Organized hypocrisy or multiple actors and centres of agency? Examining the competitive arena for normative change processes in the area of peacekeeping

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Paper presented at the
ECPR General Conference Reykjavik 2011
25th – 27th August 2011

Section: Open Section - 110


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Word count: 7285

Abstract
How does normative change occur in IOs? Previously IO behaviour has been theorized as a consequence of the interest of powerful states, but recent literature has begun to unpack the processes of normative change in IOs, and according agency in normative change processes elsewhere than to member states and powerful states. This has been done with concepts borrowed from organizational sociology related to bureaucratic dysfunction such as ‘dysfunctional behaviour’, ‘pathologies’, or ‘organized hypocrisy’. In the area of UN peacekeeping operations, the UN bureaucracy itself with the Secretary-General have been argued as norm entrepreneur. The paper will agree to this bottom-up perspective on normative formation, but also propose that there is a complex interplay between external and internal actors in the normative change processes in the UN, and that policy alliances formed by active small states such as Norway, think-tanks and NGOs may have an impact on the normative development. The paper will use the sociology of professions and the concept of ‘revolving doors’ to theorize normative change processes in the area of peacekeeping. Finally, the paper will question of what kind of legitimacy norms hold that may not have been initiated, nor developed by member states per se in the UN system, but generated through practices in the field and at headquarters, as well as by active small states.

Keywords: peacekeeping, organizational behaviour, professions, practices, organized hypocrisy, pathologies, normative change, legitimacy.
1. Introduction

Existing theory, looking at agency in international organizations, has so far mostly been concerned with the interest of states, and particularly powerful ones. In recent years increasing autonomy and indirect agency has been accorded to IOs in constructivist literature, looking at how IOs at times act in contradiction to prescripts set by its constituencies — the member states. These instances of agency have been described as ‘dysfunctional behaviour’, ‘pathologies’,¹ or ‘organized hypocrisy’.² Other authors have sought to expand the notion of agency in IOs and looked how individuals can constitute a viable unit of analysis, proposing that the UN Secretary-General can be considered a norm entrepreneur.³

This paper will seek to further refine some of these analyses. It will agree that there is autonomy in IOs, displayed as controversial behaviour, but it will seek to expand the analytical framework and also see how instances of controversial action also may be an expression of conflicting norms. The paper will argue that norms wax and wane in the international system, and that small and large member states, academic institutions, think-tanks and individuals at key positions play a role in the normative change processes that are taking place. The paper will use UN peacekeeping as a case study to further explore these phenomena.

The paper will outline some of the existing theories for understanding the behaviour of IOs in the second section. Tracing normative change processes in IOs have so far been covered only to a limited extent in the extant literature. As mentioned above, there have been some recent attempts to broaden our understanding in strands of rationalist and constructivist literature, and in recent years there has also emerged some literature looking at organizational learning in the UN, and in particularly in peacekeeping, that is very relevant.⁴ These strands of literature have in common that they are describing autonomy and agency within IOs, but looking at the area of UN peacekeeping, this paper would argue that there is a need to further refine the analysis to discern who the main actors with agency are, and to have a more refined analysis of the consequences of the actions of these actors. In existing literature, the actions are generally described with morally laden terms, such as bureaucratic spoiling, dissent-shirking, obstruction, sabotage, pathological behaviour, and organized hypocrisy.⁵ This paper will not deny that this kind of behaviour is taking place, but will try to better explain the conflicting normative pressures that exist, and how these norms evolve and change.

³ Ian Johnstone, "The Secretary-General as norm entrepreneur: Secretary or General?," in *Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics*, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge University Press, 2007).
This paper will argue that the UN, in the area of peacekeeping, can be understood as a competitive arena, where several policy alliances, frequently in competition with each other, are competing to frame issues and build support for new norms, concepts and rules. These norms, concepts or rules may be advanced on altruistic grounds, or to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization. To theorize these phenomena, the paper will turn to the sociology of professions to describe how different professional environments can make policy alliances to advance new norms, prescripts, rules and concepts. To exemplify these theoretical arguments, the paper will in the third section use the advancement of the norm of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the concept of ‘integrated missions’ as examples.

The paper will then, in its fourth section, turn to the question of legitimacy of the norm development processes it has sought to describe in the two preceding sections. If normative development not is the result of the common will of the member states of the UN, but rather a result of policy alliances formed to advance particular norms, are then these norms legitimate? The paper will argue that indeed, even if the norms may be the result of the work of a limited number of actors that may not be representative of the collective will of the organization, there also has to be a certain ripeness for a new norm to emerge. If not, counter pressures will be sufficiently strong to stop the advance of the norm in question.

Finally, the paper will argue that there is a need for a more pluralistic and complex understanding of normative development in IOs. While there is clearly many examples of dysfunctions, pathologies, and organized hypocrisy, there are also instances of practical innovation to overcome challenges and bending of rules in order to achieve a positive impact and improve the lives of others. States are not the only actors, NGOs, academic institutions, think-tanks, sections within the UN and powerful individuals are active constituents and guardians of the values of the organization. The working level is particularly important.

2. Understanding anomalous behaviour and normative change in IOs

IOs’ behavior can be explained using rational theory that describes behavior and practices of IOs as a functional consequence of the influence of powerful member states. 6 Rational institutionalism is interested in how states can minimize transaction costs through the functional design of IOs, but do not accord significant agency to the IO or their constituent parts. As these theories do not ascribe agency to IOs, they have difficulty in explaining instances where IOs act in contradiction to the intention of member states and even powerful member states. As Barnett and Finnemore have observed, drawing upon the work of Weber, the problem with these theories is that they pay “little attention to how IOs actually behave after they are created.” 7

Theorising IOs as bureaucracies

Examining IOs as bureaucracies, Barnett and Finnemore give examples of IOs and their staff acting autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated at their foundation, showing that


7 Barnett and Finnemore, "The politics, power.": 699. In the extant literature there are examples of cooperation between rational and constructivist theorists to explain anomalous behavior in IOs. See e.g. Nielsen, Tierney, and Weaver, "Bridging the rationalist–constructivist divide: re-engineering the culture of the World Bank."
IOs are capable of creating their own norms, rules, and practices independent of, and unintended by, their creators. Bureaucracies are composed of rules and are constantly reinterpretating old rules and producing new rules, defining the behaviour of the organisation, its officials and member states alike. Rules are explicit or implicit norms and regulations guiding, proscribing or prescribing action, defining the world and constitutive of the identity and culture of the organisation. The rules and norms of the organisation is more than bound rationality, distinct from its environment, they shape the rationality of the actors of the organisation and guide individual action. The relationship between rules and bureaucrats is mutually constitutive and dynamic, and at a given time several rules may be applicable. Dysfunctional behaviour based on bureaucratic culture may occur when the IO must make difficult choices where several imperatives may apply at once. Barnett and Finnemore identifies five mechanisms that can generate pathologies in IOs: 1) Irrationality of rationalisation; 2) Bureaucratic universalism; 3) Normalisation of deviance; 4) Insulation; and 4) Cultural contestation. The authority of the organisation establishes the basis for autonomous action and IOs may choose ways to solve problems which may not be in line with espoused goals.

Central to their study is what they identify as dysfunctional and pathological behaviour by the UN Secretariat in e.g. its handling of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Barnett and Finnemore show how the application of formal and informal rules of the organisation can result in dysfunctional and even pathological action and behaviour. According to Barnett and Finnemore, the decision of the UN Secretariat not to push for an intervention by the Security Council in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was based on the Secretariat’s assessment that strong states such as the US wanted to stay out of the conflict, particularly as this was shortly after the failure of Somalia, and that the likely failure of such an operation would be detrimental for the organisation. While this demonstrates that IOs have agency and can act in contradiction to the will of its member states, even powerful ones, it also underlines the difficult balancing act IOs must do in order to not betray their ideals.

**Critique of current theorisation of the UN as a bureaucratic international organisation**

However, there are several major flaws with the theoretical approach of Barnett and Finnemore. First, by arguing that dysfunctions and pathologies take place, they presuppose that the UN can be understood as one unitary actor, i.e. saying one thing and doing another. Still using constructivism as a methodological foundation, this paper argues for a more nuanced approach and hold that the UN, in the area of peacekeeping, cannot be seen as one unitary actor, but as an organisation with several sources of agenda and agency. In the area of peace operations, the UN consists of a range of different bodies, each with its particular dynamics, membership and staff. The Security Council is the most important actor and volumes have been written about the role of the Council with regards to peacekeeping. The General Assembly and the C-34 Committee on Peacekeeping meets yearly and discusses matters pertaining to peacekeeping. In addition, the General Assembly also has plenary

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8 Barnett and Finnemore, *Rules for the world*.
9 Ibid., 39-40.: pp. 39-40.
10 Ibid..
11 Lipson, "Peacekeeping: Organized hypocrisy?.
discussions on peacekeeping matters from time to time, e.g. the discussion on the Responsibility to Protect in 2009.13

Secondly, by employing the concept of bureaucratic culture and stressing the uniformity of action that this imposes on UN staff, Barnett and Finnemore also disregards the potential impact that other actors have on the normative formation of peacekeeping. The Secretary-General can act as a norm entrepreneur and uses high-level panels composed of Statesmen, member state diplomats, and prominent researchers to advance thinking on topics of particular concern.14 The Secretariat sought to rebuild its authority after Rwanda and Srebrenica through the use of issuance of reports, best practices and lessons learned.15

Peacekeeping as organised hypocrisy?

Looking at peacekeeping missions after the Cold War, Lipson displays a more nuanced view of the divergence between talk and action, showing how organised hypocrisy, a term borrowed from the organisational sociologist Brunsson,16 can be a pervasive feature of IOs. Referring to the studies of Dijkzeul and Beigbeder,17 as well as Barnett and Finnemore,18 Lipson argues that while organised hypocrisy can be a source of failure in the UN and other international organisations, it can also at times even be desirable as a solution to responding to conflicting material and normative pressures.19

Drawing upon Brunsson and Krasner, Lipson shows how the UN displays signs of both ‘organization of hypocrisy’ and ‘organized hypocrisy’,20 a distinction that fundamentally rests upon a differentiation between open and closed systems. The UN, with its many sources of agenda and agency, can display both forms of hypocrisy. Organisation of hypocrisy refers to the internal divergence of rhetoric and action, e.g. where different parts of the organisation are may pursue different, and at times conflicting agendas21. According to Brunsson, organised hypocrisy is a result of a decoupling between the rhetoric and behaviour of an organisation, i.e. in the outputs of the organisation, which he defines as talk, decisions and action.22 Talk and decisions compensate for the lack of action, or for actions that are in contradiction with the talk and decisions of the organisation. The failures of the peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Rwanda provide stark examples of this, but this is also a problem which has been noted as a consistent problem in literature on UN peacekeeping.23 Lipson argues that:

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14 Kofi A. Annan, "Foreword," in Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics, ed. Simon Chesterman (Cambridge University Press, 2007).: xii; Johnstone, "Secretary or General?".
18 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules for the world..
19 Lipson, “Peacekeeping: Organized hypocrisy?.”.
20 Ibid..
21 Brunsson originally used the term ‘organizational hypocrisy’, but changed to ‘organized hypocrisy’ after Krasner coined this term in his work on sovereignty as organised hypocrisy (1999).
22 Brunsson, The organization of hypocrisy..
23 See e.g.Bruce D. Jones, Richard Gowan, and Jake Sherman, "Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty," (New York University, 2009); UN, A more secure world: our shared responsibility:
organized hypocrisy is evident in the continued assertion of the norms of consent, impartiality and force only in self-defense as fundamental principles of peacekeeping while at the same time, when push comes to shove, either these principles or the mission itself is abandoned.  

Sociology of Professions as an analytical framework

According to Abbott, “professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases”. Control of the occupation relies on control of the abstractions which generate practical technique and implementation – in other words control of the profession-specific practices and concepts. In similar terms to Weber, Abbott identifies jurisdiction as the central connecting element between a profession and its work. Professions have both an organisational and a performative aspect, according to Molander and Terum. Professions are exclusive occupational groups who try to achieve control over certain tasks due to their skills, specialist education and the organisation that they work for. Since professions have internal control over their tasks this also implies that they have a certain degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state, or in the case of the UN, the member states. Furthermore, a profession will seek to have jurisdictional control of the defined tasks, legitimised through expert authority and the delegation of these tasks by the member states. Members of a profession also have a collective ‘fiduciary responsibility’ – the relationship between the profession and the member states, as well as other stakeholders, is based on the trust that the members will execute their tasks according to their mandate. This implies the need for self-control and penalisation of members of the profession that break the professional code to retain legitimacy. Finally, a profession is also a collective actor and will act as such when defending its tasks and legitimacy.

Practices constitute the performative aspect of professions. According to Abbott, “professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases”. Professions execute services to clients. The services are solutions to particular specialised problems requiring particular knowledge and leading to change. The tasks or problems are often complex and require the use of common sense. This also implies that the actions taken to solve the problem may be wrong, and the responsibility for the action lies with the professional. Over time, professions thus become communities of practice, gathering best practices and lessons learned which together with established rules, norms and values that form the direct repository of guidance and constitute jurisprudence for future problem-solving actions.

Barnett and Finnemore tend to look at how IOs as bureaucracies establish “jurisdictional competency” or rational-legal authority in their areas of expertise, excluding from their
analysis how bureaucratic control of a policy area tend to be created in close cooperation with think-tanks, donor governments and other actors who have similar interest in the area of discussion. Barnett and Finnemore do make reference to the importance of the external environment, but do not investigate this matter at any depth.

In the area of peacekeeping the UN has been reliant upon funding and support from donor governments to develop doctrine and best practices since the end of the Cold War.\(^{31}\) Staff have been moving through ‘revolving doors’ between being practitioners in IOs, policymakers at think-tanks and officials in government institutions. Middle powers and donor governments like the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have pushed the development of doctrine for peacekeeping, with dedicated government offices having peacekeeping on the agenda and funding the development of policy reports; discussions around new concepts and recommendations; and even best practices positions on peacekeeping at UN Headquarters.\(^ {32}\) A closer look at how this dynamic has evolved and what consequences it has for the development of doctrine and evolving practice within the UN is thus called for. Building on the sociology of professions, it is possible to argue that jurisdictional competency of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is partly being dictated by the development of a profession of peacekeeping and the staff that makes up this new profession.\(^ {33}\)

Applying Abbott on the development of peacekeeping as a profession, we see the importance of developing the concepts, diagnosis and prescripts – in essence the doctrines that guides peacekeeping operations – to establish jurisdictional claims on the area of peacekeeping. External actors from different institutional contexts such as think-tanks, donor officials and academics have been essential in this process. According to the conceptual framework of Abbott, these different institutional contexts can be called *ecologies*.\(^ {34}\)

Building on Abbott, Fourcade, studying the transnationalisation of economics, has identified how professions achieve jurisdictional competency and claims on a *global level*. Fourcade identifies transnational connectedness as one of the dimensions underlying the globalisation

\(^{31}\) See e.g. Benner and Rotmann, "Learning to Learn?.


\(^{34}\) In an unpublished section of the article on linked ecologies, *Ecologies and Fields* (available on his website [http://home.uchicago.edu/~aabbott/Papers/BOURD.pdf](http://home.uchicago.edu/~aabbott/Papers/BOURD.pdf)), Abbott acknowledges that there are many similarities between his concept of ecologies and Bourdieu’s field concept: “First, they are both concerned with locating actors relative to other actors. They refuse to consider social actors in unrelated, mass terms. Second, they agree that locations in social space are not given ex ante - by functions or by some rule system - but are rather enacted in the process of social life and in particular in the process of relating to other actors. Third, they both agree that there are units or collections of social locations that are usefully considered as macro structures - fields and ecologies. And we both see processes of conflict and competition as crucial to understanding the internal evolution of these collections of social locations” Abbott, "Linked ecologies." 1. However, Abbott argues that Bourdieu is relying economic metaphors in his descriptions, while the “ecology concept mixes the biological notions of the competition and coexistence of organisms in spaces with more strategic conceptions drawing on legal and political language”, see ———, *Ecologies and Fields,* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 2005). 2. He also criticises the concept of field for being static and based on a system of domination and subordination: “My concept of ecology arises not by the loosening up or putting into motion of structuralism, but by an attempt to find regularity in a social world first imagined as utterly fluid” ibid.: 6.
professionalisation in economics, and it is also a constitutive dimension of conceptual formation within the area of peacekeeping. Increased movement of staff between the various government institutions, think-tanks and UN offices working is also a characteristic trait in the area of peacekeeping.

Fourcade has shown how actors within different ecologies form coalitions or ‘hinges’ with like-minded actors to influence practices and gain control over a policy ‘location’. The alliance of actors will then be “able to influence how certain policy problems are understood and inform broader norms on how policy problems should be legitimately addressed”. Linking this argument with the concept of norm entrepreneurs, the paper will argue that an alliance of actors from linked ecologies can form a policy alliance to advance a new norm.

3. UN as a competitive arena for normative change

Case-study – Advancing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

During the process of advancing R2P, government officials, prominent statesmen and international diplomats, think-tanks and academic institutions outside the UN were crucial. The SG uses high-level panels and Senior Advisory Groups as independent panels that can explore a particular issue and inform member states. These panels are composed of a multicultural blend of eminent personalities – statesmen, international diplomats, and academic heavyweights who have significant standing in the international community and can lend legitimacy to a new idea or norm: “their names lend credibility to an idea which might otherwise have appeared utopian or fanciful.” With R2P, this was particularly important, as the concept had been accused for being a western norm and it became important to defend its African origins: “Although western governments were central in forming the concept, and it was based on the failures of Bosnia and Rwanda, the term was coined by Francis Deng, an African scholar and senior UN official.”

Other central actors who can be seen as norm entrepreneurs in their own right during the R2P process have been Gareth Evans, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia; Ramesh Thakur, Edward C. Luck; Stephen J. Stedman; and Bruce Jones. The work of Gareth Evans over the last decade has been deeply intertwined with the fate of R2P – he was co-chair

37 ———, "Revolving Doors.”.
38 Annan, "Foreword.”: xii.
40 Thakur was Vice Rector and Senior Vice Rector of the United Nations University from 1998–2007 and one of the principle authors of the ICISS report. His latest book was Ramesh Chandra Thakur, The United Nations, peace and security : from collective security to the responsibility to protect (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
41 Luck served as Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on R2P. He is also Senior Vice President for Research and Programs at the International Peace Institute. He is on leave from his post as Director of the Center on International Organization of the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.
of the ICISS, member of the UN SG’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change where he played a vital role in the drafting of the report,\textsuperscript{42} has published extensively on R2P and was also part of the General Assembly debate on R2P in 2009.\textsuperscript{43} Stephen J. Stedman was the Research Director to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and Special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General in crucial period leading up to the UN World Summit in 2005 ” to help gain worldwide support in implementing the panel’s recommendations”.\textsuperscript{44} The Director of CIC, Bruce Jones, had several key positions in the process leading up to the adoption of the principle of R2P in 2005, first as a Deputy Research Director to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and in the crucial period ahead of the General Assembly in 2005, where the principle was agreed upon and adopted in the eleventh hour,\textsuperscript{45} he was a Senior Advisor to the Secretary-General.\textsuperscript{46}

Think-tanks and academic institutions have often an explicit goal of normative change in the international system and have also been central actors in the R2P process. CIC has been one of the key institutions, both in the development of the R2P concept as well as others.\textsuperscript{47} The center publishes the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations and performs applied research on a series of concepts related to peacekeeping. On the website of the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect the normative goal is clearly stated:

Despite the progress achieved to date in terms of the development, initial codification and state acceptance in principle of the R2P norm, much remains to be done to effectively implement

\textsuperscript{42} NUPI, A fork in the road or a roundabout? A narrative of the UN reform process 2003-2005 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2006): 65; Alex J. Bellamy, Responsibility to protect : the global effort to end mass atrocities (Cambridge: Polity, 2009).
\textsuperscript{43} His last book was Gareth J. Evans, The responsibility to protect : ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). Evans was the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group from 2000 to 2009 and is also the Co-Chair of the International Advisory Board of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.
\textsuperscript{44} Quote from his profile at Stanford University: \url{http://cisac.stanford.edu/people/stephenjstedman/}.
\textsuperscript{46} From the CIC website: Dr. Jones “was Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary-General during the UN reform effort leading up to the World Summit 2005, and in the same period was Acting Secretary of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee. In 2004-5, he was Deputy Research Director of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. From 2000-2002 he was special assistant to the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East peace process; and held assignments in the UN Interim Mission in Kosovo, and in the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.”
\textsuperscript{47} On its webpage, the center informs that it “works to enhance international responses to humanitarian crises and global security threats through applied research and direct engagement with multilateral institutions and the wider policy community. It has an international reputation for agenda-setting work on post-conflict peacebuilding, global peace operations, and UN reform.” The center relies on funding from traditional donor governments such as the UK, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands as well as charitable trusts and foundations. For more information, see \url{http://www.cic.nyu.edu/about.html}. Other important think-tanks and academic institutions include the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland in Australia, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at City University of New York, the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI), the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (Fafo-AIS), and the Norwegian Peace Research Institute (PRIO) in Norway, FRIDE in Spain; the International Peace Institute in New York, government agencies with a focus on peace operations such as the Folke Bernadotte Academy in Sweden; the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) ; the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in South Africa; and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana. This is merely a narrow selection and many more could be added.
the concept of the responsibility to protect if civilians are not to continue to be the victims of mass-atrocity crimes.\textsuperscript{48}

Civil society has also been very active in advancing R2P. The \textit{International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect}, housed by the World Federalist Movement Institute for Global Policy, sponsored by Canada, has been a central actor, with 30 NGOs worldwide as members.\textsuperscript{49} Together with Oxfam they ran the ‘Responsibility to Protect – Engaging Civil Society’ (R2P-CS) project and ran global consultations, e.g. at the 2003 World Social Forum in Brazil. The coalition played an important role, “by marshalling the support of NGOs globally, fostering efforts to inform the public better, and by actively lobbying permanent delegations in New York”.\textsuperscript{50}

Among Member States, a few have taken a driving seat on R2P. Canada sponsored the work of the ICISS, and other Member States like the UK, Australia, Norway, Sweden have supported think-tanks and academic circles to undertake research on the subject in parallel with vigorous activism at the UN. The support by nonpermanent members of the Security Council like Canada and Norway for expanded mandates for peacekeeping also helped persuade the United States according to Bruce Jones, Director at CIC.\textsuperscript{51}

The effect of the work of a few persons, think-tanks and engaged staff in Ministries of Foreign Affairs in advancing R2P should not be underestimated. In a close knit circle, the same persons shift from advancing a norm and issuing reports from prominent think-tanks and academic institutions with the support of a few member states; to serve on UN high-level panels, or act as secretariat to these panels. The revolving doors phenomenon is clearly discernible, and using the linked ecologies framework of the sociology of professions makes it possible to grasp this phenomenon also theoretically. Looking at the codification process of R2P, significant resistance has been mounted during the last ten years, including R2P being argued as humanitarian intervention and neocolonialism in disguise, infringing on the principle of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{52} After the botched debate over the concept in 2009, R2P was seen as a divisive issue and seemed more or less abandoned in favour of the concept of protection of civilians which was less threatening to member states.

But one thing was to agree on R2P as a principle, another thing has been to turn the “words into deeds” as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon formulated it in 2007.\textsuperscript{53} This only happened in February 2011, when the Security Council made explicit reference to the responsibility to protect in a Security Council resolution. With this, a new momentum has been gained and

R2P has taken the first step towards being turned into practice and creating the basis for future jurisprudence.54

Establishing the Integrated Missions concept

With the expansion of UN involvement in internal conflicts after the end of the Cold War, the issue of how the different parts of the UN should work together on the ground quickly surfaced. In the years prior to taking up the assignment as Secretary-General in 1997, Kofi Annan had a series of postings that gave him a clear insight in the challenges the UN was confronted with in this area.55 Taking up the post as Secretary-General, he launched a reform programme that, inter alia, sought to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the UN on the ground in countries where peacekeeping operations were deployed.56 The peacekeeping and special political missions are headed by Special or Personal Representatives of the Secretary-General, and these would “have authority over all UN entities.”57 The combination of the peacekeeping mission and the other UN entities would constitute an ‘integrated mission’.

Following the decision to better integrate peacekeeping missions with the other UN entities on the ground, the Secretary-General issued a Note of guidance in 2000,58 where the initial statement that the “SRSG will have authority over all UN entities”59 was significantly watered out. Instead the guidance only gave the SRSG/RSG the authority to establish the political framework and the responsibility to provide overall leadership to the UN Country Team. The direct authority vis-à-vis the UN Resident Coordinator, who is the responsible for all development activities undertaken by UN agencies in a country, and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, who is the responsible for all humanitarian activities undertaken by UN entities in a country, as well as coordinating with other humanitarian actors, was diminished and delegated to the UN HQ who would decide on a case-by-case basis: “The RC/HC will, whenever feasible, serve as Deputy Special Representative/Representative of the Secretary-General, on the basis of a decision at UN Headquarters.”60 As a general guideline, the RC should “keep the SRSG/RSG informed” and the “information-sharing among the SRSG/RSG and the RC/HC is essential.”61

With these rather loose and ad-hoc based guidelines, integration of UN activities on the country level took many different shapes in the years that followed. The issuance of the

54 Ian Johnstone has argued for a considering operational activities and emerging practice as evolving jurisprudence and transition from soft to hard law in IOs. He looks at how the concept of protection of civilians (PoC) has served as an implicit interpretation and operationalisation of the responsibility to protect. See Ian Johnstone, ”Law-making through the operational activities of international organizations,” The George Washington International Law Review 40, no. 1 (2008): 94-100.
55 Kofi Annan was as Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) for Human Resources Management and Security Coordinator for the UN System (1987-1990), ASG for Programme Planning, Budget and Finance, and Controller (1990-1992), ASG for Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) (March 1992-February 1993) and then promoted to Under-Secretary-General (USG) (March 1993-December 1996) for the same PKOs. His tenure coincided with the unprecedented growth of United Nations peacekeeping operations, with a total deployment, at its peak in 1995, of almost 70,000 military and civilian personnel. After the Dayton Agreement was signed, he was also the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the former Yugoslavia from November 1995 to March 1996.
56 UN, ‘Renewing the United Nations’
58 UNSG, ”Note of guidance on relations between Representatives of the Secretary-General, Resident Coordinators and Humanitarian Coordinators,” United Nations, http://reliefweb.int/node/22011.
60 UNSG, ”Note of guidance”: p. 2.
guidance coincided with the second large expansion of peacekeeping operations after the Cold War. From 1999 and onwards, the UN deployed a number of new missions to countries like Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Haiti, Liberia and so on. By 2004 the troop deployment numbers had reached the previous high of the nineties, and kept climbing.\textsuperscript{62} By 2006, 20 DPKO-led operations were ongoing around the world, with more than 100,000 troops and civilians deployed.

According to Espen Barth Eide, who was one of the two lead writers of the \textit{Report on Integrated Missions}, the work “started with the reform agenda of Kofi Annan in 1997 and it coincided with the broader system-wide coherence reform agenda during 2000s.”\textsuperscript{63} Jan Egeland, the UN Under-Secretary-General for the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the time, argues that the integrated missions concept was based on the Brahimi-report which should become active policy.\textsuperscript{64} The Brahimi-report had been issued in 2000 and became the main reference for the reform process for peacekeeping operations during the next decade.\textsuperscript{65} Egeland felt that there was strong common agreement within the UN that the “UN pulled in too many directions and the result was unclear”.\textsuperscript{66} The integrated missions concept was

“in the elongation of the One UN concept, where the RC and HC should have a stronger role and the UN should be co-located. The SRSG should coordinate military, political, development and humanitarian efforts. Against integration was first and foremost some of the development agencies, and even more strongly NGOs. The most fundamental critique came from the IASC [Inter-agency Standing Committee] where the NGO-alliance was strongly against. MSF [Médecines Sans Frontières] said that they would break off contact with the UN if integration went too far.”\textsuperscript{67}

From 2003, all missions were supposed to be integrated, but practices varied widely in the field: “All new missions from 2003 and onwards were integrated and this was a controversial move by the SG.”\textsuperscript{68} As an example, several of the interviewees mentioned the discrepancies between the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia.\textsuperscript{69} In Sierra Leone, SRSG Alan Doss was perceived to be able to achieve more integration and to give an example for other countries,\textsuperscript{70} while SRSG Klein in Liberia had great difficulties to achieve integration with the humanitarian organizations.\textsuperscript{71} After having received the assignment to write the Report on Integrated Missions, the research team visited a number of countries in 2004 to

\textsuperscript{62} All statistics are from \url{http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/}.
\textsuperscript{63} Interview with Espen Barth Eide, 20 June 2011. On file with the author. Eide is now the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway.
\textsuperscript{64} Interview with Jan Egeland, 29 May 2011. On file with the author.
\textsuperscript{65} While the Brahimi-report did not mention integrated missions per se, it underscored the need to harness all the resources of the UN to consolidate peace and re-establish a stable and legitimate government that can provide the essential services to its population. UN, \textit{Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations}, A/55/305, S/2000/809 (New York: United Nations, 2000). The report became known as the Brahimi-report after the name of the Chairman of the Panel, Lakhdar Brahimi.
\textsuperscript{66} Interview with Jan Egeland
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. and Eide agree on this.
\textsuperscript{70} Interview with Jan Egeland.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
assess how integration was working in practice, record challenges and best practices. Their findings were presented at a conference in Oslo in May 2005.

In the end, the resistance to integration subsided somewhat and it is now generally accepted that a peacekeeping operation or a special political mission are integrated with the other UN entities. The level of integration depends on the political situation in the country. Egeland argues that he and OCHA managed to establish some principles – “OCHA fought through a few principles – and one of these I fought through; more violence and war – less integration, and more peacebuilding – more integration.” In practice this has meant that there has been less integration in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, where the UN is supporting the expansion of authority of a host government that is perceived as one of the parties to an ongoing war and has become one of the main targets of violence. The situation is similar in DRC and the Sudan, but here the UN has a somewhat less politically controversial role and is in general accepted also by opposition groups.

The follow-up process to the Report on Integrated Missions
The report had established that there was a wide range of practices in the field with regards to integration and how it was implemented, it recorded some of the challenges as well as best practices, and it gave a number of recommendations. In terms of achieving the policy goal of establishing integrated missions as the default option it was however still only a step on the way. Norway thus decided to support a follow-up of the report and funded regional consultations in Beijing, Addis Ababa, Geneva, New York, Johannesburg and Brussels during 2006 and 2007. The consultations ended with a two-day conference in Oslo in 2007, named Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges.

Norway chose to engage in an informal manner, and arranged consultations and workshops in all the regions of the world. This enabled states to discuss the issues in an informal manner and share their experiences. The consultation in Beijing yielded the somewhat surprising result that China could share its experiences in integrated responses to domestic natural crises. Establishing buy-in in the concept of integration on a regional level before starting the policy debate at UN Headquarters was essential to the success of the process, according to the interviewees.

Why was the report and the follow-up process a success? According to Eide and Jostein Leiro, who was the Head of the UN Section at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the follow-up process, and thus gave the financial backing for it, the follow-up process was a resounding success. Leiro argued that there are only a few countries who are interested in conceptual change in the UN system and who have diverted resources over time to increase the knowledge about the organization, both in-house as well as to research institutes and think-tanks. The continued engagement gave Norway the necessary know-how, and combined with the relatively large financial contributions that

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72 The team visited Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The remainder of the countries with a peacekeeping mission was covered by desk studies and interviews. See Annex 1: Terms of Reference in Espen Barth Eide et al., Report on Integrated Missions: p. 47.
73 For more information, visit the webpage of the subsequent follow-up process funded by Norway: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/fn/Integratedmissions.html?id=465886.
74 Interview with Jan Egeland.
75 For more about the conference, the agenda and the participants, visit http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/un/integratedmissions.html?id=465886.
76 Interview with Jostein Leiro. Deputy Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway. 27 June 2011.
77 Interview with Jostein Leiro,
Norway has been giving to various UN entities, and being perceived as a relatively impartial state, Norway was well positioned to engage itself in policy change processes within the UN. Other countries have since launched similar policy processes with peacekeeping operations as the main focus, but these have been more formal than the follow-up process on integrated missions, according to Leiro.  

The integrated missions concept was a clear and simple idea, he argued, and while there was a large need and wish to discuss the issue, there were relatively few arenas were the issue could be discussed in an open and informal manner. During the consultations, the participation was at times surprisingly high and from a variety of backgrounds, something that could be a sign of the issue filling a vacuum. Concurrently with the consultations, the UN was drafting its doctrine for UN peacekeeping operations, and there was significant interest in the integrated missions concept within the UN as part of this policy reform process. However, the internal processes at the UN often meet a number of obstacles – turf fighting, sticking to established positions etc, so it was a plus that the integrated missions discussions were taking place outside the UN in an informal setting.

Leiro also argues that there is a need for a good network that can draw upon the various actors engaged in the issue and who needs to contribute to and own the solution. Through engaging these actors and involving them throughout the process, their ownership will be strengthened. Policy, practice and academia should be involved, and can contribute to connecting experiences and knowledge from different institutional backgrounds.

Another important factor that several of the respondents mentioned was the close relationship that had been established over time between the working level staff in the various organizations. According to Egeland, it was David Harland, then Head of DPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, and Mark Bowden who had the equivalent position at UN OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch, who suggested that the Espen Barth Eide at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) should together with Randolph Kent be the main authors of the report. Eide was then the Head of the UN Programme at NUPI and had a string of publications on issues on peacekeeping operations and other UN-related issues. Kent had been the HC in Somalia, Kosovo and Rwanda. This shows the level of influence that working level staff has on these kinds of policy processes. They can identify individuals who enjoy credibility among the stakeholders and who are perceived to be able to take into consideration the views of all the actors.

Norway thus played a significant role in the institutionalization of the integrated missions concept, taking part in the writing of the Report on Integrated Missions with Eide as one of the key authors, having Jan Egeland as the USG for OCHA at the time, and funding the follow-up process which built more ownership for the concept among member states; practitioners from the humanitarian, development and peacekeeping domains; and academic institutions and think-tanks. But they would not have succeeded in institutionalizing the concept without building a policy alliance with the other stakeholders. The two-step process of first establishing a working level cooperation between the relevant UN organizations, research institutions and UN missions in the field; and subsequently arranging regional

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78 Ibid. The following paragraphs are based on the same interview. UK and France launched the “New Horizon” process in July 2009, looking at reform of UN peacekeeping operations. For more, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newhorizon.shtml

79 Interview with Jan Egeland. The main authors were supported by Anja Kaspersen from NUPI and Karin von Hippel who had worked with the UN and EU in Somalia and Kosovo.
consultations ensured that the sufficient knowledge as well as ownership among all stakeholders was established.

4. **Legitimacy of normative development driven by policy alliances or linked ecologies**

Taking into account the relatively small number of actors involved in advancing the norm of R2P and the integrated missions concept, a lingering question would be whether these norm development processes are legitimate? In the case of R2P and Libya, with the failures of the UN in Rwanda and Bosnia in mind, there was a clear sense of urgency among member states for taking swift and determinate action. But in the aftermath many of the states that voted for resolutions 1970 and 1973 have criticized the manner in which the alliance of states have implemented them, accusing them for overstepping their mandate.

Bellamy and Williams argue that there is two fundamental stances among member states in the UN and other actors trying to influence how peacekeeping should be understood and implemented in the field today. On the one hand, there is a strong pressure for the UN and the international community to take on a more assertive role to ensure that not only the sovereignty of a state is respected, but that the state also respect and take on the responsibility to ensure the rights of their individuals. This divide is reflected in most of the normative debates today, whether it is on R2P, the form and scope of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission, and so on.

Through the case studies it has become clear that the working level is particularly important. The individuals on working levels are establishing connections with colleagues. Interaction between different ecologies opens up for different perspectives and stimulates the policy debate that percolates up to the state level over time. An officer in the DPKO Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (PBPS) argued that “Academics can analyse issues much more frankly, which allows for provocativeness and frankness. This is helpful for us – it is easier for someone external to say something, and this can be used to start a broader policy dialogue.”

Some of these institutions have the convening power to bring actors together in an informal setting, with Chatham House rules. They can link academic, member states and the UN Secretariat. The yearly meeting that NUPI arranges is a good arena for this kind of informal policy discussions. It combines the external analytical perspective and the convening power of UN DPKO Best Practices Section. That it is outside New York is also helpful, as it avoids some of the entrenched positions that prevail there and opens up for a constructive debate. It is very valuable that the Global South and others are included so that they feel that they are included and that the consultations are not happening behind closed doors.

The yearly informal discussions convened by NUPI on peacekeeping issues serves as a platform where working level officials can meet and informally discuss issues. During these meetings the participants take stock of the different issues, including debates on issues such as robust peacekeeping, consent of host states, development of peacekeeping doctrine, use of civilian capacities and so on. The participants from think-tanks and the academic institutions have an opportunity to test some of their hypotheses and get a reality check with

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81 Interview with UN official at UN DPKO PBPS, 17 June 2011. Interview on file with the author.

82 Ibid.
peacekeeping officials. The importance of the working level participation was also highlighted by Eide with regards to the consultation that was arranged in Beijing: “Nationally, China had strong integration of their support systems and operations for natural disasters, and they could bring this thinking to the table, especially since they brought working level staff.”

The working level participation ensures informed discussions and helps avoid that the discussions revert to political and principled positions:

It is crucial for the success of a policy process that long-term relationships are built with people in working level positions. In the case of the integrated missions process, David Harland, as head of the Best Practices Section, Salman Ahmed and David Haeri were key interlocutors at the UN. Traditional politics often focus at the top level, but these individuals seldom have all the knowledge needed to understand the issues and will revert to political positions.

The influence Norway wields on policy processes and normative change processes in the UN is due to a long-term engagement and investment in establishing networks and relationships with working level officials, expertise on the nitty-gritty functioning of the UN, and funding policy research in think-tanks that have a proven track record of influencing policy processes:

There are few academic networks within the area of peacekeeping. Norway is engaged and knows who are the important actors. The Norwegian MFA spends much money on think-tanks in the US where policy often originates. In the US think-tanks play a major role as agenda setters as there is a tradition for a leaner government sector. It is also very important to solidly anchor the process in the UN, the process need to be with them and for them, not against them, to be allied to make the UN better. Through such partnerships Norway has the ability to shape UN processes.

Another important factor is that Norway has little negative political ballast and is generally perceived as a neutral and impartial actor with the main aim of improving how the UN works on the ground. In a policy change process, the question of legitimacy is always present, and sought to be addressed through regional consultations where member states have the opportunity to share their opinions in informal settings, and the involvement of working level staff to make sure that the discussions are substantive and not revert to political positions.

5. Conclusions

The theories and case studies presented here supports the idea that the UN in the area of peacekeeping, qua bureaucracy, qua as a professional organisation, can act autonomously. Through autonomous acts, the organisation is part of the normative change processes that form and guide UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. However, there are significant discrepancies between different theories on normative change in IOs when it comes to how and whether they can grasp and explain how autonomous acts come about.

83 NUPI is only one of several institutions that are active in this area; others include NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, the Folke Bernadotte Academy and their International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations and so on.
84 Interview with Espen Barth Eide.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
Autonomous acts can in part be explained with the conflicting normative pressures that at exist at all times in any organisation, and in the UN the principal divide is between those wanting the organization to have a stronger role in terms of protecting individuals and those wanting to maintain the post-Westphalian sovereignty of the state in a traditional sense.

The paper has demonstrated how existing constructivist theory has significant shortcomings in grasping how anomalous behaviour can be theorized and how norms are formed in the international system. The UN in the area of peacekeeping and peacebuilding is not one unitary actor, but has several centres of agenda and agency. The sociology of professions can augment constructivist theory to account for how other actors affect the normative formation in organizations, and a practice-oriented approach can be used as a method to grasp the normative change at the ‘coal face’.

In the case of R2P, the paper has shown that what has been lacking is the translation of the norm into practice. With this now in the offing, jurisprudence may be made for future cases. This was an element that the conceptual framework of e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink failed to grasp, but which is central to the understanding of normative development and change in the sociology of professions.

As has been demonstrated, the UN is reliant on donors, think-tanks and academic institutions to develop policy and analysis capacity. This gives these actors a more central role than previously argued in the normative evolution or codification processes in the UN. However, because of the dominant role of donor governments and think tanks have had on the normative evolution in the UN, the paper holds that there has been reluctance among other member states, such as the NAM and the G77, against codifying the de facto hollowing of the principle of sovereignty that implementing the R2P norm potentially signified.

In the process of advancing the integrated missions concept it was underscored by the Norwegian diplomats that they were successful because they, as one of a handful of states, had invested time and resources in acquiring knowledge about the UN as an organization and wanted to improve how it was working through relatively low-visibility reform efforts, thus avoiding politicising the subject:

It is about fifteen countries in the world that has a continuing and substantive debate about the UN at the domestic level. For other countries it is the delegation to the UN and the MFA that sets the agenda, and often substantive issues will be secondary to other political objectives that the countries want to achieve or espouse at the UN.87

Eide argues that the timing of furthering a new norm is key to success – there has to be a certain ripeness for the issue to stick to the agenda and be accepted by the stakeholders: “The timeliness of the initiative was important, there was ripeness in terms of most actors seeing a need for change in the UN system. Norway worked into this stream and tried to steer it rather than oppose it.”88 If the timeliness and ripeness is not in place, the counter pressures will be sufficiently strong to silence and stop the advancement of a new norm.

There is a need for a more pluralistic and complex understanding of normative development in IOs. While there is clearly many examples of dysfunctions, pathologies, and organized hypocrisy, there are also instances of practical innovation to overcome challenges and

87 Interview with Espen Barth Eide. This was also emphasized in the interview with Jostein Leiro.
88 Interview with Espen Barth Eide.
bending of rules in order to achieve a positive impact and improve the lives of others. States are not the only actors, NGOs, academic institutions, think-tanks, sections within the UN and powerful individuals are active constituents and guardians of the values of the organization.

However, while advancing this more pluralistic, including and bottom-up understanding of normative development in the UN, we should not be duped into the belief that UN will not at times still be acting in contradiction to its values, or rather not act at all. Realpolitik will still prevail when the interests of powerful states are in play, as we have seen in the Middle East and in the difference of action by the international community in Libya and Syria. Normative change processes are and will not be unilinear, but continue the pattern of ebb and flow, depending on external circumstances and events, as well as the appetite of the main supporters among the member states to continue to advocate for a particular norm.
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