In this empirical study we identify the aggregate power base for each decision maker in the Arctic game over international waters in the Central Arctic Ocean and derive the value of payoff from each option in the dispute from variation in this power base due to particular territorial changes in the region. In other words, we manipulate one parameter, "Arctic EEZ" to evaluate the responses in the absolute and relative strength of states in the international system. First, we use STATISTICA_10 to make sure that our replication of Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) in the ‘social’ part of the power index (called ‘SocR’) is effective, i.e. cross-index variation for 187 nation states is statistically insignificant. Second, we test whether cross-time variation in absolute values of SocR index for 187 states is statistically significant (1993–2013). Then, we add the geographic factor and summarize the absolute and relative adjustments in the aggregate power base index (called ‘SocGeoR’) due to geography; again check for cross-temporal variations; and calculate the 'cost of resuming status quo', the ‘cost of compromising’ on the basis of "Best alternative to a negotiated agreement" (BATNA), and the 'cost of taking all claimed area' – each decision maker disposes with. By doing so, we are able to offer the particular values of payoffs in the Arctic game over international waters in the Central Arctic Ocean for nine distinct game options decision makers are confronted with.
