

Creating political time: a critical typology to study the combined effects of knowledge and government from a temporal perspective

A comparison of the interpretative possibilities of Foucault and Rancière

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Re-thinking time and politics

In recent scholarship in political theory, the need to elaborate critical accounts of time and politics have been stressed (Chambers 2011, Connolly 2002, 2011, 2013). As Sheldon Wolin writes; “political time has a preservative function...authorities have been charged with preserving bodies, goods, souls, practices and circumscribed ways of life” (Wolin quoted in Connolly 2002: 140). The need to think political temporalities in relation to the ways in which asymmetries of pace and democracy relate, is stressed by William Connolly as central for a tenable theory of “pluralist” democracy (Connolly 2002). This turn to think “radical temporalities”, question the understanding of time (as homogenous, linear, chrono-time) to indicate its differential and multiple character (Chambers 2011: 197). These approaches problematize the theoretical presuppositions of time, but also the ways in which conceptions and organization of time relate to practices of politics and resistance. However, as Chambers argues, it is not enough to simply advance an “alternative” to linear time, instead: “the task of theory must include an understanding of the various temporalities of social formations¹, and must therefore include an explanation of *the work done by and through them.*” (Chambers 2011: 218, emphasis added). This in order to avoid to

¹ The social formation is described as “the relationship between the economic, the social, the political, the cultural”. Chambers 2011: 217.

fall back on an empirical account of time as if time is something which is only “out there”. If time is not an empirical concept, it needs to be related to the social formation within which it is created, and can therefore only be constructed from its *concept*.²

While temporalities of politics and the politics of time have been emphasized now and then in the social sciences, (Rutz 1992, Ekengren 2002, Jacobsson 2009), there have been few attempts to combine a framework that emphasize the need to question dominant ways of organizing and framing time in knowledge, in relation to practices relying on such frameworks, in particular in the development of new governmental programs. By departing from the emphasis above to link a questioning and critique of linear time to a need to consider how time is produced through articulations within a social formation, the paper drafts a typology to consider the creation of political time from articulations of knowledge and government, or, to quote Chambers: “to think the temporalities of the social formation entails the production of concepts of temporality that work to grasp the articulation of the social formation” (Chambers 2011: 217). The typology is drafted by relating Chambers argument to a reading of how Michel Foucault and Jacques Rancière understand the relationship between knowledge and government, and how they have considered this relationship in relation to the topic of time and politics. Foucault and Rancière also provide an interpretative framework for how to interpret the various outcomes of the typology on how time is produced in the articulation of knowledge and government.

The idea of a typology to facilitate working with the temporalities created by the articulation of knowledge and government is part of a dissertation project that

² Samuel Chambers (2011) underscores how Louis Althusser, in *Reading Capital* (1967), conceived the Marxist concept of the “social formation” as a temporalized concept, and that time, from the concept of “social formation”, can be understood as intrinsic to it, and therefore as something emerging from the social formation rather than as something “out there” (homogenous and independently existing). Time is therefore differential and non-empirical (since it exceeds experience), and can only be constructed from its concept. Chambers 2011, p. 207-210.

works with empirical material on how democracy came to be institutionalized and framed in Sweden during the 1990s and early 2000s. In a number of commissions and in an urge in policy oriented political scientific research to “vitalize” democracy, a number of new political temporalities of active citizen participation, deliberation, exclusion, etc. are produced. It is against such a case this text was drafted, even if it also exceeds that specific case.

Creation, regulation and destruction: an argument on a typology to study political time

The proposed typology is meant to facilitate an identification of the temporal-political character of an articulation between knowledge and government from a critical perspective that questions linear or homogenous time. Departing from a multiple, non-homogenous view on time – however one also produced by the social formation – leads to a hypothesis that the articulation between knowledge and government will have both restrictive and productive effects, i.e. its main feature is going to some sort of *creation* of time (even if it means restricting possibilities or processes in time). To simplify the main articulation and dimension of this “creation”, the concept (creation) can be divided into three overlapping tendencies or strategies that characterize it, and that could simplify and structure an interpretative discussion on how the articulation of knowledge and government have temporal-political effects. The first is the *creation* of time as an opening of a new time, a shuttling into the new through the emergence of a new field of intervention or a new consensus or political technique. The second is a *regulation*, as a way of handling the created, or divided time, by a number of institutional or other mechanisms. *Destruction* of time when the creative intervention imposes one time explicitly at the expense of another existing or emerging time. An interpretation for either one of these could for example be a way of arguing why one

dimension of the three practices is more present than the two others. With Foucault and Rancière it is possible to make sense of the material that one has motivated should be, for example, a case of “creation of time”. With Foucault, it could be a matter of an emergence of a field of intervention and the constitution of a knowledge/grid through which new types of governmental techniques can articulate themselves, in turn consolidating this new temporal space. With Rancière, we could motivate a different (not necessarily contradicting) interpretation, that emphasizes how disciplinary knowledge and a hierarchical definition of the common world comes before, and paves the way for, a creative practice of knowledge-government from which a de-politicizing temporality can emerge. To elucidate such possibilities, we have to look closer at how Foucault and Rancière perceive the articulation of knowledge and government.

Knowledge and government: Foucault and Rancière

To review how Rancière and Foucault understand how grids of knowledge, programmes and *savoirs* lend themselves to the demands and evolution of government, and how that relationship in turn constitutes different ways in which time gets shaped, we have to look closer at what Foucault calls the governmentalization of the state and at how Rancière’s arguments for aesthetics differs from Foucault’s focus on power.

In Foucault’s lectures at *College de France*, he conceptualizes how different forms of power emerge in relation to the formation of the modern state, the art of government and a number of sciences, or *savoirs*. By “government”, Foucault is interested in “the *reasoned* way of governing best”, that is, “the level of reflection in the practice of government and on the practice of government” (Foucault 2008: 2, emphasis added). Foucault’s method, and aim, is to show “how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (*dispositif*) of knowledge-power”

(ibid. 19). The aim in this text is, in short, to extend this reflection to how such “couplings” could be studied from how they create political temporalities, and to use Foucault’s and Rancière’s different critical approaches as interpretative frameworks for the outcomes of those “couplings”.

Government and the governmentalization of the state denote how the modern state survived and evolved in a co-constitutive relationship between sciences and practices of power and rule. Foucault traces “government” as to govern men and things, and men in their relations, back to the doctrines of the internal management of the state that used to be called the domain of “the police”. (Foucault 2008: 7) “The police” and the verb “to police” (that was used in the 16-17th Century) is for Foucault a way of making visible how the governmentalization of the state, and the emergence of the modern state, was dependent on a theory of government, or a “political reason” within which a series of problems and attempts to respond to those problems paved the way for an ever more regulated community. The police was, Foucault highlights, the name, in the governmentalization of the state, of an “internal management”; of the “unlimited regulation according to the model of the tight-knit urban organization” (Foucault 2008: 3). In *Omnes et Singulatim* (1979) Foucault claims that writers on politics and the state during the 17th century denoted “the police” a “governmental technology peculiar to the state; domains, techniques, targets where the state intervenes”. (Foucault 1979: 246) The police not only targets people, but also things; “it embraces everything”. He quotes Turquet [one of the theorists of the police] saying that “it branches out into all of the people’s conditions, everything they do or undertake. Its field comprises justice, finance, and the army.” (Foucault quoting Turquet, ibid. 248). Including everything means that men and things are “envisioned as to their relationships: coexistence on a territory; their relationships as to property; what

they produce; what is exchanged on the market... how they live, the diseases and accidents that befall them.” (ibid.) The police “ensures and highlights the state’s vigour”. Foucault summarizes that the police is “the term covering the whole new field in which centralized political and administrative power can intervene.” In the German tradition of “the police” Foucault traces the *Polizeiwissenschaft* as presenting “a grid through which the state, i.e., territory, resources, population, towns, etc. can be observed”, in a combination between statistics (“the description of states”) and the art of government. Foucault concludes that the *Polizeiwissenschaft* is at once “an art of government and a method for the analysis of a population living on a territory” (ibid.). Thus, the police *conditions* a new type of power targeting the relations between men. It is at once individualizing and totalizing. By highlighting the police and the historical analysis of the art of government, Foucault also complicates the notion of resistance, since the police indicate a broader rationalization of power (for Foucault; prisons and the psychiatric institution) that makes the simple denunciation of violence or a critique of the institution less futile. Instead, he advocates a critical scrutiny of the ways in which relations of power are rationalized: *a critique of political rationality at its roots*. (254)

With the emergence of statistics (“the science of the state”) and probability, the art of government could be refined and the category of “the population” and “the economy” could emerge. The introduction and application of economy at “the level of the entire state”, becomes a way of exercising “a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (ibid). It is in this move that “economy” goes from, in the sixteenth century, designating a form of government, to in the eighteenth century come to designate a level of reality, “a field of intervention”. (Foucault 1991: 93) “Political economy” as method thus arose out of

“the networks of continuous and multiple relations between population, territory and wealth” (101). Foucault emphasizes how the state became governmentalized in this process, and that the “power of government” resulted in the formation of, on the one hand, “a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of a whole complex of *savoirs*.” (103). Older power forms, such as the pastoral power, the diplomatic-military power and the *police* (the internal regulation on the model of the urban organization), merged and over-layered in the governmentalization of the state. (104)

What is noteworthy here is the shift to target the population, which leads to the development of a whole range of *savoirs* and techniques, that in turn regulates, produces and impairs temporalities, most notably the very contingency of life itself. Having the population and the economy as main field of intervention, and political economy as method, results in the development of ever more security mechanisms at the heart of government. The grids of knowledge, the techniques and apparatuses, the emergence of fields of interventions and the installations of security mechanism, and the way in which these co-evolve and constitute each other thus indicate a complex set of relations that can be read from how it acts on and in time. To denote the “ensemble” this forms – as a *history* – Foucault coins the term “governmentality”:

The ensemble formed by the institutions’ procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, *which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security*. (102, emphasis added)

Since the population is targeted, and since the individual emerges as entity to be governed and self-governed, the more recent neoliberal governmentality both presupposes the need to for “freedom” and the same “freedom” as the contingency which has to be endlessly targeted by security mechanisms that intervene in all aspects

of life. The contingent, as science, thus opens for an intensified securization (Dillon 2007: 46-47.) In a similar line of argument, inspired by Foucault's concept of governmentality, Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller talks about "programmes of government" as not creating a "governed world", but "a world traversed by the 'will to govern', fuelled by the constant registration of 'failure', the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the constant injunction to do better next time (Rose 2013: 71).

When approaching Rancière on the subject of knowledge/science and government, one first has to note how Rancière draws upon Foucault. Rancière could be said to accept most of Foucault's work and his method, but he reverses Foucault's focus on *power* to start from an end that Foucault "was never interested in" (Rancière 2010: 93), that of *political* subjectivation. Rancière claims that this question does not primarily have to do with power, but is rather a question of a polemic dramaturgy whose constitution is "aesthetic"³ (a configuration of the sense of sense). This "primary aesthetics" that define a common world is a precondition for power and government that must have a number of evident distributions of sensible givens upon which they can articulate themselves. He calls this primary aesthetics a "distribution/division of the sensible" (*partage du sensible*, from now on, DOS). The concept has multiple meanings at once: distribution, division, portioning out, putting in common. Jason E. Smith comments on *partage* as "the term suggests at once what is shared and what is divided, a taking part and a taking apart."⁴ The "sensible" in turn is that which is given

³ Rancière is inspired by "aesthetics" as a concept that breaks the dual framing of knowledge in Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Judgment* and in Friedrich Schiller's *Letters on the aesthetic education of man*. Aesthetics is a third term that breaks the hierarchical duality of knowledge *or* desire as the faculties that can make sense of sensible information. Aesthetic indifference, and the faculty of beauty, de-hierarchizes by ignoring hierarchical divisions structuring sensible experience. Aesthetics becomes, in Rancière's work, the name of an experience that short-cuts hierarchical systems by breaking them open from within in order to display their, and the social order's, contingent or non-necessary character. See Rancière (2002).

⁴ Jacques Rancière, 2012a: 33, footnote 2. See also Samuel A. Chambers, who puts *partage* as: "First,

to the senses as the sense of the sensible (how sense is preconceived by forms that make sense its intelligibility). The concept allows Rancière to think the process of emancipation in an antagonistic relationship to the way in which the social order “puts everyone at its place”. Rancière describes the DOS as:

the system of self-evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it. The distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts. This apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something in common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this distribution. (Rancière 2004: 12)

This DOS problematizes the analyses of power insofar as it indicates a contingency and instability at the foundations of power and its grip on the constitution of community. To Rancière, it is this aesthetics (and the contingency of the social order) that makes communities possibly political, and its configuration depends more on a dramaturgy of representations and ways in which hierarchical logics of this aesthetics are undermined by processes of emancipation and equality. Science and knowledge, art, literature and ways in which words and images are staged together weave different visibilities and intelligibilities in this dramaturgy, they add to the logics of equality and inequality and have these have effects on the DOS. Art and the aesthetic revolution of the 19th century (the possibility of all things becoming Art), as well as literature, open for a de-hierarchization of the DOS, what Rancière calls “dissensus”. Social sciences and political philosophy, by their commitment to “pure” politics tend on the contrary to support and co-constitute the hierarchical DOS Rancière calls – borrowing Foucault’s

the idea of a “cutting-up” points to the multiple senses of partition (of the world) as simultaneously separating and connecting. To put up a partition means to wall off one area from another, but erecting partitions also creates a new space where there was not one before. The partition excludes, and at the same time it makes a new form of participation possible. Secondly, the “cutting-up” in this statement calls attention to sense and the sensible (the “world”); this is a cutting up that determines what can be seen and what can be heard. *Le partage du sensible* determines a certain sort of intelligibility, of what “is” because it is made legible by the *partage*.” Chambers, 2013: 70.

term – “the police”. The police as a principle governing the DOS, is “an order of the visible and the sayable”, “a saturated sensible organization that puts beings together according to a logic of places and identities” (Rancière 2012: 263), fostering an “inegalitarian and consensual distribution of identities” (Fjeld 2015: 1). Rancière opposes the police to the logic of equality, or emancipation, that he calls “politics”, which is a dissensus that is articulated by a political subject. Politics is therefore never external to the police, but always an internal disruption within it, that breaks open the police saturation by the “emergence of an egalitarian political subject that dissensually redistributes the police horizons and distributions” (Ibid., Rancière 1999: 34).

Some features that could be indicative in an interpretative framework from Rancière’s “aesthetic” approach, is how it is structured by “saturation”; in the police account of the common world there can be “no vacuum”. Further, in the police logic, everyone has, or is presupposed to have, its due and there is nothing to add to this saturation of the social order. Rancière also mentions that the police operates by way of *consensus* as a way of securing the saturation; it consensualizes sensual givens by presupposing a total count of the parts and proper names making up community. In consensus everyone is already counted, in a de-conflictualization of any polemic on the social order (in which potentially political problems become matters of “exclusion” that preempt any dissensus). Thus, the police and the discourses supporting it de-eventualizes social reality and the contingency of the social order to evacuate its conflictual nature. For example, social sciences relation to its fields and methods, constitute reality in support of the police logic and makes invisible any alternative to its reign (we shall see below how this works in relation to temporality). Reducing dissensual activity to the police account means cancelling them out, since there is no space or gap, no perception of and no time for that in the police, who cannot see

anything but its own saturated count. (Rancière, 1999). To further elucidate how Rancière considers the relationship between knowledge and government, we shall turn to a couple of arguments by Rancière on “disciplinary thought” that can highlight the way in which disciplinary knowledge and “the police” relate.

The police and disciplinary thought

“Disciplinary thought...must ceaselessly pursue war but pursue it as a pacifying operation.” (Rancière 2006: 9)

Rancière criticizes the social sciences (and philosophy thought as a master discipline) from how they constitute themselves as “scientific” by creating a barrier between their accounts and discourses on the one hand and common language and intelligence on the other hand. As in the police/politics divide, Rancière divides two ways in which knowledge can be accounted for; in an ethical and in an aesthetic way. Rancière calls the ethical understanding of knowledge an understanding of knowledge as either wisdom or ignorance; to *know* or to “misrecognize” (to use Bourdieu’s term). Thus the ethical understanding ascribes knowledge in relation to a distribution of positions.

Rancière recalls that “ethos” original meaning is that of an “abode”, and that its function in relation to knowledge is that of a logic of proper places to which categories of people belong. The ethos, echoing Bourdieu’s work in *La Distinction*, prescribes “the way of being which corresponds to this abode, the way of feeling and thinking which belongs to whoever occupies any given place...the way in which those who belong to a condition must live it.” (Rancière 2006: 4) The social sciences supports the police distribution of the sensible by constituting frames of interpretation of the social world in which there is not much space for aesthetics and for the dissolution of the ethical framework (what Rancière calls “dissensus”), i.e.; the social sciences try to regulate and cancel out the ways in which dissensus creates gaps in relation to the

ethical order (a parallel example could be how political science relates to phenomena like Occupy Wallstreet or the Tahir/Taksim square movements in relation to the concept of democracy). Mirroring the discussion above on the how police and politics can meet, the social sciences operate – with support of their disciplinary-territorial constitution – to reduce social reality, the emergence of subjects, speech, events and temporalities to the framework of the police and to a notion of already existing dues and shares for all conflicts and events. In contrast to this, Rancière polemical interventions highlights the ways in which the *aesthetic* understanding of knowledge blurs the ethical dividing line between two alternatives, by relating “science” to the shared intelligence of telling “stories” of anyone and everyone. Thus, Rancière’s critical operation, by relating the disciplinary thought to their lack of proper foundation, serves to disrupt the distributions and divisions of the hierarchical structuration of the DOS that they weave (Rancière’s critical operations serves to opening the spaces for dissensus.) To roll back the disciplinary machine it is, so Rancière, necessary to “practice a certain ignorance” of the divisions and distributions that make their objects and territory emerge and the delays between agency and meaning, the de-politicizations and senses of incapacity their framework give rise to (Rancière 2006: 9).

The dissensual democracy that Rancière accounts for is a democracy that splits the democracy of the social scientists (and the police) from within; of a demos that is not reducible to the sum of the population, that erupts from within the social order and that tries to verify a principle of equality within the police principle of inequality. Turning to temporality in relation to disciplinary knowledge one can note that these two democracies have different, opposed temporalities. Both need their “time”, but their temporalities are antagonistic since one is at the expense of the other. While

dissensus splits the time of the police and undermines the evidences of the “necessities” linked to time, the different types of historical and social scientific ways of accounting for democracy, organizes the time of democracy to subordinate the “ephemeral” events of the public sphere to the long-term processes that “real” democracy demands.⁵ Thus, sciences structure the DOS in favor of the police principle of saturation and in favor of a “pure” politics, undisturbed by the demos, for a government after the ridding of the demos (“post-democracy”).

Foucault and temporality

Foucault is known to be a theorist of space (with his “heterotopia”), however temporality is clearly at least as central to his work (Couzens Hoy in C.G. Prado et al. 2009). The well-known introduction to *Discipline and Punish* highlights a temporal technique – the detailed temporal schedule of a prison – that displays how the power regime related to punishment shifted character drastically in the early 19th century, from the cruel bodily punishment to the disciplinary techniques of incarceration (Foucault 1995). Foucault’s methodological development reflects a concern as to how “universals” emerge over time and hence how the intervention of thinking and research are to relate to the constitution of “universals” and subjectivations from power regimes *over time*. In *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault describes his method as:

⁵ Rancière takes the example of the history writings of Marc Bloch, for whom History, so Rancière; “is the science of man in time. But this ‘in time’ is in fact an organized distribution of time. It confirms that the true time of the builder is the long time of life which reproduces itself, and not the suspended time of aesthetic experience, and that towards which it makes time deviate: the ‘short’ time, the ‘ephemeral’ time of actors in the public sphere. It functions as an ethical principle of adherence, defining what can be felt and thought by the occupants of a space and a time. The ‘new history’, the history of material life and of mind-sets belongs to the war that sociology is also engaged in.” (Rancière, 2006: 8) This comment reflects a longer critique in *The Names of History* (1992) of the historical sciences de-eventualization and muting of actors of the French Revolution and other events when the people speak without mediation.

Instead of deducing concrete phenomena from universals [state, society, sovereign and subject, etc.], or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals through the grid of these practices.” (Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, 2008: 3)

It is in this genealogical study of the state that Foucault mentions the “power of government” and coins the concept of a “governmentality”. While governmentality has been widely approached and turned into a critical social scientific program (Dean 1999, Rose 2013), its temporal character has nevertheless been overshadowed by the focus on spaces and the presumed effects of disciplinary power, in particular in the study of neoliberalism.⁶ David Couzens Hoy makes an important point on the centrality of temporality in Foucault’s work, not only in his conceptualization of power forms, but also in Foucault’s own critical methodology. The “universals” above, Couzens Hoy notes, “have a temporality” and genealogy is a method that makes visible this temporality. (Couzens Hoy in C.G. Prado et al. 2009: 13). Couzens Hoy quotes Foucault’s “method of critical history” as not positing “a single time in which all events stand”, thus emphasizing a multiplicity of temporalities. In an important quote, Foucault notes that: “History, then, is not a single time span [durée]: it is a multiplicity of time spans that entangle and develop one another. So the old notion of time should be replaced by the notion of multiple time spans” (Foucault quoted by Couzens Hoy in C.G. Prado et al. 2009: 16). Foucault thus opposes the reduction of History to one time span and the reduction of possibilities resulting from it. Couzens Hoy concludes that one, apart from spatial configurations associated with Foucault’s power forms (sovereignty, disciplinary power and biopower), also can think of their different temporalities. A quick look at these spatial and temporal dimensions of the “governmentality” gives a good indication of the importance of Foucault’s account of

⁶ Sam Blinkey (2009) does emphasize the temporalities of subjectivation, but not of the actual governmentality itself.

how spaces and times overlap in this “ensemble”. Spatially, sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, disciplinary power is exercised on the bodies of individuals and security over the whole of a population. Temporally, we can however talk of calculations and principles for how these powers operate: sovereignty “looks backward to the principle that founds its authority”, while both disciplinary power and biopower are “futural” (ibid. 11-12). Disciplinary power hence directs itself on the *future* goal of achieving a self-discipline that will function by itself. The governmental techniques of installing security mechanisms that Foucault emphasizes are also directed to the future, however as negative measures and a matter of calculation of probability, aiming to secure/control an “indefinite series of mobile elements”.

Thus, these temporal strategies overlap each other. They are contrasted to, and challenged by, the processes of what Foucault calls de-subjectivation (the subject’s critical work on its own subjectivity once it has been revealed to be a result of power) that open up the present. This “opening” is then what is central; a contingency that can break the ordered time that is reduced to probability. With Rancière’s words (more below), we could say that “de-subjectivation”⁷ is the practice of building another time in the time of power, or the breaking of a time of undisturbed calculations and effects of power. Foucault is therefore aware of the temporal dimensions of the power regimes and the practices of government that rely upon them as well as the knowledge (*savoir*) that lend its grids to temporal ordering. His critical method and critique of “political rationalities” is then involved in opening for the multiplicity of time as one of the aspects through which the processes of de-subjectivation operate. So while the forms of power are specifically directed to the past and the future in order to reduce and close the present, de-subjectification works on opening the present and reconfiguring the

⁷ In Rancière’s “aesthetic” conception, he calls it “dis-identification”. (Rancière 1999: 36)

forms of power to re-direct possible outcomes. This “expansion of the present” is further developed by Rancière, even if with different terms.

Apart from how the elements of governmentality relate to time in terms of past, present and future, one can reflect upon how it *creates* time through its effects, either in the shape of an actual emergence of a temporality, or in the regulation of a homogenized time (for example, the time of the political and “participation” as framed by electoral cycles or by representative democracy), or even in the destruction of time. The destruction of time would then be the destruction of the emergence of possibilities linked to constitutive processes, for example through the futural strategies of disciplining, or through the preemptive strategies of security mechanisms.⁸ Again, creation, regulation and destruction are inseparable, since all are produced by one another. The concept of creation could be said to be the central concept here, since time will always be produced in one way or another. Destruction and regulation could be motivated from the fact that one of these dimensions is more directly the goal of an intervention. The creation of time in turn could be interpreted to come about through demands on knowledge for the development of governmental interventions.

If we understand time, as Chambers argues, as intrinsic to the social formation (produced through it), we can expand the relation between the governmentality and its target, the population, as an attempt to produce a set of temporalities in which the temporal co-constitution of the population can be controlled, or hazards posed by it be minimized. In temporal terms; targeting the population, disciplinary power and security mechanisms all serve to grow one type of time (controlled, secured, where danger is minimized, active or passive, etc.) at the expense of another, contingent or

⁸ For a further elaborated argument on the destruction of time in relation to preemption, see Brian Massumi’s *Ontopower: War, Power and the State of Perception* (Duke University Press: 2015)

problematic time. Subjectivation could then be understood as a way of capturing people in the grids of temporalities (the example above from the disciplinary techniques of the prison in *Discipline and Punish* is an extreme example). The social formation thus produces time, but equally, one could say that the contingency of life, and even of non-human agency, co-produces time.⁹ The point here is not to discuss which of these overlapping arguments for a co-produced time that is most feasible, but to point to the fact that the governmentality, and biopower, takes these “contingencies” as a point of departure to articulate themselves, ahead of eventualities (Dillon 2006). From Foucault’s focus on calculations of power and temporal grids, we can now turn to Rancière’s dramaturgy-approach and a different conception of how homogenous time is split open.

Rancière and temporality

Rancière has worked more explicitly with the ways in which the homogenization and framing of time disempowers people and de-politicizes the possibilities of time. He has opposed these operations with a thinking of the moment as a space of possibility, and how dissensual times are created through gaps in the dominant time. In his quasi-polemical way, Rancière has intervened into the ways in which the time after the Cold War has been framed as a time of the “End” of the promises of history, making time into a principle of interdiction and necessity that has superseded a notion of time as a horizon for possible emancipation (Rancière 1999, Rancière 2010, Rancière 2012, Rancière 2014). Here, Rancière’s way of relating his arguments about a DOS to how time is ordered and re-appropriated is going to be developed in relation the proposed typology.

⁹ For more on this, see Jane Bennett *Vibrant Matter* (Durham: 2010) and William Connolly, *A World of Becoming* (Durham: 2011).

As for the DOS, Rancière claims that there is dominant, hierarchical time of domination. This time comes about through a number of operations, such as by the divisions of time, its framing and its regulation. When time is divided and regulated, and when it is framed narratively, possibilities for making time coincide or not are created for those institutions that “make the coincidence and non-coincidence of times their own affair” (Rancière 2012: 23). The outcome, the hierarchical, “rational time of necessity” is constructed as a number of confirmations and coincidences between the empirical time of the lives of individuals and the processes of domination. He takes “globalization” as a concept that fictionalizes such a necessity; a concept that in itself serves as a framework to construct a fictionalized coincidence of a coincidence between individual time and the global time of capital. Constructing a time of necessity is therefore also to de-construct any – to that time – possibly antagonistic time, that could construct a different set of possibilities and fictionalized frames of time. Seen in this light, regulation of time is constituted by three procedures according to Rancière; first, there is a division of time, second an organization of an imaginary convergence of time, and third a construction of divergences of time, that separates times and creates inertias between events and their interpretations. Through this regulation, “normal”, hierarchical time is structured so as to confirm an incapacity of those inhabiting it, being forced to adhere to the dominant ways in which its possibilities are regulated (either time is not ripe, or its already too late). This time is structured by the pedagogicization as the naturalized way of understanding collective and individual possibilities of time; “the time of the education processes of individuals and societies which is the endless reproduction of their renewed incapacity in the name of knowledge itself and the promised equality during the term of this path”¹⁰ (Rancière

¹⁰ For a longer reading of this institutionalized “stultification”, see Rancière 1991.

2014: 15).

Rancière opposes this time to the practice of “distensions and breaks in that temporality”, dissensual times in the forms of intervals and interruptions that can be turned into ways of inventing different times and capacities. If the dominant time and its institutions organizes a fictional convergence and divergence of times (of the relations between education, job markets, unemployment, re-education, political cycles, etc.), the dissensual time erupting in it, displays that “there are several times in one time”, and that, “there is no global process subjecting all the rhythms of individual and collective time to its rule” (ibid.). For example, the division of time is always a possibility for re-division from within those subjected to it, fictionalizing and constructing a different time in time; i.e. a different way of linking the experience of time to its possibilities. Emancipation from the disempowering dominant models for framing time is here done by way of “re-appropriations of time”, constructing a time of emancipation in the time of domination, a different time in “time” (ibid. 28). The “re-appropriation of time” works by avoiding being caught up by the ways in which dominant time is constructed to cancel out the “power of the moment”. This is done by the production of “gaps” in the saturated, homogenized time, as a way of articulating a power of emancipation that turn “delays”, ruptures and holes (unemployment, “exclusion”, etc.) in time into moments for recovering capacities and possibilities, that in the dominant time are identified with moments of ignorance and incapacity:

Time is divided from within by way of recovering these moments. Each of these moments is at once the point where the reproduction of the division of time passes and the point of a possible gap [écart], of a possible re-division. The moment is the productive power of another time. Which means that time is not a long duration that is opposed to the ephemerality of the moment, but on the contrary, it is the expansion of the power of the moment, which is to say, the redistribution of the weights on the scale of destinies. (Rancière, 2014: 15)

This “aesthetic” interpretation opposes the idea of a duality (passive/active), by thinking a spatialization of time, as a split (a third term, reflecting the argument on aesthetic knowledge above), that complicates the ordered idea of what time can make possible and not. It is a time of equality insofar as it undermines the hierarchical evidences that structure and turn time into a principle of impossibility (ibid.).

Turning to the consensual operations of the police, we can note that consensus and the consensualization of time also has a temporality, since it works by the *presupposition* of a total count of parts and positions of the community and the *presupposition* of a time in which nothing can become or emerge. The consensual emphasis on “exclusion” as a presupposed inclusionary count, that encloses everything, is “futural” in the same sense as Foucault’s disciplinary power and biopower. Similar to Foucault then, we can see how Rancière stresses the opening of the present and the power of resisting disempowerment. However, reflecting the discussion on power/aesthetics above, Rancière conceives of the breaking of dominant time as a breaking of the ways in which it is framed and fictionalized, i.e. as a *subversion* of the configuration of homogenous time itself, and not in terms of power/resistance, even if their view on time is easier to reconcile than that on their different understandings of “politics”, since a de-subjectivation and emancipation here could be thought as overlapping.

If we consider the proposed view of the typology, that time is *created*, one has to complicate Rancière’s framework a bit. Even if Rancière states that there are several times in one time, he does seem to rely on a notion of a “time out there” that becomes appropriated by the forces of domination and that dissensus needs to break up into

several times, meaning several openings for the construction of other possibilities.¹¹ Even if dissensus works as sort of short-circuit of the dominant time, it could also be thought of as actually creative, opening time to a series of disruptive flowerings.¹² If one adds the dimension of time being created to Rancière's arguments, can interpret the three practices of the typology from the contingency that the dominant time tries to make invisible. The first dimension, the creation of time, is therefore equally present in the dominant as in the dissensual time, whereas the regulation of time is part of the consolidation of the dominant time (the constructions of its evident, necessary nature). The *destruction* of time could be on either side, even if it seems more accurate to put it on the side of the hierarchical reduction of the possibilities of time of the dominant time (destruction, subversion or short-circuiting in the dissensual sense is rather *creative*, as an opening of another time in a time that was constructed so as to avoid any such eruption). Destruction of time as the imposition of the lone possible of the management of historical necessity in the dominant time could then be interpreted as the active undoing of emerging, multiplying times in a practice that confirm its own, homogenous and hierarchical principle. The pedagogization of individual and social time and its imposition of structural delays could in this sense both be understood as a regulation of time and a as a form of destruction of time.

To return to contingency, each of these moves, while aiming at constructing a sense of time as a principle of interdiction, in turn create a number of new conditions that can create new possibilities for disruption. Importantly then, as reflected in the quote above by Rose & Miller on the "will to govern", the knowledge-government creation/regulation/destruction of time could in this light be seen as an imperfect, perpetually failing activity that can never entirely rid itself from the contingency it

¹¹ I owe this well put point to Samuel Chambers, who commented on an earlier version of this draft.

¹² Which would then come closer to a more ontologically oriented approach as that advanced by William Connolly (2011), (2013)

wants to control – and sometimes even make it worse. The homogenization of time is then another name for making of time into a non-evental, linear space in which things – events, unexpected irruptions, the hypotheses of equality – are presupposed not to occur and whose presence among us – in time – are made invisible, or appear as absurdities and mistakes.

Conclusions: interpretative possibilities with Foucault and Rancière

The proposition of a typology to makes sense of how the articulation of knowledge and government both regulate, etc. time and pushes it into a number of new times was done on the basis of the argument that a critical approach to homogenous time cannot rest with falling back on an idea of time as “out there”. Instead, time has to be conceived of as co-produced by the social formation. Here, the articulation of knowledge and government was proposed as one site to study how such times emerges and how a politics of time is played out between the calculations of government and grids of knowledge and the ways in which this time is broken down and turned into multiple times that grow other outcomes. With Foucault and Rancière and the focus on power and the DOS, we could highlight several interpretative possibilities of the ways in which dominant time is structured and created, as well as how operations constructing it fail, how it is undermined and how to think of its contradictory relationship to contingency. It remains to be seen if the typology can function as a practical tool to make visible the contradictory and overlapping features of how control, contingency, power and the creation of a sense of im/possibility relate in the more recent ways in which knowledge and government are articulated.

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