This paper examines the causes and consequences of a much understudied type of electoral reform that has been quite common in the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe: the regulation of electoral coalitions and alliances. In spite of the recognition of their significant role in the electoral process, electoral coalitions have not attracted much scholarly interest until recently (Golder 2006; Powell 2000). This lacuna is particularly problematic in the context of the literature on new democracies where electoral coalitions constitute an important stage in the evolution and the institutionalization of political parties and the party system (Spirova 2008). The paper compares four attempts at the regulation of electoral coalitions. While each of these attempts was aimed at increasing the nominal threshold of votes that electoral coalitions had to pass in order to secure seats in the respective national parliaments, their outcomes were remarkably different. The first case is the successful abolition of electoral coalitions altogether in Estonia in 1999. The second case is Bulgaria where the proposed increase in the threshold for electoral coalition was struck down while allowing other parts of a comprehensive electoral reform package in 2009. The third case is that of the Czech Republic where a substantial increase in the threshold for coalitions was introduced as part of a broader electoral reform in 2000. Finally, the fourth case is Slovakia where the punitive increase in the threshold on coalitions that had been passed for the 1998 elections was quickly reversed after the parliamentary elections produced a new government. Based on the four case studies, the paper seeks to answer two central questions: 1. Under what conditions do electoral coalitions become a target of electoral reform? 2. Under what conditions do attempts at the regulation of electoral coalitions succeed or fail?
