The Polarization of the European Party Systems – New Data, New Approach, New Results

Paper to be presented in the panel “The Methodological Challenges of Designing Cross-National Voting Advice Applications” (P361) at the ECPR General Conference taking place from September 3 to 6 in Glasgow

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Compared to the effective number of parties and the volatility the polarization of party systems belongs the under researched topics in the literature. There are only a few noteworthy exceptions such as Sigelman/Yough (1978), Gross Sigelman (1984) and Dalton (2008). This is in so far astonishing as there is a considerable amount of theory which more or less directly addresses polarization, be it as a variable to be explained, be it – a little bit less frequently – as an independent variable. The main reason for this lack of empirical research is the fact that the data needed to measure polarization is more difficult to gather than the electoral results which are used to calculate fragmentation and stability of party systems. We do not only have to know something about the strength of the parties but also about their political positions.

Fortunately, an increasing number of internationally comparative research projects and new technologies have eased the access to data which reveal the political parties’ positions. In this paper, I will explore the possibilities that arise through the growing popularity of Voting Advice Applications (VAAs). These tools produce a huge amount of data on the political positions of the parties for a wide range of political issues. This will allow us not only to position the parties on the left-right dimension but also in a more encompassing multi-dimensional political space. Especially interesting are, of course, VAAs which use exactly the same questions in different countries. Most outstanding here are VAAs used for the elections of the European Parliament.

The paper starts with a short description of the theoretical issues addressed and a presentation of the data. In a next step, I will present the positions of the parties taking part in the 2009 elections to the EU Parliament. In the core of the paper, I will suggest a method to calculate a polarization index multi-dimensionally and present the results for the different countries. The following sections contain attempts to explain the polarization of the party systems and to ask for possible effects of party system polarization. The paper ends with a roadmap for further research.
A. Theoretical considerations

When it comes to describing party systems, the empirical indicator most often used is the number of parties. A more important topic, however, is the quality of party competition. The ideas of Downs (1957) with his concept of the median voter concentrate on the distance between the parties and the centre of a political continuum. In his eyes, two party systems were very much likely to have less polarized party systems since the parties were competing for the voters localized in the middle of the political spectrum. Sartori (1976) emphasized the difference between centripetal and centrifugal party systems. In the latter, parties are located at the extremes of a political continuum whereas in the former they compete for voters in the centre of the political space. For Sartori, a low degree of polarization was also possible in multiparty systems. He compares moderate multi-party systems to polarized multi-party systems.

Apart from admitting that polarization is an important characteristics of party systems there are three issues related to this concept. The first one is the question about how to define and measure polarization. This question will be dealt with at the end of this section. The other two issues concern the variables explaining polarization and the effects of polarization.

One of the most important explaining variable for polarization is the heterogeneity of a country. Homogenous societies tend to have less polarized party systems whereas in countries with a larger number of important cleavages (for example in the sense of Lipset/Rokkan 1967) one might expect to find parties with larger political differences between each other. There is also an open debate to what extend the size of a country goes hand in hand with polarized party systems. Larger countries might be more heterogeneous (Dahl and Tufte 1974) which would add up to the previously mentioned argument, or – following Lijphart (1999) – they tend to have a less consensus oriented political systems which generally help to avoid internal conflicts. This would add a cultural element to the bunch of explaining factors.

Another set of variables consists of institutional characteristics. Most prominent here is the electoral system and the theoretical arguments of authors like Duverger and Downs. According to Duverger’s law a majority vote in one ballot leads to a two-party system, whereas proportional representation leads to a multiparty system (Duverger 1954). Following Downs (1957) again, it is the median voter mechanism which motivates parties in a two party system to opt for a position in the centre of the political spectrum where the crucial voter needed to get more than fifty per cent of the votes is likely to be found. In PR systems, on the contrary, parties have the possibility to express more profiled positions. Hence, PR systems are likely to bring forward more polarized party systems.
Using polarization as an independent variable, one of the most salient questions is, whether polarization harms political stability. The Weimar Republic, the French Fourth Republic, the Austrian democracy in the 1930s and the Chilean Democracy failed because of their fractionalized party systems, but it was not the high number of parties these countries were facing but rather the vast ideological differences between them which made governing together problematic (Dalton 2008: 900). If we are able to limit polarization, we might be able to make democracy more sustainable one is likely to say.

A low polarization might also have an impact on economic growth. Either indirectly through the increased political stability or directly because it makes it easier for governments to come to broadly accepted policy solutions. Since the differences between the parties are not too large, solutions are closer to their political preferences.

Another possible impact of polarization can be expected on electoral turnout. Citizens are perhaps more inclined to take part in elections when there are clear political differences between the parties running for office, if they defend rather similar positions it does not make much of a difference which party gets elected.

When it comes to measuring the polarization of party systems, two sets of variables are needed. The first set – the simpler one – has to tell us something about the importance or the strength of the different parties. This can be the percentage of votes in the last elections or the percentage of seats in parliament. The second set turns out to be more difficult to gather. We need some information about the political space and the political positions of the parties in this space. The political space can be one-dimensional (left-right) or multi-dimensional. A real challenge is also to track changes (if any) in party system polarization over a longer period of time.

In the literature, we find different ways to measure the position of parties:

- Most popular is the party manifesto project (Budge 1994, Budge/Klingemann 2001, Budge et al. 2001), which positions parties according to their party program.
- The position of parties can also be measured through expert surveys (Benoit and Laver 2006, Hooghe et al. 2008).
- Another possibility is suggested by Dalton (2008) using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) which measures the citizens’ perception of party positions.

In this paper, we shall rely on a new source of information which has not been used so far. It is the way parties are presented on Voting Advice Applications (VAA). We claim that VAAs offer a very convenient way to position political parties and to define the polarization of a party system.
B. Data

The data used in this paper stem from the euprofiler, a VAA which was used in the 2009 elections for the EU parliament. During the EP election campaign, citizens going to the website www.euprofiler.eu were able to position themselves on 30 political issues. Having done so, they were offered, both in text form and graphically, a thorough look at the corresponding policy offer from the parties competing in the election. That is, they were able to match their political preferences with those advertised by the political parties competing for the voters’ support at the polls (see Trechsel/Mair 2009: 4).

Core element of the euprofiler was the positioning of the political parties. The positioning was organized and executed in three largely parallel processes at the European University Institute in Florence (for the details see Trechsel/Mair 2009): first, the parties’ self-positioning process; second, the positioning process as determined by expert coders; and third, the interaction between coder and party. Taken together, the EU Profiler therefore contains documented party positions for 30 statements for each of 274 parties; that is a total of 8,220 party positions. These data was gathered in the spring of 2009 by over one hundred highly qualified social scientists.

C. Parties competing in the 2009 EU-Parliament elections

More than 200 parties in 27 countries competed in the 2009 elections to the European Parliament. Additionally, the euprofiler included also parties from Turkey, Croatia and Switzerland. In many countries there are parties with more or less similar political claims and political positions. Most of these parties share ideas which draw upon political ideologies or tendencies such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, etc. Others are more difficult to classify. Reference points to classify and categorize the parties are the party groups of the European Parliament (parliamentary groups) and the European Parties which united parties with similar ideas beyond the European Union. This allows us to distinguish eight different party families (see Table 1).

The largest party family which accounts for about one fifth of the parties in our sample is the European People’s Party, followed by the liberals and the socialists. The greens and the green-lefts account for about 10 percent of the parties each, which means that they have a party organisation in almost all of the countries analysed, whereas the other families are smaller and only present in some of the countries. Membership in these party families are also due to change over time as is the composition of the parliamentary groups in the EU parliament.
Despite some possible uncertainties in terms of membership, the political positions of the party families gives us an idea about political differences and about the quality of the data. Figure 1 shows the median values for the different party families on the seven EU-spider dimensions: economic liberalization, restrictive financial policy, law and order, restrictive immigration policy, more environmental protection, expanded welfare state and liberal society.

The spider-diagrams show clear positions on the left as far as the expansion of the welfare state is concerned. The Greens and the green-left parties are supporting liberal values when it comes to questions of the society much stronger than the socialist, and they hold more extreme positions when it comes to environmental questions, especially the Greens. The Socialists are more restrictive in law and order issues than the other two party families. If we compare the Socialist to the parties on the right, however, they are still considerably less fierce on this dimension.

The liberals are less liberal than the green and left parties on the dimension “liberal society” but they are more restrictive in financial questions and favour a more liberal organization of the economy. The European People’s Party family is – as it might have been expected – less liberal than the liberal parties in regard to questions concerning the organisation of society but more restrictive when it comes to law and order issues. The differences between the two party families, however, are astonishingly small in economic and financial questions as well as in questions touching upon the welfare state.

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1 For the construction of the spider dimensions see Annex 3.
Most astonishing for the parties on the right (including EU sceptical parties) is the rather strong support for the welfare state. Dimensions with clear positions of the right-wing populist parties are law
and order and a restrictive immigration policy. The national-conservative parties are a bit less extreme in this respect but stronger in support of the environment.

The party families by themselves are far from homogeneous either. The most homogeneous families are the greens and the socialists, least homogenous are – not quite astonishingly – the liberals followed by the large family of the European People’s Party (see Figure 2). The homogeneity is calculated as mean value of the standard deviations for all 28 issues of the euprofiler for each party family. A high value is a sign for deviating positions within the family.

Figure 2: Homogeneity of the “party families”

The most important differences among the parties of the European People’s Party are found on the dimensions “restrictive immigration policy” and “expansion of the welfare state” (see Ladner 2010: 18 ff.). If it comes to single parties, the political profiles of the CDU in Germany, the Conservative Party in Great Britain and the Union pour un Mouvement Populaire in France are in fact quite distinct. Among the Socialist parties, the most important differences are found in environmental questions and in respect to immigration. The Parti Socialiste in France, the Partido Socialista Obrero in Spain and the Partij van de Arbeid in the Netherlands are more liberal in questions concerning the organisation of society and more pro-environment than the SPD in Germany. In the party family of the liberals, the differences are important on all dimensions. The Liberal Democrats in the UK or the Mouvement Démocrate in France are hardly comparable to the Centerpartiet in Sweden, the Venstre in Denmark or the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie in the Netherlands.²

² For a more thorough presentation of the differences and the profiles of selected parties see Ladner et al. (2010).
D. Measuring and Comparing Polarization

A closer look at the profiles of the parties in the different countries reveals immediately that the political space and therefore most probably also the political competition between the parties varies considerably. In some countries, the spider diagrams of the most important parties differ only slightly whereas in other countries we find almost complementary pictures. Figure 3 illustrates this situation quite meaningfully: The political profiles of the two most important parties in Switzerland, the Swiss People’s Party and the Social Democrats, differ considerably, whereas the two most important parties in Malta, the Partit Laburista and the Partit Nazzjonalista, have quite similar profiles.
If the differences between the parties are huge, we tend to speak of a highly polarized party system, if the differences are small, the party system is less polarized. The question here is, of course, which is the adequate or best way the measure this polarization and to produce an index for comparative studies. Attempts to calculate polarization are usually inspired by the work of Taylor/Hermann (1971: 32 ff.).

Polarization in general means the distance of the political parties to the political or ideological centre of the political space. If the political space is believed to be one-dimensional like this is very often – and not without good reasons and theoretical support (see Inglehart/Klingemann 1978) – the case when parties are compared on the left-right axis (reaching from 0 to 10, for example) only, we measure the absolute\(^3\) distance of each party’s position on the left-right axis to the mean value (the centre) of the positions of all parties which is a value somewhere in the middle between the different parties. Some party systems tend to the right, some to the left. Since it obviously makes a difference whether the parties positioned at the most extreme positions on the left and on the right are small or big, we also have to take into account the strength of the parties.

Formula 1 shows how the position of a party system is calculated:

\[
\text{Formula 1: Position of the party system: } \bar{X}_j = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i x_{ij}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i}
\]

\(N\) is the number of parties, \(f_i\) is the percentage of votes of party \(i\) and \(x_{ij}\) is the position of party \(i\) on the dimension \(j\).

Knowing the position of a party system on a political dimension when can then calculate the distance of each party from this position. Here again, it makes a difference whether a small party or a big party is far away from the center.

\[
\text{Formula 2: Polarization of the policy dimension: } p_{\text{obj}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} f_i \left| x_{ij} - \bar{x}_j \right|
\]

\(N\) is the number of parties, \(f_i\) is the percentage of votes of party \(i\), \(x_{ij}\) is the position of this party on dimension \(j\), \(\bar{x}_j\) is the position of the party system on dimension \(j\).

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\(^3\) Some authors square the distance which increases the importance of more extreme parties.

\(^4\) An alternative method would be the measurement of the distances between each possible pair of parties in a party system.
If the political space is one-dimensional only, formula 2 gives us the polarization of the party system. If the party system contains more dimensions, as we additionally suggest in this paper, we can calculate the total polarization as an average value across all dimensions:

Formula 3: Polarization of the party system: \[ p_{tot} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{m} p_{pj}}{m} \]

M is the number of policy dimensions and \( p_{pj} \) is the polarization of the party system on dimension j.

Based on the formulae presented above and using the date of the euprofiler revealing the positions of the parties on the seven dimensions, we are now able to calculate the polarization of the party systems. The strength of the parties is measured with the percentage of the votes in the last domestic elections of the parliament. The underlying reasons and assumptions are: EU elections are of lesser importance than national election. We are basically interested in the polarization of party systems in the different countries and we are not interested in the way parties are campaigning for the EU parliament. The issues used in the EU profiler are general political issues and do not concentrate on EU related questions only.

Figure 4 shows the polarizations of the 30 party systems in our sample. The least polarized party systems are found in countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg; whereas the most polarized systems are in Switzerland, France, Germany, Spain and Italy.

Interesting to note from a methodological point of view: The multi-dimensional index presented in figure 4 calculated is strongly correlated with the one-dimensional measurement of polarization using the left-right axis. The correlation coefficient amounts to .711. Figure 5 shows the highly polarized party systems Switzerland, France, Germany, Italy and Spain remain highly polarized in the simpler, one-dimensional way of measuring polarization. Similarly, Malta, Romania and Hungary remain less polarized. There are, however, also some deviating cases: Luxembourg seems to be hardly polarized according to the multi-dimensional concept but rather polarized on the left-right axis. Denmark and Finland, on the contrary, appear to be more polarized according to the multi-dimensional concept. Interesting to note as well from this descriptive presentation of the data, eastern countries are almost all among the less polarized counties according to the left-right measurement whereas Lativa, Lituania, Estonia but also Czechia and Slovakia are considerably more polarized according to the new multi-dimensional measurement. This observation brings us to the next section: How can polarization be explained?
Figure 4: Polarization of the party systems according to the differences on the seven policy dimensions

Source: EU-profiler, own calculations

Figure 5: Polarization of the party systems (left-right dimension only)

Source: EU-profiler, own calculations
E. Explaining Polarization

There are obviously quite important differences between the countries when it comes to the polarization of their party systems. In some countries the political space set up by the parties is rather large; in other it is smaller or narrower. The next question is: Are there any systematic reasons which account for these differences? Are they due to structural or cultural factors or play political institutions an important role? To answer such questions would fill a paper on their own right, so we concentrate here on a few explaining variables only. Apart from getting an idea of possible explanatory variables we are also interested in whether our multi-dimensional index leads to other results than the simpler polarization index based on the left-right dimension.

Size obviously matters. Polarization is positively correlated with population size. The larger a country, the more important become parties with diverging political positions regardless how we measure polarization (see Table 2). Following the arguments of Dahl and Tufte (1974: 97) population size leads to the development of a broader electoral offer with different party positions. This also reminds us of what Lijphart (1999: 252) claims for smaller countries which in his eyes are more likely to be consensus democracies. If we use Lijphart’s consensus variable, however, the correlation disappears which is not astonishing when we look at the previous section where Lijphart’s ideal type of a consensus democracy, Switzerland, proved to have the most polarized party system. Particularly interesting are the differences between eastern and western countries. The multi-dimensional measurement reveals no correlation whereas if we use the left-right dimension only, the eastern countries are – as we have already suspected in the previous section – significantly less polarized.

Table 2: “Explaining” polarization (correlation coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polarization multi-dimensional</th>
<th>Polarization left-right</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Size (ln)</td>
<td>.418*</td>
<td>.369*</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Countries</td>
<td>-0.185</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Countries</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-.427*</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Number of Parties</td>
<td>0.355</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lijphart’s Consensus Democracies</td>
<td>0.336</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
F. Effects of Polarization

The polarization of a party system can also be used as an independent variable. Does polarization lead to political instability, does it harm economic growth and does it make politics more interesting and increase electoral turnout? These are questions which might be of interest here.

If we simply look at the GDP, we find a positive correlation. A high GDP goes hand in hand with a strong polarization on the left-right dimension. There is, however, no significant correlation between the multi-dimensional concept of polarization and the GDP. This is most probably due to the fact that Western countries have a higher GDP and here the left-right dimension is more meaningful.

Table 3: The “effects” of polarization (correlation coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polarization multi-dimensional</th>
<th>Polarization left-right</th>
<th>N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>.433*</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurostat - GDP per capita in PPS - GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU-27 = 100)

G. Discussion and Roadmap for Future Research

The idea behind this paper was to explore a new way of measuring party system polarization by taking advantage of the data produced by VAAs. VAA data allows for moving easily beyond the one-dimensional political space which has been used so far by most of the comparative studies in the field.

On the basis of the unique data set provided by the euprofiler which was set up for the 2009 EU parliament elections by the European University Institute in Florence in collaboration with Kieskompas and a small team of the NCCR democracy, I calculated the polarization of the party systems in 30 countries. The results show that the way polarization is calculated makes a difference. If we base our calculation on a seven-dimensional political space (euspider) we get – at least for some countries – different results compared to calculations based on one dimension only. The left-right dimension seems to underestimate political differences in Eastern European countries.

The results show that the country with the most polarized party systems is Switzerland, the least polarized party system is found in Malta. This is quite astonishing, not for Malta with its two party system, but rather for the Swiss consensus democracy. According to Gross/Siegelmann (1984: 473),
Switzerland belongs to the group of countries with a larger number of parties but a medium degree of polarization only. Lane/Ersson (1994: 185) came to a similar conclusion. They were most probably both right at the time they conducted their studies. Observers of Swiss politics today have recognized an increased polarization over the last decades. There are thus good reasons to believe that our results reflect reality. If they do so, we have a very strong argument against the deterministic role of institutional variables. Polarization can vary over time without any changes of the political institutions. There seems to be some leeway for the political parties to position themselves and polarization might also reflect different strategic considerations.

In the remainder of the paper I tried to use polarization both as a dependent and as an independent variable. This part needs to be developed much more: more explaining variables and more variables to test the effects of polarization will be needed as well as multivariate methods. The correlations found so far, however, can be taken as a hint that the newly calculated polarization index brings additional insight.

The EU profiler was a stroke of luck for party system research because the same methodology to position the parties was applied for all countries by a very competent team at the EUI (see Trechsel/Mair 2009). For the 2014 EU parliament elections there were similar VAAs in operation which produced comparable date. This should give us the possibility to track the positions of the parties and the polarization of the party systems over time. One of the challenges will be to guarantee comparability of the two data sets. This challenge will become even bigger if we want to extend our sample beyond countries participating in the EU elections and if we try to compare the results from different VAAs. If we manage to come to a standardized measurement of the differences between parties, the huge number of VAAs will allow us to explore this important characteristics of party systems in a up to now unknown manner.

**Literature**


### Annex 1: The EU Profiler-Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01.</td>
<td>Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.</td>
<td>Greater efforts should be made to privatise healthcare services in the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.</td>
<td>State subsidies for crèches and child care should be increased substantially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.</td>
<td>Immigration policies oriented towards skilled workers should be encouraged as a means of fostering economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.</td>
<td>Immigration into the country should be made more restrictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.</td>
<td>Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture and values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07.</td>
<td>The legalisation of the same sex marriages is a good thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08.</td>
<td>Religious values and principles should be shown greater respect in politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09.</td>
<td>The discrimination of the personal use of drugs is to be welcomed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Euthanasia should be legalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>The EU should acquire its own tax raising powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Governments should bail out failing banks with public money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Governments should reduce workers’ protection regulations in order to fight unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>The EU should drastically reduce its subsidies to Europe’s farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Renewable sources of energy (e.g. solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this means higher energy costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (e.g. road taxing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Policies to fight global warming should be encouraged even if it hampers economic growth or employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Restrictions of civil liberties should be accepted in the fight against terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Criminals should be punished more severely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>On foreign policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU should speak with one voice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>European integration is a good thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>[Your country] is much better off in the EU than outside it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>The European Union should be enlarged to include Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>The European Parliament should be given more powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referendum in [your country]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quelle: EU Profiler 2009.

### Annex 2: Codierung der Parteipositionen - Information und Vorgehen

Die Positionen der Parteien des EU Profilers wurden von Politologinnen und Politologen sorgfältig analysiert. Sie entschieden über die Verortung der Parteien unter Verweis auf die entsprechende schriftliche Quelle.

Beispiel der Deutschen Partei „Die Republikaner“ bei der Frage:

„Die Legalisierung gleichgeschlechtlicher Ehen ist eine gute Sache.“:

Position der Partei: Stimme überhaupt nicht zu

Quelle(n):

a) Letztes Bundestagswahlprogramm:
"… Abschaffung der Homo- und Lesbenehe …" (Bundestagswahlprogramm Republikaner 2005, S. 2)

b) Andere offizielle Parteidokumente:
"… keine rechtliche Anerkennung gleichgeschlechtlicher Partnerschaften und kein Adoptionsrecht für Homosexuelle" (Bundesparteiprogramm Republikaner 2002, S. 19)

Quelle: EU Profiler 2009.

Die Parteien wurden zusätzlich direkt kontaktiert und um die Beantwortung der Fragen mit entsprechenden Quellenangaben gebeten. In Fällen von Diskrepanzen zwischen der Positionierung des EU Profiler-Politologen und der Partei, wurde die Partei um entsprechende Detailinformation gebeten. Der Entscheid über die Parteipositionierung verblieb trotz Parteikonsultation immer bei den Länderteams.

Hierarchy for the coding

1. EU Election Manifesto 2009 of national party
2. Party Election Platform
3. Current/latest national election manifesto
4. EU Election Manifesto of Europarties
5. Other programmatic and official party documentation
6. Actions/statements of party representatives in government and parliament
7. Interviews and other coverage in media outlets in 2008-2009
8. Older Election Manifestos, party documentation, actions/statements and interviews
9. Other

Trechsel/Mair (2009 :13).
Annex 3: Frage-Zuordnung zu den sieben Politikbereichen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frage</th>
<th>EU-spider Dimensionen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Frage 01 | Erweiterung des Sozialstaates  
Restriktive Finanzpolitik  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 02 | Erweiterung des Sozialstaates  
Restriktive Finanzpolitik  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 03 | Erweiterung des Sozialstaates  
Liberale Gesellschaft  
Restriktive Finanzpolitik  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 04 | Restriktive Zuwanderungspolitik |
| Frage 05 | Restriktive Zuwanderungspolitik  
Recht und Ordnung |
| Frage 06 | Restriktive Zuwanderungspolitik |
| Frage 07 | Liberale Gesellschaft |
| Frage 08 | Liberale Gesellschaft |
| Frage 09 | Liberale Gesellschaft  
Recht und Ordnung |
| Frage 10 | Liberale Gesellschaft  
Recht und Ordnung |
| Frage 11 | Restriktive Finanzpolitik  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 12 | Restriktive Finanzpolitik  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 13 | Restriktive Finanzpolitik  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 14 | Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 15 | Restriktive Finanzpolitik  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 16 | Mehr Umweltschutz  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 17 | Mehr Umweltschutz  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 18 | Mehr Umweltschutz  
Ökonomische Liberalisierung |
| Frage 19 | Liberale Gesellschaft  
Recht und Ordnung |
| Frage 20 | Liberale Gesellschaft  
Recht und Ordnung |
| Fragen 21 - 28 | EU-spider nicht zugeordnet |

Quelle: EU Profiler 2009.
Annex 4: Berechnung der Spiderpositionen

Die EU-spider zeigt die politischen Einstellungen und Werte anhand von sieben thematischen Dimensionen. Pro Streitfrage können Werte von 0 bis 100 Prozent erreicht werden. 100 Prozent bedeutet eine starke Befürwortung eines politisch formulierten Ziels, 0 Prozent bedeutet eine vollständige Nichtübereinstimmung.


Die EU-spider Dimensionen

Die sieben Dimensionen der EU-spider representieren politische Streitfragen; die entsprechenden Werte einer Partei/eines Benutzers die entsprechende Zustimmung zur jeweiligen Dimension:

1. Wirtschaftliche Liberalisierung
2. Restriktive Finanzpolitik
3. Justiz und Innere Sicherheit (Recht und Ordnung)
4. Restriktive Einwanderungspolitik
5. Umweltschutz
6. Ausbau des Sozialstaates (Wohlfahrtsstaat)
7. Liberale Gesellschaft

Die Berechnung der EU-spider Werte basiert auf den Antworten des EU Profiler Fragebogens. Für jede Antwort pro Dimension wird die Übereinstimmung berechnet. Die Antworten sind gemäss nachfolgender Tabelle zugeordnet:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numerische Werte der Antwortoptionen:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antwortpunkte:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Für die Zustimmung gewisser policy Dimensionen der EU-Spider sind einige Fragen negativ zu beantworten. Für Antworten solcher Streitfragen gilt die folgende Wertverteilung:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numerische Werte der Antwortoptionen (Pole gewechselt):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antwortpunkte:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Das jeweilige erreichte Zustimmungsniveau wird durch Addition der entsprechenden Zustimmungspunkte berechnet.

Der aktuelle Wert in der Spinnengrafik stellt die erreichte Zustimmung als Prozentanteil der maximal möglichen Zustimmung dar. Die maximale Zustimmung ist die mit 100 multiplizierte Anzahl der Fragen der jeweiligen Dimension. Zum Beispiel, eine Dimension mit sechs Fragen hat entsprechend ein maximales Zustimmungsniveau von 600.