Political corruption as accountability deficit: A theory-probing study of Hungary

Abstract

Speaker: Serkan Seker Department of Political Science and International Relations Geneva Research Centre for Corruption Studies (RCCS) The University of Geneva, Switzerland This article advances an empirically informed approach to political theory through conceptual traveling across regime types. It examines whether the ethics of office accountability theory, primarily tailored to democratic settings, retains its analytical power in analysing political corruption in a hybrid regime. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with Hungarian officeholders, the article explores how public servants themselves interpret the corruption of institutional actions. Confirming the broader applicability of the ethics of office accountability, the findings demonstrate that political corruption is understood as a deficit of office accountability in a hybrid regime in which institutional normativity has been gradually hollowed out. The study also identifies case-specific peculiarities to hybrid regimes. It shows that political corruption emerges as a systemic failure in a hybrid regime rather than individual misconduct. The research calls for further theory-driven normative and empirical inquiry for more cross-fertilisation between normative theorising and empirical analysis that may pave the way for a more integrated framework across regime types.