Governance by Informality: Informal designs at domestic and supranational courts

Abstract

Although courts might seem as overly formal institutions, in fact, both courts and judges are subject to informality – from bureaucratic practices and behavioural norms to clientelism or patronage. In recent years, we have seen a significant increase of scholarly interest in some of informal judicial institutions, particularly targeting corruption, clientelism, or informal factors influencing judicial impartiality and decision-making. The effect of informal institutions and the dynamics of their relationship with formal institutional designs however runs much deeper. Informal rules and practices reshape dynamics of competence distribution, empower some actors while weaken other in ways we fail to see and understand while examining only formal structures. This panel focuses on the role of informality in the design of judicial governance and aims to understand how the discrepancy between de iure and de facto dimensions of judicial independence, accountability, or power distribution is formed in practice. The topic is particularly salient in the face of continuous supranational attempts to develop judicial blueprints that would successfully travel across states and prove resilient to populist challenges or autocratic attacks.

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