Exploring the External Dimension of European Cooperation in the Area of Internal Security:
The Case of Euro-Mediterranean Civil Protection

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WORK IN PROGRESS.
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Abstract

This paper seeks to contribute to the study of European cooperation in the area of internal security by way of exploring the external dimension of European Union (EU) civil protection. In the paper it is argued that the inherently transboundary nature of the majority of the threats and risks facing European societies today (such as pandemics, natural disasters, terrorism, failed states, and organized crime) makes it increasingly important to understand to what extent European cooperation in the area of internal security, such as EU civil protection, also involves states that are not members of the EU. A particularly interesting aspect of EU civil protection can be seen in the Euro-Med regional programmes on civil protection that the EU has promoted since the mid-1990s. These programmes include both EU member states and Mediterranean partner countries. On a theoretical level this paper addresses the problem that revolves around the unsettled boundaries of the European security community. To phrase it differently, do the boundaries of the European security community necessarily coincide with the institutional borders of the EU? Focusing on EU civil protection as a case of increasingly institutionalised European cooperation on matters related to internal security with an important external dimension manifested in Euro-Med civil protection cooperation, this paper applies a fresh take on security communities as evolving and spreading through ‘communities of practice’.
Figure 1. Map of the Euro-Mediterranean region

Legend: Coloured states represent the members of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). EU member states are coloured in blue. States in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans are coloured in green. Libya (striped) has observer status. ENP stands for European Neighbourhood Policy, SAA for Stability & Association Agreement and ACP for Partnership Agreement with the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States.

Albania (SAA)  Greece (EU)  Morocco (ENP)
Algeria (ENP)  Hungary (EU)  Netherlands (EU)
Austria (EU)  Ireland (EU)  Palestinian Authority (ENP)
Belgium (EU)  Israel (ENP)  Poland (EU)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SAA)  Italy (EU)  Portugal (EU)
Bulgaria (EU)  Jordan (ENP)  Romania (EU)
Cyprus (EU)  Latvia (EU)  Slovakia (EU)
Czech Republic (EU)  Lebanon (ENP)  Slovenia (EU)
Denmark (EU)  Lithuania (EU)  Spain (EU)
Egypt (ENP)  Luxembourg (EU)  Sweden (EU)
Estonia (EU)  Libya (UfM observer status)  Syria (ENP)
Finland (EU)  Malta (EU)  Tunisia (ENP)
France (EU)  Mauritania (ACP)  Turkey (EU candidate)
Germany (EU)  Montenegro (SAA)  United Kingdom (EU)
1. Introduction
The changed strategic environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War together with the process of European integration seems to have contributed to making war among EU member states highly unlikely, if not unthinkable. Consequently, traditional security policies, such as the ‘Territorial Defence model’, are losing ground (Gärtner 2003). As a general trend in Europe (and North America), policies to protect the civilian population in case of large-scale invasion (civil defence) are being replaced by policies aiming at providing safety and security in face of natural disasters and terrorist attacks (civil protection) (Alexander 2002). Moreover, there seems to be indications as to increased European cooperation taking place in relation to several different security sectors, thus involving a wide range of actors, rules and practices on different levels of policy-making (Boin, et al. 2006).¹

According to some authors, the frequency and magnitude of accidents, disruptions and catastrophes are on the rise, and further economic and political integration enhances interdependencies between EU member states in terms of shared risks and common threat perceptions (Elbe, et al. 2005). As a result, the: ‘EU is in the process of developing innovative practices for dealing with security challenges originating abroad, at home and indeed within its intermestic sphere, i.e. where the international and domestic spheres intersect’ (Sundelius 2005:68, emphasis in original). In a similar fashion, it has also been argued that security in post-Cold War Europe can no longer be understood by applying the classic dichotomy between, on the one side, the anarchy among states and, on the other, the hierarchy within them. Europe today is better understood as forming a ‘heterarchy’, meaning: ‘multiple centres of power, a multiplication of actors involved in the provision of security, and highly developed forms of institutionalisation and community building, with these forms being extended across the continent, functionally within the sphere of security and geographically through enlargement and partnership’ (Webber, et al. 2004:25, emphasis added). Importantly, this state of affairs is said to be underpinned by an ‘ideational discourse’ on Europeanization and a dynamic relationship between inclusion and exclusion (ibid, see also Kirchner 2006). There are also important theoretical contributions on the increased regionalization of

¹ For example in areas such as foreign, security, and defence policy (Duke & Ojanen 2006), justice and home affairs policies (Monar 2006), and counter terrorism (Bures 2007, Rhinard 2008) but also food and health security (Leazun & Groenleer 2006, Matzén 2008).
international security, typically stressing the importance of adjacency to perceived threats as being something which triggers security dynamics.²

Rhinard, Ekengren and Boin suggest that the EU is increasingly involved in the work of providing for safety and security of civilian populations and societal functions within an emerging ‘EU Protection Policy Space’ and in their reading: ‘the EU offers an excellent test case for understanding how regional organizations can build transnational protection capacity’ (Rhinard, et al. 2006:526, emphasis added). Even more important, the Union: ‘offers a glimpse into what “security communities” might look like in the twenty-first century’ (Rhinard, et al. 2006:521). It has also been suggested that the EU helps foster the emergence of an European ‘extra-national community for security’ defined as: ‘a group of people that is integrated to the point that the members of that community expect and rely on assistance from each other in the support of their own capacity to secure democracy and the civilian population – the core functions of societies and governments’ (Ekengren, et al. 2006a:120).

Thus, there seems to be an emerging community of scholars brought together by the shared assumption that the EU is indeed taking on a new and increasingly important role when it comes to providing safety and security inside and outside of the EU, and in doing so it also helps to strengthen the ‘European security community’.³ However, important questions in relation to security community-building in Europe and the role that the EU might play in such a process are consequently left out if the analytical and empirical focus is limited to conditions for and forms of cooperative practices that only involve EU member states. If there are an increasing number of non-military and trans-boundary threats and risks facing EU member states, then it seems only logical that some of these threats and risks might also face

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² Accordingly, even in an increasingly globalised world, security dynamics are primarily structured around regional clusters or ‘regional security complexes’: ‘whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from another’ (Buzan & Waever 2003:44). For an application of the regional security complex theory to Euro-Mediterranean relations, see Bremberg (2007).

³ The question of what states should be counted as being members of the European security community is a tricky one indeed. What institutional template should be used to help us delineate its boundaries? Is it the OSCE community-building model, covering an area from ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’ (cf. Adler 1998)? Or perhaps NATO, including a state like Turkey but leaving out a state such as Sweden (cf. Risse-Kappen 1996)? Why not the Council of Europe? Counting the EU member states is not necessary the best way to establish the boundaries of the European security community. If there is anything that would characterize the European security community than it is institutional and organizational overlaps between various international organizations and nation-states. However, Ruggie have depicted the EU as a ‘multiperspectival polity’ caught up in a process of unbundling territoriality which challenges notions of a neat match between functional and geographical borders in Europe (Ruggie 1993:171ff). The EU’s mix of multi-level institutions covering a wide range of policies and sectors is particularly interesting and might thus serve as a tentative starting-point for trying to delineate the boundaries of the European security community, as long as we do not make the mistake of having EU member state borders establish the community’s boundaries.
closely situated non-members. It could be argued that providing for safety and security beyond the borders of the member states is perhaps as an important task for the EU today as the task of promoting inter-state peace in Western Europe through political and economic integration was for the European Economic Community (EEC) back in the 1950s and 1960s. Arguably, the boundaries of European security community is in this regard determined by the ways in which the EU also deals with threats to closely situated ‘non-members’. Furthermore, in the wake of the latest rounds of EU enlargement and the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) there is a growing body of research on EU conditionality and ‘external governance’ (see Schimmelfenning & Sedelmeier 2004, Lavenex 2004, Lavenex & Wichmann 2009). It would be unfortunate to ignore the lessons drawn thus far from this research, since the process of EU enlargement and especially the ENP brings to the forefront questions related to the role that the EU plays beyond its borders.

Accordingly, at a time when the EU enlargement process is seemingly reaching its limits in terms of extending the circle of EU membership, the question whether the boundaries of the European security community necessarily coincide with the institutional borders of the EU is highly pertinent. If so, what does this entail for the political and security relations between EU Member States and neighbouring states? If not, what kind of security community is possible beyond the institutional confines of the EU? The over-arching puzzle that this paper departs from revolves around the changing boundaries of the European security community. In order to address this puzzle a substantial part of this paper is devoted to the security community concept and especially recent work being done on the ‘communities of practice’ approach to the evolution and spread of security communities. Subsequently, this approach is then applied to analyse the development of EU civil protection as a way to explore the question of the boundaries of European security community. Generally speaking, EU civil protection constitutes a generic policy field aiming to protect civilian populations and societal functions in the face of natural or man-made disasters (Britz 2006, Ekengren, et al. 2006b, Ekengren 2008, Bremberg & Britz forthcoming).

What makes civil protection particularly interesting in this context is that the EU seeks to foster closer cooperation, also on an operational level, on disaster and crisis management not only between EU member states but also on a regional basis with non-

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4 The concept of ‘EU external governance’ depicts the evolving relations between the EU and neighbouring non-members (in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and North Africa) along the lines of the: ‘extension of parts of the Union’s acquis communautaire beyond the circle of member states towards their immediate neighbourhood [and] a form of governance in which internal and foreign policy goals come together’ (Lavenex 2004:681). On the developments of the ENP, see Johansson-Nogués (2004), Aliboni (2005), Del Sarto & Schumacher (2005), Smith (2005), Dannreuther (2006).
member states around the Mediterranean basin (Courela 2004, Bremberg, et al. 2009). In addition, Adler and Crawford have put forward the notion that the EU seeks to promote security community-building practices in the Mediterranean region by fostering a Mediterranean regional identity, which basically means: ‘the invention of a region that does not yet exist [and] the social engineering of a regional identity that rests, neither on blood nor on religion, but on civil society voluntary networks and civic beliefs’ (Adler & Crawford 2006:19). They argue that: ‘The long-term aim [is] to construct in the Mediterranean region a pluralistic security community [however] In the short and middle term [the aim is a] less ambitious regional security partnership’ (ibid). Still, it is not entirely clear how this is conceived to be done in practice. What would be the dynamics that foster the ‘invention’ of such a region? What processes would bring about expectations of peaceful change in the region? In this paper it is argued that EU civil protection does not only capture significant aspects of the role that the EU plays in strengthening the European security community (cf. Ekengren et al. 2006a) but possibly also points to ways in which the security community may expand beyond the institutional borders of the EU, not necessarily nor foremost by fostering expectations of peaceful change in the Mediterranean but by shared practices of protection.

The analysis presented here is mainly based on interviews, documents, reports and secondary literature. The paper is divided into five sections, including this introduction. The second section spells out the paper’s theoretical framework based on classic as well as more

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5 A quick note on the developments of Euro-Mediterranean relations might be in order. The development of relations between the EU/EC/ECC and Mediterranean non-member states dates back to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which spurred a process of formalizing trade relations mainly through the establishment of bilateral trade agreements (Pierros, et.al. 1999). Other policies such as the ‘Global Mediterranean Policy’ (1972) and the ‘Renovated Mediterranean Policy’ (1990) also had a mostly economic profile (Tovias 1996). There have been attempts to initiate cooperation on other issues as well, such as for example the Euro-Arab Dialogue (within the European Political Cooperation) (Smith 2004). The Southern enlargement of the EC in the 1980s (Greece in 1981 and Spain and Portugal in 1986) helped to direct focus to issues other than the economy.

After the end of the Cold War, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was launched in 1995. The EMP introduced a more comprehensive framework for cooperation between the EU and 10 Mediterranean non-member states, centred on three ‘chapters’ (political and security, economic and financial, and social and cultural). Arguably, the most important feature of the EMP was the signing of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean non-members. The perhaps most important changes in Euro-Mediterranean relations since the EMP is the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. The ENP aims to create an integrated policy on economic aid, development and cooperation towards all countries in the ‘European neighbourhood’ but is not intended to replace already existing frameworks (such as the EMP), rather to coordinate them and increase their leverage (European Commission 2004, 2006). However, it does replace previous financial instruments with the European Neighbourhood & Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

The most recent turn of events took place in 2008 with the launch of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (originally a French proposal which was supposed to only include states around the Mediterranean basin). All 27 EU member states and 17 Mediterranean non-members now participate in the UfM (Figure 1. see also Joint Declaration for the Mediterranean 2008). An important feature of the UfM is that it will build upon the political acquis of the EMP (in terms of Ministerial conclusions and adopted work programmes). The UfM will count with a Secretariat and a rotating North-South Co-presidency. The intention is to bring more focus on concrete projects of mutual concern as well as trying to place the cooperation between the EU, the member states and the Mediterranean non-members on a more ‘equal footing’.
recent work being done on the concept of security community (communities of practice) and EU external governance. The third provides a descriptive analysis of the developments in the policy field of EU civil protection, mainly focusing on its institutional setup. The fourth focuses on the evolution of civil protection cooperation within the EMP/UfM and the ENP. The fifth and final section provides the concluding analysis.

2. Exploring the boundaries of the European security community

In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association in 2001, Robert Jervis claimed that: ‘war among the leading great powers - the most developed states of the United States, West Europe, and Japan - will not occur in the future, and indeed is no longer a source of concern for them’ and that the same ‘leading great powers’, which historically have been rivals, are now forming a ‘pluralistic security community’ (Jervis 2002:1). Apparently, nowadays the notion that states may maintain expectations of peaceful change has made it into the mainstreams of the discipline of International Relations (IR). Indeed, Bially Mattern asserts that: ‘the interesting question about security communities is not “do they exist?” but rather “how do they work?”’ (Bially Mattern 2001:353). But in order to properly ask such a question, the theoretical underpinnings of the security community concept need to be addressed. It might very well be argued that such a question is ultimately dependent on how the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘community’ are defined. There are thus reasons enough to take a closer look at the origins of the security community concept and reflect on its more recent conceptual evolution, especially taking into account how it may serve the purpose of shedding new light on the boundaries of the European security community and the role that the EU plays in promoting safety and security in its ‘neighbourhood’.

The Deutschian puzzle and the origins of the security community concept

The question that Karl Deutsch and his co-authors 6 originally sought to answer in their by now classic work was: ‘How can we learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution?’ (Deutsch, et al. 1957:3, emphasis added). The object of study was political communities 7 and the Deutschian research puzzle can be said to depart from an understanding that not all political communities are able to prevent war among the members but some communities seem to be more successful than others in this regard. Thus, political communities which seem to constrain the practice of war-making and, more importantly, their

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6 Henceforth referred to as ‘Deutsch’ for the sake of brevity.
7 Meaning: ‘…social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery of enforcement, and some popular habits of compliance.’ (Deutsch, et al. 1957:5)
members’ expectation thereof lay at the centre of Deutsch’s attention. To describe the features and explain the emergence of this kind of community the concept ‘security community’ was coined.

A security community was defined as any group of people which had been ‘integrated’ to the point that there was: ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch, et al. 1957:5). ‘Integrated’ meant: ‘the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long time”, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population’ (ibid). ‘Sense of community’ denoted: ‘…a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”’ (ibid). ‘Peaceful change’ was meant to signify: ‘…the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force’ (ibid). Importantly, Deutsch thought of ‘integration’ as a dynamic process which allowed for both ‘amalgamated’ (i.e. ‘formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single large unit, with some type of common government’) and ‘pluralistic’ (i.e. ‘legal independence of separate governments’) types of security communities (Deutsch, et al. 1957:6) The concept of ‘pluralistic security community’ has perhaps since then rendered most scholarly attention (and controversy) since it implies the possibility of a ‘sense of community’ among independent states and according to Deutsch’s findings that type of community seemed more successful in creating dependable expectations of peaceful change in the post-World War II era.

To the contemporary reader, the perhaps most interesting feature of Deutsch’s study was the combined use of historical cases and social science methods in order to shed light on the viability of contemporary integration processes in the ‘North Atlantic area’.8 Deutsch emphasized the tendency for security communities to grow around strong political and economic ‘core areas’ (Deutsch, et al. 1957:37-41). In relation to the question of the boundaries of the European security community it is worth noting that Deutsch also stressed the importance of the ability of member governments to respond to the interests of ‘outsiders’, especially when it comes to large political communities (such as large states, empires and federations) (Deutsch, et al. 1957:119).

8 The ‘North Atlantic area’ was defined as to include: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States (Deutsch, et al. 1957:10).
Based on the findings from the historical cases and favouring an understanding of social communication as the basis for political communities, Deutsch stressed the importance of transactions among people and responsiveness between governments. Generally speaking, successful security community-building rest on a: “we-feeling,” trust, and mutual consideration... partial identification in terms of self-images and interests... mutually successful predictions of behaviour... in short, a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making’ (Deutsch, et al. 1957:36). Deutsch concluded that pluralistic security communities seemed to be particularly dependent on: the compatibility of ‘major values’ relevant to decision-making; ‘political responsiveness’; and the ‘mutual predictability of behaviour’ among the members (Deutsch, et al. 1957:66-67). Having compatible values seems almost tautological in the sense that otherwise the members would not be able to agree on the desirability of overcoming common disputes rather than once and for all getting rid of the (other) disputing party, as Deutsch himself so eloquently put it (cf. Deutsch, et al. 1957:7-8). But values seem to be quite malleable in Deutsch’s reading and it seems more important that habits of common consultations and institutionalized bargaining practices among the members develop and thus transcend (or at least change) those habits and practices that were previously established in and confined to each member state respectively.

Interestingly, Deutsch argued that to be able to predict another’s behaviour it was not really sufficient to assume that the other would fulfil commonly agreed treaties and so on. Predicting another’s behaviour meant that the ‘self’ could be placed in the position of the ‘other’. Arguably, this was historically what had happen in the course of national unification processes where an increasing number of citizens: ‘...came to predict the behaviour of their counrymen in neighbouring political units on the basis of introspection: by looking into their own minds they could make a fairly good guess as to what their neighbours would do, so they could trust them or at least understand them, to some extent much as they would trust or understand themselves’ (Deutsch, et al. 1957:57, emphasis added).

Among the merits of the Deutsch’s study it is also worth mentioning that it sought to steer clear of teleological and mono-causal modes of explanation as to why some states

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9 See also the works by Deutsch on nationalism and social communication (Deutsch 1953), political community at the international level (Deutsch 1954), and communication theory and political integration (Deutsch 1964a, 1964b).
10 Also, the free mobility of persons over state borders existed ‘to a considerable degree’ in all cases of pluralistic security communities that Deutsch had studied (Deutsch, et al. 1957:68).
11 Cf. Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1991), as well as works on ‘epistemic communities’ in IR (Haas 1992). In relation to this particular paper, Haas’ (1990) piece on the politics of international environmental cooperation in the Mediterranean is particularly interesting.
develop dependable expectations of peaceful change towards one another. Security communities might develop along quite diverging paths and periods of successful integration might be followed by periods of stagnation or even backlash (Deutsch, et al. 1957:33). But there are of course problems with Deutsch’s original concept. First of all, the contemporary reader easily gets the impression that the conclusions reached by Deutsch are largely dependent on an understanding of political communities which takes as its prototype the nation-state as it, in turn, was forged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (and this might explain the relatively little attention paid to the role of international organizations). Haas thought that the concept of ‘pluralistic security community’ was too general to begin with and in order to study such things as ‘mutual responsiveness’ and elite interaction across state borders ‘non-quantitative approaches’ would be needed (Haas 1958:626-627).

Criticism was thus early on directed towards the behaviouralist bias in Deutsch’s study, particularly the method of measuring transaction flows of people, goods and ideas (for instance, foreign mail correspondence) as a way of determining the sense of community among people in different states. Moreover, history seems to suggest that economic integration and social interaction do not necessarily lead to the creation of security communities since, according to Nye: ‘Aspects of integration and disintegration can both occur at the same time. In fact, to some extent, the two may even be casually related’ (Nye 1968:859). Although he later concluded that security communities are best studied and understood through ‘detailed case studies’ (Nye 1971:48).

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12 Of course, it needs to be taken into account that the process of European integration had at that time not spurred the birth of the EU. Although Deutsch did mentioned en passant that organizations such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): ‘should not only be launched but should also be carefully studied as they operate’ (Deutsch, et al. 1957:173). Puchala noted that Deutsch’s ‘nationalism model’ perhaps placed too much emphasis on the existence of similarities between groups of people in order for ‘integration’ to take place and that led Puchala to ask: ‘Does it really matter what people think about one another? Or, rather, does it perhaps matter more what people think about international cooperation and about supranational decision-making?’ (Puchala 1972:273)

13 Bull wrote that such methods often tend to ignore the most relevant differences between the units measured, namely: ‘...differences between the content of one item of mail and another, the diplomatic importance of one treaty and another, the significance of one inch of newspaper column and another. Differences in these or other relevant aspects may cancel themselves out, but they also may not; and in practice we are likely to respect these statistics only in cases where they confirm some intuitive impression we already have’ (Bull 1966:374). It should perhaps be said that Bull appreciated Deutsch’s attempts to think about the distinguishing features of political communities together with the qualitative judgements made on history and ‘contemporary affairs’ (Bull 1966:374-375).

14 Nye pointed to the notoriously difficult task to come up with a concept of (regional) integration which could meaningfully distinguish between seemingly different kinds of integration processes (political, economic and social in Nye’s conceptualization) and give a suggestion as to how they relate to each other (Nye 1968).
A constructivist reappraisal of the security community concept

After having laid dormant during most of the Cold War era of IR-theorizing the concept of security community was resurrected and reshaped in the course of the 1990s (cf. Möller 2007). It needs to be taken into consideration that the rebirth of the concept takes place at a time of intense academic debate on the concept of ‘security’ proper. Post-Cold War conceptualizations of security seem to come in as many shapes and forms as there are academics willing to engage in theoretical work on the concept. However, there seems to be some kind of scholarly agreement on the increased number of perceived non-military threats in international relations and a broadening of the security agenda to include not only states and territories as the referent object of security but also, for instance, civilian populations or societal functions. This essentially implies that instead of focusing our attention on trying to establish a fixed taxonomy of what security ‘is’, we should try to come up with means to grasp what security ‘does’. Thus, it needs to be investigated empirically whether political actors conceive of security to be mainly about peace and stability among states or rather about threats and risks facing societal identities and functions, natural environments, the well-functioning of economies or perhaps citizens’ well-being.

Drawing upon this understanding of security, Waever suggests that Deutsch mainly dealt with ‘non-war communities’ (Waever 1998:76). This poses certain problems when trying to apply the concept in a contemporary setting since security dynamics do not necessarily nor primarily revolve around the threat of foreign invasion. Neither do security dynamics have to vanish once inter-state peace is ‘secured’, instead they are more likely to change in that new threats and risks emerge and are acknowledged. For example, Waever points to the historically contingent development of the European security community where: ‘...the regional construction has gone through a complex process from an early phase where it was built on arguments related to war-avoidance over state-based de-securitization (neo-functionalist integration) to post-sovereign non-military re-securitization (the integration/fragmentation argument)’ (Waever 1998:105). However, Möller notes that it is

15 Except for some rare examples of scholarly attention, such as Holsti (1985).
16 See for example, Walt (1991) and Baldwin (1997).
17 See for example, Campbell (1998) and Huysmans (1998).
18 In a by now well-known conceptualization, ‘security’ deals with threats to societal survival and can be studied through processes of ‘securitization’ which construct an intersubjective understanding within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, thus moving the issue at hand from normal politics ( politicization) while enabling a call for urgent and exceptional measures (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998:21-47). On the evolution and the contested meaning of the concept of security in IR, see among many others Wolfers (1952), Buzan (1983), Ullman (1983), McSweeney (1999), Buzan & Waever (2007).
unfortunate to portray Deutsch’s understanding of security communities as being confined to only ‘non-war communities’ since that disregards Deutsch’s own distinction between ‘no-war communities’ and security communities (Möller 2007:41, see Deutsch 1954:41). Möller also points to a hapless reading by Waever of Deutsch’s original concept: ‘as made up of simply “states”’ (Waever 1998:105). This is plainly not the case since Deutsch referred to integration as the attainment of a sense of community among a population within a territory but: ‘This population does not necessarily have to be a nation, and the territory need not be a nation-state’ (Möller 2007:25).

Adler and Barnett have taken the concept of security community further by developing a three-tiered theoretical framework and adding to it a notion of incrementalism (distinguishing between nascent, ascendant, and mature security communities) (Adler & Barnett 1998:29-65). They link the concept more closely to a constructivist approach in IR (Adler 1997, Wendt 1999) and their perhaps most important move is to go beyond the conceptualization of international security as being something: ‘…working within the limits of some ontologically privileged anarchy and thus imagining security as accomplished only through alliances, balances of power, hegemonies and the like (Adler & Barnett 1998:436, see also Wendt 1992). They also introduce a distinction between loosely- and tightly-coupled (pluralistic) security communities. The first is defined as a: ‘a transnational region of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Owing to their shared structure of meaning and identity, members expect no bellicose activities from other members and, therefore, consistently practice self-restraint’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:30). The second as having: a “mutual aid” society… [which] construct collective system arrangements… [and] a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized, government; that is, it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:30).

Adler and Barnett specifically point to the role that international organizations may play as: ‘…sites of socialization and learning [being] able to foster the creation of a regional “culture” around commonly held attributes’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:43, cf. Deutsch’s

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19 Tier one consists of: ‘precipitating conditions’ which are identified as ‘change in technology, demography, economies, the environment’, ‘development of new interpretations of social reality’ and ‘external threats’. Tier two is made of: ‘factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity’ and it has two components: power and knowledge (structure); and transactions, organizations and social learning (process). Tier three contains the: ‘necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change’ and that is ‘mutual trust’ and ‘collective identity’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:38, figure 2.1).
understanding of trust as based on ‘introspection’, see above). Possible changes to the role of the state in a tightly-coupled security community are also elaborated on in the sense that: ‘…if in a pre-social environment the state’s role is limited to and understood as “protector of the national good,” the emergence of a transnational civic community will expand the role of the state as it becomes an agent that furthers the various wants of the community: security, economic welfare, human rights, a clean environment, and so on’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:36).

This understanding of possible changes to the role of states in tightly-coupled security communities seem to go well along with the broadening of the security concept (see above), not necessarily so that all is fine and well once a security community is ‘achieved’ but rather in the sense that new threats and risks become acknowledge as people worry less about war and more about other dangers. Interestingly, Douglas and Wildavsky suggested some thirty-five years ago that: ‘Risk should be seen as a joint product of knowledge about the future and consent about the most desired prospects… common values leads to common fears and, by implication, to a common agreement not to fear other things’ (Douglas & Wildavsky 1983:5-8, emphasis in original).

In relation to the question of the boundaries of the European security community it needs to be taken into account that Deutsch’s focus on transactions as the basis for the formation of a sense of community is not totally rejected in Adler and Barnett’s reading but it is certainly nuanced since: ‘…not all transactions will produce a collective identity; after all, interactions are also responsible for creating an “other” and defining threats’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:47). Hence, not only the quantity of transactions but also the quality needs to be considered (which is something that also Bull pointed out, see above). Thus, in Adler and Barnett’s constructivist reappraisal of the security community concept emphasis is placed on what might be called the ‘power/knowledge nexus’. The ability to define legitimate political actions arguably constitutes the most subtle form of exercising power which in turn makes the line between learning and socialization as well as consent and coercion a very fine one indeed (Adler & Barnett 1998:424). Power still goes a long way in explaining the emergence and continuity of security communities but in a constructivist reading: ‘…power can be alternatively understood as the authority to determine shared meaning that constitutes the “we-feeling” and practices of states and the conditions which confer, defer, or deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:39).20 Moreover: ‘social learning frequently occurs through a communicative exchange in the

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20 It is suggested that: ‘because of the positive image of security and material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security communities develop around them’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:40).
context of power asymmetries’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:45). Bially Mattern suggests that a kind of ‘power politics of identity’ is at play in security communities and that a particular form of power, namely ‘representational force’ works to ‘fasten’: ‘the shared knowledge that constitutes we-ness so that expected behaviour (of non-violence) persist even as the identity is being repudiated during crisis’ (Bially Mattern 2001:358).

Möller have raised some concerns regarding a constructivist focus on shared meaning and identity (as well as common fears!) as the basis on which security communities are being built (and possibly expanded). Importantly, Deutsch did not stress the commonality of values (identity) but rather the compatibility of values (mutual responsiveness) (Möller 2007:46). This is an important issue, especially in relation to the question of the boundaries of the European security community. Möller rightfully acknowledge that Deutsch did not devote that much space in the original work to the question about the relations between members of a security community and non-members (Möller 2007:33). However, any particular security community may: ‘in the perception of nonmembers be an insecurity community against which military means must be sustained or built up if something goes wrong’ (Möller 2007:35). Instead of assuming that security communities expand in line with the extension of shared knowledge structures and common identities (which might involve the exercise of power, however subtle), we should rather conceive of security communities to open up to non-members to the extent that new knowledge and different identities are being mutually recognized. Accordingly: ‘The concept of security community, thus, is equally interested in identity and difference’ (Möller 2007:47). There is no doubt that Möller raises a valid point, but it seems to be more of a normative concern about how security communities should be understood. However, it could still be argued that focusing on how knowledge bestows power gives us important clues as to how security communities work in practice, especially as to their internal reproduction and in relation to non-members.

The practice turn in IR and the concept of security community

Recently, what might be called ‘the practice turn in IR’ (Neumann 2002, see also Schatzki, Knorr Cetina & Savigny 2001, Bourdieu 1990) has been brought to bear on the study of security communities, in the form of the concept of ‘communities of practice’. Applying the concept of communities of practice\(^\text{21}\) provides substance to explanations of how security

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\(^\text{21}\) According to Adler: ‘Practices are knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity embedded in communities, routines and organizations that structure experience. They are not outside of or apart from discourses, and unlike habits, they can be learned from others and can be done well or badly, and correctly or incorrectly’ (Adler 2008:198).
communities might expand through processes of cognitive evolution. An essential assumption is that communities of practice are not necessarily: ‘…congruent with the reified structures of institutional affiliations, divisions and boundaries’ (Adler 2005:24, see also Wenger 1998). They are rather being composed by overlapping, concentric circles. Referring to their transformative potential, Adler argues that: ‘the vanguards or “carriers” of social structures across functional and geographical boundaries are not necessarily states or societal networks’ but: ‘like-minded groups of practitioners [i.e. forming a community of practice] who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice’ (Adler 2008:196, emphasis added). In essence, what members of security communities do is that they practice self-restraint (abstention from the use of force) so that conflicts are handled through compromises applying legal and diplomatic means (Adler 2008:204, see also Bjola & Kornprobst 2007). Drawing upon Bourdieu’s work on habitus, Pouliot contends that: ‘a theory of practice of security communities argues that peace exists in and through practice when security officials’ practical sense makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solving interstate disputes’ (Pouliot 2008:279). Furthermore: ‘The order of things is established through the iterated practices performed by capital-endowed agents, because their doing something in a certain way makes the implicit but powerful claim that “this is how things are”’ (Pouliot 2008:282).

An important assumption is that even though it can be argued that self-restraint is a key feature of liberal-democratic norms and values (Williams 2001) it is, as a practice, not necessarily confined to liberal-democratic states. Instead: ‘As communities of practice, which are constituted around liberal practices, spread to non-liberal communities, the latter may be able to develop self-restraint subjectivities, such as cooperative security, that will help them evolve into non-liberal security communities’ (Adler 2008:206, see also Acharya 1998). Adler has argued that NATO’s eastward expansion can be explained by its adoption of cooperative-security practices at the end of the Cold War and that this, in turn, helps to explain why self restraint subjectivities became institutionalized in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) (Adler 2008:220). However, in relation to the question of the boundaries of the European security community, Adler also notes that NATO and the EU: ‘while largely successful in engaging CEEC in their cooperative-security practices, are failing in the Middle East because a majority of Muslims have no or little ground for identification and negotiating meanings with Westerners; thus no learning can take place’ (Adler 2008:215).

22 This is an important step in the conceptualization of the spread of security communities since it firmly moves the concept beyond the assumptions underlying the ‘democratic peace theory’ (cf. Russett 1993).
Undoubtedly, there seems to be great challenges facing the spread of ‘practices of self-restraint’ not only in the Middle East, but also in other parts around the EU. However, this does not necessarily mean that other practices imbedded in the European security community are also prevented to spread, especially such practices that are related to protecting civilian populations and societal functions. Now, if we allow for an understanding of the European security community as a tightly-coupled security community characterised by having something resembling a mutual aid society resting upon common supranational, transnational and national institutions (cf. Adler & Barnett 1998:30) whose members entertain expectations of mutual assistance to secure the core functions of their societies and governments (cf. Ekengren, et al. 2006a:120), then it seems only logical that such community also maintains something similar to ‘practices of protection’ in some form or another, i.e. forming a ‘community of protection’ (cf. Boin, et al. 2006). This does not necessarily mean that practices of protection will give rise to coherent policies of protection in the EU, or in other international and European organizations for that matter. But it could be argued that such practices, as they rest upon shared knowledge and ways-of-doing-things, constitute necessary albeit not sufficient conditions for the development of common policies and instruments (such as for example, the EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection). It could equally be argued that once such policies and instruments are put in place they may serve the purpose of strengthening and transposing underlying practices, much in the same fashion as Adler and Barnett see the role of international organizations as sites of socialization and learning (cf. Adler & Barnett 1998:43).

It might of course be argued that practices of protection that are able to transcend state borders and involve actors in different states are dependent on the practice of self-restraint to begin with, in the sense that ‘securing’ peace precedes the development of other practices relating to security, safety and protection. But that seems to be something that needs to be investigated empirically rather than being discarded on some theoretical grounds. For sure, it is here assumed that there is no reason apriori to presuppose that such practices of protection cannot spread beyond the confines of a tightly-coupled security community once they have been established. Although, of course, the possibility that practices of protection spread to non-members of the European security community does not necessarily mean that practices of self-restraint also spread in an analogous fashion. Indeed, it is perfectly compatible with the assumption on the spread of practices of protection that practices of self-restraint do not spread in the same way or at the same time.
The conditions under which practices of protection might spread and what consequences it might have for our understanding of the boundaries of the European security community are questions that needs to be explored. In relation to the question of the boundaries of the European security community, research on EU policies towards neighbouring states within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) applying the concept ‘EU external governance’ might provide important insights as to how communities of practices could spread. The concept aims to capture: ‘the extension of parts of the Union’s *acquis communautaire* beyond the circle of member states towards their immediate neighbourhood [and] a form of governance in which internal and foreign policy goals come together’ (Lavenex 2004:681, see also Smith 1996). Rather than extending EU membership to countries in North Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus: ‘external governance may in the long run result in patterns of differentiated integration with negotiated partnerships in selected policy field of mutual interests’ (Lavenex 2004:695). There are strong conceptual links between EU external governance and the concept of ‘transgovernmental governance’, where ‘transgovernmental’ refers to relations between sub-units of national governments and ‘governance’ to the: ‘developing web of transgovernmental co-operation between the EU and the ENP countries’ (Freyburg, et al. 2007:7-8).

The connection between EU external governance and the question about the boundaries of the European security community might perhaps not seem that evident at first sight. However, Lavenex and Wichmann point out that the EU is increasingly involving the ENP countries in its internal security policies (mainly in the area of Justice and Home Affairs) (Lavenex & Wichmann 2009). The absence of a membership perspective for the majority of the ENP countries and the fact that there is less of an *acquis communautaire* in the JHA area, serve to diminish the leverage of EU conditionality but: ‘large parts of the *acquis* consist less in transferable legal instruments than in operational cooperation. A particular feature of cooperation in JHA is its network character and predominance of transgovernmentalism as a mode of governance’ (Lavenex & Wichmann 2009:85). Even though EU external governance in the JHA mainly takes place in the form of network governance, Lavenex and Wichmann suggest that these technical and operational networks

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23 Transgovernmental governance seemingly departs from a functionalist perspective in IR in which states are not held to be the exclusive nor necessarily the predominant actors in regional or international systems since the functional differentiation of societies yields the formation of partly autonomous sectors governed by distinct actors, rules and procedures (cf. Schmitter 2005).
might serve the purpose of socializing third countries into European standards (Lavenex & Wichmann 2009:98).

Thus, these networks which draw upon the EU aquis and sometimes also rather hefty amount of EU funding (through the European Commission’s instruments and programmes) can thus be seen as a tentative expression of how EU policies directed to neighbouring states also might foster the spread of practices of protection. No doubt, it could be characterized as a case of power being exercised through the production of knowledge and the extension of European ways-of-doing-things, to which it certainly can be raised normative concerns about who gets to decide what constitutes the object of protection and what it is that needs to be done to protect it (cf. Möller 2007). Lavenex and Wichmann have also noted that the successful expansion of transgovernmental networks to certain extent depend on the compatibility between administrative structures and levels of expertise among EU member states and non-members, and that this is not necessarily the case when it comes to JHA policies and the Mediterranean partner countries (Lavenex & Wichmann 2009:97).

However, this does not have to imply that the same goes for policies to protect the civilian population and societal functions in case of emergency. Moreover, it might be argued that in most JHA policies promoted by the EU (asylum and migration policies, anti-drug policies, border management, rule of law) it seems quite obvious that the object of protection is strongly biased towards the EU. Nonetheless, practices of protecting civilian populations and societal functions from the dangerous caused by man-made and natural disasters (civil protection) might, arguably, more easily create objects of protection that transverse borders rather than reproduce them. There is hardly any need of pointing out the difference between, on the one hand, the aim of regulating migratory flows towards Europe in order to protect the current organization and functioning of European labour markets and, on the other, the aim of enhancing disaster relief capacities through international cooperation in order to protect civilians residing around the Mediterranean (be it Swedish tourists on vacation in Sharm el-Sheikh, or Moroccans workers in Andalusia).

Possibly, transgovernmental networks of civil protection administrations might therefore more easily develop in the field of civil protection than in relation to other JHA policies. This by no means implies that civil protection would be more ‘benign’ than for example asylum policies or border management, only that it follows another logic whereby the safety of civilian populations and the security of societal functions in the EU is also dependent on how neighbouring non-member states deal with earthquakes, tsunamis, environmental accidents and terrorist attacks. To the extent that there is a mutual interest to
deal with such non-military and trans-boundary threats there would be a basis upon which like-minded groups of practitioners, informally and contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice (i.e. civil protection), could evolve (cf. Adler 2008). Thus, studying EU-induced cooperation on civil protection in the Mediterranean region may serve as a way to analytically capture the (expanding) boundaries of the European security community at a time when the EU is increasingly getting involved in the work of protecting civilian populations in Europe and elsewhere from the dangers of natural and man-made disasters.

A heuristic application of the community of practice concept

In this paper it is proposed that the evolution of EU civil protection and the cooperation on civil protection within the Euro-Mediterranean region can be seen as an example of how practices of protection develop within the European security community and possible also start to spread to non-members. The following empirical illustrations of the development of EU and Euro-Mediterranean civil protection are at best a first, heuristic application of the community of practice concept. It would be presumptuous enough to assume that practices of protection would be adequately captured by the study of a hand-full of EU documents and some fifteen elite interviews in Brussels. Interviewing practitioners is always a tricky matter in that it is based on the premise that there is an actual possibility that experiences and practices can be ‘verbalized’. However, Pouliot argues that interviews: ‘may take the researcher some distance in the recovery of practical perspectives and subjective meanings’ (Pouliot 2008:285). The material gathered and analysed here thus serves as an ‘entry point’ to the study of practices of protection, and studies such as this one may help to generate new hypotheses as to how to proceed. That, for a start, is what the following analysis is intended to provide.

The documents included in this study have been analysed in order to reconstruct the evolution of EU civil protection and Euro-Med civil protection since the late 1990’s. The focus here is on new instruments and policies that have been created on a European level as well as how EU and Euro-Med civil protection have developed in terms of activities and operations. The interviews referred to here have been made mainly with EU officials in Brussels during the period of September-December 2008. They were conducted as semi-structured interviews in the sense that all interviewees were asked about the same general

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24 On methodological considerations as to the study of practices in security communities, see Pouliot (2008:284-285).
themes but they were also asked to elaborate on themes that they found to be of particular relevance. Along side civil servants working at the European Commission (mainly DG ENV, DG Relex and EuropeAid) and the General Secretariat of the Council (DG H 4, Civil Protection), some member state representatives working at the Permanent Representations have also been interviewed. These representatives have been interviewed in their capacity as past or present members of the Council Working Group on Civil Protection (PROCIV) and they are, generally speaking, diplomats or civil servants seconded from Ministries of Defence or Interior. One person was also interviewed in the capacity of being a former Co-director of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme for Civil Protection and the Head of the evaluation mission of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme has also been interviewed. When an interviewee are referred to by actual quotes it means that the interview have been recorded and transcribed, otherwise it has not been possible to record the interview and the author has had to rely on personal notes.

3. EU civil protection

EU civil protection aims at providing safety and security of people, environment and property in the event of major emergencies, in Europe and other parts of the world (Council of the EU 2007b). In practical terms, fulfilling this aim calls upon the tasks normally assigned to rescue services, but the concept in itself is wider and it could also includes other resources, capacities and activities that would contribute to the aim (even national armed forces). Moreover, such tasks (providing safety and security of people, environment and property as well as preparing for emergencies) are perhaps most commonly seen as responsibilities for member states to deal with within their national security and defence policies. However, civil protection as a field for cooperation within the European Community (EC) was brought up at a ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1985. It lead to the adoption of six resolutions up until 1994 and the establishment of: ‘operational instruments dealing with the preparedness of those involved in civil protection and the response in the event of disaster, based on the subsidiarity principle laid down in the Maastricht Treaty’ (Vincent 2002:2). Currently, there is no special title in the EU treaties on civil protection but civil protection was first mentioned in the Rome Treaty (article 3) and this is why it is treated as a first-pillar issue. The (non-ratified) Lisbon Treaty does include a title on EU civil protection (see below).

In recent years, cooperation on civil protection has become a matter of ‘high politics’ within the EU and now it more explicitly relates to crisis management and terrorism whereas it at the beginning focused on natural and technological disasters (Woodbridge 2002).
For instance, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 the European Council adopted a declaration on solidarity against terrorism in which the heads of states and governments in the EU expressed their will to ‘act jointly in a spirit of solidarity’ if one member state would suffer a terrorist attack (European Council 2004:18). The declaration makes a reference to the ‘Solidarity Clause’ which is now included in the Lisbon Treaty. The Clause is not only confined to terrorist attacks since it stipulates that: ‘the Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster’ (Council of the EU 2008a, Title VII, Article 222, emphasis added). Furthermore, it is stated that the EU shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources made available by the member states. The explicit aim is to prevent terrorist threats in the territory of the member states but also to protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from terrorist attacks and assist member states on their territories (at the request of their political authorities), in the event of an attack or if a disaster strikes. In order to be able to assist each other in times of crises, it stipulates that the member states ‘shall coordinate between themselves in the Council’ and it grants the European Council the role to ‘regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action’ (ibid). What is interesting about the Solidarity Clause in the broader context of this paper is that it expresses a strong political will at the highest political level among EU member states to provide assistance in times of major emergencies but it also implies the recognition of some kind of moral and mutual obligation to help protect each other’s civilian populations and political institutions.

*The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection*

As an EU policy area civil protection is managed by the European Commission (DG Environment), which is also in charge of the available Community instruments as well as drafting new legal proposals together with the EU Presidency. At the same time, all decisions on new laws or instruments have to be made under the rules established by the Amsterdam Treaty (article 308), meaning that decisions are taken unanimously by the member states (i.e. no Qualified Majority Voting). The most important instrument on a European level is the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (the Community Mechanism) (Council of the EU 2001). It includes all 27 EU member states and 3 non-members (Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway) and it shall contribute to the protection of: ‘people but also the environment and property, including cultural heritage, in the event of natural and man-made disasters, acts of
terrorism and, technological, radiological or environmental accidents, including accidental marine pollution, occurring inside or outside the Community’ (Council of the EU 2007b). The Community Mechanism has a number of tools at its disposal and the perhaps most important is the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), operated by the Civil Protection unit at the DG ENV. Through the MIC, EU member states as well as states not participating in the Community Mechanism, can make appeals for assistance in case they would face a major emergency. \(^{25}\) Other instruments related to the Community Mechanism are the Common Emergency and Information System (CECIS) and the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (Council of the EU 2007a). Further examples of activities are training programmes and simulation exercises, involving civil protection personnel from several EU member states.

The Community Mechanism also serves as a means for the EU to cooperate with non-members, not only by providing emergency assistance but also by involving non-members in exchange and training programmes. The Civil Protection Financial Instrument provides the legal basis for granting Community assistance as to prevention and preparedness to member states and non-members, as well as to civil protection operations inside and outside the EU (Council of the EU 2007a). Participation in the instrument shall be open to all EU-membership candidate countries and third countries may cooperate in activities under the instrument where agreements between these countries and the EU so allow (ibid). For example, Croatia, F.Y.R. of Macedonia and Turkey participate as part of a general pre-accession strategy. The Commission has also signed administrative arrangements with Russia and Ukraine, and it is working on an arrangement with Morocco.

At the same time as the Commission hosts different instruments, the fact that all decisions on new laws or instruments are to be taken unanimously by EU member states means that the Council plays an important role for the development of EU civil protection. It is within the legislative Working Party PROCIV that most of the negotiations on proposals from the Commission on civil protection take place. On a ministerial level it is the ministers

\(^{25}\) In a Mediterranean context it should be mentioned that the MIC was activated four times during the devastating forest fires in Greece in 2007 where several EU member states and non-members dispatched assistance (mainly aircrants and fire fighters) (see [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/forestfires_el_2007.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/forestfires_el_2007.htm)). Also, the MIC received requests for assistance from both Cypriot and Lebanese authorities and assisted the efforts to handle the humanitarian crisis and the environmental damages in the wake of Israel’s offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006. Several EU Member States contributed with personnel and equipment to the EU civil protection operation (see [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/leb_cy_2006.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/leb_cy_2006.htm)). Only in 2005, the MIC received 14 requests for assistance and monitored some 20 other emergencies worldwide. Major disasters in which the Mechanism has been involved include; earthquakes in Algeria (2003), Iran (2003/4/5), Morocco (2004) and Pakistan (2005); as well as the Tsunami in South Asia (2004/2005); forest fires in Portugal (2003/2004/2005); floods in Romania and Bulgaria (2005); and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the United States (2005) (see [http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mechanism.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/mechanism.htm)).
in the constellation of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) that make decisions on new legislation (Jönsson & Jarlsvik 2005:53-54). Moreover, the Union does not have capacities to manage disasters and emergencies on its own, i.e. there is no standing ‘EU civil protection force’ (cf. Barnier 2006). The EU’s main capacity lies with the ability to coordinate and facilitate the use of member states capacities and resources when an emergency affects several member states or transcends the capacities of one affected state in the EU or abroad. Recently, the concept of ‘civil protection modules’ has been developed and these modules shall consist of national resources from one or several member states and they are intended to contribute, on a voluntary basis, to the ‘rapid response capability’ of the EU (Official Journal of the European Union 2007).

The external dimension of EU civil protection: civilian crisis management or development policy?

EU civil protection is listed as one out of the four priority areas within civilian crisis management in the ESDP (together with police, rule of law and civilian administration). Civil protection is also related to Community competences, such as humanitarian aid, technical assistance, institutional-building and post-conflict reconstruction (cf. Gourlay 2004:405ff). Theoretically, there are two ways of activating EU civil protection operations in third countries, either through the Commission or the Council (see Sundelius 2005:78). The Community Mechanism can thus be used as a part of the CFSP/ESDP but so far an EU civil protection operation has never been mobilised through this venue. This has to do with the rather complicated institutional set-up of the EU which can be said to recognize, on the one hand, the difference between Community competence and second pillar issues, and, on the other, non-political (for example, natural disasters) and political (for example, terrorist attacks) crisis management in the sense that the Commission is involved in the first category whereas the Council in the second. In theory, this division would also apply whether or not the crises occur within or outside the Union (see Sundelius 2005:80).

According to one civil servant at the General Secretariat of the Council the reason to include civil protection in the ESDP was to provide the EU with the means to cope with

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26 Primarily drawing upon, not necessarily in a coordinated fashion, the policies and programmes of the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex), Directorate General for Development (DG DEV) and External cooperation programmes (EuropeAid).
27 To take a simple but illustrative example, when floods struck Central Europe in 2002 the Commission was heavily involved in the crisis management by coordinating EU member states’ assistance through the MIC (Ekengren, et al. 2006b:463-466). However, in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings in 2004 the Commission was never involved in crisis management even though some member states offered assistance through the MIC (Ekengren et al. 2006a:57ff).
‘special circumstances’ relating to civilian crisis management, only that such circumstances have never materialized and even if they would do so they would probably not be recognized as such:

Usually in the EU if something works we keep it and if something doesn’t work we forget it, just like the concept of civil protection in ESDP civilian crisis management. Now we work with capabilities, and in civilian crisis management we don’t even talk about civil protection anymore. We know it’s a priority but if you look at the capabilities for civilian crisis management, they include police, rule of law and civil administration and that’s it. There is no element of civil protection. We don’t want to have another MIC in the council. We have just accepted this as a state of affairs and the member states never complained.28

Another civil servant at the General Secretariat concludes that it is an inherently political decision to handle crises through the Council structures:

…one should also realize that it could be a very cumbersome way of managing a situation because then you would need to go through COREPER and get advice from them each time, or even the ministers. It shows to the outside world that the EU does something in political terms but on the other hand it might not be the right response to have this cumbersome procedure launched… Many member states like the very practical side of civil protection cooperation. It’s not so politicized but it functions rather well… I’m not going to say anything bad about ambassadors, they are usually very intelligent people, but they are not necessarily the right people to deal with forest fires and earthquakes. At least not in the beginning, but surely later on when we need to make political decisions on how to prevent these things from happening again.29

One civil servant at the General Secretariat also said that the relation between the Commission and the Council in matters related to civil protection might shift as a consequence of the recent ‘ECOWAS judgement’ (Official Journal of the European Union 2008b). This is because the Court annulled the Council decision to use the CFSP to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on a project to combat the spread of small arms and light weapons. The Commission’s view was that it should not have been dealt with on the basis of the CFSP since it falls under development policy and, more specifically, the ‘Cotonou Agreement’.30 This is also more or less how the Court reasoned in

28 Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG E 9 (civilian crisis management), 24 October 2008, Brussels
29 Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG H 4 (civil protection), 22 October 2008, Brussels
30 The Cotonou Agreement was signed in 2000 between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States on the one side, and the European Community and its member states, on the other. It aims to
its ruling saying that although proliferation of small arms is to be conceived as a threat to peace and security, it also constitutes an obstacle to sustainable development (i.e. a Community competence). Thus, the Council decision infringed the proceedings established in the current treaties. According to the same interviewee:

…this judgement basically says that the Community is primary and that the Community has the first right to refusal, if you compare this to EU-NATO relations. So this is a fact of life and there is no way that we can challenge this, it’s the final judgement so to speak and we [in the Council] just have to live with it. In areas where there is a clear Community competence, the Council is very careful these days. That’s why civil protection is usually seen as a Community affair. Simple as that.31

Challenges to and the future of EU civil protection

Gourlay has noted that the: ‘decoupling of second-pillar instruments of ESDP from other EC policy decision-making structures and financing mechanisms means that the EU is still far from developing an integrated approach to crisis management’ (Gourlay 2004:404). In practice, coordination of civil protection in the EU is a complicated matter since it necessarily involves national ministries (mainly Defence and Interior) and national civil protection agencies which in turn can be organized and regulated quite differently throughout the member states. Also, the very definition of what should be included under the heading ‘civil protection’ may vary in the member states due to different national traditions relating to defence and security policies (Britz 2006, Bremberg & Britz forthcoming). Moreover, findings from previous studies point to something akin to a ‘North-South divide’ within the EU which generally means that Southern member states support further integration in the field and the building up of capacities at the European level whereas Northern member states rather stress the importance of better coordination albeit without integration.32

Interestingly, even though there still seem to be controversies along side the North-South divide over the future direction of EU civil protection among the member states,33 there

promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States, to contribute to peace and security and to promote a stable and democratic political environment.

31 Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG E 9 (civilian crisis management), 24 October 2008, Brussels
32 For example, in 2006 the former French Minister for Foreign Affairs Michel Barnier presented a report, requested by the Austrian EU Presidency and the Commission, on how to improve EU emergency response outside the Union. Among other proposals in the report, the setting up of a European civil protection force is suggested (Barnier 2006).
33 Interview Permanent Representation of Greece to the EU, 3 October 2008, Brussels, Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 7 October 2008, Brussels, Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 13 October 2008, Brussels, Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG H 4 (civil protection), 22 October 2008, Brussels, Interview (telephone) Portuguese National Authority of Civil Protection,
are some signs of increasing coherence at least as to how to define ‘civil protection’ in relation to EU civil protection operations in third countries. According to one member of the PROCIV working group, the group managed to agree on a ‘working definition’ of civil protection when it was preparing the EU’s position on the United Nation’s (UN) guidelines for the ‘Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief’ (the so called ‘Oslo Guidelines’, United Nations 2007). This seems to imply that there are grounds for a common understanding relating to EU civil protection, at least when it comes to operations in third countries.

This is not something entirely trivial since the Civil Protection Financial Instrument now provides a legal base for more structured cooperation on civil protection between the EU and third countries. Moreover, the external dimension of EU civil protection has increased in importance in recent years due to the fact that most catastrophes do actually occur beyond the borders of the EU. In a recent communication from the Commission it is states that: ‘Today’s disasters are often of a cross-border nature and require multilateral and coordinated responses. At the same time boundaries between internal and external disasters are increasingly blurred… Often the same instruments – in particular civil protection assets – are deployed by the Community and Member States to respond to the same needs within the Union and beyond EU borders, either as a stand alone disaster response contribution or as a complement to humanitarian aid. Any EU response to a given disaster has to make use of the most appropriate components available on the basis of needs’ (European Commission 2008:3, emphasis added). In relation to this, the Commission is currently engaged in a process of strengthening its inter-service coordination related to both internal and external crisis management. At this point in time, this means that a unit has been created in the Commission’s Secretariat-General to enhance the coordination among the Commission’s DGs and its ability to act as an interlocutor with the Council. According to a civil servant working on this unit, the process of trying to bring the different DGs together and have them

3 November 2008, Lisbon, Interview Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU, 12 November 2008, Brussels, Interview Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU, 10 December 2008, Brussels

34 Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 7 October 2008, Brussels

35 The ‘working definition’ reads: ‘Civil Protection refers to civilian activities dedicated to providing a timely response to emergencies of a natural, technological, man-made or intentional origin, in order to mitigate effects on people, property, including cultural heritage, and the environment. They contribute to the prevention, preparedness and recovery from the consequences of such events. Civil protection assets can be provided by public authorities or by volunteer organisations. Personnel designated to the intervention always operate under the direction and control of civilian public authorities, be they national, regional or local. They operate on the basis of being unarmed, regardless of the organization of origin, and respecting the humanitarian principles recognized at international level.’

36 See also the Joint Declaration on the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (Official Journal of the European Union 2008a).
understand that they are actually doing crisis management is not an easy task because most of
them work with different concepts:

…in some DGs they talk about “crisis” as in DG Relex’s Crisis Platform. In DG ECHO they don’t
like the term “crisis” because they felt that it has military connotations, so they prefer to use the term
“emergency”. DG ENV uses “disaster” because most of their work is directed towards that… We
need to agree on a common terminology, a common semantics. If we can come up with a definition
of “crisis” that is acceptable to everyone according to their sensitivities, then we can all talk about
crisis.37

According to another civil servant in the General Secretariat of the Council, this development
was entirely unforeseen when the Community Mechanism was launched in the beginning of
the 2000’s since it was intended to support EU member states among themselves.38 It is also
something that has provoked a rather complex (and still unsettled) balancing-act in the EU in
order to find some kind of cross-pillar equilibrium between political/strategic coordination (in
the European Council and the Council of the EU) and operational coordination (by the
European Commission) of EU civil protection in third countries.39 The same civil servant also
suggested that recent development show that the heads of states and governments meeting
under the heading of the European Council have provided the most important impetus to
move ahead with EU civil protection, whereas the ministers in the JHA council meetings
usually have had a harder time trying to reach common conclusions.40

For the time being, of course, it is hard to tell how the current state of affairs would
be affected by a (possible) ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The treaty includes a special title
on civil protection and it stipulates that civil protection belongs to one of the policy areas in
which the Union: ‘shall have competence to carry out actions to support, coordinate or
supplement the actions of the Member States’ (as opposed to granting the EU exclusive or
shared competences in this particular policy area) (Council of the EU 2008a). In the (new)
Title XXIII on Civil Protection, the first paragraph of Article 196 further states that the Union:
‘shall encourage cooperation between Member States’. Accordingly, the EU shall aim to:
’support and complement Member States’ action’, ‘promote swift, effective operational
cooperation’ between civil protection agencies, and ‘promote consistency in international civil

37 Interview European Commission, Secretariat-General (crisis management unit), 22 October 2008
38 Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG H 4 (civil protection), 13 November 2008,
Brussels
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
protection work’. To certain extent the Lisbon treaty would codifying into EU law what already takes place in practice but it would also bring about institutional changes in the sense that civil protection would fall under the ordinary legislative procedure implying that the European Parliament would be fully involved as co-legislator and that Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) would apply in the Council (although decisions on harmonization of national laws and regulations would be excluded). Several interviewees point out that having the Parliament on board as co-legislator as well as introducing QMV in the Council would most certainly bring about changes to EU civil protection, typically saying that the Members of the European Parliament see civil protection as a means to boost the EU’s ‘visibility’ in areas believed to be dare to EU citizens (such as assisting disaster-struck populations, in Europe and elsewhere) and that QMV implies a move away from the current decision-making procedure that is focused on reaching Council decisions based on cumbersome negotiations structured by the need to find the ‘common lowest denominator’. One civil servant at the General Secretariat asserts that:

My experience from 14 years in the Council tells me that unanimity is very often achieved but that is due to the fact that we have QMV. Under QMV conditions, the minority usually tries to get onboard with the majority but it asks of some sort of concession in the last minute and this actually leads to decisions being taken in unanimity later on. We saw this in the REACH\(^2\) where we ended up with unanimity. So we should be clear about that when we have QMV we very often end up with unanimity due to the fact that the QMV pushes delegations to rally around the majority. On the other hand, when we have unanimity as basis for decisions, then one delegation can block everything and that is where we are now. A lot of things have recently happen due to the fact that the treaty has not been ratified. The fact is that everybody expected that the treaty would be ratified and because of this the Commission didn’t want to propose any new legislative files since they wanted to wait for the new treaty… we were all waiting for the new treaty.\(^3\)

4. Civil protection in the Euro-Mediterranean region

Civil protection cooperation on a regional basis in the Mediterranean is a prioritized issue in Euro-Mediterranean relations judging from the widespread political support for further cooperation. Recent examples are provided by the Ministerial Conference in Marseille

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\(^{41}\) Interview Permanent Representation of Sweden to the EU, 7 October 2008, Brussels, Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 13 October 2008, Brussels, Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG H 4 (civil protection), 22 October 2008, Brussels, Interview Permanent Representation of Spain to the EU, 12 November 2008, Brussels

\(^{42}\) REACH stands for ‘Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemical substances’ and it refers to a Community Regulation on chemicals and their safe use which entered into force on 1 June 2007.

\(^{43}\) Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG H 4 (civil protection), 22 October 2008, Brussels
(Council of the European Union 2008:13) and at foreign ministers’ meeting in Lisbon it was recognized that the: ‘rising trend in vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters in many parts of the Mediterranean confirms the need for greater safety and security measures to be in place to the benefit of its citizens’ (Council of the European Union 2007:7). At the meeting in Tampere the cooperation on civil protection was referred to: ‘as an important political measure to strengthen trustful relationships by promoting cooperation and interaction between regional and local authorities, civil population and civil society’ (Council of the European Union 2006:4). A senior official at the Italian Department for Civil Protection has recently been quoted saying that: ‘Our concept of protection of citizens goes beyond the national borders. If you look at Sharm-el-Sheik [an Egyptian resort], you see not only Italians but Scandinavians and other EU-tourists as well. That is why it is so important that there is cooperation between all 27 EU member states and the ten Mediterranean neighbouring countries’ (ENPI e-bulletin 2008).

At the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration (celebrated in November 2005) a five year work programme was adopted where cooperation in the field of natural and man-made disaster prevention was identified as particularly relevant as political and security confidence building (European Commission 2005:20). Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism explicitly states that members of the EMP will: ‘help victims of terrorism and provide assistance to the competent authorities in dealing with the consequences of a major attack’ (The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism) as well as strengthen national and collective mechanisms to deal with the aftermath of terrorist attacks, build contacts, share experiences and participate in emergency exercises (ibid).

In addition, at the Paris summit held on the 13th July 2008, a Joint Declaration for the Mediterranean was issued thereby launching the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The Declaration lists civil protection among six ‘concrete projects’ which will serve to make the relations between the EU, the member states and the non-members more visible and relevant to the citizens of the region. It states that the Mediterranean is particularly vulnerable and exposed to man-made and natural disasters and the effects of climate change: ‘A joint Civil Protection programme on prevention, preparation and response to disasters, linking the region more closely to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, is, therefore, one of the main priorities for the region’ (Joint Declaration for the Mediterranean 2008).
The evolving Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on civil protection

The first Euro-Med programme aiming at promoting cooperation in the field of civil protection was launched following a joint proposal issued by Egypt and Italy in 1996. It was called the ‘Pilot Programme for the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean system of mitigation, prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters’ (1996-2004) and it concentrated on training and information, networking of civil protection schools, exchanges of civil protection experts and technical assistance. Courela notes that: ‘through the various training courses and seminars and the exchange of experts, the programme allowed the networking among practitioners from all the participating countries. High-level meetings, bringing together the Heads of Civil Protection services, were also held to evaluate the results of the project’ (Courela 2004:13). The same author also stresses that the Pilot Programme went ahead at times marked by high tensions in Euro-Mediterranean relations caused by events such as the launch of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 and the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. Even though these events certainly slowed things down, they did not bring the programme to a complete halt (ibid).

The succeeding ‘Euro-Med Bridge Programme’ (2005-2008) introduced risk prevention, information to the public and the identification of measures to facilitate requests for mutual assistance in the event of major emergencies (Bremberg, et al. 2009). It was called ‘Bridge’ since it was launched to fill a gap which would have been created if the partners would have waited for funding from the next EU budget cycle (2007-2013). Several training exercises and expert exchanges have taken place during the programme, involving civil protection personnel from both EU member states and Mediterranean non-members (see Tables 1, 2 & 3). A recently concluded evaluation report on the Bridge Programme alleges that: ‘the bringing together of Mediterranean nationals has… continued to build confidence and reinforce a common understanding of the importance of collaborating together in reducing risks and responding to disasters’ (Warren 2007:3).
Table 1. Summery of the main activities of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme (2005-2008)\textsuperscript{44}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of activities</th>
<th>Total Planned 1 January 2005 to 31 March 2008</th>
<th>Total Realised 9 June 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Training Workshop</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-regional Activities (South-South)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange of Experts</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Protection Schools Network</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale Disaster Simulation Exercise &amp; Establishment of Centre of Operations Network</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparation of the PPRD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Warren (2007)

As for the future of the cooperation, the Commission’s Regional Strategy Paper (2007-2013) for the ENP envisions a long-term civil protection programme building on the previous and concluded ones. It is called the Euro-Med Programme of Prevention, Preparedness and Response to natural and man-made Disasters (PPRD) and according to the strategy paper it aims at developing an effective and sustainable ‘Euro-Mediterranean Civil Protection System’. The PPRD is identical to the ‘joint civil protection programme’ referred to by the Heads of States at the Paris summit (see above).\textsuperscript{45} Furthermore, the Commission’s strategy paper explicitly states that the: ‘Euro-Mediterranean system will have to be closely linked to the civil protection systems existing at European level, such as the Community Civil Protection Mechanism’ (European Commission 2007:18). In the terms of reference for the PPRD programme it is expected that the programme will:

i) Contribute to the development of an in-depth knowledge of risk exposure, preparedness and response capacities in the region;

ii) Reinforce the existing prevention mechanisms at regional, national and local level;

iii) Improve the capacity for a coordinated, effective and efficient disaster response capacity;

\textsuperscript{44} See Tables 2 & 3 (below) for more detailed description and assessment of the activities undertaken during the Euro-Med Bridge Programme.

\textsuperscript{45} Interview European Commission, EuropeAid (Environment, statistics, civil protection and cooperation with local authorities), 23 September 2008, Brussels. Interview European Commission, DG Relex (Euro-Med and regional issues), 30 September 2008, Brussels
iv) Improve the information and awareness of populations regarding risk exposure, prevention and response (see Terms of reference Euro-Med PPRD).

The Commission would also like to link the PPRD to broader concerns which affect the Mediterranean, such as climate change and desertification, in order to get more ministries (such as environment and finance) in the partners countries involved, and not only civil protection and civil defence authorities.\footnote{46} The programme will be funded by the Community budget but it will be managed by a ‘consortium’ of states. The consortium will appoint the members of the executive committee, whereas all EU member states and participating Mediterranean non-members will be represented on the steering committee of the programme.\footnote{47} In a similar fashion, the Pilot Programme was directed by an Italian-Egyptian consortium and the Bridge Programme by a French consortium (with Italian, Egyptian and Algerian co-directors).

**Links between the ENP and Euro-Med civil protection**

The PPRD will be closely linked to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in the sense that the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) provides the main part of the EU funding, which amounts to some 4.4 million euro. The ties between Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on civil protection and the developments of the ENP is furthermore underlined by the fact that all ENP Action Plans for the Mediterranean countries contain references to civil protection and disaster management (except the ENP action plan for the Palestine Authority).\footnote{48}

The action plan for Egypt refers to: ‘cooperation in conflict prevention and crisis management… within the framework of the Bridge Project for the creation of Euro-Mediterranean system of mitigation, prevention and management of natural and man-made disasters’ (EU/Egypt Action Plan, pp.8-9). Jordan is said to: ‘explore the possibility of participation in training activities on conflict prevention, crisis and natural disaster management as well as in civil and military peace-keeping exercises and operations in co-

\footnote{46} Interview European Commission, EuropeAid (Environment, statistics, civil protection and cooperation with local authorities), 23 September 2008, Brussels, Interview European Commission, DG Relex (Euro-Med and regional issues), 30 September 2008, Brussels

\footnote{47} At the time of writing (early 2009), the PPRD has not yet been launched but the Commission is negotiating with the ‘consortium’ and is planning on having it up and running in 2009.

\footnote{48} There are currently no ENP action plans for Algeria, Libya and Syria. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements do not contain specific references to civil protection cooperation albeit they do include references to political dialogue on peace, security and stability in the Mediterranean region, much in line with the 1995 Barcelona Declaration.
operation with the EU’ (EU/Jordan Action Plan, pp. 5-6) and Morocco shall: ‘take part, as appropriate, in training and activities relating to conflict prevention, management of crises and natural disasters, civil protection and possible participation in EU-led civil and military peacekeeping exercises and operations’ (EU/Morocco Action Plan, p. 7) and the same basically applies to Tunisia (EU/Tunisia Action Plan, p. 6) and Lebanon (EU/Lebanon Action Plan, pp. 7-8). In the case of Israel it is stipulated that: ‘dialogue and co-operation should… be enhanced and diversified, at all official levels, as appropriate, and should include… civil protection and peace-keeping [and] international development co-operation, humanitarian aid and networking to allow rapid reaction for disaster relief and other emergency situations that may arise worldwide’ (EU/Israel Action Plan, pp. 5-6).

Euro-Mediterranean civil protection in a broader regional context

Besides the activities that have been realised under the auspices of the Euro-Med civil protection programmes, there are also other indications of enhanced cooperation on civil protection between the EU and the Mediterranean partners. An example is that all the Mediterranean partners were invited for the first time to participate with their respective Heads of National Civil Protection at the 19th Meeting of the Director-Generals of Civil Protection which was held in Porto during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU in 2007. This invitation was then repeated in relation to the 20th Meeting of the Director-Generals held in Marseille under the French Presidency of the EU in late 2008. However, quite few Mediterranean partners actually participated at this later occasion, possibly due to the fact that the Bridge programme had been concluded and the PPRD had not yet been launched.49

In a speech at the 11th Ministerial Meeting of the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement held in Marrakech (Morocco) in 2006, a senior official at the European Commission confirmed that: ‘this framework [referring to the Community Mechanism and the Euro-Med Bridge Programme] is extremely relevant for establishing common understanding and trust among multinational relief teams that are expected to cooperate during emergencies in foreign countries… By supporting joint initiatives in the Mediterranean area, it contributes to make prevention, preparedness and response to major disasters more effective and to promote cooperation on common concerns among neighbouring European and non-European countries’ (Bucella 2006).

The EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement, on the other hand, is a so-called ‘partial agreement’ under the auspices of the Council of Europe (CoE). It was created in 1987 as a

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49 Interview (telephone) Portuguese National Authority of Civil Protection, 3 November 2008, Lisbon
platform for cooperation in the field of major natural and technological disasters (prevention, risk management, post-crisis analysis and rehabilitation). Importantly, the cooperation involve some CoE non-members, such as Morocco, Algeria and Lebanon at the same time as a large part of the CoE member states do not participate (generally speaking, the member states of Northern and Central Europe). According to a senior official at the CoE Secretariat the cooperation is mainly directed towards promoting knowledge exchange and better regulation among the participating states in relation to risk management, but there is no operational component and the budget is no way near the amounts that the Commission provides to the Euro-Med programmes. It is also worth mentioning that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is seeking to promote cooperation on Civil Emergency Planning between members and non-members under the headings of its ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’ but according to officials at NATO, the Mediterranean partners have only recently begun to show some interest in this field and when it comes to budget matters the same as for the EUR-OPA Agreement applies.

However, the perhaps most important international organization in the Mediterranean region (besides the EU) when it comes to matters related to international cooperation on disaster management is the United Nations (UN), and especially UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) and UN ISDR (International Strategy for Disaster Reduction). In principle, all interviewees at the European Commission confirm that one major weakness of the past Euro-Med programmes has been the poor coordination with the work that the UN is doing in the region and that this is something that the PPRD Programme will have to seek to remedy.

50 See Council of Europe http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/majorhazards/Default_en.asp
51 Interview (telephone) Council of Europe, Secretariat (EUR-OPA major hazards agreement), 18 November 2008, Strasbourg
52 See NATO http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm
53 Interview NATO, Head Quarters (Political affairs and security policy division, civil emergency planning), 8 October 2008, Brussels, Interview NATO, Head Quarters (Political affairs and security policy division, regional affairs), 4 November 2008, Brussels
Bringing the Mediterranean non-members closer to the Community Mechanism?

Several interviewees at the European Commission stress the technical and practical nature of civil protection as being a key to the ‘success’ of the Euro-Med programmes.\textsuperscript{55} One civil servant at the Commission asserts that:

The uniqueness of the programme is that it is at the same time very political but it also has operational components. There is a genuine interest from both sides to participate, be it from the Israeli side and the Arab side. So here we can overcome some of the political problems that we have in other forums, where you have a political dialogue without an operational component. Here you have that operational component and you have concrete benefits from the cooperation in terms of cross-border match of materials that the countries might have when it comes to forest fires, flash floods or major disasters that could also be due to terrorism, aid to the victims and to the population. So there is an interest, and I think that this is a key element as to why this program can run so smoothly despite the political problems.\textsuperscript{56}

The technical and practical nature of the cooperation is also reflected in that civil protection personnel from the different participating states are seen to able to discuss matters of common concerns rather easily, which might have both benefits and disadvantages. According to another Commission civil servant:

…the “civil protection world” is a quite close-knit community. Which is good in one sense because they are able to cooperate but it is also a problem because if it is kept too close then we will not reap the benefits of the work that the other organisations [referring to the UN and the Red Cross] do.\textsuperscript{57}

Another important feature which several interviewees refer to is the evolution of the Community Mechanism (especially the MIC) and the momentum that EU civil protection enjoys in relation to the work of trying to boost the EU’s crisis response capabilities (see above). As one Commission civil servant claims:

…there was no such thing as the MIC back then [referring to when the Pilot Programme was launched] and the developments within the EU has led to a new strategic thinking as to what can be made and what can be gain from such a programme [the PPRD]. It’s not all about confidence-

\textsuperscript{55} Interview European Commission, EuropeAid (environment, statistics, civil protection and cooperation with local authorities), 23 September 2008, Brussels, Interview European Commission, DG Relex (euro-Med and regional issues), 30 September 2008, Brussels

\textsuperscript{56} Interview European Commission, DG Relex (Euro-Med and regional issues), 30 September 2008, Brussels

\textsuperscript{57} Interview European Commission, EuropeAid (Environment, statistics, civil protection and cooperation with local authorities), 23 September 2008, Brussels
building measures, it goes far beyond that if you compare this to 1996. Now we are really discussing concrete issues in the activities. So this is a programme that is very dear to the Mediterranean countries and we have done our best to match their expectations with the funding that we have made available, which is now more than the double that we had before in the Bridge Programme.58

But when it comes to the question of how the relations between EU member states and Mediterranean non-members should be conceived of in relation to the Community Mechanism, essentially relating to the question whether Mediterranean non-members could be ‘integrated’ to EU civil protection beyond the scope that it is currently foreseen in the provisions stipulated by the Civil Protection Financial Instrument (see above), there seems to be, again, diverging positions within the EU. However, this time the dividing line also splits the Commission. On the one side, the interviewees in DG Relex and EuropeAid express a preference for opening up the Community Mechanism to those Mediterranean non-members with sufficiently advanced national civil protection systems (such as for example Turkey, Morocco and Algeria).59 Naturally, they assert that this could not be done immediately but it is a question of time, more than anything else. One member of the PROCIV working group from a Southern EU member state said rather frankly:

…it [integration with the Community Mechanism] should be the aim, the beacon that should direct their [the Mediterranean non-members] work.60

On the other side, interviewees working in DG Environment as well as the General Secretariat of the Council are a bit more reluctant to say that something like full-scale integration with the Community Mechanism is in the cards for the Mediterranean partners. Not necessarily because the national civil protection systems of the Mediterranean partners are considered not to be advanced enough but rather because it is important to keep the ‘European identity’ of the Community Mechanism.61 One senior official at the Commission explained that, in civil protection, the EU divides the neighbouring countries into mainly three categories: accession or pre-accession countries (which need to adopt to EU standards as they will be fully integrated into the Community Mechanism once they join the EU); the Mediterranean

58 Interview European Commission, DG Relex (Euro-Med and regional issues), 30 September 2008, Brussels
59 Interview European Commission, EuropeAid (Environment, statistics, civil protection and cooperation with local authorities), 23 September 2008, Brussels, Interview European Commission, DG Relex (Euro-Med and regional issues), 30 September 2008, Brussels
60 Interview Permanent Representation of Italy to the EU, 13 October 2008, Brussels
61 Interview European Commission, DG ENV (Civil protection), 11 November 2008, Brussels, Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG H 4 (Civil protection), 13 November 2008, Brussels
countries (with whom the EU needs to develop close cooperation due to shared risks and threats); and the Eastern neighbours (with whom the EU also needs to develop close cooperation due to shared risks and threats). The same official noted that the Mediterranean countries are generally more important to the EU than the Eastern neighbours (in the Caucasus) but it is not really necessary to integrate them in the Community Mechanism in order to achieve enhanced and better cooperation since that could threaten to create more problems than it would solve. What is needed is a focus on the issues that are of strategic importance to the EU and the Mediterranean partners, such as prevention, capacity-building and host-nation support because the EU will need to get involved anyway if something ‘big’ happens in its neighbourhood. The ‘key’ issue here is training programmes and joint exercises, judging from the experience of cooperation among EU member states, and such things can very well be done without necessarily integrating non-members into the Community Mechanism.

Although there are apparently different positions as to the future direction of Euro-Med civil protection, there is an interesting case of enhanced cooperation between the EU and a Mediterranean partner which might set an example. The Commission is currently working on an administrative arrangement with Morocco. This arrangement was already mentioned in relation to Morocco’s ‘Statut Avancé’ with the EU which was agreed upon at the 8th EU-Morocco Association Council meeting in October 2008. In order to chisel out what such a status could imply the two parties submitted a ‘joint document’ where it says that they will sign: ‘un arrangement administratif entre le Maroc et la Commission européenne concernant la coopération au Centre d’information et de suivi du mécanisme communautaire de protection civile’ (Document conjoint UE-Maroc). According to a civil servant at DG ENV, similar arrangements are already in place with Russia, Ukraine and Australia and the one with Morocco will be worked out during 2009. The idea of having an arrangement instead of an agreement with a third country is that it makes it possible for the Commission not to have to abide with article 300 of the current treaties which stipulates that the Commission has to seek authorization from the Council on these matters. The administrative arrangement is not legally binding and it will deal with technical cooperation (exchange of information, training and

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62 Interview European Commission, DG ENV (Civil protection), 2 December 2008, Brussels
63 Ibid.
64 A civil servant at the Commission points out that: ‘For us [the Commission], “Advanced Status” doesn’t mean anything concrete. We don’t see it as the end of a process either, we see it as a continuing process of deepening relations. We are taking big steps with the decisions taken this year but there are clearly other areas where we could go further, and that is what we envision to do. So it’s nothing that will put an end to the process of deepening the relations, on the contrary’ (Interview European Commission, DG Relex (Maghreb unit), 6 November 2008, Brussels).
exercises). More than anything, it is a sign of commitment on behalf of the Commission and the concerned third country. Interestingly, the arrangement is to be signed directly between the DG ENV and the Moroccan civil protection administration, without having to seek ‘blessing’ higher up on the political ladder.\(^{65}\)

**Challenges to Euro-Mediterranean civil protection**

Several interviewees state that the ways in which civil protection is organized in the Mediterranean non-member states varies considerably.\(^{66}\) For example, Morocco and Algeria have proper civil protection directorates in the Ministries of Interior, whereas ‘civil protection’ in Jordan is handled with small resources by the Ministry of Environment. Experiences of handling natural and man-made disasters do also vary among the Mediterranean non-members. Turkey, Morocco and Algeria have all had to deal with major earthquakes in the last ten years, not to mention terrorist attacks. One civil servant at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU said that a country such as Algeria has a better organised and more experienced civil protection system than several EU member states.\(^{67}\)

This means that when it comes to exchange of experts in the Euro-Med programmes there is an important element of ‘give-and-take’ between EU member states and (some) Mediterranean partners.\(^{68}\)

In a recently concluded evaluation report of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme a number of problems are identified. First, civil protection personnel in the administrations of the Mediterranean partners perceive a lack of a coherent European policy on civil protection and: ‘the role of the Mechanism in recent disasters in the Mediterranean region has been eclipsed by the bilateral response of many Member States who have a long track record in disaster response and who are able to mobilise quickly and under less bureaucratic procedures’ (Warren 2007:14). Second, existing agreements between the EU and the UN do not specify a role for the Community Mechanism and the MIC in the global UN system for disaster response, which is something that negatively affects the ability to perform coordinated civil protection operations in the Mediterranean and it has also resulted in that the Bridge Programme has been forced to operate in a ‘policy vacuum’ (Warren 2007:15). Third, the organisation of EU civil protection as such is highly complex and it is no less so when it

\(^{65}\) Interview European Commission, DG ENV (Civil protection), 11 November 2008, Brussels

\(^{66}\) Interview Co-director of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme, 1 November 2008, Stockholm, Interview (skype) Evaluator Euro-Med Bridge Programme, 1 December 2008, St Lucia

\(^{67}\) Interview General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, DG H 4 (Civil protection), 13 November 2008, Brussels

\(^{68}\) Ibid.
comes to involving non-member states. The European Commission only has a broadly defined disaster response strategy for interventions beyond EU borders. The strategy involves several DGs at the Commission, but in the end it is: ‘relying heavily on inputs from EU Member State civil protection agencies’ (ibid).

A former Co-director of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme asserts that cooperation on civil protection in the Mediterranean has relied heavily on personal contacts, which might prove valuable in order for the right people in different states to quickly get in contact with each other when disasters strike but it is also an obstacle to further institutionalization of the cooperation. The same interviewee also said that the Commission usually works with the assumption that what is needed first is to establish a network of contact points based on the idea that this would allow the MIC to act as an information hub. However, this runs the risk of superimposing a network system on top of existing structures, without neither incorporating nor building upon them. Moreover, the idea that technical assistance and joint exercises will promote the transfer of new ideas, as the participants go back to their ‘home’ administrations in the Mediterranean partner countries, is often at odds with the hierarchical structures of these organisations. This basically means that nothing really happens at the desk officer’s level and that practically everything has to go through the head of the organisation (be it a director-general or a minister).

Finally, other problems of a more over-arching nature mentioned in the evaluation report relate to the bi-lateral relations in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Warren 2007:46), which perhaps does not come as a surprise to anyone. For instance, due to its historical legacy as a colonial power in the region, France seems to have been able to influence primarily Algeria and Morocco in adopting a ‘French’ approach to civil protection. When it comes to Israel, due to historical and political ties, that country relies on the United States rather than the EU when it comes to crisis management and disaster relief. A country such as Syria seeks to be independent of support from both the U.S. and the EU for political reasons related to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Whereas Tunisia, according to one interviewee, has hardly at all participated in the Euro-Med Bridge Programme as a reaction to the criticism directed towards the country by the EU for its poor record on human rights.

69 Interview Co-director of the Euro-Med Bridge Programme, 1 November 2008, Stockholm
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Interview European Commission, DG Relex (Euro-Med and regional issues), 30 September 2008
5. Conclusions

In relation to the over-arching question addressed in this paper, the above analysis suggests that the boundaries of the European security community do not necessarily coincide with the institutional confines of the EU. This is all in all a rather trivial conclusion. However, the analysis presented above points to some interesting ways in which the EU can serve as a vehicle for the expansion of practices originally developed among EU member states. This is shown in that the external dimension of EU civil protection is increasingly acknowledged first and foremost by the European Commission but also by several EU member states. Although there are significant difference between member states on how to develop EU civil protection as well as between the Commission and the Council on how to deal with the issue of enhanced cooperation with non-members. However, Community instruments, such as the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), are increasingly used to coordinate and facilitate mainly but not exclusively EU member states’ civil protection operations outside of the EU. There seems to be moves towards finding ways to better link civil protection operations to other Community competences such as humanitarian aid and development policies. Furthermore, recently adopted instruments now provide a legal basis for non-member states, especially nearly situated states, to participate in activities such as training and exercises under the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. The Euro-Med civil protection programmes that have been up and running since the mid-1990’s have also facilitated Mediterranean non-members’ participation in regional cooperation frameworks, mainly funded through the Community budget.

Reflecting upon the lessons drawn from heuristically applying an analytical framework based on a ‘community of practice’ approach to security communities, and especially focusing on practices of protection, some tentative conclusions might also be reached. First, there seems to be widespread political support among EU member states and Mediterranean non-members to further regional cooperation on civil protection based on an understanding of the need to jointly tackle natural and man-made threats and risks facing societies around the Mediterranean region. The recognition of the increased socio-economic intertwinement (albeit without necessarily any increased socio-economic integration) of the two shores of the Mediterranean basin also seems to induce change in how, or perhaps where, the object of protection is to be perceived. On behalf of the European Commission there is also an understanding that it lies in the EU’s proper interest to support the development of closely situated non-members civil protection systems, since if something ‘bad’ happens in the EU’s neighbourhood it would need to get involved anyways.
Second, political support (as shown in declarations, etc.) does not necessarily mean that the cooperation works in practice. But the evidence gathered here suggests that there is a kind of community of practice forming around the cooperation on Euro-Med civil protection, based on joint exercises and simulations, workshops, exchange of experts and technical assistance (mainly funded through the Community budget). Importantly, there is an element of ‘give-and-take’ when it comes to expertise and experiences in the programmes. In that sense there are groups of like-minded practitioners (mostly civil protection personnel in EU member states and Mediterranean non-members) who are informally (through networks) as well as contextually (through regional programmes) bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice (i.e. reduce the societal exposure to natural and man-made disasters in the Mediterranean region) (cf. Adler 2008). To the extent that new knowledge on threats and risks are produced and dispersed together with the formulation of consent on the most desired prospects and actions (cf. Douglas & Wildavsky 1983), then we might be observing a community of practice that is increasingly centred on the EU but whose boundaries do not necessarily coincide with the borders of the EU member states. It would also point to ways in which the EU can be said to exercise power in relation to neighbouring states through the production of knowledge and the spread of ways-of-doing-things, even though this issue needs to be more rigorously explored. However, this does not mean that such a community of protection automatically would foster the emergence of a security community in the Euro-Mediterranean region based on the spread of self-restraint subjectivities (according to some ideal-type model where technical cooperation on civil protection first builds confidence which then helps to promote peace among conflicting parties) (cf. Adler & Crawford 2006).

Interestingly, the same evidence that point to the existence of a community of like-minded practitioners in the field of Euro-Med civil protection also points to the limits to EU-induced regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. For example, the idea of having the MIC acting as a regional hub also in the Mediterranean might at first sight seem to hold the promise of swifter disaster response. But for the time being it rather seems to run the risk of creating a hollow structure. In a similar fashion to what have been noted in relation to cooperation in other JHA areas (cf. Lavenex & Wichmann 2009) there seems to be sufficient levels of ‘incongruence’ between administrative structures among EU member states and Mediterranean partners also when it comes civil protection, which is something that does not totally impede technical and practical cooperation but it does hamper further institutionalization on a regional level. This incongruence seems not primarily to be a function
of too big a difference in levels of organization and preparedness (several interviewees pointed out the quite a few Mediterranean partners can be said to have better civil protection systems than some EU member states) but rather due to the ways in which the Mediterranean partners generally speaking organize their systems (i.e. less transparent and more hierarchical). Of course, new knowledge about threats and risks may lead to changes in the understandings on how regional cooperation on civil protection would need to be organized, but it is not necessarily so that the civil protection organizations are able to act accordingly (cf. Adler 2008). Needless to say, the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict also hampers further institutionalization of Euro-Med regional cooperation, even though it has not brought the technical and practical side of the cooperation to a complete halt up until now.

The above analysis also points to venues for future research. Taking into consideration that it has been shown that there are diverging position on the future of EU civil protection among EU member states (cf. Bremberg & Britz forthcoming), as well as the evidence gathered here suggesting the importance of historical and political ties on a bi-lateral level between some EU member states and Mediterranean partners, it seems highly promising to explore the sub-regional dimension of Euro-Med cooperation on civil protection. By applying a community of practice approach but focusing instead more thoroughly on bi-lateral relations, it would be possible explore in more detail to what extent EU-promoted regional cooperation helps bring together practitioners from EU member states and Mediterranean partners. It would also make it possible to more precisely study how the alleged incongruence between administrative structures affects the development of the cooperation. More importantly, questions could be asked about the role that civil protection plays in national security policies which in turn might provide us with further clues as to whether there are shared understandings of the natural and man-made threats and risks that face the societies around the Mediterranean and to what extent such understandings shape regional cooperation.

6. References

Documents, speeches & reports


Council of the EU (2007b) Council decision establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast), Brussels, 2 October 2007, 11163/1/07 REV 1

Council of the EU (2007c) Agreed Conclusions of the 9th Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 6 November 2007, 14743/07 Presse 255

Council of the EU (2008a) Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, Brussels, 30 April 2008, 6655/1/08 REV 1


Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism


Official Journal of the European Communities (1998) Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Tunisia, of the other part, 30 March 98 (L 97/2)

Official Journal of the European Communities (2000a) Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Kingdom of Morocco, of the other part, 18 March 2000 (L 70/2)

Official Journal of the European Communities (2000b) Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, of the other part, 15 May 2002 (L 129/3)

Official Journal of the European Communities (2000c) Euro-Mediterranean Agreement establishing an Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the State of Israel, of the other part, 21 June 2000 (L 147/3)


Terms of reference Euro-Med Programme of Prevention, Preparedness and Response to natural and man-made Disasters (PPRD)


**Book and articles**


Bremberg, N. & M. Britz (forthcoming) ‘Uncovering the diverging institutional logics of EU civil protection’ *Cooperation and Conflict* vol.44, no.3


Table 2. Summery of Training Activities under the Euro-Med Bridge Programme (2005-2008)

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<th>Self-training workshops</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Accomplishments, effects and impact</th>
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</table>
| Seismic Risk 1, Tsunami in Mediterranean Basin (Marseille) | 24-29/09/05 | - Preparation of an intervention and information plan for the inhabitants concerned  
- Reinforced opportunities for mutual assistance  
- Increased the recognition of the need to develop Early Warning System (EWS)  
- Developed a need to identify tsunami risk zones in the Mediterranean  
- New understanding on how to manage risks of tsunamis and need to produce a population alert plan |
| National Correspondents Meeting (Brussels) | 20-24/02/06 | - Better understanding of EU institutions and Bridge Programme  
- Identified need to establish a permanent network of National Correspondents in the Mediterranean, with regular meetings and exchange of information, aimed at supporting Programme management in planning activities (including support in identification of suitable participants), as well as in preparedness of mutual assistance. The MIC has included the Mediterranean National Correspondents in the mailing list of the emergency situation report “The MIC Daily”, as well as of “the Orange Earthquake Alert” |
| Flash Floods (Tunis) | 6-10/03/06 | - Increased knowledge on flash flood modelling and use of satellite technology  
- Established a strategy on preventing flash floods  
- Use of satellite images.  
- Promoted voluntary actions on how to develop high level specialised training in hydrogeology and flash floods |
| Seismic Risks (Rome) | 8-12/05/06 | - Reinforced mutual assistance  
- Identified need to for improving training techniques to ensure adequate appraisal of seismic risks, how to reduce such risks and manage them following an earthquake  
- Identified need for a Construction Code and promotion of a culture of civil protection based on prevention rather than response.  
- Promoted links between the technical/scientific institutions and the response services. |
| Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean (Malta) | 19-23/06/06 | - Produced an intervention plan  
- Identified intervention techniques and methods for coastal rehabilitation  
- Provided training of trainers  
- Discussed coastal mapping techniques  
- Identification of the means and equipment needed at sub-regional level to combat future marine pollution in coastal areas |
| Urban Risk Management (Istanbul) | 3-7/07/06 | - Created discussion on the protection of strategic public buildings and those of historical, cultural or heritage importance and information to the public on the issue including information campaigns  
- Discussed specific training of emergency rescue personnel  
- Conducted common exercises  
- Discussed the importance of multi-risk mapping and its use in urban planning and development, |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Emergency Medicine (Amman)                                           | 10-14/12/06| - Talk on establishing EWS  
- Evaluation of medical emergency assistance  
- Organisation of emergency medicine  
- Training on “diplomante” and putting into place an assistance plan when large numbers of victims are involved  
- Reinforced mutual assistance and coordination among rescue services and emergency medical teams  
- Identified intervention techniques under extreme conditions |
| Palm Forest Fires (Aix-les-Milles)                                   | 15-19/01/07| - Evaluation of medical emergency assistance  
- Organisation of emergency medicine  
- Training on “diplomante” and putting into place an assistance plan when large numbers of victims are involved  
- Reinforced mutual assistance and coordination among rescue services and emergency medical teams  
- Identified intervention techniques under extreme conditions |
| Protection of Vulnerable Groups in Disasters (Cairo)                 | 18-22/02/07| - Risk forecasting  
- Discussion on European programmes on forest fire operations  
- Security issues during mutual assistance operations  
- Application of air and terrestrial equipment in combating fires  
- Forest fire protection measures |
| Emergency Planning and Operational Centres (Aix-les-Milles)          | 26-30/03/07| - Analysis de risks and risk mapping to determine risk coverage  
- Rescue planning and deployment of rescue equipment  
- Compilation of information for Red Alert situations  
- Mutual assistance  
- Conducted Exercise “Framework” |
| Exchange of experts                                                   | Date       | Accomplishments, effects and impact                                                                                                                                                                      |
| Eurocot Exercise (Stromboli)                                         | 14-18/10/05| - Mediterranean partners were invited as observers in the Eurocoot exercise-designed to practice planning and organisation techniques of European Civil Protection authorities in response to a hypothetical earthquake affecting 40,000 people and leaving 200,000 homeless in Sicily.  
- Looked at ways of putting into practice a strategy to identify victims |
| Urban/Industrial Fires (Slovenia & Italy)                            | 27/11-2/12/05| - Devised the ”SEVESO” Intervention Plans |
| Seismic Risks (Aix-les-Milles)                                       | 23-27/01/06| - Looked at putting into practice anti-seismic norms  
- Public information campaigns  
- How to launch rescue operation strategies |
| Psycho-social assistance                                             | 20-24/03/06| - How to care for victims with special needs  
- Creation of Psycho-medical units in some countries |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Technical assistance</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Accomplishments, effects and impact</th>
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</table>
| for disaster victims (Brussels) | 3-7/04/06 | - Security issues in fire fighting operations  
- Classification of risk areas  
- Multiple evacuation management                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| Forest fire-fighting (Lisbon) | 28/05-2/06/06 | - Management of volunteer groups  
- Examination of different solutions to resolve the problems of managing volunteers.                                                                                                                                                          |
| Role of Volunteers in National Civil Protection (Austria & Italy) | 10-13/09/06 | - Operational applications for large-scale chemical sites  
- Improved understanding on intervention techniques  
- Sweden offered to participate in on site training in Euro-Med Partner Countries, but mission was too short and involved a very intense working programme |
| Chemical Risk Management (Sweden) | 22-26/01/07 | - Improved knowledge on management of major floods and informing the public  
- Employment of modelling software and satellite images                                                                                                                                                                                        |
<p>| Civil Training Protection Colleges (Sweden &amp; Denmark) | 30/10-3/11/06 | - Improved knowledge of operational training, joint training and developing standardised training courses and exchanges of experts                                                                                                                                 |
| Flood Prevention &amp; Management (Germany) | 15-20/04/07 | - Improved knowledge on how to produce intervention plans, how to extinguish large and complex fires particularly relating to chemical and dangerous substances                                                                                     |
| Port Fire management (Italy) | 05-09/06/07 | - Mediterranean partner countries were invited to observe the second European exercise on responding to a hypothetical chemical disaster simulation concerning two explosions at a concert hall and the release of hazardous chemicals at an electricity plant. The evaluation mission participated in the penultimate day of the exercise and found the partners enjoyed the exercise, but found it of limited applicability because of the high technological dependency in the European response (such as mobile radioactive decontamination units), which no Mediterranean partner country has. They also found the response time following the disaster was slow (54 minutes). All participants, however, were very impressed with the level of preparation of the children in the evacuation drill, which some countries said they would like to replicate in their own country. |</p>
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<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Actions and Outcomes</th>
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</table>
| Accident Prevention and Emergency Preparedness in the El-Azhar tunnels (Cairo)   | 13-24/01/06   | - Assessment of the safety, evacuation and fire equipment in the tunnels (and Cairo metro)  
- Proposed actions to remedy the dangers of a back spot in the south tunnel, improved safety measures and how to control smoke in the event of a major fire, which have now been applied (confirmed by evaluation mission visit and which has reduced accident levels |
| Training in Civil Protection Education in DE, TR, DZ & ES                         | 15-29/03/06   | - Proposed methods to improve the integration of prevention, education and information in public promotion campaigns on safety and protection  
- Training of trainers  
- Conducted a training session on analysing risks in the Mediterranean  
- Specific training of high level officials in Civil Protection/Defence  
- Development of policy for future exercises  
- Training on the management of major operations  
- Creation of a Civil Protection Schools Network  
- Production of a Training Charter |
| Safety Measures, Fire Prevention and fighting and Emergency rescue operations in passenger vessels in the Nile (Egypt) | 16-28/06/06   | - Proposed emergency intervention plans for the river Nile Rescue Unit, but the evaluation mission determined they were of limited use as European experts did not have specific knowledge of the river Nile and in particular the constant changing of its course |
| Public Information on Civil Protection (Rabat)                                   | 11-17/09/06   | - Production of a training guide on reducing domestic risks  
- Revision of safety information for children  
- Prepare an information programme for the public in Morocco on domestic safety  
- The evaluation mission understands this programme was not very successful as the reading material was too detailed and long |
<p>| Special Assistance Mission - Post Conflict Reinstatement of the                  | 9-21/10/06    | - Study on reorganising the Lebanese Civil Defence following the Israeli conflict which included a plan to improve special equipment. The evaluation mission understands the exercise helped to strengthen Lebanese interest in the Programme and helped the country gain access to European donors to aid the Civil Protection’s reorganisation as well as rehabilitation efforts. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>CDA in Lebanon</th>
<th>Civil Protection Schools Network</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Accomplishments, effects and impact</th>
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<td>Gathering of Directors of Civil Protection Schools (Madrid)</td>
<td>28-29/03/06</td>
<td>- Identified need to produce a charter on CP training</td>
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<td>- Agreed to put in place a common training platform, ‘Tronc’</td>
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<td>- Training capacity assessment of the schools was needed. Further work on developing the schools is still needed</td>
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<td>Major Disaster Simulation Exercises</td>
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<td>Accomplishments, effects and impact</td>
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<td>Exercise MED 2007</td>
<td>26-30/03/07</td>
<td>- Inter-connection of 37 National Civil Protection/Defence Operations Centres and the MIC in Brussels</td>
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<td>- Network established for the first time between the National Operation Centres of the Mediterranean partner countries</td>
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<td>- Experts from EU and Mediterranean partners worked together on discussing operational issues in the event of a major disaster (earthquake and tsunami)</td>
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<td>- Enacted a rescue and evacuation plan covering 70 % of the Mediterranean region</td>
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<td>- Looked at ways of working together with the MIC</td>
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