Political Appointments and Regulatory Outcomes

Much research has been conducted on party patronage and political appointments in the public sector. Yet, the effect such appointments can have on policy outcomes is still understudied. Aside from examinations of central banks and high courts, there are hardly any systematic accounts of the impact of partisan appointments on public policy. In order to address this shortcoming, this paper takes advantage of the publication of dissenting opinions issued by the members of the Spanish National Energy Commission (CNE), the regulatory agency for the energy market in Spain, and uses ideal point estimation techniques to uncover preference heterogeneity among the members of the CNE for the period from 2003 to 2013. It then links the ideal point estimates to the partisan background of the individuals on the commission. The analysis shows that, even though the CNE is a formally independent regulator at arm’s length from the central government, the appointment channel provides politicians with an effective means to influence the direction of public policy.