An Electoral Theory of Roll Call Vote Requests: How Party Competition Explains RCV Requests

Various theories have addressed the rationale behind RCV requests focusing on specific factors such as legislator’s position taking-incentives or levels of intra-party heterogeneity. We argue that many of these approaches can be integrated into a single theory. More specifically, we argue that RCV requests result from the strategic incentives of party competition along the two analytical types of issues: positional and valence issues. In positional competition, parties aim at distancing themselves from one another. In valence competition, parties vie with each other for voters’ attention for the “their” issue(s). Roll call votes are a tailor-made instrument for both types of competition. They allow a party to first select an issue and then contrast its position against those of its competitors and/or claim ownership of this issue. Our empirical analysis draws on a novel dataset covering all 3144 RCVs held in the state parliaments of Germany between 1949 and 2011