Incentives-based social policy is controversial. “Rewarding” specific behaviors such as taking their kids to the doctor (for parents) or getting goods grade (for children) require justification. Decision, implementation and evaluation of such programs go with specific arguments. What legitimates the use of more public money to “solve” poverty? Is private money more appropriate to tackle this issue? To what extent a new kind of incentives can renew anti-poverty initiatives? Based on empirical research, this paper analyzes two reform strategies involving a mix of evidence and persuasion.
The first comes from Michael Bloomberg in 2007. As the mayor of New York City, he decided to implement “innovative solutions” to fight against poverty by getting the poor “to do the right thing”. His persuasion technique consisted in an unusual South-North policy transfer (a Mexican “conditional cash transfer program” or CCT). The second comes from France, where welfare system has been recently reformed. The change also consisted in financially “incentivizing” the poor. The RSA (Revenue for Active Solidarity) ended social assistance as an entitlement. Experimented in 2007, it became a law in 2009. It proposes a financial incentive so that people who “work more, earn more”. Solidarity, the French style of social policy making, was thus put into question.
In both cases, public and private experts have been hired to “build evidence” asserting the legitimacy of such programs (evidence-based policy). Some of the “scientific” arguments produced were used in the course of the public debate. How new are they? Both happened in a crisis context, but also both were prepared in an election context. How does this affect the policy design? This paper will propose some answers to these questions, putting an emphasis on communication techniques, argument crafting procedures and their political uses.
