Policy Representation in Seven Latin American Countries after Re-Democratization

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the congruence between party positions and voter preferences directly after the “third wave” of democratization in Latin America, and on its historical origins. Latin America displays a wide variation in the degree to which parties are anchored in society and reflect specific social groups. I argue that party systems that experienced ideological polarization in the early 20th century were set on a programmatic track and today are likely to exhibit high levels of congruence in the representation of their voters’ interests. In other contexts, where elites relied heavily on clientelistic resources to de-mobilize the citizenry when the suffrage was expanded in the first half of the 20th century, programmatic representation is likely to remain weak until the 1990s. These hypotheses are verified by combining the PELA-surveys of Latin American legislators with mass-level survey data. The first task is to discuss how congruence between voter preferences and party positions should be measured, which involves not only a number of methodological and conceptual issues, but also questions ultimately rooted in differing normative conceptions of representation. I then move on to assessing empirically what constitutes the relevant dimensions of conflict in seven Latin American countries, and measure the quality of representation along these dimensions. The results not only reveal important contrasts in the congruence of representation across the seven countries studied, but also that these differences can be explained rather well by historical patterns of party system formation.
Introduction

The first euphoria over the unprecedented diffusion of democratic rule around the world in the “Third Wave” of democratization has given way to more gloomy assessments of the quality of democracy in many of these countries. Starting with O’Donnell’s (1994) famous warning of a new type of “delegative democracy”, attention has shifted from the factors explaining the transition to formal democratic regimes to those capable of accounting for differences in the quality of democracy. This paper focuses on the congruence between voters and their parliamentary representatives as one vital aspect of the quality of democracy (Pitkin, 1967; Dahl, 1971; Powell, 2000; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Disch, 2011). The main purpose of the paper is to provide an assessment of the quality of representation in seven Latin American party systems for the earliest point in time for which adequate data is available. Contrary to prior studies by Luna and Zechmeister (2005, 2010), I do not measure congruence along theoretically determined issue categories, but start out by determining the politically relevant dimensions underlying party positions (for a similar approach, see Rivas-Perez, 2008). To measure party positions, I use the Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA) (see Alcántara Sáez, 2008). I then assess congruence by measuring the positions of party electorates along the same dimensions based on individual-level data from the World Values Survey (WVS).

This paper also extends on prior work by anchoring the quantitative assessment of political representation in a historical cleavage account of party system formation. I derive expectations regarding the extent to which party competition is rooted in parties’ distinctive ideological appeals by analyzing party system trajectories along two critical junctures. First, where nationalized elite party systems developed towards the turn of the 19th and the 20th century, this triggered the formation of strong conservative parties. This, in turn, provided favorable preconditions for the formation of responsive party systems when new middle and working class parties arose, which
constitute the second critical juncture. While this argument is presented in more detail elsewhere (Bornschier, 2012), I provide a very brief recapitulation of the historical model and argue that historical bifurcations and sequences set party systems on distinctive tracks between the early and the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century, which have long-term effects on party system responsiveness.

Because political actors may subsequently modify these historical patterns, the analysis should focus on the situation directly after the process of re-democratization occurred in Latin America as part of the Third Wave of democratization. The earliest point in time for which data is available are the mid-1990s, however. I include as many South American countries as possible in order to maximize variation in terms of my two key independent variables. Due to conceptual and practical constraints, I exclude the Central American and Caribbean countries: With the notable exception of Costa Rica, Central America’s experience with democracy is quite recent, and thus less strongly determined by prior episodes of open party competition (Mahoney, 2001). On the same grounds, I exclude Paraguay. On the other hand, following a common practice and in order to ensure comparability with other major historical studies, I include Mexico. Of the remaining ten countries, the combination of the PELA elite surveys and the WVS allows an analysis of the cases of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. While the lack of data for Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil is unfortunate, the countries covered by the data show some important variation with respect to the historical trajectories postulated above, and they encompass both cases where democracy was established anew in the 1980s, as well as long-established (formal) democracies such as Colombia and Venezuela.

Strictly speaking, the term responsiveness implies a dynamic perspective, where parties adapt to evolving voter preferences, as in Soroka and Wlezien’s (2010) “thermostatic model”. In this paper, however, I use the terms congruence, representativeness, and responsiveness interchangeably (see also Achen, 1978). Although the data only allows for an assessment of the congruence between party positions and voter preferences, I argue that linking congruence in the
1990s to historical patterns of party system formation is indicative of responsiveness: If, decades after the formation of party systems, parties continue to mirror the preferences of their voter, despite the far-reaching changes in social structure and the ideological upheavals caused by the rise of the left, and the end of cold war after 1989, then they must clearly be responsive of evolving voter preferences.

This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss how responsive party systems are formed, and how programmatic responsiveness competes with another, much older type of linkage between parties and voters: clientelism. I then summarize the expectations based on the historical analysis mentioned above pertaining to the differences within my sample of countries in terms of the responsiveness of their party systems. In the third section, I draw on representational and cleavage theory to substantiate my analytical approach to the measurement of congruence. The most important question to be settled concerns the identification of the issues or dimensions for which congruence is assessed, and whether we should take voter preferences or party positions as a starting point for measurement. The following section then specifies the issue categories used in the analysis, discusses their operationalization, and the methods appropriate to deriving dimensions from the issue categories.

The fifth section presents the results of the analysis, and has three parts. The first discusses the make-up of the relevant party system divides in the seven countries. The second part presents the results of the analysis of the correspondence between the positions of political parties, measured as the mean position of their parliamentary representatives, and the preferences of party electorates. The results testify that historical party system trajectories indeed have long-term implications of patterns of responsiveness in the 1990s. The final part summarizes the patterns of party competition found in the seven countries in terms of representational congruence and the segmentation of political competition.
The formation of responsive party systems and expectations for Latin America

Party system responsiveness and its impediments

As the actors linking citizens and the political system, parties play a central role in guaranteeing democratic governance. In a path-breaking approach, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) have argued that democratization entails not only the building of formal democratic institutions, but also of party systems that represent the interests of voters in the political process. Only when the basic patterns of opposition or conflict are stable do party systems structure the expectations of political actors and introduce predictability in politics. This, on the other hand, is considered a central prerequisite of democratic accountability and of the congruence between the positions of citizens and their representatives (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Mair, 1997, 2001; Tóka, 1998; Mainwaring and Torcal, 2006).

According to the distinction set out by Herbert Kitschelt (2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), between programmatic, clientelistic, and charismatic linkages between parties and voters, the main impediment to the formation of responsive party systems is the dominance of clientelistic and charismatic linkages in many new democracies. Because the parties of notables characteristic of pre-democratic elite party systems usually employ clientelistic means to stay in power once the suffrage is extended (c.f., Gunther & Diamond, 2003: 175-7; Kreuzer, 2001), I claim that much depends on whether these parties are subsequently challenged by strong ideological movements. To the degree that the established parties are able to prevent new competitors from entering the system, clientelistic practices are likely to remain unaltered. As Shefter (1977, 1993) and Geddes (1994) have argued and empirically shown, established parties are able to secure their position by distributing particularistic benefits. Hagopian’s (1996) case study of Brazil reveals that clientelism
is an instrument of long-established political elites to hold on to their positions of power and privilege. Only “externally mobilized parties”, in Shefter’s terminology, which do not have access to the ruling circles of power, push for programmatic competition – because programs are all they have to offer. By the same token, it can be hypothesized that once ideological party competition has been established and parties appeal to voters by offering distinctive policy options, clientelistic promises will no longer prove very successful. For voters that are sufficiently informed and are offered clear programmatic options, selling their vote for a particularistic benefit is unlikely to be an attractive option. Consequently, the initial emergence of a party system that is responsive to the preferences of the citizenry emerges as a decisive moment in the evolution of party systems.

The Western European historical experience testifies that functional conflicts resulting from large-scale processes of nation state formation and industrialization were capable of forming party systems based on powerful ideologies and firmly rooted in social structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1999; Caramani, 2004; Bartolini, 2005). Latin American trajectories have proven much more varied. While some party systems, such as the Brazilian one, have emerged more or less from scratch after every disruption of democratic rule, those in Uruguay and Chile still carry the imprint of the conflicts prevalent in the early decades of the 20th century, when democracy was first established (Dix, 1989; González, 1995; Scully, 1995; Coppedge, 1998; Mainwaring, 1999). Other party systems have proved highly stable, but the initial conflicts have faded, and as a result of the ensuing loss of differentiation between party profiles, competition has come to center primarily on particularistic benefits. Colombia and Venezuela between 1958 and the late 1980s are cases in point, as I will argue.
Two critical junctures and resulting expectations

These differences can be explained by the interaction of two critical junctures that set responsive and non-responsive party systems in Latin America apart.¹ The first bifurcation is between party systems that institutionalized elite conflict before the expansion of the suffrage in the early 20th century, and those that did not. Where rival elites relied on political parties of national scope to resolve conflicts, pluralistic elite party systems emerged, which subsequently proved open to political newcomers (Coppedge, 1998). In a perspective that puts more emphasis on political conflict, Gibson (1996) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992) have convincingly argued that nationwide conservative parties matter because they provide a means to defend the interests of economic and political elites, thus making democracy viable when the suffrage is expanded. I concur with these authors in arguing that early pluralism is important because it pushed conservative forces in society to form nationwide parties to confront challenges by liberal and radical parties. Where they engaged in gentlemen’s agreements with their competitors or relied on the army to secure their interests, on the other hand, conservatives were ill-suited to cope with a subsequent, and much more severe challenge: the rise of forces seeking to fundamentally transform the political and economic structure of society. These are mostly parties of the left, but because they sometimes meshed socialist and Fascist ideas, I will refer to them as progressive parties.

At the second critical juncture, then, is situated during a phase of polarization that hit all Latin American countries in the first decades of the 20th century. Either a balance of power between old parties and the new claimants for power resulted, and polarization was sustained, or it was aborted by more or less violent means. Where party competition remained open and polarized, clientelism receded at least partially, and strong partisan attachments based on parties’ contrasting ideological offerings developed. Political conflict then socialized successive generations of voters

¹ This argument is presented in full and substantiated with historical evidence elsewhere (Bornschier, 2012).
into the prevailing lines of conflict, perpetuating these alignments in a process similar to that experienced by West European party systems (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mair, 2001; Bornschier, 2010; Ch. 3).

In Latin America – and ignoring the Central American variations – only Chile and Uruguay clearly followed this route. Chile presents the classical case in that new political actors of the political left and the Christian Democrats strongly polarized the party system (e.g., Scully, 1992). The fact that the Uruguayan party system is a case of high polarization is often overlooked due to the strong role of the two traditional parties until quite recently. However, the Colorados’ adoption of a progressive profile firmly rooted the party in the working class and polarized the party system (Collier and Collier, 2002). The Communist party was never outlawed, and the threat from the left forced the Colorados to maintain their left-wing position. While clientelism played a major role in certain phases of Uruguayan history, González (1991: 25-8) convincingly argues that politics in Uruguay was never only a matter of clientelism, as some may have it. The Frente Amplio, which united the Communists, the Christian Democrats, and other progressive forces, then launched the most severe assault on clientelism from the 1960s on (Luna, n.d.; González, 1991: 125).

Contrary to the slender path to a responsive party system, a variety of trajectories results in settings in which clientelism remains so pervasive that it is difficult for voters to identify contrasting policy platforms. What they have in common is that no sustained polarization of the party system occurred in the first half of the 20th century. I call this aborted polarization due to the conscious effort either of the established parties, or of successful revolutionary movements to restrict competition. There are two basic ways to impede polarization: The first is an outright ban on opposition parties. In a more subtle form, established parties use their monopoly on clientelistic resources to secure their position and exclude challenging parties. If elites succeed using either of these strategies, a dominant party system results, even if more than one party competes in elections and the system appears pluralistic at first sight. However, these contexts lack what Levitsky and
Way (2010a) term a “level playing field”, making it next to impossible for opposition parties to gain power (see also Greene, 2007; Lyne, 2008). Two very different trajectories result in the formation of dominant party systems: either the older elite parties restrict competition, or of a revolutionary movement succeeds in sweeping the old elite away and establishes dominance. In the remainder of this section, I sketch out how polarization ended in the remaining five cases that are covered by the data used later on in this paper.

In Colombia, elites restricted competition after the civil war, despite the fact that conservative interests held a strong position in both traditional parties, one of the features the country’s party system shared with that in Uruguay. There is abundant evidence that clientelistic linkages predominate in Colombia at least since the late 1950s.\(^2\) In Mexico and Venezuela, on the other hand, progressive parties won over their conservative rivals so easily that a dominant party system resulted. Despite some degree of open contestation, the Mexican Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) was able to maintained dominance for decades thanks to the distribution of patronage and political favors.\(^3\) In Venezuela, a party cartel agreed to share power in 1958, and the party system soon lost any clear ideological differentiation.\(^4\)

Finally, the frequent intervention of the military impeded prolonged ideological polarization in Peru and Argentina. As a result, Peru’s Popular Revolutionary American Alliance (APRA) moved to the center in an illusive quest to gain acceptance by the military, watering down the party’s programmatic profile (Collier and Collier, 2002: 476-483). Furthermore, rather than ousting clientelistic linkages, APRA seems to have engaged in extensive patronage and clientelistic change itself (ibid.; Hilliker, 1971: 74-113). The main difference between Peru and Argentina is that in the latter case, Peronism’s dominance in the union movement kept the antagonism between Peronists and non-Peronists – primarily represented by the Radicals in the party arena – alive even during


non-democratic periods (Collier and Collier, 2002: 359-9; 484-97; 721-42). As a result, strong political identities formed despite a rather limited experience with open democratic competition. Thus, a party system rooted in social structure re-emerged in the 1980s. Consequently, I expect intermediate levels of party system responsiveness in Argentina, while Peru is likely to display low levels of programmatic structuring and congruence between parties and voters.

The measurement of party system responsiveness: Theory and analytical approach

The responsiveness of governments to the preferences of citizens is a defining attribute of polyarchy, according to Robert Dahl (1971; 1989), or of the liberal concept of representation, according to Hannah Pitkin (1967). One of the central junctures in the “chain of responsiveness” (Powell 2004) that runs from public preferences to political policies, is the congruence between voter preferences and party positions. According to the “responsible party model”, first theorized by the APSA Committee on Political Parties (1950), and synthesized by Thomassen (1994: 251-2), congruence is achieved if, first, parties offer diverging programmatic offerings, and second, voters chose parties according to these offerings. Consequently, the quality of representation has frequently been assessed by looking at the correspondence between the political preferences of voters and their representatives (e.g., Dalton, 1985; Powell, 2000; Luna and Zechmeister, 2005, 2010; see also Diamond and Morlino, 2005).

There is less consensus on how to define the substantial issues relevant for measuring the congruence of representation. In the advanced democracies, both the left-right dimension (e.g., Klingemann, 1995; Powell, 2000), as well as more specific issue categories have been used (e.g.,

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Dalton, 1985). In one of the rare analyses of this kind conducted in Latin America, Luna and Zechmeister (2005, 2010) measure responsiveness across five issue bundles, each of which is tapped using at least two separate issues. The potential problem with their approach is that we do not know whether all of these issue bundles (and the items used to measure them) are in fact politically relevant. If not, we should not expect congruence, as the issue will play no role in determining party choice. Congruent representation then results of chance, rather than due to the causal chain postulated by the responsible party model: If the issue happens to aligns with a relevant dimension of conflict, congruence will be high; if not, it will be low, but this must not indicate representational failure, since the issue may not be salient for voters. Thus, unless we have strong theoretical reasons to expect specific issues to be politically relevant across all countries, starting with a pre-defined set of issues involves at least two problems. First, it risks underestimating the degree of congruent representation due to the inclusion of issues that are not salient, and where congruence is likely to be low. Second, such an approach biases the results in favor of those countries where issues are strongly integrated into over-arching dimensions.

For this reason, I start out by empirically assessing the relevant dimensions of political conflict for each country. This immediately poses the question whether these dimensions should be determined among voters or at the level of the party system. According to the classical, unidirectional notion of representation, voters chose “promissory” representatives who promise to implement certain policies (Mansbridge, 2003; Disch, 2011). Consequently, the issues most relevant to voters should constitute the starting point of an analysis of the quality of representation. Apart from the empirical difficulty of assessing what these issues might be, however, such an approach would neglect the independent role of the party system in shaping the link between the social and the political (Sartori, 1968). From a cleavage perspective, parties bundle issues into broader dimensions that help voters make sense of what political conflict is about (Schattschneider, 1975). Citizens will only be able to chose representatives that endorse their substantive policy

6 A viable strategy is that pursued by Moreno (1999).
preferences if parties “stand for something”, in Klingemann et al.’s (1994) words. What is more, cleavage theory assumes that new generations of voters are socialized into the prevailing structure of conflict, thus assigning an important role to elite political actors in shaping politics (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Bornschier, 2010: Ch. 3). This mechanism also underlies the critical juncture approach outlined in the preceding section, as it explains why ideology continues to play an central role in those party systems that are set on a programmatic track early on.

There are also normative perspectives on representation that would suggest a focus on elite conflict. Disch (2011) has recently suggested that political theory needs to come to terms with the abundant empirical evidence suggesting that political parties play an important role in shaping citizen preferences. In what she aptly calls a “mobilization conception of political representation”, the representative process is theorized as dynamic and interactive, without necessarily implying that parties manipulate the preferences of their supporters. But rather than dismissing the utility of the concept of congruence in assessing the quality of representation, I would suggest that a high degree of congruence precisely indicates that the process of reciprocal influence – or “reflexivity”, in Disch’s terms – between parties and voters is actually at work, even if we cannot measure it directly.

The point of departure for measuring congruence in this paper is thus constituted by the dimensions that set parties apart. For this reason, I reconstruct the dimensions found among elites at the voter level for the measurement of how well parties are in tune with their voters.
Operationalization and methods

The analysis uses data from the first wave of the University of Salamanca Surveys of Latin American Legislators (PELA), for which face-to-face interviews with legislators were conducted between 1995 and 1996. This point in time is very close to the fieldwork of the World Values Survey’s (WVS) 1994-99 wave, where most interviews were also conducted in 1995 and 1996. Combining these data sources, it is possible to assess the congruence of representation in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Colombia does not form part of the first wave of the PELA surveys, but the 1998 survey happens to coincide exactly with the year in which the fieldwork for the WVS was conducted in that country. The analysis thus covers seven countries in total.

I start out by grouping the issue-specific items contained in the elite and mass surveys into the following broader, theoretically defined issue-categories:7

Economic issues
- **Welfare**: Expansion of or defense of a generous welfare state, support for public education, redistribution, and equality.
- **Economic liberalism**: Opposition to market regulation, and protectionism, support for deregulation, for more competition, and privatization.

Non-economic issues
- **Regime**: Assessment of past military regime (if there was a military dictatorship). Additional issues used on the demand side: support for democracy, opposition against authoritarianism.
- **Army** (only measured at the supply side): Support for a strong national defense, against reducing the military’s budget (to some extent, this can be interpreted as a regime dimension).
- **Cultural liberalism**: Opposition to traditional moral values, support for gender equality, the right to abortion and divorce.
- **Environmental protection**: Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic energy.

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7 The categories are derived from an analysis of political space in Western Europe (Kriesi et al., 2008), and adapted to the Latin American context.
I use principal component factor analysis to test whether the items indeed measure the same underlying concept. A list of the items used and a schematic summary of the results of the factor analyses are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. There are several reasons for using more general issue categories, rather than specific items in the analysis: Most importantly, politically relevant issue-categories are typically broader than the items used in elite and mass surveys. Consequently, we will want to include more than one item for each concept in order to reduce measurement error and to tap the underlying issue categories, rather than more specific aims.\(^8\) Moreover, if we were to assess congruence using specific items, the question wording would have to be identical, which is not typically the case in different datasets. If we include as many items as possible to measure broader underlying categories, on the other hand, we can compare political supply and political demand even if the items do not match exactly. The categories are operationalized separately for each country, since we cannot be sure that the specific items can be grouped into broader categories in the same way across countries. Moreover, some categories may in fact be too broad: In the case of the regime issue, factor analyses of the specific items often yield more than one dimension. Most of the time, these multiple dimensions make sense in theoretical terms. Where this is the case, I thus include all sub-components in the ensuing analysis of the dimensionality of political conflict.\(^9\) For example, privatization often proved to be empirically distinct from economic liberalism.

To determine the relevant dimensions of conflict based on the issue categories described above, I rely on discriminant analysis. This technique reveals which issues structure legislators’ party membership, and we can interpret which broader political divisions these issues represent.\(^10\)

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8 Rosas (2010: 87-94) performs a discriminant analysis of the ideological dimensions structuring legislatures similar to mine, using the same data. Because he uses the individual items contained in the PELA surveys, rather than operationalizing broader issue categories, there are some differences in our results.

9 Since the dimensions resulting from the factor analysis are not correlated, it is evident that one sub-dimension may be politically relevant, while the other is not.

10 This implies assessing the responsiveness of parties, not of individual legislators. Theoretically, we may therefore underestimate chains of accountability that run from voters to individual representatives in weakly structured party systems. Measuring individual representation would require a very different analytical approach, however, and is impossible unless we have information on the position of individual representatives that survey respondents voted for.
Discriminant analysis is preferable over factor analysis because the latter only tells us which dimensions underlie legislators’ orientations, not whether they set representatives from different parties apart. In fact, factor analysis tends to produce more dimensions in countries where a discriminant analysis reveals party membership to be only weakly structured by ideology (e.g., Peru), and the factors are not always easy to interpret. On the other hand, factor analysis produces a unidimensional solution for Chile, while discriminant analysis revealed traces of the religious cleavage that help to make sense of the divisions within the left and right ideological blocks.

On the voter side, most of the issue categories can be operationalized using items contained in the WVS (again using principal component factor analysis, see Table A2). The exception are attitudes regarding the army, where we lack information in the WVS. On the other hand, voters give reasonably varied responses to questions regarding the desirability of democracy and the support for authoritarian rule, while the corresponding items (with the significant exception of Chile) yield uniformly pro-democratic responses in the PELA surveys. Having constructed the issue categories at the voter level, I measure respondents’ positions along the dimensions found in the elite analysis, combining the relevant issue categories using factor analysis.11

Because the positions of parties and voters are not measured on the same scales, they cannot be directly compared. Representatives’ and voters’ answers may vary according to the wording of the question in the survey, thus there is no way to make the two scales strictly comparable. Consequently, the correspondence of party positions and electoral preferences can be judged only in relative terms. I thus measure congruence regressing the position of the party the respondent voted for on his/her individual preference along a given dimension. Since the variance of the dependent variable is limited by the typically low number of parties competing, I use ordered logit regression.

11 As a rule of thumb, I consider issue categories loading 0.4 or higher on the canonical variables derived from the discriminant analysis of party positions as constitutive of a dimension. Consequently, I use only these categories to reconstruct elite divides at the voter level. In all cases, I took care to ensure that the issue categories contributed to a similar degree to the factors at the voter level as they did to the canonical variables at the party level, which in some cases implied omitting categories with loadings between 0.4 and 0.5. A more detailed documentation of the operationalization is available from the author upon request.
The most important information provided by this analysis is not the coefficient (which again is not independent of the differing scales on which parties and voters are placed), but whether individual preferences are a significant predictor of party choice. Consequently, I use the z-statistic of the ordered logit regression as a measure for the congruence of representation that can be compared across countries.

In the next section, I first provide a summary of the dimensions structuring party positions in the seven countries studied, and then present graphs showing the positions of parties and voters on those dimensions. Finally, I summarize the results by characterizing the dominant dimensions uncovered by the analysis in terms of the congruence of representation they engender and the type of party competition they engender.

Patterns of responsiveness after re-democratization in Latin America

The nature of ideological divisions

In terms of the conflicts structuring party systems across our sample, two groups of countries stand out in the results of the discriminant analysis presented in Table 1. In the first group, composed of Chile and Uruguay, the regime divide emerges as the dimension most clearly setting legislators apart based on their party affiliation. Yet, economic issues are meshed into these regime divides, which mirrors the agenda of economic liberalization pursued by the military in both countries (although the liberalizing thrust was clearly stronger in Chile under Pinochet than during Uruguay’s military regime; see Kitschelt et al., 2010: Ch. 7). Interestingly, these are the two countries whose historical trajectory discussed at the outset of this paper leads me to expect party systems to be most
### Table 1: Results of Canonical Linear Discriminant Analyses of Legislators’ Issue Positions (based on PELA elite surveys)

| Country   | Regime-economic divide | Cultural divide | Economic divide | Socio-economic divide | Army divide | Privatization (if distinct) | Economic liberalism – (1) | Cultural liberalism – (2) | Non-economic issues | Proportion of variance explained | Data model explained | Proportion of variance of canonical correlation | Eigenvalue | Canonical correlation | Proportion of variance of canonical correlation | Canonical correlation | Proportion of variance of canonical correlation | Canonical correlation | Proportion of variance of canonical correlation | Canonical correlation |
|-----------|------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------|
| Argentina | 0.74                   | 0.05            | 0.07           | 0.79                 | 0.03        | 0.07                        | 0.45                     | 0.35                     | 0.13                  | 0.92                                | 0.16                 | 0.90                                              | 1.81       | 0.90                  | 0.90                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 |
| Chile     | 0.37                   | 0.05            | 0.07           | 0.79                 | 0.03        | 0.07                        | 0.45                     | 0.35                     | 0.13                  | 0.92                                | 0.16                 | 0.90                                              | 1.81       | 0.90                  | 0.90                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 |
| Colombia  | 0.90                   | 0.05            | 0.07           | 0.79                 | 0.03        | 0.07                        | 0.45                     | 0.35                     | 0.13                  | 0.92                                | 0.16                 | 0.90                                              | 1.81       | 0.90                  | 0.90                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 |
| Mexico    | 0.58                   | 0.05            | 0.07           | 0.79                 | 0.03        | 0.07                        | 0.45                     | 0.35                     | 0.13                  | 0.92                                | 0.16                 | 0.90                                              | 1.81       | 0.90                  | 0.90                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 |
| Peru      | 0.41                   | 0.05            | 0.07           | 0.79                 | 0.03        | 0.07                        | 0.45                     | 0.35                     | 0.13                  | 0.92                                | 0.16                 | 0.90                                              | 1.81       | 0.90                  | 0.90                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 |
| Venezuela | 0.25                   | 0.05            | 0.07           | 0.79                 | 0.03        | 0.07                        | 0.45                     | 0.35                     | 0.13                  | 0.92                                | 0.16                 | 0.90                                              | 1.81       | 0.90                  | 0.90                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 | 0.65                                                  | 0.65                 |

**Note:** Loadings are canonical structure coefficients. Beyond the first dimension, only statistically significant functions are reported. Issue categories loading |0.4| or higher on the discriminant functions are interpreted as constitutive for a dimension and are set in bold print. Loadings lower than |0.4|, but higher than |0.35| are set in italics.

- **Footnotes:**
  1. See footnote 3
  2. No military dictatorship prior to the 1990s, regime item not applicable in these countries.
  3. In Uruguay, economic liberalism items loads on the same factor as welfare, while only items pertaining to privatization are distinct.
  4. Operationalization of army issue category yields a two-dimensional solution. The dimension loading on the discriminant function encompasses all items except "the army should be a force of national development." Any should be a force of national development.

*Loadings are canonical structure coefficients. Beyond the first dimension, only statistically significant functions are reported. Issue categories loading |0.4| or higher on the discriminant functions are interpreted as constitutive for a dimension and are set in bold print. Loadings lower than |0.4|, but higher than |0.35| are set in italics.*
responsive to voter preferences. In Uruguay, the first dimension is most strongly determined by the army issue. I interpret this as a regime divide because positions regarding the army are significantly correlated with assessments of the military regime of the 1970s, yet display much more variance. Basically, legislators almost unanimously view the military dictatorship as negative, yet differ starkly in their view of the military today. By contrast, in Chile legislators differ significantly in their assessment of the Pinochet dictatorship, and the regime divide is thus measured using this issue. Although economic liberalism also plays a role in defining the first dimension, the regime issue sets parties apart much more powerfully. Chile also features a second divide between cultural conservatism and cultural liberalism, reminiscent of the country’s religious cleavage.

In the second group of countries, economic divides are decisive. In Argentina, parties differ mostly in terms of a state-market antagonism that juxtaposes a welfare statist position and economic liberalism. The fact that the most important divide is structured by economic issues mirrors the strong historical polarization between Peronist and anti-Peronist camps. As we shall see, however, parties occupy unexpected positions along this divide. In Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico, the analysis reveals traces of the religious cleavage that separated conservatives and liberals at the turn from the 19th to the 20th centuries, but the associated questions are meshed with economic issues into more encompassing socio-economic divides. Two cases stand out: First, Mexico features a two-dimensional structure of political space. Apart from the socio-economic antagonism, a regime divide emerges as a separate dimension of political space. Secondly, Peru is the only country where the analysis fails to reveal a statistically significant ideological division.
Assessing the congruence of representation

Figures 1-9 present graphs showing the positions of parties and of their voters along the divides identified in the preceding section. The upper dimension in each figure represents the positions of parties and the lower dimension the position of electorates. Both the positions of legislators and those of voters have been standardized, and the center of the axes thus indicates the mean of the distribution. The left and right markers on the axes indicate the values of -1 and 1, respectively. Apart from the aggregated mean position of parties and electorates, figures also represent the homogeneity or heterogeneity of positions, calculated as the standard deviation of positions within a party or a party electorate. Beyond reflecting how strongly parties and electorates are united by ideology, this gives an indication of the ideological overlap between the representatives of different parties, and that between their electorates. Finally, the z-value of the ordered logit regression I use to assess congruence is indicated below each figure, together with the number of party-electorate pairs on which the regression is based. While the PELA survey only identifies the representatives of larger parties, the WVS includes voters of parties not included in the PELA surveys. In the interest of legibility, however, minor parties are not shown in the figures.

Cases with favorable historical preconditions

Figure 1 presents the results for Uruguay. The party system is strongly polarized along the regime-cum-welfare divide, and parties clearly fall into two camps: The two traditional parties – the Colorados (PC) and the Blancos/Partido Nacional (PN) – form a pro-military camp, while Frente Amplio (FA) representatives stand out for their pro-democratic/pacifist convictions. At the same time, FA representatives are in favor of a strong welfare state, while the two traditional parties are more skeptical of welfare state. This division is closely mirrored
at the voter side, which is remarkable given that positions of parties are determined using their positions regarding the army, while those of voters are measured in terms of items relating to the regime dimension. What is more, voters’ regime preferences are highly significant predictors of their party choice, as indicated by the z-value of the ordered logit regression.

The second dimension revealed by the discriminant analysis in Uruguay sets apart the representatives of the two traditional rightist parties, but it is not easy to interpret. The PN tends to be more culturally conservative, but less supportive of the army, than the PC. Thus, I confine the analysis to the first dimension, which accounts for 92% of the variance explained by the model. While the historical antagonism resulted from the polarization between PC and PN, the growth of the Frente Amplio has resulted in a new division, which separates a left-wing and a right-wing camp which eventually reached a similar electoral size. In comparative terms, the Uruguayan party system is very polarized, as we will see, and parties are highly representative of voter preferences along the regime divide that has surfaced in the aftermath of the military dictatorship of the 1970s.

![Diagram](image)

**Congruence (z-value, 3 parties): 8.95 (p≤0.000)**

**Figure 1: Uruguay – Parties and Voters on the Regime Divide**

Legend: FA, Frente Amplio; PN, Partido National; PC, Partido Colorado.

More strongly than in Uruguay, the regime divide has an economic component in Chile, and party position are even more polarized (Figure 2). As in Uruguay, two clearly separated camps are revealed by the analysis. The Partido Por la Democracia (PPD), the
Socialists (PS), and the Christian Democrats (DC), which together formed the Concertación governments, take a pro-democratic left-wing position, while Renovación Nacional (RN) and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) hold favorable views of the Pinochet dictatorship and endorse market liberalism. This divide is clearly mirrored in the Chilean electorate, as there is hardly any overlap between the electorates of the left and right (remember that we must be cautious to interpret the positions of electorates as more centrist than those of parties due to differences in question wording). The figure for congruence shows a highly significant effect of regime preferences on party choice.

The second dimension in Chile is enlightening because it helps to explain alignments within the pro-democratic and authoritarian blocks. Thus, with regard to moral issues related to the traditional religious cleavage, one party in each block switches sides: Renovación National is authoritarian, but secular, and thus situates itself in the culturally liberal camp together with the two left-wing parties. The Christian Democrats, on the other hand, are pro-democratic, but culturally conservative, and form the culturally traditionalist camp together.

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12 Contrary to the other cases, a discriminant analysis of voter issue positions reveals a first dimension exactly identical to that found to structure party oppositions in Chile. For this reason, I directly use the first discriminant function to position voters in Chile. The second dimension is operationalized using only cultural liberalism.
with UDI. At the party system level, this dimension is less polarized than the regime divide, however. On the voter side, this dimension is far less polarized: While the relative positions of parties and voters more or less match, electorates display high degrees of overlap in their preferences. Although both divides thus play a statistically significant role in structuring partisan alignments in Chile, we can conclude that the second division is less important than the first. This is also reflected in the somewhat lower measure for congruence along the second dimension.

![Figure 3: Chile – Parties and Voters on the Cultural Liberalism Divide](image)

Legend: see Figure 2.

With respect to Uruguay and Chile, the high levels of responsiveness displayed by party systems in the mid-1990s conforms to the expectations derived from the historical analysis. These are the two cases where historically formed partisan attachments created favorable preconditions for the re-emergence of responsive party systems after re-democratization. For Argentina, on the other hand, I expected intermediate levels of responsiveness due to strong polarization between the 1940s and the 1960s, but a much more limited experience of open democratic competition. Figure 4 shows the economic dimension, and portrays the situation after the 1995 elections. These took place during Carlos Menem’s presidency, who performed a policy switch from the traditional state interventionist penchant of the Peronist movement to an appraisal of economic liberalism (Stokes, 2001). Figure 4
shows that the Peronists (Partido Justicialista, PJ) and the Radicals (UCR) switched sides on the economic dimension as a consequence: The UCR now takes a more state interventionist stance than its historical rival. Predictably, the most left-wing position is taken by FREPASO, a spin-off disagreeing with the Peronists’ endorsement of free markets. Although party electorates are not strongly differentiated along the economic dimension, they do line up in the same order as the parties themselves, and individual voter preferences are highly significant predictors of party choice. This seems to indicate that Peronist voters to some degree followed the party into more economically liberal terrain. On the other hand, the difference between PJ and UCR is minimal, leaving ample room for non-ideological linkages, which are considered to play an important role according to the country-specific literature. In particular, some authors have suggested that the Peronists increasingly relied on clientelism to make their lower-class support base swallow their liberal economic policies (Brusco et al. 2004, Stokes 2005, Levitsky 2003). The results also point to some disenchantment among left-leaning voters, as non-voters take a relatively distinct left-wing position close to FREPASO supporters (in most of the other figures, non voters are not shown due to their centrist positions).

Figure 4: Argentina – Parties and Voters on the Economic Divide

Legend: FREPASO, Frente para un País Solidario; UCR, Unión Cívica Radical; PJ, Partido Justicialista (Peronists); no vote, respondents who declare they would not vote or would vote blank if elections were held the next day.
Countries lacking favorable historical preconditions

Among the remaining countries, Peru shares with Argentina the historical feature of a strong progressive party. The Peruvian trajectory deviates from the Argentine path, however, in that the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) moved to the center or even further to the right from the 1950s on (Collier and Collier, 2002: 477). Unfortunately, we do not have data to assess congruence directly after the return to civilian rule in 1980. APRA won the 1985 presidential elections, but the government’s poor economic performance, the disintegration of the United Left, situated to the left of APRA, and the defeat of the right-wing alliance by Alberto Fujimori opened a new (semi-)authoritarian episode in Peruvian history (Di Tella, 2004: 154-157, McDonald and Ruhl, 1989: 214-216). The data used in this paper portrays the situation midway into Fujimori’s period in office.

Although the discriminant function does not reach statistical significance, party positions differ considerably on the divide shown in Figure 5. This dimension meshes regime issues and positions along the state-market divide. APRA occupies an economically left-wing position and calls for limits on the power of the army. While Unió por el Perú (UPP) is situated close to APRA, “Cambio ’90-New Majority”, the vehicle whereby Alberto Fujimori gained the presidency, occupies a right-wing position. The other parties cannot be positioned due to their limited representation in the legislature. At the voter level, economic liberalism, welfare state support, and regime preferences prove unrelated, and it thus makes little sense to aggregate them into a single dimension. Instead, Figure 5 shows the positions of electorates with respect to the regime issue alone. Preferences along the democracy-autocracy continuum form a powerful predictor of party choice: APRA’s electorate is pro-democratic and skeptical of a strong leader, while Fujimori’s supporters have authoritarian credentials. Congruence is non-existent, on the other hand, with respect to both economic liberalism and welfare (see the z-values of the ordered logit regression below Figure 5). Rather than mirroring substantive

13 UPP was founded in 1994 and later fused with the Partido Nacionalista Peruano (PNP).
ideological differences, then, the major antagonism in the mid-1990s is between those who support and those who oppose an authoritarian incumbent.

Congruence (z-value, 3 parties), calculated separately by issue:
- regime: 3.3 (p<0.001)
- economic liberalism: 0.65 (p=0.51)
- welfare: -0.23 (p=0.82)

Figure 5: Peru – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Economic Divide

Legend: APRA, Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana; UPP, Unión por el Perú, CAMBIO ’90-NM, Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoría; none/dk, no party preference, don’t know.

The remaining cases share with Peru a lack of prolonged periods of ideological polarization that would have anchored party systems in the populace. Even more unambiguously than in Peru, the experiences of Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico represent instances of aborted polarization. In Colombia, the traditional parties restricted competition, while victorious revolutionary movements established dominance in the two other countries. In Mexico, this resulted in single party dominance that was only overcome in 2000. In Venezuela, a two-party system eventually resulted from the 1958 pact, but as I have argued, there is abundant evidence that this compromise entailed a loss of parties’ distinct programmatic profiles.

Figure 6 presents the positions of parties and voters on the socio-economic divide in Colombia. At the time of the elite survey, the two traditional parties still held roughly three quarters of the seats in parliament. While their positions appear distinct, the Liberal Party
(PL) being more economically left-wing, more culturally liberal, as well as more skeptical of the army, this difference is not strongly mirrored in the location of their electorates, and the traditional parties’ electorates overlap to a large degree. The results thus confirm the hypothesis that these two parties are not connected to their voters by means of programmatic linkages. As a result of their limited number of parliamentary representatives, we lack information on left-wing parties in the PELA survey. The only other electorate that can be located is that of Movimento Cívico Independiente (INDEP), which roughly 15% of survey respondents claim to support. Another 31% of respondents report to support no party at all, and these respondents are located to the right of the two traditional parties. We can thus conclude that the continuing lack of viable parties on the left precludes the Colombian party system from achieving responsiveness.

![Figure 6: Colombia – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide](image)

*Legend: PL, Partido Liberal Colombiano; PC, Partido Conservador Colombiano; INDEP, Movimento Cívico Independiente.*

While Venezuela’s party system had been characterized by extraordinary stability between 1958 and the 1980s, it virtually collapsed in the following decade. Three years prior to Hugo Chávez’ victory of the presidency, the party system is clearly unresponsive along the socio-economic divide shown in Figure 7. Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI, the two main antagonists prior to 1958, hardly occupy distinct positions. Convergencia National
(CONV), a spin-off from the long-established COPEI, is situated close to the traditional parties. The space to the left divide is occupied by Causa R and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). On the voter side, preferences over the welfare state and cultural liberalism are not correlated, and Figure 7 therefore only shows positions with respect to welfare. While the differences between electorates are very small, especially given their extensive ideological overlap, it is striking to note that COPEI’s electorate is the most left wing, while MAS voters are actually the most right-wing. Overall, voters’ socio-economic preferences are unrelated to their party choice.

![Figure 7: Venezuela – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide](image)

**Legend:** CAUSA R, La Causa Radical; MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo; CONV, Convergencia National; AD, Acción Democrática; COPEI, Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente.

From this perspective, the subsequent implosion of the party system is not so surprising. If my historical argument is correct, the party system progressively lost its roots in society due to the failure of the two major parties to offer differing policy packages to voters. Although new left-wing parties gained support in the 1980s, they seem to have been unable to present a viable alternative to AD and COPEI. A striking 59% of the respondents in the WVS declare that they would vote for none of the existing parties, or answer “don’t know” when asked about their party preference. Thus, the institutionalized left was unable to re-establish confidence in party politics.
In Mexico, we encounter a situation a few years before the victory of the long-established Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) finally ended the Partido Revolucionario Institucional’s (PRI) dominance in the 2000 elections. Figure 8 shows the socio-economic divide in 1995. PRI occupies a center-left position and is challenged by the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) to its left and by the PAN far to its right. On the voter side, the PRI’s electorate is actually the most left-wing, but the most striking finding is how small the differences between electorates are. Despite the stark differences in party ideology, the parties’ electorates overlap to a large degree in their preferences. This is partially a result of the aggregation of cultural liberalism, welfare, and economic liberalism into a single dimension, as differences between electorates are statistically with respect to the single components of the socio-economic dimension (results of ANOVA analysis not shown). In other words, the way parties aggregate issues into the prime dimension of party competition in Mexico is not a reflection of their voters’ preferences. But using respondents’ preferences with respect to single issues to predict party preference does not improve the result in terms of congruence, shown below Figure 8. Thus, although Mexican parties present very clearly distinct ideological alternatives with respect to economic issues, voters are not aligned with parties based on these programmatic offerings.

Figure 8: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Socio-Economic Divide

Legend: PRD, Partido de la Revolución Democrática; PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional; PAN, Partido Acción Nacional.
In part, the low level of differentiation between electorates along the socio-economic dimension may be due to the fact that this dimension is cross-cut by a regime divide. While opposition parties in Mexico have difficulties in joining forces to defeat the PRI due to their non-centrist economic policy positions, they are united against their long-term rival along the army dimension (Greene 2007). Figure 9 confirms this finding. On the voter side, positions are measured using those regime items that do not directly address the democratic ideal, but rather ask about preferences regarding a strong leader and the role of the army. Again, however, there is a large overlap in the positions of electorates. The regime divide, in other words, had not yet fully crystallized in the mid-1990s.

![Figure 9: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Army Divide](image)

Congruence (z-value, 3 parties): 1.5 (p=.13)

Figure 9: Mexico – Parties and Voters on the Regime-Army Divide

Legend: see Figure 8.

Policy congruence and types of party competition

We are now in a position to summarize the results of the analysis of representational congruence. Apart from the degree to which party positions and electoral preferences match, which has been the prime focus of this paper, the results of my analysis also allow for a characterization of the type of party competition prevalent in countries with high and low levels of congruence. I classify the divisions found in the seven countries covered in this paper along two dimensions: congruence and polarization. Polarization is an attribute of party
systems that helps characterize the nature of competition between parties (see Dalton, 2008). The more polarized party positions are, the less voters will radically change party preference from one election to the next. Perhaps they will vote for a different party with similar policy positions, but given the stark ideological contrasts, it is unlikely that they will support a party from a different ideological block. Polarization, in other words, is an indicator of the *competitiveness* or *segmentation* of political divisions. Segmented divides are characteristic of long term divisions rooted in social structure, which we commonly refer to as *cleavages* (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Mair 1997: 162-171). The less polarized the party system, on the other hand, the more parties compete for the same groups of voters. Parties then behave in ways that approximate Schumpeter’s (1993 [1942]) and Downs’ (1957) characterization of democracy: Competing teams of politicians make appeals to the median voter. Segmentation and competition are thus inversely related; the more a party system is segmented, the less real competition there is. If a dimension is competitive, however, then party loyalties are likely to be substantially weaker. The crucial point, however, is that party systems may be responsive to voter preferences both under conditions of competition and segmentation, and we thus cannot say a priori that one type of competition is normatively superior to the other.

In terms of practical measurement, I use the polarization of *party electorates* to capture segmentation, since the latter implies not only that parties present distinctive programmatic platforms, but also that this distinction is rooted in contrasting voter positions. As we have seen, some party systems offer clear ideological alternatives, while electorates are rather centrist – a situation that does not meet the characteristics associated with segmentation. To measure the polarization of electorates, I use the standard deviation of their positions along a given dimension, weighting the standard deviation by party size. For congruence, I employ the measure used throughout this paper, namely, the z-value of the

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14 Kitschelt et al. (1999) refer to this type of representation as “polarized trusteeship”.
15 Party strength is derived from the PELA elite surveys.
Figure 10 presents the two-dimensional space created by congruence and polarization (in those cases where political space proved two-dimensional, each dimension is located separately). Values of congruence below 2 do not reach statistical significance, thus this is a useful cut-off point to distinguish between responsive and unresponsive party systems. In terms of polarization, it is difficult to define in absolute terms when polarization is high and when it is low, and I have rather arbitrarily drawn a line that runs halfway between the theoretical minimum (zero differentiation between party electorates) and the most polarized case, namely, the regime-economic dimension in Chile. It is best, however, to think of the vertical dimension as representing a continuum.

Figure 10 shows that the regime-cum-economy divides in Uruguay and Chile, the two cases with favorable historical preconditions for party system responsiveness, stand out both in the degree to which parties mirror voter preferences, as well as in terms of polarization. These divides thereby exhibit some of the core characteristics of long-term divisions we commonly call cleavages. Chile’s cultural dimension, on the other hand, is substantially less segmented, and also structures party preferences less powerfully (though still significantly). The traditional religious cleavage thus clearly seems inferior in salience to the new divide that centers on the regime question and on economic liberalism. The economic divide in Argentina, on the other hand, is best characterized as a competitive political dimension, mirroring the fact that the Peronists leapfrogged their traditional rival’s position by adopting economic liberalism. Peru’s regime divide is also situated in the lower right quadrant, but one must keep in mind that rather than mirroring substantive policy differences, this is simply an expression of the polarization around Fujimori’s authoritarian regency.
A number of party systems fail to be representative of voter preferences, namely, the cases of Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia. I have tentatively defined situations of high polarization and low congruence as instances of party system cartelization, while low polarization and low congruence is simply indicative of unresponsiveness. The three cases of incongruent representation all lie closer to the latter pole, but they differ considerably in their history. Party systems were in the process of disintegration in the 1990s in Venezuela and Colombia, and it is plausible to presume that the failure of the major parties to offer clear alternatives and to adequately represent the preferences of their voters is a major driver of this evolution. Mexico, on the other hand, is a new democracy, where party alignments based on the regime issue and the economic division expressed by political parties may be in the process of being formed (see Domínguez, 2009). Five years prior to the pivotal 2000 election,
in which the opposition for the first time in history triumphed over the once-dominant PRI, however, this was clearly not yet the case.

Conclusion

This paper has presented evidence for vast differences in the congruence of representation across seven Latin American countries. Based on an analysis of the dimensions setting parties apart, I have measured to which degree the positions of parties are mirrored by those of their electorates. The differences revealed can be explained rather well by historical patterns of party system formation. In countries that experienced longer periods of ideological polarization, and thus developed responsive party systems in the first half of the 20th century, parties proved similarly responsive of voter preferences in the mid-1990s. Whether or not countries democracy survived in the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, has left no traces on party systems. Strong loyalties between social groups and political parties have the capacity to survive authoritarian periods, and party systems re-surftaced in remarkably similar shape in Uruguay and Chile in the 1980s. While the dominant economic division has remained salient, the regime issue – setting apart pro-democratic and authoritarian forces – now also structures party oppositions. It is striking that these two cases, which most clearly exhibit the historical preconditions conductive to party systems that closely mirror voter preferences, not only exhibit the highest levels of responsiveness, but also remain much more segmented that those in the other countries studied. Responsiveness is thus not primarily a product of competition, but results from long-term bonds between voters and political parties.

Parties in Argentina also show rather high levels of congruence, despite the fact that the Peronists performed a shift from statist to pro-market policies in the 1990s. As a result,
however, the economic divide expressed by the Peronists and the Radicals is no longer segmented, but has become a competitive dimension. Apparently, parties strongly anchored in the populace are able to convince voters of non-orthodox positions and shift their preferences to some degree, in line with a growing literature emphasizing the role of agency in cleavage politics (Enyedi, 2005; for an overview, see Bornschier, 2009). In a less optimistic reading, the growing use of clientelistic inducements to mobilize voters, which the country-specific literature has documented (Gibson, 1997; Levitsky, 2003; Brusco et al., 2004; Stokes 2005), might be a side-effect of the Peronists’ quest for votes across the entire political spectrum.

Low levels of congruence, on the other hand, are an indication that distinctive policy propositions are not parties’ main currency in mobilizing voters. Ideology’s main rival, of course, is clientelism. Although it is difficult to measure clientelism directly, analyzing the congruence of representation allows an indirect assessment of whether parties use clientelistic resources to attract voters. To some degree, programmatic and clientelistic linkages are compatible, and we cannot read off the occurrence of clientelist exchanges from the congruence of representation directly. But we can assess whether clientelism takes on its most appalling form from a normative perspective, where it precludes voters from exerting influence on government policies. Weak dimensions underlying party positions point to a lack of programmatic structuring. Likewise, centrist average positions of party electorates accompanied by strong internal heterogeneity indicate that they are held together by particularistic exchanges, rather than policy preferences, impeding voters from influencing national policy.

Policy is clearly not what party-voter linkages were primarily about in Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and not in Mexico except perhaps more recently. Although Colombia had formally been a democracy for several decades, the exclusion of the left and the lack of meaningful policy-based competition results in low levels of congruence. Likewise, the two
parties that have jointly dominated politics in Venezuela little in terms of ideology, and they clearly do not mirror the preferences of their electorates. Although new left-wing parties have to some degree filled the ideological void, they have not been able to halt the erosion of the party system, ultimately paving the way for Chávez’ assault on political parties and democratic institutions more generally. Contrary to Colombia and Venezuela’s highly stable party systems, electoral vehicles came and went in Peru, with the notable exception of APRA. Peru is the only country without a clear ideological divide in the party system. Apart from making clientelism pervasive, this seems to have ebbed the way for Fujimori’s charismatic mobilization, representing yet another alternative to programmatic linkages. Finally, although the case of Mexico from today’s perspective seems to indicate that political agency can overcome historical patterns, this is a long-term process, since my results show that the parties were by no means representative of voter preferences in the mid-1990s. To move beyond the snapshot provided by this paper, and in order to assess the stability of the country differences put in evidence, the analysis therefore needs to be extended to more recent electoral periods.
References


Table A1: Operationalization of Issue Categories at the Elite Level (based on PELA surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>p42</td>
<td>Should state-owned industries be privatized? (1)</td>
<td>Economic liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p43</td>
<td>Should public services be privatized? (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a01</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Price control (2)</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a04</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Guarantee jobs (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a03</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Provide housing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a06</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Social insurance for all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a08</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Unemployment benefits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a10</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Cover all citizens’ basic needs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a02</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Primary education</td>
<td>Education (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a05</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Secondary education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p35a09</td>
<td>Desired degree of state intervention: Protecting the environment</td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p73</td>
<td>Opinion concerning divorce: in favor or opposed</td>
<td>Cultural liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p74</td>
<td>Opinion concerning abortion: in favor or opposed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p30a</td>
<td>Assessment of role of military during recent dictatorship (only in those countries that experienced military dictatorships)</td>
<td>Regime (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p32a01</td>
<td>Agreement: Army guarantees a sovereign state</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p32a02</td>
<td>Agreement: The army’s budget should be reduced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p32a03</td>
<td>Agreement: The army’s functions should be transferred to the police</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>p32a04</td>
<td>Agreement: The army should be a force of national development</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>p31a</td>
<td>Assessment of the military’s role today</td>
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</table>

Note on missing values: After a test of the dimensionality of the items assigned to each category, missing values were imputed for each item based on the other items from the same category (or sub-category, if the items proved to be more-dimensional).

Footnotes:
(1) Privatization forms a separate dimension in some countries (see Table 1). In these cases, economic liberalism and privatization were included as separate categories in the discriminant analyses.
(2) In Uruguay, these items prove strongly related to the items measuring welfare attitudes, and are therefore included to form the welfare category.
(3) Because they are very similar in content and highly correlated, the items pertaining to education are first combined into an index using factor analysis. The education index is then used together with the other items to operationalize the welfare category.
(4) The items measuring positions regarding the army often produced two-dimensional solutions (see Table 1). In these cases, the two components were included as separate categories in the discriminant analyses.

Table A2: Operationalization of Issue Categories at the Voter Level (based on WVS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Category</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>v126</td>
<td>Private vs. public ownership?</td>
<td>Economic liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v128</td>
<td>Competition: good or harmful?</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v130</td>
<td>Import foreign goods vs. protectionism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v125</td>
<td>Should incomes be made more equal?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v127</td>
<td>Government responsibility that everyone is provided for?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v41</td>
<td>Growth vs. environmental protection</td>
<td>Environmental protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v38</td>
<td>Increase taxes to protect the environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v1990</td>
<td>Opinion concerning abortion: justifiable?</td>
<td>Cultural liberalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v2001</td>
<td>Opinion concerning divorce: justifiable?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v151</td>
<td>Assessment of role of military during recent dictatorship (only in those countries that experienced military dictatorships)</td>
<td>Regime (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v154</td>
<td>Good or bad to have a strong leader who does not have to care about congress and elections?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v156</td>
<td>Good or bad to have the army rule?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v157</td>
<td>Good or bad to have a democratic system?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v159</td>
<td>Priority: Maintain order or respect individual freedom?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v161</td>
<td>Agree or disagree: Too much squabbling in democracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v163</td>
<td>Agree or disagree: Democracy may have problems, but it is still the best form of government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note on missing values: After a test of the dimensionality of the items assigned to each category, missing values were imputed for each item based on the other items from the same category (or sub-category, if the items proved to be more than one-dimensional).

(1) Attitudes regarding political regime are frequently more than one-dimensional. This information can be found in Tables 1 and A2.