often congress’s use of impeachment is also restricted to some specific types of felonies (as e.g. high treason).

3) An early election is a presidential and/or legislative election that is called for prematurely compared to the regular electoral calendar. An early election can be called for either by the

\textsuperscript{18} It varies somewhat whether it is the Congress president or the Supreme Court president who are first in the succession line after the Vice-President.

\textsuperscript{19} This means that a country must lose at least three presidents (or more) during one electoral term, before new elections are held or Congress could elect a successor. In the Peruvian case this applies to the Peruvian president, not the government and in the Venezuelan case this applies only to the last two years of the presidential period (Vice-president or “Vice-ejecutivo” takes over), an absence during the first four leads to a new popular election.

\textsuperscript{20} This means that in case both the President and the Vice-President (acting as president) become permanently absent during one electoral term, either congress or the people elect the successor.
president, congress or the Supreme Court. The procedure of early election affects not only the survival of presidents (by shortening their term), but also the origin of presidents.

4) A vote of no-confidence, or its functional equivalent, is a vote in congress which only requires a plurality or an absolute majority (50% + 1 vote) to unseat the president. The use of this vote should not require any supra-majorities in order for the vote to pass.

5) A popular recall can either be a formal constitutional recall of the president or a “voluntary” presidential resignation, the “informal” functional equivalent of a popular recall. A formal recall follows the procedures in the constitution for a recall and the president is recalled before the end of the term. An informal popular recall is a situation in which a president, during popular protests, duress or a popular “siege” of the presidential palace, resigns without a previous impeachment procedure or a congressional vote that unseats the president. The democratic institutions however, survive the fall of the president.

As a sixth type we have the congressionally elected president. This sixth type is not an interruption of the presidency, but rather a flexibilisation of the origin of the executive as a consequence of a prior flexibilisation of the survival of the executive.

6) The congressional election of the president is a procedure in congress in which congress through a vote selects the president. This can happen after a non-decisive regular election (as in Bolivia) or in between regularly scheduled elections. This resembles the investiture of parliamentary regimes.

The fuzzy-cases

Several of the interrupted presidencies are difficult to categorise within one of our categories: they are fuzzy cases. Some cases involve a military coup attempt and strong, direct popular protests (for instance with Mahuad Ecuador, 2000). Another case might involve impeachment procedures and popular protests (for instance with Cubas in Paraguay, 1999). In order to place the cases in one category, we worked out a rule of necessary and sufficient causes (or threshold effects). If, according to our judgement, popular protests were the necessary cause for a presidential interruption, and for instance an attempt of a coup was only a triggering or a sufficient cause for the presidential interruption, we would categorise this case as a case of a popular recall. This is was our evaluation with respect to Ecuador in 2000 and Mahuad. With Cubas in Paraguay we assessed that the impeachment process had come sufficiently far as to

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21 For necessary and sufficient causes, substitutability and threshold effects, see Ragin (2000), Goertz (2006) and Pierson (2003), respectively.
consider it as the necessary factor. Furthermore, we were quite confident that had it come to a voting in the Paraguayan congress, Cubas would have been sentenced. We argue that the coding of the cases should be based on necessary causes since these cannot be substituted by other causes in order to produce the outcome, while a sufficient cause can be substituted by another cause and still give the same outcome.

V. Latin American presidencies interrupted

Table 1 categorises all “successful” interrupted presidencies in the third wave Latin American democracies, according to the five procedures of governmental interruption laid out in figure 1: The coup or self-coup, impeachment, early elections, vote of no-confidence, and popular recall. Not all of the democratic procedures are envisioned constitutionally, but we find instances of all these procedures in Latin America. Below in table 7, we will also see that with respect to the origin of a presidential successor, we find cases of congressionally elected presidents. Table 1 also shows that all types of presidential interruption affect the survival of presidents, by “ignoring” the fixed terms of presidents and adapting the institutions and procedures to a volatile political reality. Furthermore, the coup and the early election also influence the origin of the presidential successor.

The literature has previously only predicted the undemocratic coup as an outcome of a deadlock conflict in presidential regimes, and until recently the impeachment has generally been ruled out as unfeasible. Our table conveys a different impression: Of the 20 interrupted presidencies there have been only three “successful” coup attempts during the third wave, and only three successful impeachments. These are, respectively, the undemocratic and

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22 It is important to note that we only discuss interruptions in democracies. This excludes the congressional destitution of President Del Valle in 1988 in Panamá. Panamá was not a democracy at the time. For the same reason it also excludes the early election called by Fujimori after his autogolpe. We have also excluded the cases early elections in Colombia 1991 and Venezuela 2000, since they not only were governmental interruption, but elections in relation to new constitutions. To include these two cases would only have increased the number of cases of a flexibilisation of presidential regimes and further substantiated our argument. Both cases show that the fixed terms are no longer as fixed as they once were in Latin America. In our case-selection, when in doubt, we chose to exclude cases that could support our argument, and include cases that could counter our argument.

23 A third solution is possible: the increased presidential dominance. This solution has found some support (e.g. Marsteintredet, 2004; O'Donnell, 1994), but is not the topic for this paper.

24 One could even argue that Haïti was not a democracy at the time of the coups against the elected governments of Aristide (see Mainwaring, Brinks, & Perez-Liñán, 2001), and should therefore be excluded from our case selection.

25 There is also one other additional, but trivial, case of presidential interruption. Hugo Bánzer retired early from his presidency in August 2001 due to terminal cancer. Even though Bánzer decided to resign during severe
democratic outcomes of political crises that we would expect in presidential regimes. But, we find that there have been seven cases of presidential resignation (without a congressional vote) during duress, popular protests, or general strikes. There have been two cases which resemble the parliamentary vote of no-confidence (Ecuador 1997 and 2005). And, there have been five cases of early elections. In total there have been 14 cases of democratic presidential interruptions that have followed procedures not envisioned in the countries’ constitutions. These cases demonstrate what we define as a flexibilisation of presidential regimes because the interruptions influence the rigidity entailed in presidentialism’s independent survival of the executive and legislative. The next section discusses and analyses the cases of presidential interruptions.

1. Undemocratic interruptions: Coups and self-coups

Of our 20 cases of interrupted presidencies there are only three cases of interruption due to forcible disruptions of constitutional democracy or downright democratic breakdown (Fujimori 1992, Aristide 1991 and 2004), and in two of these cases the degree of democracy in the first place, is disputed (Haïti). Whether the democratic breakdowns that interrupted the presidencies in these three cases were caused by crises of presidentialism (due to the inherent rigidities of the presidential system) is a different matter, but it seems that this was not the case, especially considering the fact that Haïti is a semi-presidential regime.\textsuperscript{26}

The fact that third wave Latin America has experienced only three undemocratic interruptions as opposed to 20 breakdowns between 1945 and 1978,\textsuperscript{27} indicates that democratic resilience has grown stronger. Seven more attempts at democratic reversal failed. This of course is due to a major sea change in the world-time context. As a consequence of the end of the cold war and the fall of communism, the rise of democracy in the Latin American continent, and the subsequent u-turn in US foreign policy, democracy has become the only ideologically acceptable game in town: attempts at (re-) introducing the old non-democratic coup game are

\textsuperscript{26} Also, the Haitian case is a special Latin American case, being clearly and by far the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. It is farfetched to argue that institutions are the root of Haïti’s democratic problems.

\textsuperscript{27} We counted 20 changes from either Democracy or Semi-democracy to Authoritarian in the Mainwaring et.al. (2001) classification of the period 1945 till 1978. We have not included the first authoritarian period if the regime was authoritarian in 1945, or any changes from Democracy to Semi-democracy.
non-starters and tend to fail in a matter of days or hours. International pressure was present and vital in the cases of the failed coups of Guatemala 1993, Paraguay 1996 and Ecuador 2000. We also observe that the undemocratic regimes triggered by the two successful coups in Haiti have been intervened by international UN forces, and that Fujimori’s Peru had to return to some type of constitutional democracy after only a year. These are indications that even successful coups are not long-lived. We cannot conclude of these crises that presidentialism is still in crisis, but rather that Latin American democracies are still not consolidated, but much stronger than their historic predecessors.

What about the remaining cases of interrupted presidencies? Can they all be equally well interpreted as empirical evidence that the presidential system as such is flawed or that presidentialism is still in crisis?

2. The Presidential form of interruption: impeachment

All of these cases represent the constitutional use of the presidential tool for handling conflicts between the legislative and the executive. Whereas we view coups and coup attempts as cases of either democracy or presidentialism in crisis, we contend that the three cases of interrupted presidencies due to successful impeachment cannot be interpreted as indications of a crisis of presidential democracy as such, although it took a political crisis and a deadlock conflict to trigger the impeachment processes. On the contrary, these cases may be seen as proof that the constitutional instrument available for solving conflicts between the executive and the legislative in presidential systems is in fact working and thus may be interpreted as positive for the “habituation” to democratic rules and procedures necessary for democratic consolidation. In these cases we do not necessarily see only crises but rather flexibilisation. To a difference from the “newly invented” procedures of flexibilisation we discuss below, the flexibilisation involved here consists of an increased use of the constitutional instrument of flexibility that the institutions of presidential democracies actually permit. To our knowledge there have not been any successful impeachments of presidents in Latin America before the third wave. Furthermore, we agree with Perez Liñán (2003a; 2005) that they are cases of an increased congressional power vis-à-vis the President

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28 We have not performed a historic study of this. Pérez-Liñán is working on a book on impeachments in Latin America, and reports of one impeachment proceeding in Panamá in 1955 (Pérez-Liñán, 2003b).
and an increased accountability, which in our view are both healthy and needed progressions in the Latin American democracies. Still, as Linz’s (1994, p. 10) argues, impeachment is difficult to use, which explains why we only find that three of the 20 successful presidential interruptions are results of impeachment procedures. We might even argue that it is only rational that political actors have found other ways of removing unpopular presidents. This is discussed in the next sections.

3. Regime independent: flexibility by resignation / popular recall

We have identified seven cases of “voluntary” presidential resignation, or what we define as the functional equivalent of an “informal” popular recall and one failed attempt at a formal popular recall.29

Among the cases of this category there is a great diversity, and a more finely grained differentiation between the cases could be in order. There is also more uncertainty related to the categorisations: Is Alfonsín’s early retirement a case of a “popular recall” or an elite pact with Menem? If the latter is correct, the case does not belong in this category. Should we have included Serrano’s forced resignation after his failed self coup as a popular recall, or as a failed coup? Several other cases could also be discussed along similar lines.30 Furthermore, some cases might be triggered by the killing of demonstrators in the streets (Argentina 2001), others by corruptions scandals (Peru 2000). These triggering events, sufficient causes or threshold effects (Pierson, 2003), might change from case to case. However, they all unleash a major change (presidential removal) in a situation that has reached a “boiling point”.

Nonetheless there are also striking similarities between the resignations: Congress did not vote (or impeach) the president out of office, high political tension, and popular protests.

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29 There is only one failed case of a popular recall, the failed recall of Chávez in 2004. There are probably many more attempts of forcing a president to resign through popular protests and general strikes that are similar to our successful cases in most respects. Even though the Caracazo in 1989 not necessarily had as a goal to remove President Pérez (Maya, 2003), it could have been included as a failed attempt alongside for instance the general strikes and protests in Venezuela 2002 which clearly were protests aiming for the removal of Chávez.

30 For instance the cases with Mahuad in Ecuador and Fujimori in Peru. The Ecuadorian and Peruvian congresses sanctioned the ousting of Mahuad and confirmed Fujimori’s resignation, respectively, by declaring with majority votes that Mahuad and Fujimori had abandoned their posts. In effect, these were votes of no-confidence. The votes, however, happened after the fact therefore these cases are not functional equivalents of a vote of no-confidence as were the cases with Bucaram and Gutiérrez.
demanding presidential resignation. These are the common, necessary causes providing the “boiling point” situation in the various regimes. Even though congress was an actor in several of these cases as for instance in Argentina in 2001, by informing the president that he had lost support in congress, we regard the direct popular pressure to be the necessary factor causing these interruptions or causing congress to withdraw their support to the president. Only the Venezuelan case in 2004 is constitutionally an attempt of a popular recall, but they all resemble a popular recall of the nation’s prime political representative, the president.

These political crises and resignations are not similar to the horizontal conflicts between the legislature and presidency predicted by the institutional literature. The conflicts are of a different vertical type involving direct conflicts between societies and their president and constitute crises of representation. We contend that these interruptions are results of a crisis of representation, not a crisis of presidentialism per se. The principal, the people, use its tool of agency control, the recall, to hold their agent, the president, accountable. Furthermore, as one can interpret impeachments as signs of a stronger horizontal accountability, it is possible to view these cases as examples of a stronger public sense of vertical accountability. Thus, the interruptions are not linked to any particular type of democracy. If they occur in presidential democracies they are not necessarily due to any institutional flaw. The cases however, do demonstrate a flexibilisation of a president’s fixed terms, a president’s independent survival (of popular pressure), and consequently affect core features of presidentialism.

4. Parliamentary flexibility: the vote of no-confidence

There are two cases of the vote of no confidence in Latin America, both occurred in Ecuador. Abdalá Bucaram, elected president in 1996, was voted out of office by 44 against 34 votes in February 1997 by Congress on the charge of “mental incapacity”. Congress bypassed Vice-President Rosalía Arteaga and replaced Bucaram by a congressional appointee: Fabián Alarcón (see below). And in April 2005 President Lucio Gutiérrez, elected in 2002, was voted

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31 We disagree with Perez-Liñán (2003a) that the case of Bucaram in Ecuador is a case of impeachment. We view the removal of Bucaram as the functional equivalent of a parliamentary vote of no-confidence because no supra-majority was required to unseat Bucaram.
out of office on the charge of “abandonment of office” with a 60 to 2 margin. Gutiérrez was replaced by the Vice-President Alfredo Palacio.

These two cases are clear cases of votes of no-confidence, they are not impeachment procedures. There are three reasons for this. One is that in Ecuador to declare the president physically or mentally incapable or to declare that the president has abandoned the presidency, only require an absolute majority (50% + 1 vote) in Congress (impeachment requires normally a supra-majority, in Ecuador a 2/3 majority). Second, to a difference from commencing an impeachment procedure, no crimes must have been committed in order to remove the president by declaring him incapable that the president has abandoned his post. Third, in Ecuador there are no special requirements to declare abandonment of office, or prove insanity; for instance there is no need to let the President undergo a psychological investigation before voting on the president’s sanity.

The conflicts in Ecuador have been inter-institutional as predicted by the critics of presidentialism, and supported by a high level of popular mobilisation (Andolina, 2003). But, these cases have shown that at least the Ecuadorian presidential regime by its solutions to its conflicts have effectively countered two of presidentialism’s flaws: 1) There is no longer a dual democratic legitimacy, Congress clearly prevails during conflicts; 2) the fixed terms have certainly been relaxed and consequently so has the regime’s rigidity. The votes of no-confidence in Ecuador might be special cases not supporting our more general claim that we see a flexibilisation partly through parliamentarisation of Latin American presidential regimes, but the next two sections discuss two other parliamentary procedures that are signs of a parliamentarisation of Latin America’s presidentialism.

5. Parliamentary flexibility: early elections

The call for early elections is clearly a parliamentary feature, and because of presidentialism’s fixed terms, this is not a constitutional option in Latin America. The early election is an institution that affect both the origin of the executive (and legislative) but also the survival of the same institution (-s), because it dissolves the presidency (and/or the legislature) and

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32 Data in both cases on voting records from Keesing’s Record of World Events.
33 This option is also open in Peru, see note 30.
provides for the presidential successor. Even though early elections are not prescribed in the Latin American constitutions, we have identified five cases of early elections.

All five cases are results of preceding political crises. Three of the five cases also share traits of another type of a presidential interruption and are products of a preceding presidential interruption. The early elections in Bolivia 1985 were announced in November 1984, only one week after an effective, national, general strike was called in an attempt to shorten Siles Zuazo’s presidential term. The early presidential elections in 1996 in the Dominican Republic came as a result of a special deal in 1994 after a fraudulent general election. Early elections in these two cases were the last resort to solve an ongoing political conflict. The early elections in Bolivia 2005 (following Sanchez de Lozada’s and Mesa’s resignations in 2003 and 2005, respectively), Peru 2001 (Fujimori’s resignation in 2000), and Argentina 2003 (de la Rúa in 2001), are cases where early elections follow a preceding presidential interruption. This supports our claim that a flexibilisation of the independent survival of the executive and legislative entails a flexibilisation of the independent origin of the same institutions.

The need to call for early elections is also a result of a ladder of decreasing democratic legitimacy for each presidential succession. A vice-president, congress or Supreme Court president, or a congressionally elected president obviously has less direct popular legitimacy than an elected president. Even though democratic legitimacy is better maintained through congressional elections of the presidential successor than a rule-based succession, a decrease in democratic legitimacy is unavoidable. Therefore, a call for early elections to further defuse a political crisis is a positive, parliamentary step towards finding a “salida” for the conflict. An early election is therefore an indication of flexible presidential regimes dealing democratically with political conflicts.

6) Flexibility of presidential origins: The congressionally elected presidents

Congressionally elected presidents are not a case of interrupted presidencies, but consequences of an increased number of interrupted presidents, which in turn require flexible procedures of presidential origin. It is however, a flexible and parliamentary procedure. The

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34 The Dominican case and Balaguer’s deal was a case of elite dealing after an election marred by fraud. To defuse the crisis, Balaguer agreed to step back after two years and a constitutional reform preventing him from returning to the presidency for an eight term. See e.g. Hartlyn (1998).
procedure thus shares traits with the call for early elections. Table 7 lists the Latin American cases of congressionally elected presidents.

With the exception of Bolivia where a congressionally elected president is the constitutional rule (art. 68 in 1967 and 1995 constitutions), the other four cases come as a result of prematurely interrupted presidencies. According to the constitutions in Argentina and Guatemala the Vice-Presidents should have taken over when the presidents were forced to resign. The Vice-Presidents could not take over however, therefore flexibility and parliamentary election was secured in the succession process. This circumstance, we believe, facilitated democratic solutions to the political conflicts. In Guatemala 1993 where Serrano was ousted after a failed self-coup, his Vice-President was impeached in the same coup attempt, and Congress could elect the new president. The Guatemalan Congress elected the highly respected Civil-Rights ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio through a legitimising elective process that resembled a parliamentary procedure in every way. In Argentina, Vice-President Alvarez had resigned in October 2000 (Schamis, 2002, p. 82). Therefore when De la Rúa resigned in midst of popular protest, Congress could sit down and pick his successor (-s). Schamis (2002) argues that this quasi-parliamentary process helped consolidate the Argentinean democracy, and keep the military in the barracks. Venezuela in 1993 did not have a Vice-President and the constitution provided for flexibility even in the first succession of the president. Congress thus freely elected Ramón Velásquez as the replacement for Pérez until next scheduled elections. In Ecuador 1997 Congress bypassed the constitution demonstrating the Ecuadorean supremacy over the president. The constitution stated that in case of a permanent removal of the president, the Vice-President should take over (art. 76). The Congress speaker Alarcón had a much higher support than Vice-President Arteaga, and after some confusion, Congress elected Alarcón with more than 2/3 majority.

These five cases (in four countries) alongside the five calls for early elections and the two votes of no-confidence, show that with respect to the origin and survival of the chief

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35 We count the parliamentary elections of Rodriguez Sáa and later Duhalde as one case.
36 We disagree however with Schamis’s analysis that this parliamentary outcome came as a result of the 1994 constitutional reform. Both the 1853 and 1994 Argentine constitutions had the same rules for succession. The parliamentary elections of Rodriguez Sáa and Duhalde would have been the correct constitutional process under any of the constitutions.
37 As it did by voting Bucaram out of office, and would do in 2000 with Mahuad and in 2005 with Gutierrez.
executive, Latin American presidential regimes have in 12 cases in seven different countries proven to be flexible and have chosen, constitutionally or not, parliamentary solutions to the political crises that have occurred. Furthermore, the seven cases of forced “voluntary” presidential resignation also demonstrate a flexibilisation of presidential regimes that have contributed to a democratic solution to political crises.

VI. Summary: Regime consequences of the presidential interruptions

Latin American governments have after the third wave been unstable, but the regimes have survived. Of 20 interrupted presidencies, only three ended in clear reversals to authoritarian regimes, two of the three occurred in the special case of Haïti. 17 interrupted presidencies and eleven more attempts have not ended with a democratic breakdown. We believe that these figures warrant cautious optimism with respect to presidentialism and democracy in Latin America. Why don’t the presidential democracies break down anymore? The answer to this question is overdetermined by the end of the cold war. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent change of “zeitgeist” and US’ foreign policy towards Latin America constituted a major change that in effect closed the undemocratic alternative to democratic politics in the region. The international context which before 1990 might have been negative with respect to democracy is now a variable with a positive effect on democracy. Hence, new solutions to the political crises had to be found or invented in the region. In finding these tools, presidential regimes have proven flexible and able to handle intense political conflicts. The conflicts have been handled in a way that counters presidentialism’s core definitional criteria and thus renders harmless Linz’s (1990) “Perils of Presidentialism”. The regime consequences of our typology of presidential interruptions (and presidential elections) are summarised in table 8:

| Table 8 Here |

The presidential tool, the impeachment is not surprisingly found to be a very cumbersome and rigid process and has succeeded in only three (out of six) cases. The consequence of an increased use of impeachments is in our understanding, a higher degree of accountability. Political leaders, not only presidents, now risk being held accountable even between elections. However, in our view, an increased use of impeachments per se does not have any direct regime consequences.

The remaining 14 cases affect the very nature of (Latin American) presidentialism: the independent origin and survival of the elected institutions. These cases have been adoptions of
functional equivalents of parliamentary procedures or popular recalls. The independent origin and survival were the factors that Linz (1994) argued led to dual democratic legitimacy and rigidity, respectively, and are the causes for why presidentialism is supposed to be negatively correlated with democracy. We assert that 14 cases of “successful” presidential interruptions and four more cases of congressional elections of the president (in addition to the Bolivian congressionally elected presidents), can be understood as cases of a flexibilisation of the independent origin and survival of the executive and the legislative.

The (Ecuadorean) functional equivalent of a vote of no-confidence changes presidentialism by affecting the independent survival of presidents. This is done through parliamentary procedures that also weaken the dual democratic legitimacy because this procedure demonstrates a congressional supremacy over the executive.

The calls for early elections also affect both the independent survival and origin of the executive (and legislative). A call for early election is also a parliamentary procedure which weakens the rigidity and fixed terms of presidentialism. A “voluntary” presidential resignation or the functional equivalent of a popular recall affects the independent survival of the president. This is not a specifically parliamentary procedure, but it weakens the problems of rigidity and fixed terms. These three procedures all share one feature: they affect the survival of presidents by making rigid rules more flexible. This also entails a flexibilisation of the independent origin of presidents, either through early elections or congressionally elected presidents. A congressional election of the chief executive is also a parliamentary procedure. This procedure weakens the problems of rigidity and dual democratic legitimacy. In these cases, presidents get their legitimacy from congress, and there are no longer two agents of the people with direct democratic legitimacy.

Latin American presidents are no longer immune to popular protests demanding presidential resignation, investigations of corruption scandals etc., nor are they immune to congressional power. It seems the time has passed when presidents could bypass congress without consequences. Congresses in more countries than Bolivia take control and elects new presidents after presidential interruptions. Hence, the origin of presidents is not independent

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38 For statistical support of Linz’s argument, see Stepan & Skach (1994) or Przeworski et.al. (2000), for recent statistical investigations contradicting Linz’s argument, see Cheibub & Limongi (2002) and Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh (2004).
of the will of congress. These changes in Latin American presidentialism weaken the problems of rigidity/fixed terms and dual democratic legitimacy. In country after country, congress prevails if there is a conflict with the president, and popular protests, and strikes. show that the people can overrun the fixed terms of presidents. Our cases demonstrate that during political crises presidential regimes can work like parliamentary regimes and resort to early elections or vote of no-confidence in order to defuse a crisis, or the people and social movements may have the power to force a presidential resignation through what we defined as a functional equivalent of a popular recall. Thus in its core, defining features Latin American presidentialism is becoming more flexible and more like parliamentarism. If Linz is correct in stating that parliamentarism is the better regime type, this development bodes well for Latin American democracies. These cases of presidential interruptions could be isolated cases with no future consequences for the presidential regimes, but the cases could also create common para-constitutional practices (Riggs, 1988). These new, non-presidential procedures used to solve political crises might become “sticky” as Pierson (2004) calls it and common non-constitutional, practice for future conflict resolutions. Latin American presidentialism is changing by way the conflicts are solved through presidential interruptions, this warrants some optimism: political crises ending in government instability is still better than ending in regime instability.

Presidentialism is thus surviving the first real test of its viability by changing some of its core definitional criteria identified as “The perils of presidentialism” (Linz, 1990). Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela have long been calling for constitutional reforms to adopt parliamentarism in Latin America. These reforms will most likely never materialise in presidential Latin America. Nevertheless, our evidence show that Latin American presidentialism is turning the constitutional perils of presidentialism into dead letters, and is adapting more and more flexible and parliamentary features.

39 Cox & Morgenstern (2002) have shown that on other non-defining features Latin American presidentialism is already taking a mid-position between US presidentialism and European parliamentarism.
40 Certainly in several European countries, as e.g. Norway, parliamentarisation occurred against the letter of the constitution and “stuck” on the regime as common practice.
Tables and figures

Figure 1: Types of governmental interruption

![Figure 1: Types of governmental interruption]

Table 1: Third wave interrupted presidencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Undemocratic</th>
<th>Presidential</th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
<th>Regime independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procedure/functional equivalent of:</td>
<td>Coup or self-coup</td>
<td>Impeachment</td>
<td>Early election</td>
<td>Abandonment of post or mental incapacity/Vote of no confidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility of:</td>
<td>Survival and origin</td>
<td>Survival</td>
<td>Survival and Origin</td>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data for tables 2 through 7 comes from Keesing’s Record of World Events, Europa World Yearbook Online, our reading of secondary literature and our own knowledge of cases.
Table 2: Coups and self-coups

1. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti in December 1990 and deposed in September 1991 by a military coup and replaced by a military junta led by Raúl Cedras.

2. Aristide was elected president again in 2000 and was forced to resign on 29 February 2004 in the wake of an uprising by former military, and replaced by Supreme Court chief justice as provisional president.

3. Alberto Fujimori was elected president in Peru in 1990, and shut down Congress in April 1992 in an autogolpe supported by the military. New elections for a constituent assembly which elaborated a new constitution approved by a referendum in 1993.

4. F: Jamil Mahuad was elected president in Ecuador in 1998. In January 2000 junior officers of the military allied with the indigenous movement CONAIE toppled Mahuad in a coup, but the new civil-military junta lasted only 20 hours. The top military backed down, and Mahuad was replaced by vice-president Gustavo Noboa.

5. F: In Venezuela a civil-military coup removed president Hugo Chávez from office on 11 April 2002. The leader of Fedecámaras, Pedro Carmona, was named interim president during the coup. However, the coup failed in the face of a furious pro-Chávez backlash that brought Chávez back in office after 47 hours.


9. F: In Guatemala, president Jorge Serrano, elected in 1991, failed in his attempt to perform an autogolpe in May 1993 because the military decided not to back him in the end. Serrano was replaced by a congressional appointee: Ramiro de León Carpio.

10. F: In Bolivia 1984, president Silez Suazo was kidnapped for 10 hours by members of the security forces in an attempt to overthrow the government, the military command quickly denounced and aborted the coup.

Table 3: Impeachments

1. In Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello was elected president in 1989 in the first direct presidential elections after the democratic transition in 1985. Collor was impeached on corruption charges in 1992 and replaced by vice-president Itamar Franco.

2. In Venezuela, president Carlos Andrés Pérez, elected in 1988, was impeached in 1993 on corruption charges and replaced by a congressional appointee: Senator Ramón Velásquez, who finished out the last few months of Pérez’s term.

3. In Paraguay, Raúl Cubas was elected president in 1998, but faced with the threat of impeachment, triggered by the assassination of vice-president Argaña, resigned in 1999. Congress appointed successor (Luis González Macchi) in the absence of the assassinated vice-president.


5. F: Unsuccessful impeachment against Ernesto Samper in Colombia in 1996

Table 4: Presidential resignations/popular recall

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>In Bolivia, Hernán Siles Zuazo, elected president in 1982, agreed to resign one year early in 1985 after Church-brokered agreement. Hyperinflation and failed economic policies and mass demonstrations played a role in the resignation. New elections were held in 1985.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>In Argentina, President Alfonsín decided to retire early in 1989 and leave power to president elect Carlos Menem. This was a result of a deal between Alfonsín and Menem and occurred during an economic crisis, and popular protests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>In Argentina, Fernando de la Rúa, elected president in 1999, resigned on 20 December 2001 faced by demonstrations and street violence causing civilian deaths triggered by an economic crisis going out of hand. The vice-president had resigned in October 2000, so Congress appointed a series of successors that ended up with Eduardo Duhalde as new president until new presidential elections were held in April 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>In Ecuador in January 2000, president Mahuad chose to resign faced with the fait accompli provided by the civil-military coup and the accompanying popular protest mobilization against his economic policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>In Peru, president Alberto Fujimori, reelected in 1995, and reelected again for a third term in April 2000, resigned on 17 November 2000 after widespread accusations of corruption involving his intelligence chief Vladimir Montesinos. Fujimori tendered his resignation by fax after having left the country for exile in Japan. Congress refused to accept the resignation and suspended the president from office while starting impeachment proceedings. The vice-president having already resigned before Fujimori, he was replaced by Valentín Paniagua charged with holding new general elections in April 2001.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>In Bolivia, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was elected president in 2002, and resigned in October 2003 in the face of mass demonstrations and civilian deaths. He was replaced by vice-president Carlos Mesa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>F: In Venezuela popular and elite mobilization against president Hugo Chávez’s policies led in 2004 to an attempt to get rid of the president by following the constitutional provisions for popular recall provided by the 1999 Bolivarian constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Carlos Mesa resigned in June 2005 after failure to provide a solution to the issues that caused Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation. Mesa was replaced by Supreme Court chief justice Rodríguez, who later decided to hold early general elections on 18 December.</td>
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Table 5: Vote of no-confidence

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Abdalá Bucaram, elected president in 1996, was voted out of office in February 1997 by Congress on the charge of “mental incapacity” with 44 against 34 votes. Congress bypassed vice-president Rosalía Arteaga and replaced Bucaram by a congressional appointee: Fabián Alarcón (see below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>And in April 2005 President Lucio Gutiérrez, elected in 2002, was voted out of office on the charge of “abandonment of office” with a 60 to 2 margin. Gutiérrez was replaced by the vice president Alfredo Palacio.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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41 Including the Argentine cases as types of popular recall and not as cases of vote of no-confidence, we differ from Schamis’s (2002) analysis. Since there were no formal votes of no-confidence against either de la Rúa or Rodriguez Sáa in congress, we see these cases as presidential resignations as results of popular recalls. There is however, no doubt that de facto neither de la Rúa nor the congressionally elected successor Rodriguez Sáa, had sufficient support in congress and that both were facing rapidly waning party support. In this sense, even the Argentine case could be regarded as a fuzzy-case.

42 Data in both cases on voting records from Keesing’s Record of World Events.
Table 6: Early elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dominican Republic 1996: After (alleged) electoral fraud in the 1994 election where Balaguer was declared winner, Balaguer agreed in a multipartisan deal which included US involvement, to shorten his presidential period with two years and hold new presidential elections in 1996. Election originally scheduled for 1998.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bolivia 2005: President Rodríguez, (former Supreme Court President who took over for Carlos Mesa who took over for Sánchez de Lozada) called for early elections in December 2005 to resolve the socio-political stalemate that had paralysed the country since the previous presidential election. Elections originally scheduled for 2006.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Argentina 2003: President Duhalde who was elected president by the Argentinian congress in January 2002, called for early elections in April 2003 instead of October 2003.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The early elections in Colombia 1991, Peru 1993, and Venezuela in 2000 are excluded, see note 22.

Table 7: Congressionally elected presidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bolivia all elections 1985-2005: This is a result of article 68 of constitution. Evo Morales became first president in the most recent democratic period not to be elected by Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guatemala 1993 Ramón de León Carpio elected by Congress after a failed “self-coup” by Serrano and subsequent impeachment procedures against the vice-president.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Venezuela 1993: Velásquez elected president by congress after impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ecuador 1997: After the congressional destitution of President Bucaram, congress speaker Alarcón was elected president after congress had bypassed vice-president Arteaga. The constitution was bypassed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Argentina 2001/02: After de la Rúa’s resignation (and previously the vice-president’s resignation), congress elected first Rodriguez Sáa as president in December 2001. Rodriguez Sáa resigned (after understanding he had no support in Congress), and congress then elected Eduardo Duhalde new President in January 2002.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8: Summary: Interruptions and elections of presidents and their effect on presidentialism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Undemocratic (regime ind.)</th>
<th>Presidential</th>
<th>Parliamentary</th>
<th>Regime independent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Procedure</td>
<td>Coup or self-coup</td>
<td>Impeachment</td>
<td>Early election</td>
<td>Resignation without congressional vote/Popular recall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect on separate origin and survival (regime)</td>
<td>Regime breakdown</td>
<td>Flexibilisation of independent survival. Could entail flexibilisation of independent origin by congressionally elected presidents or early elections.</td>
<td>Flexibilisation through parliamentarisation of independent survival and origin.</td>
<td>Flexibilisation of independent survival. Could entail flexibilisation of independent origin by congressionally elected presidents or early elections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: We include congressional elections of presidents in this summary table even though they are not cases of interrupted presidencies, but as we have argued, consequences of interrupted presidencies. Since they do affect the regimes, they are included here.
Bibliography:


