Cosmopolitan Europeans or Partisans of Fortress Europe?

Supra-national identity patterns in the EU

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Abstract

The European Union is founded on the principles of freedom, democracy and human rights. Yet while internally the principle of free movement reigns, Europe is fortifying its outer boundaries. This paper analyses the question whether we find comparable dynamics in the construction of European identity. More concretely, based on which commonalities and which boundaries do Europeans construct their emerging collective identity? Is European identity one step towards a universalist and inclusive cosmopolitan identity? Or are Europeans partisans of fortress Europe with exclusionary forms of boundary construction? The question of boundaries has an external as well as an internal dimension: externally it concerns the question who would be admitted as new member states. Internally it refers to others within, to cultural diversity which is mainly created by immigrants’ inflow. In order to analyse these dimensions I will build upon socio-psychological insights into mechanisms of in- and out-group building as well as upon the debate on different constructions of national identity. Empirically Eurobarometer data on the 27 member states from the last decade will be analysed. The extent of European and cosmopolitan identification is set in relation by analysing in more details how European identity is filled. This regards first different references made in respect to the content or central markers of European identity. Secondly, concerning the boundaries, I especially differentiate between attitudes towards potential new member states as well as those towards European and non-European immigrants of different ethnic and religious origin. A structural equation model finally rounds up the analysed relationships between the identity patterns in a comprehensive manner. The results show that emotional European and cosmopolitan identification have increased in the past decade and that both kinds of supra-national identity go hand in hand. Yet, the kind of European identity construction makes a difference. As expected, there is an especially strong and positive relationship between a civic construction of European identity and cosmopolitanism, and a negative one between ethnic elements of EU identity and cosmopolitanism. Surprisingly, a cultural European identity is less, but still positively related to cosmopolitanism. However, the widespread cosmopolitanism in Europe still has to work out its relationship to the existing external and internal boundaries drawn by European citizens.
Introduction

Europe today is bound to be a space of freedom, peace and security. In light of the history of devastating wars between European nation-states, the initial purpose of European integration was to overcome national egoisms and ethnocentrism. According to the Treaties, the European Union is founded “on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” (Article 6 TEU). These are quite universal values with a very inclusive character. Indeed, the number of member states today is more than four times higher than when the European Community was founded by six countries. Thus, on first sight one might conclude that the European Union (EU) is not only on paper, but also in reality an inclusive entity based on postnational, universal values. This assumption concerns first of all legal matters as to the definition who is a member and who is not. The criteria for accession of potential new member states laid down in the treaty of Amsterdam indeed include the above mentioned universal values, but also obligations specific for the EU, such as the ‘acquis communautaire’. This oscillation between universal and particular values is also inherent in the treatment of migration. While internally the principle of free movement reigns, Europe is fortifying its outer boundaries. This shows that already in these policy domains the EU is not necessarily as universalistic as its founding values might suggest.

Yet, the EU is not only a legal entity, but also a community of people. The extent of inclusiveness of the EU is therefore not only legally defined but also dependent on the orientations and convictions of the individuals who make up this entity. The question whether a political community of Europeans, a European ‘demos’, exists that backs up the institutional structure has gained in salience since the elite driven character of the EU has increasingly come under attack. Various analyses found that the ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970) of the first decades slowly withers away (e.g. Kaina 2009: 15-30). Talking about a European ‘demos’ refers to the assumption that the EU, in order to be persistent, has to be based on a community that is held together not only by short-term economic interests, but by long-term support, finally by a European identity. The quest for a European identity advanced to the centre stage of political as well as scientific debates and research on this topic exploded in recent years (Bruter 2005; Cederman 2001; Cerutti and Rudolph 2001; Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frogner 1995, 2008; Fuchs et al. 2009; Herrmann et al. 2004; Kaina 2009; Kantner 2006; Kohli 2000). Mainly two camps formed: those who deny the possibility of such a postnational European identity and those who belief in its possibility and in first evidence of its existence.
Those who are more optimistic about the prospect of a European identity can back up their position by a long research tradition which assumes that regional integration along with globalisation processes produces a postnational, cosmopolitan identity among a wide public. Not only for Europe, but also for other continents, it was anticipated that the more countries penetrate into one another, the more boundaries of nation-states would wither away and the more national loyalty would be superseded by sub-, cross-, trans- and supra-national identities (Galtung 1967). In the same vein, the globalisation literature conjectures that economic globalisation accompanied by increasing interconnectedness of political communities, global migration and communication, leads to a higher degree of mass cultural homogenisation particularly among younger generations, and some degree of value convergence toward universal principles (Dower 2003; Falk 1994; Held and McGrew 2002; Vertovec and Cohen 2002). These tendencies are expected to erode the capacity of nation-states to sustain a singular political identity, eventually leading to the rise of ‘global citizenship’.

On the other side, established national identifications may pose real barriers to the mass development of supranational attitudes including, as a response to supra-national integration and globalisation, a revival of nationalism or a more localised mobilisation effort rather than the rise of a global identity (Keohane and Nye 2000; Scharpf 1999). The sceptics of European identity mainly point to the diffuse and fuzzy boundaries of the EU, its immense cultural diversity and the lack of institutional transparency as well as the lack of democratic and symbolic references for identification offered by the EU; all these aspects would undermine the possibility to construct a common European identity (Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Kielmannsegg 1996; Kohli 2000; Offe 1998; Lepsius 1999; Walkenhorst 1999). The clearly demarcated nation-state offers many more commonalities and historical memories and is therefore the dominant ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) attracting loyalty.

However, conceiving of national and European identities in opposition to each other underestimates the multiple nature of social identities. It is meanwhile well established that an identity shift toward higher levels of the continent or the world need not presume a substantial decrease of identification on lower levels (Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 2008; Diez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001; Herrmann et al. 2004; Marcussen et al. 1999; Marks and Hooghe 2003; Risse 2001; Schlenker-Fischer 2011). Supranational identities oftentimes coexist comfortably with local and national identities. The simultaneous multiplicity of

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1 The introduction of a European Citizenship is an attempt to bolster identification and participation with this particular supranational entity (Jacobs and Maier 1998; Preuss 1998). Its power to redefine collective identities is however limited given that this status still depends on the nationality of a member country and that national states control the access to political membership and ultimately implement rights (Bauböck 1994; Olsen 2011).
collective identities on different levels gives a brighter future to the development of more widespread European identification.

Yet even if European identity is possible and eventually increasing, there is no automatic link between different kinds of supranational identity. Re-inventing political community on the continental level as within the EU certainly means to overcome national boundaries to a certain extent. Thus identification on this level could be closely tied up with cosmopolitan identities. However, this is not necessarily the case. Even if national boundaries are eventually less important within a developing community of European citizens\(^2\), exclusionary tendencies can always be shifted up to the continental level. Such an expectation is nurtured by psychological research which repeatedly underlined that the definition of boundaries is fundamental in the construction of collective identities and in any community building process (Barth 1969; Schlenker-Fischer 2009). Universal values and the community of human beings are expected to be too flou and fuzzy in order to serve as anchors for collective identification (Calhoun 2002, 2003; Cerutti and Rudolph 2001; Spinner-Halev 2008). In addition, collective identities such as European identity can be very differently constructed, with more or less exclusionary consequences (Greenfeld 1999; Brubaker 1999).

The most widespread differentiation on the national level is between ethnic, cultural and civic ways to construct collective identity (e.g. Kymlicka 1999; Shulman 2002). Such different constructions are conceptually also possible on the European level. We cannot automatically assume that a civic European identity prevails among citizens because of the officially universalistic founding values of the EU. Given the ambivalent inclusiveness of European policies, this assumption is even less convincing and apart from some experimental evidence on the question what kind of European identity is predominant (Bruter 2004), this is still an open empirical question.

Therefore the research question of this paper is: which supra-national identity patterns do we find in the European Union and what is their relationship? This involves in a first step an analysis of the extent of emotional identification with Europe and the world as a whole as well as their relationship. In order to assess this relationship in more details it is in a second step instructive to analyse how Europeans construct European identity, what the main content of this collective identity is. Finally, complementing this content oriented analysis of European identity construction, I will ask in a third step: where are the boundaries drawn? Who is ‘the other’ for European citizens? To frame it provocatively: Is the Polish plumber more ‘part of the crew’ than the African refugee due to his European passport? The analysis of content as well as

\(^2\) For the sake of simplicity, I use Europeans and European citizens for citizens of the European Union, thus employing a restricted understanding of Europeans.
boundaries will allow understanding in more details which kind of European identity prevails and what its relationship to cosmopolitan identity is. After a short overview over social-psychological insights into collective identity construction, I derive concrete hypotheses based on the discussion on cosmopolitanism in Europe as well as on tensions in European identity construction ‘from above’. These hypotheses will be empirically tested by analysing public opinion surveys, namely Eurobarometer data from the last decade. Although these surveys are not as complete as I would like, they offer the only representative data available covering the relevant indicators and all EU countries. Wherever appropriate I complement this data with findings from the European Value Studies.

Theoretical framework

Foundations of collective identity construction

Though all kinds of collective identities are contested\(^3\), there are some fundamentals which these phenomena share. In the first place, any identity should not be conceived as static, but as dynamic; no form of identity is ever complete or totally stable. Secondly, identity is not a loose patchwork but a more or less integrated symbolic structure with time dimensions (past, present, future), providing certain continuity and consistency to individuals. The central question is which are the dominant references and how do they change over time and with the changing institutional environment. This refers mainly to the social aspects of identity which originate from different forms of association. Every personal identity is a continuous (re)combination of different identifications of changing, but relatively persistent patterns of references to potential groups of belonging (Duchesne and Frognier 2008: 144). Building on social identity theory (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986; Abrams and Hogg 1999), collective identities are thus defined as individual knowledge about the belonging to a social group, which is endowed with affective and evaluative meaning. This literature underlines that two central operations are necessary for any collective identity construction, namely (1) an internal definition of the in-group, thus certain commonalities to refer to, and (2) an external boundary drawing by constructing outsiders or out-groups.\(^4\) For defining the in-group real or imagined similarities or commonalities are activated and (over-)emphasized, and for demarcation towards the outside accordingly real or imagined differences. With reference to these elements, the individual as

\(^3\) Brubaker and Cooper (2000) offer an instructive critique of the many meanings and uses of the term.

\(^4\) This stems from the assumption that collective identities are fundamentally relational. Philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas, Simone de Beauvois and Jacques Derrida did the theoretical groundwork for this assumption. In terms of method, the breakthrough came within social anthropology. Frederik Barth and his colleagues (1969) underlined that the maintenance of ethnic groups could be studied from the borders, especially in terms of which differences the groups themselves saw as constituting them. Ever since their pioneer work, the process of ‘other-building’ has been considered to be a basic characteristic of any kind of collective identity.
social actor can redefine him/herself; yet this identification usually takes place within
categorizations imposed by various more or less powerful actors.

Different entities may differ in the mix of the traits that form the basis of their unity and
identity. National identity seems to be particularly important since it is at the same time
constitutive for as well as constructed by the state, one of the most important forms of
association. Due to the widespread usage and familiarity of national identity its various ways to
be constructed, its different contents and boundaries, might serve as blueprint for other forms
of association. Research on nationalism was for a long time based on the distinction between
civic, political, or territorial national identity on the one hand and ethnic or cultural nations on
the other hand. This distinction dates back to the beginning of the last century (Meinecke 1907/
1970; see also Kohn 1944) and is still employed and discussed (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Ignatieff
1993). Yet many scholars have already criticised this dichotomy as being too simple
(Greenfield 1999; Brubaker 1999). Nielsen (1999) and Kymlicka (1999), for example, note that
it is a mistake to equate ethnic with cultural nationalism, because they differ according to their
openness to outsiders. Nieguth (1999) similarly calls for unpacking the dichotomy, since
ancestry, race, culture, and territory are analytically distinct bases for national membership.
The main problem with the civic/ethnic dichotomy is that it collapses too much in the ethnic
category. Therefore many scholars meanwhile differentiate three idealtypes, namely an ethnic,
cultural and civic one (e.g. Kymlicka 1999; Nielson 1999; Shulman 2002).\footnote{This is in line with Greenfield’s (1999) collectivistic-ethnic, collectivistic-civic and individualistic-civic types of
nationalism. These models can also be paralleled by different codes of collective identity construction, namely
primordial, traditional and universalistic ones (see Giesen 1999; Schlenker-Fischer 2011).}

The focus of this paper concerns the extent and relationship of broader forms of
association than the nation-state that trigger supra-national forms of identification
encompassing the continental as well as the global level. In the following I will first give a
brief overview on the foundations of global or cosmopolitan identification and the relevant
empirical literature in order to state some hypotheses on its relationship to European identity.
This aim makes it necessary to differentiate in a second step between different ways to
conceive of European identity for which the insights into different ways to construct national
identity will become relevant again.

\textit{Cosmopolitanism and postnational identity in Europe}

Cosmopolitanism as a philosophy urges us all to be ‘citizens of the world’, creating a world-
wide moral community of humanity committed to universal values (e.g. Nussbaum 1997; for
an overview see Carter 2005). Waldron defines cosmopolitans as individuals whose cultural
identities are not defined by any bounded subset of the cultural resources available in the world (1992: 782). This idea is usually contrasted with communitarian theories, in particular ideologies of patriotism and nationalism. Deriving from the Greek cosmos (the universe) and polis (city) cosmopolitanism is usually traced back to Diogenes who called himself a ‘citizen of the world’. The Stoics developed his idea further and stressed that we should conceive of our identity in concentric circles: the first is the self, the next the immediate family, then the extended family, the local group, all co-citizens, countrymen, and lastly humanity. The task of world citizens then becomes to “draw the circles somehow towards the centre, making all human beings more like our fellow city dwellers, and so forth” (Nussbaum 1994: 9). Since philosophical cosmopolitans are moral universalists, they believe that all humans, and not merely compatriots or fellow-citizens, come under the same moral standards. The boundaries between nations, states, cultures or societies in which one happens to be born or situated are morally irrelevant (e.g. Appiah 2006; Nussbaum 1997).

One of the primary goals of founding the European Union was indeed to overcome national egoisms. Along with modernisation, the related functional differentiation and the predominantly economic aims of integration in the beginning, especially functionalists expected spill-over effects to further integration processes. This also meant that ethnic, regional and national particularities would step back, in fact that all collective identities and social categorisations would make place for more individual differentiations and a growing convergence of the member states in all societal spheres accompanied by the strengthening of a European sense of community (e.g. Deutsch 1954; Haas 1964). In fact, some argue today that the spread of a legal order above the nation state paves the way to supplant rights based on membership in a particular national community with rights based on supranational membership or on universal personhood (Soysal 1994). This is close to cosmopolitan citizenship and implies less an overcoming of national citizenship than its embedding and complementing through more universal levels of citizenship (e.g. Benhabib 2004, 2006; Archibugi et al. 1998). In consequence some scholars are convinced that European identity must grow out of a sense of cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006; Beck and Grande 2007; Delanty 2006).

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6 Immanuel Kant has prominently adopted the Stoic ideas. In his 1795 essay on “perpetual peace” he stages a ‘ius cosmopoliticum’ as a guiding principle to protect people from war. He morally grounds this right on the principle of universal hospitality, the duty to aid foreigners who are starving or otherwise suffering.

7 Empirically a concrete step towards cosmopolitanism occurred after the Second World War. As a reaction to the Holocaust and other massacres, the concept of crimes against humanity became a generally accepted category in international law and led, though decades later, to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. The idea is to protect human dignity as a universal value in international law (Beck 2006: 45; Benhabib 2008).

8 This can also be thought in line with a developmental psychology according to which patriotism is a step on the way to cosmopolitanism: as human individuals mature they develop ever wider loyalties and allegiances, starting with attachment to their caregivers and ending with allegiance to humanity at large.
Yet, critics doubt that citizenship beyond a narrow liberal perspective on human rights is viable on a global or on a supranational level. Even more, cosmopolitanism would embody “all the worst aspects of classical liberalism – atomism, abstraction, alienation from one’s roots, vacuity of commitment, indeterminacy of character, and ambivalence towards the good” (Waldron 1992: 764f). Cosmopolitanism would therefore endanger the positive aspects of national citizenship, namely foremost loyalty and solidarity (Carter 2005: 167-176). It might furthermore exaggerate the availability of universal citizenship not marked by ethnicity or other asymmetrically available solidarities (Calhoun 2007: 287). Universality is usually conceived of as being insufficient for identity building since every identity would need a genuine particularity and a boundary towards others. Thus critics refer to the very possibility, but also to the desirability of a truly supranational and universal identity (e.g. Cerutti and Rudolph 2001). Anti-cosmopolitan stances in the moral sphere are especially taken by those communitarians (e.g. MacIntyre 1992) who believe either that our obligations to compatriots and more local people crowd out any obligations to benefit human beings as such or that there are no obligations except where there are close, communal relationships. But also liberals argue that the elimination of particular and motivating attachments to fellow-citizens will render democracy impossible (e.g. Spinner-Halev 2008). Nussbaum is aware of the fact that cosmopolitanism does not offer any easy refuge; “it offers only reason and the love for humanity, which may seem at times less colourful than other sources of belonging” (1994: 11). With Beck we can therefore summarize: “To belong or not to belong, that is the cosmopolitan question” (2003: 45).

Indeed several empirical studies stressed that worldwide there is relatively little identification beyond the nation state. Norris (2000: 161) for example found, based on World Value Survey data, that only 15 percent of the public see themselves as belonging primarily to their continent or the world as a whole. While Norris interprets the differences between generations optimistically and expects an increase of identification with supranational communities in the future, Jung (2008) contradicts this interpretation and discovers instead a life cycle effect. Such findings strengthen those scholars who argue that postnationalism and cosmopolitanism lack empirical support. This critical stance is repeatedly also taken towards the possibility and first evidence of a European identity. The main argument holds that such a postnational identity could never supersede the strong and long established national identities (Kielmansegg 1996; Offe 1998; Scharpf 1999; Lepsius 1999; Zürn 2000).

However, this result has to be taken carefully since identities on different levels do not always stand in an exclusive relationship to each other, which is assumed if only the ‘primary identity’ is taken into consideration. Because of their potentially varying embeddedness,
Herrmann, Brewer and Risse (2004) question a presumed hierarchy between identities. In contrast to the low numbers above, analysing the extent of simultaneous identification with the national and European level, we also have to consider different observations: nearly three quarters of Europeans (73 percent in 2009) feel attached to their nation and to the EU at the same time (Schlenker-Fischer 2010; see also Fuchs et al. 2009: 101). National and European identification in contrast to being antagonistic rather seem cumulative or nested (see also Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Risse 2003). This widespread simultaneous identification has not yet been empirically set in relation to further levels such as the world as a whole. It is an open empirical question to what extent European integration has led to the emergence of supranational identities anchored in Europe itself or constructed with reference to the world. Given Europe’s interconnectedness worldwide and the far reaching advances made in European integration, I assume that the more optimistic camp is right and that we can expect that

(H1a) There is considerably more supra-national identification in Europe today than in the past, including European as well as cosmopolitan identity.

Furthermore, the evidence on nested identities on various territorial levels might be explained by an individually variable disposition to identify with collectives or the underlying general tendency to identify with a remote and abstract – or imagined – group (Duchesne and Frognier 2008). The feeling of belonging to the world would in this perspective be a logical last step in the enlargement of an increasingly inclusive ‘we’ one feels belonging to. This leads to the hypothesis that

(H1b) There is a positive relationship between European and cosmopolitan identity.

Duchesne and Frognier (2008), however, do not only point out to the variable disposition to identify with a group but to a dual nature of identification processes. In the process of concrete community building identification with a specific group is facilitated by the delimitation of the group as the second mechanism in collective identity construction. I therefore venture to dig deeper into the different ways to construct European identity in order to disentangle the various supra-national identity patterns and their compatible or, under certain circumstances, rather competitive relationship. For this endeavour I will differentiate various commonalities and boundaries of European identity as the necessary two ingredients of collective identity construction as specified above.

While there are considerable country differences in this respect, more than a majority display such a multiple identity in 20 out of 25 member states, in seven countries even more than three quarters (Schlenker-Fischer 2011.; see also Fuchs et al. 2009: 102).
Different ways to construct European identity

Different commonalities

A positive relationship between European and cosmopolitan identity might not be straightforward. Even if it is not convincing to conceive of different collective identities always in opposition to each other, we know from the national level that this is nevertheless many times the case. Repeatedly collective identifications are (re-)vived in ways which make them incompatible with others. Re-ethnifications not only appeared in Eastern Europe after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, but we also see them in Western Europe with several movements for autonomy and secession along ethno-regional boundaries, such as in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, Flanders and Wallonia, the Basque country and Catalonia. While mainly directed against the central state, these movements partly also develop as counterreactions to impositions caused by modernisation, globalisation and supranationalisation in the form of the European Union.\footnote{They sometimes also go hand-in-hand with Europeanisation and its promotion of subsidiarity and direct regional subsidies (e.g. Hettlage 1997). Westle (2003: 116) therefore alerts that the overarching aim in Europe to overcome small scale particularities could also lead to the opposite in the long run, to a fragmentation of Europe.}

The emphasis on commonalities and boundaries of a specific community is not limited to subnational or national entities, but also possible on the European level. Conceptualisations of European identity indeed oscillate between the concepts of ‘society’ and ‘community’, in line with the tension between a modernist vision of an individualised world and a communitarian insistence on collective identities and particularities. On the one hand, there is a strong emphasis on universal, democracy related characteristics as they are associated with terms such as ‘postnationality’, ‘open society’ or ‘open republic’ (Dewandre and Lenoble 1994; Habermas 2001; Oberndörfer 1991; Flora 2000; Strath 2000; White 2000). In terms of the different models of national identity construction mentioned above, official European policy is strongly guided by a civic approach. The EU is, after all, a self-proclaimed civic community which respects and promotes its cultural diversity. Politicians and researchers alike most of the time proclaim ‘unity in diversity’ as the core reference for a European identity (e.g. Reif 1993; Kielmannsegg 1996; Lepsius 1999). In order to enhance unity the European Union employs symbols that represent the cultural diversity of its member states. This is exemplified in the flag which includes a star for each original member state, and the anthem which mentions Europe’s cultural diversity. That the fundamental values basic to the whole project of European integration are essentially universalistic was strengthened when after long discussions no reference to God was included in the draft for an EU constitution.
On the other hand, the European Union has also clearly communitarian traits, such as particular conditions for membership (see Westle 2003). Whether a candidate can apply for membership in the EU is less tied to a subjective will or commitment to a political regime form, but in the first place depends on unchangeable conditions such as European geopolitical location. Furthermore membership is collective (accession of states) and in many instances happens without a direct vote of the people concerned. In addition, membership is conceived irredeemable; there are no provisions for exit by or exclusion of single countries.\textsuperscript{11}

Usually communitarian conceptions of collective identity are closely tied to cultural or even ethnic references. Whether it is possible to find a cultural trait that is shared by all Europeans and not shared by any non-Europeans is however widely in doubt (e.g. Neumann 2006: 9). Yet, even if this is in theory difficult to argue, we cannot preclude from the outset that Europeans base their European identity on presumed cultural commonalities. Gerhards (2007) even offers scientific evidence for the conviction that some cultural differences between EU members and other countries seem bigger than differences within the EU. Also Ruiz Jiménez and her colleagues (2004) find that European identity in most countries includes cultural elements such as references to language, culture and history in a similar way to national identities (also Bruter 2004). Because of their particular and exclusive character, such cultural elements of European identity are presumably not compatible with cosmopolitanism. Lastly even common ancestry of all Europeans in opposition to non-European peoples is a possibility to construct a common ground, not unusual in rather right-wing political camps. Even though such a conceptually difficult and normatively highly contestable ethnic element of European identity might be marginal, it might nevertheless trigger consequences for cosmopolitanism, presumably the strongest negative ones. Thus, summing up I hypothesize:

(H2a) A civic construction of European identity is strongly and positively related to cosmopolitanism.
(H2b) A cultural construction of European identity is negatively related to cosmopolitanism.
(H2c) An ethnic construction of European identity is most strongly negatively related to cosmopolitanism.

Different boundaries
The official abstraction of cultural particularities makes the Union in principle open to new members; internally we are meanwhile used to open borders within the EU. In general, a consequently universalistic framing would imply the attrition of any boundary drawing. However, while borders were indeed eliminated between EU member-states, the opening up of

\textsuperscript{11} Westle (2003) points out that these communitarian components are in tension with the growing ‘Vergesellschaftung’ of European societies as well as with the rational universalistic legitimation of the EU.
this internal space of free movement was accompanied by a fortification of its external boundaries. Since the EU deepened with Maastricht, advancing the monetary and further political unification, as well as since it grew considerably to the East including now twelve new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU is also strengthening its outer borders by more restrictive immigration policies towards third country nationals (Hassner 1994; Lavenex 2001). The old picture of ‘fortress Europe’ does not concern the formerly communist East any more, but the migratory movements from developing countries and areas of catastrophes as well as foreign culture areas. In consequence, while Europe is for many worldwide a haven of human rights, peace and liberty, the reality for migrants from non-European countries looks often different. Recurrent pictures of desperate boat people from Africa illustrate this fact sadly. In the sense of Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” (1993), these phenomena are interpreted as the counter-pictures of European identity which would serve to wall-off Europe and its new boundaries (Niethammer 2000). This entails that strengthening European identity would merely transform the excluding and aggressive components of nationalism, which were meant to be overcome by the very European integration process, and revive Eurocentrist orientations.

As mentioned, it is widely assumed that collective identities have their constitutive ‘others’. Who these others are is a question of construction and perception. The size of cultural differences, for example, depends not on some inherent trait, but on how different they are perceived to be. It is an especially interesting question whether also supranational identities have to shore up against someone or something in order to perpetuate themselves (see Abizadeh 2005). The cultural boundaries of Europe are decidedly fuzzy – as any culture is patchy, amorphous and unstable. There are family resemblances between EU countries and their neighbours all around and big changes over time. Since any argument where the boundary of Europe is, is very hard to sustain, we might settle on an empirical fact: if enough people adopt these differences as constitutive of Europe, then that becomes a social fact, and thereby self-fulfilling (see also Westle 2003). This is about forging a ‘we’, this is identity politics at work – with high stakes.

Thus, the empirical question is: how relevant is boundary drawing in Europe? Are ‘us-them’ relations in the EU merely enlarged to include all Europeans while non-Europeans are excluded and thus cosmopolitanism rejected? This concerns two kinds of boundary drawing: on the one hand, external boundaries, who would be accepted as a new member entering the EU; and on the other hand, internal boundaries, where the anchorage point for delimitation is not a territorial state entity but cultural, non-European otherness, mainly of immigrants. Fuchs and his colleagues (1995) offered an instructive analysis in this respect. Their results indeed
show that the migratory movements in Europe brought about a re-drawing of the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’; these boundaries today seem to be less drawn between individual countries than between natives and immigrant foreigners within countries. However, it appears to matter to citizens making this distinction whether immigrants come from outside Europe or from other European countries. In addition, this kind of Eurocentrist attitudes mainly derive from the shared culture of the West, since Northern European and North Americans are evaluated considerably higher than other non European migrants (ibid. 175f). What does the picture look like almost 20 years later? Especially with the heightened salience of the question whether Turkey will become a member of the EU as well as the (at least mediated) increase of tensions between majority populations and immigrant, especially Muslim minorities in several member states, I expect the following:

(H3a) There is a relatively strong external boundary drawing towards countries which are perceived as being culturally non Western.
(H3b) Internally, European citizens clearly differentiate between European and non-European immigrants.
(H3c) Among minority groups, European citizens are least willing to accept Muslims.

These hypotheses contradict any assumption on a close relationship between European identification and cosmopolitanism which explicitly embraces cultural diversity and open borders. If the empirical results are in this line, we have evidence of a widespread ‘fortress Europe’ mentality. If European identity is however constructed in universal terms, such distinctions are minor or even not made at all, i.e. new members would be welcomed with open arms and immigrants would be accepted to a large extent and without major differentiations.

Empirical results: Supra-national identity construction in Europe

European and cosmopolitan identification

Repeating Beck’s “To belong or not to belong is the cosmopolitan question” (2003: 45) – to which territorial level do Europeans actually feel belonging to? As other studies confirmed before, also in 2009 identification with the nation is predominant (95 per cent), closely followed by identification with the region (93 per cent). Yet, simultaneously three quarters of Europeans also feel belonging to Europe and a considerable 65 per cent say that they feel at least somewhat to be a citizen of the world. While comparing the intensity of these identity patterns (see Figure 1) we discover by far stronger identification with the nation and the region, than with the larger communities of Europe or humanity. However, in light of several accounts of a widespread lack of supra-national consciousness it is quite remarkable that a clear majority of Europeans not only identify with Europe, but also feel as citizens of the world.
Figure 1: Identity patterns over different territorial levels (EU27, 2009)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World citizen</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To a great extent</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supranationalists are even more confirmed when we regard the development of European and cosmopolitan identification over time. In spite of considerable ups and downs in the European integration processes – one might only think of the crisis following the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in several countries – the extent of emotional European identification has not decreased in the last decade, rather to the contrary. While in 1999 a majority of 58 per cent of Europeans felt attached to Europe, this majority increased to three quarters in 2009 (see Figure 2). At the same time, the proportion of those who do not feel European decreased from 37 to 23 per cent. This slight increase in European identification did not take place at the expense of national identification. Instead, it is an increase in dual identification with Europe and the nation. This trend was coupled with a decrease in exclusive national identity from 31 percent in 1999 to 20 percent in 2009, when meanwhile 27 member states were included in the surveys (see also Schlenker-Fischer 2010).

Question: (QE4) “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are…” Source: Eb 73.1 (N=26830)

Unfortunately the wording of the question changed in 2009. Instead of asking about feelings of attachment to Europe, now the extent one is feeling European is asked. Yet, since both questions focus on emotional identification in a similar way, the numbers are, in my opinion, comparable.

For a development of identification with the nation and Europe since 1992 see Kaina (2009: 59-62), who uses a more cognitive self-description indicator (“In the near future, do you see yourself as…?”).
What about the development of cosmopolitan identity? Contradicting the small numbers found by Norris (2000) in the mid-1990s, the development of cosmopolitan feeling in Europe over time is impressive: over the past five years there has been an increase in consciousness for the world from 41 per cent in 2005, 56 per cent in 2007 to finally 64 per cent in 2009. Today only a third of Europeans do not sense any belonging to humankind (Figure 3).

These results strengthen our first hypothesis, there is indeed more supra-national identification in Europe today than in the past, including European as well as cosmopolitan identity (H1a). However, disaggregating the European average reveals big differences in the amount of world citizens in each country, ranging from more than 80 per cent in Romania, Malta, Spain and...
Cyprus to less than 50 per cent in East Germany, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The results contradict any modernist expectation that the level of socio-economic development of a country is necessarily connected to cosmopolitan attitudes. They also stand in opposition to widespread assumptions that Central and Eastern European countries have populations whose collective identities are stronger ethno-cultural than those of West European citizens (see also Shulman 2002). These country differences are impressive and it is an interesting question what might cause them. While this would be a promising question for another paper, my focus here is on general European trends.

In the literature, more than country specific influences, individual characteristics such as education, occupation and age are usually detected as primarily influencing cosmopolitan orientations. These factors are indeed significantly correlated to a cosmopolitan orientation (feeling to belong to the world; EU27 in 2009); education exerts the strongest positive influence \((r =0,12)\), occupation also a positive one \((r =0,11)\) and age a negative one \((r = -0,11)\). The younger, the better educated and the higher the occupation, the more Europeans tend to feel belonging to the world. However, cosmopolitan identity is much stronger related to European identity than to these demographics. It makes a big difference for cosmopolitan attitudes if one identifies with Europe or not. On the aggregate European level again, these two forms of supranational identification are strongly and positively correlated \((r =0,46)\) confirming hypothesis (H1b). A majority of Europeans, namely 57,5 per cent, feel simultaneously attached to Europe and the world, while 15 per cent do not identify with either of these two entities. Almost one fifth feels European but not citizen of the world, while only 8,5 per cent feel citizen of the world but not European (Table 1).

**Table 1: European and cosmopolitan identity** (EU 27, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling as a world citizen</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeling European</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>57,5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8,5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson’s \(R = 0,46\) (p<0,01)

*Question:* (QE4) “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are European/ a world citizen”

*Source:* Eb 73.1 (N= 26 830)

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14 The three countries in the survey which are not members of the EU – Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey – also show a high percentage of world citizens, namely 74 per cent and more.

15 This is in line with findings on European identity and its various elements which are hardly influenced by traditional social and demographic variables (Bruter 2004: 208).
This strong positive correlation is slightly weaker in non-EU countries ($r = 0.34$), but still present.\textsuperscript{16} Thus even beyond the borders of the EU, both kinds of supranational identification often go hand in hand.\textsuperscript{17} This speaks for a widespread disposition to identify with a remote collective which seems to be for many enlarged to even include humanity. Does this strong relationship hold for all kinds of European identity construction? An analysis of the content as well as boundaries of European identity is revealing.

\textit{Content of European identity}

In analogy to civic, cultural and ethnic ways to construct national identity we can differentiate between civic elements used for European identity construction such as democratic values and rights, cultural ones including common history and language and ethnic elements based on ancestry and religious heritage (for more details see Shulman 2002: 559; Bruter 2004: 192f). Several indicators of the Eurobarometer are at our disposal in order to determine what people mean by European identity. When asked about the most important elements that go to make up a European identity, democratic values are indeed by far most often mentioned (Figure 5).

Democracy is followed by two other non-cultural traits, namely geography and social protection. Yet with more than 20 per cent mentioning common history and common culture and still almost 8 per cent relating European identity to religious heritage we can see that cultural and even ethnic elements are not absent in the construction of European identity confirming previous findings (Bruter 2004, 2005; Ruiz Jiménez et al. 2004).\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} In Turkey, Croatia and Macedonia – the three non-EU countries included in the survey – 43.6 per cent feel simultaneously European and as a world citizen, while 16.8 per cent reject both identities. Only 6.2 per cent feel European but not citizen of the world, and an impressive 33.3 per cent are world citizens not feeling European.

\textsuperscript{17} Also impressive are the percentages of those in the EU27 who feel belonging to Europe: three quarters also feel as citizens of the world, only one quarter reject this broader identity. 36 per cent of those without European attachment feel as a citizen of the world, against 64 per cent not attached to either entity.

\textsuperscript{18} In addition, here again, we find considerable differences between countries, with almost 80 per cent of the respondents referring to democratic values in Sweden in contrast to only a fourth of the population in Portugal, Poland and Latvia. Yet, as already mentioned, country differences have to be analysed in another paper.
Figure 5: European identity elements (EU27, 2009, percentages)

Question: (QE1) “In your opinion, which of the following are the two most important elements that go to make up a European identity?” Source: Eb 71.3 (N=26830)

However, the predominantly civic framing of European identity does not so neatly hold when assessed in a different way. Directly compared to national identity construction, the characteristics associated with being European do not differ a lot from those used to describe nationality. Citizens’ rights, the prototype of a civic identity construction, is with 29 per cent exactly as important on the European as on the national level. Feeling (European or nationality) and place of birth, which are again typical for civic constructions of collective identities, are slightly less mentioned for European identity than for national identity. More difference is found with respect to cultural elements such as language and traditions; both seem to be less important on the European level, but still 22 and 31 per cent respectively mention these commonalities as anchors for European identity. Even parentage and being Christian, the most exclusive and ethnic way to construct a community, are not much less important on the European than on the national level (Table 2). This evidence has to make us cautious to conclude too fast that European identity construction is, due to its inherent enormous cultural diversity, automatically more inclusive and civic than national identity construction. In contrast it seems that, on average, European identity is in average as inclusively or exclusively constructed as national identities; it also shows a mix of civic, cultural and ethnic elements.

Table 2: Characteristics of European and national identity (EU27, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Cultural traditions</th>
<th>Citizens’ rights</th>
<th>Brought up</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Parentage</th>
<th>Be Christian</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European identity</td>
<td>44,0</td>
<td>37,2</td>
<td>31,0</td>
<td>29,0</td>
<td>26,9</td>
<td>22,1</td>
<td>12,1</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>5,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td>46,3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36,7</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>25,8</td>
<td>31,7</td>
<td>14,2</td>
<td>11,7</td>
<td>4,7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Questions (QE2) “People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONALITY). In your view, among the following, what do you think are the most important characteristics to be (NATIONALITY)?” (QE3) “And in terms of being European, among the following, what do you think are the most important characteristics?” Source: Eb 71.3 (N=26830)
In addition it is an important finding that there is no unanimity with respect to the question what makes up a European identity (see also Westle 2003). This makes the question whether there is more consensus on the boundaries of it, drawn either to the external world or to internal ‘others’, even more relevant.

**Boundaries of European identity**

**External boundary drawing**

As elaborated above, cosmopolitans do not draw boundaries around particular groups but instead think in inclusive terms. Such an outlook applied to the European collective would mean in respect to the external world to accept new members as well as to internally accept newcomers, such as immigrants, and to embrace cultural diversity. ‘Partisans of fortress Europe’ would not easily accept the accession of new member states nor cultural diversity and the arrival of individual newcomers, especially of those without a European background.

Concerning the acceptance of potential new member states, the majority of Europeans make a clear difference between countries in West Europe, such as Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, and those on the Balkans and in Eastern Europe including Turkey (Figure 7). Impressively, only almost half of the population in the EU25 in 2005 was in favour of the meanwhile effectuated accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Whether this has changed since their accession in 2007, leading to a stronger integration into the Union also by the population, unfortunately has not been surveyed yet. However, the results of Gerhards (2007) showing long established cultural differences between old and new member states and Turkey do not render optimistic in this respect.

**Figure 7: External boundary drawing: acceptance of potential new members (EU25, 2005, percentages)**

*Question:* “For each of the following countries, would you be in favour of or against it becoming part of the European Union (in the future)?” *Source:* Eb 64.2
Given the unanimity of accepting the accession of Norway, Switzerland and Iceland, we might conclude that there are common justifications for defining the external borders of the EU. However, even if these countries would be accepted by a big majority, this inclusion is not necessarily coupled by common exclusion criteria. Except for Turkey and Albania, the population of the ten new member states are clearly more in favour of the accession of the potential candidates from the Balkans and Eastern Europe than the six founding member states (Kaina 2009: 137f). In addition, the concrete reasons why some are included and others excluded vary considerably (ibid. 139-142).

EU citizens are thus far from accepting every possible accession candidate. Cosmopolitanism combined with open borders towards all humankind would look different. A majority of Europeans agree to specific further enlargements, they do not regard the external boundaries of the EU today as fixed. However, this acceptance is very limited; no majority is in favour of including any other country than the Western European countries not members of the EU so far. Boundaries are drawn to the external world, even if not in a uniform way. Still, those who would accept Turkey are a minority, but with 31 per cent not an irrelevant one; and the more inclusively oriented minority is even bigger for all other countries. Thus, we can see a certain divide among European citizens in respect to this external boundary drawing, with a big minority thinking very inclusively and a majority being more hesitant towards further enlarging the EU to the East and South. The results for this majority thus support our hypothesis that there is a relatively strong external boundary drawing towards countries which are perceived as being culturally non Western (H3a).

As elaborated above, inclusiveness does not only concern the exterior, but especially in our times of large international migration, a delimited entity can be internally more or less inclusive. I therefore look in a last step at the extent to which different groups of immigrants and cultural diversity in general are accepted by European citizens.

Internal boundary drawing
Again, when asked whether they embrace cultural diversity, Europeans are divided. In 2009 half of them embrace cultural diversity and say that different ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of their country. In contrast, a third disagrees with this statement, 12 per cent say this depends on specific conditions and four per cent are not decided. These proportions are impressively constant over the past ten years, they were exactly the same in 1999. However, these European averages again conceal considerable country differences. While a large majority in Sweden, namely 80 per cent, tend to embrace cultural diversity, the same large majority tend to reject it in Malta. Malta is extreme in this respect, but also in Greece, Cyprus
and Austria only less than a third perceive the existence of different ethnicities in their country positively. These differences show that there is no consensus as to whether cultural diversity in general should be embraced or not. It is therefore difficult to generalize on this aspect of cosmopolitanism, i.e. acceptance of cultural diversity, and talk about any dominant perspective among EU citizens as a whole. Eventually some further differentiations offer valuable clues.

This general question might hide a more differentiated pattern of accepting cultural diversity, namely one which distinguishes between different kinds of minorities. In most European countries, ethnic minorities mainly arise by different kinds of immigration. If there is something like fortress Europe in the minds of Europeans, we should be able to discover a differentiation between different circles. First of all, people would make a difference between migrants from EU countries and those coming from outside of the EU. Furthermore it is interesting whether this would mark a clear-cut differentiation or whether there are several boundaries drawn in the sense of concentric circles. This would imply to differentiate again, for example, between migrants from Eastern Europe and others. Or whether it is less about where people come from geographically than more about their different religion. Whether these assumptions stand empirical scrutiny shows the following figure.

Figure 8: Acceptance of different groups of immigrants (EU15, 2000, percentages)

17 6  20,5  27,8  25,5  39,7  58,4  59,7  55,2  57,3  46,5  77,3  7,1  6,4  7,1  6,8

Questions: “If people from Muslim countries wish to work here in the European Union, do you think that they should ... “ “And what about people coming from Eastern Europe who wish to work in the West?”, “And what about people fleeing from countries where there is a serious international conflict?”, “And what about citizens of other countries of the European Union, who wish to settle in (OUR COUNTRY)” Source: Eb53 (2000, Q54-58), N= 16078

As for the fifteen old member states in 2000, we can say that indeed European migrants are clearly more accepted without restrictions (almost 40 per cent) than all other kinds of migrants. The group least accepted without restrictions (under 18 per cent) are Muslim migrants without

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19 Unfortunately, this differentiated evaluation of immigrants from different countries has not been assessed in the new member states.
any specifications why they migrate. Taking together conditional and unconditional acceptance, Muslims again are the least liked ones with 76 per cent accepting them compared to 80 per cent for Eastern Europeans, 82.8 for Asylum seekers, 83 for refugees and, again the highest acceptance, 86 per cent for EU migrants. Still, it is relatively surprising that the difference in the overall acceptance of EU migrants and other migrants is with max. 10 per cent not huge. This difference could merely be interpreted as a hint towards the existence of fortress Europe; we can not (yet) discover clear-cut internal boundaries including migrants from EU countries and excluding all other migrants. European citizens thus differentiate between European and non-European immigrants (H3b), however the difference is not very big.

The results furthermore show that for a considerable part of Europeans religious background indeed seems to be important. The relative highest rejection of Muslim migrants confirms analyses of Islamophobia in Europe to a certain extent and one might expect that the figure would be a lot higher if this question was raised after the terrorist attacks of September 2001. Unfortunately, the same question has not been asked in more recent surveys. However, we can use instead a widespread indicator of prejudice, namely the acceptance or rather rejection as neighbours of members of specific groups or with specific stigmata raised by the European Value Survey (Figure 9). In 2000, Muslims were mentioned by 17.3 per cent of the population in the then 25 member and accession states. This percentage has indeed raised by 6 per cent points to 23 per cent in the EU27 in 2008. This rejection rate is higher than the rejection of immigrants and guest workers in general (17.7 per cent) and of those with a different race (13.7 per cent). Yet, in comparison to other stigmatised groups, for example drug addicts or people with a criminal record, this rejection rate is much lower. It is also by far overtaken by the rejection of Gypsies which are mentioned by almost 40 per cent of the respondents. This minority spread over many member states continues to be one of the most vulnerable and discriminated groups in Europe.
**Figure 9: Rejection as neighbors (EU27, 2008, percentages)**

**Question:** “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?” **Source:** European Value Study, 4th wave, 2008.

These results are strengthened and even more pronounced referring to the same question in the Eurobarometer (Figure 10). Only 33 per cent of the respondents in the EU27 in 2008 feel comfortable with a Roma as a neighbour. The acceptance of homosexuals is also surprisingly low with only about half of the population, lower than the acceptance of people of different ethnic origin (61 per cent). People with a different religion or belief are even more widely accepted as neighbours (67 per cent). In light of these results, we have to reject our hypothesis that among minority groups, European citizens are least willing to accept Muslims (H3c).

**Figure 10: Acceptance as neighbors (EU27, 2008, percentages)**

**Question:** “For each of the following situations, please tell me how you would personally feel about it. (from very uncomfortable to totally comfortable) Having a … as a neighbour.” **Source:** Eb 69.1 (N=26746)
Analysing the influence of different identity patterns on the acceptance of migrants we find that those who identify exclusively with Europe are twice as willing as those with exclusive national identification to accept all kinds of migrants without restrictions. Those with dual identification with both territorial levels lie in between. Exclusive national identity is also constantly more related to rejecting migrants of all kinds. Thus, the more Europeans identify with Europe, the more they embrace cultural diversity – and vice versa. Yet, among all identity patterns, we find considerably more acceptance of EU migrants than of others.

In addition to the repeated pattern of more acceptance of EU migrants, more than a third (36 per cent) of the citizens in the old member states in 2000 think that there are too many non EU immigrants in their country. This conviction is a further hint of the existence of Eurocentrist orientations among a considerably large minority in Europe. Still, a majority (57 per cent) does not think so. However, more recent numbers taken from the European Value Study in 2008 and concerning immigrants in general are more pronounced. 46 per cent of the respondents in the 27 member states say that there are too many immigrants in their country, only 31,3 disagree with this statement and 22,7 per cent are undecided. This shows a further increase in the salience of the issue of immigration and a strong tendency in European societies to shore up against outsiders.

When we consider more down to earth questions that concern the daily life in our multicultural European societies, cultural boundaries are less clearly drawn. An overwhelming majority (80 per cent) does not feel disturbed by the opinions, customs or way of life of people different from themselves, neither of those of another nationality, nor of another race nor religion. Only around 15 per cent say they do indeed feel disturbed by such people, but interestingly, the results are very similar for each group, with even slightly less rejection (of 2 per cent) of people of another religion. In contrast to the results above, this contradicts the widespread assumption of Islamophobia in Europe. Overall, this last indicator draws a picture of Europeans which are in daily life more tolerant towards cultural differences than their general attitude towards immigration and cultural diversity would make us expect.

Overall, however, most indicators of boundary drawing point to the fact that a majority of Europeans delimitate the European in-group to the exterior as well as to the interior. This is in line with the assumptions of social identity theory on the necessity of boundaries for collective identity construction (see also Duchesne and Frognier 2008). These findings show a mixed picture of boundaries drawn around and within Europe which is not so neatly compatible with cosmopolitanism.

20 Asked whether different ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of their society, 55 per cent of those who feel belonging to Europe agree (31 per cent disagree) against only 39 per cent of those who have no European sense of belonging (44 per cent of which disagree).
Relationships between the supra-national identity patterns

So far, I have not yet treated my second hypothesis, split into three statements concerning the relationship between different kinds of European identity construction and cosmopolitanism. For this endeavour, we have to analyse these constructs with the help of a synthesizing empirical method. The reflections on the relationship between European and cosmopolitan identification as well as on different content and boundaries can be captured in a structural equation model (Figure 12). Such a model allows analysing various relationships as well as measuring various latent constructs, in our case various forms of collective identity, by several indicators simultaneously. The aim is to evaluate whether different types of European identity constructions differently influence cosmopolitanism and thus whether the strong influence of emotional identification with Europe on cosmopolitan identity found above is mediated by these various forms of European identity construction.

Cosmopolitanism, civic as well as cultural European identity constructions are each measured with two indicators derived from the discussion above. Cosmopolitanism encompasses the feeling as a world citizen as well as the acceptance of cultural diversity (“minorities enrich the life of our country”). Civic European identity is measured by reference to democratic values and citizens’ rights as the most important elements of European identity. Cultural European identity again is based on the mentioning of common cultural traditions and common history as the basis of European identity. Confirmatory factor analysis scores of more than .3 allow considering these latent variables to be sufficiently measured by the selected indicators (see Brown 2006). An ethnic construction of European identity is based on the reference to ancestry (European parentage) as basis of European identity; a similar second indicator was unfortunately not available.

The evaluation of this model relies on the accepted standards of Hu and Bentler (1999): A CFI above 0.90, an RMSEA below 0.06 and an SRMR below 0.08 indicate acceptable model fit. The global fit measures of our model indicate that we can indeed draw conclusions from this model to reality. The analyses are based on covariance matrices and robust maximum likelihood estimates using AMOS. Already with this restricted selection of influencing factors we can explain 39 per cent of the variance in cosmopolitanism. However, the large residuals also draw to our attention that many other factors influence these complex identity patterns.

This model demonstrates that the different ways to construct European identity indeed influence cosmopolitanism differently. A civic European identity has a strong and positive influence on cosmopolitanism \((r = .55)\), confirming hypothesis (2a). The second hypothesis expected that a cultural construction of European identity is negatively correlated with cosmopolitanism \((H2b)\). To our surprise, this is not the case and we have to reject this hypothesis. Also here we find a positive though clearly less strong relationship with
cosmopolitanism ($r = .27$). This finding is puzzling and calls for more detailed analysis what kind of cultural traditions people have in mind when they think of such commonalities on the European level. We can assume that these traditions refer among others to a common political culture. This might explain the positive relationship to cosmopolitanism. Finally, in accordance with our expectation, an ethnic European identity is negatively related to cosmopolitanism ($H2c$). However, this negative relationship is not very strongly ($r = -.08$), leaving considerable room for a very exclusive construction of European identity and simultaneous attachment to the idea of a world citizen. In these cases the exclusionary tendencies of ethnic nationalism is simply enlarged to the European level and at the same time embedded in a broader community of humankind; or this puzzling combination is simply due to hypocrisy.

**Figure 12: Relationship between European identity constructions and cosmopolitanism (EU27, 2009)**

All regression coefficients are significant on the 0.01 level.

**Model Fit Measures**

CFI = .901; SRMR = .0239; RMSEA = .040; PClose = 1.00; CMIN/DF = 46.758

*Source*: Eb 73.1 (2009, N = 28 960)

Including the classically assumed influencing factors education and age (for a better readability of the figure not shown in the model here) they have surprisingly little effects. Education has a small positive influence on a civic frame of EU identity as well as on cosmopolitanism and age has a slightly negative effect on these constructs. Thus the different ways to construct European identity are stronger related to cosmopolitanism than these classical socio-demographic controls. However, we have to be cautious about interpreting the direction of the causal path. Indeed, cosmopolitanism is influencing the different elements of European identity.
construction in exactly the same way and in almost the same strength. Thus we have equivalent models which are confirmed by the data. In order to find out the final causality between these correlations and the most valid model, we would need panel data or experiments. With the data at hand we can thus not decide what comes first, a cosmopolitan or a civic European identity. It might well be that finally both constructs are influenced by deeper value orientations such as universalism which is one of ten basic human value types postulated by Schwartz (1994). Conversely, an ethnic construction of European identity might be based on Eurocentrist convictions in parallel to nationalist orientations which again are known to be related to deeper ethnic prejudices (e.g. Wagner et al. 2010), motivating some to reject cosmopolitanism stronger than others who use the same frame of European identity. Yet overall, and for our research question most importantly, we can retain that there are remarkable relationships between the different ways to construct European identity and cosmopolitanism which go in the expected directions except for the unexpectedly positive relationship between cultural European identity and cosmopolitanism.

Conclusion

The analysis in this paper allows drawing several conclusions and, at the same time, leaves us with important open questions. First of all, an impressively large majority of Europeans today manifest supra-national identities. Almost two thirds feel simultaneously European and citizens of the world without actually loosing their attachment to national or regional entities. Thus, multiple identities on different territorial levels including the global level are widespread in Europe today. Furthermore, European and cosmopolitan identification measured on the emotional level go hand in hand, they are strongly and positively correlated. Thus to leave the national frame of reference and to enlarge collective identity construction in order to include other Europeans indeed seems to be one step in the direction of including all humankind into one’s consciousness. Emotionally, a majority of Europeans are cosmopolitans and from first sight no partisans of fortress Europe.

The picture becomes more complicated when one digs deeper into the question on what commonalities and boundaries these emotional identification patterns rest, i.e. how the emerging European identity is concretely constructed. Civic elements such as peace and democracy are indeed very important references made when Europeans think of their common identity. However, common culture and history are also important. Thus European identity seems to be constructed – as we know it from national identities – by referring to a mix of civic, cultural and – though to a clearly less degree – even ethnic elements. Still, civic elements dominate on the European level. However, without going back as far as to the very exclusive
form of democracy in ancient Athens we know that also civic elements such as democratic values can be applied to a clearly demarcated entity with restrictive membership rules. And indeed, the majority of Europeans are far from propagating open borders, neither for every potential new member state nor for all kinds of newcomers to their society. Western European countries would be accepted into the EU, neighbours further to the East overwhelmingly not. This is thus no sign of a cosmopolitan construction of the European community but a particular and demarcated conception of it which is rooted in Western Europe.

With respect to boundaries which are drawn within European societies and which concern different immigrant groups, the results showed that EU migrants are indeed more accepted than others. Thus the Polish plumber seems to be more ‘part of the crew’ than the African refugee due to his European passport. However, the difference is not very big and certainly does not mark a clear inclusion of all Europeans and exclusion of non-Europeans. Large majorities accept at least with restrictions also Eastern Europeans, Muslims or refugees, exhibiting a considerable degree of conditional openness to all kinds of immigrants. However, the impression that there are too many immigrants rose in the past decade considerably. Still, so far, although half of the Europeans do not embrace cultural diversity warm-heartedly, they would not go as far as to really (and openly) favour a fortress Europe with impassable borders around and within European societies. People with different ethnic or religious origin, also Muslims, are by large majorities accepted with the important exception of Roma. The open rejection of this widespread minority group calls for more scientific and political attention. Apart from this exception, Eurocentrist constructions of European identity are (so far) in a minority. This reminds us that there is a lot of space for wise political decisions and constructive solutions for the sensitive challenges and problems created by immigration and xenophobia in European societies.

Again, Europeans are not receiving everybody with open arms, but especially those who identify with this culturally diverse Europe are open to others and proofed to be rather cosmopolitans. This is especially the case for those who construct European identity in a civic way, or in whose European identity civic elements predominate. But even a cultural construction of European identity does not necessarily stand in the way of developing cosmopolitanism – in contrast to ethnic elements in European identity construction which usually do not go hand in hand with cosmopolitan identity. However, repeatedly it became evident that it is difficult to talk about European averages. Country differences in the extent of cosmopolitan identity, democratic values for European identity construction as well as acceptance of cultural diversity are immense and call for further explanation. Thus in spite of the need to transcend national boundaries in research on postnational identity, it seems to be
necessary to analyse influencing factors on the national level and to find out national particularities which might be especially prone to lead to cosmopolitanism.

For our analysis in this paper we can conclude that a kind of demarcated cosmopolitanism prevails among Europeans and especially among those who also emotionally identify with this postnational entity. The results concerning still existing boundaries around and within European societies might make us interpret this finding as bigotry. A more generous interpretation might take into account the way we are used to think of democracy. The widespread demarcation tendencies might exist not in spite of the big relevance of democratic values among the European public, but precisely because of it. Theoretically as well as empirically, we are thus far used to think of democratic rule within a demarcated political community; the demos is conceived of as a demarcated entity constituting the sovereign of political rule. It might therefore be only logic for Europeans who value democracy that it should be implemented in a demarcated political community on the European level as well. This need for demarcation might also be strengthened by the widespread conviction that collective identities need external boundaries, even though in theory this does not necessarily have to be the case (see Abizadeh 2005). The results show that boundaries (still) exist in Europe, to the outside as well as with reference to internal others. Thus, widespread cosmopolitan orientations do not necessarily bring about the erosion of demarcation, rootedness and community building on lower levels.

This nuanced picture of cosmopolitanism in Europe and simultaneous boundary drawing allows cautious conclusions in respect to supra-national forms of governance in this region. On the one hand, on the basis of the widespread feeling to belong to the world as a whole we can expect a considerable concern about issues that transcend national and even continental borders such as environmental protection. On the other hand, the majority of political issues should be treated within familiar political communities, may they be national ones or increasingly European one. Such an approach would be in line with the subsidiarity rule which is applied in European affairs and which is proposed to be enlarged by scholars on cosmopolitan democracy (Held 2003; Archibugi and Held 1998; for their explicit application to democracy in the EU see Eriksen 2006; Eriksen and Fossum 2007; Olsen 2011). The postnational identity patterns empirically detected in this paper are compatible with an innovative enlargement of such institutional arrangements.

Thus overall, it seems too idealistic to expect Europeans to be citizens of the world without still referring to a demarcated community. The evidence in this paper points to the necessity to demarcate political communities. However, we still have ample work to do to conceive of visions and concrete implementations of citizenship and political community.
beyond the nation-state in imaginative ways, thus to offer institutional, democratic and symbolic references for Europeans and individuals worldwide who identify as world citizens and would still like to preserve a bounded political community integrated in and able to act on different levels of political rule. With respect to Europe and the prevailing collective identity we can pursue several avenues since Europe’s identity is tied to Europe’s relations not only to the external world and its internal social others; the relationship to its own past is also highly important. For some people, the European heritage has to do with the triumph of secularism over faith, so Enlightenment thinking and intellectual life are the cornerstone and ideal. For others, Europe’s historic lessons come mainly from the painful experiences and barbaric excesses against humanity before and during the Second World War (Habermas 2001). This kind of boundary construction involves former generations, regimes and political ideologies against which an in-group might be defined as being different from the former. This would lend the necessary demarcation to universalistic values without creating a living out-group except those who still adhere to similar values like those of former generations. There is no necessary zero-sum relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism. The future of supra-national identities is more related to the question to which extent cosmopolitanism is conceptualized as a positive form of belonging rather than as the absence of particularism.
References


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