One of the key functions of the Western liberal state is that of a creator, guarantor and arbitrator of property rights not least with regard to natural resources. At the same time, environmental problems have often been linked to misspecifications of property rights (Hardin, 1968, Ostrom, 1990). However, the relationship between property rights regimes and the emergence of the ecological state – i.e. the differentiation of state agencies following an ecological as opposed to an economic or social rationale – has received little systematic attention in political science. This paper argues that the ecological state as promulgated in the context of liberal democracies is essentially linked to the creation and specification of property rights on previously “common” goods. This is exemplified by three contrasting examples: The implications for existing property rights from emission control and zoning decisions; the creation of property rights on emissions as part of cap and trade schemes; and the establishment of property rights on genetic resources. Contrary to hopes that re-specification of property rights can help to internalise environmental externalities, the origin of property rights in anthropocentric and instrumentalist concepts of nature raises questions about its adequacy to address the ecological challenge of the Anthropocene.
