Considering Resistance in Economic Institutions

Abstract

Diagnoses of economic structures that find severe moral flaws in economic institutions abound. Many theorists are highly critical of the undemocratic influence of large corporations, their harmful impact on the climate, different forms of exploitation, and the undemocratic lack of voice for employees. Yet, the actions that philosophers consider in response are mostly limited to calls for citizens to become politically active and for politicians to pass laws that would remedy these faults. My paper argues that this position is, to some extent, untenable. It constitutes a mismatch between the severity of the moral flaws we find and the actions we consider permissible in response to these flaws. Either philosophers should dial down the criticism and be more appreciative of current economic institutions or they should widen the scope of the kinds of actions they consider in response. I will make this argument drawing on the examples of the workplace democracy debate, climate justice, and global justice. In all three of these debates, authors often diagnose severe moral-political flaws, using the language of dictatorships, deep injustice, existential threats, and so on. If we take these kinds of diagnoses seriously, I argue, they can justify disruptive actions like illegal strikes, theft, and sabotage. That is because moral rights, like those to political participation, non-domination, and bodily integrity, are conventionally thought to come with secondary rights to defend them if they are threatened. Existing arguments on workplace democracy, climate justice, and global justice seem to imply that some features of the current economic order and the actions that others take within it, constitute such a threat. Hence, those immediately threatened by this threat are justified in resisting against these structures and actions, even when that involves violating some rights of those people. Concretely, this argument speaks in favour of, for example, the exploited engaging in fraud and theft in order to alleviate their situation. And those working in unsafe or polluting environments can, prima facie, sabotage their workplaces in order to prevent harm. Of course, there are some limiting conditions to these actions. I derive these from the conventional criteria for permissible self-defence. But, so I argue, none of these conditions generally prohibits employees from engaging in disruptive actions like strikes, sabotage, or wage theft. In the end, I suggest that this argument leaves philosophers with a choice. Either they can grant that the kinds of injustices much of the political philosophy of economic institutions is dedicated to grounds a claim to the permissibility of uncivil and violent acts of resistance. Or they will have to lay off on the kind of severe language that is often used to describe these constellations and instead adopt a more conciliatory posture. But, according to the argument of my paper, we cannot both decry terrible injustice and hold that the victims of those injustices may not do more than petition their governments or protests peacefully.