Institutional Trust and Democratic Support: A Comparison of the Peoples of East Asia

Abstract

Does institutional trust influence citizens’ support for democracy? If institutional trust does indeed influence support for democracy, why is trust at such low levels in East Asian democracies? And, why is trust in the political system higher in many countries classified as partially free or not free? In order to answer these questions, this paper uses data from the second wave of the Asian Barometer Survey for thirteen counties. This study has utilized the perspectives of institutionalism, culturalism, and critical citizens, respectively, to review the relationship between institutional trust and democratic support, which were then further tested by adding traditional social values according to the country’s status among East Asian countries. The empirical results of this study prove that institutional trust influences democratic support. The chief finding was that the high level of trust in institutions is mainly caused by TSV. Our research supports culturalism, but disagrees with the position of institutional theorists that there is no relationship between institutional trust and democratic support. Furthermore, contra previous research, this study found that critical citizens support democracy less than non-critical citizens.

Key words: institutional trust, institutionalism, culturalism, critical citizens
Institutional Trust and Democratic Support: A Comparison of the Peoples of East Asia

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1. Introduction

A basic essential factor in the operation of democratic government is the public’s trust in the political system and support for political institutions. The relationship between the public’s trust in political institutions and the operation of government has long been the subject of academic discussion (Warren, 1999; Dalton, 2004). It began with David Easton’s system theory, which held that political trust was on the one hand the public’s support for the political system, and, on the other, the public’s level of satisfaction with the government. If most members of the public did not trust the government, no longer complying with policy to the extent that social conflict developed, government would incur greater social costs in the implementation of policy (Easton, 1965). This point highlights the political impact of trust on the political system, and there are two key points in this regard. First, what degree of recognition of the government by the public reflects the public’s trust in political institutions? That is to say, how much legitimacy does the government possess? Second, what degree of support for the policies promoted by the government is reflected by the public’s trust in political institutions? This implies the question of whether the government can promote policies without hindrance or only without incurring a great social cost. To put it another way, this argument implies that the greater the public’s trust in the institutions, the smoother the operations of government will be.

An implicit assumption in democratic theory is that the greater the public’s trust in political systems, the greater the legitimacy of government, and the more sustainable hence the democracy. This is not true of the actual operation of democratic government, however. Since the 1970s, several scholars have found that the advanced democracies of North America, Europe and Japan have all faced crises of democracy, one sign of which has been a decline in public trust of government (Crozier,
Huntington, Watanuki, 1975). By the 2000s, it was even found that the public’s trust in political figures, political parties, and political institutions in almost all advanced, industrial, democratic countries had universally declined (Dalton, 2004: 3; Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton, 2000). This finding prompted scholars to again consider the reasons why their empirical findings about the operations of democracy run counter to the scenarios predicted by their theories; and to conduct debate about issues to which this gave rise, such as what the political consequences would be of the decline in political trust. Would a decline in institutional trust affect the survival of democratic government?

Many kinds of explanations have been offered for the perceived declines in trust in political institutions in the advanced Western democracies. A certain number of scholars though have switched their attention to the emerging democracies of East Asia, to explore the assessment of democratic operations and of the institutions of the East Asian countries that have experienced authoritarian governments. Unexpectedly, the trust in political institutions of the people of the countries of East Asia which enjoy democratic government—Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—is actually very low. By contrast, the trust in political institutions among the populations of authoritarian countries, such as China, Singapore, and Cambodia, is persistently high (Albritton, Bureekul, and Guo, 2005; Li, 2004; Wang, Dalton, and Shin, 2006; Ahn, and Kang, 2002). This paradoxical finding has aroused the curiosity of scholars as one of the myths about East Asia (Chu and Chang, 2010: 1). Why is trust in political institutions in the authoritarian countries of East Asia, contrary to expectations, greater than that in democratic countries? What will be the political consequences of this? Most importantly, what impact will it have on Asia’s democratic future? No definitive answers to these questions are available, so this study attempts to survey these issues.

This study is divided into six parts. The first part illustrates the significance of
institutional trust for democratic operations; and then the second part demonstrates the
definition and origins of political institutions. The third section reviews the
relationship between the theories of institutional trust and democratic supports, in
terms of institutionalism and culturalism, and critical citizens. It also explains the
method used to measure institutional trust and democratic supports. The fourth section
defines the data source and the data testing methods. In the fifth section, the
distribution of the public’s institutional trust in East Asia is described, followed by an
analysis of the models of institutional trust and democratic supports. It also attempts
to account for the higher levels of institutional trust in authoritarian East Asian
governments in contrast to their democratic counterparts. This is followed by a
conclusion.

2. Targets and Sources of Trust in Institutions:

The first and foremost theory in research on political trust is Easton’s (1957)
system theory. He further subdivided the targets of political trust into three levels:
political community, government, and political authority. Trust in the political
community refers to support for the country or political system in a general sense.
Government involves three essential factors. The first is the mode of operation of
government, such as democratic government or authoritarian government. The second
is standards of behavior, which we might also call the rules of the game obeyed by the
actors. In democratic government, for example, citizens enjoy political rights. The
third is the assessment of political institutions, such as the legislature, courts, and
political parties. In general terms, public trust in government implies that citizens
should support their country’s type of government, and obey the rules of the game that
apply therein, as well as accept governance by its political institutions and the policies
that they formulate. A final type of target of political trust, political authority, refers to
those who trust in political institutions, such as presidents, legislators, and so forth. (Easton, 1965: 178). With reference to Easton’s classification of political trust, this study focuses on the third target, which is people’s trust in political institutions.

If we wish to review the relationship between trust in institutions and democratic support, we must first understand the sources of trust in institutions in order to understand the mechanism linking trust in institutions and democratic support. There are primarily two types of theory that are used to explain the sources of trust in institutions: institutionalism and culturalism. Institutionalism holds that political trust is the achievement of people towards political institutions and government administration, as well as a rational assessment of the trustworthiness of political institutions. When a government’s administrative performance enhances the public’s sense of well-being, the operations of democratic institutions win the public’s recognition. The public’s trust in political institutions rises along with the government’s administrative legitimacy. The government’s implementation of policy then proceeds more smoothly. Conversely, if most members of the public do not trust the government, the government inevitably encounters more obstacles to its administrative efforts, and may have to shoulder greater social costs by implementing its policies. Institutionalism involves observation from a rational perspective. The people believe that this political system will achieve objectives, which they will derive satisfaction from. This in turn leads to a rise in the public’s trust in political institutions; but this also implies that the degree of the public’s political trust is variable because it depends on the ups and downs of political achievements.

Unlike the rational interpretation of institutionalism, culturalism holds that political trust is formed outside the realm of politics through the socialization of the cultural standards and development processes within the social context of the places in which people live. From the perspective of culturalism, trust in institutions is an
extension of interpersonal trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001: 31). In concrete terms, social trust serves as a kind of cultural element, deriving from political trust. The greater the social trust, the greater the political trust (Verba, 1965: 535). Putnam, in the book *Making Democracy Work*, used a tradition of a civil community enjoying trust and cooperation to explain why local government in northern Italy performed better than local government in southern Italy (Putnam, 1993). He held that people cultivate social trust from citizen networks and that people who trust each other cooperate more easily with others, and treat each other fairly. At the same time, the cooperation involved in social trust will expand to the political system, and people will have more trust in the government’s ability to govern (Putnam, 1993: 111; 2000: 338). In general terms, culturalism holds that the social trust of individuals will be extended to trust in institutions, and that trust in political institutions is in fact trust in the ability or integrity of those who trust in those institutions; it differs from trust in interpersonal networks only to the extent it recognizes the personnel of political institutions (Harre, 1999: 259).

The above theories can be of considerable assistance in terms of understanding the sources of trust in political institutions, but if we draw on them to gain an understanding of trust in institutions in Asian countries, we risk not seeing the whole picture. This is especially true of the assumption in culturalism that political trust is derived from social trust. Any observation of the newly emerging democracies of East Asia will disabuse the researcher of this notion. This is because some of the countries have experienced authoritarian rule, in which the government controlled the power of the military and police. This meant the people were compelled to obey the government only, not to mention monitor each other and report any suspected subversion to the government. As a result, they developed a submissive attitude towards government, and were forced not to trust others. Owing to this historical
background, errors may be caused by the application of social trust to the analysis of
the East Asian public's institutional trust. Furthermore, traditional Asian social values
emphasize obedience rather than a questioning attitude, unlike their Western
counterparts. This study therefore holds that traditional social values should be
factored into analyses of East Asian peoples’ trust in political institutions.

3. Institutional Trust and Support for Democracy

(1) The Relationship Between Institutional Trust and Support for Democracy

As institutional trust has declined throughout the advanced democracies, many
studies of democratization have held that when the people do not trust the institutions,
democratic consolidation will be compromised (Miller and Listhaug, 1999; Dalton,
1996; Nye et al., 1997). The issue of whether institutional trust affects support for
democracy has generated a lot of debate and is primarily interpreted from three points
of view: culturalism, critical citizens, and institutionalism. Each will now be
addressed in turn.

Political cultural theory emphasizes that culture and concepts that are deeply
rooted in a country’s society will forge citizens’ attitudes towards the government
(Abramson and Inglehart, 1995; Inglehart, 1997). It also highlights the significance of
the influence of institutional trust on democratic operations for three primary reasons:
First, institutional trust is seen as capable of enhancing support for democracy and has
a direct influence on the continued existence and operational effectiveness of
government; it facilitates a relationship involving a comparable degree of trust
between the government and the governed, which allows the government to formulate
policy that advances the well-being of the people (Bianco, 1994; Weatherford, 1987).
For this reason, institutional trust and democratic support can be seen as mutually
reinforcing. Public support for both the institutions facilitating the government’s
production of effective policies and for the government is enhanced by the achievements of governance. (Easton, 1965). Second, institutional support enhances the people’s confidence in the government’s ability to respond to their needs, and encourages them to express their needs through democratic procedures (such as voting). The government in turn then responds once again to the people’s needs and the people in turn subscribe all the more to democratic procedures and institutions, so institutional support advances the public’s participation in political (Norris, 1999; Putnam, 2000), and deepens democratic support. Third, trust in the political system will also prompt the public to accept democratic values and standards (Norris, 1999), and to reject other, non-democratic systems (Rose, Mishler, and Haerper, 1998). To put it another way, institutional trust has both direct and indirect effects upon support for democracy; the indirect effect being that it enhances democratic values, which facilitate support for democracy, and the direct effect being that it brings legitimacy, which strengthens support for the government (Mishler and Rose, 2005: 1053).

The most famous theory in the post-1990 development of culturalism was the postmodern theory of Inglehart. He held that the shift in basic values signaled by the emergence of post-materialism among younger generations would tend to subvert traditional sources of political authority, including political institutions representative of government, such as the army and police. For this reason, changes in the values of post-industrialized society would encourage the development of critical citizens who would adopt a more distrustful attitude toward government (Inglehart, 1997). Diverging from the above culturalism view, however, is the view that critical citizens should not be seen as a threat to democratic government, because, although they are dissatisfied with the achievements of their country’s democratic operations, they still endorse democracy (Klingemann, 1999; Norris, 1999). The reason that critical citizens endorse democracy is because they have a deep understanding of the value of
liberal democracy. They are often better educated, urban, male, and younger. Additionally, some have argued that a critical citizenry is indicative of a robust democracy; indeed, that it is the very essence of democracy itself (Dalton, 2004; Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton, 2000).

In contrast to culturalism, institutionalism calls into question the view that institutional trust is associated with cultural features that substantially impact on support for democracy. Institutional theorists interpret the institutional support of the public from a rational choice perspective, holding that the public’s assessment of institutions is mainly based on administrative performance, and that when the public’s expectation of the governments’ administrative performance cannot be satisfied, the public feels dissatisfied with government institutions (Miller, 1974). The assessment of administrative performance mainly concerns the economic aspect. If the public believes the economy is not good, there is dissatisfaction with institutions and the sense of trust declines (Jackman and Miller, 1996; Mishler and Rose, 2001). According to Kitschelt (1992), in emerging democratic nations, the states of national and individual finances are the essential influences on democratic support. However, a number of studies have applied quantitative research methods and drawn the contrary conclusion that, overall, economic factors only have a limited impact on the public’s level of institutional trust (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg, 1993; McAllister, 1999; Nye and Zelikow, 1997). Corruption is one issue though that is connected to economic performance. A certain number of evidence-based studies have found that political corruption can lead to public distrust of institutions (Seligson, 2002; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chang, Chu, and Hu, 2003). Aside from the treatment of economic performance as an assessment of institutional trust, there are also scholars who have started to emphasize other aspects such as governance in accordance with the law and the guaranteeing of civil rights. Further relevant initiatives include the rise of new
forms of political participation, such as petitions for referenda and assembly, and the view that basic radicalism will allow the replacement of previous forms of participation; on this basis it has been argued that there is no need to worry about crises of democracy (Rose et al., 1998; Pharr Putnam Dalton, 2000). Generally speaking, institutional theorists believe that the political trust of the public merely reflects an assessment of the effectiveness of governance, or administrative achievement as regards other indicators, so it is normal that there should be brief fluctuations. Any observed relationship between political trust and support for democracy may simply be a false relationship (Mishler and Rose, 2005: 1054).

Although the explanations of institutionalism and culturalism are persuasive, certain aspects merit further discussion. First, Easton’s theories of political systems analyze trust in political institutions that are the products of democratically open governments. However, there are currently many non-democratic countries or electoral democratic countries that have established political systems which appear democratic, but in practice are completely different. To give an example, the citizens of democratic countries can use their vote to support or replace their leaders, whereas in authoritarian countries rulers are rarely elected by popular vote. For this reason, under closed governments, the relationship between the public’s trust in political institutions and support for democracy was not initially discussed by System Theory. Democratic theory maintains that a higher degree of trust in political institutions correlates to a higher degree of legitimacy and sustainability for a government. The problem is that “government” here means democratic government. The difficulty currently faced by East Asian countries, however, is that the level of institutional trust on the part of peoples under authoritarian rule is quite high. Does this indicate that authoritarian governments are sustainable?

Next, the explanation offered by culturalism is founded upon Western cultural
premises. If we are to examine East Asian countries though, we cannot conduct our analysis by relying on perspectives taken from Western culturalism that make no allowance for the importance of Confucian values in East Asian cultures. To be specific, Western culture emphasizes the self and individualism, whereas Confucian tradition and culture emphasizes obedience and collectivism. These values are reflected in the social trust emphasized by culturalism, but there may be great differences. Therefore, this study holds that the distinctive traditional social values of East Asia need to be brought into consideration. To elaborate on this, traditional social values can be used to test the applicability of postmodern theory to East Asian countries. If postmodern theory proves correct, the change in fundamental values brought about by modernization processes, not least democratization, will erase any remaining cultural differences between the East and the West. Liberal democracy will gradually replace other political regimes and become the only choice. Conversely, if cultural relativism holds, there will be a mismatch between East Asian political culture and the tenets of liberal democracy. In East Asian cultures, this would mean that the traditional style of authoritarian and patriarchal leadership will be sustained, even after modernization. The dependant mode developed in families will interact with the individual insecurity caused by rapid social economic development, and become a new form of power dependence relationship (Lucian Pye, 1985).

(2) Measurements of Support for Democracy

The concept of support for democracy is an important topic in research on democratic consolidation (Chu et al., 2008; Shi & Lu, 2010). Its complexity incorporates many aspects and definitions of what democracy is supposed to consist of (Dalton, Shin, and Willt, 2007). Mishler and Rose (2005) summed up three ways of conceptualizing democracy: the level of support for democracy, assessment of the
performance of democratic systems, and citizens’ democratic principles. Currently, many long-term cross-national survey projects, such as comparative research on electoral systems (CNES) and Eurobarometer, use assessments of the performances of democratic systems to measure citizens’ attitudes to democracy. Critics argue though that measuring the public’s democratic values simply in terms of their assessment of the performance of democratic systems is not ideal, since what it measures may only reflect their assessment of administrative performance, rather than their attitude towards democracy (Linde and Ekman, 2003).

Chu and Huang (2010: 115) raised two noteworthy points regarding the measurement of support for democracy. First, if one wishes to compare support for democracy across national boundaries, one cannot simply rely on a single measuring indicator; otherwise the results will be confusing. For example, from 2007 to 2008, the citizens of Vietnam, a country with an authoritarian system, actually showed a higher level of support for democracy than the people of recently democratized Japan. Second, when measuring democracy across international boundaries, since democracy is a universal value, the appearance of this term in a questionnaire might lead people to give a positive answer, thus causing people living under an authoritarian system to assert that their system is democratic. Chu et al., (2008) recommended using a variety of aspects to establish indicators of democratic support, namely the desirability of democracy, the suitability of democracy, the preferability of democracy, the efficacy of democracy, the priority of democracy, and anti-authoritarianism. The current study cites these indicators as measurements of support for democracy, but excludes the aspect of anti-authoritarianism, because anti-authoritarianism does not necessarily imply support for democracy; citizens might have anti-authoritarian and anti-democratic depoliticization tendencies (Chang, 2011: 109).

As regards the measurement of political trust, especially when related to political
figures and institutions, difficulties are often encountered in opinion polls because the items in the questionnaire can confuse respondents. When asked about trust in government, for example, there are respondents who will think about their current rulers, and there are those who will respond on the basis of their views about the political system (Miller, 1974a; Citrin, 1974), thus always causing validity problems as far as measurement is concerned. Also, because of conceptual confusion about measurement, early research on the political consequences of declining political trust produced two completely different discourses: one holding that declining political trust indicated that the public was dissatisfied with the results of governmental operations (Miller, 1974), and the other holding that it only indicated the public’s dissatisfaction with current leaders and the government’s administrative performance. The problem was that neither approach could necessarily be extrapolated to the level of the political system and its institutions.

Subsequently, as regards measurements of institutional trust, large-scale, national-level US survey organizations, such as Harris and General Social Survey polls, changed the design of questionnaires to address trust in relation to specific government institutions—including legislatures, courts, as well as major social groups—in order to reduce projection by respondents to different targets. Apart from national surveys, large cross-national survey organizations, such as the Global Barometer Survey¹, have also especially designed a series of questions about institutional trust for use in questionnaire items about different governmental systems around the world, including levels of trust in such institutions as premiers, prime ministers, ruling parties, legislatures, militaries, police, and so forth. The sets of

¹A detailed introduction to Global Barometer Survey can be found on its website at http://www.globalbarometer.net/
questions in the Asian Barometer Survey\textsuperscript{2} used in the current study, in tandem with the Global Barometer Survey, not only reduce confusion in the measuring of concepts, but also incorporate more varied political systems. For related measurement items and methods of coding, please see Appendix One.

Based on the theories already referred to, this study has developed the following research hypothesis:

\textbf{H1:} Peoples’ trust in institutions affects their support for democracy. Therefore a higher level of institutional trust translates into greater support for democracy.

\textbf{H2:} Peoples’ evaluation of economic conditions affects their support for democracy. Therefore the higher their evaluation is, the greater is their support for democracy.

\textbf{H3:} Peoples’ attitudes towards traditional social values affect their support for democracy. Therefore less fidelity to traditional social values translates into greater support for democracy.

\textbf{H4:} Peoples’ liberal values affect their support for democracy. Therefore a higher esteem for liberal values translates into greater support for democracy.

\textbf{H5:} Critical citizens affect the support for democracy, as they tend to back democracy.

4. Data Source and Relevance Testing

The multinational survey data analyzed in this study is derived from Taiwan University’s ‘Asian Barometer Survey’ (ABS). This survey was conducted between 2006 and 2008. It covered thirteen Eastern Asian countries: Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, China, Mongolia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Vietnam, Vietnam.

\textsuperscript{2}A detailed introduction to Global Barometer Survey can be found on its website at http://www.asianbarometer.org/
Cambodia, and Malaysia. These countries were selected because they are all influenced by East Asian Confucianism, which made it more convenient to compare Eastern and Western cultures. Furthermore, these thirteen countries include democratic regimes, mixed regimes, and non-democratic regimes. This range of characteristics provided an ideal basis for comparing any differences in terms of institutional trust in democratic governments and non-democratic governments. Finally, with regard to the sampling method, it involved legitimate adult voters from each country, who were randomly sampled, and then combined with multi-layer, multi-stage, and systematic sampling. All the successful samples needed to be tested for sample representativeness and weighted.

In terms of developing dependent variables, democratic support, covering multiple aspects, is a latent variable, and so cannot be directly observed. It must be measured by observable variables. Previous studies often apply factor analysis by selecting questions with eigenvalue greater than 1 from the democratic attitude question group to establish democratic attitude indices. As the conclusion of factor analysis is founded on all testing questions possessing ‘Face Validity,’ ‘Content Validity’ and the assumption of ‘Interpersonal Commonality,’ it has been questioned by scholars who argue that psychological testing results are not reliable due to the influence of external environments and internal individuals, in addition to the various difficulties associated with each question. Moreover, they are regarded as the same question group to conduct factor analysis (Narens and Luce, 1983; Chang and Huang, 2008). Consequently, this study utilizes a mainstream approach in psychology, IRT(item response theory), which forms a relative measurement by combining the ‘Ability point’ of a potential psychological characteristic and the ‘Position index’ of a question’s difficulty, and then develops a number of non-linear measurement models by using a ‘Differential parameter’ and an ‘Estimation parameter’ (Chang and Huang,
The index development was tested by applying Mplus4.12, which can deal with the issue of missing value. Except for cases in which none of the questions are answered validly, each factor scale will generate a score for the latent trait behind the measuring items. The factor score is derived as a posterior Bayesian estimate given the independent and dependent variables, which is commonly called “the regression method” (Chu and Huang, 2010). This study, in accordance with the theory, used five democratic characteristics to construct one democratic index. All the measuring items, except the priority item’s relatively low factor loading, were between 0.45 and 0.69. Because the concept of democratic support is multi-dimensional, this study still maintained the priority item. After calculation, the factor score ranged between -2~+2, and appeared to be left-skewed distribution.

In keeping with the previously stated theories, this study has independent variables: institutional trust, traditional social values (TSV), liberal democratic values (LDV), evaluation of economic conditions, and whether the subjects are critical citizens. Of these, institutional trust, TSV, and liberal democratic values are the most prominent. This paper also used IRT to construct an index. TSV has three essential definitions: deference to authority, conflict avoidance, and subordination (Ikeda, Kobayashi, and Nathan, 2010: 3). LDV includes four concepts: separation of powers, political liberty, political pluralism, and government accountability. As LDV is a factor score constructed by IRT, and the level of the interviewees’ liberal democratic values is compared to the relevant position of all samples, this study therefore regards the samples with more than a median level of liberal democratic values as equivalent.

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3 Relevant studies on the application of IRT in politics, please refer Chang and Huang, 2008; Huang, 2006; Chu and Huang, 2010; Chang, 2011.
to high democratic value. The evaluation of economic conditions is based on the interviewees’ evaluation of their domestic economic condition; critical citizens refer to those who are dissatisfied with the democratic situations, but still have high democratic values. With respect to the control variables, this study, in accordance with related theories, selects individual social and economic background items, including gender, age, and education.

5. The Empirical Analysis of Institutional Trust and Democratic Support

(1) East Asian People’s Institutional Trust

The level of trust East Asians invest in political institutions is illustrated in Table 1. People’s institutional trust in advanced democratic countries (i.e. Japan) and emerging democratic countries (i.e. Taiwan and South Korea), was the lowest, with the average below 40%. Surprisingly, this figure in non-democratic countries, such as China, Singapore, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia, was the highest, averaging 70%. Of this latter group, Chinese people’s trust for national government, political parties, parliament, and police, was sometimes higher than 80%. Vietnam had the highest institutional trust amongst these thirteen countries, with people’s trust for the prime minister, national government, parliament, military, and local government, as high as 90%. Overall, we found that East Asian democratic countries had the lowest levels of institutional trust; however, non-democratic countries had the highest level of trust in political institutions.

Table 1 about here

Prior to testing the relationship between institutional trust and democratic support, we first generalized the distribution of democratic support in East Asian countries, as shown in Table 2. Regarding the degree of democratic desire, with the exception of China and the Philippines, there was a comparatively low level of
democratic support; all of the other countries had support of more than 80%, which indicates the majority of East Asians still desire democracy. In terms of the suitability of democracy, the Philippines had the lowest recognition, approximately 55.2%, followed by China and Taiwan, both around 60%. However, in all of the East Asian countries, Vietnam had the highest recognition, at approximately 90.4%, followed by Singapore, Mongolia, Thailand, and Malaysia, which all stand above 80%. In terms of democratic preferences, there is an obvious division: 70% of the people in Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia preferred a democratic regime. However, in Mongolia, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, only less than 50% of people preferred democratic governments. Regarding democratic performance, more than 80% of people in Vietnam and Cambodia believed democracy can solve their domestic issues; whereas only 39.2% of people in Hong Kong recognized the performance of democracy. As per the superiority of democracy, generally no significant support was found in most of the East Asian countries. Only less than 30% of people recognized its significance, except 42.1% of people in Japan believed democracy is more important than economic development. This demonstrates that economic development prior to democracy is a common thought in East Asian developing countries. Overall, we observed that in a number of non-democratic countries, people profess more support for democracy than those in democratic countries. If we analyze this phenomenon along with the trust in the political system, an important issue remains. When the institutional trust of democratic governments fails to reach its expected level, on the contrary, institutional trust in non-democratic governments arrives that trust level, and then will this have impact on supporting democracy?

Table 2 about here

(2) Model Analysis of Institutional Trust and Democratic Support

This study tests the relationship between institutional trust and democratic
support, primarily by analyzing the contrasting views of institutionalism and culture theory. This research conducted a cross-country comparison of thirteen East Asian countries, which included democratic, mixed and authoritarian regimes, each with their own unique backgrounds. When designing the empirical models, it must be considered how each country may have different intercepts; therefore, the OLS model (Ordinary Least Square model) is not suitable in such a context. Because the OLS model does not preset individual intercepts and error terms due to the specificities of each country, this equates to no control over some key variables and an increase in the opportunities for a Type I error; consequently, it is more likely to reject the null hypothesis. To reduce the possibility of a Type I error occurring, this study employed a mixed model to test by using Stata 10.0 to conduct the analysis.

According to the results in Table 3’s fixed-effects section, after controlling the variables of individual social and economic backgrounds, institutional trust still has a positive impact on democratic support. Additionally, TSV, LDV, critical citizens, evaluation of overall economy, age, education, and gender each impact on the level of democratic support. From the statistical model, without changing other variables, one unit increase in people’s institutional trust will result in 0.1 unit of support for democracy. Increasing one unit of TSV will increase democratic support by 0.046 unit. One unit increase in LDV will lift democratic support by 0.07 unit. Compared to non-critical citizens, critical citizens supported democracy less. Those who were satisfied with overall economy have greater support for democracy. Older people and the more highly educated tended to be stronger supporters of democracy. Males supported democracy more than females. Regarding the random—effects sector, the null hypothesis in each country has the same intercepts. According to the results of the Likelihood Ratio Test (LR test), the t-value is 1956.8, p-value<.001, so the null hypothesis is rejected, which indicates each country has different intercepts. This
study discusses the meaning of the model’s results.

First, this paper’s findings differ from institutionalism, which believes people’s institutional trust has no impact on the support for democracy, and suggests that people decide their trust level for political systems according to political performance, particularly economic performance. However, voters are able to clearly distinguish the evaluation of a current government’s performance from the support for a political regime. As a result, although institutional trust appears to be in decline, there is no need to be concerned about its influence on democratic support (Dalton, 1999: 72). However, the empirical results of this study confirm that the institutionalism approach may not suit East Asian countries. In these countries, people’s institutional trust will indeed affect democratic support, and the higher people’s trust in institutions is, the greater the support they have for democracy. Additionally, the economic hypothesis of this study is also verified: The economic evaluation of individual aspects advocated by system theorists indeed affects democratic support. The situation in East Asian countries corresponds with David Easton’s (1976: 436) view that the logic of democratic governance is evaluated in terms of policy performance. If the government’s performance falls below expectation, then they will be eliminated in the next election. If this kind of dissatisfaction lasts for a period, then this distrust for institutions may affect the evaluation of the form of government.

Second, this study backs the views of culturalism that political trust will affect democratic support. Its logic is that political trust encourages democratic value, which benefits democratic support. This study applies liberal democratic values and traditional social values to highlight how the LDV scale was designed to probe further into the substance and depth of popular commitment to democracy. They tap into respondents’ value orientations toward the fundamental organizing principles of liberal democracy (Chu and Chang, 2010: 5). The LDV hypothesis of this study
approves the opinions of Chu et al. that the way citizens view regime performance is affected by an individual’s cultural values, as measured by liberal democratic values (Chu, et al., 2008). However, this paper finds that the higher the traditional society value is, the greater the amount of democratic support, which contradicts the hypothesis of this study. The explanation could lie with ‘Twin Tolerations’: meaning that culture is diversified, rather than simply supporting or opposing democracy (Stephan, 2000).

Third, this study confirms that critical citizens can affect the support for democracy, however, in contrast to the findings of other studies, it demonstrates that critical citizens, compared to non-critical citizens, support democracy to a lesser degree. This means that people with a high level of liberal democratic can be dissatisfied with democratic effectiveness and therefore support democracy less. Previous studies have maintained that as long as citizens have a high level of democratic values, it means that liberal democratic values have been well understood. Although they may express their dissatisfaction with democratic performance, that might only be temporary. If citizens take this opportunity to express their concerns, this will actually benefit the reform of the existing systems. For instance, in the 1980s, in response to the issue of people’s diminished trust in policy, New Zealand and Japan implemented a series of radical reforms to their respective congress electoral systems (Norris, 1995). This study believes that although critical citizens have profoundly invested in liberal democratic values, their dissatisfaction with democratic performance, which results in less support for democracy, is an indisputable fact. If they receive no response from governments regarding their dissatisfaction with political forms, will this increasing dissatisfaction lead to a general outbreak?

Table 3 about here

(3) Why is institutional trust higher in East Asian countries than other democratic
countries?

Finally, this study reviews the key topic in East Asia: Why is people’s institutional trust higher in authoritarian East Asian countries than in democratic countries? Answering this query necessitates starting with an analysis of the origin of institutional trust. There are two opposite views regarding the origin of institutional trust: one is institutionalism, the other is culturalism. Institutional theorists explain from a rational viewpoint and believe people’s political trust depends on the government’s performance, particularly in regard to economic aspects. If people are more satisfied with economic performance, they will increasingly trust their political system. In contrast, cultural theorists argue that political trust is exogenous and formed by socialization during the process of the regulation and development of a society and its culture. They emphasize how institutional trust is derived from social trust (Mishler and Rose, 2001: 31; Verba, 1965: 535). Additionally, we believe that Eastern culture has its own unique characteristics that are related to the traditions of Confucianism, and social value should be taken into consideration. Consequently, this study reviews the origin of political trust among East Asians from economic, social, and traditional social value aspects.

Figure 1 demonstrates the relationships between economic performance and institutional trust in each country. The results indicate that although institutionalism can provide the explanations for some countries, it is inapplicable in some unusual instances. More specifically, Vietnam, China, Singapore, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Malaysia correspond with the explanations of institutionalism, as they have higher levels of institutional trust when people favorably review their economic performances. However, in Mongolia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Taiwan, economic performance is rather high, whereas people’s institutional trust is somewhat low. This phenomenon cannot be explained by institutionalism. Figure 2 therefore
illustrates the relationship between social trust and institutional trust in each country in terms of culturalism. Social trust can only offer a limited explanation of institutional trust in East Asia, with validity in China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Mongolia.

Finally, Figure 3 shows the relationship between TSV and institutional trust in each country. Clearly, with the exception of the Philippines, all other twelve countries’ political trust can be demonstrated with reference to traditional social values. Broadly speaking, in East Asia, the higher people’s traditional social value is, the higher their institutional trust will be. For the non-democratic countries (i.e. Vietnam, China, Singapore, Cambodia, Malaysia) the higher people’s traditional social value is, the higher their institutional trust will be. In democratic countries (i.e. Japan, Taiwan and Korea), the lower the people’s level of traditional social values, the lower their level of institutional trust.

In summary, the reason why institutional trust is higher in the authoritarian East Asian countries than in democratic countries is that they have relatively higher levels of TSV. The essential principles of traditional social value in East Asia include obeying authority, conflict avoidance, and the overall maintenance of collective welfare. These are all characteristics of East Asian Confucianism and different greatly from Western cultures. Therefore, reviewing people’s institutional trust by applying Western culturalism to East Asia may generate confusion.

6. Conclusions

Along with the increasing numbers of citizens who have less trust in politics in advanced democratic countries, the relationship between institutional trust and
democratic support has become a significant subject. However, in contrast to the situation in Western democratic countries, the levels of institutional trust in non-democratic East Asian countries is even higher than it is for their democratic peers. Consequently, scholars refer to this as the Asian Myth (Chu and Chang, 2010: 1). The task of this study has been to review the relationship between institutional trust and democratic support, in order to determine why institutional trust is higher in non-democratic East Asian countries than in democratic countries. This can mainly be explained in terms of institutionalism, culturalism, and critical citizens. Institutionalism emphasizes how economic performance decides institutional trust and democratic support. Institutional trust is simply reflecting the governing achievements; therefore its temporary volatility is acceptable and will have no impact on democratic support. Compared to institutionalism, cultural theorists believe that political trust will affect democratic support. They also emphasize that people are part of the entire social structure and how culture and belief will influence people’s attitudes towards politics. Political beliefs are formed by extending interpersonal trust during the socialization process. Postmodern theory argues that the process of modernization will cause variations to values, with the post-materialism developed by younger generations tending to question traditional authority and creating critical citizens. However, scholars’ opinions of critical citizens have evolved from an original concern that critical citizens may threaten democratic government, to the current agreement that critical citizens will benefit democracy.

This study has utilized the perspectives of institutionalism, culturalism, and critical citizens, respectively, to review the relationship between institutional trust and democratic support, which were then further tested by adding traditional social values according to the country’s status among East Asian countries. Additionally, this study incorporates the factor of democratic diversification and modifies the measurement
methods by using IRT to construct an index. The advantage in so doing was to reduce the impact of any values missing from the calculations by considering various weights for different questions to capture the concept of democratic support. The empirical results of this study prove that institutional trust influences democratic support. Our research supports culturalism, but disagrees with the position of institutional theorists that there is no relationship between institutional trust and democratic support. Furthermore, contra previous research, this study found that critical citizens support democracy less than non-critical citizens.

Finally, this study has attempted to answer a confusing question: Why is institutional trust higher in authoritarian East Asian countries than among their democratic peers? To answer this question, tests were conducted from the perspectives of institutionalism, culturalism, and East Asia’s unique set of TSV. The chief finding was that the high level of trust in institutions is mainly caused by TSV. In authoritarian countries with relatively high levels of TSV, people often obey authority, avoid conflicts, and believe in collectivism. In Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, people often have relatively low levels of TSV; therefore, their levels of institutional trust are low as well. The social trust advocated by Western cultures is unsuitable when it comes to illustrating institutional trust in non-democratic East Asian countries.

This study raises a number of issues that require further investigation, such as the empirical results that contradict our hypothesis by indicating that the higher the level of TSV is, the greater the level of support. Basically, regarding whether Confucianism will obstruct the development of democracy, there are three contrasting opinions: The first is modernization theory, which argues that the differences between Eastern and Western cultures are declining, with liberal democracy destined to become the final universal value (Scalapino, 1998: 228-33; Plattner, 1993, 26-38; Curtis, 1998,
The second is cultural relativism, which believes that East Asian political culture and liberal democratic governments are incompatible because each has its own unique culture (Lucian Pye; Huntington, 1996). The third is twin tolerations, which believes religion, culture, and democracy can tolerate each other (Stephan, 2000). According to Chang, Chu and Tsai’s (2005) research findings on Confucianism and democratic values in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and mainland China, Confucianism may be an obstacle to democratic development in these three Chinese societies. But they also emphasize that there is no need to be overly pessimistic as education and modernization will enlarge the space for the development of social, political, and economic initiatives, which will in turn undergo democratization. However, the findings of our research are completely different from these earlier studies. One of the reasons is that our study reviews people’s support for democracy, whereas Chang, Chu, and Tsai (2005) analyzed people’s democratic values. Whether this result reflects people’s desire and support for democratic government is becoming a universal value, therefore, the barriers between traditional Eastern social values and Western democratic values were broken? Or will culture and democracy tolerate each other (Twin Tolerations) as suggested by Stephan (2000)?

The citizens of authoritarian East Asian countries have higher levels of institutional trust than the levels of those in democratic countries. What impact will this have on the future of democracy in Asia? According to our findings, the reason why people in authoritarian countries obey and trust their country’s political system is because of East Asian traditionalism. This cultural influence has accumulated over time and therefore will not be suddenly changed. Furthermore, the sound economic performance of these authoritarian countries satisfies the desires of East Asians, who generally focus more on the development of the economy than on the development of democracy. This tendency will also strengthen the existence of authoritarian
government. As per the increase in the education level and the modernization process emphasized by many scholars, these two factors will reduce the obstacle of shifting from East Asian traditional social values to liberal democratic values, with the popularity of the latter set to gradually increase. We agree with this opinion, however, this study also finds the people who have relatively high levels of liberal democratic values, but who are dissatisfied with democratic performance (so-called “critical citizens”), support democracy to a lesser extent. This study therefore confirms Norris’s (1999: 270) opinion that the number of critical citizens is increasing and that they are the catalysis for the reform of outdated democratic systems. However, in many newer democracies, the consolidation process has often proved hazardous and fraught with difficulties. This is the essential challenge that East Asian countries will potentially be facing in due course.
TABLE 1 TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Percent of respondents)</th>
<th>CN</th>
<th>HK</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>TW</th>
<th>KR</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>TH</th>
<th>PH</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>KHM</th>
<th>MY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Presidency or Prime Minister</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Courts</td>
<td>69.9</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National government</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Political parties</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Parliament</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Civil service</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Military</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Police</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Local government</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note:

2. The percentage is answering trust plus very trust.
# TABLE 2 SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Percent of respondents)</th>
<th>CN</th>
<th>HK</th>
<th>TW</th>
<th>KR</th>
<th>MN</th>
<th>TH</th>
<th>PH</th>
<th>JP</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>SG</th>
<th>VN</th>
<th>KHM</th>
<th>MY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desirable for our country now (^a)</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>92.9</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitable for our country now (^b)</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective in solving the problems of society</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>77.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferable to all other kinds of government (^c)</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More important than economic development (^d)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note:\(^a\) Six or above on a 10-point dictatorship-democracy scale of where the country should or could be now.

\(^b\) Dichotomous variable.

\(^c\) Trichotomous variable recoded into a dichotomous variable.

\(^d\) Five-way variable recoded into dichotomous variable.

\(^e\) CN: CHINA; HK: HONG KONG; TW: TAIWAN; KR: KOREA; MN: MONGOLIA; TH: THAILAND; PH: PHILIPPINES; JP: JAPAN; ID: INDONESIA; SG: SINGAPORE; VN: VIETNAM; KHM: CAMBODIA; MY: MALAYSIA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>Std. Err.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional trust</td>
<td>.1111***</td>
<td>.0058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional social values(TSV)</td>
<td>.0462**</td>
<td>.0141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal democratic values(LDV)</td>
<td>.0702***</td>
<td>.0098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical citizens</td>
<td>-.0908***</td>
<td>.0100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>.0303***</td>
<td>.0041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.0012***</td>
<td>.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.0133***</td>
<td>.0017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.0180**</td>
<td>.0066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_cons</td>
<td>-.2135***</td>
<td>.0547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sd_cons</td>
<td>.1822***</td>
<td>.0374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-square = 845.09
Number of obs=17,582
Number of groups=13
Lr test=1956.80, Prob>.0000

Note: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (level of significance for two-tailed test)
Figure 1: Economic and Institutional Trust
Figure 2 Social Trust and Institutional Trust
Figure 3: Traditional Social Values and Institutional Trust
## Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>item</th>
<th>Question(s)</th>
<th>coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for democracy</td>
<td>1. Desirability</td>
<td>To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now? (q101)</td>
<td>1-10 scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Suitability</td>
<td>Which would you think democracy is suitable for our country? (q103)</td>
<td>1-10 scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                        | 3. Preferability                    | Which of the following statements comes closest to your own opinion? (q117)  | 3=Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 2=Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 1=to a de For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime  
|                        | 4. Efficacy                         | Which of the following statements comes closer to your own view? (q118)       | 2=Democracy is capable of solving the problems of our society  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 1=Democracy can not solve our society's problems  
|                        | 5. Priority                         | If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, which would you say is more important? (q119) | 5=Democracy is definitely more important.  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 4=Democracy is somewhat more important  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 3=They are both equally important  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 2=Economic development is somewhat more important  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 1=Economic development is definitely more important  
| Institution trust      | qII07. Prime minister or president. | q007. Courts.                                                               | 4 A Great Deal of Trust  
|                        | q008. National government.          | q009. Political parties.                                                   | 3 Quite a Lot of Trust  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 2 Not Very Much Trust  
|                        |                                     |                                                                             | 1 None at all  
|
|   | q010. Parliament.  
|   | q011. Civil service.  
|   | q012. Military.  
|   | q013. Police.  
|   | q014. Local government.  
| TSV | q064. Even if parents’ demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask.  
|   | q1157. Being a student, one should not question the authority of their teacher.  
|   | q066. When one has conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person.  
|   | q068. A person should not insist on his own opinion if his co-workers disagree with him.  
|   | q069. For the sake of the family, the individual should put his personal interests second.  
|   | q143. For the sake of the national community/society, the individual should be prepared to sacrifice.  
|   | 4=Strongly disagree  
|   | 3=Somewhat disagree  
|   | 2=Somewhat agree  
|   | 1=Strongly agree  
| LDV | q133. Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions.  
|   | q134. The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society.  
|   | q135. Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups.  
|   | q136. When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch.  
|   | q137. If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.  
|   | q138. If we have political leaders who  
|   | 4=Strongly disagree  
|   | 3=Somewhat disagree  
|   | 2=Somewhat agree  
|   | 1=Strongly agree  

36
are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.

q139. If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Citizen</th>
<th>q93. On the whole, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the way democracy works in. Are you …?</th>
<th>High LDV but dissatisfied with the democratic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Evaluation of economic | q001. How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today? | 5=Very good  
4=Good  
3=So so  
2=Bad  
1=Very bad |
| Gender | 1=male  
0=female | |
| Age | Actual age | |
| Education | 1= No formal education  
2= Incomplete primary  
3= Complete primary  
4= Incomplete secondary/high school: technical/vocational type  
5= Complete secondary/high school: technical/vocational type  
6= Incomplete secondary/high school  
7= Complete secondary/high school  
8= Some university education  
9= University education completed  
10= Post-graduate degree | |
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