The role of globalisation in arguments for cosmopolitanism

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2.1. Introduction

Cosmopolitanism is the subject of renewed and widespread debate in the areas of international relations and political theory. Present circumstances in the world raise increasing questions about the scope of justice and duties across the boundaries of nation-states. In this chapter I discuss several arguments for adhering to a cosmopolitan theory of global justice. The central question I raise is whether it makes more sense to advocate cosmopolitanism on the basis of abstract arguments or on the basis of recent global trends such as globalisation. Both approaches have been subject to criticism. My conclusion is that there are abstract arguments for cosmopolitanism but that it might make sense in the current debates to rely on a more practical and minimalist strategy rather than having to defend a specific conception of human nature. Therefore globalisation does illustrate the duties people and institutions have across boundaries, yet this does not mean that in a non-globalised world duties across boundaries would not exist.

The chapter is divided into 9 sections. First of all I set out what I mean by cosmopolitanism in section 2. In section 3 I raise some general arguments against the realist and neo-realist approaches in international relations. In section 4 I discuss my first example of an abstract argument for a norm-governed international society based on Grotius. In section 5 I discuss the Kantian approach as a second example. Then I move on to the approaches that rely on some form of global interdependence. First I look at globalisation and the moral implications it is thought to have in section 6. Then in section 7 I critically assess Beitz’ original theory arguing for global duties of redistribution based on the existing global interdependence. Finally, I suggest in section 8 that O’Neill’s practical approach to the defence of cosmopolitan principles overcomes some of the problems identified with both the abstract and the globalisation approaches to global justice.
2.2. What is cosmopolitanism?

Theories of justice were traditionally developed for the domain of domestic societies only. Rawls started up the resurgence in political philosophy in 1971 by publishing *A Theory of Justice*. In this book Rawls designed principles of justice for a democratic Western society, although he acknowledged the need to specify principles of justice for the global order at a later stage. In 1993 Rawls argued for the basic rules of international law in his 'Law of the Peoples' but he did not argue for the globalisation of the Difference Principle. Others took up the theme of international justice and extended Rawls's original theory of justice as fairness. (Beitz 1979; Pogge, 1987). The tradition in political philosophy to develop theories of distributive justice and, more recently, normative arguments about the global distribution of resources, is well established. In recent years, this tradition has been seen as a valuable contribution to new approaches within international relations theory (Brown, 1997b).

Cosmopolitan political theory is an area in which the starting point is abstract from the current pattern of international relations or global realities. The aim of a theory of justice, for example, is to formulate principles of justice that are not necessarily reflected in existing institutions already. The only limit to this design of principles of justice is that they could be implemented by real existing people and would not require the development of super-humans. This is one of the reasons why I defend the position that globalisation can play a role in arguments for global justice only on the level of motivation and institutionalisation. Globalisation may be helpful in creating motivation for people to act on global principles of justice by providing more opportunities for people to relate to others across their borders. It may also be helpful by providing practical opportunities for institutions across borders. In most cases, political theory abstracts from the current distribution of resources and power to develop principles of justice from the basis of which existing institutions can be criticised.

Cosmopolitan theories have in common that they hold three things as fundamental to their arguments. They view the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern, they consider all presently living human beings as belonging to the scope of justice and they hold that principles should apply universally to equal cases. Cosmopolitan arguments have been made in debates on world government, global democracy, humanitarian intervention, perpetual peace, global distributive justice and the development of European political institutions.

A distinction is often made between moral and political cosmopolitanism (Pogge and Beitz, in Brown 1994). Political cosmopolitanism is concerned with the project of global government and global governance. Moral cosmopolitanism focuses on global principles of distributive justice and duties across boundaries, independently of the political structure that governs relations beyond states at that present moment or which type of political arrangements are seen as most attractive by the theorist in question. This chapter will be
concerned with moral cosmopolitanism rather than with designs for political institutions. I am not arguing for a world government or global democracy here.

Within moral cosmopolitanism there is another distinction to make, namely between the view that principles of justice and moral duties apply to institutions (contractarian cosmopolitanism) and the view that they apply to individuals directly (consequentialist cosmopolitanism). The latter is defended for example by Peter Singer (Singer, 1972) and has been open to criticism by people who believe this type of cosmopolitanism generates duties that are too demanding on people, given that people should have the right to prioritise significant others in their lives (O’Neill, 1989). Consequentialism has also been criticised for not taking individuals as proper ends in themselves and allowing for the possibility of sacrificing them for the good of the collective (Rawls, 1972). Contractarian cosmopolitanism as defended by Barry (1995) has been criticised for not solving the conflict between universal obligations to humankind and special obligations to family, friends and fellow nationals. I believe that Barry’s concept of first order impartiality and second order impartiality is convincing although the debate needs to be developed further as to what are proper limits to duties to humankind collectively and where we are allowed to make special allowances for fellow nationals, family members and friends. In this respect, I would like to endorse Thompson’s view that cosmopolitans need to look at political obligation beyond the nation-state.

‘cosmopolitans cannot be content with putting forward a moral position or with constructing blueprints for a cosmopolitan society. They must turn their attention to the creation of community. If, for example, cosmopolitans propose that the United Nations should become a body capable of legislating in a democratic way for the people of the world and of imposing principles of justice on world society, then they have to consider what social development could make individuals into world citizens prepared to obey the law and accept the rule of the majority, even at the expense of personal objectives and the communities that they value. Whatever form it takes, the political realisation of cosmopolitan values will require that individuals come to identify with transnational communities in a way that so far has not happened. This does not mean that existing social commitments will have to wither away, but it requires that these other allegiances sometimes take a subordinate place in a global framework in which new loci of political authority become more prominent and are able to common support on crucial issues.’ (Thompson in: Archibugi, Held, Köhler, 1998: 193)

My view of cosmopolitanism is therefore specifically focused on the institutional changes this type of theory implies and not so much on individual duties over and above the duty to create and uphold just institutions. I follow the definition of moral cosmopolitanism put forward by Beitz that

"it applies to the whole world the maxim that answers to questions about what we should do, or what institutions we should establish, should be based on an impartial consideration of the claims of each person who would be affected by our choices" (Beitz, in Brown, 1994: 124-5).

A consequence of my cosmopolitan position is that I speak of global justice rather than international justice, because I am not speaking of inter-state relations, but focus on the individual as the ultimate unit of moral concern and see a role in creating global justice for other actors than states.
A further distinction has recently been made between pragmatic and deontological cosmopolitanism (Dunne and Wheeler, 1999: 4). Cosmopolitan approaches based on deontological principles are classified as epistemologically foundationalist whereas cosmopolitan pragmatism is characterised as non-foundationalist. This distinction is made with regard to theories of human rights but could be applied to other types of cosmopolitan projects, too. The distinction I make in this chapter between abstract cosmopolitanism and practical cosmopolitanism could be understood to overlap with the classification of pragmatic and deontological cosmopolitanism. However, the practical argument for cosmopolitanism defended in this chapter aims to avoid the reliance on any strong conception of the person, not because of non-foundationalist convictions, but because the debate is most likely to progress if the most minimally controversial argument is relied on.

2.3. The shortcomings of a realist approach to global politics

Realism is the approach to politics and international relations that finds its origin in the theories of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. It has by now many versions, but in both classical realism and neo-realist statements the main descriptive thesis holds that people and states act on the basis of their self-interest and seek to maximise their power. In classical realism the use of any principles of justice to judge social institutions or the foreign policies of states by external criteria is rejected and morality is supposed to be effective only to the extent that it is enforced by physical power. This form of realism is found in Hobbes, for example, who argues that in the state of nature any concept of right and wrong is lacking. This state of nature is described by Hobbes as a place where there is a war of all against all. Life is nasty, brutish and short. Industry and agriculture are impossible because no one is safe from attack by others and possessions are not securely held. Out of fear people will resort to pre-emptive strikes so violence is widespread.

In order to escape from the state of nature, individuals in a domestic society form a central government to protect a peaceful society in which government secures possessions, enforces promises and guarantees limits on violence. In Hobbes' terms people give up the right to everything (which was not worth much in a society where the weakest can wipe out the strongest) and settle for a sovereign power which limits their liberty severely. (Hobbes, 1985 (1651))

According to the domestic analogy drawn by the realist approach to international relations, nation-states in the global order are in the equivalent of a Hobbesian state of nature. Therefore they argue that there is no place for morality in relations across borders although morality may legitimately play a role in domestic arrangements. Nation-states are seen in the domestic analogy made by realists as the main actors in the global order. They are portrayed as being in a Hobbesian state of nature since a central global authority or world government does not exist. As a consequence of the international anarchy it is claimed that mere self-
interest governs the relations between states and moral considerations are out of the question. The question of justice in the global context is therefore not worth asking. It is seen as a waste of time.

Neorealism, like realism, defends as its main starting points the self-interest of states and the anarchical nature of international relations (Brown, 1997a). In addition to its empirical claims about the lack of morality in relations beyond national boundaries, neorealism incorporates an underlying normative element in the way it treats reason and rationality. This is basic to the game theories in which the conception of what is essential to human nature is presented as common rationality of the competing actors who appraise the stakes at issue, the alternative strategies, and the respective pay-offs in a similar manner. Neorealism is founded upon this idea of a common rationality (Cox, 1992). The normative element in the paradigm is that it advocates this form of rationality. This normative claim shows up in all three areas realism has contributed to: the understanding of the nature of human beings, the nature of the state and the nature of the relations between states. The normative part of the paradigm holds that since people act on their self-interest that is what they should do and as a consequence the aggregate result is just. The state should internally provide order to prevent anarchy and externally it should act in the interests of its own existence. Note that this is different from acting in the interests of its citizens. For example, if a majority is in favour of an ethical foreign policy, it is the duty of the government to implement this only to the extent that it does not harm the interests of the state as such, according to orthodox realist views.

The crudest forms of realism have lost their attraction to many modern thinkers, since the moderation of societies purely based on self-interest by norms and social schemes is generally accepted. This does not apply equally to scepticism in the realm of international relations. In the global context there is still a strong adherence to realism. To be fair, many neorealists recognise the existing and growing co-operation between states internationally, for example in the area of regime building, but their analysis of regimes is true to the old assumptions of realism. States are seen as acting on their self-interest only and no independent body of moral norms is recognised to influence the behaviour of states in cases where their (short-term) self-interest may be harmed.

So why do I think the realist position is wrong? I endorse Beitz’s criticism of the main empirical and normative claims of realism. The empirical claim holds that the international state of nature is a state of war, in which no state has an overriding interest in following moral rules that restrain the pursuit of more immediate interests. The theoretical claim states that moral principles must be justified by showing that following them promotes the long-range interests of each agent to whom they apply. The first claim is wrong because it involves an inaccurate perception of the structure and dynamics of contemporary international politics, and the second because it provides an incorrect account of the basis for moral principles and of the moral character of the state. Both premises are embodied in the image of international relations as a Hobbesian state of nature. Beitz argues convincingly that one cannot maintain that moral
judgements about international affairs are meaningless without embracing a more far-reaching scepticism about all morality. (Beitz, 1979: 14) One cannot consistently maintain that there are moral restrictions on individual action but not on the actions of states. In addition to that, the point should be noted that not only individual morality is accepted by most realists, also morality of governments internally to their citizens is accepted. Only the behaviour of states on the international stage, towards others countries, or towards citizens of other countries is supposedly outside the reach of morality. That is not a very plausible position.

The recent critique of using any normative theory in the global context centred around two problems. Firstly, the lack of a global government which could enforce the norms if any government would not comply with them. And secondly, the role of a state is seen as defending its citizens' interests over and above the interests of citizens of other states. This would prioritise the pursuit of these interests over any moral considerations. However, as Barry suggested, there are some answers to this type of criticism (Barry, 1986). These problems have a direct analogue in domestic relations where they are not seen as detrimental to theories of justice. Non compliance does not rule out the possibility of norms and rules in the law for example. And the pursuit of our own interests or our families' interests before the interests of others does not rule out limiting the way in which we are allowed to go about pursuing our interests. For example, there are moral limits to the harm we may cause others.

Corresponding to the claim that political leaders have a right, and perhaps a duty, to pursue the national interest is the common sense notion that people have their own legitimately differing 'moral ends', which will permit or, again, possibly even require them to give more weight to the interests of themselves and of others connected to them in various ways than they give to the interests of others. This feature of common-sense morality is not often thought to cause it to self-destruct as a source of moral obligations and other moral phenomena. Why then should it be supposed that their international analogues must have such devastating implications for the possibility of moral appraisal in international affairs? (Barry, 1986)

Countries are in a position in the world-system analogous to citizens in a single country. They owe their own citizens things they do not owe citizens of other countries, just like citizens themselves may owe more to their fellow nationals than to others outside the boundaries of the nation-state, according to Barry. But from this it does not follow that anything is justified. The special obligation is set in a context of constraints on the morally acceptable ways of advancing 'moral ends'. The analogous situation for countries is that they have special duties towards their own citizens, but this does not entail that it has a moral licence to do whatever appears to it to advance the national interest, however much that may violate the legitimate interests of other countries. (Barry, 1986: 67-68) A common international morality takes the form of a belief that there are morally binding constraints on the things governments can do in pursuit of their national interests. This leads directly to the question of how to enforce moral rules without an agency compatible to a national government. Barry's initial answer is the following:
"The simple answer, which is not complete, but is still worth making, is that the moral norms that govern everyday life in a society are not for the most part backed up by legal sanctions either but are none the less quite broadly effective in restraining conduct." (Barry, 1986: 68)

Still, the security provided by the legal enforcement provides the essential underpinning of the whole system of mutual constraints within a society. International relations are fundamentally conditioned by the absence of an agency capable of enforcing compliance. However, in Barry's view, 'the notion that in the absence of a core of centrally enforced norms there can be no others that are effective is simply a crude error'. (Barry, 1986: 68) It is belied by the way in which huge numbers of international transactions take place every day on the basis of these norms (some codified in international law, and others developed through custom) that are the vast amount of the time relied on by the parties and in fact adhered to. A great deal of compliance can be accounted for without going beyond the rational pursuit of interest. It is to the advantage of a state not to be excluded from the system of diplomatic relations, to have a reputation as a reliable trading partner, and so on. It is equally true that there are many self-interested motives to stick to the prescriptions of everyday morality. But at the same time there is a commonly felt obligation to do so.

In conclusion, traditional versions of realism are wrong because they rely on a Hobbesian theory of human nature. This account has been criticised in many ways. The most important flaw is that it does not give any account of human co-operation other than the set up of a sovereign, authoritarian government. Any considerations for fellow human beings are not part of the picture. Neo-realism has not solved this problem because it has incorporated the Hobbesian model in the context of a world of sovereign states. Again any other motivation than pure and short-term self-interest is denied.

The present global order does not reflect the realist world-view. Co-operation exists in the present global order and norms are adhered to. Even if there is no global government, there are international norms and regimes. The realist position that these are simply adhered to out of self-interest conflicts with empirical evidence of states co-operating globally out of concern for the whole of humankind as in the case of environmental problems or out of concern for the rights of citizens in other states as in the case of human rights instruments.

The question I turn to now, is whether we argue for cosmopolitanism on the basis of abstract arguments or on the basis of practical arguments. In other words, is the case for cosmopolitanism dependent on the existence of interdependence or globalisation? First I consider the two abstract arguments put forward by Grotius and Kant.
2. 4. Grotius, neo-Grotians and international norms

A case for using moral arguments in the global context is found very clearly in the Grotian or rationalist tradition in international relations. This is the conception of international relations which regards them as taking place within a global society where rules and institutions confine the behaviour of individuals and states alike. (Vincent, in Kingsbury, Roberts and Bull, 1990: 241) Morality in global interactions is argued by the realists to depend on the existence of a global government. However, Bull argues from a neo-Grotian perspective that states may not be capable of installing a global government but they are still organised in such a way as to have common institutions and rules. They do not only take each other into account in their calculations, they also realise that they are bound by common rules and they recognise they have common values.

Inevitably the emphasis differs between the work of Grotius, written in the sixteenth century, and the neo-Grotians, writing in the twentieth. The main distinction is the re-interpretation of natural law as the basis for the norms governing the global society. The neo-Grotians replace the Grotian notion of natural law with a more empirical account of the basic necessities to maintain social life at all (H.L.A. Hart, 1994 and H. Bull, 1995). The neo-Grotian tradition in international relations develops a theory of international society, but as Cutler shows, the neo-Grotians don't use this to argue for an account of justice or human rights. She argues that the neo-Grotian tradition has mainly abandoned its natural law origins and has adopted a positivist stance, more in line with realism and the classical tradition (Cutler, 1991: 58). Because the Grotian tradition has abandoned Grotius on a number of crucial issues (van Gelderen, 1994) I therefore turn to Grotius himself and focus on the notion of sociability to affirm the norm-governed status of the global context.

Grotius is famous for his ideas on international law and the society of nations. He tried to systematise and complete the body of rules governing international relations that gradually became accepted, on the basis of an understanding of the Law of Nature. Grotius sought to develop an understanding of the state in the context of the 'society of states'. He explored the conditions and requirements of co-existence and cooperation among states, focusing in particular on the nature and extent of law-governed relations. (Held, 1991b: 205)

Grotius held the view that morality is constitutive of all relations between people. He considered the existence of moral norms the automatic consequence of the fact that people lived together in society and were capable of understanding that certain rules were necessary for the preservation of society. From this idea that norms are constitutive of societies Grotius derived that international society and the relations between states are also norm-governed. He asserted in De Jure Belli ac Pacis, written in the middle of the Thirty Years War, that there was a common law among nations which was valid alike for war and in peace and elaborated on what he believed this common law prescribed.
Grotius argued against the sceptic's assertion that all human conduct is motivated by self-interest. Law, according to the sceptic, is in consequence merely a social convention generally beneficial and supported not by a sense of justice, but by prudence. Grotius responded that such an appeal to utility is essentially ambiguous since human beings are inherently social beings.

"(...) (A)mong the traits characteristic of man(sic) is an impelling desire for society, that is, for social life- not of any and every sort, but peaceful, and organised according to the measure of his(sic) intelligence, with those who are of his(sic) own kind; this social trend the Stoics called 'sociableness'." (Grotius, (1625) 1979 Prolegomena, section 6)

Grotius presented a distinct position about human nature from that of Hobbes. He contradicted the notion of the collective as being constituted out of the individual which is essentially Hobbesian, by assuming the sociability of people as their desire for living together. The peaceful preservation of the social order itself becomes an intrinsic good in this way, and the conditions required for that purpose are as binding as those which serve more strictly private ends. Many accounts of why people come together in a society, focus on their mutual dependence, but according to Grotius, the formation of a society would also take place if people were not mutually dependent.

"For the very nature of man(sic), which even if we had no lack of anything would lead us into the mutual relations of society, is the mother of the law of nature." (Grotius, (1625) 1979, Prolegomena, section 16)

I call this the principle of sociability. Grotius believed that this principle could be sustained on purely secular grounds. The Grotian idea that an international society exists and that there are norms of natural law which rule the conduct of states, is built on the assumption that natural law is to be found in reason. There is no divine link via which natural law is to be known. Here I just want to affirm the norm-governed status of the international order and my adherence to a position within the Grotian tradition. This does not mean I adhere to any account of natural law; instead I believe there are other ways of developing principles of morality that hold globally. Those principles need to be debated and agreed upon instead of discovered in natural law. It seems to me that the force of Grotius’ account of norm-governed global order does not rely on natural law but on his concept of human sociability.

Sociability can be said to apply to the creation of domestic societies only. This raises the question of whether the global order is a social community in a sense that makes normative arguments relevant. Grotius saw the society between states as a great society of humankind and not a society of states alone. The individual had a dignified place in this society and was not merely an object (Vincent, in Bull, et. al. 1990: 244). Grotius held that sovereigns retain a residual responsibility for humankind at large. "They ought to care not only for the single nation which is committed to them, said Grotius, but for the whole human race."
Vincent, in Bull, et. al., 1990: 247). Grotius can therefore be understood to defend a cosmopolitan interpretation of sociability instead of a narrow Hobbesian interpretation of sociability.

In principle we can classify the Grotian argument for cosmopolitanism (in the sense of existing morality beyond boundaries) as an abstract argument, that does not rely on existing practices or interdependence. Before assessing arguments relying on the current process of globalisation, I discuss the Kantian view of morality in the global context as another example of an abstract argument for cosmopolitanism.

2.5. Kant and universal moral obligations

Another argument for cosmopolitanism is provided by Kant’s theory of perpetual peace. The Kantian approach is not based on sociability but on the Categorical Imperative and the universality of moral principles. Kantians believe that moral norms should be applicable to the international context, even more so than the Grotians. Kantians do not take the empirical existence of the state system serious as a limit on moral duties.

Since the Enlightenment moral and political philosophy has seen morality as independent from the actually existing world. This is evidence of a Kantian influence. Kant himself said: '[w]hen we have the course of nature alone in view, 'ought' has no meaning whatsoever. It is just as absurd to ask what ought to happen in the natural world as to ask what properties a circle ought to have' (Kant, 1787 (1929): 473). Kantian moral theory is based on universal principles and the conviction that principles have precedence over consequential or collective considerations. Kantian universality means that principles stand independently from place or time. The analysis of the world as it is cannot alter those principles. The widespread opinion that globalisation in itself raises questions of a moral nature in determining the obligations we have towards people who live outside our nation-state would be denied by strict Kantians. This is not to say that in a Kantian perspective duties across borders cannot be justified. On the contrary, duties across borders are part of the underlying universality of the Kantian morality. Both Kant and modern day cosmopolitans argue that national boundaries are arbitrary and do not plausibly limit the duties we have to other people.

In Kant's view, existing or potential co-operation is largely irrelevant when framing the responsibility of global actors. Just as for domestic morality the basis for international morality is the moral demand of reason (Donaldson, 1992). The main source for Kant's cosmopolitanism is his Categorical Imperative: 'act only in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law' (Kant, 1991: 67). The Categorical Imperative is valid independently of any desires or inclinations towards alternative actions; it is also valid for all rational human beings. O'Neill has illustrated the importance of universality by considering some non-universalisable principles. There are, according to O'Neill, certain principles of action which can be held coherently by one agent but which cannot be coherently proposed as principles for all. For example, if coercion and deception were universalised, then all projects of individual coercion or deception would be
made incoherent: 'Since nobody who hopes to deceive can coherently will that a principle of deception be fundamental to the practice of any plurality, justice require that it be rejected.' (O'Neill, 1992: 64) The Categorical Imperative leads to a universal theory of ethics.

Many of the contemporary cosmopolitan liberal theories rely to some extent on Kantian universalism. Their focus on theories of justice rather than virtue and their prioritising of just principles over the consequences of actions are examples of this Kantian heritage. Kantian ethics is sometimes criticised for its reliance on a metaphysical conception of the person. Any strong metaphysical position is claimed to be avoided in a contractual scenario, along the lines of Rawls' original position or Scanlon's more inclusive notions of reasonable agreement as used by Barry (Scanlon, 1982; Barry, 1995).

If we were to take Kant's work seriously, whether in its original forms or in the revised form of the contemporary cosmopolitans, the question of the ethical implications of globalisation would have to be answered in a balanced way. It is not due to globalisation that duties beyond borders are owed but to the principle of universalisability or the Categorical Imperative. In the contractarian theories duties are owed according to the principles of justice. In contractarian theories of justice Kant's universality of principle was taken seriously from the start but the universalisity of scope was at first not accepted.

Some cosmopolitan versions of the contractarian theory, as for example developed by Beitz (1979; 1983), used globalisation to show why theories of justice should no longer be confined to models of one society. Strictly speaking, however, it is not globalisation in itself that creates moral duties. Humanity should have accepted universal moral obligations before globalisation became as influential as it is. People knew of the existence of others in the world and contact was possible. If globalisation was the necessary condition for a global theory of justice then it is implied that practices like the slave trade and imperialism were morally acceptable. Barry pointed out this problem in Rawls' work as early as 1973 (Barry, 1973). However, globalisation is empirically no longer disputed and therefore it is even less plausible to deny duties across borders. It might make sense to hold that globalisation, strictly speaking, cannot alter our duties across borders, since we were already in a position to influence others' lives for a long time. The process of globalisation only makes it extra-clear that the effects of interaction demand moral responsibility. In section 8 I sketch a view which includes globalisation in this careful way, without denying that in a less globalised world duties could have been due to the same extent.

I now move on to the second group of arguments for cosmopolitanism, namely those that provide pragmatic or practical arguments rather than abstract arguments based on a specific conception of human nature. Some defences of cosmopolitanism are based on an assessment that the present situation in the world is moving towards cosmopolitanism as a result of globalisation, interdependence and so on. The question to be asked is how relevant are changes in the international system towards a norm governed international order?
Grotius held that natural law makes rules and norms a requirement for every sovereign of state or prince, since they are human beings, too. Neo-Grotians thought that it is not a moral requirement but that there is empirical evidence that states do behave as if they are bound by normative rules. They also referred to evidence of philosophers and other intellectuals and statesmen who think that states and princes should behave like that. Kant put forward the categorical imperative, based on universal natural law in defence of morality across boundaries. Contemporary cosmopolitans rely on their own interpretations of these traditional arguments or chose to defend cosmopolitanism from a more practical perspective, based on recent trends in the world. They rely on empirical evidence for a process of globalisation and the growth of supranational regimes to justify the existence of global principles of justice.

2.6. Cosmopolitanism and the implications of globalisation

The developments that are commonly believed to be constituent of globalisation are economic expansion and increased flexibility in the choice of locations for production; reduced influence of the governments of nation-states on their economies and an intensification of the social and cultural connections between people in different parts of the world. The main cause is identified as the development of technology which speeds up communication, the transport of goods and the travel of people. These are sometimes complemented by factors such as the growth of global networks of social movements and non-governmental organisations, the growing awareness of environmental problems which need to be addressed globally and security issues in a nuclear age as important elements of globalisation. In short, globalisation is often defined as the process by which the world seems to shrink and actions in one place have major long distance effects. This process is sometimes linked to the end of the Cold War and the global rise of liberal capitalism. (Scholte, 1993, 1996; Waters, 1995; Luard, 1990, 1992; McGrew, 1992; Held, 1991a, 1991b; Giddens, 1990; Robinson, 1996)

In evaluating whether globalisation creates new types of duties across borders, it is also important to establish whether globalisation is anything new. If globalisation is merely a continuation of the initial expansion of the world economy and the rise of modern states from the late sixteenth century onwards, then there would be no special occasion to re-evaluate our moral duties. The topic of this chapter therefore suggests that there are reasons to believe that globalisation in its present form is qualitatively different from earlier forms and requires a critical evaluation of its ethical implications. According to O'Neill, the time in which strangers were temporary visitors who had a right to hospitality for the length of their visit is now far away. Our relations to people across our national borders are very different. 'We live in a world where action and interaction at a distance are possible. (...) Distant strangers may be benefited or harmed, at the limit sustained or destroyed, by our action or inaction as we may be by theirs.' (O'Neill, 1995)

An objection to this type of view claims that there is nothing new about global interconnections. According to this view, a dense pattern of worldwide interconnections began to emerge with the initial expansion of the
world economy and the rise of the modern state from the late sixteenth century. Held admits that the complex interplay between state and non-state actors is hardly new. But claiming an element of continuity in the formation of the states system is quite different from claiming that there is nothing new about the present global system. The first new feature of our time is that political, economic and social activity is becoming world wide in scope and the second new feature is the intensification of levels of interaction and interconnectedness within and between states (Held, 1991a and 1991b). If globalisation is both an expansion of the scope of activities and an intensification, it is clear that this is a relatively new trend even though expansion of networks of trade across the globe has been going on for centuries. It is the intensification and the acceleration that make a qualitative difference. Scholte holds that only in recent history something approximating 'planetary' social relations has emerged (Scholte, 1993). We can conclude that globalisation has its origins in much earlier developments but has accelerated since the end of the Second World War.

Another important element in the debate on globalisation is the connection between the two sides of a paradoxical relationship. On the one hand globalisation can be defined as the intensification of world-wide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens, 1990: 64). On the other hand local transformation also forms an intrinsic part of globalisation. While the nation-state becomes less influential and cross-border influences become stronger, the connection between local communities and their national state may become weaker and the identity of the smaller unit more pronounced. In Scholte's view the process of globalisation is characterised by 'an intertwining of processes of globalisation and the promotion of sub national, sub-state territorial identities' (Scholte, 1996). This has important implications for the way duties are perceived and for debates on who is included in the scope of distributive justice. Universalists and particularists make references in support of their argument to these different sides of the process of globalisation.

There is also a reflexive element in globalisation which may be very important for its moral implications. The growing interconnectedness and expansion of contacts across borders as well as their intensification and the speeding up of communication, transport and travel have made many people aware of the fact that they live in a globalised world. This element of realisation and self-reflection is sometimes connected by observers to a larger awareness of others in distant locations as fellow human beings. According to cosmopolitans the awareness of sharing one world may make it easier to see that we have moral obligations towards others even if they live outside our borders. I suggest, however, that this is a matter of motivating people to act on principles of justice rather than a justification for a particular scope of principles of justice. Globalisation may make it easier for people to act on universal cosmopolitan principles of justice but it does not make those principles right or wrong.

The sometimes implicit cosmopolitan stance of authors on globalisation contributes to the common assumption that the causal link between globalisation and global moral duties no longer needs explicit
justification. For example Luard views the centre of decision making as moving away from nation-states and towards collective institutions. ‘The welfare of ordinary men and women no longer depends primarily on the actions of their own governments. It depends, far more, on actions and decisions reached, far beyond the frontiers of their own state, by other governments, or by international bodies taking decisions collectively.’ (Luard, 1990: vi) It remains to be seen to what extent the space created by the diminishing powers of the nation-state will be occupied by transnational or global institutions. It may well be that regional institutions are going to play a more important role than global ones in the near future. Waters sketches a picture of what he calls ‘a fully globalised world’ as far from a cosmopolitan utopia of one world community. He foresees that in a globalised world there will be a single society and culture occupying the planet but neither will social relations be harmoniously integrated nor will there be a central government. Territoriality will disappear as an organising principle for social and cultural life and we will be unable to predict social practices and preferences on the basis of geographical location. We can expect relationships between people in disparate locations to be formed as easily as relationships between people in proximate ones. (Waters, 1994: 3) The picture of a global village (McLuhan, 1964: 93) can obviously no longer be taken for granted.

A further point worth making when assessing cosmopolitan claims about the ethical impact of globalisation is that globalisation and interdependence do not automatically imply equality. Inequality between nation-states and within nation-states can be and is frequently increased by integration in the global economy. The Newly Industrialised Countries are often mentioned as an example of how beneficial the integration into the world economy is for countries in the South. Although there may be some success stories, there is a wide divergence between countries in the South in how well their integration in the global economy has paid off and who has benefited from it. In the heyday of Structural Adjustment Programs many countries were advised to focus on the production of primary goods for the world market. As a consequence of the additional supply, the price for those goods declined and the results are well known. Even for countries which did successfully integrate in the world economy, the results were not beneficial for everyone. In Brazil, for example, economic growth over the past twenty years has been remarkable. Yet the internal distribution of income has not advanced. Instead of becoming more equal, the situation has deteriorated. Globalisation and integration in the world economy have not had positive effects for Brazil's poor. Furthermore, the use of the term interdependence in the world economy conceals that the poorer countries in the world are part of this integrated economy on the basis of dependency rather than genuine interdependence. Even if one does not hold that dependency causes underdevelopment, dependence cannot be denied. While everyone may take part in the process of globalisation, not everyone takes part to the same extent. Therefore it must be noted that interdependence does not coincide with equality (Gilpin, 1987).

So far, globalisation has been widely held to mean the increased freedom of market forces and the diminishing roles of political actors, mainly nation-states, in softening the impact of market outcomes. In
the context of national societies it is now common practice to smooth out the worst implications of market capitalism. With the decreasing influence over economics of national governments, the sombre situation for the world's poor has sometimes been seen as a possible cause of social change in the direction of some form of power to contain global capitalism. In reality this can only be a co-ordinated power between nation-states and other global actors since single nation-states have no longer many instruments to control the major players in the global economy. 'The strongest impetus towards the re-imagining of our communities will come from the realisation that without political opposition capitalism will not on its own accord provide the conditions for narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor, a redistribution of wealth globally nor even much more than a basic level of security and stability. Without the articulation of a political balance to the international economy, the likely result will be a perpetuation of the system's inequalities.' (Horsman and Marshall, 1994).

Luard argues that the vacuum left by national governments in the provision of welfare will make welfare a global issue just like the environment has become. 'If national politicians are not always capable of making decisions to protect the well being of their citizens, there is a vacuum in which human welfare must be considered. If we use the analogy of the environment human welfare becomes a global problem which requires an open debate about the extent of duties across boundaries.' (Luard, 1990) Political philosophers can be of great help in opening up the debate by providing relevant concepts and arguments. Seeing a role for political philosophers in the debate on the impact of globalisation is, however, not the same as viewing globalisation as the basis for duties across borders. The direct route of arguing that global interdependence creates duties to fellow human beings across boundaries raises philosophical problems.

The issue here is whether or not globalisation changes the moral obligations people have towards others in the world. The main element in globalisation that causes the need to look freshly at moral obligations is sometimes seen as the growing knowledge about others in the world. Luard, for example, maintains that people are more prepared to take human rights issues seriously across the globe 'because the world is so much smaller that we are all today more conscious of the human rights violations that occur in other parts of the world and more determined to do something about them.' (Luard, 1992: 296) Alternatively, it is argued that interdependence in a globalised world causes the need for new principles of global justice. Robinson, for example, suggests that '(i)n an interdependent world, questions of justice and fairness, duty and obligation, rights and responsibilities, and trust and care are more pressing than ever.' (Robinson, 1996: 1) It is clear from the argument in this section that globalisation and interdependence do not automatically lead to the cosmopolitan ideal. For a further critical evaluation the next section looks in more detail at the cosmopolitan political theory of duties based on global interdependence developed by Charles Beitz.
2.7. Moral duties based on global interdependence

The main proponent of a moral theory based on growing interdependence is Beitz (1979). Although he altered his argument (Beitz, 1983) the original theory is worth looking at in more detail since many people share the intuition that globalisation causes a shift in the moral duties towards people across boundaries. In some ways interaction is the obvious condition for moral duties. Even though morality may come into play in situations where there is no interaction such as the balance between present and future generations, it cannot be plausibly excluded from situations in which there is human interaction. While we could argue that in the period before communities knew about the existence of other communities in the world the members of those communities did not have moral duties towards one another, in a historical period where we know of the existence of others and have intensive interaction with them, morality and obligations are denied only by outright moral sceptics. The form global interaction has taken, according to Beitz (1979), leads to a strong argument for global duties of redistribution. Since nation-states are no longer self-contained justice becomes a global matter and cannot be coherently theorised within models of one society.

Beitz's original argument follows in the Rawlsian tradition. He uses the persuasive force of a hypothetical contract agreed on by all those involved. As long as the situation in which the choice of the principles is made satisfies the criteria of justice, the principles that result from the deliberations are also just. Rawls himself argued that two principles of justice would follow from an imaginary original position. People who did not know their future position in society would opt for the greatest equal liberty for all and a second principle, specifying equality of opportunity by guaranteeing offices open to all. The second principle would also include, according to Rawls, the Difference Principle, which holds that benefits and burdens of social co-operation should be divided equally unless the worst off in society benefit from any inequalities. Rawls believes in the trickle-down process of wealth and he assumes that incentives for the rich are needed to get them to invest their money and talents in the society. This is why inequality may benefit the least advantaged up to a certain point (Rawls, 1972).

Rawls argued, however, that in the question of international justice, the second principle would not be opted for. The theory of international justice would justify the non-intervention principle that presently rules the international order albeit combined with a basic set of human rights, including the right to life and security, the right to personal property, and the elements of the rule of law, as well as the right to a certain liberty of conscience and freedom of association, and the right to emigration. (Rawls, 1993: 68) The Difference Principle was not applicable to international justice, according to Rawls, for the following reason: 'persons' adverse fate is more often to be born into a distorted and corrupt political culture than into a country lacking resources. The only principle that does away with that misfortune is to make the political traditions and culture of all peoples reasonable and able to sustain just political and social institutions that secure human rights. (...) We do not need a liberal principle of distributive justice for this purpose.' (Rawls, 1993: fn52)
Beitz criticised Rawls and argued that the Difference Principle should also hold internationally. He makes two basic points. Firstly, even if we accept that states are separate self-contained societies, their representatives would insist on a more wide ranging contract than Rawls envisages. Secondly, since states are not self-contained there is no reason to look for a second contract between them; instead Rawls’ full account of justice should be applied world-wide, including the Difference Principle. Beitz’s first point concerns the distribution of natural resources. He argues that the initial distribution of resources is morally arbitrary and therefore subject to procedures of distributive justice. His argument is roughly that if representatives in an international original position do not know how rich their country is in resources, their aversion of risk will make them opt for an equivalent of an international Difference Principle (Beitz, 1985).

The main concern here is the second argument. Beitz’s position that the world is now in practice a single society as a result of interdependence and that therefore Rawls’s principles should be applied without exception brings up some interesting problems (Beitz, 1979: 129 and onwards and Beitz, 1985: 295 and onwards). The argument runs as follows: ’if evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows the existence of a global scheme of social co-operation, we should not view national boundaries as having fundamental moral significance. Since boundaries are not coextensive with the scope of social co-operation, they do not make the limits of social obligations. Thus, the parties to the original position cannot be assumed to know that they are members of a particular national society, choosing principles of justice for that society. The veil of ignorance must extend to all matters of national citizenship.’ (Beitz, 1985: 298) In conclusion, Beitz argues that there is no reason why the content of the chosen principles of justice would change when the original position is thus transformed.

A first difficulty is that the present interdependent world system cannot plausibly be defined as a co-operative venture for mutual advantage, which is the definition of society Rawls presents in his original theory of justice. ‘Possibly parts of the industrial world could be seen in this way - the European Union, for example - but it would be difficult to see relations between rich and poor countries in this light.’ (Brown 1997: 290)

One way out of this dilemma is to adopt a position which is no longer dependent on a society as a scheme of co-operation for mutual advantage, as has been done by Brian Barry. He argues against Rawls that impartiality is the crucial principle of international justice. His theory is universalist and includes all human beings. A reasonable agreement on the principles of international justice can be reached on the basis of their motivation to justify behaviour to others. (Barry, 1995)

Further critics have attacked the causal link Beitz presupposes between the currently growing interdependence and moral duties of redistribution across borders. Brown, for example, writes that a sense of obligation towards people across national boundaries is not something that can be expected to emerge
simply as a result of individuals and peoples coming to have more contact with one another, because such contact need not generate the essentially moral consciousness of common identity that is required' (Brown, 1995: 94). And, similarly, Robinson rejects the 'dubious causality whereby the increasing scope and range of influence and contact among individuals, institutions and states is thought to bring about the creation of a set of universal norms, universalised moral commitments and a global shared identity.' (Robinson, 1996: 17) The critics expect that there may be certain trends, commonly associated with globalisation which hinder rather than assist the creation of positive moral relations across borders. They do not see why, for example, the expansion of the global market economy would contribute to an extension of moral concern to other communities when the global capitalist system is characterised not only by interdependence, but often by dependence and increasing inequalities between and within North and South. Moreover, these two critics argue, certain trends associated with the spread of what might be called a 'global consumer culture' - the fact that young people everywhere desire the same jeans, trainers and electronic games, (Brown 1995: 93) - do not suggest any movement towards new understandings between cultures or heightened moral awareness of the well-being of distant others. Scholte also warns for over-enthusiasm on the side of cosmopolitan arguments: '(...) (W)orld interdependence is not by definition a good thing. World social relations do not guarantee us equality or community, although these eventualities are not logical impossibilities, either.' (Scholte, 1993: 39)

The points made by these critics are essentially about the fact that increasing contact between people across the globe does not necessarily lead to moral concerns between them. I would add that some parts of the globalisation process may seem to include more contact with people in other parts of the world, but in fact they add to the increasing isolation in which people (especially in the North) sometimes live. For example, the contacts made through the internet talk-rooms are often based on complete fantasy stories about one's life and the home-shopping trend means that people can withdraw even more behind the walls of their flats. In some instances the point is even further developed, arguing that even if some moral obligations are the result of these contacts, they may never add up to the same kind of obligations people have towards their fellow nationals. Brown, for example, concludes that '(I)n practice, and quite sensibly, we recognise degrees of obligations towards family, friends, acquaintances, fellow citizens, and so on, and as long as this recognition does not lead us to disregard the interests of those in the outer circles of our concern, there is no reason to see this as immoral.' (Brown, 1995: 96) The discussion of priorities in moral obligations is beyond the scope of this chapter.

A point in favour of Beitz's argument is that in his original version, he does not argue that globalisation leads to moral concern and to equality among nations. Beitz clearly suggests that the benefits of globalisation are distributed unequally and that therefore principles of global distributive justice are required: 'Economic interdependence, then, involves a pattern of relationships which are largely non voluntary from the point of view of the worst off participants, and which produce benefits for some while imposing burdens on others.
These facts, by now part of the conventional wisdom of international relations, describe a world in which national boundaries can no longer be regarded as the outer limits of social co-operation.' (Beitz, 1985: 296) Beitz rejects in this way the criterion of co-operation for mutual advantage which Rawls developed for principles of justice.

The final and most important criticism posed the hardest problem for Beitz's initial position. It can be argued that not only his prediction of the effect of globalisation is at least uncertain and at worst wrong but the use of an empirical fact to justify moral duties as in the sense described above is methodologically unsound. In Beitz's original theory his account of the international Difference Principle relies on the empirical fact of interdependence. Inclusion of all human beings alive on earth now in a universal theory of international or global justice may be morally obligatory even when the states system has not evolved into anything like a global society. Exactly how relevant the present circumstances of globalisation and mutual dependence are is questioned by the more strictly Kantian approaches.

Beitz himself has answered this objection, which was first formulated by Barry (1982), by stating that his argument that the members of the Original Position should be global rather than national because national societies are not self-sufficient misses the point although he still agrees with its conclusion. (Beitz, 1983: 595) The basis from which Beitz now includes all human beings in the theory of justice are the two basic powers: a capacity for an effective sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good (Beitz, 1983 and 1991). This formulation is found in Rawls' 1980 article on Kantian constructivism. 'Since human beings possess these essential powers regardless of whether, at present, they belong to a common co-operative scheme, the argument for construing the original position globally need not depend on my claim about the existence of international social co-operation.' (Beitz, 1983: 595) It may well be that Beitz has revised his theory arguing for global redistribution but many continue to link globalisation with world-wide duties. If it is put forward in the form Beitz chose in 1985, namely, using the increasing global inequalities as a result of the unfair global economic and political institutions as an illustration for why a theory of global justice is needed then this seems a plausible argument. The crux of this version of his argument is the denial of any moral relevance to national boundaries. This would be in line with a Kantian moral theory. The problematic version of the argument is the one that relies on global interdependence per se to invoke duties of redistribution.

2.8. O’Neill’s practical approach to cosmopolitan ethics

After the discussion of several problems with the cosmopolitan position insofar as it relies on globalisation to make its point and mentioning the Kantian problem of relying on metaphysical notions of the person and human rationality, I will now turn to a recently suggested alternative which takes globalisation seriously as an element in moral reasoning while not relying on it. As I pointed out earlier, the two main positions in ethics, universalism and particularism, both deal well with one aspect of the globalisation process but not
with both at the same time. Universalism, broadly speaking, holds that judgements in ethics should be made according to universal principles which hold for all lives and in all situations. The scope of universal principles is mostly seen as cosmopolitan. Universalism uses as evidence for its position the aspects of globalisation such as the process of growing world-wide interdependence, the expansion of supra-national institutions and the development of a cosmopolitan frame of mind. Particularism in contrast appeals to the actual practices or traditions of particular communities, which rules out the cosmopolitan scope of the universalists. Particularists emphasise the aspect of globalisation which cause the restatement of sub-national local communities and of groups coming together on the basis of particular identities. If it is true that both aspects of globalisation are causally linked, it may be best to reach for an approach in ethics which could include both universal principles and an account of existing local practices. O'Neill's version of practical ethics aims to arrive at universal principles without having to rely on a metaphysical account of the person. O'Neill avoids the question ‘what are the obligations from one person to others in the world?’ and asks instead ‘what are our obligations in the present time?’ (O'Neill, 1996). In her search for an answer to the questions of global or transnational justice she acknowledges that in today's world, theories of justice for a wider scope than national societies are unavoidable: ‘today questions of global distributive justice will arise whether or not we can find the theoretical possibilities to handle them. Modern technical and institutional possibilities make far wider intervention not only possible but unavoidable.’ (O'Neill, 1991: 277) In order to solve those questions, according to O'Neill, we need to look at who is obliged to take which sorts of actions for whom. In her later work she therefore focuses on the question of moral standing.

O'Neill takes a practical approach rather than a theoretical one because cosmopolitan, universal principles have not convincingly overcome the objections from the communitarians and liberal nationalists. One way forward could be to focus on the practical approach to moral standing. This approach holds that assumptions of moral standing we show when acting cannot be denied in the realm of moral obligations. In summary, when we interact with others across borders we make quite complicated assumptions about the agents and subjects we deal with. It would be incoherent to deny those agents or subjects moral standing while clearly assuming their complexities when we interact.

It seems to me that O'Neill has a point when she argues that it is not possible to have complex relations with others without conceding that they are indeed agents or subjects. In her view agents must accord moral standing to neighbours and strangers, near and far, but her theory does not need any account of essential features of beings deserving moral standing. In this way she avoids the trap that universalists are often accused of falling into. The result is a less universalistic approach that still defends the principles that the universalists hold so dearly. O'Neill's practical approach will yield results which are different for different people at different times. A theoretical universalist approach would not. The approach does not say anything about agents on whom we cannot act (like inhabitants of distant planets) and whether or not they have moral standing.
What then is the importance of empirical facts for moral obligations in the practical approach to ethics? O'Neill makes three assumptions relevant to fixing ethical standing. From an agent perspective the first assumption is that there are others who are separate from the agent. Secondly the agent assumes that those others are somehow connected to him or her. Thirdly the assumption is made by an agent that the others have limited but determinate powers. These three assumptions are respectively called plurality, connection and finitude. 'Where assumptions under all three headings are made, there will be a basis for agents to determine which others they are committed to according ethical standing and consideration' (O'Neill, 1996: 101). In O'Neill's theory of moral standing, connection means that agents can be or are acted on by others. For this it is necessary that the agents believe they are connected to others by some causal link. This causal pathway may be a very indirect route as is the case in many instances in the modern, globalised world. This is a much more modest claim than what is sometimes thought to be a necessary condition of moral standing, namely that agents share a language, normative ties and so on. (For a discussion see Brown, 1995.)

O'Neill presents some examples to show that moral standing is not due if communities are not aware of each other's existence. One such example are the inhabitants of Anglo-Saxon England and their T'ang Chinese contemporaries (O'Neill, 1996: 105) and another the Vikings living in Dublin and their Peruvian contemporaries (O'Neill, 1995). These communities lived beyond the pales of each other's known world. They did not and could not premise actions on assumptions on one another's capacities to act or to suffer. It would be absurd to accuse them of acting either justly or unjustly to the members of the other group.

Since in our world action which is globally institutionalised is a reality, O'Neill's approach shows that a more or less cosmopolitan view of moral standing is contingently appropriate. Due to the assumptions we make about others as soon as we take part in practices in which they play a part moral standing cannot be denied. Examples of such assumptions are that others can trade and negotiate, translate and settle payments, pollute the environment and contribute to its renewal and so on. O'Neill concludes therefore that '(i)f we owe justice to those whose moral standing we acknowledge (by our actions) we will owe it to strangers as well as to neighbours and to distant strangers as well as to those who are relatively near at hand' (O'Neill, 1995).

However, O'Neill is vulnerable to two reactions. Firstly, the practical approach to global ethics cannot answer the question of what duties we owe based on our common humanity. This is because moral standing relies on people being recognised as human beings already in the shared practices of communication and trade. O'Neill’s theory explicitly starts from the question of what we owe others in the present world rather than the question of what do human beings owe each other. From the perspective of ethical debate it would still be interesting to discuss the latter question, but O'Neill’s more modest approach may help us to move ahead and establish obligations here and now which is helpful in a world where action to reduce poverty and
other injustices are urgently needed. Moreover, I do not believe that the contingency O'Neill brings into the debate is a threat to the universality of justice in her theory, since her notion of complex moral assumptions does not require one-to-one contact between all people in the world but a network of intricate causal links which can only exist if we assume moral standing of others involved in this network of interactions.

Secondly, O'Neill’s approach can be questioned for whether it provides a model of which duties follow from the recognition of moral standing. An important part of the ethical debate on duties across borders is focused on the strength of those duties. Although it is important that O'Neill argues for duties based on justice rather than on common humanity, a theory of the hierarchy of duties and the relevance of the borders of nation-states needs to be developed. I will argue in Chapter 3, that a valid principle of global justice is impartiality. I defend a conception of impartiality that implies that groups (whether nation-states or not) can institutionalise care and obligations to others over and above the global principles of justice in the same way as individuals can give away (part of) their resources to 'significant others'. However, these arrangements may not interfere with the duties owed to others across borders and those duties must be part of a theory of justice rather than charity.

2.9. Conclusion

In this chapter I rebutted the position that if moral arguments can be meaningfully applied in domestic cases of moral argument, they cannot be used in the case of global relations. I discussed the shortcomings of the realist approach to global politics and defended the Grotian argument that all relations between people are norm-governed and therefore international relations are subject to social norms as well. This is based on the notion of human sociability. I argued that sociability is not just the collective human tendency to create moral relations with others in domestic societies, but a cosmopolitan notion of viewing all relationships with other human beings as norm governed. This leaves the global order open to evaluations from a moral point of view. I discussed the Kantian position on global morality based on the Categorical Imperative and indicated some criticisms strictly Kantian approaches have generated in recent debate. Then I posed the more general question of whether cosmopolitanism should be defended in abstract terms at all or whether a practical defence could bring the debate further. I argued that although intuitively we may want to defend a more abstract cosmopolitanism, the question of duties is most relevant under the present circumstances. If we can argue a convincing case for the duties across borders in the contemporary world then that is a big step forwards. The context of globalisation becomes relevant to the duties we have to people outside our own nation-state without being relied on as the justification for cosmopolitan principles of distributive justice. My conclusion is therefore that there are abstract arguments for cosmopolitanism but that it might make sense in the current debates to rely on a more practical and minimalist strategy rather than having to defend a specific conception of human nature. Therefore globalisation is seen as illustrating the duties people and institutions have across boundaries yet this does not mean that in a non-globalised world duties across boundaries would not exist.
However, it is not coherent to argue, as Charles Beitz did in 1979 and many others have done more or less implicitly since then, that global interdependence in itself means that we now have global obligations. As Brown and Robinson have objected, interdependence can add to global inequality and does not necessarily bring about a broadening of moral scope in common sense morality. In order to show the existence of moral obligations beyond those recognised in common sense morality, a separate argument is required since global interdependence cannot provide the grounds for global obligations. Such an argument is provided by the practical approach to moral standing as proposed by O'Neill. The main advantage of her approach is that cosmopolitan universal principles are defended without having to rely on metaphysical assumptions. This strengthens my argument for a universal scope of and weakens grounds for arguments that duties across borders are based on humanitarian considerations rather than principles of justice.

Finally, this chapter has dealt with the moral implications of globalisation in a rather abstract and theoretical way. This does not mean to say that the effects of globalisation in terms of increased poverty and exclusion of specific social groups within Northern and Southern societies do not affect the understanding of global duties. This chapter argued that these effects need to be theorised in the context of a separate theory of global justice rather than as part of an argument for duties across borders based on global interdependence.

Bibliography


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