Citizenship, statelessness and belonging in Estonia

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After Estonia regained independence in August 1991 and reintroduced the Citizenship Act of 1938 half a year later in February 1992, about one third of the population of the country became stateless. The 1992 law was based on the idea of the ‘legal continuity’ of the pre-war Estonian Republic, according to which only those persons who were citizens before Estonia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1940 and their descendants were entitled to automatic citizenship. Migrants to Estonia from the Soviet period and their descendants, by contrast, had to go through the process of naturalization in order to get the Estonian citizenship (Kionka and Vetik, 1996).

This paper examines, first, the history of citizenship reform in Estonia and considers reasons why massive statelessness has persisted nearly 20 years after Estonia regained independence. Second, the paper discusses the impact of the legal status of Estonian Russians to their socio-economic and socio-cultural in Estonia. To this end, it draws upon two principal sources of information: evidence gathered in public opinion polls on the integration of Russians in Estonia, conducted in the period 2000-2008, and in-depth interviews connected to the polls.

Literature on the Estonian citizenship issue is rather extensive (see Aasland 2002; Smith et.al 1998). One of the most specific features of the issue, compared to most other countries, consists in the fact that the social rights enjoyed by the stateless persons are not remarkably different from those of the Estonian citizens, who have only two (though important) additional rights – the right to vote and to run in the parliamentary elections as well as to apply for certain public positions that are regarded to be important for the public interest. The fact that non-citizens enjoyed the same social rights as those of citizens partly explains why the citizenship policy that marginalized Estonian Russians did not bring about any significant ethnic mobilization, as might otherwise have been expected (Kolsto and Melberg, 2002; Smith et al., 1998), and why, over time, Russian-
speakers considered other alternatives, including the adoption of Russian citizenship or remaining as stateless non-citizens in Estonia.

Thus, citizenship is a complex phenomenon, in which the relationship between the *de jure* and *de facto* aspects can take different forms. Soysal, for example, claims, that in the era of postnational membership in Europe, the rights are no longer dependent on *de jure* citizenship, but on supranational institutions, which emphasize the universality of rights, as opposed to their national character (Soysal, 2004). Hammar, on the other hand, claims that in modern states, a large proportion of aliens is emerging, with no interest or opportunity to acquire citizenship. These people are the so called denizens, to whom rather broad-scale rights and social benefits extend. Thus, they cannot be regarded regular aliens, however, nor are they naturalized citizens (Hammar, 1990). Estonia represents an example of a state where a large number of long-term permanent residents do not own Estonian citizenship *de jure*, but whose social rights (*de facto* citizenship) do not differ remarkably from that of the Estonian citizens. However, it is not an example of a postnational condition described by Soysal, but that of a post-communist one, where the issue of massive denizenship has a specific history and meaning (Järve and Poleschuk, 2009).

**CITIZENSHIP REFORM AND PERSISTENCE OF WIDESPREAD STATELESSNESS**

The Citizenship Act of 1992 requires two years of residence before a person is entitled to apply for citizenship and a further one year waiting period before the applicant can be naturalized. The law also includes a loyalty oath and restricts certain categories of people from gaining citizenship (military officers, foreign intelligence officers etc.). In addition, the law required knowledge of the Estonian language. As said above, the most controversial consequence of the citizenship law lay in the fact that although it was presented in an ethnically neutral language, the law nonetheless principally affected the Russian-speaking minority, who had migrated to Estonia during the Soviet period.
In 1995 a new Citizenship Act was adopted in Estonia. In order to submit a citizenship application, the following criteria, defined in the new law, need to be met: a person must have been residing in Estonia before 1 July 1990 and possess a long-term or permanent residence permit at the time of submitting the request. If one of these requirements is met, the person applying for Estonian citizenship must also (a) have proficiency in the Estonian language on a day-to-day level; (b) be at least 15 years of age; (c) have lived in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit for at least eight years, at least five years permanently; (d) have knowledge of the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Act; (e) have permanent lawful income sufficient to support himself or herself and his or her dependents; (f) have a registered residence in Estonia; (g) be loyal to the state of Estonia; and, (h) take an oath of loyalty.

Since 1995 the Citizenship Act has been amended several times in order to ease the requirements for obtaining citizenship for certain categories of non-citizens. For example, in 2004 the waiting period for naturalization was reduced to six months and a simplified naturalization procedure has been established for people with disabilities. In addition, stateless children who were born after 1992 may also obtain citizenship with a simplified procedure if both parents are stateless. According to Article 13, section 4 of the Citizenship Act, a simplified naturalization procedure can be sought for minors less than 15 years of age who were born in Estonia after 26 February 1992. This can be done by either of two parents, a single parent or an adoptive parent, who has or have, by the time of submitting the application, legally resided in Estonia for no less than five years and who are not considered as citizens by any other state (for example, persons with undetermined citizenship).

Compared to the other EU countries, the naturalization requirements in Estonia can be regarded as rather liberal. What makes the Estonian citizenship law exceptional is that at the moment it was brought into force, it left a considerable part of the population without citizenship. The exclusive nature of the citizenship policy in Estonia should be considered in the context of the high level of mistrust between the ethnic Estonian majority and Russian-speaking minority population at the beginning of the transition into
independent statehood. This can be illustrated, for example, by the fact that while in the 1991 independence referendum a majority of Estonians voted for Estonian independence from the Soviet Union, only 25 per cent of the Estonian Russians were in favour (Vetik, 1993). Thus only six months before actually regaining independence, Estonian society was fundamentally polarized over one of the most existential political issues, which inevitably evoked strong mutual fears regarding the future of the state and its mixed population.

The core legal Act regulating the foundation of the non-citizens’ status in Estonia is the Law on Aliens adopted in 1993. The law refers to both citizens of foreign states and stateless persons as ‘aliens’. The Estonian legislation makes no distinction between these two categories of non-citizens. In general, non-citizens in Estonia enjoy the same rights and free access to social protection as citizens. For example, aliens with any type of residence permit are subjects of the Law on Social Protection, Law on Social Protection of Unemployed, Law on Social Protection of Disabled, Law on State Pension Insurance, the Law on State Support for Families, and so on.

While there was considerable demand for naturalization by stateless non-citizens in the first half of the 1990s, the pace has since slowed down. In 1999, the percentage of Estonian citizens within the population had risen to 80 per cent but over the next decade it had only increased slightly to 84 per cent in 2008. The current population of non-citizens now stands at 16 per cent of the total population of Estonia: of this 16 per cent, about half are stateless and the other half are citizens of other states, above all Russia. Thus, from 1992 to 2008 about 150 000 people have been naturalized in Estonia while another 100 000 people have become citizens of Russia.

A study of ethnic Russians conducted in April 2008 offered four explanations for the persistent and widespread statelessness among Estonian Russians (1). These include: 1) difficulties in learning the Estonian language and passing the citizenship test; 2) emotional aversion to applying for citizenship related to the fact that many Estonian
Russians feel that, similarly to ethnic Estonians, they should have automatically been granted citizenship after independence was restored in Estonia; 3) preferring Russian citizenship due to better travel and other opportunities; and 4) lack of Estonian citizenship does not affect a person’s daily life.

The non-citizen respondents considered difficulties with learning the Estonian language to be the most significant reason for not applying for citizenship. Six out of ten respondents in interview mentioned the language issue as one of the reasons for not obtaining Estonian citizenship thus far. The significance of the problems related to learning Estonian is also affirmed by the integration monitoring poll, conducted in parallel with the in-depth interviews, in which over 90 per cent of Estonian Russians named difficulties with learning the Estonian language as the reason why many Estonian Russians do not yet have Estonian citizenship (2). The main obstacles mentioned in the interview study were the absence of contact with Estonians as well as the cost of the courses and their own sense that the lessons should be provided free of charge:

*I cannot speak Estonian sufficiently to pass the language exam. Estonian is very hard to learn, because there are so few contacts between the two ethnic groups in our country. Some people do communicate in Estonian at work, but I worked at a place where everybody was Russian. So, I use Estonian only in shops, about 5–10 minutes per day. But this is not sufficient . . . . We have not been provided with proper conditions for studying Estonian. That is the first reason why I have not applied for Estonian citizenship. (F, 37y, Tallinn).

She added:

*Estonian language courses cost an immense amount of money. I cannot afford to pay 1500–2000 kroons per month [US$135–$180] for them, because I have two children and one of them, besides, is ill. And so I am faced with a vicious circle: if I do not know Estonian, I cannot find a well-paying job, and therefore cannot pay for the courses. (F, 37y, Tallinn)
The second group of reasons is related to emotional aversion, which stems from the opinion that the citizenship policy of the Estonian state is unjust by its very nature. Many respondents felt bitter for not receiving citizenship unconditionally like most ethnic Estonians did at the beginning of the 1990s, despite being born and raised in Estonia and living there for their entire lives. The need to apply for citizenship was considered demeaning by most respondents, and, in their judgement, the state should care more about its residents and not give privileges to one ethnic group. During the integration monitoring, two thirds of the Russian-speaking respondents agreed with these types of claims explaining the reasons behind statelessness:

*But overall, it is all so strange that second or third generation people, born here, are not offered citizenship. In the USA, they offer citizenship even if a person was born in the airplane, provided that the airline was American. But overall, I think that our country is still young and the attitude towards citizenship is still not so serious.* (F, 37y, Tallinn)

*We have not applied, and do not intend to apply for citizenship in the future. I was born here and have lived here for over 40 years. I already have two children here. And I consider applying for citizenship a big humiliation for myself. Nothing like this exists in any other state of the European Union.* (M, 41y, Jõhvi)

In addition to the fact that applying for citizenship is considered by some to be demeaning and unfair, other respondents said that they feel they are second-rate persons in the eyes of Estonians and the Estonian state. Thus, they perceived the attitude of ethnic Estonians as hostile and this deters some Russian-speaking non-citizens from applying for Estonian citizenship:

*I have already applied for Russian citizenship, for I will no doubt receive it without problems, just like that. I actually do not care which citizenship I
receive. If I had lived in the USA or England for a long time, I could have already become an American or Englishman. But our situation with these ‘wolf’ passports is atrocious. They have already made such a big deal out of their nationality that we are like flies to them with these gray passports. We were simply segregated from the very start. (M, 41y, Jõhvi)

The second reason why I do not wish to apply for citizenship lies in the fact that I do not want to become a so-called second-rate citizen because I will be thought of as this person who became a citizen through naturalization. But why acquire citizenship then? Anyway, these feelings that I have now will remain the same, my attitude will not change. I seriously do not like this differentiation: you have received citizenship through naturalization, but I am a true citizen. Therefore we can speak of first and second-rate citizens. But we are all, in fact, equal . . . . All people must be regarded as equal. There is no sense in wasting time, money and emotions to become a citizen, if in the end you do not gain anything, because their attitude will stay the same. But the color of the passport does not mean anything, if the attitude towards me stays the same. (F, 35y, Tallinn)

The third group of reasons for not choosing Estonian citizenship is related to preferring Russian citizenship. According to the integration monitoring data, this reason was mentioned by 70 per cent of the respondents (Integration Monitoring. 2008). It can be added that applying for Russian citizenship has abruptly increased in Estonia in recent years (Kase, 2008). Reasons for this were explored in the interview study and categories of answers are identified below:

a. Applying for Russian citizenship is easier than applying for Estonian citizenship:
   Being a noncitizen is very difficult. Also, some people have relatives in Russia. Some take Russian citizenship because they have tried but not succeeded in obtaining Estonian citizenship. Some elderly people take up Russian citizenship only because they are unable to learn the language. (F, 35y, Tallinn)
b. Travelling to Russia is easier:

_Maybe, because it is cheaper and for business as well. The cigarettes and lots of other things, like children’s clothes, are cheaper there. This is how many people probably reason. On the other hand, many have relatives on the other side. I also have relatives there. If you want to visit, you need to apply for a visa and so on._ (M, 41y, Jõhvi)

c. The impact of the so called ‘Bronze Soldier Crisis’ (Vetik, 2008a) - removal of the Bronze Soldier monument from from its initial place at the centre of Tallinn to a military cemetary by the Estonian government in April 2007 (3):

_I think that one of the motivating reasons for applying for Russian citizenship has been the April events. It was like a big blow to the Russians’ self-respect. These events also brought about big changes. In these times, it was almost impossible to find work. My husband encountered it himself. Maybe some people think that their children would receive higher quality education in Russia. And even if people have worked hard with the Estonian language, they think that if they go to Russia, it will be easier for them to find work, but I doubt that. Because Russia is a rapidly developing state, it gives people more opportunities, for example, to find work._ (F, 37y, Tallinn)

The fourth group of reasons has to do with the perception that the lack of Estonian citizenship does not affect a person’s daily life and this is why people do not want to make the effort required for obtaining citizenship. About three quarters of the respondents of the Integration Monitoring answers to the questions of whether not having Estonian citizenship affects their lives:

_He [the interviewee’s husband] does not intend to apply for Estonian citizenship, because he knows that he already came here at a more mature age and cannot learn Estonian language in any way. He doesn’t apply for some other state citizenship because he also feels comfortable with the gray passport._ My
husband does not feel that he is discriminated here in any way. And he has also not encountered that. He has his own business here. He is very loyal to Estonia, but as his business here is doing well and the lack of citizenship does not bother him, he does not feel that applying for some country’s citizenship is necessary.

I think that those people who want citizenship do everything to receive it, but those who do not want it will never get it. Citizenship is not important to some, because they are satisfied with their lives and also have a good income. So they don’t even have time to think about citizenship. (F, 33y, Tallinn)

The pragmatic reasons also include circumstances that are related to the difficulties of stateless parents in deciding on the future options of their underage children:

My second child is a boy. And I don’t want anyone to send him into the army, no matter if it’s the Estonian or Russian one, to fight in some strange place without him agreeing to it. I want to leave him the right to choose which country’s citizenship he wants. (F, 37y, Tallinn)

My son wants to go study in Russia and that is hard to do with a Russian visa. The language barrier is also a problem. It’s easier for him to study in Russian in his native language, than in Estonia in a foreign language. But my daughter is applying for Estonian citizenship, since she is planning on continuing her studies in Estonia (M, 41y, Jõhvi)

For older non-citizens, their desire not to acquire Estonian citizenship may also be understood as a form of complacency: there is a large share of older and retired people among the Russian citizens, who have lower expectations and, at the same time, enjoy the relatively high level of social security in Estonia, when compared to Russia (Lauristin, 2008).
The Integration Monitoring (IM) project referred to above was conducted four times during the past ten years (in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008). The IM project data show the trends in applications for citizenship along with the factors that explain any changes. Comparing the reasons why people did not apply for citizenship from 2000 and 2008, the research team identified explanations relating to the fulfilment of citizenship requirements, pragmatic reasons and participants’ feeling of connection to Estonia.

In the 2008 monitoring exercise 34 per cent of Russian Estonians surveyed considered the inability to learn Estonian to be the primary reason for their refusal to naturalize in Estonia. A further 23 per cent stated that the reason why they opted against citizenship lies in the humiliating nature of the citizenship requirements. Participants noted that they still felt an attachment to Estonia and few claimed to have turned down the possibility of citizenship on the grounds that they did not have a sense of belonging to Estonia (10 per cent) or were disinterested in national politics (11 per cent). Very few rejected citizenship on the grounds of global irrelevance, given the size of Estonia (7 per cent).

The findings from the 2008 monitoring exercise, when compared with the earlier exercises, suggest that there has been a change in the intensity of the negative attitudes among the Estonian Russians towards the process of acquiring citizenship. More people appear to have come to appreciate the difficulty of learning Estonian, and this may also have discouraged them from applying for citizenship (4). The findings also indicate a decline in the Estonian Russian’s perception of the value of integration and the state’s integrationist policies. This tendency is corroborated by comparing the data on citizenship preferences gathered during the four integration monitoring studies. In 2000, the preference for Estonian citizenship was on the rise, reaching its highest point in 2005 (at 74 per cent), but by 2008 the number of those who desired Estonian citizenship dropped to half (51 per cent). During the same time period, the desirability of Russian citizenship increased steadily from just 5 per cent in 2000 to 11 per cent in 2005 and to
19 per cent in 2008. These changes suggest a new protest identity among Estonian Russians, which has notably increased in recent years (Burch and Smith, 2007; Hackmann and Lehti, 2008; Wertsch, 2008).

Some participants stated during interviews that remaining a non-citizen did not have a profound effect on their daily lives and that they could not see any benefit to taking up Estonian citizenship. However, evidence from research data suggests that even if ethnic Russians encounter societal discrimination, citizenship does make a difference. The integration monitorings (as well as other studies) record that the socio-economic situation of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia has gradually improved as evidenced by the steadily decreasing pay gap between the salaries of ethnic Estonians and Estonian Russians (Leping and Toomet, 2008). Education rather than ethnic identity now seems to be the main reason for the existing differences in earnings between the ethnic groups, as fewer Russian-speakers have access to higher education and hence are disadvantaged from taking up the best-paid jobs (Kasearu and Trumm, 2008).

Between the abovementioned groups among the Russian-speaking population there are some important differences in terms of human capital and adaptability, which are not based on citizenship status. This is nonetheless important to consider: compared to Russian citizens and ethnic Russian non-citizens, Estonian Russians who hold Estonian citizenship tend to be younger, better educated, more proficient in Estonian and other languages and have a higher employment status. People who acquired Russian citizenship, by contrast, tend to belong to the older generation, have less education and their Estonian language skills are not as strong, mainly because they reside in Eastern Estonia where the population is mostly Russian-speaking. At the same time, their socio-economic situation is somewhat better than that of people with no citizenship at all.

The Russian-speaking citizens of Estonia are also characterized by a greater degree of social confidence compared to the stateless persons. They are more optimistic about their future. They do not feel inferior within the society, and they are prepared to protect their rights. While there is a marked difference between Estonian-speaking and Russian-
speaking Estonian citizens in terms of the way they evaluate their economic situation, this gap is closing. Progress has been made over the past decade and as a result, those who seek to integrate by opting for Estonian citizenship are reportedly able to lead better lives than those who remain stateless non-citizens.

The data of the integration monitoring studies indicate that knowledge of the Estonian language among Russian-speakers has gradually improved over the last decade. However, it is important to differentiate between two opposing tendencies. First, the utilitarian significance of learning Estonian has become stronger, meaning that people feel that the Estonian language is important for them and that they need it to maintain good employment. On the other hand, the integrative potential of learning Estonian has decreased in the opinion of many Estonian Russians. This is confirmed by the fact that learning Estonian is considered less important for achieving mutual trust and an equal standing in society. For example, in the monitoring of 2005, the positive responses to the questions – does learning Estonian increase confidence and help one achieve an equal position in society – were 68 per cent and 64 per cent, respectively. In the monitoring survey of 2008, however, only 38 per cent and 23 per cent responded positively to the same questions (Vihalemm, 2008)).

The IM data reveals that while structural integration of Estonian Russians has gradually improved, the indicators of identificational integration, understood in the context of national integration and the development of shared values and acceptance of national symbols, have rather worsened over recent years. In addition to what has already been mentioned, this is also affirmed by other data from the IM 2008 project – for example, the trust of the Russian-speaking population toward Estonian state institutions and the numbers of those who feel that they are part of the Estonian society have decreased remarkably over recent years. In addition, Estonian Russians perceive the opportunities available to them in Estonia with mistrust. The poll data records that 80–90 per cent of Estonian Russians believe that the opportunities for ethnic Estonians are better in the labour market, the educational system and politics than they are for Estonian Russians. As a result, integration through naturalization and language acquisition is seen
not so much as a socially valuable act that furthers adaptation and relations between the main ethnic communities but rather as an instrumental choice to improve individual’s standard of living (Vetik, 2008b). A closer look reveals that such sentiments have emerged quite recently. Until 2005, the attitudes of Estonian Russians regarding these issues were generally becoming more positive, but have now suffered an abrupt decline. In the literature, this has been explained mostly by the significant increase in the politicization of the ethnic issue and conflicting historical memories of ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians (Vetik, 2008b).

CONCLUSION: CITIZENSHIP AND LOYALTY RECONSIDERED

The underlying ideology of Estonian citizenship policy assumes the statelessness issue in Estonia has to do with loyalty; that is, if a person successfully passes the Estonian language and citizenship exams, then that is presumed to prove his or her loyalty to the Estonian state making them worthy of Estonian citizenship. The logic behind such reasoning holds that those who acquire Estonian citizenship demonstrate through this formal legal act that they have successfully integrated into Estonian society by having adopted the so-called ‘Estonian mindset’ (Steen, 2006). The research reported in this paper, however, reveal that, for most Estonian Russians, obtaining Estonian citizenship is more of a pragmatic and instrumental step motivated foremost by seeking the socio-economic advantages that follow citizenship (Lauristin, 2008). This claim is supported besides the integration monitoring exercises also by other studies cited above. Thus, acquiring citizenship and learning Estonian cannot be taken as a one-time solution regarding issues related to personal identity and social integration.

The Russian-language population in Estonia is in large part perceives the citizenship policy the Estonian state has pursued to be unfair towards their group. The obligation to apply for citizenship, as a result of the legalistic citizenship policy introduced at the beginning of the 1990s, is viewed as demeaning to those people who have lived in
Estonia all their life. Perceptions of unfairness as well as difficulties in learning the Estonian language and passing the citizenship exam are the main reasons for the Estonian Russians’ refusal to acquire Estonian citizenship. In addition, pragmatic personal calculations and the ease with which Russian-speakers may obtain Russian citizenship, as well as efforts of the Russian state to engage its diaspora, are important additional factors in persuading people to abandon their pursuit of Estonian citizenship.

One of the main findings of this study is that there are measurable benefits associated with the acquisition of citizenship by formerly stateless ethnic Russians in Estonia. This conclusion is, however, set against a particular context: namely, the unusually strong non-discrimination provisions recorded in law and Estonia’s geopolitical situation. In particular, the proximity to Russia and the possibility of obtaining Russian citizenship while simultaneously benefiting from residency in a European Union member state has made Estonian citizenship less desirable today than when independence was restored in 1991. While Estonian citizenship offers more advantages, there are benefits associated with the acquisition of Russian citizenship too. By contrast, stateless non-citizens expressed feelings of rejection, inferiority and passivity. They fare worst of all in the labour market and in the educational system. In this context then, citizenship is indeed important.

NOTES
1. Ten in-depth interviews were carried out with ethnic Russians who had children below 15 years of age with undetermined citizenship in March 2008. Five interviews were carried out with respondents from Tallinn, two from Narva and one each from Jõhvi, Sillamäe, and Kohtla-Järve. In Tallinn, people from different parts of town were interviewed (three from Lasnamäe, one from Õismäe and one from the city centre area). The sample was chosen from an anonymized list provided by the State Chancellery and which included Estonian residents with undetermined citizenship who also had children below 15 years of age. The full list included 2437 cases. The gross sample was determined to be ten times bigger, and the stratified sample (n = 100) chosen from the...
total population was divided into strata on the basis of residence areas and the children’s age. In each stratum, simple random sampling was employed after that. The people included in the sample were sent contact letters, introducing them to the research and asking for their consent for participation. Eighteen people demonstrated their willingness to take part in the study, of whom ten where chosen for the interview according to the initially stipulated condition for residential variety, as well as accounting for variety in gender, age and one’s status as a single or joint parent.

2. ‘Integration Monitoring 2008’ was carried out by this author and his colleagues at Tallinn University and Tartu University in the form of a statewide poll, where oral interviews and the proportional random cohort method were used to question 1505 people aged 15–74 in March and April 2008. Among the respondents, 83 per cent had Estonian citizenship, 8 per cent had Russian citizenship, 2 per cent citizenship in another state and 7 per cent of the cohort was stateless. In the cohort, there were 992 Estonians and 513 other nationalities; among the latter 51 per cent had Estonian citizenship, 23 per cent were Russian citizens, 5 per cent citizens of another state and 21 per cent were stateless persons. In compiling the socio-demographic characterization of the model, population statistics data from 1 January 2008 were used. To reduce the differences that arose when comparing the model and the representativeness of the poll results, the results obtained were considered according to the following socio-demographic features: place of residence, gender, age, religion and education.

3. The so-called ‘Bronze Soldier crisis’ in April 2007 culminated in massive protests against the removal of the Soviet era war memorial from downtown Tallinn by young Russians. The confrontation with police grew into vandalizing in Tallinn’s old town, as a result of which over 1000 people were arrested.

4. In 2000 the percentage of Estonian Russians who considered their inability to learn Estonian to be a reason for not naturalizing was 34 per cent; in 2008 it was already 53 per cent.

REFERENCES


Kase, K. (2008), ‘Vene kodakondsus peibutab Eesti omast rohkem’ [Russian citizenship is more alluring than Estonian], *Postimees*, October 20.


