Many political scientists agree that contemporary China’s economic success is related to China’s own authoritarian single-party political system. Many scholars even argue that development is one the consequences of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. With empirical support, this study at present argues that local development, especially economic successes, across China is as a matter of fact the consequence of the inner contradiction of China’s authoritarian regime. First, further development calls for fuller separation of power, which the CCP center rejects by all means. Second, greater development calls for broader competitions, which the state-owned economy objects in every way. Third, more economic successes and improved social conditions call for much more freedom, in particular, liberty and citizenship, which is more than the ruling party’s “Chinese Dream” contains.
Furthermore, the growing contradictions of the regime are also fueled by other great concerns: the unsustainability, regional inequalities, and the fragmented Communist ideology. Because in practice, the only ruling party does not represent all the people of China and its own self at the same time; it constantly and almost permanently postpones its national representativeness by “buy off” the people with income growth and legitimacy promises. It is of any political party’s nature that it only represents some but not all. And fundamentally, Chinese people are confused with what they need and what they are given. Thus, by boosting local development, the CCP will see more tensions, violence, frustrations, angers and distrusts of the people instead of the delightful pictures it has been describing to them.
