Key words: protest, anti-austerity campaign, claims, repertoires of action

Abstract

As various surveys have shown a significant proportion of the Greek population has taken part to at least one protest event against austerity policies and structural adjustment reforms during the last crisis-ridden years. Do these protests exemplify a reactionary aspect of the Greek political culture or are rather signs of an active process of contestation and empowerment? In our research we focus on the main organizations/groups that called and coordinated the major and most visible protest events of the period (general strikes, demonstrations, square occupations). Our sample includes trade unions, political parties, anarchist groups, justice oriented groups and Indignados, while their repertoires of contention are combinations of demonstrative, confrontational and violent protests. In this paper we will focus on the interplay between forms of action and the political claims raised by each group. Our findings are based on a questionnaire that was distributed to the main organizers of each organization.

1. Introduction

Greece, a euro zone member, was one of the European countries most severely hit by the capitalist crisis that erupted after the financial crash of 2008. Due to its large deficit Greece could not borrow money from the international markets to recapitalize its huge public debt and practically at the beginning of 2010 came close to bankruptcy. By that time EU intervened, jointly with the IMF, and offered a rescue
package to the Greek government. The EU, the ECB (European Central Bank) and the IMF formed the “Troika” that provided financial aid to Greece and as an exchange the center-left government of PASOK (Greek socialists) signed a “Memorandum” agreeing on the reforms and the austerity measures that had to be imposed upon the economy and the Greek population. Analogous “Memoranda” soon followed for Portugal and Ireland while Spain also receives financial aid by the ECB in exchange for austerity and structural adjustment programs. In Greece, the “Memorandum” received fierce opposition from the beginning (in the spring of 2010). The main trade union confederations declared consecutive general strikes and the political parties and organizations of the left mobilized in mass protests to overthrow the agreement. At the same time in Parliament, the main oppositional party, the conservative New Democracy (ND), also opposed the “Memorandum”, mainly for tactical reasons. For the three years period we examine here, austerity policies deepened economic recession; new more severe measures were imposed and mass protests erupted all over Greece (Kousis 2013, Kousis and Kanellopoulos 2014).

Drawing on the interplay between contention and convention (Tilly 1994, Goldstone 2003), we will analyze in this paper some of the main internal features of the Greek anti-austerity campaign, by 1) identifying the main networks operating in this campaign and analyzing their characteristics, 2) focusing on the interplay between forms of action and the political claims raised by each network. Along these lines we propose here five hypotheses to be tested:

\textit{Hypothesis 1: The more radical the repertoires of action a group or a network usually uses the more radical the political claims it raises.}

In other words since protest politics do not usually follow the instrumental logic of conventional politics we expect to find a strong affinity between means and ends. By the same logic in \textit{Hypothesis 2: the more institutionalized the position of a group or a network the more moderate its political claims.} And in \textit{Hypothesis 3: the less institutionalized the position of the actor the more reactionary the political claims.} As “reactionary” we have termed claims that do not contain a positive proposal either on a moderate direction or a radical one, and appear as simple reactions to an externally imposed pressure – in our case the “Memorandum”.


Another important variable we tried to incorporate in our research is the attribution of blame under play in the Greek crisis (Gerhards et al. 2009, Roose 2013). The attribution claim analysis evolves around a central question: *Who blames whom for what, in which form and for what reason?* Here we focus on the attribution of blame on behalf of the protest groups that formed the Greek anti-austerity campaign. These groups attributed blame either to concrete actors or to abstract social phenomena, or to unspecified reasons. Thus we expect in Hypothesis 4: *the more radical the repertoires of action of each network the more abstract/ideological the attribution claims,* and Hypothesis 5: *the more concrete the attribution claims the more moderate the overall political claims of each network.*

In the following sections we will analyze our methodology of research, the network and alliance building process of the campaign, and the findings of our work.

### 2. Methodology of research

The period beginning in spring 2010 is a typical period of “thickened history” (Tilly 1978) – *the pace of challenging events accelerated when whole populations engaged at a higher level of contention.* The high frequency of protests that were synchronized at the national level, the high level of participants, the broad cross-class coalitions that involved a large number of challenging groups and the general public, make us argue for the emergence of a sustained anti-austerity campaign in Greece. In order to understand how these groups managed to work together, to what extent they did so, and the nature of their coalition, an array of insights from network analysis seems appropriate. Network analysis has long been applied in contentious politics (Curtis and Zurcher 1973, Zald and McCarthy 1987, Knoke 1990, Diani 1995, Melucci 1996). However, most studies focus on recruitment processes (Snow et al. 1980, McAdam 1988, Fernadez and McAdam 1989, McAdam and Paulsen 1993), or on interorganizational dynamics (Rosental et al. 1985, Diani 1995). Others have addressed the community embeddedness that allow for participation in movements (Gould 1991, Ansell 2003). Mario Diani has approached social movements as networks and has proposed a relevant research agenda (Diani 1992, 2003). But besides the advances offered by an impressive body of studies on network effects (for an overview see Diani and McAdam 2003), there is still little theoretical agreement on
the actual role of networks and networking (Passy 2003, 2014). Moreover, seen from a strategic action field perspective, network analysis is very helpful to map a field but is “… mute on the dynamics that shape fields” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 29).

To quantify the Greek anti-austerity campaign we draw on a previous protest event analysis of the large protests against the Memorandum from February 2010 until November 2012, conducted by Kousis and Kanellopoulos (Kousis 2012, 2013, Kousis and Kanellopoulos 2014). Kousis and Kanellopoulos have depicted thirty-one large protest events (LPEs) where big crowds in synchronized actions across the country made specific anti-austerity collective claims on authorities. Twenty-four out of thirty-one LPEs occurred during general strikes, demonstration marches, and the Indignados gatherings in central squares and brought together 40,000 to 500,000 participants. Five LPEs were carried out in national commemoration days that turned into anti-austerity protests and brought together 10,000 to 80,000 participants. Finally two LPEs were actually transnational days of action against austerity and brought the fewest participants, around 5,000 each.

Figure 1: Participation in large protest events

Based on the findings of Kousis and Kanellopoulos research we picked up 34 organization/groups to study. These organizations and groups acted as SMOs in the
Greek anti-austerity campaign throughout the 2010-2012 period. They were those that more frequently called, coordinated or participated in the LPEs. Two of them are the officially recognized by the Greek state as social partners: the confederation of trade unions (GSEE) and the central union of civil servants (ADEDY). These confederations called seventeen 24-hour and three 48-hour general strikes. Calling a general strike is, though, a very common feature of industrial relations in Greece (Hamann et al. 2013). GSEE and ADEDY are highly bureaucratized organizations run by groupings that are actually fronts of the main political parties of Greece. Thus, we also included in our sample PASKE, which holds the majority of seats in both GSEE and ADEDY administrations and is connected to PASOK, DAKE that is connected to ND and AYTONOMI PAREMVASI, which is connected to SYRIZA. DAS is the frontal grouping of KKE that is formally participating in the elections for GSEE and ADEDY but it does not taking part to the administration although it controls some seats. KKE has created its own confederation, PAME, which is not officially recognized and many times mobilizes separately from GSEE and ADEDY. However KKE is participating in the administration of second-level workers federations. We included in our study the largest of these federations that were the most active in the campaign (electricity workers, school-teachers, workers in local administration, public hospital workers).

The second vein of groups we examined are the political forces that actively participated in the LPEs: KKE and its youth organization KNE, SYRIZA and ANTARSYA, which are in themselves coalition of political organizations and some of the largest anarchist groups. All of these collectivities, besides the obvious differences and tensions among them, are very regularly active in Greek street politics (Kanellopoulos 2012). Finally we looked at some newcomers in anti-austerity contentious politics: the associations of merchants, taxi drivers and journalists and some newly founded collectivities like that of REAL DEMOCRACY, which coordinated the Indignados protests in public squares, the Coordination of first-level grassroots unions, which mobilizes independently from GSEE and ADEDY, and the ROSINANTE, which is an anarcho-syndicalist collectivity.

Trying to overcome the static tendencies of network analysis mentioned above, we have applied this research method to a highly contentious and sustained campaign. Our case in study does not include NGOs or voluntary associations that usually
participate in short term coalitions and non-conflictual movements like many cases that have been studied before. It comprises a set of organizations/groups that: a) sometimes are antagonistic or even openly hostile to each other, but they participated in the same LPEs, b) are also engaged in conventional politics, thus their size and impact are wider. Additionally, what was at stake made not only the Greek governments but also foreign governments and intergovernmental bodies to interact in the conflict while the wider public was indeed engaged in massive numbers. In other words a massive political campaign is in itself a dynamic process. We, thus, suppose that our application of network analysis will also be more dynamic. In doing so we distributed an extended questionnaire to core members of our sample organizations/groups asking, beyond the typical in network researches, questions about claim making and the perception of opportunities and threats. Besides that, we also conducted interviews with one representative from each one of the 34 organizations/groups asking questions concerning tactics and strategy, the evaluation of the conflict and the stance towards alliance building.

3. Networks and alliance building process

In figure 2 we depict the general positioning of groups participating in the Greek anti-austerity campaign. We placed our organizations/groups along two axes. The first concerns the organizational structure of the groups and the second their political positioning. On the vertical one at the top appear the most hierarchical organized groups, at the middle the less hierarchical, and at the bottom the horizontal coordinated groups. On the horizontal axis, we replicated the classical 1 to 9 left-right axis. We placed at the far-left the more radical leftist and groups, then the left, center-left, center, center-right groups, and at the right edge the far-right groups (see table 1 and table 2).

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1 A survey has shown that almost one third of the population of Greece has participated in at least one anti-austerity protest event (Mavris 2012).
The arrangement in these axes was based on: a) the responses we received to relevant questions, b) the relevant Greek literature c) our own knowledge gathered through participant observation in Greek politics and SMO’s. Of course many objections could be raised for these classifications. To give an example the “tyranny of structurelessness” (Freeman 1973) also applies to the Greek case: many organizations that do not have official leaders could be argued that are much more centralized and vertical than others they have. Nominally a general assembly has all the powers but in practice few core members are in charge of most activities and decisions. To overcome this classification dilemma we added an extra criterion – that of the existence or not of state’s financing. The organizations/groups that receive funds from the state usually create a bureaucratic structure that is by virtue more hierarchical than any informal leadership. To the thorny issue of political positioning we moved across conventional lines without embarking on the very usual ontological quarrels within the Greek social movement milieu of what is the real left or which organization is closer to Marx’s or Lenin’s legacies.
We have not chosen to construct our network across direct or indirect ties because the main indicators for that short of analysis did not apply in our case. Namely, we have found few overlapping in our sample. The same goes for other relevant indicators like sharing of resources and information, organize supplementary actions, having strong personal relations. The linkages we sketched in figure 2 are based mostly on the formal relations that SYRIZA, KKE, ANTARSYA, and the anarchist groups have among themselves and with unions, the organization of common actions, and on indirect ties.

Also, in this network landscape appears one more organization/group we had not included in our initial sample: the far-right political party of Golden Dawn (XA). Golden Dawn is also against the Memorandum with the foreign lenders from a nationalist perspective and never called or openly participated in any LPE. This would be against its political orientation and very risky for their members. However, through informal talks with some XA members we have found that they had a clear tactic to mingle in the Indignados LPEs to gain leverage (see also Stavrou 2011, Petropoulos 2014).

Figure 2 depicts the polycephalous and complex nature of the Greek campaign. The anti-austerity campaign consists of three main actors. On the one side are the trade unions and on the other the organized political forces, which in turn are consisting of four different components: SYRIZA and ANTARSYA, which are in itself coalitions, KKE and the anarchists. Somewhere between the political actors and the union actors appears the short-lived but very decisive Indignados (Petropoulos 2014).

Unlike other cases of polycephalous networks (Sawer and Groves 1994) the actors in our case are not only strongly connected internally but also share considerable ties between them. Many core activists in the Indignados were also members of political parties and organizations of the left, while Greek trade unions are related strongly to the same political parties and organizations.

Greek unions have low mobilization capacity. Union density is also low and those workers that went actually on strike were drawn mainly from the public sector where

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2 XA members refused to fulfill our questionnaires or to record an interview.
state law effectively protects workers’ rights. GSEE and ADEDY called the general strikes but very few people, mostly top official bureaucrats from each trade federation, participated at GSEE and ADEDY central rallies. Most of the workers in the LPE’s participated under the banners of KKE, SYRIZA’s and ANTARSYA’s, while many marched outside party or union blocks. One plausible explanation for that is that Greek unions shared strong ties with the political parties that enforced the austerity policies, namely PASOK. Throughout the 2010-2012 period the administration of all major trade unions were controlled by PASOK (through PASKE and in collaboration with DAKE) and had to compromise between two ends. On the one hand they had to protect the interests of the workers they represent and on the other they also had to bear in mind the interests of their political party of origin that happened to be in office at the same time. Eventually, PASKE lost many rank and files who either went to SYRIZA or took clear distances from PASOK leadership. PASKE lost considerable ground in many trade unions but managed, in the last general conference in May 2013, to remain in charge of GSEE along with DAKE. Unionism is perhaps one of the last social sectors that PASOK still holds its power.

The political forces cluster of the campaign is consisted of four different components which all are strongly connected internally but have little ties between them. Given the considerable weight that political forces exercised in our LPEs, this typical polycephalous structure in the interior of the political cluster explains the low density of the overall network whilst the certain amount of centralization. To better understand these tendencies and the alliance building processes we decomposed the overall network into four smaller networks (see figures 3, 4, 5, and 6).

Figure 3 depicts the network of KKE. It appears like a typical wheel-shaped network (Diani 2003: 310-311) with KKE at the central position and all the other organizations connected to it, but it could barely being characterized as a network. In reality all the other groups appearing at figure 3 are frontal organizations of KKE in various sectors (students, farmers, and women) that are fully controlled by the party. Only through PAME and its participation in the administration of some major unions, KKE is networking with other groups in the campaign. Throughout the campaign KKE participated in the majority of LPEs except those initiated by the Indignados. But in any case KKE and PAME have chosen to march separately and at a safe distance from other organizations/groups.
The network of ANTARSYA is much more different than that of KKE. ANTARSYA is actually a coalition of 10 different organizations of the “anti-capitalist, revolutionary, communist left and the radical ecology”. The largest organizations of ANTARSYA are depicted in the frame of figure 4. They form a dense clique structure (Diani 2003: 307-308) since none of these organizations holds a more centralized position or exerts significant influence over the others. ANTARSYA, which was formed in 2009, has ties with the rest extra-parliamentary left organizations. It retains strong ties with the Coordination of grassroots unions while the anti-capitalist coalition has even secured few seats in the administration of some large trade unions. Also, many ANTARSYA activists vividly participated in the Indignados LPEs. Finally, ANTARSYA has only indirect ties with SYRIZA but the two coalitions use to march very close to each other.
SYRIZA was formed in 2004 as a coalition of the parliamentary party of SYNASPISMOS (once more a coalition of the remnants of the euro-communist party, a large fraction of KKE and some ecologists) and some small extraparliamentary political organizations of the left. SYNASPISMOS was always the dominant party of the coalition. Its leader by principle was the chairman of SYRIZA and finally in 2013 and after its great electoral advance SYRIZA was transformed into a unified political party. SYRIZA’s network in 2010-2012 is closer to the clique structure. Unlike KKE this is a much more loose network and in fact is the wider one comparing to those of the other political forces. SYNASPISMOS maintained its central position but all the other groups maintained their independency and participated in the leadership of SYRIZA. SYNASPISMOS youth organization is more radical and is not fully controlled by the party. SYRIZA has a very open alliance strategy to its left and to its right. On the one hand it has established strong ties with social justice groups (DIKTYO), it connects to radical trade unions and has fully embraced the Indignados LPEs. On the other hand it has participated in the administration of GSEE/ADEDY (but not any more after the last GSEE congress) and, mainly, has attracted many defected PASOK MPs and rank and files social-democrats forming the electoral front of SYRIZA/EKM just before the elections of 2012. SYRIZA has a more or less bureaucratic structure but at the same time has ties with less hierarchical and
horizontal organizations and groups, seemingly resembling the Greek version of the mass connective party (March 2011, Spourdalakis 2013).

**Figure 5: SYRIZA-EKM network**

In contrast, among Greek anarchists there is neither an umbrella organization nor even some typical formal organizations. Since they choose to act autonomously rejecting leadership, representative structures and (most of the times) the collaboration with non anarchist organizations of the left, they are generally unable to participate in broader coalitions either on their specific concerns. Consequently, they organize themselves through informal groups and social centers that have produced a typical segmented decentralized network (Diani 2003: 311-312). Some groups are connected to each other while others are acting only at a local level or on their own. Also some groups are hostile towards other anarchists, although some other groups have recently embraced a more collaborative and inclusive political style. Greek anarchists in general are in open confrontation with KKE, which considers them as agents provocateurs. Their relations with the others parties of the Greek left are more peaceful since all sides tolerate each other, and at the big demonstrations anarchists
used to march on their own blocks next to those of SYRIZA and ANTARSYA. As it is expected these groups employed a more confrontational repertoire of action in the anti-austerity LPE’s.

In sum it seems that the Greek anti-austerity campaign consists of 5 different networks: 1) the most concrete, interest based and institutionalized network of the official trade unions of Greece, 2) the concrete and institutionalized network around KKE, 3) the more loose but equally institutionalized network of SYRIZA, 4) the less institutionalized network of political organizations of the extra-parliamentary left, and 5) the loose and non-institutionalized network of anarchist groups.

The co-presence of these separate networks in the mass protest events right from the start of the campaign, and actually in many instances throughout the last decade (Kostopoulos 2010, Kanellopoulos 2012), is making us argue for the evolution of an informal protest coalition. The differences between the various networks, of course, remain. Thus, our aim in what follows is to deconstruct and analyze these differences in order to better comprehend the whole process and its implications in Greek politics and in Greek society.
4. Data and discussion

In table 1 regarding the repertoires of action we followed the classical categorization of social movements literature (Tilly 1978, 2004, Tarrow 1998), distinguishing between conventional forms of action (petitions, demonstrations, strikes etc), disruption (occupations, sit-ins), and violence (damage of property, clashes with the police). The boundaries between these three forms are not stable since a strike may be declared illegal or a peaceful demonstration turn violent. Also some forms of action that today are considered conventional in the past were considered disruptive and in the future this may change again. However, we gave our respondents the opportunity to fill in the sum of the forms they use.

Table 1: Repertoires of action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anarchist groups</th>
<th>ANTARSYA</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYRIZA-EKM</th>
<th>TRADE UNIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conventional</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected the more institutionalized of our networks, trade unions and parliamentary parties have a strong preference for conventional means of action (trade unions 93%, KKE 90%, SYRIZA 86%) while the non-institutionalized networks use conventional means of action to a lesser extent. It is striking though that even the anarchists groups in their everyday activity use conventional means (71%) contrary to image that is usually reproduced by the mainstream media. On the other hand Anarchists and ANTARSYA networks employ the more radical forms of action and raise the more radical political claims confirming hypothesis 1, while SYRIZA and the trade unions raise the more moderate political claims and as logical consequence employ to a lesser extent violent or disruptive forms of action (see table 2).
Nevertheless, hypothesis 1 is not confirmed in the case of KKE. This party uses conventional means of action while raising radical/revolutionary political claims. The same goes for hypothesis 2 too: KKE from an institutionalized position raises radical political claims contrary to both SYRIZA and trade unions, the other institutional networks in our sample, that seem to advocate more moderate claims.

Table 2: Political claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anarchist groups</th>
<th>ANTARSYA</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYRIZA-EKM</th>
<th>TRADE UNIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate/Reformist</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical/Revolutionary</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensive/Reactionary</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We distinguished in table 2 between three broad categories of political claims: the more moderate/reformist (reforms in the Eurozone, loosening of the fiscal policy, reforms in taxation etc), the more radical/revolutionary (nationalization of banks, workers control in production etc), and defensive/reactionary (return to the drachma, abolition of the Memorandum, etc). These distinctions could again be said that are vague but they are based on possible answers that were especially designed to represent the context of the discourse in the public sphere. Thus, all the networks of the anti-austerity campaign seem to be sharing and reflect a common defensive tendency in the Greek society. ANTARSYA and SYRIZA confirm hypothesis 3 (the less institutionalized the more defensive and vise versa) but KKE, the anarchists and the trade unions defy this hypothesis. As it proves in the data the majority of the political claims of all the groups is consisting of “positive” political proposals that could be also termed as moderate or reformist. KKE and the anarchists have a strong preference for radical or revolutionary changes while SYRIZA and the unions express the least radical or revolutionary political claims.
The responses concerning the political claims could be combined with the responses to questions concerning who or what is responsible for the evolution of the crisis (see table 3). There we distinguished between the more concrete/specific causes (EU policies, the banks, the political parties in power, etc) the more general causes that mainly reflect ideological tendencies (capitalism, the political system, the state) or unclear/unspecific (everybody is responsible, a combination of all).

Table 3: Attribution claims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Anarchist groups</th>
<th>ANTARSYA</th>
<th>KKE</th>
<th>SYRIZA-EKM</th>
<th>TRADE UNIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological/General</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete/Specified</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear/Unspecified</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 4 (the more moderate political claims, the more concrete attribution claims) seems to be confirmed. SYRIZA and the trade unions that raise the more moderate political claims also attribute responsibility to more concrete entities. The same goes for KKE and the anarchists from the opposite direction. Only ANTARSYA challenges the validity of the hypothesis 4 since their responses distribute equally among concrete and ideological attribution claims. They both raise radical political claims and attribute responsibility to abstract entities, namely capitalism. Hypothesis 5 that combines the repertoires of action with the attribution of responsibility is once more confirmed in the cases of SYRIZA, the trade unions and the anarchists and defied in the case of KKE.

Looking back to these findings some preliminary conclusions could be drawn regarding some features of the Greek anti-austerity campaign:
• SYRIZA and the trade unions acted in most cases according to expectations. In terms of claims and means of action they have a clear position that is visible and recognizable by the wider public. Thus, it could be argued that SYRIZA was the main beneficiary of the anti-austerity campaign. This proved in both its spectacular advance in the electoral arena and its organizational strengthening. The trade unions didn’t gain in power but their leadership endured the pressure and reestablished its dominant position in the field. Its seems that SYRIZA’s and trade unions moderate attitude towards the EU and their support for the euro helped them to play a central role in the protest campaign.

• ANTARSYA was very active throughout the campaign but its ambivalent positions seem to have downplayed its role in the campaign.

• The anarchists have a more recognizable attitude according in most time to what is expected. They were present in the protest campaign but this was not their primary concern since they pursue a variety of goals through a variety of means.

• KKE is the more problematic case. It has the most organizational strength compared to all the other networks but it didn’t manage throughout the campaign to play a central role. The contradiction between goals and means has probably made KKE unattractive to both the other protest networks and the wider public.

Greeks fiercely reacted to austerity. They didn’t manage to alter the austerity policies or stop the structural adjustment reforms, but they managed to change radically the political system. This change in the political field may function as a precondition for changes in the economic policies. Reactions to austerity were not only and not mainly, defensive. The different networks behind the protest campaign tried also to enact hope to a severely depressed society.
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