

## **Angry, anxious, and populist? – The affective dynamics of populist party support**

Abstract: Is there a special relationship between emotions and populism? Academic and popular discussions of populism frequently suggest that this is the case, and that anger and anxiety in particular, are crucial explanatory factors for the continued appeal of populist parties. But despite the often-positing link between negative emotions and populism, few studies have explored this relationship empirically.

This paper aims to fill this gap and answer three related questions: Firstly, to what extent is the relationship between negative affect and populist party support unique to these parties and do we observe differences between left and right-wing populism? Secondly, what is the temporal relationship between affect and populism? Do voters support populist parties because they are anxious or does support for these parties create these negative emotions? And finally, are populists angry, scared, or both? In other words, to what extent do we need to distinguish between specific types of negative affect, such as anger and anxiety, when discussing the emotional underpinnings of populism?

Comparing panel data from Austria and Germany, this paper investigates the relationship between anger and anxiety on the one hand, and support for populist parties on the other. Using a random-intercept, autoregressive cross-lagged design, the paper has three findings.

First of all, the reinforcing pattern of increased negative emotions and increased party support is unique to (right-wing) populists. Secondly, this relationship is self-reinforcing. While negative affect leads to greater support for right wing populist parties, the reverse relationship is more consistent and of larger magnitude. Negative emotions trigger populist support, but they are more important for maintaining it. Finally, it is important to distinguish between anger and anxiety. While only anxiety is consistent in its ability to trigger populist support, subsequently both anger and anxiety are increased.

## INTRODUCTION

Emotions are at the heart of populism. As populist parties gain prominence across Western Democracies, popular commentary and academic discourse alike have highlighted the affinity between negative affect and populist politics. Voters' anger at elites and outsiders for their real, or imagined, loss of social and economic security is a powerful kindling for the resentment-fueled, anti-elite politics of populist parties. Moreover, the appeal of populism lies at least in part in its ability to validate voters' anxiety that they are economically and socially left behind by distant elites and an increasingly heterogenous lifeworld (Bonikowski, 2017; Salmela and von Scheve, 2017; Schmuck and Matthes, 2017).

Moreover, as populists have become more successful, questions have emerged to what extent their emotional political style will influence the perception and behaviors of voters (Hameleers, Bos and de Vreese, 2016; Hobolt and Tilley, 2016) and parties (Rydgren, 2005; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018). Indeed, there is a growing concern that populist discourses either create or amplify existing anxieties, which in turn is leveraged to stoke anger at elites and outsiders alike. Understanding the link between populism and emotions could therefore provide not only important insights into the activation of populist attitudes (Hawkins, Kaltwasser and Andreadis, 2018), it could also illuminate a crucial mechanism for the way in which populist parties maintain support over time.

However, despite the often-asserted link between emotions and populism, there is surprisingly little empirical research on the relationship between the two. To what extent is the link between negative emotions and party support actually unique to populist parties? Moreover, with some recent exceptions<sup>1</sup> much of the literature on emotions and populism is limited in several important ways. First of all, most studies treat all forms of negative affect as interchangeable. However, insights from political and social psychology suggest that different negative emotions, such as anger or anxiety, differ both in their antecedents and in their downstream cognitive effects. Secondly, there are few studies that explicitly model the temporal dynamics of affect and

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<sup>1</sup> See for example Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza (2017) or Berning and Schlueter (2016)

populism. In other words, is it voters' negative emotions that drive support for populists, does support for populists increase negative emotions, or is there a recursive feedback loop between affect and populist support? Finally, there are no papers that simultaneously differentiate between different forms of negative affect and consider the temporal dynamics.

This paper aims to fill these gaps. Using panel data from Austria and Germany, I investigate the temporal dynamics between anger, anxiety, and support for populist parties. Using autoregressive, cross-lagged panel models, the paper has two key findings. Firstly, support for right-wing populists is uniquely associated with negative emotions. Unlike support for traditional center-right parties, left-wing populist or far-right parties, only support for right-wing populists is associated with higher levels of anger and anxiety in politics and in everyday life. Secondly, although negative affect is associated with increased support for right-wing populist parties, contrary to received wisdom, negative emotions are more important for the maintenance of populist party support than for their initial activation.

As such, the paper makes two important contributions: First of all, by explicitly modeling the dynamic relationship between negative emotions and populism, the paper offers a more comprehensive account of how support for populists is activated and maintained overtime, and how right-wing populists can mobilize spontaneous yet durable electoral support. Secondly, the paper adds to the growing literature on emotions in politics more generally, and on the causes and effects of anger and anxiety in particular.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section will briefly review the literature on the meaning of populism and highlight how existing explanations of populist support can be supplemented with a more explicit focus on emotional dynamics, especially with regards to the activation and maintenance of populist attitudes. I then draw on affect-appraisal theory to outline why distinguishing between anger and anxiety is both theoretically and empirically necessary, particularly when discussing the relationship between emotions and populism. Additionally, I combine the literature on determinants of populist support and populist communication to show that closer attention needs to be paid to the temporal ordering of affect and support for populist parties, since there are persuasive arguments to be made for both possible directions. After introducing the logic and interpretation of cross-lagged, autoregressive

panel models, I present two studies that test the relationship between anger, anxiety, and support for populists empirically. Study 1 uses Austrian election panel data (AUTNES) to model how support for the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and respondents' emotion interact with one another over the course of the election, comparing it to support for the center-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP). Study 2 expands this comparison using the German socio-economic panel (SOEP) to also explore how the affective dynamics surrounding support for the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) differ from support for left-wing populist and extreme far-right parties.

## DETERMINANTS OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM

Populist parties have successfully established themselves in most Western and Central European countries (Rydgren, 2005, 2007; Taggart, 2017), which has led not only to an ongoing debate about the precise nature of populism, but also raised the question how this seemingly sudden emergence can be explained. However, particularly on the demand side, most of the existing work has focused on structural or attitudinal factors (Kehrberg, 2015; Niedermayer and Hofrichter, 2016; Lengfeld, 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018), whose relative stability make it difficult to explain their sudden political "activation" (Bonikowski, 2017; Hawkins, Kaltwasser and Andreadis, 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018).

What exactly is populism? Although the label "populist" has been applied widely, its specific meaning remains contested in the literature. However, most scholars now agree that populism consists of an ideational element that presupposes the presence of a homogenous in-group of "a common people" (Hawkins, 2009; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, 2013; Taggart, 2017). Moreover, the common people are placed in direct antagonism to a corrupt or removed elite, which is either unwilling or unable to represent the interests of the 'ordinary person on the street' (Grimm, 2015; Taggart, 2017).

While distrust of political elites and a focus on "the people" unifies all forms of populism, scholars also distinguish between left and right-wing populism. Right-wing populism extends this conflict to also include an out-group of "others" that threaten the unity of the people (Mudde

and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). In other words, the people are not only oppressed by an elite “above them”, but also threatened, either economically or culturally, by a group of ‘impure’ outsiders, which in the European context often consists of immigrants and ethnic minorities (Swank, 2003; Derks, 2004).

Which factors draw voters towards populist parties? At the individual level, explanations have traditionally focused on socio-economic, and more recently on attitudinal drivers. Structurally, supporters of populists are expected to be less educated, working class, male, and at greater risk of unemployment (Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). Especially with regards to supporters for right-wing populist parties, this “losers of globalization” thesis implicitly argues voters channel their anxiety and anger over their disadvantaged position into a rejection of cosmopolitan elites and immigration alike. While debates are ongoing whether this backlash is primarily driven by economic insecurity, or simply a cultural backlash against the perceived loss of privilege, the empirical support for the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and populism remains mixed at best (Knigge, 1998; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Lengfeld, 2017; Rooduijn, 2017; Stockemer, Lentz and Mayer, 2018).

A more promising approach focuses on voters’ populist attitudes (Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, 2014; Hawkins, Kaltwasser and Andreadis, 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). This approach highlights that parts of the electorate are drawn to populist parties because they have a fundamentally populist conception of democracy and politics. This set of populist attitudes is orthogonal to the traditional left-right political spectrum and, when sufficiently developed, may even lead voters to support parties at odds with their own policy preferences (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). But while voters’ populist attitudes are clearly important, they are also contingent on political and ideological context (Kessler and Freeman, 2005; Rooduijn, 2017), and only become salient when political conditions (Hawkins, Kaltwasser, and Andreadis 2018) or personal experiences (Agerberg, 2017) make them relevant. Taking into account voters’ emotions in turn provides an important theoretical basis for understanding the mechanisms that activate and sustains these attitudes in the first place (Banks, 2016; Magni, 2017; Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017).

## ANGER, ANXIETY, AND THE ACTIVATION AND MAINTENANCE OF POPULIST PARTY SUPPORT

Focusing on affect is therefore not only an important component of understanding political behavior in general (Marcus, 2000; Redlawsk, 2006; Neuman *et al.*, 2007), it also seems inexorably linked to theories of populist support (Demertzis, 2006; Seawright, 2012; Spruyt, Keppens and Van Droogenbroeck, 2016; Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017; Salmela and von Scheve, 2017). But while a relationship between (negative) emotions and populism seems almost self-evident, untangling the dynamic and potentially recursive relationship between affect and populist support highlights three important questions: To what extent is the relationship between negative affect and party support unique to populist parties, and similarly, do we see differences between left-wing and right-wing populism? Secondly, to what extent do we need to differentiate between different forms of negative affect? Are populist supporters primarily angry, anxious, or both? And finally, what is the exact temporal ordering in the relationship of populism and affect? In other words, do anger and anxiety increase the probability of subsequently supporting populists, or is it the very support of these parties that makes citizens more anxious and angry?

### Anger, Anxiety, and the activation of (right-wing) populist support

Although the relationship between negative emotions and support for populist parties has become part of received wisdom, there is growing evidence that not all forms of negative affect matter equally. At its most basic, emotions matter because they change individuals' cognitive processes, and thus the ways in which they interpret, remember, and react to social reality.<sup>2</sup> In political science, most research has focused on emotional valence and its associated cognitive patterns (G. Marcus 2000; Neuman et al. 2007; Redlawsk 2006). However, more recent studies have shown that different emotions do not only carry a positive or negative valence, they also

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<sup>2</sup> Although some scholars do differentiate between affect, mood, and emotion, I follow Neuman et al. (2007) and use affect and emotion interchangeably.

correspond to different “appraisal tendencies”. These appraisal tendencies are “relatively automatic processes that guide subsequent perceptions and judgements” (Lerner *et al.*, 2003) (pg.489). Unlike the purely valence-oriented literature, affect appraisal theory contests that even two emotions that carry a negative valence can be triggered for different reasons, may lead to different appraisal tendencies, and thus influence cognition and judgement in divergent ways (Ellsworth and Smith, 1988; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Petersen, 2010). The appraisal tendencies of anger and anxiety, the two emotions most frequently associated with populism, are particularly different, so distinguishing between them is especially important. Indeed, at least in the context of left-wing populism and Spanish politics, it appears to be anger, rather than anxiety, that drives populist attitudes and party support (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017).

Anxiety evolved as an evolutionary response to novel threats (Marcus and MacKuen, 1993; Petersen, 2010). As such, anxiety is associated with reduced certainty and prompts individuals to seek out new information (Valentino *et al.*, 2008). Thus prompted to reevaluate previously held beliefs and habits (Weeks, 2015), anxiety can play an important role in triggering “political awakenings” (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008), since it provides an opening to change previously held political attitudes and party preferences.

Indeed, there is growing evidence that connect anxiety and greater support of, particularly right-wing, populist parties. Gadarian and Albertson (2014), find that when primed with anxiety, individuals are not only more likely to seek out more information in general, they are particularly likely to consume more negative and fearful news about immigrants. It is therefore not surprising that anxiety has also been linked to stronger anti-immigrant attitudes (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). Similarly, anxiety is also associated with greater incidents of conspiratorial thinking and anti-elite attitudes (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2013). Finally, anxiety may be especially important for right-wing authoritarianism since it is also associated with an increase in authoritarianism (Vasilopoulos, Marcus and Foucault, 2018). In short, anxiety not only provides the cognitive context for a reevaluation of ones’ prior political beliefs, it can also trigger more authoritarian, anti-elite, and anti-outsider attitudes, which in turn are precisely the kind of attitudes that drive support for right-wing populists.

Anxieties association with greater uncertainty, however, could also lead to increased political withdrawal and reduced responsibility attribution (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Petersen, 2010; Weeks, 2015). Mobilizing voters to support party-system outsiders, however, requires not only a greater appetite for risk (Seawright, 2012), it also frequently involves the assignment of blame (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Petersen, 2010). Anger has therefore been highlighted as an important alternative source of populist support. The notion of the “Wutbürger ” or the “angry white men” (Ford and Goodwin, 2010), citizens whose (excessive) anger drives them to reject “politics as usual” have become a common trope in the description of populist voters. This is not surprising, given how many of the appraisal patterns associated with anger could both increase populist support, and be increased by populist messages.

Anger, unlike anxiety, evolved as a moral emotion that is primarily concerned with rendering moral judgement (Petersen, 2010). Specifically, it plays an important role in managing violations of social norms and is much more explicitly concerned with establishing responsibility and culpability and generating an impetus to punish rule violators. As such, anger is associated with perceptions of greater control, intentionality, and responsibility (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Petersen, 2010). Once rule violations have been detected, anger also provides the motivation to punish perpetrators, leading to a greater willingness to take risks and a greater willingness to rely on heuristics (Lerner *et al.*, 2003; Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Small and Lerner, 2008; Weeks, 2015).

The appraisal patterns of anger, in turn, could play an important role in triggering and sustaining support for populist parties. Most fundamentally, anger not only increases the perceived responsibility of existing political elites, it also motivates voters to punish them, making anti-elite attitudes more salient. For example, in the context of Spanish left-wing populism, anger over austerity and the financial crisis are the primary emotion associated with support for Podemos (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017).

However, right-wing populism may be even more closely associated with anger. As a moral emotion, anger's desire to punish rule violators also increases authoritarianism (Milburn, Niwa and Patterson, 2014; Vasilopoulos, Marcus and Foucault, 2018), which in turn has been linked to greater support for right-wing populists (Bakker, Rooduijn and Schumacher, 2016). The reduced



depth of processing associated with anger also increases reliance on group cues and heuristics (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Valentino *et al.*, 2008). As such, it is not surprising that anger has been found to trigger more partisan processing of information (Weeks, 2015), and to activate ethnocentrism and group-threat (Banks, 2016). Greater ethno-centrism and external-group threat in turn are a key predictor of populist attitudes and support for populist parties (Dunn, 2015; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018)

### From Populist Support to Negative Affect

While anxiety and anger might activate populist support for populist parties in general, and right-wing populists in particular, the downstream affective impact of this support could also play an important role in sustaining support. Populist parties are particularly prone to employ emotionalizing language, focused on stoking outrage over distant and corrupt elites (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007; Hamелеers, Bos and de Vreese, 2016). Additionally, right-wing populist party positions are often deliberately targeted at excluding “outsiders” (Wirz *et al.*, 2018). As voters increase their support and become more receptive to party discourses and platforms, they are also more likely to internalize both the affect and the political attitudes of populists. Taking a more dynamic perspective therefore not only helps rule out potential reverse-causality, it also provides a more comprehensive model for the ways in which populist support is maintained over time.

Greater support for populist parties also implies a greater receptiveness to their messages and ideas. While I have defined populism as an ideational lens that separates the world into an “us” and a “them”, such a worldview also corresponds to a particular, more emotional, style of discourse and communication (Moffitt and Tormey, 2014). Populist communication is more explicitly focused on “the people” (Hawkins, 2009), placing blame on political elites and, in the case of right-wing populists, protecting against outside threat (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). It is also more simplistic and thus memorable (Bischof and Senninger, 2018), and amplified by traditional media, tends to garner more attention (Koopmans and Muis, 2009).

Populist communication focuses on blame attribution, thus increasing voters’ anger, and threat, which could further increase anxiety. In light of this focus on external threat and blame attribution, it is not surprising that the effects of populist communication are associated with

increased negative affect (Wirz *et al.*, 2018) in general, and higher levels of anger and anxiety in particular. The emotionalized blame attribution of populist communication increases anger and populist attitudes, especially for those voters who do not have strong prior attachments (Hameleers, Bos and de Vreese, 2016, 2018). Similarly, right-wing populist communication increases anxiety, especially with regards to immigrants (Schmuck and Matthes, 2017).

Beyond the direct effects of populist communication, closer association with populists could also increase negative affect because of an alignment of ones' own political attitudes with those of the party, and because of greater interest and engagement with politics. Party affiliations, like other forms of group attachment, often create an alignment effect, where group members adjust their own perceptions and attitudes to be more in line with attitudes held in the group. Populists create clear narratives and identities. But while this clarity can enhance engagement and interest in politics (Marx and Nguyen, 2018), the dominant narrative of lacking responsiveness should also trigger anger. Moreover, while support for one party also creates greater political interest and engagement, higher engagement also leads to more emotional responses to politics (Miller, 2011).

In short, while anger and/or anxiety could drive voters to become more supportive of populists, greater support could also lead them to be angrier and more anxious. Moreover, given the particular association between negative affect and right-wing populism, I expect these relationships to be stronger for right-wing populist parties.

## METHOD – AUTOREGRESSIVE CROSS-LAGGED MODELS

I have argued that the relationship between emotions and populism is likely going to be dynamic. Differentiating between the directional hypotheses outlined above therefore requires a model that can estimate the sequential order of voters' affect and their support for populist parties simultaneously. To adequately model the possibility of a bidirectional relationship between affect and populism, this paper uses a cross-lagged panel (CLP) model with respondent-level random intercepts. CLP models use structural equation modeling to simultaneously estimate the relationship between two or more variables over time, taking into account both the overtime dynamics within each variable, and the relationship between them. While more common in psychology, this approach has been used in political science to, among many other things, model

the relationship between media use and political interest (Strömbäck and Shehata, 2010), the interaction between party preferences and party performance evaluations (Evans and Chzhen, 2016), and most pertinently for this study, the dynamics of support for radical-right political parties and perceived group-threat of foreigners and immigrants (Berning and Schlueter, 2016).

*Equation 1: Autoregressive, cross-lagged panel model for populist support, anger, and anxiety*

$$\text{populist support}_{it} = \eta_t * \text{populist support}_{i,t-1} + \epsilon_t * \text{anger}_{i,t-1} + \zeta_t * \text{anxiety}_{i,t-1} + v_{it}$$

$$\text{anger}_{it} = \alpha_t * \text{anger}_{i,t-1} + \beta_t * \text{anxiety}_{i,t-1} + \iota_t * \text{populist support}_{i,t-1} + u_{it}$$


$$\text{anxiety}_{it} = \delta_t * \text{anxiety}_{i,t-1} + \gamma_t * \text{anger}_{i,t-1} + \kappa_t * \text{populist support}_{i,t-1} + \rho_{it}$$

The traditional CLP model, however, may exhibit bias in cross-lagged regression results if the stability of the measured constructs is trait-like and time invariant (Hamaker, Kuiper and Grasman, 2015). Given strong evidence that both emotional predispositions and support for populist parties are, at least in part, based on largely stable personality traits (Bakker, Rooduijn and Schumacher, 2016), this assumption is likely violated in the present study. To address this issue, all models also include a random-intercept component, calculating the within-person mean for each respondent's level of anger, anxiety, and populist support. This approach introduces the logic of multi-level modeling into the structural equation framework and allows for a more explicit modeling of the variance at both the within-person and the between-person level.

An additional benefit of this technique is the added ease of interpreting the model results. Like traditional CLP models, two types of coefficients are estimated: Stability effects ( $\eta_t, \alpha_t, \delta_t$ ) and cross-lagged effects ( $\epsilon_t, \zeta_t, \beta_t, \iota_t, \gamma_t, \kappa_t$ ), demonstrated graphically in Figure 1 and mathematically in Equation 1. Unlike traditional CLP approaches, however, coefficient in the random-intercept models represent an individual's temporal deviation from their expected mean scores, rather than overall group means. This implies that coefficient estimates now represent the within-person, carry-over effect, where a cross lagged parameter now indicates “the degree by which deviations from an individuals expected score [on a given variable] can be predicted from preceding deviations from ones expected score [of a different variable], also accounting for individual-differences and wave-to-wave group differences (Hamaker, Kuiper and Grasman,

2015). Moreover, this approach is similar to a change score or within-effects pooled model, and thus automatically controls for unobserved, invariant respondent traits.

*Figure 1: Simplified cross-lagged, autoregressive model between anger, anxiety, and support for populist parties.*



*Note: Simplified generalized model of anger, anxiety and populist party support in a cross-lagged, autoregressive panel setting. Covariances and paths between anger and anxiety have been omitted to improve legibility*

In simpler terms: The cross-lagged coefficients can tell us, for example, how elevated levels of anger at T1 increases a respondent’s support for populist parties at T2, while controlling for their general propensity to be angry or support populist parties and the direct effect of an increase in populist party support at time T1. If the cross-lagged coefficient between anger and populist support  $\epsilon_t$  is positive and significant, it implies that an individual who is angrier than they normally are at time T1 will also subsequently evaluate populist parties more positively than they normally would. Conversely, a positive and significant effect between populist support and anger ( $\iota_t$ ) indicates that becoming more supportive of a populist party at time T1 will correspond with higher levels of anger at time T2. If both relationships are statistically significant, it is additionally possible to compare effect sizes to assess their relative impact. To facilitate this comparison, all variables have been standardized by mean-centering them and dividing them by twice their standard deviation (Gelman, 2008)

## STUDY 1: AUSTRIA

Right-wing populism has long, if intermittent, history of electoral success in Austria (Luther, 2003; McGann and Kitschelt, 2005). The 2017 national election is no exception, with the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) gaining 26% of the vote. Moreover, the FPÖ leveraged this electoral success to form a coalition with the center-right Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), serving as the junior partner in the current Austrian government. As such, Austria serves as an important case for the study of affect and right-wing populist support. Given its relatively established nature and its electoral success, FPÖ supporters should be less driven to be angry or anxious because of (perceived) lack of political representation or electoral underperformance. Moreover, since the ÖVP has mirrored many of the policy positions of the FPÖ (Wodak, 2018), comparing the affective dynamics of FPÖ and ÖVP support reduces the confounding impact of party platforms and policy positions, and instead focuses on the ideational differences between the populist right and traditional conservative politics.

### Data

Study 1 uses the Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES), a six-wave longitudinal panel collected during the 2017 national election. The survey is representative panel of Austrian citizens age 16 and above who were eligible to vote on election day. Quote-sampling was used to create a closer overlap with Austrian census data. The relevant survey questions were collected in four, bi-monthly waves from June 2017 (Wave 1) to October 2017 (Wave 4), creating a panel structure with relatively short time-lags between waves. After accounting for item-nonresponse and panel attrition, 2292 respondents remained in the study

Party support is measured through respondents' self-reported probability of voting for a party in the upcoming election on a scale of 0 (highly unlikely) to 10 (very likely). Support for right-wing populists is measured through support for the FPÖ, while support for the center-right ÖVP serves as a reference category to establish to what extent this effect is unique to (right-wing)

populist parties.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, since there is no competitive left-wing populist party in Austria, a comparison to left-wing populism is not possible.

To measure voters' negative affect, AUTNES asks respondents to what degree they feel anxious or annoyed when thinking about the current political situation in Austria, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much). Although these items are linked to political evaluations, they provide considerable leeway about the precise source of anxiety or the specific targets of respondents' anger, allowing for a relatively general test of the relationship between populist party support and respondent affect.<sup>4</sup>

RI-CLMP models automatically control for time-invariant respondent characteristics (Hamaker, Kuiper and Grasman, 2015), such as age, gender, educational status, as well as stable personality traits or political attitudes. Given the shorter timeframe of the panel, time variant in respondents' employment status, income, or relationship status were relatively infrequent and were not recorded across survey waves. However, insofar as they affect either respondents affect or political preferences, the models will reflect them as exogenous shocks. All reported models therefore only use respondents' affect and party support.

## Results

Is there a unique link between (right-wing) populist party support and affect? And if so, what are the dynamics of this relationship? Do voters support right-wing populist parties because they are angry and afraid? Or does support make it more likely to become angry and anxious subsequently? Table 1 and Figure 2 report the results of the main autoregressive, cross-lagged panel model that explore these questions empirically. Model fit indicators suggest that all models

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<sup>3</sup> The appendix also reports models for the Green party, the Social Democratic Party of Austria, and the liberal NEOs. None of them show any association between party support and increased levels of anger or anxiety. Indeed, for the social democrats and green party, support is associated with subsequent reductions in negative affect.

<sup>4</sup> In the affect-appraisal literature, annoyance is generally considered as a sub-type of anger (Watson and Clark, 1994). Although a question that focused on explicit anger was also asked, it was asked in fewer waves. The appendix reports alternative models that use the anger item instead of annoyance. Additionally, I also report models that use worry instead of anxiety. These models do not change the findings of the paper.

fulfill standard model fit criteria<sup>5</sup>, and comparison to the baseline autoregressive model show that the random-intercept model has significantly better model fit.<sup>6</sup>

As both the table and the figure show, most stability coefficients are significant. As expected, even when baseline affect and support are taken into account, changes in one time period are associated with a spill-over effect in subsequent waves. In other words, once voters' begin to support one party, their support will remain elevated above its "natural" baseline in subsequent waves. Similarly, once voters display either anger or anxiety about the current state of Austrian politics, their negative affect in subsequent waves will remain elevated.

But is there a uniquely emotional dynamic underpinning support for right-wing populists? Table 1 and Figure 2 strongly support this hypothesis. There is a clear and significant relationship between negative affect and subsequent support for the FPÖ, as well as a significant relationship between FPÖ support and subsequently higher levels of anger and anxiety. Moreover, this relationship is unique to the populist FPÖ. Support for the ÖVP either has no association with affect at all, or is associated with subsequent reductions in anger.

Support for right-wing populists is therefore uniquely associated with increases in negative affect. But what are the specific temporal dynamics, and to what extent do we need to distinguish between anger and anxiety? Comparing the standardized cross-lagged and stability coefficients shows that the path from negative affect to support for the FPÖ is considerably less impactful than the reverse path from increased support to subsequent affect. The effect of populist support on anger, for example, is about 5.5 times larger than the reverse effect from anger to populist support. Similarly, the relationship from anxiety to FPÖ support is roughly 2.5 times larger than the link from anxiety to party support.

Support for right-wing populists is therefore uniquely associated with increases in negative affect. But what are the specific temporal dynamics, and to what extent do we need to distinguish between anger and anxiety? Comparing the standardized cross-lagged and stability coefficients


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<sup>5</sup> Following the criteria outlined by Hu & Bentler(1999) of  $\frac{\chi^2}{degrees\ of\ freedom} < 5$ , Confirmatory fit index (CFI) > 0.95 and residual mean squared error (RMSEA) <0.06.

<sup>6</sup>  $\chi^2$  Difference test between models with  $p < 0.0001$

shows that the path from negative affect to support for the FPÖ is considerably less impactful than the reverse path from increased support to subsequent affect. The effect of populist support on anger, for example, is about 5.5 times larger than the reverse effect from anger to populist support. Similarly, the relationship from anxiety to FPÖ support is roughly 2.5 times larger than the link from anxiety to party support.

Figure 2: Relationship between Anger, Anxiety, and FPÖ/ ÖVP Support



\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\*p<0.01, \*p<0.05

Summary of cross-lagged, autoregressive panel model between party support and respondent affect. Covariances and paths between anger and anxiety have been omitted to improve legibility. Table 1 provides more detail. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

In other words, while high levels of anger and anxiety are associated with greater support of a right-wing populist party, higher levels of negative affect among FPÖ supporters are an effect, rather than a cause of, this support. Voters may become somewhat more supportive of right-wing populist parties if they are angry and anxious. Once they have become more supportive, however, they subsequently become considerably more angry and anxious. It is therefore important to disentangle the temporal dynamics between negative affect and support for right-wing populist parties, since the common theory that anger and anxiety drive voters to support them misses the role that support plays in shaping the emotions of their supporter. Conversely, at least in the Austrian case, there is no evidence that anger and anxiety need to be empirically distinguished.



Table 1: Cross-lagged Models of Party Support, Anger, and Anxiety in Austria

	Model 1: FPÖ			Model 2: ÖVP		
	Estimate	Std. Er.	P(> z )	Estimate	Std. Er	P(> z )
<b>Autoregressive Coefficients</b>						
Party Support	1.062***	0.017	0.001	1.207***	0.027	0.000
Anger	0.041**	0.018	0.018	0.042**	0.017	0.013
Anxiety	0.057***	0.017	0.001	0.025	0.016	0.125
<b>Cross-Lagged Coefficients</b>						
Anger → Party Support	0.045**	0.021	0.030	0.006	0.029	0.840
Anxiety → Party Support	0.095***	0.019	0.000	-0.040	0.028	0.147
Party Support → Anger	0.253***	0.014	0.000	-0.067***	0.025	0.007
Party Support → Anxiety	0.240***	0.016	0.000	-0.038	0.027	0.154
<b>Model Fit</b>						
Chi-Square / D.of F.	4.001			4.540		
RMSEA	0.043			0.046		
CFI	0.992			0.988		
N	2098			2024		

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: Results of a cross-lagged, autoregressive panel model with random intercepts. Estimated using R-3.4.3 and lavaan Version 0.6-2 and maximum likelihood estimation. Cross-lagged paths between anger and anxiety and covariances were omitted for clarity. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

## STUDY 2: GERMANY

Study 1 shows that the dynamics of right-wing populist support are uniquely emotional. Compared to traditional conservative party support, right-wing populism is both driven by negative affect, and more importantly, creates considerably higher subsequent levels of anger and anxiety. However, several questions remain. First of all, potential vote choice and emotions concerning politics are theoretically proximate, making an empirical connection likely. But to what extent do these dynamics also apply over a longer time frame, and when considering less immediately related measures of populist support and affect? Secondly, to what extent are these emotional dynamics exclusive to supporters of right-wing populists? While Study 1 shows that support for traditional, conservative-right parties is not associated with elevated anger or anxiety, additional analyses are necessary to also distinguish supporters of right-wing populists from both

left-wing populists and supporters of more explicitly radical-right parties. Study 2 focuses on Germany, which allows us to investigate these questions in greater detail.

Germany provides an important counterpoint to the Austrian case. While the FPÖ has a long and relatively successful history in Austrian politics, Germany had long avoided the emergence of a (nationally) successful right-wing populist party, while more extreme, far-right parties like the National Democratic Party (NPD) have seen only limited electoral and societal success. This changed, however, with the explosive emergence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD).

Although initially founded in 2013 to protest against bailouts in the Eurozone (Grimm, 2015), increasing radicalization following a party split in 2014, and a close link to anti-immigration protests in 2015 have seen them gaining increasing public prominence and electoral support (Niedermayer and Hofrichter, 2016). They were the third strongest party in the 2018 national election and will likely remain a fixture of an increasingly fragmented German political party system (Schwarzbözl and Fatke, 2016). Despite its early technocratic and Eurosceptic roots, the AfD has therefore become a firmly entrenched right-wing populist party. Indeed, even as early as 2014, the AfD was already the party with the most anti-elite and populist positions in the German political system (Lewandowsky, Giebler and Wagner, 2016; Marx and Nguyen, 2018), and subsequent party-splits and electoral strategies have increased this trend further.

While the discussions about the drivers of AfD support are ongoing and mirror the discussion over the economic and cultural roots of populist support more generally, themes of anxiety and anger are persistent across these different explanations (Niedermayer and Hofrichter, 2016; Lengfeld, 2017). As such, Germany and the growth of AfD support provide an important test case for the relationship between anger, anxiety, and voters' support for right-wing populism. Moreover, unlike Austria, Germany does have an established, and electorally successful left-populist party, the Left (*Die Linke*) (Hough, Koss and Olsen, 2007; Olsen, 2007). The German case therefore allows for an explicit comparison of the emotional dynamics among supporters of right and left-populist parties respectively. A similar comparison is possible between support for the AfD and the NPD, delineating the dynamics of right-wing populists support from even more extreme, far-right party support. Finally, as the next section will describe in greater detail, the data structure of the German case also expands on the findings of Study 1.

## Data

Unfortunately, the relative recency of the AfD's emergence on the German political landscape limit the available survey waves. Since the AfD was only founded in 2013, items measuring attitudes towards the AfD only become informative in the last three available waves, covering the years of 2014, 2015 and 2016. However, even given this relatively constricted timeframe, the extensive coverage of the SOEP allows us to measure the relationship between affect and populism among 19600 unique respondents. Moreover, the annual structure of the data makes it possible to model affective dynamics over a much longer time-horizon than in Study 1.

Party support is measured through the combination of two variables: Feelings of party affiliation and the strength of that affiliation. The SOEP asks respondents if they feel close to a specific party, and if so, how strong this feeling of closeness is on a Likert-Scale ranging between 1 and 5. The dependent variables are built through a combination of those two variables, where 0 indicates no feelings of affiliation and 5 indicates a very strong sense of proximity. Compared to the propensity to vote measure in Study 1, this measure is a much more conservative measure of party support. While there is some debate about the stability of party identification (Bakker, Hopmann and Persson, 2015), it is less frequently updated than voting intentions and it is less likely that relatively ephemeral affective states are related to a more deeply ingrained form of party support.

Support for right-wing populists is measured through feelings of affiliation with the AfD. Following Study 1, support for conservative center-right parties is modeled through support for the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister party (CDU/CSU). To expand on Study 1, Study 2 also compares the affective dynamics of right-wing populist support to support for left-populist parties and far-right extremist parties. Support for these is measured through feelings of affiliation with the Left party and the NPD respectively.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Once more, the appendix also reports results for the social democratic SPD, the Green party, and the market-liberal FDP. None of these parties show a relationship between increased support and higher levels of negative affect.

To measure respondent affect, the SOEP asks respondents how frequently they experience different emotional states, ranging from 1 (very rarely) to 5 (very often). These items capture general affect rather than their feelings towards a specific political actors or institution. However, even generalized affect has been shown to influence political perceptions and decision-making (Lerner and Tiedens, 2006; Small and Lerner, 2008; Seawright, 2012; Banks, 2016). More importantly, much of the theoretical arguments that link affect and populism focus on the transference of general resentment and anxiety into targeted blame and a subsequent shift in political attitudes (Seawright, 2012; Bonikowski, 2017; Salmela and von Scheve, 2017). Understanding the dynamics of affect and populism thus should focus not only on targeted political emotions, but also on its roots in more general affective states. But while these measures are theoretically important, they will nevertheless result in weaker and more noisy relationships with political attitudes, increasing the conservativeness of Study 2.


Otherwise, the model specifications of Study 2 follow those of Study 1. As such, all models control for time-invariant respondent characteristics such as age, gender, and educational status. Similarly, stable personality traits or political attitudes are controlled for in the model. Given the longer time frame of the survey, controlling for changes in respondents' life, particularly changes in employment status or income, could be important. However, including additional controls not only reduces model fit considerably, it also does not change the main results of the paper. All models therefore only use respondents' affect and party support.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Models using additional control variables are reported in the appendix.

Results

Figure 3: Relationship between Anger, Anxiety, and AfD/ CDU Support



Summary of cross-lagged, autoregressive panel model between party support and respondent affect. Covariances and paths between anger and anxiety have been omitted to improve legibility. Table 2 provides more detail. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

Table 2 and Figure 3 mirror the design of Study 1 and compare the affective dynamics surrounding support for right-wing populists and conservative center-right parties respectively. To expand on Study 1, Table 3 and Figure 4 also report the affective dynamics surrounding support for the left-populist Left party and the far-right NPD. Across all models, model diagnostics suggest good model fit, and all stability coefficients are significant. Even when controlling for baseline affect or party support, changes in one time period are associated with a spill-over effect in subsequent waves. AfD support in particular displays this cross-wave growth, which suggests that once voters begin to feel a sense of affiliation with “their AfD”, they will begin to feel increasingly closer to the party over time.

Table 2: Cross-lagged Model of Party Support, Anger, and Anxiety for AfD and CDU


	Model 3: AfD			Model 4: CDU/CSU		
	Estimate	Std. Er.	P(> z )	Estimate	Std. Er	P(> z )
<b>Autoregressive Coefficients</b>						
Party Support	0.210***	0.016	0	0.035***	0.006	0
Anger	0.015*	0.008	0.07	0.016**	0.008	0.046
Anxiety	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
<b>Cross-Lagged Coefficients</b>						
Anger → Party Support	-0.003	0.007	0.729	-0.003	0.005	0.463
Anxiety → Party Support	0.013*	0.008	0.079	0.002	0.005	0.674
Party Support → Anger	0.015*	0.009	0.096	0.006	0.007	0.334
Party Support → Anxiety	0.024***	0.009	0.007	-0.001	0.007	0.905
<b>Model Fit</b>						
Chi-Square / D.of F.	1.346			1.930		
RMSEA	0.006			0.007		
CFI	0.999			0.999		
N	19600			19600		

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

Note: Results of a cross-lagged, autoregressive panel model with random intercepts. Estimated using R-3.4.3 and lavaan Version 0.6-2 and maximum likelihood estimation. Cross-lagged paths between anger and anxiety and covariances were omitted for clarity. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

Moreover, as in Study 1, the relationship between higher negative affect and party support is unique to right-wing populists. Neither support for the center-right CDU/CSU, nor for left-populist Left Party or far-right NPD, is associated with increases in negative affect. More importantly, a comparison of the autoregressive and cross-lagged coefficients demonstrates that this effect is substantively important. A one unit increase in AfD support is associated with a subsequent increase in anger is comparable to simply becoming angrier in the previous time period. In other words, becoming more supportive of the AfD has a large and significant effect on respondents' affect, making them both more afraid and considerably more angry than they would have otherwise been.

Figure 4: Relationship between Anger, Anxiety, and Left Party / NPD Support



Summary of cross-lagged, autoregressive panel model between party support and respondent affect. Covariances and paths between anger and anxiety have been omitted to improve legibility. Table 3 provides more detail. Full results can be found in the Appendix.

Conversely, the impact of affect on support for the AfD is more nuanced. Although both anger and anxiety are often invoked as explanatory factors for the emergence and support of populist parties, only anxiety is significantly related to subsequent changes in support. Moreover, while anxiety is significantly associated with both support for the AfD and for the Left party, only AfD support is increased by anxiety. Becoming more anxious actually reduces the expected support for the left-party.<sup>9</sup> Similar to the findings of Study 1, there is stronger evidence that negative affect is the result, rather than the cause of, support for right-wing populist parties.

<sup>9</sup> The results for the Left party contradict the findings of Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza (2017), who find anger an important driver of support for left-wing populism in Spain. However, their models use anger towards a specific policy (austerity) rather than generalized affect.

Table 3: Cross-lagged Models of Party Support, Anger, and Anxiety in Germany

	<i>Model 5: Left Party</i>			<i>Model 6: NPD</i>		
	Estimate	Std. Er.	P(> z )	Estimate	Std. Er	P(> z )
<b><i>Autoregressive Coefficients</i></b>						
Party Support	0.061***	0.007	0	0.145***	0.009	0
Anger	0.015*	0.008	0.067	0.015*	0.008	0.059
Anxiety	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
<b><i>Cross-Lagged Coefficients</i></b>						
Anger → Party Support	0.001	0.005	0.844	-0.002	0.003	0.393
Anxiety → Party Support	-0.010*	0.006	0.081	-0.001	0.003	0.765
Party Support → Anger	0.004	0.007	0.557	-0.011	0.016	0.505
Party Support → Anxiety	-0.005	0.007	0.475	-0.005	0.016	0.74
<b><i>Model Fit</i></b>						
Chi-Square / D.of F.	1.036			1.586		
RMSEA	0.003			0.005		
CFI	1			1		
N	19600			19600		

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$

*Note: Results of a cross-lagged, autoregressive panel model with random intercepts. Estimated using R-3.4.3 and lavaan Version 0.6-2 and maximum likelihood estimation. Cross-lagged paths between anger and anxiety and covariances were omitted for clarity. Full results can be found in the Appendix.*

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Is there a special relationship between anger, anxiety, and support for right-wing populist parties? And what do these dynamics look like? Is it anger, anxiety, or both emotions that matter? And similarly, to what extent do these negative emotions cause support for populism, and to what extent are they caused by it? Using data from Austria and Germany, I show that support for right-wing populist parties is uniquely linked to negative emotions. Compared to support for “traditional” parties, left-wing populists, and even far-right extremists, only right-wing populist party support is associated with increased negative affect.

Moreover, I show that the relationship between affect and right-wing populist support is more nuanced than commonly discussed. While anxiety consistently increase subsequent support, anger’s association is less certain. Moreover, the substantive impact is comparatively small. However, once voters have become support of right-wing populist parties, they subsequently



become consistently and substantively more angry and anxious than they would have otherwise been.

The paper thus contributes to the literature on emotions and populism by differentiating the commonly held stereotype of the angry, anxious, right-wing populist. Although there is some evidence that these negative emotions lead to support for right-wing populist parties, there is stronger evidence that support for these parties amplifies negative affect. Indeed, while there is some evidence that populist parties serve as an important vehicle for leveraging general anxieties into targeted resentment and anger (Bonikowski, 2017; Salmela and von Scheve, 2017), the results of this paper demonstrate that populist parties cannot “solve” voters’ anxiety, but rather increase it further, supplementing it with greater anger and resentment as well. Negative emotions may therefore be more important in sustaining support for right-wing populist parties than in initially causing it.

By establishing a more complex relationship between anxiety, anger, and right-wing populist support, the paper also opens up several interesting avenues of future research. While I have focused here on generalized emotions and longer timeframes, the role of emotions in triggering an activation of populist attitudes may require a more fine-grained and focused look on short-term emotions and cognitive mechanisms. Similarly, although anger and anxiety have received the largest attention, other emotions, such as disgust and optimism, may also be connected to populism. Finally, this paper has focused predominantly on right-wing populism, since several of the proposed mechanisms connect to its exclusionary nature. The results of the paper support this focus. However, in light of the existing finding that anger over austerity politics did drive support for left-wing populism in the Spanish case (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017), more work is needed to distinguish the affective dynamics of left and right-wing populism. Indeed, one under-appreciated difference between right and leftwing populism may lie in its affective roots.

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# Study 1

## Full Model Results

	FPÖ			ÖVP		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
<b><u>Regression Slopes</u></b>						
<b><u>Party Support W4</u></b>						
Annoyance W3	0.045 <sup>**</sup>	0.021	0.03	0.006	0.029	0.84
Anxiety W3	0.095 <sup>***</sup>	0.019	0	-0.040	0.028	0.147
Party Support W3	1.062 <sup>***</sup>	0.017	0	1.207 <sup>***</sup>	0.027	0
<b><u>Party Support W3</u></b>						
Annoyance W2	0.045 <sup>**</sup>	0.021	0.03	0.006	0.029	0.84
Anxiety W2	0.095 <sup>***</sup>	0.019	0	-0.040	0.028	0.147
Party Support W2	0.982 <sup>***</sup>	0.013	0	1.079 <sup>***</sup>	0.018	0
<b><u>Party Support W2</u></b>						
Annoyance W1	0.045 <sup>**</sup>	0.021	0.03	0.006	0.029	0.84
Anxiety W1	0.095 <sup>***</sup>	0.019	0	-0.040	0.028	0.147
Party Support W1	0.929 <sup>***</sup>	0.013	0	0.954 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0
<b><u>Annoyance W4</u></b>						
Annoyance W3	0.041 <sup>**</sup>	0.018	0.018	0.042 <sup>**</sup>	0.017	0.013
Anxiety W3	0.066 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0	0.048 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	0.001
Party Support W3	0.253 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	0	-0.067 <sup>***</sup>	0.025	0.007
<b><u>Annoyance W3</u></b>						
Annoyance W2	0.041 <sup>**</sup>	0.018	0.018	0.042 <sup>**</sup>	0.017	0.013
Anxiety W2	0.066 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0	0.048 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	0.001
Party Support W2	0.253 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	0	-0.067 <sup>***</sup>	0.025	0.007
<b><u>Annoyance W2</u></b>						
Annoyance W1	0.041 <sup>**</sup>	0.018	0.018	0.042 <sup>**</sup>	0.017	0.013
Anxiety W1	0.066 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0	0.048 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	0.001
Party Support W1	0.253 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	0	-0.067 <sup>***</sup>	0.025	0.007
<b><u>Anxiety W4</u></b>						
Anxiety W3	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.017	0.001	0.025	0.016	0.125
Annoyance W3	0.034 <sup>**</sup>	0.016	0.034	0.023	0.015	0.136
Party Support W3	0.240 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0	-0.038	0.027	0.154
<b><u>Anxiety W3</u></b>						
Anxiety W2	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.017	0.001	0.025	0.016	0.125
Annoyance W2	0.034 <sup>**</sup>	0.016	0.034	0.023	0.015	0.136
Party Support W2	0.240 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0	-0.038	0.027	0.154
<b><u>Anxiety W2</u></b>						
Anxiety W1	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.017	0.001	0.025	0.016	0.125
Annoyance W1	0.034 <sup>**</sup>	0.016	0.034	0.023	0.015	0.136
Party Support W1	0.240 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0	-0.038	0.027	0.154
<b><u>Intercepts</u></b>						
Annoyance W1	6.871 <sup>**</sup>	0.06	0	6.893 <sup>***</sup>	0.061	0

Annoyance W2	4.704 <sup>***</sup>	0.142	0	6.159 <sup>***</sup>	0.17	0
Annoyance W3	4.662 <sup>***</sup>	0.134	0	6.084 <sup>***</sup>	0.164	0
Annoyance W4	4.607 <sup>***</sup>	0.134	0	6.065 <sup>***</sup>	0.165	0
Anxiety W1	4.226 <sup>***</sup>	0.064	0	4.203 <sup>***</sup>	0.065	0
Anxiety W2	2.711 <sup>***</sup>	0.14	0	4.074 <sup>***</sup>	0.176	0
Anxiety W3	2.765 <sup>***</sup>	0.133	0	4.083 <sup>***</sup>	0.171	0
Anxiety W4	2.470 <sup>***</sup>	0.133	0	3.813 <sup>***</sup>	0.172	0
Party Support W1	4.152 <sup>***</sup>	0.089	0	4.785 <sup>***</sup>	0.078	0
Party Support W2	-0.519 <sup>***</sup>	0.136	0	0.321	0.241	0.184
Party Support W3	-0.579 <sup>***</sup>	0.12	0	-0.167	0.242	0.49
Party Support W4	-0.833 <sup>***</sup>	0.121	0	-1.168 <sup>***</sup>	0.273	0
<b><u>Factor Loadings</u></b>						
<b><u>Mean Annoyance</u></b>						
Annoyance W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Anxiety</u></b>						
Anxiety W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Party Support</u></b>						
Party Support W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Residual Variances</u></b>						
Annoyance W1	4.617 <sup>***</sup>	0.193	0	3.812 <sup>***</sup>	0.153	0
Annoyance W2	3.959 <sup>***</sup>	0.155	0	3.836 <sup>***</sup>	0.158	0
Annoyance W3	3.356 <sup>***</sup>	0.134	0	3.332 <sup>***</sup>	0.14	0
Annoyance W4	4.072 <sup>***</sup>	0.152	0	3.834 <sup>***</sup>	0.15	0
Anxiety W1	5.315 <sup>***</sup>	0.224	0	4.188 <sup>***</sup>	0.168	0
Anxiety W2	4.200 <sup>***</sup>	0.163	0	4.070 <sup>***</sup>	0.165	0
Anxiety W3	3.764 <sup>***</sup>	0.15	0	3.575 <sup>***</sup>	0.151	0
Anxiety W4	3.748 <sup>***</sup>	0.147	0	3.475 <sup>***</sup>	0.142	0
Party Support W1	17.587 <sup>***</sup>	0.509	0	13.998 <sup>***</sup>	0.381	0
Party Support W2	5.160 <sup>***</sup>	0.145	0	7.109 <sup>***</sup>	0.213	0
Party Support W3	4.464 <sup>***</sup>	0.129	0	6.807 <sup>***</sup>	0.236	0
Party Support W4	5.494 <sup>***</sup>	0.186	0	9.025 <sup>***</sup>	0.409	0
<b><u>Residual Covariances</u></b>						
Annoyance W1 w/Anxiety W1	1.948 <sup>***</sup>	0.162	0	0.966 <sup>***</sup>	0.117	0
Annoyance W2 w/Anxiety W2	1.246 <sup>***</sup>	0.117	0	1.143 <sup>***</sup>	0.119	0
Annoyance W3 w/Anxiety W3	1.150 <sup>***</sup>	0.105	0	1.009 <sup>***</sup>	0.107	0
Annoyance W4 w/Anxiety W4	1.013 <sup>***</sup>	0.11	0	0.763 <sup>***</sup>	0.106	0

Annoyance W1 w/Party Support W1	3.821 <sup>***</sup>	0.283	0	-0.458	0.285	0.108
Annoyance W2 w/Party Support W2	0.949 <sup>***</sup>	0.099	0	-0.241 <sup>*</sup>	0.138	0.082
Annoyance W3 w/Party Support W3	0.906 <sup>***</sup>	0.085	0	-0.300 <sup>**</sup>	0.146	0.04
Annoyance W4 w/Party Support W4	0.906 <sup>***</sup>	0.085	0	-0.300 <sup>**</sup>	0.146	0.04
Anxiety W1 w/Party Support W1	4.308 <sup>***</sup>	0.309	0	-0.163	0.314	0.603
Anxiety W2 w/Party Support W2	0.791 <sup>***</sup>	0.103	0	-0.151	0.144	0.292
Anxiety W3 w/Party Support W3	0.706 <sup>***</sup>	0.088	0	-0.314 <sup>**</sup>	0.153	0.04
Anxiety W4 w/Party Support W4	0.706 <sup>***</sup>	0.088	0	-0.314 <sup>**</sup>	0.153	0.04
<u>Latent Variances</u>						
Mean Annoyance	2.862 <sup>***</sup>	0.164	0	3.657 <sup>***</sup>	0.192	0
Mean Anxiety	3.365 <sup>***</sup>	0.186	0	4.370 <sup>***</sup>	0.219	0
Mean Party Support	-1.086 <sup>***</sup>	0.054	0	-1.729 <sup>***</sup>	0.078	0
<u>Latent Covariances</u>						
Mean Annoyance w/Mean Party Support	-0.523 <sup>***</sup>	0.097	0	0.072	0.17	0.67
Mean Anxiety w/Mean Party Support	-0.694 <sup>***</sup>	0.106	0	0.187	0.187	0.316
Mean Annoyance w/Mean Anxiety	1.221 <sup>***</sup>	0.133	0	2.116 <sup>***</sup>	0.159	0
<u>Latent Intercepts</u>						
Mean Annoyance	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Anxiety	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Fit Indices</u>						
$\chi^2$	190.511(df=39) <sup>***</sup>			204.109(df=39) <sup>***</sup>		
<b>DF</b>	39			39		
<b>RMSEA</b>	0.043			0.046		
<b>CFI</b>	0.992			0.988		

Models for other Parties: SPO, NEOS, Greens

	SPO			NEO			Greens		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
<b>Regression Slopes</b>									
<b>Party Support W4</b>									
Annoyance W3	-0.068***	0.025	0.007	-0.006	0.013	0.635	-0.110***	0.023	0
Anxiety W3	-0.066***	0.023	0.005	0.003	0.012	0.803	-0.067***	0.021	0.002
Party Support W3	1.186***	0.03	0	0.019	0.019	0.323	1.112***	0.032	0
<b>Party Support W3</b>									
Annoyance W2	-0.068***	0.025	0.007	-0.006	0.013	0.635	-0.110***	0.023	0
Anxiety W2	-0.066***	0.023	0.005	0.003	0.012	0.803	-0.067***	0.021	0.002
Party Support W2	1.075***	0.02	0	0.079***	0.018	0	1.030***	0.022	0
<b>Party Support W2</b>									
Annoyance W1	-0.068***	0.025	0.007	-0.006	0.013	0.635	-0.110***	0.023	0
Anxiety W1	-0.066***	0.023	0.005	0.003	0.012	0.803	-0.067***	0.021	0.002
Party Support W1	0.934***	0.016	0	0.083***	0.018	0	0.809***	0.016	0
<b>Annoyance W4</b>									
Annoyance W3	0.062***	0.018	0.001	0.041**	0.017	0.014	0.079***	0.019	0
Anxiety W3	0.064***	0.015	0	0.047***	0.014	0.001	0.065***	0.015	0
Party Support W3	-0.264***	0.021	0	-0.023	0.014	0.108	-0.299***	0.021	0
<b>Annoyance W3</b>									
Annoyance W2	0.062***	0.018	0.001	0.041**	0.017	0.014	0.079***	0.019	0
Anxiety W2	0.064***	0.015	0	0.047***	0.014	0.001	0.065***	0.015	0
Party Support W2	-0.264***	0.021	0	-0.023	0.014	0.108	-0.299***	0.021	0
<b>Annoyance W2</b>									
Annoyance W1	0.062***	0.018	0.001	0.041**	0.017	0.014	0.079***	0.019	0
Anxiety W1	0.064***	0.015	0	0.047***	0.014	0.001	0.065***	0.015	0
Party Support W1	-0.264***	0.021	0	-0.023	0.014	0.108	-0.299***	0.021	0
<b>Anxiety W4</b>									
Anxiety W3	0.046***	0.017	0.008	0.028*	0.016	0.085	0.046***	0.017	0.006
Annoyance W3	0.048***	0.016	0.003	0.025*	0.015	0.098	0.055***	0.016	0.001
Party Support W3	-0.196***	0.024	0	0.005	0.015	0.754	-0.221***	0.024	0
<b>Anxiety W3</b>									
Anxiety W2	0.046***	0.017	0.008	0.028*	0.016	0.085	0.046***	0.017	0.006
Annoyance W2	0.048***	0.016	0.003	0.025*	0.015	0.098	0.055***	0.016	0.001
Party Support W2	-0.196***	0.024	0	0.005	0.015	0.754	-0.221***	0.024	0
<b>Anxiety W2</b>									
Anxiety W1	0.046***	0.017	0.008	0.028*	0.016	0.085	0.046***	0.017	0.006
Annoyance W1	0.048***	0.016	0.003	0.025*	0.015	0.098	0.055***	0.016	0.001
Party Support W1	-0.196***	0.024	0	0.005	0.015	0.754	-0.221***	0.024	0
<b>Intercepts</b>									
Annoyance W1	6.874***	0.059	0	6.882***	0.06	0	6.880***	0.059	0
Annoyance W2	6.701***	0.148	0	5.912***	0.138	0	6.345***	0.141	0
Annoyance W3	6.622***	0.14	0	5.850***	0.129	0	6.159***	0.131	0
Annoyance W4	6.628***	0.141	0	5.796***	0.13	0	6.147***	0.131	0
Anxiety W1	4.213***	0.064	0	4.222***	0.065	0	4.234***	0.064	0
Anxiety W2	4.439***	0.151	0	3.872***	0.135	0	4.233***	0.139	0
Anxiety W3	4.470***	0.144	0	3.912***	0.127	0	4.168***	0.129	0
Anxiety W4	4.200***	0.145	0	3.612***	0.128	0	3.901***	0.128	0
Party Support W1	4.122***	0.075	0	2.692***	0.064	0	2.864***	0.075	0
Party Support W2	0.934***	0.24	0	2.335***	0.12	0	1.081***	0.211	0
Party Support W3	0.517**	0.245	0.035	2.543***	0.115	0	0.979***	0.209	0
Party Support W4	-0.081	0.281	0.774	2.726***	0.12	0	0.625***	0.23	0.007

<u>Factor Loadings</u>									
<b><u>Mean Annoyance</u></b>									
Annoyance W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Anxiety</u></b>									
Anxiety W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Party Support</u></b>									
Party Support W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Residual Variances</u>									
Annoyance W1	4.325 <sup>***</sup>	0.185	0	3.796 <sup>***</sup>	0.151	0	4.540 <sup>***</sup>	0.196	0
Annoyance W2	4.107 <sup>***</sup>	0.166	0	3.891 <sup>***</sup>	0.158	0	4.161 <sup>***</sup>	0.164	0
Annoyance W3	3.477 <sup>***</sup>	0.142	0	3.256 <sup>***</sup>	0.136	0	3.656 <sup>***</sup>	0.147	0
Annoyance W4	4.075 <sup>***</sup>	0.163	0	3.841 <sup>***</sup>	0.148	0	4.224 <sup>***</sup>	0.167	0
Anxiety W1	4.730 <sup>***</sup>	0.206	0	4.220 <sup>***</sup>	0.168	0	4.764 <sup>***</sup>	0.203	0
Anxiety W2	4.262 <sup>***</sup>	0.17	0	3.994 <sup>***</sup>	0.161	0	4.255 <sup>***</sup>	0.169	0
Anxiety W3	3.726 <sup>***</sup>	0.153	0	3.538 <sup>***</sup>	0.148	0	3.768 <sup>***</sup>	0.154	0
Anxiety W4	3.684 <sup>***</sup>	0.153	0	3.534 <sup>***</sup>	0.142	0	3.721 <sup>***</sup>	0.155	0
Party Support W1	13.204 <sup>**</sup>	0.358	0	3.042 <sup>***</sup>	0.13	0	12.881 <sup>**</sup>	0.357	0
	*						*		
Party Support W2	6.263 <sup>***</sup>	0.18	0	2.386 <sup>***</sup>	0.108	0	5.254 <sup>***</sup>	0.153	0
Party Support W3	5.848 <sup>***</sup>	0.197	0	2.457 <sup>***</sup>	0.108	0	4.910 <sup>***</sup>	0.166	0
Party Support W4	8.457 <sup>***</sup>	0.35	0	3.460 <sup>***</sup>	0.132	0	6.685 <sup>***</sup>	0.292	0
<u>Residual Covariances</u>									
Annoyance W1 w/Anxiety W1	1.504 <sup>***</sup>	0.153	0	0.985 <sup>***</sup>	0.116	0	1.639 <sup>***</sup>	0.159	0
Annoyance W2 w/Anxiety W2	1.397 <sup>***</sup>	0.126	0	1.146 <sup>***</sup>	0.118	0	1.375 <sup>***</sup>	0.124	0
Annoyance W3 w/Anxiety W3	1.168 <sup>***</sup>	0.11	0	0.942 <sup>***</sup>	0.104	0	1.260 <sup>***</sup>	0.113	0
Annoyance W4 w/Anxiety W4	1.013 <sup>***</sup>	0.119	0	0.796 <sup>***</sup>	0.106	0	1.101 <sup>***</sup>	0.122	0
Annoyance W1 w/Party Support W1	-2.587 <sup>***</sup>	0.266	0	-0.241 <sup>**</sup>	0.098	0.014	-3.006 <sup>***</sup>	0.261	0
Annoyance W2 w/Party Support W2	-0.965 <sup>***</sup>	0.116	0	-0.037	0.092	0.685	-0.902 <sup>***</sup>	0.103	0
Annoyance W3 w/Party Support W3	-0.939 <sup>***</sup>	0.121	0	-0.088	0.063	0.161	-1.032 <sup>***</sup>	0.103	0
Annoyance W4 w/Party Support W4	-0.939 <sup>***</sup>	0.121	0	-0.088	0.063	0.161	-1.032 <sup>***</sup>	0.103	0
Anxiety W1 w/Party Support W1	-2.401 <sup>***</sup>	0.286	0	-0.051	0.103	0.621	-2.559 <sup>***</sup>	0.283	0
Anxiety W2 w/Party Support W2	-0.829 <sup>***</sup>	0.12	0	-0.052	0.092	0.573	-0.793 <sup>***</sup>	0.108	0
Anxiety W3 w/Party Support W3	-0.864 <sup>***</sup>	0.127	0	-0.113 <sup>*</sup>	0.064	0.074	-0.815 <sup>***</sup>	0.11	0
Anxiety W4 w/Party Support W4	-0.864 <sup>***</sup>	0.127	0	-0.113 <sup>*</sup>	0.064	0.074	-0.815 <sup>***</sup>	0.11	0
<u>Latent Variances</u>									
Mean Annoyance	2.954 <sup>***</sup>	0.177	0	3.715 <sup>***</sup>	0.192	0	2.705 <sup>***</sup>	0.172	0
Mean Anxiety	3.766 <sup>***</sup>	0.208	0	4.432 <sup>***</sup>	0.22	0	3.763 <sup>***</sup>	0.206	0
Mean Party Support	-1.551 <sup>***</sup>	0.078	0	5.337 <sup>***</sup>	0.242	0	-1.259 <sup>***</sup>	0.078	0

<u>Latent Covariances</u>									
Mean Annoyance w/Mean Party Support	0.614***	0.128	0	-1.154***	0.156	0	0.773***	0.111	0
Mean Anxiety w/Mean Party Support	0.638***	0.143	0	-1.339***	0.166	0	0.735***	0.131	0
Mean Annoyance w/Mean Anxiety	1.474***	0.15	0	2.157***	0.159	0	1.377***	0.148	0
<u>Latent Intercepts</u>									
Mean Annoyance	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Anxiety	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Fit Indices</u>									
$\chi^2$	188.293(df=39)***			47.461(df=39)			254.437(df=39)***		
DF	39			39			39		
RMSEA	0.043			0.01			0.051		
CFI	0.99			0.999			0.985		
<sup>+</sup> Fixed parameter									
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01									

### Robustness Check: Alternative Measures of Emotion: Anger instead of Annoyance

	<b>FPÖ</b>			<b>ÖVP</b>		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
<b><u>Regression Slopes</u></b>						
<b><u>Party Support W4</u></b>						
Angry W3	0.102***	0.03	0.001	-0.048	0.048	0.323
Anxiety W3	0.112***	0.028	0	-0.092**	0.043	0.031
Party Support W3	1.037***	0.023	0	1.151***	0.044	0
<b><u>Party Support W3</u></b>						
Angry W1	0.102***	0.03	0.001	-0.048	0.048	0.323
Anxiety W1	0.112***	0.028	0	-0.092**	0.043	0.031
Party Support W1	0.914***	0.017	0	0.988***	0.024	0
<b><u>Angry W4</u></b>						
Angry W3	0.074***	0.027	0.005	0.042*	0.023	0.069
Anxiety W3	0.093***	0.021	0	0.058***	0.021	0.005
Party Support W3	0.304***	0.018	0	-0.143***	0.043	0.001
<b><u>Angry W3</u></b>						
Angry W1	0.074***	0.027	0.005	0.042*	0.023	0.069
Anxiety W1	0.093***	0.021	0	0.058***	0.021	0.005
Party Support W1	0.304***	0.018	0	-0.143***	0.043	0.001
<b><u>Anxiety W4</u></b>						
Anxiety W3	0.056**	0.023	0.016	0.028	0.023	0.228
Angry W3	0.055***	0.021	0.008	0.011	0.019	0.556
Party Support W3	0.235***	0.018	0	-0.112***	0.039	0.005
<b><u>Anxiety W3</u></b>						
Anxiety W1	0.056**	0.023	0.016	0.028	0.023	0.228
Angry W1	0.055***	0.021	0.008	0.011	0.019	0.556
Party Support W1	0.235***	0.018	0	-0.112***	0.039	0.005
<b><u>Intercepts</u></b>						
Angry W1	5.900***	0.064	0	5.925***	0.065	0
Angry W3	3.358***	0.185	0	5.665***	0.217	0
Angry W4	3.277***	0.176	0	5.566***	0.216	0

Anxiety W1	4.228 <sup>***</sup>	0.062	0	4.223 <sup>***</sup>	0.063	0
Anxiety W3	2.640 <sup>***</sup>	0.164	0	4.506 <sup>***</sup>	0.199	0
Anxiety W4	2.406 <sup>***</sup>	0.158	0	4.255 <sup>***</sup>	0.199	0
Party Support W1	4.158 <sup>***</sup>	0.085	0	4.757 <sup>***</sup>	0.074	0
Party Support W3	-0.791 <sup>***</sup>	0.153	0	0.797 <sup>*</sup>	0.422	0.059
Party Support W4	-1.084 <sup>***</sup>	0.141	0	-0.376	0.49	0.442
<u>Factor Loadings</u>						
<u>Mean angry</u>						
Angry W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Angry W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Angry W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Mean Anxiety</u>						
Anxiety W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anxiety W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Mean Party Support</u>						
Party Support W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Residual Variances</u>						
Angry W1	6.051 <sup>***</sup>	0.293	0	4.511 <sup>***</sup>	0.211	0
Angry W3	3.826 <sup>***</sup>	0.184	0	3.576 <sup>***</sup>	0.183	0
Angry W4	4.342 <sup>***</sup>	0.18	0	3.848 <sup>***</sup>	0.172	0
Anxiety W1	5.403 <sup>***</sup>	0.247	0	4.339 <sup>***</sup>	0.199	0
Anxiety W3	3.945 <sup>***</sup>	0.178	0	3.612 <sup>***</sup>	0.178	0
Anxiety W4	3.751 <sup>***</sup>	0.162	0	3.462 <sup>***</sup>	0.158	0
Party Support W1	17.937 <sup>***</sup>	0.496	0	14.465 <sup>***</sup>	0.416	0
Party Support W3	5.857 <sup>***</sup>	0.223	0	8.276 <sup>***</sup>	0.411	0
Party Support W4	5.947 <sup>***</sup>	0.271	0	9.094 <sup>***</sup>	0.622	0
<u>Residual Covariances</u>						
Angry W1 w/Anxiety W1	2.592 <sup>***</sup>	0.22	0	1.226 <sup>***</sup>	0.159	0
Angry W3 w/Anxiety W3	1.551 <sup>***</sup>	0.137	0	1.183 <sup>***</sup>	0.137	0
Angry W4 w/Anxiety W4	1.516 <sup>***</sup>	0.132	0	1.148 <sup>***</sup>	0.129	0
Angry W1 w/Party Support W1	5.285 <sup>***</sup>	0.344	0	-1.200 <sup>**</sup>	0.494	0.015
Angry W3 w/Party Support W3	1.391 <sup>***</sup>	0.147	0	-0.772 <sup>***</sup>	0.279	0.006
Angry W4 w/Party Support W4	1.391 <sup>***</sup>	0.147	0	-0.772 <sup>***</sup>	0.279	0.006
Anxiety W1 w/Party Support W1	4.531 <sup>***</sup>	0.334	0	-0.993 <sup>**</sup>	0.452	0.028
Anxiety W3 w/Party Support W3	1.071 <sup>***</sup>	0.135	0	-0.791 <sup>***</sup>	0.253	0.002
Anxiety W4 w/Party Support W4	1.071 <sup>***</sup>	0.135	0	-0.791 <sup>***</sup>	0.253	0.002
<u>Latent Variances</u>						
Mean angry	3.263 <sup>***</sup>	0.26	0	4.814 <sup>***</sup>	0.283	0
Mean Anxiety	3.282 <sup>***</sup>	0.229	0	4.385 <sup>***</sup>	0.258	0
Mean Party Support	-1.556 <sup>***</sup>	0.136	0	-2.330 <sup>***</sup>	0.252	0
<u>Latent Covariances</u>						
Mean angry w/Mean Party Support	-1.119 <sup>***</sup>	0.185	0	0.690 <sup>*</sup>	0.409	0.092
Mean Anxiety w/Mean Party Support	-1.102 <sup>***</sup>	0.177	0	0.816 <sup>**</sup>	0.367	0.026

Mean angry w/Mean Anxiety	1.533 <sup>***</sup>	0.193	0	2.865 <sup>***</sup>	0.216	0
<u>Latent Intercepts</u>						
Mean angry	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Anxiety	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Fit Indices</u>						
$\chi^2$	37.711(df=13) <sup>***</sup>			22.989(df=13) <sup>**</sup>		
DF	13			13		
RMSEA	0.029			0.019		
CFI	0.998			0.999		
<sup>+</sup> Fixed parameter						
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01						

Robustness Check: Alternative Measure of Emotion: Worry instead of anxiety

	<u>FPÖ</u>			<u>ÖVP</u>		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
<u>Regression Slopes</u>						
<b><u>Party Support W4</u></b>						
Annoyance W3	0.045 <sup>**</sup>	0.021	0.03	0.016	0.029	0.582
Worry W3	0.065 <sup>***</sup>	0.02	0.001	-0.010	0.027	0.717
Party Support W3	1.078 <sup>**</sup>	0.017	0	1.206 <sup>***</sup>	0.027	0
<b><u>Party Support W3</u></b>						
Annoyance W2	0.045 <sup>**</sup>	0.021	0.03	0.016	0.029	0.582
Worry W2	0.065 <sup>***</sup>	0.02	0.001	-0.010	0.027	0.717
Party Support W2	0.994 <sup>***</sup>	0.013	0	1.080 <sup>***</sup>	0.018	0
<b><u>Party Support W2</u></b>						
Annoyance W1	0.045 <sup>**</sup>	0.021	0.03	0.016	0.029	0.582
Worry W1	0.065 <sup>***</sup>	0.02	0.001	-0.010	0.027	0.717
Party Support W1	0.939 <sup>***</sup>	0.012	0	0.954 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0
<b><u>Annoyance W4</u></b>						
Annoyance W3	0.037 <sup>**</sup>	0.019	0.048	0.034 <sup>*</sup>	0.018	0.066
Worry W3	0.056 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0.001	0.051 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0.002
Party Support W3	0.258 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0	-0.049 <sup>*</sup>	0.025	0.052
<b><u>Annoyance W3</u></b>						
Annoyance W2	0.037 <sup>**</sup>	0.019	0.048	0.034 <sup>*</sup>	0.018	0.066
Worry W2	0.056 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0.001	0.051 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0.002
Party Support W2	0.258 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0	-0.049 <sup>*</sup>	0.025	0.052
<b><u>Annoyance W2</u></b>						
Annoyance W1	0.037 <sup>**</sup>	0.019	0.048	0.034 <sup>*</sup>	0.018	0.066
Worry W1	0.056 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0.001	0.051 <sup>***</sup>	0.016	0.002
Party Support W1	0.258 <sup>***</sup>	0.015	0	-0.049 <sup>*</sup>	0.025	0.052
<b><u>Worry W4</u></b>						
Worry W3	0.052 <sup>***</sup>	0.018	0.005	0.050 <sup>***</sup>	0.018	0.007
Annoyance W3	0.012	0.016	0.46	0.006	0.016	0.724
Party Support W3	0.237 <sup>***</sup>	0.014	0	-0.036	0.024	0.138
<b><u>Worry W3</u></b>						
Worry W2	0.052 <sup>***</sup>	0.018	0.005	0.050 <sup>***</sup>	0.018	0.007
Annoyance W2	0.012	0.016	0.46	0.006	0.016	0.724



Party Support W2	0.237***	0.014	0	-0.036	0.024	0.138
<b>Worry W2</b>						
Worry W1	0.052***	0.018	0.005	0.050***	0.018	0.007
Annoyance W1	0.012	0.016	0.46	0.006	0.016	0.724
Party Support W1	0.237***	0.014	0	-0.036	0.024	0.138
<u>Intercepts</u>						
Annoyance W1	6.871***	0.06	0	6.893***	0.061	0
Annoyance W2	4.627***	0.15	0	6.002***	0.179	0
Annoyance W3	4.595***	0.142	0	5.935***	0.173	0
Annoyance W4	4.543***	0.142	0	5.915***	0.174	0
Worry W1	6.488***	0.059	0	6.484***	0.06	0
Worry W2	4.827***	0.146	0	6.031***	0.175	0
Worry W3	4.825***	0.137	0	6.001***	0.169	0
Worry W4	4.583***	0.137	0	5.765***	0.17	0
Party Support W1	4.152***	0.089	0	4.785***	0.078	0
Party Support W2	-0.588***	0.153	0	0.148	0.257	0.565
Party Support W3	-0.640***	0.136	0	-0.339	0.255	0.184
Party Support W4	-0.907***	0.136	0	-1.335***	0.287	0
<u>Factor Loadings</u>						
<u>Mean Annoyance</u>						
Annoyance W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Annoyance W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Mean Anxiety</u>						
Worry W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Worry W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Worry W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Worry W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Mean Party Support</u>						
Party Support W1	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W2	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W3	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support W4	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Residual Variances</u>						
Annoyance W1	4.629***	0.192	0	3.798***	0.151	0
Annoyance W2	3.967***	0.154	0	3.841***	0.156	0
Annoyance W3	3.375***	0.133	0	3.351***	0.139	0
Annoyance W4	4.058***	0.15	0	3.804***	0.147	0
Worry W1	4.802***	0.191	0	4.060***	0.158	0
Worry W2	4.193***	0.158	0	4.154***	0.164	0
Worry W3	3.240***	0.128	0	3.246***	0.135	0
Worry W4	3.747***	0.141	0	3.568***	0.139	0
Party Support W1	17.596***	0.507	0	13.990***	0.381	0
Party Support W2	5.248***	0.148	0	7.099***	0.213	0
Party Support W3	4.542***	0.132	0	6.807***	0.236	0
Party Support W4	5.617***	0.191	0	9.001***	0.409	0
<u>Residual Covariances</u>						
Annoyance W1 w/Worry W1	2.284***	0.158	0	1.473***	0.119	0
Annoyance W2 w/Worry W2	1.532***	0.119	0	1.459***	0.123	0
Annoyance W3 w/Worry W3	1.521***	0.102	0	1.540***	0.108	0

Annoyance W4 w/Worry W4	1.511 <sup>***</sup>	0.112	0	1.306 <sup>***</sup>	0.109	0
Annoyance W1 w/Party Support W1	3.845 <sup>***</sup>	0.284	0	-0.262	0.289	0.365
Annoyance W2 w/Party Support W2	0.979 <sup>***</sup>	0.1	0	-0.156	0.14	0.265
Annoyance W3 w/Party Support W3	0.916 <sup>***</sup>	0.086	0	-0.220	0.146	0.132
Annoyance W4 w/Party Support W4	0.916 <sup>***</sup>	0.086	0	-0.220	0.146	0.132
Worry W1 w/Party Support W1	3.586 <sup>***</sup>	0.276	0	0.047	0.279	0.867
Worry W2 w/Party Support W2	0.871 <sup>***</sup>	0.1	0	-0.069	0.137	0.613
Worry W3 w/Party Support W3	0.748 <sup>***</sup>	0.085	0	-0.169	0.144	0.242
Worry W4 w/Party Support W4	0.748 <sup>***</sup>	0.085	0	-0.169	0.144	0.242
<u>Latent Variances</u>						
Mean Annoyance	2.832 <sup>***</sup>	0.164	0	3.640 <sup>***</sup>	0.191	0
Mean Anxiety	2.537 <sup>***</sup>	0.152	0	3.239 <sup>***</sup>	0.179	0
Mean Party Support	-1.147 <sup>***</sup>	0.051	0	-1.727 <sup>***</sup>	0.077	0
<u>Latent Covariances</u>						
Mean Annoyance w/Mean Party Support	-0.543 <sup>***</sup>	0.101	0	-0.060	0.175	0.731
Mean Anxiety w/Mean Party Support	-0.531 <sup>***</sup>	0.094	0	-0.055	0.164	0.736
Mean Annoyance w/Mean Anxiety	2.109 <sup>***</sup>	0.134	0	2.872 <sup>***</sup>	0.159	0
<u>Latent Intercepts</u>						
Mean Annoyance	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>			
Mean Anxiety	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>			
<b>Mean Party Support</b>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>			
<u>Fit Indices</u>						
$\chi^2$	197.118(d f=39) <sup>***</sup>		0	208.524( df=39) <sup>***</sup>		0
<b>DF</b>	39		39			
<b>RMSEA</b>	0.044		0.046			
<b>CFI</b>	0.992		0.988			
<sup>+</sup> Fixed parameter						
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01						

## Study 2

### Full Model Results AfD and CDU/CSU

	AfD			CDU/CSU		
	Est.	Std. Err.	p	Est.	Std. Err.	p
<b><u>Regression Slopes</u></b>						
<b><u>Party Support 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	-0.003	0.007	0.729	-0.003	0.005	0.463
Fear 2015	0.013*	0.008	0.079	0.002	0.005	0.674
Party Support 2015	0.318***	0.014	0	-0.045***	0.007	0
<b><u>Party Support 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	-0.003	0.007	0.729	-0.003	0.005	0.463
Fear 2014	0.013*	0.008	0.079	0.002	0.005	0.674
Party Support 2014	0.210***	0.016	0	0.035***	0.006	0
<b><u>Anger 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	0.015*	0.008	0.07	0.016**	0.008	0.046
Fear 2015	-0.012*	0.007	0.095	-0.012*	0.007	0.084
Party Support 2015	0.015*	0.009	0.096	0.006	0.007	0.334
<b><u>Anger 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	0.015*	0.008	0.07	0.016**	0.008	0.046
Fear 2014	-0.012*	0.007	0.095	-0.012*	0.007	0.084
Party Support 2014	0.015*	0.009	0.096	0.006	0.007	0.334
<b><u>Fear 2016</u></b>						
Fear 2015	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
Anger 2015	-0.010	0.007	0.127	-0.010	0.007	0.141
Party Support 2015	0.024***	0.009	0.007	-0.001	0.007	0.905
<b><u>Fear 2015</u></b>						
Fear 2014	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
Anger 2014	-0.010	0.007	0.127	-0.010	0.007	0.141
Party Support 2014	0.024***	0.009	0.007	-0.001	0.007	0.905
<b><u>Intercepts</u></b>						
Anger 2014	0.007**	0.004	0.046	0.007**	0.004	0.046
Anger 2015	-0.004	0.004	0.249	-0.005	0.004	0.2
Anger 2016	-0.003	0.004	0.409	-0.003	0.004	0.387
Fear 2014	-0.018***	0.004	0	-0.018***	0.004	0
Fear 2015	-0.004	0.003	0.233	-0.005	0.003	0.18
Fear 2016	0.024***	0.004	0	0.024***	0.004	0
Party Support 2014	-0.022***	0.003	0	0.017***	0.004	0
Party Support 2015	-0.007**	0.003	0.021	-0.004	0.003	0.212
Party Support 2016	0.038***	0.004	0	-0.013***	0.004	0
<b><u>Factor Loadings</u></b>						
<b><u>Mean Anger</u></b>						
Anger 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Fear</u></b>						
Fear 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		

Fear 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Fear 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b>Mean Party Support</b>						
Party Support 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b>Residual Variances</b>						
Anger 2014	0.145 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.145 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Anger 2015	0.132 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.132 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Anger 2016	0.139 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.139 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Fear 2014	0.138 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.138 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Fear 2015	0.130 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.130 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Fear 2016	0.142 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.142 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Party Support 2014	0.107 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.080 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
Party Support 2015	0.124 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.047 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
Party Support 2016	0.302 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0	0.068 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
<b>Residual Covariances</b>						
Anger 2014 w/Fear 2014	0.032 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.032 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Anger 2015 w/Fear 2015	0.025 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0	0.025 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
Anger 2016 w/Fear 2016	0.034 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0	0.035 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
Anger 2014 w/Party Support 2014	0.002	0.002	0.21	-0.000	0.001	0.787
Anger 2015 w/Party Support 2015	0.000	0.001	0.936	-0.002 <sup>*</sup>	0.001	0.07
Anger 2016 w/Party Support 2016	0.007 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	-0.001	0.001	0.131
Fear 2014 w/Party Support 2014	-0.001	0.002	0.719	-0.000	0.001	0.792
Fear 2015 w/Party Support 2015	0.003 <sup>**</sup>	0.001	0.012	-0.000	0.001	0.955
Fear 2016 w/Party Support 2016	0.006 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0.001	-0.002	0.001	0.104
<b>Latent Variances</b>						
Mean Anger	0.110 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0	0.110 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0
Mean Fear	0.107 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.107 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Mean Party Support	0.045 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.186 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0
<b>Latent Covariances</b>						
Mean Anger w/Mean Party Support	0.003 <sup>**</sup>	0.002	0.041	-0.019 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Mean Fear w/Mean Party Support	-0.001	0.002	0.348	-0.009 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Mean Anger w/Mean Fear	0.056 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.056 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
<b>Latent Intercepts</b>						
Mean Anger	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Fear	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b>Fit Indices</b>						
$\chi^2$	17.559(df=11) <sup>*</sup>	0.092		22.030(df=11) <sup>**</sup>	0.024	
DF	11			11		
RMSEA	0.006			0.007		
CFI	1			1		

## Full Model Results: Left Party and NPD

	Left Party			NPD		
	Est.	Std. Err.	p	Est.	Std. Err.	p
<b><u>Regression Slopes</u></b>						
<b><u>Party Support 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	0.001	0.005	0.844	-0.002	0.003	0.393
Fear 2015	-0.010*	0.006	0.081	-0.001	0.003	0.765
Party Support 2015	-0.015**	0.008	0.043	-0.145***	0.009	0
<b><u>Party Support 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	0.001	0.005	0.844	-0.002	0.003	0.393
Fear 2014	-0.010*	0.006	0.081	-0.001	0.003	0.765
Party Support 2014	0.061***	0.007	0	0.145***	0.009	0
<b><u>Anger 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	0.015*	0.008	0.067	0.015*	0.008	0.059
Fear 2015	-0.012*	0.007	0.092	-0.012*	0.007	0.096
Party Support 2015	0.004	0.007	0.557	-0.011	0.016	0.505
<b><u>Anger 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	0.015*	0.008	0.067	0.015*	0.008	0.059
Fear 2014	-0.012*	0.007	0.092	-0.012*	0.007	0.096
Party Support 2014	0.004	0.007	0.557	-0.011	0.016	0.505
<b><u>Fear 2016</u></b>						
Fear 2015	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
Anger 2015	-0.010	0.007	0.138	-0.010	0.007	0.149
Party Support 2015	-0.005	0.007	0.475	-0.005	0.016	0.74
<b><u>Fear 2015</u></b>						
Fear 2014	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
Anger 2014	-0.010	0.007	0.138	-0.010	0.007	0.149
Party Support 2014	-0.005	0.007	0.475	-0.005	0.016	0.74
<b><u>Intercepts</u></b>						
Anger 2014	0.007**	0.004	0.046	0.007**	0.004	0.046
Anger 2015	-0.004	0.004	0.21	-0.004	0.004	0.227
Anger 2016	-0.003	0.004	0.382	-0.003	0.004	0.405
Fear 2014	-0.018***	0.004	0	-0.018***	0.004	0
Fear 2015	-0.005	0.003	0.182	-0.005	0.003	0.185
Fear 2016	0.024***	0.004	0	0.024***	0.004	0
Party Support 2014	0.006*	0.004	0.079	0.012***	0.001	0
Party Support 2015	-0.000	0.003	0.972	0.011***	0.001	0
Party Support 2016	-0.007**	0.003	0.044	0.012***	0.002	0
<b><u>Factor Loadings</u></b>						
<b><u>Mean Anger</u></b>						
Anger 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Fear</u></b>						
Fear 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Fear 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Fear 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		

<b>Mean Party Support</b>						
Party Support 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b>Residual Variances</b>						
Anger 2014	0.145 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.145 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Anger 2015	0.132 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.132 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Anger 2016	0.139 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.139 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Fear 2014	0.139 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.139 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Fear 2015	0.130 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.130 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Fear 2016	0.142 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.142 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Party Support 2014	0.107 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.022 <sup>***</sup>	0	0
Party Support 2015	0.072 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0	0.019 <sup>***</sup>	0	0
Party Support 2016	0.077 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0	0.024 <sup>***</sup>	0	0
<b>Residual Covariances</b>						
Anger 2014 w/Fear 2014	0.032 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.032 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Anger 2015 w/Fear 2015	0.025 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0	0.025 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
Anger 2016 w/Fear 2016	0.035 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0	0.035 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
Anger 2014 w/Party Support 2014	-0.001	0.001	0.616	-0.000	0.001	0.709
Anger 2015 w/Party Support 2015	0.000	0.001	0.794	0.001	0.001	0.175
Anger 2016 w/Party Support 2016	-0.001	0.001	0.175	0.001*	0.001	0.066
Fear 2014 w/Party Support 2014	0.000	0.001	0.884	-0.001	0.001	0.102
Fear 2015 w/Party Support 2015	-0.001	0.001	0.335	0.000	0.001	0.793
Fear 2016 w/Party Support 2016	-0.001	0.001	0.312	0.001*	0.001	0.068
<b>Latent Variances</b>						
Mean Anger	0.110 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0	0.110 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0
Mean Fear	0.107 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.107 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Mean Party Support	0.160 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0	0.022 <sup>***</sup>	0	0
<b>Latent Covariances</b>						
Mean Anger w/Mean Party Support	0.003*	0.002	0.082	0.004 <sup>***</sup>	0.001	0
Mean Fear w/Mean Party Support	0.004 <sup>**</sup>	0.002	0.033	0.001	0.001	0.16
Mean Anger w/Mean Fear	0.056 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.056 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
<b>Latent Intercepts</b>						
Mean Anger	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Fear	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b>Fit Indices</b>						
$\chi^2$	12.774(		0.308	17.453(		0.095
	df=11)			df=11)*		
DF	11			11		
RMSEA	0.003			0.005		
CFI	1			1		
<sup>+</sup> Fixed parameter						

\*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01

## Models for Additional Parties

	<b>FDP</b>			<b>Green Party</b>			<b>SPD</b>		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
<u>Regression Slopes</u>									
<b><u>Party Support 2016</u></b>									
Anger 2015	-0.007	0.005	0.195	-0.003	0.005	0.463	0.008	0.005	0.111
Fear 2015	-0.000	0.005	0.955	0.002	0.005	0.674	-0.000	0.005	0.941
Party Support 2015	-0.040***	0.008	0	-0.045***	0.007	0	-0.070***	0.007	0
<b><u>Party Support 2015</u></b>									
Anger 2014	-0.007	0.005	0.195	-0.003	0.005	0.463	0.008	0.005	0.111
Fear 2014	-0.000	0.005	0.955	0.002	0.005	0.674	-0.000	0.005	0.941
Party Support 2014	0.039***	0.007	0	0.035***	0.006	0	0.016***	0.006	0.007
<b><u>Anger 2016</u></b>									
Anger 2015	0.015*	0.008	0.063	0.016**	0.008	0.046	0.016*	0.008	0.053
Fear 2015	-0.012*	0.007	0.088	-0.012*	0.007	0.084	-0.012*	0.007	0.083
Party Support 2015	-0.001	0.007	0.866	0.006	0.007	0.334	0.007	0.006	0.272
<b><u>Anger 2015</u></b>									
Anger 2014	0.015*	0.008	0.063	0.016**	0.008	0.046	0.016*	0.008	0.053
Fear 2014	-0.012*	0.007	0.088	-0.012*	0.007	0.084	-0.012*	0.007	0.083
Party Support 2014	-0.001	0.007	0.866	0.006	0.007	0.334	0.007	0.006	0.272
<b><u>Fear 2016</u></b>									
Fear 2015	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
Anger 2015	-0.010	0.007	0.135	-0.010	0.007	0.141	-0.010	0.007	0.128
Party Support 2015	0.001	0.007	0.939	-0.001	0.007	0.905	-0.012*	0.006	0.065
<b><u>Fear 2015</u></b>									
Fear 2014	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0	0.044***	0.008	0
Anger 2014	-0.010	0.007	0.135	-0.010	0.007	0.141	-0.010	0.007	0.128
Party Support 2014	0.001	0.007	0.939	-0.001	0.007	0.905	-0.012*	0.006	0.065
<u>Intercepts</u>									
Anger 2014	0.007**	0.004	0.046	0.007**	0.004	0.046	0.007**	0.004	0.047
Anger 2015	-0.004	0.004	0.212	-0.005	0.004	0.2	-0.005	0.004	0.196
Anger 2016	-0.003	0.004	0.382	-0.003	0.004	0.387	-0.003	0.004	0.384
Fear 2014	-0.018***	0.004	0	-0.018***	0.004	0	-0.018***	0.004	0
Fear 2015	-0.005	0.003	0.179	-0.005	0.003	0.18	-0.004	0.003	0.205
Fear 2016	0.024***	0.004	0	0.024***	0.004	0	0.024***	0.004	0
Party Support 2014	0.000	0.004	0.946	0.017***	0.004	0	0.022***	0.004	0
Party Support 2015	-0.004	0.003	0.254	-0.004	0.003	0.212	-0.002	0.004	0.572
Party Support 2016	0.003	0.004	0.366	-0.013***	0.004	0	-0.021***	0.004	0
<u>Factor Loadings</u>									
<b><u>Mean Anger</u></b>									
Anger 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Fear</u></b>									
Fear 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Fear 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Fear 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Mean Party Support</u></b>									
Party Support 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Residual Variances</u>									
Anger 2014	0.145***	0.002	0	0.145***	0.002	0	0.145***	0.002	0
Anger 2015	0.132***	0.002	0	0.132***	0.002	0	0.132***	0.002	0
Anger 2016	0.139***	0.002	0	0.139***	0.002	0	0.139***	0.002	0



Fear 2014	0.138***	0.002	0	0.138***	0.002	0	0.138***	0.002	0
Fear 2015	0.130***	0.002	0	0.130***	0.002	0	0.130***	0.002	0
Fear 2016	0.142***	0.002	0	0.142***	0.002	0	0.142***	0.002	0
Party Support 2014	0.081***	0.001	0	0.080***	0.001	0	0.096***	0.001	0
Party Support 2015	0.051***	0.001	0	0.047***	0.001	0	0.058***	0.001	0
Party Support 2016	0.114***	0.001	0	0.068***	0.001	0	0.066***	0.001	0
<u>Residual Covariances</u>									
Anger 2014 w/Fear 2014	0.032***	0.002	0	0.032***	0.002	0	0.032***	0.002	0
Anger 2015 w/Fear 2015	0.025***	0.001	0	0.025***	0.001	0	0.025***	0.001	0
Anger 2016 w/Fear 2016	0.035***	0.001	0	0.035***	0.001	0	0.035***	0.001	0
Anger 2014 w/Party Support 2014	-0.000	0.001	0.739	-0.000	0.001	0.787	0.002*	0.001	0.097
Anger 2015 w/Party Support 2015	-0.002*	0.001	0.091	-0.002*	0.001	0.07	-0.000	0.001	0.696
Anger 2016 w/Party Support 2016	-0.001	0.001	0.309	-0.001	0.001	0.131	-0.000	0.001	0.64
Fear 2014 w/Party Support 2014	-0.001	0.001	0.498	-0.000	0.001	0.792	-0.002	0.001	0.16
Fear 2015 w/Party Support 2015	-0.000	0.001	0.747	-0.000	0.001	0.955	-0.000	0.001	0.717
Fear 2016 w/Party Support 2016	-0.001	0.001	0.409	-0.002	0.001	0.104	0.001	0.001	0.541
<u>Latent Variances</u>									
Mean Anger	0.110***	0.003	0	0.110***	0.003	0	0.110***	0.003	0
Mean Fear	0.107***	0.002	0	0.107***	0.002	0	0.107***	0.002	0
Mean Party Support	0.168***	0.003	0	0.186***	0.003	0	0.182***	0.003	0
<u>Latent Covariances</u>									
Mean Anger w/Mean Party Support	-0.002	0.002	0.418	-0.019***	0.002	0	-0.010***	0.002	0
Mean Fear w/Mean Party Support	-0.004**	0.002	0.043	-0.009***	0.002	0	-0.001	0.002	0.451
Mean Anger w/Mean Fear	0.056***	0.002	0	0.056***	0.002	0	0.056***	0.002	0
<u>Latent Intercepts</u>									
Mean Anger	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Fear	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Fit Indices</u>									
$\chi^2$	13.974(d	0.234	22.030(d	0.024	11.663(d	0.39			
	f=11)		f=11)**		f=11)				
DF	11		11		11				
RMSEA	0.004		0.007		0.002				
CFI	1		1		1				
<sup>+</sup> Fixed parameter									
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01									

Models with added controls – AfD and CDU/CSU

	AfD			CDU		
	Estimate	Std. Err.	p	Estimate	Std. Err.	p
<b><u>Regression Slopes</u></b>						
<b><u>Party Support 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	-0.001	0.008	0.845	0.000	0.005	0.921
Fear 2015	0.013*	0.008	0.092	0.001	0.005	0.811
Party Support 2015	0.318***	0.014	0	-0.052***	0.007	0
High Income 2016	-0.013**	0.006	0.035	0.024***	0.005	0
Low Income 2016	-0.003	0.007	0.669	0.010*	0.005	0.072
Unemployed 2016	0.001	0.012	0.912	-0.012	0.009	0.176
Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.000	0.009	0.988	0.017**	0.007	0.012
Retired 2016	-0.005	0.009	0.581	0.058***	0.007	0
Student 2016	-0.004	0.017	0.795	0.012	0.013	0.328
Maternity 2016	-0.018	0.017	0.293	-0.006	0.012	0.622
<b><u>Party Support 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	-0.001	0.008	0.845	0.000	0.005	0.921
Fear 2014	0.013*	0.008	0.092	0.001	0.005	0.811
Party Support 2014	0.211***	0.016	0	0.029***	0.006	0
High Income 2015	-0.013**	0.006	0.035	0.024***	0.005	0
Low Income 2015	-0.003	0.007	0.669	0.010*	0.005	0.072
Unemployed 2015	0.001	0.012	0.912	-0.012	0.009	0.176
Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.000	0.009	0.988	0.017**	0.007	0.012
Retired 2015	-0.005	0.009	0.581	0.058***	0.007	0
Student 2015	-0.004	0.017	0.795	0.012	0.013	0.328
Maternity 2015	-0.018	0.017	0.293	-0.006	0.012	0.622
<b><u>Anger 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	0.012	0.008	0.162	0.013	0.008	0.125
Fear 2015	-0.015**	0.007	0.037	-0.015**	0.007	0.035
Party Support 2015	0.015*	0.009	0.086	0.015**	0.007	0.024
High Income 2016	-0.002	0.006	0.686	-0.001	0.006	0.906
Low Income 2016	0.005	0.007	0.51	0.005	0.007	0.492
Unemployed 2016	0.071***	0.012	0	0.070***	0.012	0
Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.036***	0.009	0	-0.036***	0.009	0
Retired 2016	-0.121***	0.009	0	-0.117***	0.009	0
Student 2016	-0.024	0.017	0.151	-0.026	0.017	0.128
Maternity 2016	0.034**	0.017	0.045	0.033**	0.017	0.047
<b><u>Anger 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	0.012	0.008	0.162	0.013	0.008	0.125
Fear 2014	-0.015**	0.007	0.037	-0.015**	0.007	0.035
Party Support 2014	0.015*	0.009	0.086	0.015**	0.007	0.024
High Income 2015	-0.002	0.006	0.686	-0.001	0.006	0.906
Low Income 2015	0.005	0.007	0.51	0.005	0.007	0.492
Unemployed 2015	0.071***	0.012	0	0.070***	0.012	0
Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.036***	0.009	0	-0.036***	0.009	0
Retired 2015	-0.121***	0.009	0	-0.117***	0.009	0
Student 2015	-0.024	0.017	0.151	-0.026	0.017	0.128
Maternity 2015	0.034**	0.017	0.045	0.033**	0.017	0.047
<b><u>Fear 2016</u></b>						
Fear 2015	0.039***	0.008	0	0.039***	0.008	0
Anger 2015	-0.010	0.007	0.152	-0.009	0.007	0.177
Party Support 2015	0.024***	0.009	0.006	0.000	0.007	0.989

High Income 2016	-0.013**	0.006	0.023	-0.012**	0.006	0.04
Low Income 2016	0.031***	0.007	0	0.031***	0.007	0
Unemployed 2016	0.108***	0.012	0	0.106***	0.012	0
Econ. Inactive 2016	0.062***	0.009	0	0.062***	0.009	0
Retired 2016	0.022***	0.008	0.009	0.025***	0.009	0.003
Student 2016	0.063***	0.017	0	0.063***	0.017	0
Maternity 2016	0.081***	0.017	0	0.081***	0.017	0
<u>Fear 2015</u>						
Fear 2014	0.039***	0.008	0	0.039***	0.008	0
Anger 2014	-0.010	0.007	0.152	-0.009	0.007	0.177
Party Support 2014	0.024***	0.009	0.006	0.000	0.007	0.989
High Income 2015	-0.013**	0.006	0.023	-0.012**	0.006	0.04
Low Income 2015	0.031***	0.007	0	0.031***	0.007	0
Unemployed 2015	0.108***	0.012	0	0.106***	0.012	0
Econ. Inactive 2015	0.062***	0.009	0	0.062***	0.009	0
Retired 2015	0.022***	0.008	0.009	0.025***	0.009	0.003
Student 2015	0.063***	0.017	0	0.063***	0.017	0
Maternity 2015	0.081***	0.017	0	0.081***	0.017	0
<b>Intercepts</b>						
Anger 2014	0.007**	0.004	0.046	0.007**	0.004	0.046
Anger 2015	0.092**	0.037	0.013	0.087**	0.037	0.019
Anger 2016	0.094**	0.037	0.011	0.090**	0.037	0.015
Fear 2014	-0.018***	0.004	0	-0.018***	0.004	0
Fear 2015	-0.382***	0.037	0	-0.386***	0.037	0
Fear 2016	-0.353***	0.037	0	-0.356***	0.037	0
Party Support 2014	-0.022***	0.003	0	0.017***	0.004	0
Party Support 2015	0.042	0.038	0.265	-0.132***	0.028	0
Party Support 2016	0.087**	0.038	0.022	-0.142***	0.028	0
High Income 2016	1.366 <sup>+</sup>			1.366 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016	1.341 <sup>+</sup>			1.341 <sup>+</sup>		
Unemployed 2016	1.045 <sup>+</sup>			1.045 <sup>+</sup>		
Econ. Inactive 2016	1.087 <sup>+</sup>			1.087 <sup>+</sup>		
Retired 2016	1.204 <sup>+</sup>			1.204 <sup>+</sup>		
Student 2016	1.017 <sup>+</sup>			1.017 <sup>+</sup>		
Maternity 2016	1.017 <sup>+</sup>			1.017 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2015	1.352 <sup>+</sup>			1.352 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2015	1.340 <sup>+</sup>			1.340 <sup>+</sup>		
Unemployed 2015	1.049 <sup>+</sup>			1.049 <sup>+</sup>		
Econ. Inactive 2015	1.091 <sup>+</sup>			1.091 <sup>+</sup>		
Retired 2015	1.192 <sup>+</sup>			1.192 <sup>+</sup>		
Student 2015	1.022 <sup>+</sup>			1.022 <sup>+</sup>		
Maternity 2015	1.021 <sup>+</sup>			1.021 <sup>+</sup>		
<b>Factor Loadings</b>						
<u>Mean Anger</u>						
Anger 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Anger 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Mean Fear</u>						
Fear 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Fear 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Fear 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<u>Mean Party Support</u>						
Party Support 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Party Support 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>			1.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b>Residual Variances</b>						
Anger 2014	0.149***	0.002	0	0.149***	0.002	0

Anger 2015	0.131***	0.002	0	0.131***	0.002	0
Anger 2016	0.139***	0.002	0	0.139***	0.002	0
Fear 2014	0.139***	0.002	0	0.139***	0.002	0
Fear 2015	0.129***	0.002	0	0.129***	0.002	0
Fear 2016	0.141***	0.002	0	0.141***	0.002	0
Party Support 2014	0.107***	0.002	0	0.080***	0.001	0
Party Support 2015	0.124***	0.002	0	0.047***	0.001	0
Party Support 2016	0.301***	0.003	0	0.068***	0.001	0
High Income 2016	0.232 <sup>+</sup>			0.232 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016	0.225 <sup>+</sup>			0.225 <sup>+</sup>		
Unemployed 2016	0.043 <sup>+</sup>			0.043 <sup>+</sup>		
Econ. Inactive 2016	0.079 <sup>+</sup>			0.079 <sup>+</sup>		
Retired 2016	0.162 <sup>+</sup>			0.162 <sup>+</sup>		
Student 2016	0.017 <sup>+</sup>			0.017 <sup>+</sup>		
Maternity 2016	0.017 <sup>+</sup>			0.017 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2015	0.228 <sup>+</sup>			0.228 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2015	0.224 <sup>+</sup>			0.224 <sup>+</sup>		
Unemployed 2015	0.047 <sup>+</sup>			0.047 <sup>+</sup>		
Econ. Inactive 2015	0.083 <sup>+</sup>			0.083 <sup>+</sup>		
Retired 2015	0.155 <sup>+</sup>			0.155 <sup>+</sup>		
Student 2015	0.021 <sup>+</sup>			0.021 <sup>+</sup>		
Maternity 2015	0.020 <sup>+</sup>			0.020 <sup>+</sup>		

**Residual Covariances**

Anger 2014 w/Fear 2014	0.031***	0.002	0	0.031***	0.002	0
Anger 2015 w/Fear 2015	0.025***	0.001	0	0.025***	0.001	0
Anger 2016 w/Fear 2016	0.034***	0.001	0	0.035***	0.001	0
Anger 2014 w/Party Support 2014	0.002	0.002	0.162	-0.002	0.001	0.149
Anger 2015 w/Party Support 2015	0.000	0.001	0.772	-0.001	0.001	0.334
Anger 2016 w/Party Support 2016	0.007***	0.002	0	-0.001	0.001	0.226
Fear 2014 w/Party Support 2014	-0.001	0.002	0.732	-0.000	0.001	0.843
Fear 2015 w/Party Support 2015	0.004***	0.001	0.009	-0.000	0.001	0.943
Fear 2016 w/Party Support 2016	0.006***	0.002	0.001	-0.002*	0.001	0.078
High Income 2016 w/Low Income 2016	-0.125 <sup>+</sup>			-0.125 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2016	-0.013 <sup>+</sup>			-0.013 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>			-0.014 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Retired 2016	-0.071 <sup>+</sup>			-0.071 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>			-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>			-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/High Income 2015	0.182 <sup>+</sup>			0.182 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Low Income 2015	-0.122 <sup>+</sup>			-0.122 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>			-0.015 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>			-0.015 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.067 <sup>+</sup>			-0.067 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>			-0.001 <sup>+</sup>		
High Income 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>			-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2016	0.016 <sup>+</sup>			0.016 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2016	0.012 <sup>+</sup>			0.012 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Retired 2016	0.116 <sup>+</sup>			0.116 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Student 2016	0.001 <sup>+</sup>			0.001 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>			-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.113 <sup>+</sup>			-0.113 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.192 <sup>+</sup>			0.192 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.020 <sup>+</sup>			0.020 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.013 <sup>+</sup>			0.013 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Retired 2015	0.112 <sup>+</sup>			0.112 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Student 2015	0.002 <sup>+</sup>			0.002 <sup>+</sup>		
Low Income 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>			-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		

Unemployed 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Retired 2016	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.012 <sup>+</sup>	-0.012 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.016 <sup>+</sup>	0.016 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.024 <sup>+</sup>	0.024 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Maternity 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Retired 2016	-0.018 <sup>+</sup>	-0.018 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.011 <sup>+</sup>	-0.011 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.009 <sup>+</sup>	0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.050 <sup>+</sup>	0.050 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Student 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Maternity 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.066 <sup>+</sup>	-0.066 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.113 <sup>+</sup>	0.113 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.010 <sup>+</sup>	-0.010 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Retired 2015	0.149 <sup>+</sup>	0.149 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/High Income 2015	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Student 2015	0.010 <sup>+</sup>	0.010 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/High Income 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Low Income 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Maternity 2015	0.007 <sup>+</sup>	0.007 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Low Income 2015	-0.120 <sup>+</sup>	-0.120 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.013 <sup>+</sup>	-0.013 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Retired 2015	-0.064 <sup>+</sup>	-0.064 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Unemployed 2015	0.019 <sup>+</sup>	0.019 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.011 <sup>+</sup>	0.011 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Retired 2015	0.110 <sup>+</sup>	0.110 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Student 2015	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2015 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>

Unemployed 2015 w/Retired 2015	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>			-0.009 <sup>+</sup>		
Unemployed 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>			-0.001 <sup>+</sup>		
Unemployed 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>			-0.001 <sup>+</sup>		
Econ. Inactive 2015 w/Retired 2015	-0.017 <sup>+</sup>			-0.017 <sup>+</sup>		
Econ. Inactive 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>			-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		
Econ. Inactive 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>			-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		
Retired 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>			-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		
Retired 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>			-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		
Student 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>			-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Latent Variances</u></b>						
Mean Anger	0.105 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0	0.105 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0
Mean Fear	0.106 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.106 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Mean Party Support	0.045 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.185 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0
<b><u>Latent Covariances</u></b>						
Mean Anger w/Mean Party Support	0.003 <sup>*</sup>	0.002	0.072	-0.017 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Mean Fear w/Mean Party Support	-0.002	0.002	0.317	-0.009 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
Mean Anger w/Mean Fear	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0
<b><u>Latent Intercepts</u></b>						
Mean Anger	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Fear	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>			0.000 <sup>+</sup>		
<b><u>Fit Indices</u></b>						
$\chi^2$	1547.696		0	2122.718		0
	(df=116) <sup>*</sup>			(df=116)		
	**			***		
DF	116			116		
RMSEA	0.025			0.03		
CFI	0.963			0.97		
+Fixed parameter						
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01						

Models with added controls – Left Party and NPD

	Left Party		NPD			
	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.	Estimate	Std. Err.
<b><u>Regression Slopes</u></b>						
<b><u>Party Support 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	-0.000	0.005	-0.000	0.005	-0.000	0.005
Fear 2015	-0.010*	0.006	-0.010*	0.006	-0.010*	0.006
Party Support 2015	-0.016**	0.008	-0.016**	0.008	-0.016**	0.008
High Income 2016	-0.011**	0.005	-0.011**	0.005	-0.011**	0.005
Low Income 2016	0.013**	0.006	0.013**	0.006	0.013**	0.006
Unemployed 2016	-0.012	0.01	-0.012	0.01	-0.012	0.01
Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.004	0.007	-0.004	0.007	-0.004	0.007
Retired 2016	-0.020***	0.007	-0.020***	0.007	-0.020***	0.007
Student 2016	0.010	0.014	0.010	0.014	0.010	0.014
Maternity 2016	-0.024*	0.014	-0.024*	0.014	-0.024*	0.014
<b><u>Party Support 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	-0.000	0.005	-0.000	0.005	-0.000	0.005
Fear 2014	-0.010*	0.006	-0.010*	0.006	-0.010*	0.006
Party Support 2014	0.061***	0.007	0.061***	0.007	0.061***	0.007
High Income 2015	-0.011**	0.005	-0.011**	0.005	-0.011**	0.005
Low Income 2015	0.013**	0.006	0.013**	0.006	0.013**	0.006
Unemployed 2015	-0.012	0.01	-0.012	0.01	-0.012	0.01
Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.004	0.007	-0.004	0.007	-0.004	0.007
Retired 2015	-0.020***	0.007	-0.020***	0.007	-0.020***	0.007
Student 2015	0.010	0.014	0.010	0.014	0.010	0.014
Maternity 2015	-0.024*	0.014	-0.024*	0.014	-0.024*	0.014
<b><u>Anger 2016</u></b>						
Anger 2015	0.012	0.008	0.012	0.008	0.012	0.008
Fear 2015	-0.015**	0.007	-0.015**	0.007	-0.015**	0.007
Party Support 2015	0.004	0.007	0.004	0.007	0.004	0.007
High Income 2016	-0.002	0.006	-0.002	0.006	-0.002	0.006
Low Income 2016	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.007
Unemployed 2016	0.072***	0.012	0.072***	0.012	0.072***	0.012
Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.036***	0.009	-0.036***	0.009	-0.036***	0.009
Retired 2016	-0.121***	0.009	-0.121***	0.009	-0.121***	0.009
Student 2016	-0.025	0.017	-0.025	0.017	-0.025	0.017
Maternity 2016	0.035**	0.017	0.035**	0.017	0.035**	0.017
<b><u>Anger 2015</u></b>						
Anger 2014	0.012	0.008	0.012	0.008	0.012	0.008
Fear 2014	-0.015**	0.007	-0.015**	0.007	-0.015**	0.007
Party Support 2014	0.004	0.007	0.004	0.007	0.004	0.007
High Income 2015	-0.002	0.006	-0.002	0.006	-0.002	0.006
Low Income 2015	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.007
Unemployed 2015	0.072***	0.012	0.072***	0.012	0.072***	0.012
Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.036***	0.009	-0.036***	0.009	-0.036***	0.009
Retired 2015	-0.121***	0.009	-0.121***	0.009	-0.121***	0.009
Student 2015	-0.025	0.017	-0.025	0.017	-0.025	0.017
Maternity 2015	0.035**	0.017	0.035**	0.017	0.035**	0.017
<b><u>Fear 2016</u></b>						
Fear 2015	0.039***	0.008	0.039***	0.008	0.039***	0.008
Anger 2015	-0.010	0.007	-0.010	0.007	-0.010	0.007
Party Support 2015	-0.005	0.007	-0.005	0.007	-0.005	0.007
High Income 2016	-0.014**	0.006	-0.014**	0.006	-0.014**	0.006
Low Income 2016	0.031***	0.007	0.031***	0.007	0.031***	0.007
Unemployed 2016	0.107***	0.012	0.107***	0.012	0.107***	0.012

Econ. Inactive 2016	0.061***	0.009	0.061***	0.009	0.061***	0.009
Retired 2016	0.022**	0.008	0.022**	0.008	0.022**	0.008
Student 2016	0.063***	0.017	0.063***	0.017	0.063***	0.017
Maternity 2016	0.082***	0.017	0.082***	0.017	0.082***	0.017
<u>Fear 2015</u>						
Fear 2014	0.039***	0.008	0.039***	0.008	0.039***	0.008
Anger 2014	-0.010	0.007	-0.010	0.007	-0.010	0.007
Party Support 2014	-0.005	0.007	-0.005	0.007	-0.005	0.007
High Income 2015	-0.014**	0.006	-0.014**	0.006	-0.014**	0.006
Low Income 2015	0.031***	0.007	0.031***	0.007	0.031***	0.007
Unemployed 2015	0.107***	0.012	0.107***	0.012	0.107***	0.012
Econ. Inactive 2015	0.061***	0.009	0.061***	0.009	0.061***	0.009
Retired 2015	0.022**	0.008	0.022**	0.008	0.022**	0.008
Student 2015	0.063***	0.017	0.063***	0.017	0.063***	0.017
Maternity 2015	0.082***	0.017	0.082***	0.017	0.082***	0.017
<b>Intercepts</b>						
Anger 2014	0.007**	0.004	0.007**	0.004	0.007**	0.004
Anger 2015	0.091**	0.037	0.091**	0.037	0.091**	0.037
Anger 2016	0.094**	0.037	0.094**	0.037	0.094**	0.037
Fear 2014	-0.018***	0.004	-0.018***	0.004	-0.018***	0.004
Fear 2015	-0.382***	0.037	-0.382***	0.037	-0.382***	0.037
Fear 2016	-0.352***	0.037	-0.352***	0.037	-0.352***	0.037
Party Support 2014	0.006*	0.004	0.006*	0.004	0.006*	0.004
Party Support 2015	0.051*	0.031	0.051*	0.031	0.051*	0.031
Party Support 2016	0.045	0.031	0.045	0.031	0.045	0.031
High Income 2016	1.366 <sup>+</sup>		1.366 <sup>+</sup>		1.366 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016	1.341 <sup>+</sup>		1.341 <sup>+</sup>		1.341 <sup>+</sup>	
Unemployed 2016	1.045 <sup>+</sup>		1.045 <sup>+</sup>		1.045 <sup>+</sup>	
Econ. Inactive 2016	1.087 <sup>+</sup>		1.087 <sup>+</sup>		1.087 <sup>+</sup>	
Retired 2016	1.204 <sup>+</sup>		1.204 <sup>+</sup>		1.204 <sup>+</sup>	
Student 2016	1.017 <sup>+</sup>		1.017 <sup>+</sup>		1.017 <sup>+</sup>	
Maternity 2016	1.017 <sup>+</sup>		1.017 <sup>+</sup>		1.017 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2015	1.352 <sup>+</sup>		1.352 <sup>+</sup>		1.352 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2015	1.340 <sup>+</sup>		1.340 <sup>+</sup>		1.340 <sup>+</sup>	
Unemployed 2015	1.049 <sup>+</sup>		1.049 <sup>+</sup>		1.049 <sup>+</sup>	
Econ. Inactive 2015	1.091 <sup>+</sup>		1.091 <sup>+</sup>		1.091 <sup>+</sup>	
Retired 2015	1.192 <sup>+</sup>		1.192 <sup>+</sup>		1.192 <sup>+</sup>	
Student 2015	1.022 <sup>+</sup>		1.022 <sup>+</sup>		1.022 <sup>+</sup>	
Maternity 2015	1.021 <sup>+</sup>		1.021 <sup>+</sup>		1.021 <sup>+</sup>	
<b>Factor Loadings</b>						
<u>Mean Anger</u>						
Anger 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Anger 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Anger 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
<u>Mean Fear</u>						
Fear 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Fear 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Fear 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
<u>Mean Party Support</u>						
Party Support 2014	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Party Support 2015	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Party Support 2016	1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>		1.000 <sup>+</sup>	
<b>Residual Variances</b>						
Anger 2014	0.149***	0.002	0.149***	0.002	0.149***	0.002
Anger 2015	0.131***	0.002	0.131***	0.002	0.131***	0.002
Anger 2016	0.139***	0.002	0.139***	0.002	0.139***	0.002
Fear 2014	0.139***	0.002	0.139***	0.002	0.139***	0.002



Fear 2015	0.129***	0.002	0.129***	0.002	0.129***	0.002
Fear 2016	0.141***	0.002	0.141***	0.002	0.141***	0.002
Party Support 2014	0.107***	0.002	0.107***	0.002	0.107***	0.002
Party Support 2015	0.072***	0.001	0.072***	0.001	0.072***	0.001
Party Support 2016	0.077***	0.001	0.077***	0.001	0.077***	0.001
High Income 2016	0.232 <sup>+</sup>		0.232 <sup>+</sup>		0.232 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016	0.225 <sup>+</sup>		0.225 <sup>+</sup>		0.225 <sup>+</sup>	
Unemployed 2016	0.043 <sup>+</sup>		0.043 <sup>+</sup>		0.043 <sup>+</sup>	
Econ. Inactive 2016	0.079 <sup>+</sup>		0.079 <sup>+</sup>		0.079 <sup>+</sup>	
Retired 2016	0.162 <sup>+</sup>		0.162 <sup>+</sup>		0.162 <sup>+</sup>	
Student 2016	0.017 <sup>+</sup>		0.017 <sup>+</sup>		0.017 <sup>+</sup>	
Maternity 2016	0.017 <sup>+</sup>		0.017 <sup>+</sup>		0.017 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2015	0.228 <sup>+</sup>		0.228 <sup>+</sup>		0.228 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2015	0.224 <sup>+</sup>		0.224 <sup>+</sup>		0.224 <sup>+</sup>	
Unemployed 2015	0.047 <sup>+</sup>		0.047 <sup>+</sup>		0.047 <sup>+</sup>	
Econ. Inactive 2015	0.083 <sup>+</sup>		0.083 <sup>+</sup>		0.083 <sup>+</sup>	
Retired 2015	0.155 <sup>+</sup>		0.155 <sup>+</sup>		0.155 <sup>+</sup>	
Student 2015	0.021 <sup>+</sup>		0.021 <sup>+</sup>		0.021 <sup>+</sup>	
Maternity 2015	0.020 <sup>+</sup>		0.020 <sup>+</sup>		0.020 <sup>+</sup>	

**Residual Covariances**

Anger 2014 w/Fear 2014	0.031***	0.002	0.031***	0.002	0.031***	0.002
Anger 2015 w/Fear 2015	0.025***	0.001	0.025***	0.001	0.025***	0.001
Anger 2016 w/Fear 2016	0.035***	0.001	0.035***	0.001	0.035***	0.001
Anger 2014 w/Party Support 2014	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Anger 2015 w/Party Support 2015	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Anger 2016 w/Party Support 2016	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Fear 2014 w/Party Support 2014	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.001
Fear 2015 w/Party Support 2015	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
Fear 2016 w/Party Support 2016	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.001
High Income 2016 w/Low Income 2016	-0.125 <sup>+</sup>		-0.125 <sup>+</sup>		-0.125 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2016	-0.013 <sup>+</sup>		-0.013 <sup>+</sup>		-0.013 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>		-0.014 <sup>+</sup>		-0.014 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Retired 2016	-0.071 <sup>+</sup>		-0.071 <sup>+</sup>		-0.071 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/High Income 2015	0.182 <sup>+</sup>		0.182 <sup>+</sup>		0.182 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Low Income 2015	-0.122 <sup>+</sup>		-0.122 <sup>+</sup>		-0.122 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>		-0.015 <sup>+</sup>		-0.015 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>		-0.015 <sup>+</sup>		-0.015 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.067 <sup>+</sup>		-0.067 <sup>+</sup>		-0.067 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>		-0.001 <sup>+</sup>		-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	
High Income 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2016	0.016 <sup>+</sup>		0.016 <sup>+</sup>		0.016 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2016	0.012 <sup>+</sup>		0.012 <sup>+</sup>		0.012 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Retired 2016	0.116 <sup>+</sup>		0.116 <sup>+</sup>		0.116 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Student 2016	0.001 <sup>+</sup>		0.001 <sup>+</sup>		0.001 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.113 <sup>+</sup>		-0.113 <sup>+</sup>		-0.113 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.192 <sup>+</sup>		0.192 <sup>+</sup>		0.192 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.020 <sup>+</sup>		0.020 <sup>+</sup>		0.020 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.013 <sup>+</sup>		0.013 <sup>+</sup>		0.013 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Retired 2015	0.112 <sup>+</sup>		0.112 <sup>+</sup>		0.112 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Student 2015	0.002 <sup>+</sup>		0.002 <sup>+</sup>		0.002 <sup>+</sup>	
Low Income 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	
Unemployed 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2016	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	
Unemployed 2016 w/Retired 2016	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>		-0.009 <sup>+</sup>		-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	
Unemployed 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>		-0.001 <sup>+</sup>		-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	

Unemployed 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.012 <sup>+</sup>	-0.012 <sup>+</sup>	-0.012 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.016 <sup>+</sup>	0.016 <sup>+</sup>	0.016 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.024 <sup>+</sup>	0.024 <sup>+</sup>	0.024 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2016 w/Maternity 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Retired 2016	-0.018 <sup>+</sup>	-0.018 <sup>+</sup>	-0.018 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.011 <sup>+</sup>	-0.011 <sup>+</sup>	-0.011 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.009 <sup>+</sup>	0.009 <sup>+</sup>	0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.050 <sup>+</sup>	0.050 <sup>+</sup>	0.050 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>	-0.015 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Student 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Econ. Inactive 2016 w/Maternity 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Student 2016	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/High Income 2015	-0.066 <sup>+</sup>	-0.066 <sup>+</sup>	-0.066 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.113 <sup>+</sup>	0.113 <sup>+</sup>	0.113 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.010 <sup>+</sup>	-0.010 <sup>+</sup>	-0.010 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Retired 2015	0.149 <sup>+</sup>	0.149 <sup>+</sup>	0.149 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>
Retired 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Maternity 2016	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/High Income 2015	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Low Income 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Student 2015	0.010 <sup>+</sup>	0.010 <sup>+</sup>	0.010 <sup>+</sup>
Student 2016 w/Maternity 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/High Income 2015	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>	0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Low Income 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Unemployed 2015	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>	0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Retired 2015	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>	-0.003 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Student 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Maternity 2016 w/Maternity 2015	0.007 <sup>+</sup>	0.007 <sup>+</sup>	0.007 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Low Income 2015	-0.120 <sup>+</sup>	-0.120 <sup>+</sup>	-0.120 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Unemployed 2015	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>	-0.014 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.013 <sup>+</sup>	-0.013 <sup>+</sup>	-0.013 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Retired 2015	-0.064 <sup>+</sup>	-0.064 <sup>+</sup>	-0.064 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
High Income 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Unemployed 2015	0.019 <sup>+</sup>	0.019 <sup>+</sup>	0.019 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	0.011 <sup>+</sup>	0.011 <sup>+</sup>	0.011 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Retired 2015	0.110 <sup>+</sup>	0.110 <sup>+</sup>	0.110 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Student 2015	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	0.002 <sup>+</sup>	0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Low Income 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2015 w/Econ. Inactive 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2015 w/Retired 2015	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>	-0.009 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>
Unemployed 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>	-0.001 <sup>+</sup>

Econ. Inactive 2015 w/Retired 2015	-0.017 <sup>+</sup>		-0.017 <sup>+</sup>		-0.017 <sup>+</sup>	
Econ. Inactive 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	
Econ. Inactive 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>		-0.002 <sup>+</sup>	
Retired 2015 w/Student 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	
Retired 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		-0.004 <sup>+</sup>		-0.004 <sup>+</sup>	
Student 2015 w/Maternity 2015	-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		-0.000 <sup>+</sup>		-0.000 <sup>+</sup>	
<b><u>Latent Variances</u></b>						
Mean Anger	0.105 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0.105 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0.105 <sup>***</sup>	0.003
Mean Fear	0.106 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0.106 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0.106 <sup>***</sup>	0.002
Mean Party Support	0.160 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0.160 <sup>***</sup>	0.003	0.160 <sup>***</sup>	0.003
<b><u>Latent Covariances</u></b>						
Mean Anger w/Mean Party Support	0.004 <sup>*</sup>	0.002	0.004 <sup>*</sup>	0.002	0.004 <sup>*</sup>	0.002
Mean Fear w/Mean Party Support	0.004 <sup>**</sup>	0.002	0.004 <sup>**</sup>	0.002	0.004 <sup>**</sup>	0.002
Mean Anger w/Mean Fear	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.002	0.057 <sup>***</sup>	0.002
<b><u>Latent Intercepts</u></b>						
Mean Anger	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Mean Fear	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>	
Mean Party Support	0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>		0.000 <sup>+</sup>	
<b><u>Fit Indices</u></b>						
$\chi^2$	1566.85		1566.85		1566.85	
	6(df=11		6(df=11		6(df=11	
	6) <sup>***</sup>		6) <sup>***</sup>		6) <sup>***</sup>	
DF	116		116		116	
RMSEA	0.025		0.025		0.025	
CFI	0.975		0.975		0.975	

<sup>+</sup>Fixed parameter

\*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.

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