Theory Before Testimony: Non-Ideal Theory and Epistemic Violence

Abstract

Drawing on feminist standpoint epistemology, I have previously argued that victims of injustice possess unique insights into marginalisation and oppression that are epistemically valuable to political philosophers (Engelstad 2023). Despite the recent turn toward more empirically informed methodologies in political philosophy, particularly non-ideal theory and political realism, victim testimony remains conspicuously absent from sustained theoretical engagement. This paper examines whether non-ideal theory can serve as an appropriate methodology for incorporating victim testimony in an epistemically and ethically responsible manner. Non-ideal theory, as I define it here, applies normative principles developed through ideal theorising to real-world circumstances. Crucially, its normative content is determined prior to and independently of empirical investigation, and is then modified in light of these investigations. While this approach might seem compatible with incorporating victim testimony to better understand concrete injustices, I argue it creates systematic epistemic problems. First, drawing on Iris Marion Young's critique of the distributive paradigm, I demonstrate how pre-given normative frameworks risk mischaracterising or overlooking injustices that don't fit existing categories. Second, I show how non-ideal theory's theoretical priors create conditions for two forms of epistemic injustice identified by Kristie Dotson. The first is testimonial smothering, where victims self-censor their testimony based on perceived audience incompetence. The second is that of contributory injustice, where theorists' prejudiced hermeneutical resources render victims' knowledge invisible or unintelligible. Even indirect engagement with victim testimony through written accounts or social research cannot fully address these problems, as theorists still interpret evidence through frameworks potentially unsuited to recognising what victims know. Thus, I conclude that non-ideal theory's defining feature, its normative pre-commitment to ideal theory principles, makes it systematically ill-suited for the kind of open, responsive engagement that victim testimony requires for both ethical and epistemic reasons.