Abstract
What is the role of political entrepreneurship in fostering regional demands for autonomy from national/central administration? Political, public (managerial and administrative) as well as economic actors are examined in their attempt at devising policies relevant to their respective localities/regions. Standard definitions of political entrepreneurship (i.e. Schneider, Mintrop) are employed in attempting to determine motivational structure and available policy space. It is assumed that a number of actors in their attempt to expand their policy domain inevitably become agents of change and fuel demands for political and administrative autonomy from their respective nation states. This is a predominantly theoretical account. The main focus is on exploring preconditions for fostering those regionalist, bottom-up demands that can alter the relationship between nation states and their periphery.

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1 I would like to acknowledge the generous financial assistance of the UK Government Office for the South West (HERD Project) for field research in SW England and of the Centre for Social and Economic Research-CESER for field research in Scotland. For the Scottish field-work I have collaborated with Dr Stephen Herbert (Glasgow). The SW England research has benefited from the copious research assistance of Irene Shaw (UWE).
A. Regions and Regional Elites

Proponents of globalisation (Harvey, 1990; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Jessop, 1996) claim that the nation-state is being ‘hollowed-out’ as national regimes accommodate the new global ‘reality’, by transferring functions upwards, to supra-national institutions such as the EU, downwards to regional and local political structures, and outwards to a new realm of political activity termed ‘governance’. In order for us to understand the process at hand we have to determine the degree of ‘independence of action’ of sub-state governments; the degree of ‘emancipation’ of sub-state actors and population groups; and the institutional and policy domain available to them for independent action.

On this section I am exploring the transformation of the relationship between centre and periphery in Europe with a focus on the role of regional elites. In the next section I am looking at the role of political and public entrepreneurship as factors affecting that relationship.

1. Regional Behaviour

The question arises of identifying those actors that can produce change in the regional political landscape. For reasons of expediency I call these regional elites. I accept Lasswell’s rather general definition of elites as the influential (1950, p.3), which I refine to include those exercising influence within regions. These regional elites I assume are territorially bound. This territoriality is by definition exclusive and acts as a cohesive force for regional elites and identifies them versus all others, while it aligns their interests with those of their region of identification. Under this definition I could perceive the existence or ‘emergence’ of regional elite behaviour as a distinct force in the interplay between, regional, national and supra-national forces.

I accept that regional ‘imagined communities’ (as identified by Anderson, 1991) can be created since “national and subnational identities are reimagined as awareness of external, globalizing ‘threats’ takes place” (Rosamond, 1995, p. 401). It is also possible to apply a liberal corporatist perspective, if one accepts that “political and economic elites have shared interests in managing their complex environments, which facilitates co-operative elite bargaining” (Dunleavy, 1987, p. 197). It is highly probable that by reducing the size of the operational sphere regional elite ‘interests’ are more readily ‘shared’ and ‘cooperation’ more easily facilitated.

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2. In this context post (or radicalised) modernity “would not be a world that ‘collapses outward’ into decentralised organisations but would no doubt interlace the local and global in complex fashion” (Giddens, 1991, p.178)

3. I have developed the themes discussed here in a monograph to be published in June 2001 Ashgate under the title ‘Regional Behaviour: Political Values and Economic Growth in European Regions’.

4. Welsh makes a distinction between functional and positional eliteness. He identifies those “whose positions are reflected with some consistency in the decisions made by groups of which they are a part [to] have functional eliteness” (Welsh, 1979, pp.166-7). Functional eliteness can be also linked to ‘issue determination’ or ‘agenda setting’ individuals within elite structures (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970).

5. An interesting element of this debate centres on whether unitary elites actually exist in western liberal democracies (Burton & Higley, 1987), while arguments based on corporatist theory reasoning (after Weber and Schumpeter) assume that “elites collude and collaborate rather than compete” (Dunleavy, 1987, p.143). Dunleavy further extrapolates on the corporatist network model under which “state and economic elites are so interpenetrated by each others’ concerns that no sensible boundary line or balance of influence can be drawn” (1987, p. 185).

6. It may be relevant to this discussion to examine the concept of restricted and biased mental ‘maps of opportunity’ (Gould and White, 1986) of regional elite members. This can be considered as one of the ‘development ingredients’ of a regional economy (such as local entrepreneurship) and can, in this respect, be thought of as a regional asset.
In recent research exercises the emergence of regional or sub-national elites within the EU has been affirmed. In an exposition of research conducted over more than two decades Putnam et al report that they can identify changes in the political culture of Italian regions and regional elites. This has resulted in ‘open partisanship’ and the ‘building’ of new regional institutions, they further assume that ‘institutional socialisation’ for the new regional elites has a high effect on the moderation of political views by ‘fostering a tolerant and collaborative pragmatism’ within political elites (Putnam, 1993, pp. 36-38).7

Research in Spain has focused on the interaction between local business and political elites faced with the challenge of local development strategies. Vazquez-Barquero argues that in conditions of ‘incipient autonomy’ local development programmes depend, among others, on a “tacit or express acceptance of the local development strategy by the local entrepreneurs” (1990, p.372), while local political leaders “show themselves ready to cooperate and collaborate with other local groups” (1990, p. 371).

In a different context Dupoirier finds that in France, regional elites have been ‘created’ as a result of institutional decentralisation. According to her “the first regional elites have indeed been bearers of regional autonomy” (Dupoirier, 1994, p.32). This I find an interesting exposition, that can have a limited explanatory value for our purposes, as it focuses on the relationship between the local and the national political elites.

Leonardi and Garmise, drawing from primary research on a number of peripheral European Union states (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland) point to the “possible connection between regional government and economic growth” (1992, p. 247). Their argument is primarily one of decentralisation, as it relates to further efficiency gains under which, regional political elite attitudes are implicitly assumed to account for regional prospects and development.

Regional elites were surveyed or interviewed for all research work referred to above and although the method breadth and depth of their research varied, if there could be a general consensual view, it would point to an increased significance of regional actors.

2. EU Regional Funds and Europeanisation

Accession to European Community institutions and accruing benefits from programmes such as the IMPs and the Common Agricultural Policy brought with them demands for probity by the European Commission and other Community partners. As the fund transfers increased commensurate with further European integration their significance in economic terms has forced the national political classes to take heed of the European Commissions’ anticipation that funds should be administered at the regional level. Or to be more precise the European Council regulation assumes that the implementation of regional programmes like the IMPs will be ‘at the relevant geographical level’ (EEC/2088/5/July 1985). Further pressure has been applied in the 1990’s by an effort to establish a so called ‘partnership’ principle between the

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Commission and European regions (see Elliot, 1997). This on face value gives the impression that regional actors have direct inroads into the European Commission administrative apparatus. An interesting side-effect of this is the elevation of the role of bureaucrats into prominent actors among regional elites. Partly due to the intricacy of new institutional arrangements and partly due to the highly competitive nature of European financing 'euro-expertise' has become a key element in the advancement of regional bureaucrats.  

3. Regionalism from Below?

Localism was the scourge of public administrative efficiency at the beginning of the industrial revolution. In many respects present day centralisation is the by-product of the modernisation of state administration which in most of mainland Europe followed the French centrist model. Localism and local identity have been perceived therefore to be parochial and in direct antithesis to the unifying principles of the emerging nation states. Localism was also seen as detrimental to the ‘natural laws’ of industrial development. Present day re-assertion of local identities and pride in scarcely remembered traditions and local cultures flies in the face of this trend and can only be related to global socio-political processes and the perception that economic activity is inherently bound to territory (see Krugman, 1991).

How have nation states reacted to this contestation of their domain? Administrative devolution is the most frequent antidote to sub-state pressure employed by most administratively modernising European states. It is possible that administrative devolution will eventually lead to a reassertion of local identity. However, this does not necessarily imply a ‘contest’ for the nation-state. Usually there is no significant conflict in the hierarchical structuring of identities. Regional/local identities belong to a concentric set of mental maps where the regional is typically subjugated to the national sense of identity.

Ritaine, with Spain and Italy in mind, argues that civil society may be essential in this process. Maybe the pluralist and neo-corporatist conceptions are inadequate to provide adequate explanations of regional dynamics. In that respect the hypothesis of the political exchange paradigm might be relevant. ‘Confronted with the weakness of state regulation these [regional] societies have produced forms of political regulation’ (Ritaine, 1998, p.87). It is not improbable that we will witness a delayed effect from the same parameters that affected the Spanish and Italian regions on some other formally centralist states as well. Bottom-up regionalism in that event may emerge due to the weakness of the state to efficiently and effectively regulate. However, that does not imply that regional identities would universally be contesting national ones. Initially, if a regionalist rhetoric was to emerge it is very unlikely that it will be aimed at the part of the nation-state that underpins the foundations of national identity and would most

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8. The role of these actors could be viewed within the epistemic communities framework proposed by Sabatier among others.
9. But how does sub-state ethnic culture and identity becomes triggered into challenging an overarching nation-state nationalism? Is it possible that accounts so far circumvent the role of local actors as a class for lack of systematic local evidence?
likely be aimed instead at the perceived remoteness, inefficiency and/or corruption of central administration.\textsuperscript{11}

For some of the peripheral European states it seems that the process of regionalisation is multilayered. Indeed the national political elite seems embedded in the process of political and economic integration as there appear to be significant direct and indirect gains derived from membership of the EU. It is easy to deduce therefore that calls for increasing local democratic accountability have at best been relevant to central government’s decentralisation rhetoric and not at any point been the driving force behind regionalisation.

4. Regionalism vs. Regionalisation: The Transformation of the Relationship between Centre and Periphery
Latent tensions from perceived economic exploitation and political domination of the periphery by the centre can not at this stage be seen as the most significant force in the process of regionalisation at hand. The future of the relationship between national centres and regional units will depend on a great variety of factors including:\textsuperscript{12}
- the speed of modernisation of national administrative structures,
- the speed with which regional administrations and local government will adapt to the transformations at hand,
- the Europeanisation of national politics and administrative practices,
- the transformation of institutional relationships between all tiers of government and the EU,
- the fate of the vertical clientelistic and patronage networks between centre and periphery,
- the extend of transformation of EC institutions and the pressures that will emanate from these for national administrations,
- the effect economic development will have on political demands,
- the assertiveness of regional identity and political culture,
- the ability of the state to ‘preside’ and control a multi-tier structure of local-prefecture-regional-national-European governance and policy making and
- regional political entrepreneurship.

Whichever way one examines this gradual transformation of European states evidence presented here suggests that the process of decentralisation has given its place to a phase of regionalisation that is bound to irrevocably affect the centre-periphery relationship of almost all nation-states in Europe.

5. The Scope for Regional Governance
The extensive literature on concepts like ‘innovative milieu’ (Camagni, 1995), ‘local context’ (Johanisson and Spilling, 1983), ‘development from below’ (Stohr and Todling, 1977) and ‘indigenous potential’ (Ciciotti and Wettmann, 1981), explicitly or implicitly cite the significance of regional elite actor collaboration as essential for regional

\textsuperscript{11} The obvious ‘contesting regionalisms’ of Cataluna, Scotland, Wales, Piedmonte etc. could be best described as sub-state nationalisms rather than regionalist movements (see Keating, 1997).
\textsuperscript{12} A number of these have been explored in Christopoulos (1998) and Christopoulos (forthcoming)
development. To competently explore the relationship between political and economic elite actors it is pertinent to examine networks of interaction at the regional level.

It appears that the governance of contemporary localities depends not only on the underlying socio-economic structures but also on the relations between key decision-makers who occupy dual roles in both public and private organisations (John, 1997). Networks do facilitate the governance of localities/regions. The structure of networks themselves affect power relationships, while networking is shown to affect decision-making (John, 1997). Networking is further, perceived as a model for local governance (Lowndes, et al., 1997) and network analysis enables researchers to understand considerations of decision makers in formulating, processing and implementing policy outcomes (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, 1994; Knoke, 1994). Within the examination of networks the decision making process can be analysed to show how actors relate to each other and how their interaction can lead to co-operative solutions. These interactions facilitate what can be perceived as local corporatist outcomes (Cawson, 1985).

Network structures are perceived to have a direct effect on regional governance, which in turn is also influenced by regional as well as wider political and economic dynamics. This results in regional governance existing in a constant state of flux within a trajectory of ever increasing importance. It has been suggested that regional development planning is intrinsically related with regional governance, while furthermore “different models for regional planning arise within different traditions of governance” (Wannop, 1997). It appears that regional development planning and environmental protection are key areas of policy where influences from the European policy process create pressures for regionalising decision making within nation states and provide the policy space for local elites to enter the policy domain. For example “many environmental issues transcend municipal [and local] boundaries, requiring greater force and legitimacy to deal with bodies such as environmental infrastructure companies (in water, gas, electricity, waste and so on)” (Marshall, 1997) creating an imperative for regional planning in some policy sectors.

It seems therefore that for certain sectors, such as the environment and local development, a valid investigation should examine policy inputs at a level below the nation state and above municipal institutions. The regional administration is an obvious point of departure for such an analysis. It appears that increasingly some European regions have gained “wide powers in land planning and the management of environmental protection” (Pridham and Konstadakopulos, 1997). This could be partly due to the fact that, since 1988, the Structural Funds administered by the European Commission, as mentioned earlier, make obligatory the use of Partnerships. This is an institutional mechanism that injects a greater degree of responsibility into regional

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13. To examine the relationship between factors such as entrepreneurship, elite interaction, human capital formation with regional development does not always presume a causal link. It may indeed be the case that such factors are marked by an interactive relationship as suggested by Bradley and Taylor (1995).

14. In this context it would be interesting to examine further the motivation nation-states have for regionalisation. ‘The willingness of political sovereigns to delegate important policy-making powers to expert bodies may be explained as a strategy for achieving credible commitments in situations of incomplete contracting’ (Majone, 1996, p.624). Guy Peters and Wright (1996, p. 635) further suggest that in the UK ‘chief executives may take the blame for policies of their agencies; the propensity for ministers to evade responsibility has thus been aggravated’. 
policy by drawing both public and private regional actors into the policy process. Justification for this approach is provided by the belief that regional differences are partly the cause of regional problems therefore making a territorially differentiated policy necessary.

In the 1980’s we observe that a number of European regions started to mobilise when they were faced with the threat of marginalisation by the major core of regions the so-called London-Millan axis. They formed a number of transnational groupings such as the Council of European Municipalities and Regions and the Commission of Maritime Peripheral Regions. This mobilisation has been aimed not at territorial autonomy but rather at economic development as well as in some cases cultural and linguistic preservation. It cannot therefore be assumed that regions suddenly became coherent actors contesting nation-state authority. This type of activism has demonstrated that regional entities have a remarkable ability to adapt and seek collaborative partnerships with other regional or supra-national actors. If it was valid to anthropomorphise we could claim that regions show signs of entrepreneurialism!

B. The Role of Economic, Public and Political Entrepreneurship in Regional Cohesion

1. Networks as Facilitators of Regional Economic Entrepreneurship
Most entrepreneurial activity is obviously network dependent whether interaction is personal, inter-personal, group or organisation determined. It is safe to assume that institutional structures can only determine the parameters of actor interaction rather than the precise nature of such interaction. Different types of actors see different rewards and benefits from promoting innovative practice. Of interest to political scientists are differences in the rationalisation rhetoric of any sub-group of entrepreneurs.

The uncertainty in innovation and the importance of learning suggest that regions (and particularly the less favoured ones) and their relevant economic actors (including SMEs) need a well developed learning capability for identifying and adopting new trends and developments at the global level. This is particularly the case when knowledge exchanged is tacit (specific to a particular production process), informal or quasi-informal and difficult to codify. The most important forms of learning are interactive processes, which are influenced by both the economic structure and the institutional set-up of an economic region (Lundvall, 1992: 9; Gregersen and Johnson, 1997: 479-490). When networked actors originate in the same environment, of collective entrepreneurship then similarity in norms and culture develop. Those in turn are essential to interactive learning and policy innovation. Furthermore, collective learning cements shared cultural traits of interaction and increases regional coherency of the economic space.16

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15. Although it can be argued that in exceptional cases entrepreneurs are mould breakers that ignore institutional convention. Riker (1985) has termed the ability to change the political agenda hereistics.
16. Cowling (2000, p. 789) reports that business ‘entrepreneurs across countries are not a homogenous group in terms of their personal characteristics’.
Empirical evidence\textsuperscript{17} suggests that networks are highly developed between SMEs and regional public institutions in a number of European economically successful regions. These networks can give rise to a ‘local learning and innovation system’; they exist within particular industries at the meso- (regional) or macro-level, such as the aerospace or automotive sector since they are embedded in their particular knowledge bases or labour markets. Often, firms encouraged by regional authorities\textsuperscript{18}, form networks and closer relationships with suppliers, customers, or venture partners. In this perspective the crucial role of regional government becomes a didactic one, to support learning processes. Learning is a main characteristic of social and economic evolution. I postulate here that it can be affected by policy making particularly when evidence suggests that institutionalising learning functions produces efficient outcomes (Dalum \textit{et al}, 1992: 301).

The innovative milieu/networks and the technological change/learning theories present a good insight into how generic processes interact with historically evolved local (micro), regional/sectoral (meso) and national-supra-national (macro) conditions whether these are economic, socio-political or cultural. Within these complex interactions regions prosper or decline. Flexibility in network formation, learning capability, internal synergies, and external linkages with other regions and independent actors are vital in this process.

Evolved regional political institutions allow for fast responses to markets that are in constant transformation. Firms in autonomous regions appear to have a competitive edge from firms in regions with a more limited socio-political infrastructure. Different socio-political networks shape the learning process, and hence the strategic choices and innovative activity of a firms’ managers, in remarkably different ways. How these socio-political networks enable these processes to take place and new forces to define regional economies at micro-level is a topic deserving far more attention in the future.

European economic integration and the policies generated by the European Commission have opened new avenues to regions and their actors for learning and the generation of policy innovation. National governments and the European Union have also placed a greater emphasis on the overall goal of promoting indigenous innovation and encouraging an enterprise culture based on a high rate of innovation and new firm formation. Policy makers are increasingly concerned with reducing regional disparities and are shifting their focus in regional policy away from purely economic issues towards the science and technology aspects of regional industrial activity, which is reflected in changes in regional policy objectives (CEC, 1995; Landabaso, 1997). Nevertheless, it is largely up to regional authorities and regionally embedded firms to combine social cohesion, civic engagement, and co-ordinated technology policies with openness to the rest of the world, so that learning within the regional milieu will be effective.

The set of conditions that underpin economic competitiveness of the regional economic milieu, by enhancing socio-political cohesiveness, become the background for

\textsuperscript{17} Christopoulos and Konstadakopulos (2000).
\textsuperscript{18} A case in point is the network brokers scheme for aerospace promoted by the Government Office for the South West.
enhancing the cultural cohesion of regional populations and gradual assertiveness of regional elites.

2. Public Entrepreneurs

I will venture here to call individuals that exhibit innovative drive, extreme inquisitiveness, intellectual curiosity and the determination to take necessary risks to be public entrepreneurs.\(^{19}\) They could hold public office (mayors, ministers) that entails some policy responsibility or be senior civil servants (public managers)\(^{20}\). I would like to distinguish this from the classical economics perspective of entrepreneurship (Schumpeter, 1939 & 1961) and the Austrian schools’ revival of the same principles (Kirzner 1973 & 1985). My account borrows mainly from Schneider \textit{et al} (1995) and Mintrom and Vergari (1996).

Public entrepreneurs are identified by personal resources of the classical entrepreneurial type, i.e. intellectual ability, good knowledge of their domain, team building skills, reputation, extensive networks, strategic vision and tenacity. They differ from classical expositions of entrepreneurship in that there is no assumption of exceptional leadership or indeed uniqueness of them as actors beyond the intuitive assumption that they have to be in the upper decile of ability (versus the general population).\(^{21}\) This ‘non-uniqueness’ is significant because it implies that the public entrepreneur type is more condition dependent than classic assumptions of entrepreneurialism where these individuals are perceived as singularly exceptional. I suggest here that if necessary conditions are in place a good number of key individuals will be allowed to excel by creating innovative policy solutions.

Obviously all entrepreneurial activity bears risks. Those risks however are mitigated by the existence of networks.\(^{22}\) These networks facilitate the creation of coalition support mechanisms for innovative actors. Their risk is therefore diminished to the degree they can draw support from their organisational network.\(^{23}\) Such favourable conditions internally and externally to their institutions facilitate their continuous policy innovative activity.

Issues of relevance to the effectiveness of regional public policy entrepreneurs are:

(a) the support of effective (but not necessarily accountable) administrative systems of regional governance;
(b) extensive \textit{links between the public sector} (regional, national and European) \textit{with the private sector} in order to increase regional competitiveness;
(c) the support by local actors of \textit{corporatist intermediation} strategies in labour relations;

\(^{19}\) It would be interesting to note that borrowing the terminology of public choice economics a political entrepreneur is ‘an actor who can correct the problem of underprovision through the coordination of expectations or coercing contributions’ (Arce, 2001, p. 124).
\(^{20}\) Leadbeater and Goss (1998, p.69) suggest that ‘public sector managers are often motivated by esteem rather than financial reward’.
\(^{21}\) We have to remember that ‘Schumpeter’s entrepreneur engages in creative destruction tearing apart existing political - economic arrangements in order to create new ones’ Schneider \textit{et al} (1995, p.35).
\(^{22}\) Indeed Schneider \textit{et al} (1995, p. 176) suggest that ‘networks can increase the supply of entrepreneurs by reducing the costs of entrepreneurship’.
\(^{23}\) There is extensive literature on policy networks broadly supporting this view (see Rhodes, 1992 & 2000).
(d) the elaboration of visionary goals, technology plans, and strategies (designed to upgrade the skills and the technological and organisational capabilities) to the benefit of indigenous firms, and particularly of SMEs;
(e) the maintenance of efficient and regionally accountable corporate governance;
(f) the creation of institutions to facilitate business-to-business interaction, trust, networking particularly with external firms and research institutions, in order to capture external technological and organisational know-how to the benefit of the local production system.

If we accept the premise that public entrepreneurs are network dependent this implies their ability for political action is network contingent as well. Their reach will be limited by the reach of their network.\textsuperscript{24} Centrality being a key parameter of effectiveness in networks, only those closely knit (highly interconnected) are likely to be effective support mechanisms for policy entrepreneurs (see Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Policy network literature would suggest that the more embedded public entrepreneurs are within their network the more they would have to share values with other network members. A sharing of values increases effectiveness and has the interesting side-effect of affecting group cohesion.\textsuperscript{25}

3. Political Entrepreneurship in Context
Political entrepreneurs are those actors some of the literature identifies as innovative politicians (Schneider \textit{et al}, 1995, Kingdon, 1995). They possess a number of characteristics that make them exceptional including good rhetoric ability, heresthetics (Riker, 1985), arbitrage and charismatic leadership. Although a number of these key features can be found in most well researched key leadership personalities it can be argued that there is only anecdotal evidence that any political actors possess these attributes \textit{ex ante} to their political involvement.\textsuperscript{26} A number of these traits can therefore be acquired as part of the political socialisation of political actors.

I will argue here that we can look at those key individuals\textsuperscript{27} as both situation dependent but also as exceptional entrepreneurial strategists. The relationship is obviously an interactive one. They formulate statements that may express public feeling (innovate) but can only do that within the confines of public belief structures (public belief market) gaining entrepreneurial advantage exploiting pent-up public frustration (latent opportunities) from their political rivals. In this formulation we are offered an obvious way to avoid the structure versus agency quagmire. Political entrepreneurs are both shaped by and help shape the cultural and belief structure within which they operate.\textsuperscript{28} Accepting the entrepreneurial nature of their actions

\textsuperscript{24} Of interest here would be the classic reference to Granoveter's (1974) thesis on the importance of weak ties.
\textsuperscript{25} Although there is no apparent causality between value cohesion of a policy network of public entrepreneurs and wider regional socio-cultural values the two must be interrelated. As Nye and Verba argued in the 1960s the values of the middle class closely reflect overall social values. I have elsewhere (Christopoulos, 2001) called this value concordance. Smith and Peterson (1988) suggest that leaders and their contexts constantly redefine one another.
\textsuperscript{26} Schneider and Teske (1992) explore the issues related to the 'collective action problem' for entrepreneurs as well as the market for the 'supply' of entrepreneurs.
\textsuperscript{27} Jim Sillars and Alex Salmond in Scotland or Jordi Pujol in Catalonia are obvious examples.
\textsuperscript{28} Stodgill (1948 reprinted 1974) suggests that in term of their psychology 'a person does not become a leader by virtue of the possession of some combination of traits, but the pattern of personal characteristics of the leader must bear some relevant relationship to the characteristics, activities and goals of the followers' (1974, p.63)
relaxes the assumption that political elites are conscious shapers of history or that they can be seen as external to socio-cultural processes. A heresthetic re-formulation of the political debate, a shift in perception of available opportunity structures, an entrepreneurial invention in policy, all foster attention in novel and distinctive political messages.

Maintaining consistency through time to an innovative political platform inevitably has an effect on both coherency of the wider political culture and the sense of distinctiveness of the political class. This in effect emancipates political entrepreneurs who gradually build upon the distinctiveness of the emerging political message to demand policy space.

In Lieu of Conclusion
The suggestion by Mintrom and Vergari (1996) that advocacy coalitions and policy entrepreneurship is a useful tool for examining the formulation of policy could be creatively explored. I would suggest however that it would be more useful to perceive policy innovative activity on a slightly more intricate fashion. The frame of reference has to be the sub-state region were acceptable explanations of the policy process will have to take account of a multi-level governance platform under the strain of regionalisation and regionalism. At the actor level it would be helpful to separate between:

a. the macro-effects best explained by approaches such as the advocacy coalition and /or policy networks one and
b. the micro level where policy/political entrepreneurship can explain in a rational choice perspective some actions; but account should also be taken for the possibility of alternative approaches including policy opportunism or public entrepreneurship (as developed by Schneider et al, 1995).

As most students of politics know, rational choice explanations can be found wanting in predicting the behaviour of actors in very complex policy environments. It is important therefore, to have a theory of motivation for this class of actors I have called regional political entrepreneurs. I believe it is equally important to determine the networks within which they are bound as well as the generic processes such as regionalism that bring them to prominence.

APPENDIX
Public Entrepreneurs in Scotland and the SW of England
In a brief assessment to policy formulation styles the policy of the now defunct Strathclyde Region towards European representation is examined for indications of political entrepreneurship. A brief assessment of policy priorities and actors in the

South West of England is also attempted. Both regions demonstrate the characteristics of a regional economic milieu.

1. Strathclydes’ Representation to Brussels
The representation of Scottish interests in Brussels was marked in contrast, to other UK regions, in its cohesiveness and significant Scottish persona, as one Welsh lobbyist commented:

"people generally, don't think of Wales as that separate from England, or are not even clear where it is, everyone is clear where Scotland is."  

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I will only attempt a summary of findings here on the degree of concordance among elite actors in this policy domain. I have discovered a discordance of attitudes between political and business elites centred on issues relating to devolution and attitudes towards central government in 1991 (Christopoulos, 2001). Between 1991 and 1995, although the themes of the political debate have changed, local political actors have shown a persistent support for devolution and further integration, their view in 1995 being however more moderate. In the examination of the administrative and policy making elite in 1996 we witness a concordance of opinion with recorded attitudes of the local political elite. We also witness a concordance of attitudes across policy sectors and institutions in 1996 (as reported in Christopoulos and Herbert, 1996).

Indeed, the concordance of views amongst the 'Jock Tamson's Bairns' network in Brussels was often striking. This may be a consequence of being part of a comparatively small and tightly knit territorial elite group, with well defined objectives, in a distant location from the home base. Such conditions, presumably, force together individuals from varying institutional backgrounds. To demonstrate the point we only need to look at the remarkable extent of co-operation between institutions. As one Scottish lobbyist remarked:

"I think you can see from the way we work here, that we have no problem working with the Scottish Office, Scottish Enterprise etc. Of course we don't always agree on things, but that's no problem. I think that spirit of cooperation will continue. But we have to wait and see what is going on in Edinburgh really."  

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To date, the manoeuvring of the Scottish policy entrepreneurs in Brussels can only serve to assist the plans that a Scottish Parliament could have in Europe. However, many issues remain to be dealt with, most importantly, where a Scottish representation fits-in vis-à-vis UKREP. At present, little consideration has been given to this, especially by the key political actors. Whilst, the current structures will assist a Scottish Parliament, this implies that the current policy elite will continue to exert significant influence over the form of European policy. This is not an uncommon situation at home in Scotland, where the task of Scottish politicians trying to cover a huge range of subjects, leave much policy development to bureaucrats (Kellas, 1989; Midwinter et al, 1991). In both these case studies we can see clear evidence of policy entrepreneur from policy actors belonging to local government or more commonly

30 Case 39, Non-Scottish Lobbyist, 21/10/96.
31 Case 46, Scottish Lobbyist, 25/10/96.
senior local bureaucracy. These actors take initiatives and successfully exploit their networks and the process of policy devolution to ‘carve-up’ policy space. The intended and unintended consequence of their action is the transformation of policy space in the UK and Europe. It is also the case that we witness a coherency in group values and an assertiveness stemming from their positive input to the Strathclyde economy. Through media exposure and the wider political debate the perceived positive effect of the regional institutions to regenerating the economy of the west of Scotland has had an effect on the subsequent devolution debate. It has also affected the assertiveness of the local political class.

2. Development Policy in the South West of England

In the South West of England, the former County of Avon has taken advantage of London’s decentralisation policies by changing Bristol from a declining industrial area to a financial services and insurance centre. However, lack of regional identity, individual actors self-interest, institutional rivalry (as that between Bristol City Council and the now defunct Bristol Development Corporation) and the demise of the County of Avon in 1996, have inhibited the ability of the region to coherently expand development policies in the past few years (Konstadakopulos and Christopoulos, 1999). There is a long array of public organisations with an often overlapping remit in the arena of local development policy. The most prominent of these in 1999 were:

- Western Development Partnership,
- Business Link West,
- Western Training and Enterprise Council,
- Learning Partnership West,
- West of England Development Agency,
- West of England Initiative and
- Regional Development Agency (RDA).

The latter of these organisations the RDA is perceived as very likely to consolidate the activities of a number of other organisations in operation. As of March 2001 it has subsumed the role of the Western Development Partnership. Furthermore, the institutional rivalry extends to a number of Whitehall ministries. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) and the Department of Environment Transport and the Regions (DETR) and their deconcentrated agencies operating through the Government Office for the South West all contest institutional space. The establishment of the Regional Chamber to oversee the functioning of the RDA is a precursor to further devolution of policy domain from Whitehall. This is anticipated with legislation that will be introduced after the next elections in the UK. Key policy actors are currently positioning themselves from the upcoming upheaval anticipated from the changes in policy space.

There is a two fold process at hand. A West of England Constitutional Convention (inaugural assembly May 19th 2001) attempts to garner public support but meets with apathy or hostility (Cornish Constitutional Convention). The regional economic space is also highly fragmented. The RDA has seven sub-regional agencies to facilitate the

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32. The institutions and period examined pre-date the formation of a Scottish Parliament.
33. We can see this as a ‘multi level governance scenario’ in the context discussed by Marks and McAdam (1996), Marks (1993).
existence of the varied regional economic milieu. This in effect limits the ability of local political actors to find region-wide political issues with public resonance. This hinders the possibility of the emergence of truly regional political elites. In the meantime the public managers related to the RDA and the other government agencies consolidate their position. The region lacks socio-political coherency. Limited local policy space and very restricted scope for political entrepreneurship imply that very little change is likely as a result of bottom-up regionalism.
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