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Political representation is commonly understood as the inclusion of individuals and social groups within democratic institutions. The presence of women in electoral politics, public debate and representative bodies is therefore frequently treated as evidence of democratic inclusion. Yet formal political inclusion does not necessarily mean that women’s experiences are recognised as authoritative sources of political knowledge. This paper argues that existing theories of political representation remain incomplete because they fail to account for the epistemic conditions under which political inclusion becomes meaningful. Building on feminist political theory and social epistemology, the paper introduces the concept of epistemic representation as a missing dimension of democratic inclusion. Whereas political representation concerns the presence of individuals and groups within democratic institutions, epistemic representation refers to the recognition of their experiences, interpretations and knowledge as legitimate contributions to collective political judgement. Political representation answers the question of who is represented; epistemic representation asks whose knowledge counts. On this view, democratic legitimacy depends not only on who is formally represented, but also on whose experiences are recognised as authoritative. Epistemic representation therefore complements, rather than replaces, existing theories of political representation. The paper develops this distinction through a dialogue between theories of political representation and contemporary accounts of epistemic injustice. It draws on Hanna Pitkin’s work on political representation and Judith Butler’s critique of representational politics. It places these in dialogue with Miranda Fricker’s concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, José Medina’s account of epistemic injustice as a structural feature of democratic life and Kristie Dotson’s analysis of epistemic oppression. The theoretical argument is illustrated by an analysis of Polish political party programmes from the 2019 and 2023 parliamentary elections. The analysis shows that parties rarely deny women’s political agency. Rather, they compete over the interpretation of women’s experiences, assigning epistemic authority to particular narratives about motherhood, reproductive autonomy, family, demographic policy or popular sovereignty. Political disagreement thus concerns not only competing policy proposals but also competing forms of epistemic representation. The analysis suggest that democratic exclusion may persist despite formal political inclusion. Women may participate fully in electoral politics while being only partially recognised as epistemic subjects capable of shaping public understanding and institutional responses. Rather than treating political representation as the endpoint of democratic inclusion, democratic theory should also account for the conditions under which political claims become intelligible, credible and institutionally effective. By bringing together political theory and social epistemology, the concept of epistemic representation offers a framework for analysing the relationship between democratic inclusion, epistemic authority and the politics of recognition.